Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the perils of distraction Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology Final version pdf available at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Q82bMjAmsiyhTXyniy8v/full Juan Pablo Bermúdez Universidad Externado de Colombia Bogotá, Colombia
[email protected] Abstract: From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary, since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism (choking under pressure, expertise-induced amnesia, and expert confabulation), and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate ‘attention-control account’, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action, and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation. Hence the need for reflecting throughout performance. Keywords: skill, expertise, habit, attention, automaticity, control, utilization behavior, dual process 1 1.