Vol. 148, No. 1 · Research article

Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over ’s most DIE ERDE controversial Amazonian dam Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin

Philip M Fearnside1 1 National Institute for Research in Amazonia (INPA), Av. André Araújo, 2936, Manaus, Amazonas, CEP 69067-375, Brazil, [email protected]

Manuscript submitted: 06 April 2015 / Accepted for publication: 08 February 2017 / Published online: 31 March 2017

Abstract The reservoir of Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam was filled in December 2015. The dam’s planning, licensing and con- struction had rolled inexorably forward despite opposition from local victims of this development and from a wide array of other actors. Logical, legal and ethical arguments had less effect than the political and business forces prioritizing the dam. Part of the environmental destruction and human-rights violation at Belo Monte was apparently financed by taxpayers in North America and Europe with funds passed through Brazil’s Na- tional Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) from development policy loans (DPLs) to Brazil by the World Bank. This opens the opportunity for World Bank reforms to eliminate loopholes allowing funding through financial intermediaries. The human and environmental cost of Belo Monte should also give pause to governments and financial institutions in promoting dams as their primary response to energy issues.

Zusammenfassung und Bau des Staudamms waren trotz des Widerstands der von diesen Entwicklungen lokalen Betroffenen sowie Der Stausee des brasilianischen Belo Monte Staudamms wurde im Dezember 2015 geflutet. Planung, Lizensierung-

Eineines Teil breiten der Umweltzerstörungen Spektrums anderer Akteureund Menschenrechtsverletzungen unerbittlich vorangeschritten. in Belo Logische, Monte werdenrechtliche offenkundig und ethische durch Argu die mente hatten geringere Wirkung als die den Staudamm priorisierenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kräfte. als sogenannte development policy loans Steuerzahler in Nordamerika und Europa insofern über Mittel mitfinanziert, die Brasilien seitens der Weltbank (DPL) erhielt und die über die nationale Entwicklungsbank (BNDES) zur Verfügung gestellt wurden. Dies eröffnet die Chance für Weltbank-Reformen, um Hintertüren zu schließen, die- Finanzierungen durch Kreditvermittler ermöglichen. Die sozialen und ökologischen Kosten von Belo Monte sollten ebenso Regierungen und Finanzinstitutionen Einhalt dabei gebieten, Staudämme als ihre Hauptantwort auf Ener Keywordsgiefragen anzupreisen. development impacts Hydropower, indigenous peoples, hydroelectric dams, Amazonia, social movements,

Philip M Fearnside, 148 2017: Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam. – DIE ERDE (1): 14-26

DOI: 10.12854/erde-148-27 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017 14 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

1. Introduction other impacts (Fig. 2 ribeirinhos and part of tributary entering the Xingu in this stretch), among ). Other (BeloFig. Monte1 is a hydroelectric dam on Brazil’s Xingu inthe comparison city of Altamira, to the Pará impacts are flooded this dam by is the expected reservoir. to River, a north-flowing tributary to the Amazon River unleashGreat as asthe the impacts driving of forceBelo Monte for construction itself are, they of other pale ). The reservoir was filled in December 2015 and generation is officially projected to begin in 2016 (atBrazil, the 233-MWMME/EPE auxiliary powerhouse, with the full dams further upstream, especially the Babaquara- 11,233-MW installed capacity to be completed in 2019 Dam (officially renamed as the “Altamira” Dam). 2015: 100). When fully operational- The Xingu River has one of the greatest annual vari enousthe dam areas will andleave a apopulation 100-km stretch of traditional of river withriverside only ations in water flow of all Amazon tributaries, with dwellers20% of its (ribeirinhos normal flow, directly affecting two indig high-water season flows up to 60 times those of the low-water season. During three months of the year, ) on this “reduced flow” stretch, the low-flow period leaves the river with insufficient plus a third indigenous area on the Bacajá70°W (a small water to turn60°W even one of the 2050° turbinesW in the dam’s Fig. 1 Locations mentioned in the text. Dams: 1.) Belo Monte, 2.) Balbina, ´ 3.) Tucuruí, 10°N 10°N 4.) Jirau, 5.) Santo Antônio, 6.) Cachoeira Riberão (Guajará-Mirim), 7.) Babaquara (Altamira), 8.) Chacorão, Uatumã Rive 9.), São Luiz do Tapajós, Pará 0° 0° 10.) Jatobá. .! *# r Santarém Source: Own elaboration 2 .! Belém Manaus .! *#.!*#1 r Altamira *#3 Amazon River *# 7 *# 9 y 10 pajós*# River MadeiraTa Rive8 r Porto Velho *#.! ansamazon Highwa *# BR-364 TrHighwa 5 Xingu Rive r *# 4 10°S 6 10°S Rondônia cantins Rive

y To River

o .!Cuiabá

São Francisc 20°S 20°S

*# Planned dam *# Existing dam .! Cities Rivers km Highways 05250 00 1000 30°S 30°S 70°W 60°W 50°W 15 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

