10 the Construction of Railways and the Decline of the Propination System

10 The Construction of Railways and the Decline of the Propination System The propination system came into being because of the logistical difficulties associated with the transportation of grain from Eastern Europe westwards. These difficulties were less acute in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth than in Russia, since it had open access to the Baltic Sea ports (Gdańsk, Königsberg, Riga), and to several large navigable rivers of the Baltic basin, namely the Vistula, the Neman, and the Daugava. However, the rivers of grain-producing Ukraine which flow to the Black Sea (the Dnieper, the Dniester, and the Southern Bug) were closed to Polish merchants, since its northern shore was controlled by the Ottoman Empire (through Crimean Khanate). This problem was solved only in 1783, after the First Partition of Poland, when two canals connected the river systems of the Baltic and the Black Sea basins. These were the Royal Canal (Kanał Królewski), constructed in from 1775 to 1783, which connected the Pina (a tributary of Pripiat’, itself a tributary of Dnieper) with the Mukhavets (a tributary of the Western Bug, itself a tributary of Vistula), and the Ogiński Canal (Kanał Ogińskiego), constructed from 1767 to 1783, which connected the Yasel’da (a tributary of Pripiat’) with river Shchara (tributary of Neman). Nevertheless, Poland remained the largest exporter of grain in Europe from the 16th to the 18th centuries, but the usual problems of river traffic in Eastern Europe, which included frozen rivers in winter, made it more profitable for noble landowners to sell grain locally in the form of alcohol. In Russia, the logistical problems were much more serious. Muscovite Russia had only one sea port, Arkhangelsk, which had been founded after the discovery of the maritime route to the White Sea by the English explorer Richard Chancellor in 1553. However, Arkhangelsk was too far away from the grain producing regions of central and Southern Russia, and the Arctic maritime route was too dangerous to make grain export from Russia an attractive option for landowners. For this reason many Russian rulers of from the 16th to the 18th centuries strove to obtain access to either the Baltic or the Black Sea. The repeated attempts of Ivan the Terrible to conquer Livonia from 1558 to 1583 failed. As did those of Boris Godunov, Mikhail Romanov and Alexei Mikhailovich, who each attempted to conquer the Karelian Isthmus from 1590 to 1595, from 1613 to 1617 and from 1656 to 1658 respectively. Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Peter the Great fared no better in their attempts, from 1687 to 1689 and from 1695 to 1711 respectively, to gain access to the Black Sea. Russia reached the Baltic only after the conquest of Livonia and the Karelian Isthmus in 1710 in the Great Northern War. Only after the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, which ratified the territorial acquisitions of Peter the Great, was Russia a significant player in the European grain market. Even more important for the Russian grain trade was the opening of the Black Sea ports after the annexation of Crimean Khanate in 1783, during the reign of Catherine the Great, since the Russian part of Ukraine (Left-bank Ukraine) was connected to the sea through The Construction of Railways and the Decline of the Propination System 207 rivers in the Black Sea basin. Thus, only with the foundation of new ports on the Northern shore of the Black Sea in the form of Kherson (1783), Nikolayev (1788) and Odessa (1794), did Russia began to compete seriously with Poland in European grain markets. However, the problems of the river navigation were as valid in Russia as they were in Poland. The enserfment of the Ukrainian peasants in 1783 and the annexation of the Right-bank Ukraine from 1793 to 1795 did not bring about any significant changes in the propination system in the first half of the 19th century. The situation began to change only with construction of the railway networks in European Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Cheap, uninterrupted and swift transportation by rail made grain export for the first time more profitable for local landowners, than its use in the local production of alcoholic beverages.334 The amount of Russian grain exported grew between 1860 and 1913, from 50 million poods to 350 million poods.335 The correlation between the growth of Russian grain export and railway construction in the second half of the 19th century is shown in table 10.1, where the data for 1861 is taken as 100%. By the eve of World War I Russia had become the largest grain exporter in the world, producing from 1909 to 1913 25% of the world supply of wheat, 37% of rye, 71% of barley, and 43% of oats.336 The exportation of grain also dominated its own foreign trade. The influx of the cheap Russian grain transported via rail into central and Western Europe also caused a drastic drop in grain export