Ontology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Nihilism. Essay on Nietzsche And

speaks only indirectly of Sein1, never address- KRITERION ing it directly in its purity. In his introduction Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 to “Was ist Metaphysik?”, he reviews Descartes’ tree of philosophy to illustrate the indirect rela- tion between metaphysics and Sein [Hei67, p. 195- “Ontology, Metaphysics, Ethics 196]. This tree presents metaphysics as being the and Nihilism. Essay on Nietzsche roots of the tree, physics its trunk and its prin- and Heidegger” cipal branches as being medicine, mechanics, and morals. Heidegger argues that the metaphysical Christine Daigle, Concordia roots of the tree support him but that the tree it- University self does not lie on them but rather on the soil, the soil representing the domain of Sein underlying Abstract: When one undertakes research on Ni- the Seienden. Philosophy thus takes its essence etzsche, a confrontation with Heidegger’s interpreta- and its necessity from Sein and not from Seien- tion of his philosophy is almost unavoidable. Widely den but Sein keeps hidden as the nurrishing soil known, particular and influent, this interpretation is does. nevertheless problematic and its analysis, particularly of its occurence in Holzwege, leads to a questionning Metaphysics is thus a discourse on Seienden. of the generally admitted notions of ontology, meta- But it is a two-branched discourse. In “Was ist physics, ethics, and nihilism. These notions are an in- Metaphysik?”, Heidegger uses Aristotle’s Meta- tegral part of the philosophical vocabulary and never physics, and following it, distinguishes two dis- seem to pose a problem. I am claiming here that, courses of metaphysics: 1- discourse on Seienden although they might seem quite univoqual and clear, as Seienden in general, and 2- discourse on the these terms do pose a problem, at least when one wants Seienden of the divine2 [Hei67, p. 207]. But nei- to analyse Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. ther acts as a foundation, Sein underlying both. I will divide this paper according to the following Furthermore, says Heidegger, the metaphysical plan. I will begin by presenting Heidegger’s interpre- discourse has a double character: 1- it embraces tation of Nietzsche as it appears in Holzwege. This totality, and 2- since it embraces totality, the ques- interpretation will lead us to the first question: how tioner which is a part of this totality is himself to define “ontology”, “metaphysics”, and “ethics” and taken into the question. That leads him to say how to relate them. From this question, and its tenta- that metaphysics is man’s nature, the foundation tive answer, I will move to the question of Heidegger’s of human reality. In brief, metaphysics thinks possible nihilism. This discussion will lead us to an- Seienden, speaks only indirectly of Sein and is other question: what is nihilism exactly? With my thus an active “forgetting of Sein”3 Let us see how answer to this question, the circle will be closed and I will determine whether there is nihilism in Nietzsche, 1In the following I will use the german Sein and Seiende as Heidegger claims. in place of Being wherever the differentiation is of importance 2But is not the divine supposed to be the supreme foun- 1 Heidegger’s interpretation of dation? It seems to me that such an affirmation is to be understood from an epistemological point of view. Heideg- Nietzsche ger probably wants to say that we could know “better” the divine (foundation of Seienden) from its Sein. The true Before presenting Heidegger’s interpretation of Ni- foundation of Seienden would not be in the Sein of the divine but rather in the Sein of the Seienden of the divine etzsche, it is important to present his definition of which could be found in a true thought about Sein. For “metaphysics” and “nihilism” since he says that the Aristotelian discussion of the discourse of metaphysics Nietzsche presents a metaphysical thought and cf. Metaphysics, Γ, E, K. since he accuses Nietzsche’s philosophy of being 3This may sound a little bizzare to say that metaphysics nihilistic. is a forgetting of Sein. Heidegger’s text , in “Brief über den Humanismus”, goes as follow: “das Wesen des Humanis- According to Heidegger, metaphysics “denkt mus metaphysisch ist und das heißt jetzt, daß die Meta- das Seiende als das Seiende” [Hei67, p. 195]. It physik die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins nicht nur KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18

Heidegger defines nihilism. In “Die Uberwindung¨ But in consulting the context of Nietzsche’s utter- der Metaphysik” the definition goes as follows: ance, we see how Heidegger is mistaken and we “Das seinsgeschichtliche Wesen des Nihilismus ist can reject his conclusion about the will to power. die Seinsverlassenheit,...” [Hei54, p. 91]. The Nietzsche says: field which thus seems the most liable to nihilism is metaphysics since it speaks only indirectly of “... darin drückt sich die Grundthat- Sein even though it is its foundation. He effec- sache des menschlichen Willens aus, tively says, in Holzwege, “Der Bereich fürdas We- sein horror vacui: er braucht ein Ziel, sen und das Ereignis des Nihilismus ist die Meta- - und eher will er noch das Nichts physik selbst.” [Hei63, p. 204] In Heidegger, we wollen, als nicht wollen.” Nietzsche, 6 thus find the adequation metaphysics=nihilism. F., ibid. From these Heideggerian definitions of meta- It is here clear that Nietzsche speaks about physics and nihilism, it is easy to see why he ac- the human will and not about the will to power. cuses Nietzsche of being a nihilist. According to These two things are radically different in Niet- Heidegger, even though Nietzsche tries to over- zsche. Human will is a manifestation of a will to come metaphysics and nihilism4 his philosophy re- power but should not be adequated with it. A will mains a metaphysics. Since any metaphysics “for- to power is always at the ground of the human will gets” Sein, any metaphysics is nihilistic. Since but the human will is not a pure expression of it. Nietzsche’s thought presents a metaphysics, it is One should not take one for the other, a mistake accordingly nihilistic. Heidegger here commits. But beyond Heidegger’s adequation between The context of the quotation explains clearly metaphysics and nihilism which leads him to his what Nietzsche means by that. The third disser- conclusion about Nietzsche’s nihilism, we find two tation of Zur Genealogie der Moral is an analysis elements in his analysis of the will to power which of the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche is highly critical to- support his primary judgment. He first analyses ward this ideal and one of his reproach toward it is the sense of the locution “will to power” and his that the ascetic, nihilistic, man wills the nothing, conclusion about it is that what stands at the cen- nothingness. ter of Nietzsche’s metaphysics is the power and it is this power which posits values, values compris- “...einer unio mystica mit Gott ist das ing, beside others, the value of Sein. Sein is thus Verlangen des Buddhisten [the bud- relegated to the rank of a “simple” value. The dhist being one example of the ascetic will to power, after its first slaying of God, com- man] in’s Nichts, Nirvâna- und nicht mits the “radical slain”, that of Sein. mehr!”7 The second point comes with Heidegger’s mis- use of a quotation out of the third dissertation of But let us go back to Heidegger’s analysis in Zur Genealogie der Moral. The quotation goes as general. In The Authority of Language: Heideg- follows: “...eher will er noch das Nichts wollen, ger, Wittgenstein, and the Threat of Philosophical als nicht wollen.” 5 Heidegger uses this quotation Nihilism [Edw90], J. C. Edwards examines Hei- without its context and concludes that Nietzsche degger’s analysis and shows that it is based upon here speaks of the will to power and that it means two arguable assumptions: 1- any philosophy must that the will to power wills reality but reality as contain (or be) a metaphysics and 2- any meta- nothingness, that the will to power wills nihilation. physics is nihilistic. Edwards goes on to say that Heidegger’s first assumption leads him to do any- nicht stellt, sondern verbaut insofern die Metaphysik in der thing possible to make of Nietzsche a metaphysi- Seinsvergessenheit verharrt.” [Hei67, p. 175]. cian by interpreting the philosophy of the will to 4 One should not however confuse Heidegger’s and Ni- power as a new metaphysics. etzsche’s views of nihilism. We will see later how the distinction presents itself. 6My underlining. 5Nietzsche, F., KSA 5, Dritte Abhandlung, § 1, p. 339. 7Nietzsche, F., KSA 5., Erste Abhandlung, §6, p. 266.

