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The Shadow of Napoleon Upon Lee at Gettysburg
Papers of the 2017 Gettysburg National Military Park Seminar The Shadow of Napoleon upon Lee at Gettysburg Charles Teague Every general commanding an army hopes to win the next battle. Some will dream that they might accomplish a decisive victory, and in this Robert E. Lee was no different. By the late spring of 1863 he already had notable successes in battlefield trials. But now, over two years into a devastating war, he was looking to destroy the military force that would again oppose him, thereby assuring an end to the war to the benefit of the Confederate States of America. In the late spring of 1863 he embarked upon an audacious plan that necessitated a huge vulnerability: uncovering the capital city of Richmond. His speculation, which proved prescient, was that the Union army that lay between the two capitals would be directed to pursue and block him as he advanced north Robert E. Lee, 1865 (LOC) of the Potomac River. He would thereby draw it out of entrenched defensive positions held along the Rappahannock River and into the open, stretched out by marching. He expected that force to risk a battle against his Army of Northern Virginia, one that could bring a Federal defeat such that the cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington might succumb, morale in the North to continue the war would plummet, and the South could achieve its true independence. One of Lee’s major generals would later explain that Lee told him in the march to battle of his goal to destroy the Union army. -
Mahan at West Point, “Gallic Bias,” and the “Old Army”: the Subconscious of Leadership at Gettysburg
Mahan at West Point, “Gallic Bias,” and the “Old Army”: The Subconscious of Leadership at Gettysburg Michael Phipps “In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory, always I come back to West Point.” Douglas MacArthur “…Napoleon stands unrivalled.” Dennis Hart Mahan “God and the soldier we like adore, In time of danger, not before. The danger past and all things righted, God is forgotten, the soldier slighted.” Thomas Jordan 1 Introduction What follows is not a discussion of the direct results of leadership on the Battle of Gettysburg. That subject is one of the most widely and deeply covered in all of American and world history. This paper is rather an examination of the subtle impact on the battle caused by the background of the highest-ranking leaders on the field. In a sense, it is a look at the subconscious of the leadership on the field. The Battle of Gettysburg, and with it the entire American Civil War, was in one sense, not a fight between slave and free, states’ rights and central federal, industrial and agrarian, north and south, “Johnny Reb” and “Billy Yank,” or the overdone cliché “brother against brother.” Rather, it was a fight at the highest command level between men with virtually identical backgrounds. That background consisted of four or five years attending the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. There at least a year was spent in the classroom of Dennis Hart Mahan, Professor of Civil and Military Engineering and the Art (or Science) of War. -
The West Point Class of 1861 and the First Manassas Campaign
University of Mary Washington Eagle Scholar Student Research Submissions Spring 5-8-2020 Faithful Unto Death: The West Point Class of 1861 and the First Manassas Campaign Jessie Fitzgerald Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.umw.edu/student_research Part of the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Fitzgerald, Jessie, "Faithful Unto Death: The West Point Class of 1861 and the First Manassas Campaign" (2020). Student Research Submissions. 322. https://scholar.umw.edu/student_research/322 This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by Eagle Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Research Submissions by an authorized administrator of Eagle Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Faithful Unto Death: The West Point Class of 1861 and the First Manassas Campaign Jessie Fitzgerald History 485: Historical Research Dr. Porter Blakemore April 24, 2020 The West Point Class of 1861 graduated on the eve of the American Civil War as a class defined by regional and political lines. As the secession crisis heated up, cadets appointed from southern states resigned and went south, some just two weeks shy of graduating, while northern cadets remained at West Point. Two months after graduation, the class exhibited their military ability and the value of their training during the Manassas Campaign in July of 1861. They also demonstrated a commitment of duty to the causes and countries they fought for. Furthermore, they showed devotion to each other, even as they fought on opposite sides of the war. The Civil War careers of six exemplary members of the class demonstrated the influence and significance of West Point to the war. -