Fearnside - 11,000-MW main powerhouse, leaving only the 233-- agreements were bypassed repeatedly as the Belo MW auxiliary powerhouse in operation. Belo Monte is- human-rightsMonte project advancedorganizations ( and the, forthcoming). academic com Op- a run-of-river dam, not a storage dam, and its electri posing efforts from local people, environmental and cal generation therefore depends entirely on the riv high-impact Amazonian dams such as those on the er’s flow each day. Because the turbines are the most munity were much larger than in the cases of other expensive part of any hydroelectric project, building- fait accompli a dam that leaves 11,000 MW idle for three months is Madeira and Tapajós Rivers, yet the project advanced- difficult to explain as a financial and economic deci inexorably to make Belo Monte a . The damssion. The upstream answer of to Belo how Monte such a in dam order could to storepossibly water be dam project was impervious to all arguments – logi considered lies in officially denied plans to build other cal, legal and moral – and was successful at obtaining - support in the government agencies that promoted it, for release during the low-flow period. These dams canin the be banks learned? that financed it and in the companies that would flood vast areas of indigenous land. Protec invested in it. How did this happen and what lessons tions in Brazil’s laws, constitution and52°W international Fig 2 Belo Monte and surrounding area. Source: Own elaboration ´ 3° S Belo Monte 3° S main power house (Sitio Belo Monte) y *# Transamazon Highwa Travessão Altamira.! Belo Monte main dam No. 27 and auxiliary power house Big Bend of the Xingu Rive Babaquara *# (Sitio Pimental) (Altamira) Dam

*# Adduction canal

r

Juruna de Paquiçamba Indigenous Land ± á j Arara da Volta r

Grande do Xingu Baca Rive Indigenous Land

.! Cities *# dam Trincheira/Bacajá Indigenous Land Highways (Xikrin)

S Belo Monte Reservoir km S 4° Indigenous Land 015 020 4° 52°W DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 1/2017

16 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

2. Actors in the Belo Monte struggle of a deal allowing him to leave federal prison for house arrest while he faces charges from federal prosecu- - A2.1 range Pro-dam of actors actors make up the two sides of the Belo Carvalho and Megale - tors for “corruption, money laundering and participa tion companies and industries producing aluminum tion in a criminal organization” ( Monte struggle. Pro-dam actors include the construc 2016). - and other electro-intensive commodities, consultingbarragei- advantageAs compared in the to decision-making options such as process energy due conserva to the firmsros that prepare impact reports in the licensing tion or ceasing aluminum export, dams have a great process, the various groups of individual “ - - ” (engineers and other professionals, including possibility of the decision makers and their political some academics, who work in the dam-buildingCentrais ef parties obtaining financial support from contrac Elétricasfort), and Brasileirasgovernment agencies that plan and promote- tors interested in the constructioncaixas projects, dois whether searchdams, suchEnterprise as Brazilian (Empresa Electrical de Pesquisa Centers Energética ( = this is obtained as legal political donations, as illegal = ELETROBRÁS), the Energy Re donations to secret slush funds (“ Partido ”),dos or Tra as- (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica outrightbalhadores bribes to key politicians. In March 2016 the- EPE), and the National Agency for Electrical Energy former leader of the Workers’ Party ( = ANEEL). There the Lava Jato = PT) in the Senate made a lengthy confes are also influential business interests that profit from sion to federaldo Amaral prosecutors in exchange for leniency in localselling entrepreneurs goods and services and others to the supportingdam-building the effort, dam corruption probes. His 254-page sworn including the commercial elite of Altamira. In 2009 affidavit ( 2016) was released by the federal Environmental Development of the Transamazon judge in charge of the case; it includes the following on founded the Regional ForumFórum forRegional Economic de Desenvolviand Socio-- Belo‘‘The Monte Belo Monte(pp. 69-70): bribe [propina] served as a decisive mento Econômico e Socioambiental da Transamazônica contribution to the election campaigns of 2010 and Highwaye Xingu and Xingu ( 2014. The main negotiating agent for the Belo Mon- te Consortium was the contractor FLAVIO BARRA of = Fort Xingu). Finally, there are politicians at [the construction firm] ANDRADE GUTIERREZ. The all levels who find major projects like dams useful as- numbers for the bribe were around R$30 million visible achievementsTribunal Superior that can Eleitoral win votes in subsequent [then ~US$ 15 million] for election campaigns. DEL- elections. In January 2013 Brazil’s Supreme Elector CÍDIO DO AMARAL believes that the final figures for donations:al Court ( the top four contributors to = TSE)political released cam- bribery are higher because during the campaign paignsinformation in Brazil for thein the first preceding time on politicaldecade were campaign con- an agreement was made with respect to “claims” struction companies that build dams in Amazonia presented by the Consortium of about R$1.5 bil- (Gama lion [~US$750 million]. The agreement regarding - “claims” was one of the conditions required for in- 2013). Three of the four largestZampier donors to the creasing the companies’ election contributions. And 2010 presidential campaign of Brazil’s current presi it must be said that the actions of the “triumvirate” Indent the were Lava large Jato construction firms ( 2010). - composed of SILAS RONDEAU [Minister of Mines - and Energy 2005-2007], ERENICE GUERA [head of (“Car Wash”) investigation into a mas- the Civil House during the 2010 election campaign] tivessive corruptionwho have cooperated scandal initially with the focused investigation on PETRO in and ANTONIO PALOCCI [head of the Civil House in exchangeBRÁS (the for government lighter sentences oil company), have stated several that execu the 2011] were fundamental to reaching [agreement on] - the corporate and business design of the Belo Monte Casado 2015; Project. DELCÍDIO estimates that the value for the samesee: Stauffer arrangements that apply to the petroleum sec contributions to the campaigns (2010 and 2014) of tor also apply to the electrical sector ( the PMDB and PT reached approximately R$45 mil- 2015). The chief executive officer of the lion [~US$23 million].” BeloCamargo Monte Corrêa (Amazonas construction em Tempo company has confessed to paying bribes to obtain construction contracts for - 2015). The Andrade- Gutierrez construction company also paid bribes for Dilma Vana Rousseff (known simply as “Dilma,” Bra Belo Monte contracts, and the former CEO of that com zil’s president since January 2011) served on the pany is currently negotiating to reveal details as part energy-policy committee of DIELuiz ERDE Inácio · Vol. Lula 148 da· 1/2017 Silva