from the Kingdom of Poland in the 1880s.337 In Belarus the railway network was especially dense since its territory connected the political and economic centers of the Russian Empire (Moscow and St. Petersburg) with those of central Europe (Berlin and Vienna), and Russia’s Baltic Sea ports (Libava and Riga) with Black Sea ports (Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa). In Minsk Guberniya the railway age began with the construction of the Moscow-Warsaw railway in 1870. Initially, two alternative routes for this railway line were proposed: a southern one via Smolensk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Pinsk and Brest, and a northern one via Smolensk, Orsha, Borisov, Minsk and Brest. After an examination of the terrain, the commission 334 The impact of the construction of the railways on Russian economy is examined in numerous stu- dies: Блиох, Иван, Влияние железных дорог на экономическое состояние России, С-Петербург, 1878; Давыдов, Михаил, Всероссийский рынок в конце XIX - начале XX вв. и железнодорожная статистика. С-Петербург, 2010; Петров, Николай, Экономическое значение русских железных дорог, С-Петербург, 1910; Радциг, Александр, Влияние железных дорог на сельское хозяйство, промышленность, торговлю, С-Петербург, 1896; Соловьева, Анна, Железнодорожный транспорт России во второй половине XIX в., Москва, 1975. 335 Falkus, Macolm E., “Russia and the International Wheat Trade, 1861-1914”, Economica (New Se- ries) 33, 1966, p. 417. 336 Goodwin, Barry K. and Grennes, Thomas J., “Tsarist Russia and the World Wheat Market”, Explo- rations in Economic History 35, 1998, p. 406. 337 Dynner, Glenn, Yankel’s Tavern: Jews, Liquor, and Life in the Kingdom of Poland, Oxford, 2014, p. 138. 208 The Construction of Railways and the Decline of the Propination System chose the northern route in 1867, because of the possible construction problems in the Polesye marshes of the Pinsk region. This decision caused an economic crisis in the Pinsk district, where the grain production became unprofitable.338 Table 10.1 Grain Exportation and Railway Construction in Russia in 1861-1913.339 Years Grain Exports Railways (Length) 1861 100 100 1871 242 618 1881 359 1050 1891 504 1395 1896 647 1795 1901 740 2564 1906 725 2891 1913 783 3191 The second railway in Minsk Guberniya was the Libava (now Liepaja) – Romny line, which was constructed in 1873-1874. This railway connected the Baltic Sea port Libava with the center of the sugar production in Ukraine, Romny, passing via Vilna, Minsk, Bobruisk and Gomel’. Its construction transformed Minsk into the first city with a railway junction in the Guberniya. Both these railway lines were commercial in nature, but in 1882 the first military railway in Polesye region was constructed, the Zhabinka (near Brest) -Pinsk line. In 1883 the Ministry of War decided to construct a strategic network of railways in the Polesye marshes, which posed a serious logistical problem for troops’ deployment in western direction. This network was called “the Polesye railway system”. It was constructed from 1884 to 1887, and connected Briansk with Brest, via Gomel’, Luninets and Pinsk, Vilna with Sarny, via Lida, Baranovichi and Luninets, and Baranovichi with Belostok, via Slonim (see figure 13.10 in appendix 4). The villages of Luninets and Baranovichi additionally became two railway junctions as result of the construction of the Polesye railway system. In 1896 the local line Osipovichi-Staryye Dorogi was constructed as an offshoot of the Libava-Romny line, transforming the village of Osipovichi into yet another railway junction. In 1907 this line was extended to Urechye at the expense of a local landlady named Permiakova. Finally, in 1911, an offshoot of the Briansk-Brest line 338 Nadav, Mordekhai, The Jews of Pinsk, 1506 to 1880, ed. Mark Jay Mirsky and Moshe Rosman, transl. Moshe Rosman and Faigie Tropper, Stanford, 2008, pp. 394-395. 339 Christian, David, Imperial and Soviet Russia: Power, Privilege and the Challenge of Modernity, Basingstoke, 1997. The Construction of Railways and the Decline of the Propination System 209 between Vasilevichi and Khoiniki was constructed, making the village of Vasilevichi a railway junction too. The most obvious impact of railway construction in Minsk Guberniya on its rural Jewish population was the rapid concentration of the Jews in those villages, which suddenly obtained railway stations . The most striking example is Baranovichi in the district of Novogrudok , a small village with 150 inhabitants in 1880.340 It had become by 1897 one of the largest towns in the Guberniya with the population of 8718 (half of them Jews). It should be taken into account that the construction of the Polesye railway system coincided with the Temporary Rules (“May Laws ”) of 1882, which drastically restricted the mobility of the rural Jewish population. Many villages, which obtained railway stations, were closed to Jews and their presence there became illegal.

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