Belo Monte: Actors and Arguments in the Struggle Over Brazil's Most
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Vol. 148, No. 1 · Research article Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most DIE ERDE controversial Amazonian dam Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin Philip M Fearnside1 1 National Institute for Research in Amazonia (INPA), Av. André Araújo, 2936, Manaus, Amazonas, CEP 69067-375, Brazil, [email protected] Manuscript submitted: 06 April 2015 / Accepted for publication: 08 February 2017 / Published online: 31 March 2017 Abstract The reservoir of Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam was filled in December 2015. The dam’s planning, licensing and con- struction had rolled inexorably forward despite opposition from local victims of this development and from a wide array of other actors. Logical, legal and ethical arguments had less effect than the political and business forces prioritizing the dam. Part of the environmental destruction and human-rights violation at Belo Monte was apparently financed by taxpayers in North America and Europe with funds passed through Brazil’s Na- tional Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) from development policy loans (DPLs) to Brazil by the World Bank. This opens the opportunity for World Bank reforms to eliminate loopholes allowing funding through financial intermediaries. The human and environmental cost of Belo Monte should also give pause to governments and financial institutions in promoting dams as their primary response to energy issues. Zusammenfassung und Bau des Staudamms waren trotz des Widerstands der von diesen Entwicklungen lokalen Betroffenen sowie Der Stausee des brasilianischen Belo Monte Staudamms wurde im Dezember 2015 geflutet. Planung, Lizensierung- Eineines Teil breiten der Umweltzerstörungen Spektrums anderer Akteureund Menschenrechtsverletzungen unerbittlich vorangeschritten. in Belo Logische, Monte werdenrechtliche offenkundig und ethische durch Argu die mente hatten geringere Wirkung als die den Staudamm priorisierenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kräfte. als sogenannte development policy loans Steuerzahler in Nordamerika und Europa insofern über Mittel mitfinanziert, die Brasilien seitens der Weltbank (DPL) erhielt und die über die nationale Entwicklungsbank (BNDES) zur Verfügung gestellt wurden. Dies eröffnet die Chance für Weltbank-Reformen, um Hintertüren zu schließen, die- Finanzierungen durch Kreditvermittler ermöglichen. Die sozialen und ökologischen Kosten von Belo Monte sollten ebenso Regierungen und Finanzinstitutionen Einhalt dabei gebieten, Staudämme als ihre Hauptantwort auf Ener Keywordsgiefragen anzupreisen. development impacts Hydropower, indigenous peoples, hydroelectric dams, Amazonia, social movements, Philip M Fearnside, 148 2017: Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam. – DIE ERDE (1): 14-26 DOI: 10.12854/erde-148-27 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017 14 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam 1. Introduction other impacts (Fig. 2 ribeirinhos and part of tributary entering the Xingu in this stretch), among ). Other (BeloFig. Monte1 is a hydroelectric dam on Brazil’s Xingu inthe comparison city of Altamira, to the Pará impacts are flooded this dam by is the expected reservoir. to River, a north-flowing tributary to the Amazon River unleashGreat as asthe the impacts driving of forceBelo Monte for construction itself are, they of other pale ). The reservoir was filled in December 2015 and generation is officially projected to begin in 2016 (atBrazil, the 233-MW MME/EPE auxiliary powerhouse, with the full dams further upstream, especially the Babaquara- 11,233-MW installed capacity to be completed in 2019 Dam (officially renamed as the “Altamira” Dam). 2015: 100). When fully operational- The Xingu River has one of the greatest annual vari enousthe dam areas will andleave a apopulation 100-km stretch of traditional of river withriverside only ations in water flow of all Amazon tributaries, with dwellers20% of its (ribeirinhos normal flow, directly affecting two indig high-water season flows up to 60 times those of the low-water season. During three months of the year, ) on this “reduced flow” stretch, the low-flow period leaves the river with insufficient plus a third indigenous area on the Bacajá70°W (a small water to turn60°W even one of the 2050° turbinesW in the dam’s Fig. 1 Locations mentioned in the text. Dams: 1.) Belo Monte, 2.) Balbina, ´ 3.) Tucuruí, 10°N 10°N 4.) Jirau, 5.) Santo Antônio, 6.) Cachoeira Riberão (Guajará-Mirim), 7.) Babaquara (Altamira), 8.) Chacorão, Uatumã Rive 9.), São Luiz do Tapajós, Pará 0° 0° 10.) Jatobá. .! *# r Santarém Source: Own elaboration 2 .! Belém Manaus .! *#.!