Security Council Distr.: General 19 April 2018
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Syria and Repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP
30.11.2012 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 330/21 DECISIONS COUNCIL DECISION 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, internal repression or for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be particular Article 29 thereof, prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories. Whereas: The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph. (1) On 1 December 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/782/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria ( 1 ). 3. It shall be prohibited to: (2) On the basis of a review of Decision 2011/782/CFSP, the (a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering Council has concluded that the restrictive measures services or other services related to the items referred to in should be renewed until 1 March 2013. paragraphs 1 and 2 or related to the provision, manu facture, maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, (3) Furthermore, it is necessary to update the list of persons Syria; and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Decision 2011/782/CFSP. (b) provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraphs 1 (4) For the sake of clarity, the measures imposed under and 2, including in particular grants, loans and export credit Decision 2011/273/CFSP should be integrated into a insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, single legal instrument. -
Syria: 'Nowhere Is Safe for Us': Unlawful Attacks and Mass
‘NOWHERE IS SAFE FOR US’ UNLAWFUL ATTACKS AND MASS DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-WEST SYRIA Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2020 Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons Cover photo: Ariha in southern Idlib, which was turned into a ghost town after civilians fled to northern (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. Idlib, close to the Turkish border, due to attacks by Syrian government and allied forces. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode © Muhammed Said/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2020 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 24/2089/2020 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS MAP OF NORTH-WEST SYRIA 4 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 2. METHODOLOGY 8 3. BACKGROUND 10 4. ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS 12 4.1 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES 14 AL-SHAMI HOSPITAL IN ARIHA 14 AL-FERDOUS HOSPITAL AND AL-KINANA HOSPITAL IN DARET IZZA 16 MEDICAL FACILITIES IN SARMIN AND TAFTANAZ 17 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES IN 2019 17 4.2 ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS 18 AL-BARAEM SCHOOL IN IDLIB CITY 19 MOUNIB KAMISHE SCHOOL IN MAARET MISREEN 20 OTHER ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS IN 2020 21 5. -
The Political Direction of Which Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan Forms a Part Is the Most Significant Development in Israe
FRAGMENTED SYRIA: THE BALANCE OF FORCES AS OF LATE 2013 By Jonathan Spyer* Syria today is divided de facto into three identifiable entities. These three entities are: first, the Asad regime itself, which has survived all attempts to divide it from within. The second area is the zone controlled by the rebels. In this area there is no central authority. Rather, the territory is divided up into areas controlled by a variety of militias. The third area consists of majority-Kurdish northeast Syria. This area is under the control of the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian franchise of the PKK. This article will look into how this situation emerged, and examine its implications for the future of Syria. As the Syrian civil war moves toward its The emergence of a de facto divided Syria fourth anniversary, there are no signs of is the result first and foremost of the Asad imminent victory or defeat for either of the regime’s response to its strategic predicament sides. The military situation has reached a in the course of 2012. By the end of 2011, the stalemate. The result is that Syria today is uprising against the regime had transformed divided de facto into three identifiable entities, from a largely civilian movement into an each of which is capable of defending its armed insurgency, largely because of the existence against threats from either of the regime’s very brutal and ruthless response to others. civilian demonstrations against it. This These three entities are: first, the Asad response did not produce the decline of regime itself, which has survived all attempts opposition, but rather the formation of armed to divide it from within. -
PRISM Syrian Supplemental
PRISM syria A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. -
WHEAT VALUE CHAIN ASSESSMENT North West - Syria June 2020
WHEAT VALUE CHAIN ASSESSMENT North West - Syria June 2020 Shafak & MH Europe Organizations Contents 1 Humanitarian Needs Overview ............................................................................................................................ 2 2 Methodology and Approach................................................................................................................................... 3 3 Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................... 4 4 Locations .................................................................................................................................................................... 6 5 Assessment Findings ................................................................................................................................................ 7 5.1 Affected population demographics: ............................................................................................. 7 5.2 Affected people main occupation: ................................................................................................ 7 5.3 Agriculture land-farmers: ................................................................................................................... 9 5.4 farmers Challenges: ............................................................................................................................. 10 5.5 Main Cultivated Crops: ...................................................................................................................... -