4 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism.

If Edward’s analysis is right, and I think it is, tries to answer the question “what should I do?”. it would seem sufficient to counter Heidegger’s in- The fundamental question of ethics is thus a ques- terpretation of Nietzsche to show either that 1- tion of ideal, of a model. As the science of doing, any philosophy is not necessarily a metaphysics, ethics proposes models, norms, and principles of or does not contain one or if it takes as its ground action. The ethical task is thus normative. a metaphysics, then it is not a metaphysics in the But does an ethical question necessarily follow Heideggerian sense (this would have to be the case from an ontological question? It seems that, when with Nietzsche’s philosophy) or 2- that any meta- we stick to the strict determination of the domain physics is not necessarily nihilistic (again, this of being, no ethical proposition would necessarily would have to be the case with Nietzsche). spring out of it. In saying what being is, one does To decide of these questions, one would need not say how it should be. One does not posit any to enter a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s thought norm for being, one only says what it is and what and try to determine whether we are presented its domain is8. with a new metaphysics or not. The question be- Do we find the same phenomenon regarding ing rather important and the specialists being far the ethical question? Does an ontological ques- from an agreement on the matter, I will leave it tion necessarily emanate from an ethical question? aside. My interest being in the Nietzschean ethics, Does the question “what should I do?” contain the I do not want to enter an ontological debate on question “what is?”. Should the question about the validity of Heidegger’s judgment. Why then, being obligatorily be answered before formulating since this one springs out of an ontological point an ethical thinking?9 of view? Because I think that here lies the fun- As a question of “ought-to-be” and as a ques- damental mistake of Heidegger, that is of having tion of “how-to-act”, ethics adresses itself to the wanted to analyse a thought from a strict onto- individual. Man is himself of the domain of being, logical point of view when this thought elaborates either through his whole being or by the presence itself from another domain: ethics. in him of the soul, of reason (according to what What does it mean? Do I want to say that on- one holds as being part of being). After what we tology and ethics are radically separated fields in said earlier about the task of ontology, it would philosophy? Do ontology and ethics exclude each seem that the concept of man, as he is a partici- other in philosophy? The answer I will give here to pant in being, would receive its definition from on- this question can throw a light on my opinion that tology. Ethics, which proposes a normative model Heidegger’s position is strictly ontological whereas to man must at least have a certain notion of the Nietzsche’s position is principally ethical and thus individual it deals with. As ethics must have a that Heidegger’s critic is not located on the same concept of man, it would seem that the ethical re- level. flexion needs the participation of ontology for this part of its reflexion: that of giving a definition of

2 Ontology vs ethics; ontology 8 But if we think about Aristotle, it would seem that a normative dimension is a part of ontology. According to vs metaphysics him, being is such only when it accomplishes itself according to the norms which are its possessions (let us think here In ontology, one tries to answer the question “what about the Categories). 9 does exist?”, “what is?”. The fundamental ques- Let us think again for a moment about the tree of philosophy presented by Descartes. The roots of the tree tion of ontology is the question about being. As are constituted by metaphysics, the trunk by physics, and the science of being (litterally: “discourse on be- the main branches by mecanics, medicine, and MORAL. ing”), ontology is a fundamental discourse on real- Following Descartes then, we should say that the ethical ity. The task of ontology will thus be to determine question is necessarily underlied by a metaphysical ques- what it is to “be” and thus to circumscribe the do- tion. We will later see that the roots and the trunk, metaphysics and physics, can be understood as constituting, in main of being, reality. We could qualify this task their reunion, the domain of ontology. Which is to say that as being essentially descriptive. For its part, ethics ontology necessarily underlies ethics.

5 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 the concept of man. But one must avoid positing But here arises the question of the interchange- an adequation between man and being. What is ability of the terms “metaphysics” and “ontol- is not man and man is not what is. Being is a do- ogy”. In an article about the Heideggerian over- main which embraces much more than man and coming of metaphysics, Laurent Giroux points to which contains him only as a particular occurence what Heidegger says of metaphysics as a prin- of being among many others. cipial knowing of Seienden in its totality and But is that really the only participation of on- concludes that, for Heidegger, “Thus understood, tology to the ethical reflexion? Ethics adresses it- metaphysics is nothing else than traditional on- self to man as an acting being. Action is not inter- tology.” [Gir75, p. 213]10. Should we follow Hei- nal to man but is accomplished in the world. The degger in using the terms as equivalents? This question “what should I do?” implies an agent, explains however the fact that Heidegger speaks man, and a domain in which action is accom- of a metaphysics of the will to power and of the plished and which comprises the objects affected eternal return when I think we should rather talk by this action, the world. As ontology must give a about an ontology answering the question of being definition of man, it must give a definition of the with the will to power and eternal return, ontology world as well. which would be the presupposition to the ethics of ¨ We should therefore conclude that any ethical the Ubermensch. Let us see how. reflexion presents a concept of man and a con- Let us first consider the etymology of the cept of the world drawn from an ontology. One terms. “Ontology”, ontos logos, means: discourse must have certain conceptions of what is before on being. “Metaphysics”, meta ta physica, means: proposing a “what-to-do” in view of a “ought-to- beyond physics, thus designating the suprasensi- be”. That is to say that the ontological question ble world. From an etymological point of view, must be answered before the ethical questionning it would thus seem that we cannot talk of an in- arises. But this does not mean that any ethical terchangeability of the terms. But as Heidegger thinking must present an ontological reflexion. All indicates it in his text, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, that it means is that all ethical thinking contains we can identify two preoccupations of metaphysics ontological presuppositions. All an ethics in con- if we refer ourselves to Aristotle, that is the do- tinuity with ontological tenants must respect, is main of being in general and the domain of the di- the essential determination of being which is held. vine11. Would metaphysics be a reunion of physics Let us resume to make our conclusion clear. and metaphysics? If this is admitted, we can talk Traditionally, ontology does not only describe na- about the equivalence between “metaphysics” and ture. The domain of ontology comprises the sensi- “ontology”. ble world as well as the suprasensible world (God, But if we consider the evolution of the usage the soul, etc...). Furthermore, in answering the of the term “metaphysics”, we see that the meta- question “what is?”, the ontological reflexion also physical preoccupation has principally oriented it- answers to “how is it?”. As I said earlier, this self toward the determination of the things of the question embraces the soul and thus man as he soul and the divine. In considering the etymol- possesses one. From this point of view the ethi- ogy of the terms as well as the evolution of the cal question would be a natural extension of the term “metaphysics”, I will then adopt the follow- ontological question. From “what is and how?” ing definition of the metaphysical questionning: we proceed naturally to “what should I do?”, in the questionning which considers the determina- the sense that ethics proposes a normative ideal tion of the existence of the suprasensible (God, which in general, if not always, tries to bring the the soul, etc...) as this one is perceived as the ef- actual being of man to its being, its ontological na- ficient cause of the sensible world. By the same ture. The ontological question is self-sufficient, it 10 does not need to have any ethical presuppositions, My translation of: “Ainsi comprise, la métaphysique n’est rien d’autre que l’ontologie traditionnelle.” but ethics must have ontological presuppositions 11 Cf. section 1 of this paper, Heideggerian definition of in order to be formulated. metaphysics.

