` the Emerging Gas Region of the Eastern Mediterranean By

` The Emerging Gas Region of the Eastern Mediterranean By Emmanuel Karagiannis, Ph.D. The Eastern Mediterranean is changing fast. Significant gas discoveries near Cyprus and Israel are affecting the political, economic and security dynamics in the region. Indeed, energy development and transportation are an influential factor in determining the nature of interstate relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. New regional patterns of amity and enmity can now be observed. Israel's new relationship with Greece and Cyprus is largely based on shared energy interests. But gas discoveries have also worsened relations between Israel and Lebanon, and Turkey and Cyprus. The imminent economic boon to the region is more likely to exacerbate decades-old territorial disputes rather than create a foundation for solving long- standing problems in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean is once again in turmoil.1 Turkey is becoming increasingly assertive in pressing its claims and strengthening relations with the Muslim world. While it is preoccupied with Iran, Israel finds itself isolated after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. Greece and Cyprus faced a severe financial crisis from which they have only partly recovered. The Syrian civil war has turned into a regional crisis, drawing other neighboring countries into it. Post-Mubarak Egypt has sought a regional role as a leading Arab country, but the current confrontation between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood is threatening the country’s stability. Against this geopolitical background, a new factor has been added to the equation. Due to the recent natural gas finds, the Eastern Mediterranean will soon become the new energy frontier. The region has an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of undiscovered, but technically recoverable, natural gas.2 Both Israel and Cyprus could become major gas exporters, while Greece and Turkey could become hubs for the transportation of the resources to Europe. More importantly, energy development could have far reaching geopolitical implications for the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Indeed, energy has already impacted regional patterns of amity and enmity. The gas discoveries have strained Israeli-Lebanese relations. Also, relations between Ankara and Nicosia have deteriorated due to disagreements over the exploitation of offshore gas deposits south of the divided island of Cyprus. Simultaneously, energy cooperation has been the driving force behind the emerging Greek-Israeli-Cypriot partnership, leading in turn to cooperation in the field of defense. The aim of this article is to examine the implications of energy development and transportation on interstate relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The available 1 The Eastern Mediterranean includes the Levant (Lebanon, Cyprus, Syria, Israel and Jordan), Greece, Egypt, and Turkey. 2 US Geological Survey, “Natural Gas Potential Assessed in Eastern Mediterranean”, August 4, 2010, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2435#.Uzb8nldoYdU 1 studies either tend to focus on individual countries3, or simply lack theoretical depth.4 The article will first outline two different theoretical perspectives on energy. It will then describe the strategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves. Moreover, it will examine the role of energy in fostering interstate cooperation or exacerbating interstate disputes in the region. Finally, it will summarize the main findings and will offer some policy recommendations to Eastern Mediterranean governments. Theoretical perspectives on the politics of energy After the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, it became clear that exploitation and export of large quantities of hydrocarbons could contribute significantly to the redistribution of power among states.5 In the post-Cold War international system, the control of energy resources has become one of the most important indicators of state power.6 Those countries that have energy self-sufficiency and can export significant quantities of oil and/or gas could improve their position in the international system. Small states, like Norway and Qatar, exercise disproportionate to their population size influence because of their energy wealth.7 Although its core mission is to understand the international system, the discipline of International Relations has not studied in detail energy as a determinant of interstate relations.8 Nevertheless, there are two main theoretical perspectives on the politics of energy: the realist and the liberal. The theory of political realism, in all its versions, views energy largely as a national security issue.9 The end of the Cold War has intensified competition among great powers (i.e. the USA, China, Russia, and the EU) to control the energy resources of the Middle East, the Caspian Sea, and Africa. The consuming countries seek diversification of supply in order to enhance their energy security and not to fall victim of political or economic blackmail. Most realists have espoused the theory of 3 Hubert Faustmann, Ayla Gurel & Gregory M. Reichberg, Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution (Nicosia: PRIO Center, 2012); Anastasios Giamouridis, “The Offshore Discovery in the Republic of Cyprus: Monetisation Prospects and Challenges”, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, July 2012; Brenda Shaffer, “Israel – New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean”, Energy Policy 39 (2011): 5379-5387. 4 Michael Emerson, “Fishing for Gas and More in the Cypriot Waters”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Policy Brief 02, July 2012, accessed January 12, 2014, http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_PB_02.pdf 5 See, for example, Mason Willrich, Energy and World Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975) and Charles K. Ebinger, The Critical Link: Energy and National Security in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1982). 6 Oystein Noreng, Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 7 John Ausland, Norway, Oil and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1979) and David Roberts, Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State (London: Hurst Publishers, 2014). 8 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 18. 9 See, for example, Robert L. Paarlberg, “Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Power”, International Security 3 (1978): 3-19 and Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008). 2 peak oil, which claims that oil (and gas) will run out one day because it is a non- renewable source of energy.10 This means that conflicts over energy resources will increase significantly both regionally and globally. Already some analysts attribute the British-Argentinean conflict for the control of the Falklands11 and the territorial disputes in South China12 Sea to the possible existence of hydrocarbons. Oil and gas transportation, meaning pipelines and tankers, sits right at the intersections of politics and economics. By its very nature, energy transportation is a high-reward business. The countries through which pipelines pass will enjoy substantial income from transit fees. Additionally, pipeline construction and operation means jobs and supporting infrastructure important to local economies. Whoever controls the transportation routes can block the flow of oil and gas; pipelines have become tool of leverage in times of political disagreements and hostage in times of armed conflict.13 The tanker industry, carrying much of the world’s oil and gas supply, has also been vulnerable to geopolitical upheavals. In contrast, liberal analysts do not associate energy with national security issues. Instead this perspective favors the depoliticisation of energy and supports the liberalization of energy markets in order to achieve maximum benefit for the consumers.14 Liberals have criticized the peak oil theory as being too focused on cheap conventional oil; the massive Alberta tar sands only prove that world oil resources cannot be fully estimated. Also, proponents of the liberal approach argue that the interdependence between producers and consumers is a positive development, as it creates a climate of cooperation and reciprocity.15 Furthermore, some liberals view energy as a tool for resolving political conflicts. This is based on the view that energy cooperation may be the catalyst for conflict resolution. For instance, the process of European integration began in 1952 with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, which partly aimed at fostering energy cooperation between two former belligerents, West Germany and France. From the liberal perspective, international organizations like the International Energy Agency can also help to resolve interstate disputes in energy issues.16 10 Alexander Tsatskin and Oded Balaban, “Peak Oil in the Light of Oil Formation Theories”, Energy Policy 36 (2008): 1826-1828. 11 Peter Keirnan, “The Falkland Islands: Oil and Gas Exploration’s Newest Frontier”, Oil and Gas Monitor, April 9, 2012, accessed February 3, 2014, http://www.oilgasmonitor.com/falkland-islands-oil-gas-explorations-newest- frontier/1714/ 12 Ben Bland and Jamil Anderlini, “Tensions Flare Over Oil in South China Sea”, Financial Times, October 16, 2011, accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8316f698-f801-11e0-8e7e- 00144feab49a.html#axzz2xhvCzpbO 13 Rafael Kandiyoti, Pipelines: Flowing Oil and Crude Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 14 Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin, Global Energy Governance:

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