17 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

- verted into Brazilian law in 2004 (Brazil, PR st (better known as “Lula”) in 2002 in preparing his can- 2004). In didacy for the October 2002 presidential election that 2012 the Regional Federal Court of 1 Region (TRF-- initiated the PT administration of the federal govern- 1)viding found a morein favor substantial of the indigenous legal barrier people to incontinuing one such ment. President Lula appointed Dilma as MinisterMensalão of suit (Civil Appeal nº 2006.39.03.000711-8), thus pro Mines and Energy, where she served from 2003 un til 2005, when a corruption scandal (the “Casa Civil”) construction. The head of the AGU was able to obtain forced President Lula to replace the presidential a private audience with the chief justice of Brazil’s chief-of-staff (head of the “Civil House” or );- Supreme Court and convince him to accept an appeal Dilma’s promotion to that office made her the second wasthat haltedwould severalallow the members dam to ofgo the forward executive in practice. branch most powerful person in the country from 2005 un During the four days that Belo Monte’s construction til her own presidential candidacy in 2010. During this time shePrograma became de known Aceleração as the do “mother Crescimento of the (ofInternational the government Rivers were 2012; received ISA by the chief justice PAC,” referring to the “Program for the Acceleration and no representatives of civil society were received- of Growth” ( ), 2012). The decision,- thea package 2010 presidential of projects launchedcampaign in her January advertising 2007 thatfea- lowedwhich constructionwas made by tothe continue chief justice pending without a decision consult on included many dams, among them Belo Monte. During ing any of the other justices in the Supreme Court, al tured the phrase “mother of the PAC.” the merits of the case at some unspecified future time. Monte has made her the most important actor on the This occurred only two weeks before the chief justicemen- Dilma’s personal involvement in championing Belo salãowas to reach the mandatory retirementSevá-Filho age and was meeting in 2011 where the minister of the environ- thisin the 2012 middle decision of the the high-priority Belo Monte case trial has of thenever “ ap- mentpro-dam attempted side. An to emblematic raise the issueevent of was criticism a ministerial of the ” corruption scandal (see: 2014). Since- Folha de São Paulo newspaper peared on the schedule of the Supreme Court for con Belo Monte Dam. The sideration, and the dam has, in practice, been built. reported that President Dilma cut the minister off, shouting “You must understand, once and for all, that this project is good, important for the country, and it On2.2 theAnti-dam anti-dam actors side there have been the various will be done”; the report goes on to state that “from groups of Indigenous people (both upstream and then on no one objected to anything else, and all of - (theMagalhães ministers began to publically defend the dam as digenous riverside dwellers (ribeirinhos a strategic project for the country’s infrastructure” downstream of Belo Monte), the traditional non-in 2011). ) both from- (Advocacia Geral da União - the stretch of river to be flooded and from the Big The head of the Federal Attorney General’s Office Bend, and many Altamira residents. An important lo = AGU), a presidential ap- cal actor opposing Belo Monte has been the Catholic pointee, has repeatedlyliminares managed to obtain judicial Church in Altamira. Dom Erwin Kräutler, Bishop of todecisions halt Belo from Monte a select pending set of consultation judges to overturn of the indig pre- inherentthe Xingu, in hastaking been this an position outspoken he has critic 24-hour of the secu dam- liminary decisions ( ) issued by lower courts plans ever since they became public. Due to the risks - vestments (Bratman enous peoples or other preconditions for the dam. A rity guards and wears a bullet-proof vest under his Millikansmall set and of federal Hurwitz judges can be counted on to quick- 2014: 284). Dom Erwin has had ly issue decisions overruling these impediments (e.g., access to high-level government officials, and it was 2011). These judges are, there (toInternational him that President Rivers Lula famously promised not to- fore, among the key actors on the pro-dam side. “ram Belo Monte down anyone’s throat” in July 2009Ca- - lixto 2009). Dom Erwin later conclud ilAt suits least (60AIDA legal contestations are still pending against ed that “none of Lula’s promises have been kept” ( Belo Monte in Brazilian courts, including 22 public civ A group 2015). of national-level Brazilian NGOs has support- 2015). The impacted indigenousILO people ed the local anti-dam movement and has publicized have not been consulted as required by International- - Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 ( 1989), whichDIE ERDE Brazil · Vol. signed 148 · 1/2017 in 1991, ratified in 2002 and con the dam’s implications and tried to influence govern

