Introduction 1. See Peter A. Hall, the Political Power of Economic Ideas

Notes Introduction 1. See Peter A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton University Press, 1989). 2. Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994). 3. Kalecki came to hold views, later termed 'Keynesian', at least as early as 1933. 4. M. Kalecki, 'The Political Aspects of Full Employment' Political Quar terly, vol. 14, no. 4, 1943, pp. 322-31. 5. For an example, see S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, F. Longstreth (eds), Struc turing Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 6. See his contribution to the aforementioned, Peter A. Hall, 'The Move ment from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 1970s', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, F. Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 90-113. See also The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. 7. I do not wish to suggest that all Marxists or all neo-liberals draw on monetarist thought. Those who do are in the distinct minority in each case, especially the former. 8. Such a position is not to claim that there are not important changes that have to be accounted for, such as the growth of female part-time em ployment, together with social changes such as increased male involve ment in the domestic sphere. It is merely to acknowledge that a justification of this stance cannot be made here. One excellent attempt at such a justification, however, has been made by Jocelyn Pixley, Citizenship and Employment: Investigating Post-Industrial Options (Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1993). 1. Keynesian Ideas, Keynesianism and Keynesian Social Democracy I. D. Winch, 'Keynes, Keynesianism, and State Intervention', in Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 109. 2. A yet even more specific concept is that of the 'economics of Keynes' which is supposed to be distinguished from the economics of those purporting to be Keynes' disciples. See Axel Leijonhufvud, On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). The distinction is also made by those who wish to retrieve the more conservative side of Keynes' thought. See T.W. Hutchison, 249 250 Notes Keynes versus the Keynesians (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1977). 3. Peter A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, (Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 4. 4. Peter Hall is but one example. See The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 5. 5. J. Tomlinson, 'Why Wasn't There a 'Keynesian Revolution', in Econ omic Policy Everywhere?', Economy and Society, vol. 20 no. I, Feb. 1991, pp. 108-9; Tomlinson's earlier work was pertinent to Britain: 'Why Was There Never a "Keynesian Revolution" in Economic Policy?' , Economy and Society, vol. 10, no. I, Feb. 1981, pp. 72-87. For a Canadian account, see R.M. Campbell, Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada 1945-1975 (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1987). 6. The two pieces on Germany in P.A. Hall's edited collection, The Pol itical Power of Economic Ideas, by Harold James, 'What is Keynesian About Deficit Financing? The Case of Interwar Germany' pp. 231-62, and C.S. Allen, 'The Underdevelopment of Keynesianism in the Fed eral Republic of Germany' pp. 263-90, both argue that Keynesian ideas had little influence on the 1930s or immediate post-war Germany. Simi larly, Marcello De Cecco has argued that Italian policy owed little to Keynes. This is more obvious in Italy, however, due to the dominant individualistic political philosophy. See his 'Keynes and Italian Econ omics', in Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, pp. 195-230. In Japan also the politics was not receptive to Keynesian ideas: Eleanor M. Hadley, 'The Diffusion of Keynesian Ideas in Japan', in Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, pp. 291-310. The more curious case is that of Scandinavia, where Sweden and Norway quickly ab sorbed Keynesian ideas, while Finland and Denmark did not adopt Keynesian economic management in the narrow sense of the term. All four countries, however, had a commitment to interventionism: 1. Pekkarinen, 'Keynesianism and the Scandinavian Models of Economic Policy', in Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, pp. 311-46. 7. This was in contradistinction to views held by Joseph Lyons, for in stance. In a radio broadcast on 8 November 1933 he stated that the Commonwealth Government has always taken the view that there are definite limits to provide full-time work and, further, that unem ployment cannot be permanently eased by a policy of relief schemes of this kind ... The work provided would be largely of unproduc tive and temporary nature, and at the conclusion of it those who had been so employed would again be relegated to the unemployed. Cited in Public Investment and Full Employment (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1946), p. 194 fn. 8. G. Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986). Notes 251 9. In The General Theory, Keynes used the term 'classical' in his attack on his intellectual opponents. Whenever the term 'classical' appears in the following thesis, in contrast, I use it in its broader meaning to include thinkers as diverse as Smith, Marx, Ricardo, and Sraffa. 10. Peter Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, pp. 6-7. 11. See, for instance, her chapter, 'What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?' in Milo Keynes (ed.), Essays on John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge University Press, 1975). From an American perspective see E.J. Nell, Prosperity and Public Spending: Transformational Growth and the Role of Government (Winchester: Allen & Unwin, 1988), wherein he argues that Keynesianism accepted the principles of the market to the extent that it responded to neoclassical criticism on the latter's terms. For a specific discussion of this aspect of Keynesian economics, see W.C. Peterson, 'Market Power: The Missing Element in Keynesian Economics', Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 23, no. 2, June 1989, pp. 379-91. 12. See B. McFarlane, Radical Economics (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p.72. 13. In Australia there is very little published material: E. Jones, 'Who Won the Post-War? The Legacy of Keynes', Journal of Australian Political Economy, 22, February 1988, pp. 73-90. Unpublished material includes E. Jones, 'Was the Post-War Boom Keynesian?', Department of Econ omics, University of Sydney, October 1989; Annette Stevens, 'The Keynesian Revolution That Never Was', BA Honours thesis, Depart ment of Politics, Macquarie University, 1984. 14. For example, Tomlinson has taken deficit financing as the cutting edge of Keynesian policy proposals whereas Booth has argued that this is far too simplistic. J. Tomlinson, 'Why Wasn't There a 'Keynesian Revo lution' in Economic Policy Everywhere?', Economy and Society, pp. 108-9; 'Why was there never a 'Keynesian Revolution' in Econ omic Policy?'. A. Booth, 'Defining a "Keynesian Revolution'" Econ omic History Review, 37, 1984, p. 263; Booth, 'The "Keynesian Revolution" in Economic Policy-Making', Economic History Review, 36, 1983, pp. 103-23. 15. W. Salant, 'The Spread of Keynesian Doctrines and Practices in the United States', in P. A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 28. 16. This is notwithstanding the fact that the 1946 Full Employment Act was watered down in order to get it through Congress. Margaret Weir, 'Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States', in Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, pp. 71-2. 17. Jones, 'Was the Post-War Boom Keynesian?', p. 4. 18. Ibid. pp. 10-17. 19. Ibid., pp. 20-3. 20. Ibid., p. 36. 252 Notes 21. Ibid., pp. 14 and 16. 22. S.M. Sheffrin, Rational Expectations (Cambridge, 1983), p. 66; G.K. Shaw, Rational Expectations (Brighton, 1984) p. 20. 23. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 9. 24. G. Whitwell, The Treasury Line. 25. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 10. 26. Ibid., p. II. 27. Ibid., p. 12. 28. Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). See also, Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 16-17. 29. The Political Power of Economic Ideas, p. 13. 30. Ibid. 31. R. Skidelsky, 'The Political Meaning of the Keynesian Revolution' in Skidelsky (ed.), The End of the Keynesian Era (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 34. 32. See G. Dow, 'What Do We Know About Social Democracy?' Econ omic and Social Democracy, vol. 14, no. I, 1993, pp. 11-48, who seems to take this argument further. 33. A. Prezworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1984), p. 207. 34. Keynes, cited in Prezworski, p. 207. 35. For instance, citations like Prezworski's are rarely, if ever, accompa nied by the previous paragraph wherein Keynes expressed that 'a some what comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment'. For accounts emphasising Keynes' credentials as an egalitarian see R. Lekachman, 'The Radical Keynes', in H.L. Wattel (ed.), The Policy Consequences of John Maynard Keynes (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 30-8. R.M. Glassman, Democracy and Equality (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 67-98. A. Fitzgibbons, Keynes's Vision: A New Political Economy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). 36. Prezworski, p. 207. 37. Ibid., p. 210. 38. John Vaizey, Social Democracy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p.79. 39. Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Uni versity Press, 1976), p. 7. 40. L.R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 167. 41. J.

Load more