The F1 Defender the First Defenders Civil War Round Table at Kutztown University
1I co,) eft- / _C-e,tde20 2- /My .20,3 THE F1 DEFENDER THE FIRST DEFENDERS CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE AT KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY SEPTEMBER 2002 Round Table Business On April 15, 1997 The First Defenders Civil War Round Table held its first meeting at the Moselem Springs Inn. This September 10, 2002 marks the opening of the 6 th. season of our organization. In a way an anniversary and the opportunity to think and reflect on the past five years. We have developed a positive reputation in battlefield preservation, maintained a membership of 100 plus in each of our years. We have enjoyed presentations and programs by noted historians and most of all have enjoyed the friendship and fellowship of many people who hold the years of the American Civil War, and its effect on the history of our great nation, in the highest regard. Our efforts to help preserve our national landmarks and battlefields, our interest in the books and battlefields and our Round Table discussions of this great conflict are activities that represent the very purpose of the Round Table. With this review let us move to the business of a new and exciting campaign. Our June field trip was a huge success. We had a full bus and a great trip to the Shenandoah Valley visiting the Kernstown and Cedar Creek battlefields. A review of this trip follows later in the newsletter. A new slate of officers defines our Board of Directors for the coming year. President, Dave Valuska; Vice President, Ron Rhein; Treasure, Arlan Christ; Membership Secretary, Pat Christ; Solicitor, Bob Grim; Preservation Chair, Tom Tate; Recording Secretary, Rich Kennedy; Member At Large, Dave Fox; Member Emeritus, Mike Gabriel; Newsletter Editor, Tony Reilly. -
Military History Primer-2012
SHIVAPURI, KATHMANDU MILITARY HISTORY PRIMER-2012 2 FOREWORD 1. This Military History Primer-2012 is exclusively designed for the benefit of potential participants and the examiners of the entrance examination to the Command and Staff Course which runs annually in the Army Command and Staff College Shivapuri. 2. Main aim of this primer is to provide basic knowledge of military history. However the readers are requested to carry out further studies on their own. Considering the nature of the subject in general and topics in specific, this primer is documented by taking references from different sources. 3. The contents that has been included in this primer is subject to change and will be peoridacally reviewed. 3 LIST OF CONTENTS Serial Subjects Page Part-I 1 The Relevance of Military History to Teaching of Modern Warfare 4-22 2 Lessons from Military History 23-34 3 Strategy – Past, Present and Future 35-49 4 Origin of Modern War 50-59 5 Napoleonic Influence on Development of Modern Warfare 60-72 6 Impact of Industrial Revolution 73-92 7 Reformation in Military thoughts 93-107 8 Age of Machine Warfare 108-119 Part- II 9 Nepal-Tibet China War-1791 120-133 10 Anglo Nepal War(1814-1816) 134-139 11 Blitzkrieg 140-163 12 Allied Invasion of Europ 164-188 13 Korean War 189-209 14 Vietnam War 210-230 15 Arab Israel War – 1967 & 1973 231-257 16 Russo Afghan War 258-271 Part- III 17 Impact of Nuclearisation on Conventional Warfare 272-281 18 Nuclearisation of South Asia 282-285 19 References 286-287 4 THE RELEVANCE OF MILITARY HISTORY TO THE TEACHING OF MODERN WARFARE “Throughout history, modernists have questioned the relevance of military history. -
Microfilmed 2002 Information to Users
UMI MICROFILMED 2002 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may t>e from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing In this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 UMÏ A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: UNION GENERALSHIP DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Thomas Joseph Goss, B. S., M. A. ***** The Ohio State University 2001 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Dr. -
No Army Inspired: the Failure of Nationalism at Antebellum West Point
No Army Inspired: The Failure of Nationalism at Antebellum West Point Jacob Kobrick Department of History Villanova University Edited by Alison Fisk “No army inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy can ever endanger a country’s liberty or can ever desert its country’s flag.” – Secretary of War Elihu Root, 1902 Elihu Root spoke these words upon a happy occasion – the centennial celebration for the United States Military Academy at West Point. But Root surely knew, as most of his audience probably did, that 286 graduates of West Point had, in substantially less happy times just 41 years earlier, both endangered their country’s liberty and deserted its flag by opting to fight for the Confederate States of America in the Civil War.1 