Key Findings Recommendations to the U.S. Government
SYRIA TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) KEY FINDINGS In 2017, religious freedom conditions, as well as human rights, vary in levels of restriction of religious freedom. In northeastern remained dire in Syria. For most of the year, the Islamic State Syria, Christians living in the Kurdish-held Autonomous Adminis- of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continued to carry out mass exe- tration complained of increased interference in private Christian cutions, attack civilian populations, and kidnap religious schools and confiscation of property. Armed Islamist opposition minorities. By year’s end, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS groups in northern Syria, including the al-Qaeda affiliated Hay’at largely had defeated the group in Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor. The Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), attacked Shi’a pilgrims and harassed those Syrian government continued to target and depopulate Sunni opposed to their strict Islamic rules. Due to the collective actions Muslim-dominated areas. The year also saw a massive spike of the Assad regime, elements of the armed opposition, and in the involvement of the Syrian Local Defense Forces (LDF)— U.S.-designated terrorist groups, USCIRF again finds in 2018 that militias backed and funded by Iran and integrated into the Syrian Syria merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or Armed Forces—in sectarian violence targeting Sunni Muslims. CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), as Allies of the Syrian regime, including foreign Shi’a fighters it has found since 2014. USCIRF also finds that, based on condi- recruited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) from tions in 2017, ISIS merits designation as an “entity of particular Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, also carried out sec- concern” (EPC) for religious freedom violations under December tarian attacks. -
Sorensen SYRIA
Sorensen Last updated: July 11, 2008 Photo- Print Neg. Binder grapher Nation State Locale no. Description Year Neg. Sorenson Number Notes only ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Looking west from Orient Palace Hotel. 1951 x Syria Damascus 1 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Looking west from Orient Palace Hotel, towards 1951 x Syria Damascus 2 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Looking northeast from Orient Palace Hotel. 1951 x Syria Damascus 3 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Front view of the Orient Palace Hotel. 1951 x Syria Damascus 4 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Looking down on traffic in road before Orient Palace 1951 Syria Damascus 5 x Hotel, and railroad station. ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Bus stops east of Orient Palace Hotel. 1951 x Syria Damascus 6 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Photography lab near Orient Palace Hotel. 1951 x Syria Damascus 7 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Looking across city from hillside. 1951 x Syria Damascus 8 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Man sitting on hill crest over city in background. 1951 x Syria Damascus 9 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Downtown gas station, on Baroda Road. 1951 x Syria Damascus 10 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Man filling gas in white vehicle at filling station. 1951 x Syria Damascus 11 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Women and child walking along railroad tracks. 1951 x Syria Damascus 12 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus New mosque built in embassy district of city. 1951 x Syria Damascus 13 ME Syria Dimashq City Damascus Men chiseling stone on sidewalk near new mosque. -
PDF | 5.22 MB | English Version
Friday 1 January 2021 The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria. M210101 Contents I. Background and Methodology...............................................................2 II. The Issues That Characterized 2020 According to the SNHR’s Database of Extrajudicial Killings...............................................................................5 III. Death Toll of Civilian Victims......................................................................7 IV. Death Toll of Victims Who Died Due to Torture, and Victims Amongst Media, Medical and Civil Defense Personnel...................................15 V. Record of Most Notable Massacres.....................................................30 VI. The Syrian Regime Bears Primary Responsibility for the Deaths of Syrian Citizens Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic............................................... 36 VII. The Most Notable Work Carried Out by SNHR on the Extrajudicial Killing Issue.........................................................................................................37 VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................38 Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in 2 Syria in 2020, Including 99 in December I. Background and Methodology: The documentation process to register victims killed in Syria is one of the most important roles performed by the Syrian -