6 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism. token, I adopt the second sense Heidegger finds in rian presupposition thus satisfies us. But what the Metaphysics of Aristotle, which is the sense about the second, that which says that all meta- developed by the philosophical tradition. physics is nihilistic? Should we change the term Taking this definition for granted, the conclu- “metaphysics” to “ontology”? Does Heidegger re- sion follows that “ontology” and “metaphysics” ally mean that all ontology is nihilistic? It would cannot be equivalent but rather that metaphysics seem rather contradictory to say that the science is a branch of ontology, most important branch of being ends up in “nothingness”. I therefore since it considers the source of existence. A re- think, for the moment, that one should read the vision of Descartes’ tree of philosophy is thus two presuppositions as follows: any philosophy necessary and goes as follow: the roots and the must contain an ontology and any metaphysics trunk are constituted by ontology (the roots be- (considered as a branch of ontology oriented to- ing specifically metaphysics and the trunk specif- ward the suprasensible) is nihilistic. In examining ically physics) and the branches are mechanics, the Nietzschean critic of the metaphysical tradi- medicine, and moral. tion we would see that Nietzsche also considers If metaphysics is only a branch of ontology, traditional metaphysics as being nihilistic, even what can we say of the fact that Heidegger con- though his reasons for that are not the same as siders the thought of the will to power and of the that of Heidegger. eternal return as being metaphysical (for, let us What is then our counter-argument to Hei- not forget that this interpretation is at the ba- degger? Any philosophy contains an ontology. sis of his argument on Nietzsche’s nihilism)? Are Granted. Any metaphysics is nihilistic. Granted. we dealing with metaphysics or with ontology in But Nietzsche’s philosophy does not produce a Nietzsche? Since the will to power and eternal re- metaphysics but rather a new ontology without turn are foundations of reality, should we not say metaphysics. The will to power and eternal re- that we are here dealing with a metaphysics (un- turn are to be understood in the natural and sen- derstood as source of existence)? Or rather, are sible frame. One is not dealing here with the we dealing with an ontology (as will to power and realm of absolutes and suprasensible entities but eternal return are not understood as suprasensible really with the sensible motor of the world itself. by Nietzsche, but rather of “this world”)? Would These two concepts would thus be a part of the not Nietzsche answer to his destitution of tradi- branch “physics” of ontology and not of the branch tional metaphysics with a new ontology without “metaphysics”. To report ourselves to the image a metaphysics instead of replacing it by a meta- of the tree, the will to power and the eternal re- physics with new components12? turn13 are certainly foundations of reality but are Now we see a new possibility to counter not to be found in the roots but rather in the trunk Heidegger’s argument concerning Nietzsche’s ni- of the tree. This makes of the thought of the will hilism. As Edwards tells us, Heidegger holds to power and of the eternal return an ontology that any philosophy must contain a metaphysics without metaphysics and thus cannot be consid- and that all metaphysics is nihilistic. Considering ered as being nihilistic, since we cannot apply the the adequation Heidegger posits between “meta- second Heideggerian presupposition to it14. physics” and “ontology”, we revise this by saying: 13 I include the notion of eternal return only to coun- any philosophy must contain an ontology. Ac- terweight Heidegger who considers both will to power and cording to our earlier conclusion, we cannot but eternal return as going hand in hand. This is for me far from agree with this affirmation. The first Heidegge- evident and the numerous attempts to interpret the eternal return as a physical principle are far from convincing to 12The Nietzschean critic toward the metaphysical tradi- me. I rather think that we should consider the eternal re- tion is specifically oriented toward what I have indicated as turn as a thought experiment necessary for the Nietzschean the part of ontology which adresses itself to the suprasensi- ethics, as an hypothesis. The text from aphorism 341 of Die ble, since he considers that it is the notion of a division be- fröhlicheWissenschaft indicates it in the formulation of the tween sensible and suprasensible which places the suprasen- first sentence: “Wie, wenn dir eines Tages oder Nachts...“ sible as normative ideal and domain of truth which is the (Nietzsche, F., KSA 3, p. 570, my underlining). cause of the alienation in which man finds himself. 14 But one can ask whether an ontology without meta-