He also was no doubt aware that of the 86 Southern- born cadets at the Academy in 1860-1861, 65 of them resigned, abandoning their training for the United States Army in order to serve the enemy instead.2 With this in mind, Root’s statement takes on a strange tone. Given the context in which it was made, it seems more than likely that the statement was intended as nothing more than a reflection of the high esteem in which West Point was held at the dawn of the twentieth century and an affirmation that another civil war could never occur. Read literally, however, it can just as well be taken as a rather unsubtle criticism of the Academy’s checkered past. Viewed in this light, Root’s words beg an interesting question: to what extent were West Point cadets in the antebellum era “inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy”? To put it 1 Thomas J. -
The Civil War Infantry Doctrine
The Civil War Infantry Doctrine A study on the origins and evolution of infantry tactics in the American Civil War. Matthijs Boonstra MA-thesis s1219146 Political culture and national identities ****************** Leiden University ****************** Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ben Schoenmaker [email protected] September 10, 2013 Contents i. List of Abbreviations 3 ii. List of Tables 3 iii. List of Maps 3 Introduction 4 Part One: The American Infantry Doctrine 1812 – 1861 Chapter 1 The American infantry doctrine 1812 – 1846 11 1.1 The origins and transfer of nineteenth century infantry tactics 11 1.2 The adoption of nineteenth century infantry tactics 17 1.3 The Mexican-American War 1846 – 1848 25 Chapter 2 The American infantry doctrine 1848 – 1861 31 2.1 The rifled musket and light infantry tactics 31 2.2 The creation of Union and Confederate armies 35 2.3 The drill-training of Union and Confederate soldiers 38 Part Two: The warfare of the American Civil War 1861 – 1864 Chapter 3 Bull Run to Antietam 1861 – 1862 41 3.1 The First Battle of Bull Run July 21, 1861 41 3.2 The infantry tactics at Bull Run 46 3.3 The Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862 48 3.4 The infantry tactics at Antietam 53 Chapter 4 Gettysburg to Spotsylvania 1863 – 1864 55 4.1 The Battle of Gettysburg July 1-3, 1863 55 4.2 The infantry tactics at Gettysburg 59 4.3 The Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse May 8-21, 1864 61 4.3 The infantry tactics at Spotsylvania Courthouse 66 Chapter 5 The academic opinions concluded 68 Conclusion 71 Appendix 77 Bibliography 90 2 i. -
Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 8, No 3, Fall 2014
FALL 2014 Vol. 8, No. 3 Commentaries Austere Defense: Challenges and Opportunities W. Michael Guillot Measuring Military Power James Jay Carafano Strategy and Force Planning in a Time of Austerity BG Michael J. Meese, USA, Retired Pensive Sword: Educating Officers in Austere Times fall 2014 fall Stephen D. Chiabotti Rethinking Readiness Todd Harrison Budgeting for Austere Defense Mackenzie Eaglen Politics and Defense Capabilities: Local Interests versus Strategic Imperatives Maj Brian R. Davis, USMC Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Mark A. Welsh III Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Robin Rand Commander and President, Air University Lt Gen David S. Fadok Director and Publisher, Air Force Research Institute Allen G. Peck Editorial Staff Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF, Retired, Editor CAPT Jerry L. Gantt, USNR, Retired, Content Editor Nedra O. Looney, Prepress Production Manager Tammi K. Dacus, Editorial Assistant Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Advisors Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, Retired Allen G. Peck Christina Goulter, PhD Colin S. Gray, DPhil Robert P. Haffa, PhD Charlotte Ku, PhD Benjamin S. Lambeth, PhD John T. LaSaine, PhD Allan R. Millett, PhD Rayford Vaughn, PhD Contributing Editors Air Force Research Institute Anthony C. Gould, PhD School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Stephen D. Chiabotti, PhD James W. Forsyth Jr., PhD The Spaatz Center Charles E. Costanzo, PhD Christopher M. Hemmer, PhD Kimberly A. Hudson, PhD Nori Katagiri, PhD Paul J. Springer, PhD Zachary J. Zwald, PhD Strategic Studies Quarterly (SSQ) (ISSN 1936-1815) is published quarterly by Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL. Articles in SSQ may be reproduced free of charge. -
The Hudson River Valley's Influence On
