Judicial Cooperation and Legal Interpretation in European Union Tax Law
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JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN EUROPEAN UNION TAX LAW Robert F. van Brederodel I. INTRODUCTION The relationship between European Community (EC or Community) law and the national laws of its member states is2 complicated. The treaties establishing the European Communities have created a law system sui generis, i.e., separate from that of the individual member states, with its own terminology and under- lying legal principles. Community law is the common internal law of the member states rather than a law between the states, as is the case in traditional international law. Beyond the mere creation of mutual rights and duties between the states, as under traditional international law, Community law regulates the relation between I Dr. Robert F. van Brederode is a tax lawyer concentrating in the area of value added tax (VAT) and other transaction taxes. He has over 25 years experience in the field prac- ticing on both sides of the Atlantic, currently as a partner with International VAT Con- sultants. In addition, he teaches courses as an adjunct professor at New York University, School of Law, Graduate Tax Program. Previously, Dr Van Brederode was a partner with PwC, leading the Netherlands VAT & Customs practice, and professor of tax law at the Erasmus University, School of Economics. He can be reached at [email protected]. 2 Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force 1 January 1958); Treaty of 18 April 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (entered into force as of 23 July 1952); Treaty of 25 March 1957, establishing the EURATOM (entered into force on 1 January 1958). Together, EURATOM, ECSC and the EEC are the founding treaties of European integra- tion as amended by later treaties. The ECSC expired on 23 July 2002, and since then the coal and steel sectors are incorporated within the legal scope of the EEC Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 changed the name EEC to EC for the simple reason that the Community, beyond mere economic policy, is concerned with social, cultural and envi- ronmental policies. It also established the European Union (EU). The terminology may be confusing, especially to the non-European reader. It is important to realize that EC and EURATOM, with their common structures and institutions remain totally in place. The EU comprises the totality of the relations between the Member States, but is not a separate legal entity. The EU, therefore, is in essence a combination of supranational and intergovernmental power, but in the political sense only. 3 See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 3; Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 1194; Joined Cases C-6/90 & C- 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357. FA ULKNER LA W REVIEW Vol. 1-1:53 the Community and its subjects, including member states and pri- vate and legal persons, and between these subjects amongst them- selves.4 As a distinctive legal order, Community law regulates the powers, rights, and obligations of the Community and its subjects. Community law also provides for the procedures required for de-5 termining, adjudicating, and sanctioning infringements of the law. Community law is not common law or civil law; therefore, legal principles and precedent developed under common or civil law have no direct bearing on Community law. 6 Even if the same legal terminology is used, the meaning is not necessarily the same. 7 According to established case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Community law has priority over the national laws of the member states. 8 Primacy of Community law arises from the treaty itself, because realization of the objectives of the EC, particularly the establishment of a common market, would be illusory without the treaty.9 Primacy in this context should not be read as hierar- chy, but be understood in terms of substitution. When a country accedes to membership of the Community, it voluntarily limits its sovereign rights in favor of the Community it has decided to join. In interstate legal transactions, interpretation of the agree- ment is a matter for the contracting parties. However, the actions of the contracting parties of the EC and their subjects are super- vised by the ECJ. Therefore, the ECJ has a unique role. National courts operate within, and can rely on and refer to, their national legal tradition, but that was not the case at the European level. The ECJ had to create such a legal order from the texts of the treaties, 4 See THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 71 (P.J.G. Kapteyn et al. eds., 4th rev. ed. 2008). 5 Joined Cases 90/63 & 91/63, Comm'n v. Lux. & Belg., 1964 E.C.R. 1217. 6 See Case 64/81, Nicolaus Corman & Fils SA v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1982 E.C.R. 13. 7 See Case 51/76, Verbond van Nederlandse Ondememingen v. Inspecteur der Invoer- rechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E.C.R. 113. 8 See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 1194. 9 The supremacy of EC law is a cornerstone principle of Community law but the treaties do not provide for it. A Declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty provides, however, that "in accordance with the settled case-law of the ECJ, the treaties and the law adopted by the EU on the basis of the treaties have primacy over the law of member states, under the conditions laid down by the said case-law." Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 3, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 30 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty], Declaration 17. Although it is not legally binding, this Declaration represents the Member States' recognition of the ECJ case law on primacy of Community law. 2009 EUROPEAN UNION TAX LA W while referencing general principles of law, such as good faith,0 legal certainty, equality, legitimate expectations, proportionality,' and abuse of rights.'1 These principles are derived directly from the treaties, or are common to the legal systems of the member states. There also exists a cooperative relationship between Com- munity law and the laws of the member states. Community law may refer to national law' and national law may supplement Community law 13 or serve to implement it. The extent to which Community law affects member state national laws depends on the legal instrument applied to shape Community policy. The most important legal instruments are regulations and directives. A regu- lation is directly applicable in every member state (i.e., it does not require any action by the national legislature), and it can convey rights to, and impose obligations on, the member states, their bod- ies, and individuals. 14 A directive, however, is only binding on each member state as to the result to be achieved, and leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 15 Member states are required to loyally cooperate with Community law, a principle derived by the ECJ from article 10 of the EC treaty. This principle includes the legal obligation of the states to pay damages for losses incurred by individuals as a result of the non-compliance of a state with Community law. 16 Private parties may invoke directly effective provisions of Community law before their national courts, even in cases where national rules con- 10 Proportionality is now included in the European Community Treaty through article 5, and it is generally applicable to Community action. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter EC Treaty], arts. 1-5. 11See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (2d ed. 2006); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (6th ed. 2001). 12 For instance, the nationality requirement plays an important role in determining who benefits from the freedom of establishment or the free movement of employees; and national law determines who is eligible to plead before the ECJ. See EC Treaty, supra note 10, at Protocol 9, Statute of the Court of Justice, art. 19. 13Decisions of the ECJ, for example, are implemented in accordance with the procedures afplicable in the various member states. See id. at art. 256. Id. at art. 249, para. 2. 15 Id. at para. 3. Forms and methods, however, should be chosen in such a way that the stated result or objective of a certain provision in the Directive is also in fact achieved. See Case 48/75, Belg. v. Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497, para. 75; Case 38/77, Enka v. Inspec- teur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen Arnhem, 1977 E.C.R. 2203, para. 11. 16 Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, para. 40. FA ULKNER LAW REVIEW Vol. 1-1:53 flict with, or deviate from, Community law. In the latter case, na- tional courts must refrain from applying these national legal meas- ures; not because Community law is of a higher order, but because the national legislature has acted ultra vires.17 The national courts are entrusted with the legal protection of citizens under Commu- nity law 18 and legal actions must follow national legal procedures and national rules on court jurisdiction. In this sense, national courts also act as Community courts. As a general rule, a litigant who wishes to invoke Community law must approach a national court.