7 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18

I pointed earlier to the adequation Heideg- ness. He says, “Das Nichts gibt nicht erst den ger posits between ”ontology” and “metaphysics”. Gegenbegriff zum Seienden her, sondern gehört This has lead me to reformulate the Heideggerian ursprunglich zum Wesen [1949 edition: Wesen des presuppositions in the following way: any philos- Seins] selbst.” [Hei67, p. 12]. This means liter- ophy must contain an ontology and any meta- ally that nothingness is at the beginning a part of physics (understood as a branch of ontology) is Sein. nihilistic. But does this mean that the entire on- Heidegger goes even further. In the same ar- tology is nihilistic? Does the caracterisation of a ticle he affirms “”Das reine Sein und das reine part, here metaphysics, determine the whole, here Nichts ist also dasselbe.“ Dieser Satz Hegels ontology? We can propose an answer in analysing (Wissenschaft der Logik, I. Buch, WWIII, S.74), the text “Was ist Metaphysik?” but as we will see, besteht zu Recht.”[Hei67, p.17]. No mistake is here arises a rather big problem for Heideggerians. possible here, Heidegger expresses his agreement with the Hegelian thesis of the adequation between nothingness and being. 3 Heidegger a nihilist? What does this mean? Not only nothingness is a part of being, but more: it is the same as Let us examine “Was ist Metaphysik?” and being. The return to being should then be a return Holzwege. The analysis of the first present com- to nothingness. If we add to this the following promising points for the analysis presented by Hei- affirmation taken out of “Die Uberwindung¨ der degger in the second, this keeping in mind the Metaphysik”, two presuppositions which guide Heidegger’s argumentation in Holzwege. In this text, Heidegger “...daß die Metaphysik aus dem Sein proposes the interpretation of the will to power selbst und die Uberwindung¨ der Meta- as being a will to nothingness [Hei63, p. 217f]15. physik als Verwindung des Seins sich The will to power being the foundation of the Ni- ereignet.” [Hei54, p. 72] etzschean philosophy, of what Heidegger sees as the Nietzschean metaphysics, this philosophy has we come up with the overcoming of meta- then a foundation which wills nothingness, which physics as being the acceptation of nothingness. orients itself toward nothingness, which is itself Following these complementary affirmations of nihilistic. Heidegger, we ask again: Would not nihilism as Let us consider certain affirmations brought by will to Nothingness (Heideggerian interpretation Heidegger in “Was ist Metaphysik?”. We first find of the will to power) be the same as a will to return the following: “... das Nichts ist ursprünglicher to the primary? Is not the overcoming of meta- als das Nicht und die Verneinung.” [Hei67, p. physics as the acceptation of Sein/Nothingness 6]. How can we interpret this affirmation which exactly what Heidegger interprets as the will to seems, at first, rather trivial? We could interpret power (will to Nothingness and acceptation of this it as meaning that nothingness is primary. This one)? Where is the problem of the philosophy brings us to the question: would not nihilism as of the will to power if this one is effectively a will to nothingness (Heideggerian interpretation of will to Nothingness? Heidegger wants a return the will to power) be then a will of the return to to Sein. Following what I noted in the preceding the primary? paragraphs one can ask: is not a return to Noth- We should not conclude too fast and consult ingness the same exact thing? Again, let us repeat what Heidegger has else to say about nothing- it, where is the problem of the will to power’s nihilism if a return to Sein/Nothingness is wished? physics is even possible. What is then left? Only physics? The problem I announced for the Heidegge- If this would be true, a physical theory which would cor- rians is the following. According to Heidegger, rectly describe the universe would lead us to the elimination the big crime of metaphysics is to be an active of ontology as a philosophical field. 15We saw in section 1 of this paper how he is wrong “forgetting” of Sein, that is, not to have posited concerning the will to power. the question regarding Sein, to have talked only

8 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism. about Seienden. He specifies that this seems to posits the adequation between Sein and Nothing- be the nature of metaphysics. He insists to say ness? What is the overcoming of metaphysics if that thought must bring about the question of not the acceptance of Nothingness as foundation, Sein, that we must return to Sein. The meta- of reality as nihilation? The great thought of Sein physical tradition is nihilistic because it was not reveals itself as the most nihilistic thought. successful in bringing this question about, in re- And what should be said about the two Hei- turning to Sein. Is Heidegger’s thought successful deggerian presuppositions presented by Edwards? where the one of his predecessors failed? Is not It is formulated this way: any philosophy must the opening to Sein supposed to be brought by contain (or be) a metaphysics and any meta- the fundamental ontology of Heidegger itself un- physics is nihilistic. After our discussion of the der nihilism? Not that it enters the metaphysical link between ontology and metaphysics, and after tradition (even though we could argue that way) our definition of metaphysics as a branch of ontol- but because, in its opening to Sein, it discovers the ogy oriented toward the suprasensible, we refor- adequation between Sein and Nothingness. Fun- mulated these presuppositions in saying: any phi- damental ontology as a return to Sein is a return losophy must contain (or be) an ontology and any to Nothingness and is thus nihilistic. metaphysics (as a branch of ontology) is nihilistic. According to Heidegger, nihilism is the nega- What happens to this last formulation if we con- tion of Sein. Does he not say that the Nothing sider what we just exposed, that is the adequation is the radical negation of the totality of Seien- Heidegger posits between Sein and Nothingness in den? Of course, Seienden is not Sein but does “Was ist Metaphysik?”? We said that, in the end, not Sein underly Seienden? Don’t we talk about following this adequation, the fundamental ontol- the Sein of Seienden? As negation of Seienden, ogy is nihilistic since the foundation of reality is Nothingness would then be a negation of the Sein Nothingness. In the end, it would seem that we of Seienden and thus a negation of Sein. Noth- are autorised to change the term “metaphysics” to ingness as negating itself. Nothingness nihilating. that of “ontology” in both presuppositions. This The foundation of reality would then be nihilation. gives: any philosophy must contain (or be) an on- Heidegger’s fundamental ontology would then be tology and any ontology is nihilistic. And here, nothing but the most complete nihilism presenting the stress must be placed on the second presup- the foundation of metaphysics as lying in the do- position. Not only is any “traditional” ontology main of Sein/Nothingness, Nothingness negating nihilistic but, in the end, Heidegger’s own funda- Seienden and the Sein of Seienden: Nothingness mental ontology is confronted with the discovery nihilating itself and everything else with it since it of Nothingness as being the foundation of real- is the foundation. The big result of the nihilistic ity. The fundamental ontology supposed to cor- tradition would then be the complete and radical rect the traditional nihilism of ontology which did nihilism of the philosophy of fundamental ontol- not posit the question of Sein falls itself in a more ogy which, contradictorily, gave itself the task of radical nihilism: it posits the question of Sein just reaching Sein when it discovers in this reaching to discover that this one is Nothingness. that Sein is in fact Nothingness. The foundation Another important question here comes up. of reality being nihilation, not only is metaphysics A very important concept was until now widely nihilistic but, necessarily, any thought. Thought used but still remains vague: that of “nihilism”. being human, human being being a Dasein, a part What do we mean exatly when we use the term of the Seienden of Sein, having at its foundation “nihilism”? In what way does it operate? What the nihilation of Nothingness, this thought is nec- is the purpose of nihilism, if it has any? To what essarily then nihilistic. does it attack itself and in which domains is it ac- What would then be the overcoming of the tive? Those questions remain without clear and metaphysical tradition’s nihilism if not a more satisfying answers even though the term is widely complete, more radical nihilism, more nihilistic used. We should then turn our attention toward offered to us by the fundamental ontology which this concept and try to bring explanations if not

