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The Human Cost RIGHTS the Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan WATCH

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The Human Cost RIGHTS the Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan WATCH Afghanistan HUMAN The Human Cost RIGHTS The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan WATCH PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ April 2007 Volume 19, No. 6(C) The Human Cost The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Map of Afghanistan.................................................................................................. 1 I. Summary...............................................................................................................2 II. Background........................................................................................................12 III. Civilian Accounts...............................................................................................25 Attacks Targeting Civilians ................................................................................25 Indiscriminate or Disproportionate Attacks on Military Targets ..........................47 IV. Civilian Perceptions ..........................................................................................67 V. Rising Civilian Casualties: Trends and Statistics ................................................70 VI. Legal Analysis...................................................................................................78 Applicable Treaties and Customary Law ............................................................79 Applying Legal Standards to Insurgent Activities ...............................................82 International Forces, Security Concerns, and Laws of War Violations ................ 98 VII. Recommendations ......................................................................................... 101 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 105 Acknowledgments................................................................................................106 Appendix A: Examples of Insurgent Attacks in 2006............................................. 107 Appendix B: Attacks on Afghan Educational Facilities in 2006.............................. 116 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ Map of Afghanistan 1 Human Rights Watch April 2007 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ I. Summary I passed the cart and a few seconds later the bomb exploded. It was like an earthquake. It blew me back about three or four meters. I woke up and saw people and body parts everywhere: fingers, hands, feet, toes, almost everything. People were screaming and others were screaming that another bomb would explode . I was wearing a white suit that day and I saw that my suit was red. I can’t walk fast now. You know, I was a boxer. I can’t box anymore. My leg hurts everyday and I have a hard time walking. When I think about these things it brings tears to my eyes. When I think about these things and put them all together it makes me want to leave this country. —Mohammad Yusef Aresh, describing a bomb attack in Kabul, July 5, 2006.1 Since early 2006, Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, and other armed groups in Afghanistan have carried out an increasing number of armed attacks that either target civilians or are launched without regard for the impact on civilian life. While going about ordinary activities—walking down the street or riding in a bus—many Afghan civilians have faced sudden and terrifying violence: shootings, ambushes, bombings, or other violent attacks. These insurgent attacks have caused terrible and profound harm to the Afghan civilian population. Attacks have killed and maimed mothers, fathers, husbands, wives, parents, and children, leaving behind widows, widowers, and orphans. Many civilians have been specifically targeted by the insurgents, including aid workers, doctors, day laborers, mechanics, students, clerics, and civilian government employees such as teachers and engineers. Attacks have also left lasting physical and psychological scars on victims and eyewitnesses, and caused tremendous pain and suffering to surviving family members. 1 Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Yusef Aresh, Kabul, September 6, 2006. The Human Cost 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ This report is about insurgent attacks and their consequences. It is based on accounts provided by witnesses, victims, and victims’ relatives, and a thorough review of records and reports of incidents in 2006 and through the first two months of 2007. The report also includes an assessment of statements by insurgent groups themselves, who often claim responsibility for attacks that kill and injure large numbers of civilians. Anti-government forces are not the only forces responsible for civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan. At least 230 civilians were killed during coalition or NATO operations in 2006, some of which appear to have violated the laws of war. While there is no evidence suggesting that coalition or NATO forces have intentionally directed attacks against civilians, in a number of cases international forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks or otherwise failed to take adequate precautions to prevent harm to civilians. Human Rights Watch has reported on several of these cases and will continue to monitor the conduct of such forces. But in this report we focus on the civilian victims of insurgent attacks, and on the effects of these attacks on civilian life in Afghanistan. Civilian deaths from insurgent attacks skyrocketed in 2006. Though exact casualty numbers from previous years are not available, increases in overall numbers of insurgent attacks in 2006 indicate that 2006 was the deadliest year for civilians in Afghanistan since 2001. Roadside bombs and other bomb attacks more than doubled since the previous year. Human Rights Watch counted 189 bomb attacks in 2006, killing nearly 500 civilians. Another 177 civilians were killed in shootings, assassinations, or ambushes. Overall, at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 separate armed attacks by anti-government forces in 2006. (Almost half of these attacks appear to have been intentionally launched at civilians or civilian objects.) Hundreds of civilians also suffered serious injuries, including burns, severe lacerations, broken bones, and severed limbs. The total number of civilian casualties—Afghans killed or wounded in insurgent attacks—was well over 1,000 for the year. 3 Human Rights Watch April 2007 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ Suicide bombings, once very rare in Afghanistan, now occur on a regular basis. At least 136 suicide attacks occurred in Afghanistan during 2006—a six-fold increase over the previous year. (This count is a subset of the 189 bomb attacks noted above.) At least 803 Afghan civilians were killed or injured in these suicide attacks (272 killed and 531 injured). At least 80 of these attacks—a clear majority—were on military targets, yet these 80 attacks caused significant civilian casualties, killing five times as many civilians as combatants (181 civilians versus 37 combatants). Civilian deaths and injuries from insurgent attacks have continued in 2007. In the first two months of 2007, insurgent forces have carried out at least 25 armed attacks resulting in civilian casualties, including suicide attacks and other bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and executions. These attacks have killed at least 52 Afghan civilians and injured 83 more. Insurgent attacks have also done significant damage to civilian property. In addition to bombings and other attacks that resulted in damaged shops, buildings, and infrastructure, insurgents specifically targeted local schools, which are often the only symbol of government in remote areas. In 2006, bombing and arson attacks on Afghan schools doubled, from 91 reported attacks in 2005 to 190 attacks in 2006. Attacks have continued into 2007. Violations of the Laws of War Civilian casualties during armed conflict are not necessarily the result of violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war). The nature of modern armed conflict is such that civilians are frequently killed and injured during fighting that is nonetheless in accordance with the rules of warfare. However, Human Rights Watch investigations found that many civilian casualties from insurgent attacks in Afghanistan in 2006 were intentional or avoidable. Insurgent forces regularly targeted civilians, or attacked military targets and civilians without distinction or with the knowledge that attacks would cause disproportionate harm to civilians. The Human Cost 4 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954fd1/ Such attacks violate international humanitarian law. Serious violations of international humanitarian law are considered war crimes, and are subject to the jurisdiction of the R0me statute of the International Criminal Court, which Afghanistan ratified in 2003. There is little question that responsibility for most attacks lies with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Taliban spokesmen have claimed responsibility for over two- thirds of recorded bombing attacks–primarily those in the southern and southeastern provinces—although in some cases their claims may be unfounded boasts. As for attacks in eastern and northern areas of Afghanistan, there is significant evidence of involvement by the Hezb-e Islami network under the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which has been increasingly active in insurgent activities. Other groups associated with Taliban and Hezb-e Islami forces, including Jaish al Muslemin and forces under Jalaluddin Haqqani, are likely
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