*#1 r Altamira *#3 Amazon River *# 7 *# 9 y r 10 pajós*# River MadeiraTa Rive8 r Porto Velho *#.! ansamazon Highwa *# BR-364 TrHighwa 5 Xingu Rive *# 4 10°S 6 10°S Rondônia cantins Rive y To River o .!Cuiabá São Francisc 20°S 20°S *# Planned dam *# Existing dam .! Cities Rivers km Highways 05250 00 1000 30°S 30°S 70°W 60°W 50°W 15 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam Fearnside - 11,000-MW main powerhouse, leaving only the 233-- agreements were bypassed repeatedly as the Belo MW auxiliary powerhouse in operation. Belo Monte is- human-rightsMonte project advancedorganizations ( and the, forthcoming). academic com Op- a run-of-river dam, not a storage dam, and its electri posing efforts from local people, environmental and cal generation therefore depends entirely on the riv high-impact Amazonian dams such as those on the er’s flow each day. Because the turbines are the most munity were much larger than in the cases of other expensive part of any hydroelectric project, building- fait accompli a dam that leaves 11,000 MW idle for three months is Madeira and Tapajós Rivers, yet the project advanced- difficult to explain as a financial and economic deci inexorably to make Belo Monte a . The damssion. The upstream answer of to Belo how Monte such a in dam order could to storepossibly water be dam project was impervious to all arguments – logi considered lies in officially denied plans to build other cal, legal and moral – and was successful at obtaining - support in the government agencies that promoted it, for release during the low-flow period. These dams canin the be banks learned? that financed it and in the companies that would flood vast areas of indigenous land. Protec invested in it. How did this happen and what lessons tions in Brazil’s laws, constitution and52°W international Fig 2 Belo Monte and surrounding area. Source: Own elaboration ´ S S 3° Belo Monte 3° main power house (Sitio Belo Monte) y *# Transamazon Highwa Travessão Altamira.! Belo Monte main dam No. 27 and auxiliary power house Big Bend of the Xingu Rive Babaquara *# (Sitio Pimental) (Altamira) Dam *# Adduction canal r Juruna de Paquiçamba Indigenous Land ± á j Arara da Volta r Grande do Xingu Baca Rive Indigenous Land .! Cities *# dam Trincheira/Bacajá Indigenous Land Highways (Xikrin) S Belo Monte Reservoir km S 4° Indigenous Land 015 020 4° 52°W DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017 16 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam 2. Actors in the Belo Monte struggle of a deal allowing him to leave federal prison for house arrest while he faces charges from federal prosecu- - A2.1 range Pro-dam of actors actors make up the two sides of the Belo Carvalho and Megale - tors for “corruption, money laundering and participa tion companies and industries producing aluminum tion in a criminal organization” ( Monte struggle. Pro-dam actors include the construc 2016). - and other electro-intensive commodities, consultingbarragei- advantageAs compared in the to decision-makingoptions such as processenergy dueconserva to the firmsros that prepare impact reports in the licensing tion or ceasing aluminum export, dams have a great process, the various groups of individual “ - - ” (engineers and other professionals, including possibility of the decision makers and their political some academics, who work in the dam-buildingCentrais ef parties obtaining financial support from contrac Elétricasfort), and Brasileirasgovernment agencies that plan and promote- tors interested in the constructioncaixas projects, dois whether searchdams, suchEnterprise as Brazilian (Empresa Electrical de Pesquisa Centers Energética ( = this is obtained as legal political donations, as illegal = ELETROBRÁS), the Energy Re donations to secret slush funds (“ Partido ”),dos or Tra as- (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica outrightbalhadores bribes to key politicians. In March 2016 the- EPE), and the National Agency for Electrical Energy former leader of the Workers’ Party ( = ANEEL). There the Lava Jato = PT) in the Senate made a lengthy confes are also influential business interests that profit from sion to federaldo Amaral prosecutors in exchange for leniency in localselling entrepreneurs goods and services and others to the supportingdam-building the effort, dam corruption probes. His 254-page sworn including the commercial elite of Altamira. In 2009 affidavit ( 2016) was released by the federal Environmental Development of the Transamazon judge in charge of the case; it includes the following on founded the Regional ForumFórum forRegional Economic de Desenvolviand Socio-- Belo‘‘The Monte Belo Monte(pp. 69-70): bribe [propina] served as a decisive mento Econômico e Socioambiental da Transamazônica contribution to the election campaigns of 2010 and eHighway