9 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 direct answers. ily go hand in hand. We find the expression of this in “Die Uberwindung¨ der Metaphysik” where Hei- 4 What is meant by “nihilism”? degger says that “Das seinsgeschichtliche Wesen des Nihilismus ist die Seinsverlassenheit.” [Hei54, To consult an encyclopedia may seem scholarly p. 91, my emphasis]. Heidegger defines nihilism in but can be very helpful as a starting point to get a particular way and indicates by the same token to a definition of the concept of nihilism. In her ar- that it is only a point of view. We could conclude ticle “Le nihilisme”[Ban90], Bannour presents dif- that nihilism, according to the point of view from ferent definitions of this concept. She tracks down which it is considered, can be defined in different the first steps of nihilism in the Greek Skeptics ways. We know Heidegger’s definition and its im- and Sophists. First as an epistemological nihilism plications, let us see what Nietzsche has to say of in the Skeptics, it evolves into a practical nihilism nihilism. in the Sophists who consider the word “virtue” as From the Nietzschean point of view, nihilism having no meaning. Bannour then presents an- is a complex phenomenon. There are many mean- other form of nihilism, that of Descartes and his ings and many degrees of nihilism. The only ac- malin génie: methodological nihilism. She then ceptable one for Nietzsche is that which goes to turns to the link between nihilism and language, the end of the negation in order to bring a new expressed by certain writers as Proust, who ex- affirmation, that is: complete nihilism. But we press everything in saying nothing, to then exam- do not find only this complete nihilism in Niet- ine the link between nihilism and aesthetics ex- zsche. There is also the incomplete nihilism of pressed in contemporary art and in the theater. the metaphysical-religious tradition to which Niet- Her review goes on with nihilism in moral, pre- zsche attacks himself. According to Deleuze, this senting Diogen the Cynic as the most radical ni- form of nihilism is called by Nietzsche “the en- 16 hilist in terms of morals. To end her article, she terprise to negate life, to depreciate existence.” considers ontological nihilism and presents Niet- [Del62, p. 39]. He also stresses the point that zsche’s enterprise as the apex of nihilism. nihil in “nihilism” signifies that negation is the On his part, Müller-Lauter[ML84] presents quality of the will to power. Deleuze gives four the concept of nihilism following its different uses. distinctions of nihilism in Nietzsche: 1- negative In this way he points out the numerous domains nihilism where one recognizes the value of noth- and streams which are touched by nihilism. He ingness of life, 2- reactive nihilism in which comes even says that links between these examples are into play reactive life and the man of ressentment, to be found, only he does not give them. From 3- passive nihilism, that of the man who wants to the descriptions he gives of nihilism we can sup- perish, passive extinction of oneself (Christ, Bud- pose that he would agree with the definition I take dha), and 4- complete nihilism, that of Nietzsche, out from Bannour’s historical presentation. the self-destruction through eternal return [Del62, What comes out clearly of this historical pre- 170-186]. sentation of the concept of nihilism and of its dif- In his small study on Also sprach Zarathus- ferent manifestations, is the understanding of the tra, Héber-Suffrin [HS88] also distinguishes four term as “nihilation”, “negation”, rejection of a meanings of nihilism in Nietzsche: 1- devaluation value, an institution, of something established and of this world in favour of a transcendant world, this, in all the domains where nihilism was active. 2- depreciation of both worlds, 3- replacement of Nihilism should then be understood simply as a the metaphysical foundation of values by a hu- negation, a rejection of established values. But is man foundation, but without changing the values it sufficient to transpose the latin sense of nihil themselves, and 4- will to decline, to destruct old to obtain the richness of meaning of this term? table of values in order to erect new tables. We [ML84, p. 846]. After this very large definition see that Deleuze and Héber-Suffrin differ in their of the term as negation, many meanings can be 16My translation of: “L’entreprise de nier la vie, de added to this concept and these do not necessar- déprécierl’existence.”

10 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism. classifications, but these are nevertheless linked by ethics, aesthetics, etc...), in a precise historical pe- the distinction they each posit between complete riod and cultural circle. For example, metaphys- and incomplete nihilism. ical nihilism will never be the same as ethical ni- Let us consult other authors to see if we can hilism; the epistemological nihilism of the Greek expand the notion of nihilism further then that Skeptics cannot be the same as that of Descartes. which comes out of Heidegger and Nietzsche. For According to the domain in which it is active, ni- G. Vattimo [Vat88], nihilism is defined strictly in hilism attacks itself to the highest recognized val- Heideggerian terms. For Edwards [Edw90], ni- ues of this domain. In ontology it attacks itself hilism is to be understood in different ways and to Being (which comes back to Heidegger’s def- in that he follows the differentiation posited by inition of nihilism). In ethics, it attacks itself to Héber-Suffrin and Deleuze in Nietzsche between moral values, to the recognized reference for moral complete and incomplete nihilism. evaluations. The same goes for other domains. In his essay L’homme révolté [Cam51], Camus But what is wanted through such a negation? talks abondantly of the phenomenon of nihilism, Does nihilism want only destruction? Does it try of this “indifference to life which is the mark of to bring about Nothingness? To recognize the nihilism” [Cam51, p. 19]17. His interpretation of nothingness-value of everything? Nihilism is also what nihilism is seems very Nietszchean when he an intentional phenomenon because it gets and adds modifies its signification when we consider what is its goal. In this, I want to distinguish three “The nihilist is not the one who does different levels of intention of nihilism. An ex- not believe in anything but rather the treme nihilism would be one which completely de- one who does not believe in what is.” nies and rejects everything and does not recog- [Cam51, p. 96]18. nize anything. A radical nihilism would be one that completely denies and rejects a value, an el- He thus seems to identify nihilism to what ement of a domain, in order to put a new one in Nietzsche calls incomplete nihilism, that of the its place. A moderate nihilism would be one that metaphysical-religious tradition. denies the central place and importance tradition- It seems that “nihilism” means only: “nega- ally granted to a value or an element of a domain tion”, “rejection”, negation of the existence of in order to give it a new place, a new weight, in something this something being, most of the time, general through the adjoining of a new element. an established value. But this definition is much Moderate nihilism is then not so much a rejection too vague. I would say that the fact that nihilism phenomenon but rather a relativization-process. is almost always defined through the presentation I want to illustrate my proposition by means of examples of its occurences is a sign that the of three examples: ontological nihilism, ethical ni- concept gets its signification only through these hilism, and practical theory nihilism. In the case examples, for these reveal nihilism’s activity in of ontology, an extreme nihilism would direct its a special domain, in a precise historical and cul- action on Being and Nothingness, reject both and tural context and with a certain purpose. “Ni- hold that there is nothing. A radical nihilism hilism” would then have to be understood as a would act upon Being not only to devaluate it, term which denotes a contextual and an inten- but to replace it by Nothingness as central value tional phenomenon. and primary fact. On its part, a moderate nihilism I explain right away what I mean by that. Ni- would only relativize Being, that is it would op- hilism is a contextual phenomenon since it is al- erate a devaluation of Being but only in order to ways active in a precise domain (i.e. meataphysics, put Nothingness at the same level. We could then

17 speak of a monistic radical nihilism which recog- My translation of: “cette indifférenceàla vie qui est la nize only one primary fact, i.e. Nothingness, and marque du nihilisme.” 18My translation of: “Le nihiliste n’est par celui qui ne of a dualistic moderate nihilism which recognizes croit àrien, mais celui qui ne croit pas àce qui est.”. two primary facts, i.e. Being and Nothingness, as