18 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

Environmental Institute (Instituto Socioambiental = - ment decisions. Especially active have been the Socio- - Brazilian Amazonia (Amigos da Terra Amazônia Bra- A key organization of local non-indigenousMovimento dam oppo pela sileiraISA) [www.socioambiental.org.br/], Friends of the Earth- Sobrevivêncianents was founded da Transamazônica in 1987: the Movement for the Sur Comissão Pró-Índio de São Paulo vival of the Transamazon Highway ( ) [www.amazonia.org.br/]; the Pro-Indian Com- = MPST),Movimento renamed pelo mission of(Comissão São Paulo Pastoral ( da Terra Desenvolvimentoin 1998 as the Movement da Transamazônica for the Development e Xingu of the = CPISP) [www.cpisp.org.br/], the Pastoral Land Com- Transamazon Highway and the Xingu ( - Movimento dos Atingidos= por CPT) Barragens [www. = MDTX). cptnacional.org.br/] and the Movement of Dam-Af This organization was to play an important role in re fected People ( - sisting the proposals for the “Altamira Complex” (Belo- = MAB) [www.mabnacional.org.br/]. International Monte and Babaquara) until the group split in 2008. NGOs playing similar support roles have included Cul AIn call August for good 2001 sense MDTX on brought the damming together of rivers 113 social in Ama or- tural Survival [https://www.culturalsurvival.org/], ganizationsMDTX to draft a document entitled “SOS Xingu: International Rivers [www.internationalrivers.org/] Indigenousand AmazonWatch groups [http://amazonwatch.org/].and their leaders have been at the zonia” ( 2001). - ISA 2001;On 25 SwitkesAugust 2001 the head of MDTX (Ademir Albeu longcenter series of the of demonstrations Belo Monte struggle. and direct They actions have main such Federicci, known as “Dema”) was assassinated ( - tained pressure on government officials through a- 2001). Dema is regarded as a martyr in- the struggle against Belo Monte. Although two gun as occupations of government offices or of construc men were arrested, their patrons were never identi- tion sites. However, a serious loss on the anti-dam estsfied (preventingin the Altamira confirmation area that of were whether also the displeased gunmen givingside has material been the rewards dam consortium’s such as outboard successes motor in co-- were paid by the dam proponents or by other inter opting some key indigenous leaders. This is done by- Heurich with MDTX). - boats, vehicles, fuel and foodstuffs to selected lead ers (e.g., 2013). Much of this was part of the- opponentsWhen the PT of Belowon MonteBrazil’s expected presidential this electionto decrease in Oc or “Emergency Plan”Plano agreed Básico toAmbiental by the consortium as a- tober 2002 and Lula took office in January 2003, many two-yearing prepared program (Norte whileEnergia the SA dam’s Basic Environ- the opposite turned out to be the case (see: Sevá-Filho mentalsures within Plan ( the indigenous groups could= PBA) then was lead be end federal government support for Belo Monte, but 2011). Internal pres Scholz2014). Many dam opponents had ties and overlapping- to silencing group members who had previously been interests with the PT, causing predictable strains (e.g., outspoken critics of Belo Monte. It has also led to the et al. 2004: 53-56). Under the PT administra fission of numerous indigenous villages (the number- tion, the federal government made substantial sums tionof villages to Belo increased Monte and from as a 19 means to 39 of between obtaining 2010 access and available to NGOs through contracts for a variety of to2015), the material both as ahandouts result of from disagreements the dam consortium over opposi for social and environmental projects, thus presenting an additional temptation for civil-society groups to moderate their criticisms of priority projects like Belo sub-groups withinQueiroz the indigenous communities, since Monte. - distribution of the benefits within communities was - very uneven ( 2015). The voices of the three The MDTX continued to oppose Belo Monte and suf downstream indigenous groups, which are the ones fered harassmentMelo from ELETRONORTE (the govern- most directly affected by the Belo Monte Dam itself, ment electrical company leading the preparations for Septemberhave fallen 2013silent bringing in recent together years. A indigenousnotable event groups was Belo Monte) ( 2005). However, a split was devel- a major gathering organized by ISA in Altamira in- dationoping within (Fundação MDTX, Viver, with Produzir various emembers Preservar becoming dam supporters. The Live, Produce and Preserve Foun from the whole length of the Xingu River, but repre = FVPP)- sentatives of the three downstream groups (Juruna- had been created in 1998 as the legal entity for the de Paquiçamba, Arara da Volta Grande do Xingu, and MDTX, and this status allowed it to compete for gov Xikrin do Bacajá) did not come (personal observa ernment contracts. In 2006 FVPP produced a report tion). on the history of MDTX (publishedDIE ERDE by · Vol.the 148Ministry · 1/2017 of

