Are Distributions Really Structures? a Critique of the Methodology of Max Weber
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ARE DISTRIBUTIONS REALLY STRUCTURES? A CRITIQUE OF THE METHODOLOGY OF MAX WEBER Harriet Friedmann* Research Paper No. 63 *Harvard University and Centre for Urban and Community Studies University of Toronto The first draft of this paper was much improved through the criticisms and suggestions of Stephen Berkowitz, Ron Brieger, George Homans, and Harrison White. The final version emerged after several drafts, each of which benefited greatly from the detailed criticism and enthusiastic encouragement of Karen Anderson, Barry Edginton, Leslie Howard, Jack Wayne, and Barry Wellman. I wish also to express my appreciation to William Michelson and L.S. Bourne who have generously made available the facilities of the Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto. July, 1974 Abstract Two conceptions of social structure can be distinguished: structural approaches analyze the patterns of relations among units, while distributional approaches seek to depict social structure through determining the distributions of characteristics of the units. Through explicitly developing the analytic method of constructing organized social forms from probabilistically conceived social actions, Weber systematically defined the aggregative and distributional logic which underlies much contemporary sociology. An examination of some of his most important work -- the study of bureaucracy, class and status, and charisma -- reveals that Weber abandoned his methodological strictures in favour of a more structural approach when the substantive and theore tical analysis required it. An understanding of the limitations of dis tributional conceptions of social structure points to theoretical and methodological approaches through which sociologists can build on both the distributive and the structural aspects of Weber's work. Are Distributions Really Structures? A Critique of the Methodology of Max Weber The most fundamental concept in sociology is social structure. Although it is rarely defined explicitly, one or another meaning of the concept provides the basic assumption underlying all sociological analysis. At least two fundamentally different conceptions of social 1 structure can be identified, which I shall call structural and distributional. The first defines structure as changing patterns of relations among units, whether individuals, organizations, or groups. The second, usually implicitly, seeks to depict social structure through determining distributions of characteristics of the units, whether they be shared norms or values, or socio-economic attributes. Both approaches have been taken, for example, in mobility studies, and a simplified contrast may clarify the distinction. A structural approach determines both the existing paths of mobility within the organized set of positions (not occupational categories) in society and the career lines determined by the patterns of recruitment into those positions. A distributional strategy approaches social structure less directly, through its reflection in the distribution of rewards (such as income or status) , and seeks to determine the distribution of characteristics (such as education, motivation, or father's occupation) of mobile and non-mobile individuals. I shall return to this example in my conclusions. This paper is a critical examination of one of the classical sources of distibutional, or aggregative, strategies of social - 2 - analysis, the methodology of Max Weber. Weber's ideal-typical social actions are rooted in probabilities of the occurrence of given meaningful behaviors; he bases his construction of organi zational forms sometimes on the simple aggregation of these actions, and other times, on the distributions of types of action among the population of social actors. Although the importance of Weber's work is universally recognized among sociologists, and a wide range of researchers, from ethnographers2 to survey analysts, draw upon his social action methodology, the probabilistic underpinnings of Weberian analysis have rarely been examined. Nor have either the implications of restricting the unit of analysis to probabilistically conceived ideal-typical social actions, or the derivation of structure to the aggregations of these units. In what follows, I will attempt to explicate Weber's explicit methodology and to examine the degree to which he applies it consistently in his substantive work. What will emerge from the analysis is that Weber both system atically defined the aggregative and distributional logic which underlies much contemporary sociology, and at crucial points in his substantive work, abandoned it in favour of a more formal and structural approach. As Zeitlin (1968) convincingly argues, Weber should not be read in opposition to thinkers seeking to analyze objectively observable social dynamics. But this substantive and theoretical compatibility exists precisely because Weber was willing to sacrifice his methodological strictures when the analysis required it. His commitment was to understanding basic social dynamics, such as the development of rationality as the basis of social action in - 3 - modern Western society and not in other times or places. There fore, when his method failed him, he implicitly adopted another. Some of his most significant work for later generations of scholars --- the study of bureacracy, class and status, and charisma -- will provide the material for an examination of his own adaptations to the limitations of the distributional methodology implied by the social action approach. This critical examination, in turn, will lead to conclusions about the appropriate uses of each strategy of analysis. - 4 - Probability and Aggregation: From the ideal-typical actor to organized social life Weber's emphasis on the subjective meaning of social action uniquely defines the character of his analysis and differentiates 3 him from other classical thinkers. This methodological requirement restricts the object of analysis to the individual, as the only entity which can think and act. Organized social life must, according to Weberian methodology, derive from the cumulated social actions of individuals. While the larger consequences may not be predicted or even understood by the set of social actors, their individual actions must be subjectively meaningful and thus subject to the interpretive understanding of the analyst. In this way, as Wrong (1970: 22) puts it, the concept of verstehen, is the link between Weber's methodological reflections on the social sciences and his general sociological concepts. But it is precisely these larg.er social consequences of cumulated social actions which are of interest to sociology. The central methodological problem, then, is how to derive the organizational outcomes of a set of individual social actions in a consistent way. Weber argues for two related strategies. First, in order to isolate subjective meanings which are important analytically, the analyst must adopt a nominalist stance; he chooses a point of view from which to select and order relevant observations and constructs ideal- typical social actions from the probabilities that actors will attach a given meaning to a given behavior. Second, and more problematically, - 5 - he attempts to aggregate these social actions in such a way that he can explain organization. In analyzing Weber's methodological argu- ments, I will focus on: (1) the element of probabilistic reasoning in his concepts of "verstehen" and "ideal-type" and (2) the derivation of different organizational units out of typical social actions. Verstehen, Weber's fundamental methodological concept, is probably best translated as "interpretative understanding". (Freund 1968: 93) Such understanding may refer either to common-place rational activity (such as arithmetic operations) or to the motive or "meaning" of action as subjectively experienced by an actor. However, it is only the latter --- understandable, subjectively meaningful behavior which Weber considers "action". If this action is oriented toward others, it is "social action". In contrast to historical explanation, a truly sociological approach attempts to interpret the meaning of mass4or aggregated, social actions. (Weber 1968: 4 - 9) For Weber, the interpretation of mass phenomena of this kind requires an abstraction from complex ideas and motivations of those elements which are interpreted as central from the point of view the analyst chooses to adopt. This abstraction is an "ideal type"; i.e., the typical meaning, which as a shared individual attribute, defines a set of actors. An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of - 6 - a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. (Emphasis in the original.) (1949: 90) The epistemology which underlies Weber's concept of the ideal type posits an infinite number of "facts", which are ordered by analytic constructs. This nominalism implies only a relative correspondence between any given construct and actual historical reality. For this reason, understanding that seeks to go beyond the typical individual, even to the simplest relationships, must be verified in terms of probabilities. (Freund 1969: 50) Weber consistently defines his simplest relational concepts in this way. For example, the "probability of social action" is the basis of his definition of "social