11 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 determinants of existence. tence, so a moderate practical nihilism wants to What about ethical nihilism? The tradition show that the correlates of Being and Nothing- has imposed a moral type to man as well as a ness, reason and the instincts, determine practi- ﬁxed and immuable reference for moral evalua- cal life and are, in their reunion, the reference for tions which had the characteristics of the Being the validation of actions under moral considera- of ontology. Being is what confers reality, exis- tions. A radical nihilism would give value only tence to things and beings. In moral matters, the to instincts and pulsions, there would be no place Good, or God, is the garant of morality in this left whatsoever for reason. And what would be an world. Would nihilism in moral matters be the extreme nihilism? The denial of any right of rule, attempt to recognize a certain value to the oppo- the rejection of any direction in man with regard site of the Good, to “Evil”? to actions.20 An extreme nihilism would be the destitution Let us resume the proposition with the follow- of the reference for moral evaluations to replace ing table: it by the reign of amorality, by a moral vacuum. A radical ethical nihilism would replace the Good by Evil, that is it would put in place the reign of immorality.19 What would then be moderate nihilism? A simple dualism like that of Manicheism? The question is more complex with regards to moderate ethical nihilism. Such a thing as a dualism Good/Evil as reference for moral evaluations is not a satisfactory answer. I think we should talk about a relativization process of the Good, that is the Good as being plurivoqual instead of univoqual. But I will keep the two possibilities in mind: Manicheism and a relative Good. And what about action theory? What would be the correlates of ontological Being and Noth- ingness? The metaphysical-religious tradition has generally required that practical deliberation be ruled by reason alone (or the soul). Reason was then considered as having the highest value in man, as being the reference for the validation of actions under moral considerations. All pulsions, instincts, were considered as having no practical value whatsoever, these being even able to throw man in immorality, in “moral nothingness”. In this case, would then moderate nihilism be the attempt to grant these pulsions and instincts a value, a right of rule beside reason in practical life? As a moderate ontological nihilism wants to show that Being and Nothingness determine exis-

19 This distinction between extreme and radical nihilism in ethics corresponds to the diﬀerentiation between Evil considered as the absence of the Good and Evil considered as the contrary of the Good. Extreme nihilism holds Evil 20 This seems to me quite hard to imagine even though it to be the absence of the Good and radical nihilism holds it is the result of a straight transposition of the diﬀerentiation to be the contrary of the Good. held under ontology and ethics.

12 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism.

Table 1:

Ontology Ethics Action Theory Metaphysical- Only ﬁxed and The Good (God Reason is the ref- religious tradition immuable Being for religion) is the erence for action. confers and deter- only validating It is the part of mines existence. reference of moral man which has evaluations. the most value from the moral point of view. Extreme nihilism Nothing is (nei- The Good and Nothing governs ther Being nor God are evacu- the actions. Nothingness). ated. There is no reference for moral evaluations. Reign of amorality. Radical nihilism Being is evacu- The Good is evac- Negation of the ated. Nothing- uated in favour of role of reason in ness is what ex- Evil. Reign of im- governing practi- ists. Nothing- morality. cal life. Reign of ness is what sup- immorality under ports and deter- the governing of mines existence.21 pulsions. Moderate ni- Being and Noth- Relativization Reason and the hilism ingness determine of the Good (no instincts deter- existence more univoqual mine practical but equivoqual) life and are, in OR Good and their reunion, Evil reign to- the reference for gether (kind of actions. Manicheism).

13 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18

After this definition22 of nihilism and the pre- Heidegger believes any metaphysics is nihilistic be- sentation of the distinction to make between ex- cause any metaphysics “forgets” Sein. Because he treme, radical, and moderate nihilism, we can now considers the thought of the will to power and of turn to the problem of Nietzsche’s nihilism and the eternal return as a metaphysics and because come back to our discussion of Heidegger’s ni- any metaphysics is nihilistic, Nietzsche’s thought hilism. is consequently nihilistic. Heidegger finds a further confirmation of this judgment in his analysis of the will to power as value-thought which places 5 Is Nietzsche’s thought nihilis- Sein at the rank of a simple value. Nietzsche’s tic? In what sense? thought is really “forgetting” of Sein. I proposed that the Heideggerian judgment Nietzsche discovers a latent nihilism in the me- could not be accepted because his starting point taphysical-religious tradition and calls it incom- is ontology whereas Nietzsche’s main preoccupa- plete nihilism. To overcome this nihilism, he pro- tion is ethics. I still think this is the case but I will poses a complete nihilism through the reevalua- nevertheless examine the question as to what kind tion of values, the rejection of the metaphysical- of nihilism one finds in Nietzsche, following what religious tradition and of Christianity through the we said about nihilism in the preceding section. announcement of the death of God. I proposed to consider Nietzsche’s thought of This big negation, this complete nihilism, is a the will to power and of the eternal return as a new nihilism in the general sense I gave earlier. But ontology without a metaphysics and, accordingly, with what type of nihilism are we dealing? Is it as a thought which does not correspond to tra- extreme? Is Heidegger right in calling it a radical ditional metaphysics, that which Heidegger con- nihilism23? Or is it rather a moderate nihilism? siders nihilistic. Edwards goes even further and Let us review briefly Heidegger’s judgment toward says: “Once a metaphysics cuts itself loose from Nietzsche’s thought. the claim to provide a comprehensive and accurate Heidegger analyses “God is dead!” as signify- representation of reality, it is not clear in what ing that the suprasensible has lost its existence, sense it remains a metaphysics at all... On this its validity, that a certain Nothingness takes place account, then, Nietzsche’s metaphysics is either following the death of the suprasensible founda- manifestly false, or else, impossible to assert as a tion of existence. Furthermore, he analyses the metaphysics.” [Edw90, p. 34]. Do I agree here will to power and eternal return as a metaphys- with Edwards? I think that Nietzsche presents ical thought which makes of Sein a value. The the will to power as a representation of reality, as foundation of this metaphysics, the will to power, the “most elementary fact”, as he terms it. is perspective and grants value. But as we saw it, In fact, it is not necessary to go as far as Ed- Heidegger is wrong about the will to power, He wards to counter Heidegger’s argument of the rad- presents it as will to overcome but also, and here ical ontological nihilism in Nietzsche. If we follow is his mistake, as will to Nothingness. the distinction established between extreme, rad- We presented Edwards’ analysis of the Heideg- ical, and moderate nihilism, it would seem that gerian argumentation. This has lead us to the Heidegger attaches the tag of radical nihilism to discovery of two presuppositions which guide Hei- Nietzsche. According to him, Sein is evacuated degger: 1- any philosophy must contain (or be) a since it is relegated to the rank of a value and metaphysics and 2- any metaphysics is nihilistic. Nothingness is what is since that is what the will to power wants24. 22This definition is not to be considered as complete and entirely satisfactory. It is an attempt to precise what is 24 One could say that Heidegger is quite Platonician in meant by “nihilism”. The differentiations will need to be this judgment. Why? The will to power has the charac- thought again and the dividing line between critique and teristic of the Becoming and pretends to be the foundation moderate nihilism will be especially important to establish. of reality. Becoming, in traditional Platonician thought, is 23Even though he does not define it the way I do. nothing but Nothingness. To make of Becoming the foun-

14 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism.