19 Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

- - tion of the group against Belo Monte as a thing of the the Environment); the report only mentions a posi criticized MAB’s dropping its opposition to Belo Mon FVPP - te as reflecting the factBratman that the group’s advocacy for past – in the 1990s before the name was changed from the displaced population logically required the dam “survival” to “development” ( 2006: 35). The as- Theproject non-indigenous to go forward opponents ( 2014:of the 277-278). dam hail from sassination of Dema did not merit mention in the 65- page “history.” However, only in 2008 did FVPP for pavedmally decide(Bratman to “not oppose” Belo Monte, ostensibly so familiesthree distinct (Villas-Bôas groups. One is the urban residents of as to assure that the Transamazon Highway would be Altamira who were displaced, officially 5141 urban- 2015: 70). In addition to the influence dents (ribeirinhos et al. 2015: 12), or about 25,000 of the PT affiliations of the organization’s leadership,- people. The second is the traditional riverside resi- positionthe government’s social groups linking in ofthe the Altamira highway area paving (Bratman to the ) who lived onVillas-Bôas the shores and islands dam proposal had succeeded as a “wedge” to split op in what is nowribeirinhos the Belo Monte reservoir (3568 fami the dam consortium has not kept its promises for a lies or about 18,000 people) ( et al. 2015: 2014: 277). Recently FVPP has been indignant that 13), and the along the “reducedDe Francesco flow” condicionantes andstretch Carneirom of the Big Bend of the Xingu, who have also serieslicensing of actionsBelo Monte that ( Britowould benefit local farmers, as spendinglost their somelivelihoods time withfrom ribeirinhosfishing (e.g., in what is now stipulated in the “preconditions” ( ) for 2015). This author had the privilege of 2015). on their livelihoods (da Silva-Forsberg and Fearnside the reservoir while advising a master’s dissertation (InMovimento 2008 the Xingu portion Vivo of para MDTX Sempre opposing Belo Monte- Travessão split off to form the Xingu Alive Forever Movement 1995, 1997); the knowledge and skills of these people = MXVPS), bet will be of little use in the housing project on - ter known simply as “Xingu Vivo” (www.xinguvivo. No. 27 (aMPF side 2015; Villas-Bôas branching off the Transamazon org.br/). Xingu Vivo was founded at the May 2008 Highway)third group where is the they small have farmers now been in the forcibly Transamazon relocat Second Encounter of the Indigenous Peoples of the ed (e.g., et al. 2015: 126). The Xingu. This group, led by Antônia Melo, became (and continues to be) the main grassroots organization Highway colonization areas near Altamira; this group contesting Belo Monte. The websites of the different is now divided, with many having switched sides to Notorganizations reported are give the the various impression disagreements that they andall have splits a support the dam. - continuous history of joint struggle for common goals. opponents occurred as the result of a visit to Altamira Celebrities of various types represent one of the out in these groups. AdditionalBratman divisions amongSalm local dam side groups that has helped to give public visibility to- - the impacts of Belo Monte. In 2011, for example, 19 byganizers Lula in of June the 2010 event ( were able 2014: to 277;aggravate 2010),splits somesoap-opera inaccuracies stars from (Movimento Brazil’s Gota Globo d’Água television net where, at a rally held in the city’s soccer stadium, or work made a video criticizing the dam, albeit with 2011). A woundbetween up local shouting social at organizations each other across (Marcelo a police Salazar, bar- counter-video supporting Tempestadethe dam was em produced Copo d’Água by a rierpublic (Bratman statement, 29 January 2016). Former allies group of students at the State University articleof Campinas in Veja (UNICAMP) magazine (Eler and Diniz 2014: 277). 2011). The counter-video was converted into a cover been an important national group opposing dams 2011), which The Movement of Dam-AffectedRothman People (MAB) has- was reprinted and widely distributed in Altamira by- workthe dam (Terra consortium. TV I recommend my debate with the since its founding in 1991 (e.g., 2001). How- students’ teacher on the Terra internet television net ever, MAB is allied with the PT and helped in the 2002- Various international 2011). celebrities have visited Altami- presidential campaign. When the PT won the elec tion and subsequently made Belo Monte a top prior- tratedity, MAB on softened organizing its stance urban atresidents the national who level. would MAB be ra and spoken out against Belo Monte. These include displacedonly arrived in Altamirain Altamira to demandin 2009, betterwhere compensationit has concen rock singer Sting in 1989, filmmaker James Cameron (Bratman and actress Sigourney Weaver in 2009, and James Cameron again in 2011. Actor and former California DIE ERDE · Vol. 2015: 148 70). · 1/2017 In 2009 Dom Erwin publically governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who was taken 20to Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

