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Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances

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Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Volume 41, Number 1, January 2004 TROPE THEORY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF APPEARANCES Uriah Kriegel 1. INTRODUCTION: TWO NOTIONS OF other-worldliness about them that makes APPEARANCE ontological commitment to them discon- certing. This other-worldliness is mani- In modern philosophy, the notion of ap- fested in the fact that appearances have no pearance is introduced in a broadly Kantian location in physical space, and exert no or idealist context. The theory of percep- causal powers over the physical world. tion is thought to require the postulation They are ghostly objects floating about in of a special set of objects which exist only the private mental spaces of the subject. “in the perceiver’s mind.” The argument There is also a more mundane and more goes something like this. When x perceives, innocuous notion of appearance. There is there is always some thing y such that y is a sense in which, when x looks at a white what x perceives. Yet it may happen that in wall, the white wall appears to x, or there reality y does not exist. If it does not exist appears to x to be a white wall. In this more in reality, y must exist elsewhere or other- mundane sense, to say that y appears to x wise—as an appearance. is simply to say that x perceives y. The logi- Traditionally, the appeal to this idealist cal relation between perception and ap- notion of appearance is motivated by con- pearance (in the mundane sense) is nothing sideration of cases of illusion. Illusion mysterious; it is the same as the relation comes in two varieties: (i) x perceives a between kicking and being kicked. To ap- real object y to have property F when y pear is simply to be perceived, and an ap- does not really have F; (ii) x perceives there pearance is a perceived—qua perceived. to be an object y when in reality there is There is much philosophical interest in no y. Correspondingly, the traditional ac- the mundane notion of appearance. If an count of illusion posits two kinds of ap- appearance in this sense is just an external pearances: (i) when y does not really have object qua perceived, then to the extent that F, y still appears to have F; (ii) when there philosophers are interested in the precise is no y, there is still an appearance of y, or relationship(s) between a perceiving sub- a y-appearance. ject and a perceived object, they will find Despite their periodic popularity, appear- an account of appearance to be indispens- ances—so construed—have often been re- able. The effect of discussing philosophi- garded with suspicion. They have an air of cally the mundane notion of appearance is 5 6 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY not to introduce a new kind of entity; it is ball appearance has physical, external to direct our attention to the ontological causes and effects; it has spatial location correlates of perception as such (that is, and temporal duration; it can be perceived as ontological correlates of perception). by more than one subject; etc. Ultimately, what one hopes to obtain The mundane notion of appearance is both through the study of appearances is a useful and unobjectionable, then. One may metaphysic of the experienced world qua resist it on Ockhamesque grounds: appear- experienced. There is no principled barrier ances represent an unnecessary ontological to studying the metaphysics of the world addition, since there is nothing we cannot qua kicked, but that undertaking happens explain without mentioning them. Granted, to be of little interest. we can explain the fact that x has a red ball It is important to note that the philosophi- perception by saying that x stands before a cal motivations behind the introduction of red ball appearance; but we can also explain the mundane notion of appearance do not the fact that x has a red ball perception by revolve around the possibility of illusion. saying that x is positioned in a certain way, In the mundane sense of the term, x need and under certain conditions, relative to the not be under an illusion for x to be pre- mirrors or hologram. Indeed, the latter ex- sented with a mere appearance. Consider planation will be a fuller, deeper explana- the following case: x stands before a white tion than the former. wall, and perceives it to be white; then x However, talk of appearances need not shines a pink light on the wall; now x per- be construed as committing to any onto- ceives the wall to be pink; x is well aware logical addition. Compare: in talking about that the wall appears pink only because x water, we do not commit to the existence is shining a pink light on it, and that the of a new substance over and above H2O. wall is not really pink but white—but none- Water is not an ontological addition to an theless the wall appears pink to x. In this H2O-inclusive ontology. Likewise, appear- case, x is not under any sort of illusion. ances need not be construed as ontologi- The appearance of the pink wall is nowise cal additions to realities.1 Just as water other-worldly. It does not invite us to con- phenomena can be reductively explained ceive of it as a-spatial or “internal” or pri- in terms of Hydrogen and Oxygen phenom- vate. It is very much embedded in the ena, so appearance phenomena can be ordinary causal network of external, pub- reductively explained in terms of phenom- lic states of affairs: the wall being white, ena of mirrors, holograms, hallucinogens, the light being pink, x standing before the or whatever. wall, another subject’s possibly entering Given the philosophical significance of the room, etc. the mundane notion of appearance, there The perception of the pink wall is a non- is remarkably little we know about appear- illusory perception of an appearance of ances. This is mainly because the term “ap- kind (i). There are similarly non-illusory pearance” has had the historical misfortune perceptions of appearances of kind (ii): a of being associated, in philosophical play of mirrors, or a well-done hologram, circles, with a specific doctrine of appear- may produce an appearance of a red ball ances, namely, the broadly idealist doctrine where no ball (red or not) is to be found. sketched at the opening. Once we over- The perceiver may be well aware that there throw the idealist framework, many ques- is no ball before her, but still she is pre- tions present themselves. There are, first sented with a ball appearance. Again, the of all, questions about the nature of appear- TROPE THEORY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF APPEARANCES / 7 ance. What is an appearance? As noted and see how a metaphysic of appearances above, an appearance, in the mundane could be developed within it. The meta- sense, is an external object qua perceived. physical framework in question is that of But what does it mean to say that some- Trope Theory, but the conclusions of the thing is a pink wall qua perceived? When discussion to follow are not supposed to we add “qua perceived” after a name or a depend on the specifics of Trope Theory.2 description, what exactly are we doing? In §2, the metaphysical framework of How is the wall qua perceived related to Trope Theory is introduced, and the mini- the wall simpliciter? There are also ques- mum is done to justify it. Because appear- tions about the individuation of appear- ances are particulars, §3 takes a closer look ances. Suppose x looks at a purple music at the way Trope Theory handles particu- box. Are the purple color and the box shape lars in general. §4 considers how Trope two different appearances or parts of one Theory might account for appearances; this and the same appearance? If two, is the left section addresses the nature of appearance, half of the box a different appearance from then. §5 then turns to the individuation of the right half, or are they part of the same appearances and the challenges it raises. appearance? If color and shape are part of the same single appearance, is the sound 2. METAPHYSICAL FUNDAMENTALISM AND produced by the music box also part of the TROPE THEORY same appearance, or do different percep- On a natural understanding, a simple state tual modalities necessarily define differ- of affairs, such as a ball’s being yellow, ent appearances? When x does not touch should be analyzed as featuring two entities the music box, but knows it is rigid because of two different ontological categories. One all music boxes are, is the rigidity of the entity is the ball, the other is yellowness. The music box part of its appearance? If x can- former is an individual, the latter a property. not see how far behind the music box ex- According to the natural understanding, the tends, does the appearance of the music ball is a particular: an unrepeatable, unique box have a back side? If it does, how can individual substance; and yellowness is a an appearance have parts that do not ap- universal: an entity literally (token-)identi- pear? If not, how can we admit an object cal among many individuals. with no back side? If x is presented with a In the history of philosophy, many at- duck-rabbit sculpture, is x presented with tempts have been made to analyze all cat- two appearances—a duck-appearance and egories of existence into a single category a rabbit-appearance—or only one appear- of fundamental beings.3 The view is that ance? If both x and her next-door neighbor there is a category of fundamental entities, are looking at the music box, are there two such that any form of existence is in some appearances before them—one for each, so sense merely a combination or manifesta- to speak—or is it only one appearance? Is tion of these fundamental entities; call this there a general answer to the question How view Metaphysical Fundamentalism.
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