But is that really the case? Is Sein radically still gives some indications concerning Nietzsche’s evacuated in Nietzsche? Is there no value left to ethics since he talks about the death of God and Sein? How can one say that Sein has no more about the symbol of the Nietzschean ethics: the value when, at the same time, one grants it value? Ubermensch¨ . Let us consider what he has to say Sein is a value in the value-thought which makes on these. of values and of their institution the most elevated “God is dead!” signiﬁes that the conservating act. In fact, is it not rather, in Nietzsche, a settling place of Seienden is now empty. Heidegger does right of the most primary facts of life? Is not the not believe that the thought of the will to power point to recognize that tries to occupy this place nor that its representant (for he makes of the Ubermensch¨ the repre- “Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt sentant of the will to power) tries to occupy it. He auf ihren ’intelligiblen Charakter’ hin rather says that this place can stay empty, for an- bestimmt und bezeichnet - sie w¨are other place which corresponds to it metaphysically eben ’Wille zur Macht’ und nichts opens itself. außerdem.”25

Is not the point to say that both Being and “... die Stelle, auf die das Wollen des ¨ Nothingness (Becoming) determine existence? Ubermenschen eingeht, ist ein anderer I think we should understand the thought of Bereich einer anderen Begründungdes the will to power to mean that Being is not the Seienden in seinem anderen Sein. only thing to confer and to found existence but Dieses andere Sein des Seienden ist that becoming also enters into play in this deter- inszwischen - und das bezeichnet den mination of existence. This would signify that, on- Beginn der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik - tologically, Nietzsche’s thought should be placed die Subjektivitätgeworden.” [Hei63, under a moderate nihilism which negates the cen- p. 236]. tral place traditionally granted to Being to join to it its traditional opposite as determinant of reality. Even though Heidegger does not give a precise When one places himself from the same point judgment concerning the nihilism of Nietzsche’s of view as Heidegger, that of ontology, it then ethics, let us try to see what would mean what would be necessary to attenuate his judgment and I just reported according to the differentiation I say that Nietzsche’s thought does not present a brought in the preceding section. Extreme ethical radical nihilism, a “radical slaying”, a “forgetting” nihilism signifies the evacuation of any reference of Being but rather, a moderate nihilism which for moral evaluations, the reign of amorality. But wants to give a correct account of life as move- Heidegger tells us that what replaces God as a ment, as will to power which wants to surpass it- reference is subjectivity, which means that a refer- self perpetually, in adjoining Becoming to Being ence for moral evaluations remains and, thus, that as determinant of reality. It is not a “forgetting” Nietzsche’s ethics would present either a radical or of Being, but a “putting into the right place of it”. a moderate nihilism and no extreme nihilism. Let But let us go back a little bit. I advanced that us see what kind of nihilism we definitely find. Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s points of view are dif- Nietzsche presents a humanistic ethics having ferent. That of Heidegger is ontological whereas for symbol the Ubermensch¨ , the representant of that of Nietzsche is mainly ethical. How is it with the new man of the new ethics. This ethics re- ethics? Do we find a nihilism? Even though Hei- verses the traditional moral order. It has for foun- degger’s point of view is essentially ontological in dation the rejection of the metaphysical-religious his judgment concerning Nietzsche’s nihilism he tradition. Nihilism is thus active at this level, at the level of the destitution of the reference for dation of reality, as Nietzsche does, is, consequently, the moral evaluation. We could then talk about an most radical nihilism. 25Nietzsche, F., KSA 5. Jenseits von Gut und Böse, §36, extreme nihilism in ethics. But is it really an ex- p. 55. treme nihilism? Extreme nihilism demands the

15 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 destitution of the Good and God but it also de- humanism makes of man the essence of reality, it mands the reign of amorality, the absence of any follows that humanism is “forgetful” of Sein as reference for moral evaluations. Is it the case with well. Nietzsche? On its part, radical nihilism demands But I do not adopt the Heideggerian defini- the reign of Evil, the reign of immorality. Again: tion of nihilism because I believe that it is erected is it the case with Nietzsche? only in the view of his argumentation concern- It is not the case. There is actually a reference ing fundamental ontology: anything which is not for moral evaluations in the new ethics of Niet- fundamental ontology is nihilistic. I hold to the zsche, only it is no more located in a realm of abso- definition I proposed in section 4. According to lutes but in man himself26. From an ethical point this one, the nihilism of Nietzsche’s thought is a of view, we then find a moderate nihilism. Since moderate nihilism that wants to show: in ontology subjectivity is now the reference for moral evalu- that Being and Nothingness determine existence, ations it follows that a process of relativization of in ethics, that a relativization process of the Good the concept of the Good takes place from which takes place, and in action theory that reason and a plurivocity of the concept results. It also seems the instincts determine practical life and are, in to meet the definition of a moderate nihilism in their reunion, the reference for the validation of action theory. I already said, in the preceding sec- actions under moral considerations. tion, how this type of nihilism wants to show that If we consider nihilism from a general point of reason and the instincts rule together over practi- view, as being the rejection of what was consid- cal life. The Ubermensch¨ embodies this reunion of ered until now as supreme values (God, the Good, reason and instincts. He represents the new man reason, Being, etc...) we see that nihilism as re- who creates values according to his reunited being. jection is not only present in Nietzsche but more, Nietzsche says that man is fragmented and that it is the starting point for the elaboration that we must add the pieces together to obtain of his constructive thought, that it is the foun- one man. The Ubermensch¨ , the representant of dation over which the new ethics represented by the new man of the new ethics is precisely this man the Ubermensch¨ will be elevated. This sentence of of which one has reunited the different pieces. The Camus applies perfectly well to Nietzsche: Ubermensch¨ posits moral evaluations according to his added whole. Moderate nihilism wants pre- “What is a revolted man? A man who cisely to show that the human whole determines says no. But if he refuses, he does practical life. We can thus say, from the point of not renounce: it is also a man who view of his ethics, and of action theory, that Niet- says yes, from his first movement.” zsche presents a moderate nihilism rather than a [Cam51, p. 27]27. radical nihilism. We thus see that we should attenuate Heidegger’s judgment of the Nietzschean radical nihilism both concerning ontology and ethics. Let us add this sentence by Héber-Suffrin: We now come to the following question: is it not contradictory to talk about a humanistic “... since the dualistic metaphysics is ethics in the frame of a nihilistic thought? If one in regression, the first step of Niet- understands nihilism in the Heideggerian sense, as zsche will simply be to add to its de- a “forgetting” of Sein, an abandonment of Sein, cline... THE IDEA OF WILL TO AF- then a philosophy that would present a humanis- FIRM IS PRIMARY TO THE WILL tic ethics would not be a contradiction. Heidegger TO OVERCOME VALUES AND TO says, in his “Brief über den ¡¡Humanismus¿¿”, that THE IDEA OF THE DEATH OF humanism is metaphysical and that, consequently, it is nihilistic [Hei67, 145-194]. Furthermore, since 27My translation of: “Qu’est-ce qu’un homme révolté? Un homme qui dit non. Mais s’il refuse, il ne renonce pas: 26 This constitutes the basis for the interpretation of Ni- c’est aussi un homme qui dit oui, dèsson premier mouve- etzsche’s ethics as a humanism. ment.”

