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Opening up Russia: the Right to Information and the Fight for Transparency 2018 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Report Was Written and Produced by ARTICLE 19

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Opening up Russia: the Right to Information and the Fight for Transparency 2018 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Report Was Written and Produced by ARTICLE 19 Opening up Russia: The right to information and the fight for transparency 2018 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was written and produced by ARTICLE 19. We are grateful to Team 29, the Saint Petersburg based association of freedom of information experts, for allowing us to use and build upon their existing research in this report. In particular, information regarding the national context for the right to information in Russia is based upon Team 29’s report “‘Pravo znat’, Doklad Komnadyi 29 o dostupe k informatsii v Rossii',” (“The Right to Know. Report by Team 29 about access to information in Russia”) published on 28 September 2018, available at team29.org/knowhow/znat. We appreciate the advice and further contributions provided by Ivan Pavlov, Head of Team 29, and Max Olenichev, Team 29 lawyer, during the production of this report. The report was produced in the framework of a two year project on “Promoting Access to Information in Russia,” funded by the European Union (EU). Any views or opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the position of the EU. Edited by Writing Rights. 1 CONTENTS Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 4 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................... 5 Foreword by Ivan Pavlov ................................................................................................................ 8 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 10 Section 1: International standards and principles on RTI ......................................................... 12 1.1 International standards on the right to information ................................................................. 12 The environment ....................................................................................................................... 12 Sustainable development ......................................................................................................... 13 Anti-corruption .......................................................................................................................... 13 1.2. Russia’s obligations under international law and failure to include international norms in national legislation ........................................................................................................................ 14 1.3 The ‘right to know’: fundamental principles ............................................................................ 15 Principle 1: Maximum disclosure .............................................................................................. 15 Principle 2: Obligation to publish .............................................................................................. 16 Principle 3: Promotion of open government ............................................................................. 16 Principle 4: Limited scope of exceptions .................................................................................. 17 Principle 5: Rapid and fair processes ....................................................................................... 18 Principle 6: Reasonable costs .................................................................................................. 18 Principle 7: Open meetings ...................................................................................................... 19 Principle 8: Disclosure takes precedence ................................................................................. 19 Principle 9: Protection for whistleblowers ................................................................................. 19 Section 2: The Right to Information in Russia – the law ............................................................ 20 2.1. The legal framework .............................................................................................................. 20 2.1.1 Volatile legislative environment ....................................................................................... 21 2.1.2 Conflicting norms ............................................................................................................. 21 2.2. General principles of RTI in Russian law .............................................................................. 21 2.3. Proactive publication of information ...................................................................................... 22 2.4. Requesting information ......................................................................................................... 23 2.4.1 Procedures for media outlets ........................................................................................... 24 2.4.2 Costs ............................................................................................................................... 24 2.5. Restrictions and exemptions to RTI ...................................................................................... 25 2.5.1 Unrestricted categories .................................................................................................... 25 2.5.2 Restricted categories ....................................................................................................... 25 2.5.3 State secrets .................................................................................................................... 26 2 2.5.4 Personal data .................................................................................................................. 27 Section 3: Barriers to effective implementation of RTI in Russia ............................................. 29 3.1. Arbitrary implementation ....................................................................................................... 29 3.2 Administrative barriers ........................................................................................................... 29 3.3 Lack of standardisation and oversight of implementation ...................................................... 30 3.4 Challenges facing those making information requests ........................................................... 31 Section 4: Challenging failures of Implementation .................................................................... 34 4.1 Appealing against refusals to provide information – the theory ............................................. 34 4.2 Challenging refusals for information – in practice .................................................................. 34 Section 5: Information is power – case studies from the field .................................................. 37 5.1 Popularising RTI requests as a means to change ................................................................. 37 5.2 RTI as a Media Tool – Experience of media outlet Horizontal Russia “7x7” .......................... 38 5.2. Enabling Rights, Enabling People: RTI as a tool for change ................................................ 40 Nothing about us, without us: RTI makes indigenous peoples stronger ................................... 40 Information in detention: Raising awareness among inmates and their families ...................... 41 Section 6: Thematic exploration of RTI ....................................................................................... 42 6.1 Environmental information ..................................................................................................... 42 Environmental impact assessment ........................................................................................... 43 6.2 Information in archives ........................................................................................................... 45 The cost of accessing archival information ............................................................................... 46 6.3: Anti-corruption and information on income of public officials ................................................ 47 6.4: Information about the Judiciary ............................................................................................. 49 6.5 Video recording of elections ................................................................................................... 50 6.6 Public Monitoring Commissions ............................................................................................. 51 Section 7: Disseminating information – the wider context ........................................................ 52 7.1 Laws restricting freedom of expression .................................................................................. 52 7.2 Online blocking of information ................................................................................................ 53 7.3 Wider context for civil society ................................................................................................. 54 7.4 ‘Spy Mania’ and the ‘Security Doctrine’ .................................................................................. 55 7.5 From experience: disseminating information ......................................................................... 56 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 57 Annex 1: Team 29 Survey – Questions and respondents .........................................................
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