more than the initial expectations and take longer - the Xingu by his friend James Cameron in 2011, then- such cases around the world shows this to be the nor- ritiesrefused has to been comment controversial publically both on inside Belo Monteand outside (per than expected to complete. A review of hundredsAnsar of ofsonal Brazil observation). (see Jampolsky The involvement of foreign celeb - mal pattern, not an isolated exception ( et al. 2012). BiancaJagger Jagger has been administration2014). In the case had of to Belo use Monte,all of its the powers project’s of politifinan- the most consistently active celebrity in speaking and cial unviability is suggested by the fact that the PT writing about Belo Monte (e.g., Ministério 2013). Público Fed- eral - cal persuasion to bully companies and entities suchSevá as The Federal Public Ministry ( pensionFilho funds over which the PT has influence into = MPF), which was created by Brazil’s 1988 con investing in the project against their will (e.g., stitution as a special prosecutors’ office in defense of as a contractor 2014); Camargo - not as Corrêa, an investor the company with its involved own capi in- the interests of the people, has had a very important planning the project from the beginning, only serves basedrole, especially on the various the branches failures in to Belém follow and the Altamira.licensing proceduresThe MPF has and brought the violation series ofof suitsconstitutional against the and dam le- Thetal at environmental risk. impacts such as greenhouse-gas - - duced to unsupported assertions that the dam repre- gal provisions, such as the requirements for consulta emissions are generally little discussedFearnside and are 2012; re Othertion of actors indigenous include peoples. international human-rights agen- see Fearnside - - sents “green” or “clean” energy (e.g., 2011). Indigenous peoples are por cies, such as the Inter-AmericanAIDA Commission on Hu trayed as not directly affected, since the downstream andman members Rights (IACHR) of the press of the have Organization had roles ofin Americanobtaining groups are not underwater. The upstream groups are States (OAS) (see: 2016). A number of academics ignored completely, as the upstream dams are never of books with collections of papers on Belo Monte has mentioned. - beenand distributing an important information. source of information Over the years, in the a strugseries- Santos and de Andrade Sevá Filho The “need” for Belo Monte is questionable, since Bra and Switkes Magalhães and Hernández zil has much better energy options.Prado Projections of degle, Oliveira notably and Cohn (1990), electricity demand underlying Brazil’s dam-building- version of Villas-Bôas (2005), (2009), plans are grossly exaggerated ( et al. 2016). In (2014) and an annex to the online useaddition, (Brazil, not MME/EPE all of the “demand” is really “need”. Be et al. (2015). causethat a onlydecision 28.7% not of toBrazil’s build electricityBelo Monte is wouldfor domestic mean 3. The debate on Belo Monte: Arguments cast aside 2015: 44), the easy argument