16 Daigle, C.: Ontology, Metaphysics and Nihilism.

GOD - it is from this one that the The traditional frame of metaphysics and other follows.” [HS88, p. 47]28. Christianity creates this division, makes of this division its foundation. In order to reconstitute That is because man, to reunite him in his own being, and to give him back his central place, it is necessary to des- “The most profound point of Niet- titute this order of things. To come up with a zsche’s thought cannot be a refusal, humanistic ethics, one must reject these outer- Nietzsche has a positive reason to worldly values which negate man as man. But let 29 refuse.” [HS88, p. 47] . us see more closely how a definition of a humanistic ethics corresponds to a moderate nihilism. What is this reason? Let us remember the Nie- I adopt AndréClair’s definition of a human- tzschean judgement toward the metaphysical-reli- istic ethics. He says that a humanistic ethics gious tradition. It is nihilistic because everything presents man as “... the ethical creator of his comes from a realm of absolutes. In this tradi- norms and values.” [Cla89, p. 342]30. A hu- tional frame, all value is retired from the world, manistic ethics therefore implies the rejection of from life, from man as man. The only thing which any justification or prescription coming from else- has value in him is what comes from the realm of where than from the human being. The desti- absolutes, namely: the soul, reason. This pro- tution of traditional metaphysics and Christian- duces a fragmented man which must fight perma- ity which the Nietzschean nihilism operates corre- nently against himself to live to the height of the sponds to this characteristic. God and the Good exigencies that come out of the morality of Chris- are rejected as reference for the validation of moral tianity and metaphysics. This exigency is out of evaluations. The realm of absolutes is no more the reach for man because of his real being and be- place of validation but rather it is the new man of cause of the strength of his instincts. Man thus the reevaluation of values which erects his own val- finds himself in a perpetual state of sin and no ues. The moderate nihilism which rejects God and possibility is opened to him except for the passage the Good for the benefit of the reunited man ful- in the realm of absolutes, in life after life. Man is fill this humanistic exigency. Any justification and alienated from himself and from life in this world. prescription now comes from the human realm. How is it possible to remediate to this state We could define humanism in general as being of things? One must affirm the whole being of a doctrine which takes man as fundamental value man, reject the division imposed on him by the and which has confidence in his capacities for self- metaphysical-religious tradition, give him back determination. This definition also corresponds confidence in himself, in life, in the world, so that to the moderate nihilism of Nietzsche. Man being his hope will be in himself and in his present life now the creator of values, after the rejection of in the world in which he lives, instead of lying in the metaphysical-religious tradition, it is evident an illusory realm of absolutes. This constitutes the that he is the fundamental value and that he de- humanistic project of Nietzsche. But how can this termines himself under the new order which erects end be reached without destroying the established itself from the ruins of the ancient. order? Can we conceive such a reversal within the It can seem at first contradictory to inscribe a traditional frame of thought? humanistic ethics within the frame of a nihilistic 28My translation of: “... puisqu’il se trouve que thought. But we clearly see that for a human- la métaphysique dualiste est en régression, la première istic ethics to be possible, a nihilism must take démarche de Nietzsche sera simplement d’ajouter àson place. Only the nihilism which rejects the man- déclin... L’IDEE´ D’AFFIRMATION EST PREMIERE` PAR RAPPORT A` CELLE DE RENVERSEMENT DES negating tradition permits the rise of a humanistic VALEURS ET A` CELLE DE MORT DE DIEU - C’est de thought. It is difficult to see how an extreme ni- celle-làque suivent celles-ci.” hilism in ethics, which rejects any morality, could 29 My translation of: “Le point le plus profond de la penséede Nietzsche ne saurait êtreun refus, Nietzsche a 30My translation of: “... créateuréthiquede ses normes une raison positive de refuser.” et valeurs.”

17 KRITERION, Nr. 16 (2002), pp. 3-18 produce a humanistic ethics or any ethics at all. Cerf, Paris, coll. “recherches morales” Radical nihilism and its institution of immorality synth`esesedition, 1989. is as much a bad candidate. Only a moderate nihilism permits the erection of a new ethics after [Del62] G. Deleuze. Nietzsche et la philosophie. the destitution of the traditional moral order. P. U. F., Paris, 1962. The moderate nihilism active in Nietzsche’s [Edw90] J. C. Edwards. The Authority of Lan- thought permits the erection of a new ethics. Not guage: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the only it permits it but it is necessary for the goal threat of Philosophical Nihilism. Uni- Nietzsche gives himself with the reevaluation of versity of South Florida Press, Tampa, values: the erection of a humanistic ethics. 1990.

[Gir75] L. Giroux. Heidegger et la 6 Conclusion métaphysique: un double dépassement. Philosophiques, 2(2), Octobre 1975. This paper has lead us to important questions and surprising conclusions. I demonstrated the mis- [Hei54] Martin Heidegger. Vorträge und take of Heidegger’s interpretation by the revision Aufsätze. Neske, Tübingen,1954. of the concepts in play and by my analysis of his argumentation. Thus, far from presenting the end [Hei63] Martin Heidegger. Holzwege. Vittorio of all philosophy with a radical or even extreme Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1963. nihilism, the Nietzschean thought opens up new [Hei67] Martin Heidegger. Wegmarken. Vittorio horizons with its use of a moderate nihilism which Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1967. permits the setting up of a reconstruction. As for Heidegger, champion of the thought of [HS88] P. Héber-Suffrin. Le Zarathoustra de Ni- Being, the man who presents himself as the de- etzsche. P. U. F., Paris, coll. philosophies nounciator of nihilism and who presents his own edition, 1988. thought as the ultimate overcoming of nihilism, it appears in the end that he sinks himself in ni- [ML84] W. Müller-Lauter. Nihilismus: Der hilism. Heideggerian nihilism, which has the char- Nihilismus-Begriff in West- und Mit- acteristics of radical nihilism, does not open to teleuropa. In Historisches Wörterbuch anything, cannot open to anything, and consti- der Philosophie, volume 6, pages 846– tutes itself as the end of philosophy with no pos- 853. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, sibility whatsoever for a reconstruction. Strange Darmstadt, 1984. J. Ritter & K. conclusion for a thought which proposed itself the Gründer. exact contrary! [Vat88] G. Vattimo. The End of Modernity: Ni- hilism and Hermenautiks in Postmodern References Culture. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1988. Trad. and intro. J. R. [Ban90] W. Bannour. Le nihilisme. In A. Ja- Snyder. cob, editor, Encyclopédiephilosophique universelle 1. L’univers philosophique, pages 207–213. P. U. F., Paris, 1990.

[Cam51] Albert Camus. L’homme r´evolt´e. Gal- limard, Paris, coll. folio/essais edition, 1951.

[Cla89] A Clair. Ethique´ et humanisme: es- sai sur la modernit´e. Les Editions´ du