Money and banking in a New Keynesian model* Monika Piazzesi Ciaran Rogers Martin Schneider Stanford & NBER Stanford Stanford & NBER March 2021 Abstract This paper studies a New Keynesian model with a banking system. The central bank targets the interest rate on short safe bonds that are held by banks to back inside money and hence earn convenience yield for their safety or liquidity. Central bank operating procedures matter. In a floor system, the reserve rate and the quantity of reserves are independent policy tools that affect banks’ cost of safety. In a corridor system, increasing the interbank rate by making reserves scarce increases banks’ cost of liquidity and generates strong pass-through to other rates of return, output and inflation. In either system, policy rules that do not respond aggressively to inflation – such as an interest rate peg – need not lead to self-fulfilling fluctuations. The stabilizing effect from an endogenous convenience yield is stronger when there are more nominal rigidities in bank balance sheets. *Email addresses:
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[email protected]. We thank Roc Ar- menter, Eric Swanson, Tommaso Monacelli, as well as seminar and conference participants at the Bank of Canada, Chicago, ECB, Kellogg, Lausanne, Macro-Finance Society, NYU, Princeton, UC Santa Cruz, the RBNZ Macro- Finance Conference, SF Fed, Stanford, and the NBER SI Impulse and Propagations meeting for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 1 Introduction Models of monetary policy typically assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate on household savings. In the presence of nominal rigidities, the central bank then has a powerful lever to affect households’ stochastic discount factor and hence intertemporal deci- sions such as savings and investment.