Security Council Distr.: General 9 October 2012
United Nations S/2012/651 Security Council Distr.: General 9 October 2012 Original: English Identical letters dated 16 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council Upon instructions from my Government, and following my letters dated 16 to 20 and 23 to 25 April, 7, 11, 14 to 16, 18, 21, 24, 29 and 31 May, 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 25, 27 and 28 June, 2, 3, 9, 11, 13, 17 and 24 July, and 1, 2, 8, 10 and 14 to 16 August 2012, I have the honour to attach herewith a detailed list of violations of cessation of violence that were committed by armed groups in Syria from Thursday evening, 9 August 2012, until Friday evening, 10 August 2012 (see annex). It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Bashar Ja’afari Ambassador Permanent Representative 12-54062 (E) 221012 231012 *1254062* S/2012/651 Annex to the identical letters dated 16 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council [Original: Arabic] List of acts of aggression and violations committed by armed terrorist groups from 2000 hours on 9 August 2012 to 2000 hours on 10 August 2012 No. Place Time Violations committed by armed terrorist groups and outcomes 1 Syrian-Lebanese border 2355 There was an attempted infiltration from Lebanese territory into Syrian territory, and border guards in the vicinity of the Kabir al-Janubi River came under fire. -
EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2021/08 How Global Jihad Relocalises And
RSC 2021/08 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Middle East Directions Programme How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Middle East Directions Programm How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni EUI Working Paper RSC 2021/08 Terms of access and reuse for this work are governed by the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC- BY 4.0) International license. If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper series and number, the year and the publisher. ISSN 1028-3625 © Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, 2021 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0) International license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Published in January 2021 by the European University Institute. Badia Fiesolana, via dei Roccettini 9 I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual author(s) and not those of the European University Institute. This publication is available in Open Access in Cadmus, the EUI Research Repository: https://cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. -
Damascus City Reference
240,000 242,000 244,000 246,000 248,000 250,000 252,000 254,000 Jdidet Elwadi C2322 d Al Hurriya_ Ish Al Werwer DOWNLOAD MAP _ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮرﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﺴــﻮرﻳﺔ SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Al-Hama DAMASCUS CITY C2323Reference Map d Scan it! Navigate! with QR reader App with Avenza PDF Maps App ﺧﺮﻳــﻄﺔ ﻣﺮﺟــﻌﻴﺔ Barza Al Balad M5 ﻣﺪﻳـﻨﺔ دﻣﺸــــــﻖ Al Manara 0 0 0 , 6 1 7 , 3 0 0 Tishrine 0 , 6 1 7 , 3 Al Abbas Asad Addein Qaboun Masakin Barza Qudsiya C2328 Dummar Sharqiya d Qasyoun Mount New Dahiet Qdosiya Elsakina C2327 Naqshabandi d Nuzha Qasyoun Ayoubiya 0 0 Al Woroud 0 , 4 1 7 , Al Masani' 3 0 0 0 , 4 1 7 , 3 Abou Jarash Al Fayhaa Faris Al Khouri Zamalka Al Fayhaa Sporting City C2320 Sheikh Muhie Addin Dahiet Dummar Joubar Sharqi d Al Arin Mastaba Shoura Al Madaris Al Qusur Joubar Gharbi Al Marabit Al Mazra'a Al 'Adwi Bar ada Rawda Riv er Shuhada Abbasien Stadium Al Qusa' 0 0 Al Maliki Ma'amouniyyeh 0 , 2 1 7 , 3 Saroujah Ein Terma 0 Oqaiba Masjid Aqsab 0 Tishreen Park Haboubi C2315 0 , 2 Abou Rummaneh 1 d 7 , 3 Amara Baraniyyeh Joura Amara Jowaniyyeh Hijaz Damascus Castle Hameidiyyeh Bab Touma Dummar Gharbiya Al Qeimariyyeh University City Al Istiqlal Hariqa Al Qanawat Mazzeh Al Qadimeh Ma'azanet Ash Shahm Amin Damascus University Rabwa Shaghour Jowani Mazzeh 86 Baramkeh Bab Sreijeh 86 Bab Al Jabiyeh Bab Sharqi Ansari Shaghour Barani Jalaa Suweiqa 0 Ibn Asaker 0 Qabr Atikah Nidal 0 , 0 Mazzej Jabal N0066 1 7 , Al Moujtahed 3 Industrial Area 0 0 Kafr Souseh Al Balad 0 , Wihdeh 0 Fealat Gharbiyeh Mazzeh Basatin 1 7 Al Ikhlas , 3 Bilal Al Waha Midan -
Crimes Against Humanity in Syria Systematic Torture to Quell Public Dissent
Crimes against Humanity in Syria Systematic Torture to Quell Public Dissent Report submitted to the Committee against Torture in the context of the special review of the Syrian Arab Republic 20 April 2012 Alkarama recalls that it concentrates its work on four priority areas: extrajudicial executions, enforced and involuntary disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention. We base our work primarily on the documented individual cases we submit to UN Special Procedures and Treaty Bodies, as well as our contacts with local actors including victims, their families, lawyers and human rights defenders. Alkarama – 2bis Chemin des Vignes – 1209 Geneva – Switzerland +41 22 734 10 06 – F +41 22 734 10 34 - Email: [email protected] – Url: www.alkarama.org Table of contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................................................................ 3 1.1 ERUPTION OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND EXCESSIVE STATE REACTION ................................................................................. 3 1.2 PATTERNS OF COLLECTIVE REPRESSION..........................................................................................................................