higher electricity bills in Brazilian cities distorts the- question at hand. Most of the power from Belo Monte- popularThe pro-dam perception side largely and mainstream succeeded mediain casting reporting aside is not intended for household use, let alone for extend the various arguments questioning Belo Monte. Most ing electricity to remote areas without access to pow- er. Substantial amounts of electricity go to industries- portray the dam as a wise investment for the country- with little benefit for the Brazilian population. A logi- with minimal impactsEler and and Diniz as a project that is needed cal starting point in reforming energy policy is elimi to lower electricity bills and avoid blackouts in Brazil nating the export of electricity in the formFearnside of elec ian homes (e.g., 2011). However, these tro-intensive commodities such as aluminum, which- perceptions are mistaken on all counts. - generate little employment in the country ( bunked (de Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010; de Sousa Júnior 2016). Brazil has major opportunities to reduce en The economic arguments have been effectively de ergy use by improvements in energy efficiency and- in the transmission and distribution systems, and et al. 2006). The dam was economically indefensible- the country has enormousBaitelo potential for windBermann and so pectationeven at the when low constructionthe decision costswas made initially to buildforeseen. the lar2002; generation Moreira that receives only token priority when By 2013 theVeja cost was already (at least) double the ex compared to hydropower ( et al. 2013; - 2016-20192012). Most recently, Brazil’s ISApresident dam (e.g., 2013). In fact, this is part of a general vetoed all funding for “non-hydraulic renewable ener pattern21 worldwide, where dams normally cost much gy” in Brazil’s Pluri-AnnualDIE ERDE · Plan Vol. 148 ( · 1/20172016). Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

- Brazil, Questioningnewspaper accounts of the legality is limited of the to aproject simple is statement little un censingCIMC process, were not. The open-ended support- derstood. What appears in television news and mostder- for Brazil’s National Plan for Climate Change ( rubado 2008) is potentially also questionable, since Lunpro- that an injunction halting the dam was “toppled” ( motingdell hydroelectric dams is a major feature of the ) by a given judge. The perception is that there plan. The World Bank’s evaluations of DPLs (e.g., must therefore have been no merit to the injunction 2011) are strictly a checking off of the “triggers” halting the project. Not mentioned is the fact that the that have been met – not an assessment of how the injunction may be based on dozens of pages detailing- money was actually used. NGOs have long criticized violation of multiple laws, while the decision toppling- the possibility of the money being usedAmigos for da projects Terra the injunction consists of a few lines invoking a secu Amazônialike Belo Monte, Brasileira since the World Bank essentially does rity suspension without even touching on the mer usednot know in the where environmental the money areas goes associated ( with the its of the case. TheGraeff history of Belo Monte has amply- et al. 2009). Even if the money is shown that “the law is not a sufficient guarantee of enforcing rights” ( 2012: 277). There is little im policies that justify the funding, the funds indirectly petus to change the security suspension laws because- free up other funds for environmentally damaging only a tiny fraction of the Brazilian population knows projects like dams. The development policy loans to of the existence of theseFearnside laws, which allow judicial de Brazil essentially go into a common pot in BNDES, and cisions to be reversed if they imply “grave damage” to this government bank then uses the funds to finance the public economy ( 2015). individual projects, such as Belo Monte. Belo Monte- 4. International connections received a series of loansRojas with and highlyMillikan favorable terms that would be unavailable to virtually any other devel One of the factors that weakened involvement of in- opment project (e.g., 2014). BNDES- ternational NGOs in the Belo Monte struggle was the charged the Belo Monte consortium only 4% annual terminterest bonds on a at30-year-loan, 10% interest while (Leitão the Brazilian govern consortiumment simultaneously also obtained financed an unusualitself by seriesselling of short- loan fact that the dam was, at least on paper, entirely paid 2010). The dam for by Brazilian sources. Brazil’s National Bank for Millikan and Garzón Economic Development (BNDES) financed 80% of the- extensions and other modifications of the terms after- encetotal cost,(Rojas and and the Millikan rest was obtained from the pension thetions first in releasing DPL had thebeen funds granted for Belo ( Monte without an funds and other sources over which the PT had influ 2015). BNDES also ignored its own internal regula- 2014: 38). However, some of- mental risks (Garzón - the funds may have come from taxpayers abroad, as- evaluation of economic viability and socio-environ tectionsBNDES was were apparently avoided thatserving would as abar conduit funding for high-mon et al. 2015: 131). The relation etary flows from international sources such that pro ship between the BNDES leadershipLava (appointed Jato corruption by the federal government)Stauffer and politically motivated loans impact projects like Belo Monte. “Development policy has now become exposed by the loans” (DPLs) have become the predominantBIC form of investigationThe powerful (e.g., effect of international 2015). funding on re- World Bank lending in recent years, representing over- temhalf thatof the was World set upBank’s within total the lending World Bank (see in the 2009). late These loans essentially escape from the review sys- source struggles is apparent from past history. A case in point is POLONOROESTE, the program that rebuilt- 1980s to avoid environmentally and socially damag forestationand paved the (Fearnside BR-364 (Cuiabá-Porto Velho) Highway thereforeing projects. represent DPLs comean inducement with a series for the of “triggers”recipient and opened Rondônia to migration and massive de- (World Bank jargon for conditions), and the loans 1987). Funding from the World Bank meant that taxpayers in North America and Eu country to change its policies in ways and at a pace rope had paid for part of the destruction they were that otherwise might not be adopted. seeing on their television screens. An exposé on the- US television program “SixtyWade Minutes” was the key In the case of the first US$ 1.3 billion DPL to Brazil stimulus for the World Bank’s creating its environ for environmental policy, most of the “triggers” were- ment department in 1987 ( 2011). Belo Monte worthwhile changes for the environment, although now presents an opportunity for World Bank reforms, some,DIE ERDE such · Vol. as 148accelerating · 1/2017 Brazil’s environmental li such as ending the use of financial intermediaries 22to Belo Monte: Actors and arguments in the struggle over Brazil’s most controversial Amazonian dam

