Problems of Mental Causation - Whether and How It Can Exist A Review of Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World Rüdiger Vaas University of Stuttgart Posener Str. 85, 74321 Bietigheim-Bissingen GERMANY
[email protected] Copyright (c) Rüdiger Vaas 2002 PSYCHE, 8(04), August 2002 http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-04-vaas.html KEYWORDS: mind-body problem, mental causation, free will, consciousness, functionalism, nonreductive physicalism, supervenience, multiple realization, reduction, emergence, explanation, properties. REVIEW OF: Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind- Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. viii + 146 pp. ISBN: 0262112345, US$ 25.00 (cloth), 0262611538, US$ 15.00 (pbk, 2000). ABSTRACT: There is a tension or even contradiction between mental causation - the belief that some mental events or properties are causally relevant for some physical events or properties - and the irreducibility of mental features to physical ones, the causal closure of the physical, and the assumption that there is no overdetermination of the physical. To reconcile these premises was a promise of nonreductive physicalism, but a closer inspection shows that it is, on the contrary, a source of the problem - namely, the unintelligibility of mental causation. This has to do with the widely-held assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical. How can the mental be causally relevant, then (because the physical seems to do all the causal work)? And what is the relationship of the mental and the physical (because supervenience must be explained)? There are many options, including identity, realizationism, emergence, or some kind of reducibility.