THE HUDSON RIVER VALLEY REVIEW A Journal of Regional Studies MARIST Publisher Thomas S. Wermuth, Director, Hudson River Valley Institute, Marist College Editors Reed Sparling, Editor in Chief, Hudson Valley Magazine Christopher Pryslopski, Program Director, Hudson River Valley Institute, Marist College Art Director Richard Deon Business Manager Jean DeFino The Hudson River Valley Review (ISSN 1546-3486) is published twice a year by the Hudson River Valley Institute at Marist College. Thomas S. Wermuth, Director James M. Johnson, Executive Director Hudson River Valley Institute Advisory Board Todd Brinckerhoff, Chair Maureen Kangas Peter Bienstock, Vice Chair Barnabas McHenry J. Patrick Dugan Alex Reese Patrick Garvey Denise Doring VanBuren Copyright ©2005 by the Hudson River Valley Institute Post: The Hudson River Valley Review c/o Hudson River Valley Institute Marist College 3399 North Road Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-1387 Tel: 845-575-3052 Fax: 845-575-3176 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.hudsonrivervalley.net Subscription: The annual subscription rate is $20 a year (2 issues), $35 for two years (4 issues). A one-year institutional subscription is $30. Subscribers are urged to inform us promptly of a change of address. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Hudson River Valley Institute, Marist College, 3399 North Road, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-1387 The Hudson River Valley Review was founded and published by Bard College, 1984-2002. Founding Editors, David C. Pierce and Richard C. Wiles The Hudson River Valley Review is underwritten by the Hudson River Valley National Heritage Area. ii From the Editors The historical net in this issue of The Hudson River Valley Review has been cast especially wide, spanning from the early eighteenth century right up to the twenty-first. -
Corps of Engineer Officers for Whom FORMER Streets Were Named by the Manhattan Engineering District but No Biography Could Be Found
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information provided herein. If you note an error or omission, please contact the City of Richland’s Planning & Redevelopment Office so that a correction can be made. ABBOT STREET HENRY LARCOM ABBOT BORN: August 13, 1831 – Beverly, Massachusetts DIED: October 1, 1927 – Cambridge, Massachusetts ABBOT STREE T HENRY LARCOM ABBOT graduated in 1854 from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, placing second in his class. He was posted in the Topographical Engineer Corps, where he served until the beginning of the Civil War. During the Battle of First Bull Run on July 21, 1861, he was wounded while serving on the staff of Major General Irwin McDowell. He then served on the staff of the Army of the Potomac's Chief Engineer, Brigadier General John G. Barnard, through the Peninsular Campaign. After a year and a half of staff officer duty he was commissioned colonel and commander of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery regiment in January 1863, and was assigned to the defenses of Washington, D.C., frequently commanding a brigade in the protective fortifications. When the Union forces began the Siege of Petersburg in the summer of 1864, he was detailed to command all the siege artillery throughout the campaign. He was brevetted brigadier general, U.S. Volunteers on August 1, 1864, for "gallant and distinguished services in the operations before Richmond, and especially in the lines before Petersburg, Virginia." On March 13, 1865, he was brevetted brigadier general, U.S. Regular Army and major general, U.S. -
Civil War Spies and Spying 5
EDUCATOR’S GUIDE A MESSAGE FROM PETER EARNEST, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPY MUSEUM AND FORMER OPERATIONS OFFICER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This year on the 150th anniversary of the Civil War, there is a cascade of books, films, lectures, reenactments, and programs surrounding the events and significance of this tortured and bloody chapter in America’s two centuries old saga. Throughout the war, marked by splintered families, divided loyalties, and casualties in the hundreds of thousands, each side maneuvered to gain an edge, an advantage that might change the course of the war to gain victory or avoid defeat. That edge often lies in discovering the strengths and weaknesses of one’s adversary, in learning his secret plans and subterfuges, and in seeking to deceive him. Today we call such knowledge intelligence and plans to deceive, covert action. The Civil War was rife with both. And as in military conflicts throughout history, the edge often depended on which side could win the race to develop winning technologies. As a former Intelligence Officer, I vividly recall our strenuous efforts in the Central Intelligence Agency to develop leading edge communications technology during the Cold War. I was in the CIA unit engaged in clandestine operations to recruit Soviet officials as secret sources and to developing the technology for communicating with them secretly and securely. As the risk of working secretly with the CIA was often a matter of life and death to our sources, we in the Agency felt a special obligation to protect them at any cost. The Agency and its dedicated engineers and technical support staff worked tirelessly to develop new high tech, highly classified communications systems.