Loyola University Chicago, School of Law LAW eCommons Faculty Publications & Other Works 2003 The trS uctural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy James T. Gathii Loyola University Chicago, School of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation James T. Gathii, The trS uctural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. Gender Race & Just. 267 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy James Thuo Gathii* While the Chief Justice's dissent says there are 'weapons [such as cartels or boycotts] in the arsenalsofforeign nations' sufficient to enable them to counter anticompetitive conduct ... such ... political remed[ies are] hardly available to a foreign nation faced with the monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed for the health and safety of its people. I I. INTRODUCTION There are two distinct, albeit mutually reinforcing, stances within U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS. The first of these stances favors strong international pharmaceutical patent protection, unencumbered by any restrictions, as the best alternative to ensuring availability of drugs to treat those infected with HIV/AIDS. 2 Unlike the first stance that is Assistant Professor, Albany Law School.