- Bermann, C. - bypass bank safeguards in channeling funds to dam 2002: O Brasil não precisa de Belo Monte.- Ami aging projects. The impacts of Belo Monte also provide gos da Terra-Amazônia Brasileira, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. a clear example of why both financial institutions and – Online available at: http://philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_ livres/Dossie/BM/Outros/Celio_Bermann-Belo_Monte. national governments should give priority to other BIC (Bank Information Center) - pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 energy alternatives, such as energy conservation and - generation from wind and solar sources. 2009: World Bank environ mental policy loan to BNDES: Moving money or main Acknowledgements streaming environmental sustainability? – IFI infobrief - September 2009, BIC, Washington, DC, U.S.A. – Online available at: www.bankinformationcenter.org/en/Docu Bratman, E.Z The author’s research is supported exclusively by academic ment.101658.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 sources: Conselho Nacional do Desenvolvimento Científico e . 2014: Contradictions of green development: Tecnológico (CNPq: Proc. 305880/2007-1; 304020/2010-9; Human rights and environmental norms in light of Belo 46 573810/2008-7; 575853/2008-5), Fundação de Amparo à Monte dam activism. – Journal of Latin American Studies Bratman, E.Z. 2015: - Pesquisa do Estado do Amazonas (FAPEAM: Proc. 708565) (2): 261–289, – doi: 10.1017/S0022216X14000042 and Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia (INPA: Passive revolution in the green econ PRJ15.125). Marcelo Augusto dos Santos Júnior prepared omy: activism and the Belo Monte dam. – International 15 the figures. I thank Paulo Maurício Lima de Alencastro Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics Brazil, CIMC (Comitê Interministerial sobre Mudança do Cli- Graça for comments. : 61-77, – doi: 10.1007/s10784-014-9268-z ma) References 2008: Plano Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima – - PNMC -- Brasil. – Ministério do Meio Ambiente, Brasília, AIDA (Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense) DF, Brazil. – Online available at: www.mma.gov.br/es - truturas/imprensa/_arquivos/96_01122008060233.pdf - Brazil, MME/EPE (Ministério de Minas e Energia, Empresa de 2015: Caso Belo Monte Brasil. Updated August 2015. – On –accessed 09/02/2017 Pesquisa Energética) - line available at: http://docplayer.com.br/6597204-Ca AIDA (Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense) - so-belo-monte-brasil.html – accessed 14/02/2017 2015: Plano decenal de expansão de en ergia 2024. – MME/EPE, Brasília, DF, Brazil. – Online avail 2016: IACHR opens case against Brazil for human rights able at: www.epe.gov.br/PDEE/Relatório%20Final%20 Brazil, PR (Presidência da Republica) violations related to Belo Monte Dam. – Amazon Watch, 7 do%20PDE%202024.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 - January 2016. – Online available at: http://amazonwatch. 2004: Decreto No 5.051, for-human-rights-violations-related-to-belo-monte-dam org/news/2016/0107-iachr-opens-case-against-brazil- de 19 de abril de 2004. – PR, Brasilia, DF, Brazil. – On line available at: www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004- Amazonas em Tempo Brito, R – accessed 08/03/2016 2006/2004/decreto/d5051.htm – accessed 08/03/2016 - 2015: Delator deverá revelar propina em . 2015: Verás que um filho teu não foge à luta. – ASCOM Amigos da Terra Amazônia Brasileira and 9 other organiza- - Belo Monte. – Amazonas em Tempo, 7 March 2015, p. 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