UIC Law Review Volume 36 Issue 2 Article 3 Winter 2003 Holmes, Common Law Theory, and Judicial Restraint, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 457 (2003) Frederic R. Kellogg Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Common Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Frederic R. Kellogg, Holmes, Common Law Theory, and Judicial Restraint, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 457 (2003) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. HOLMES, COMMON LAW THEORY, AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT FREDERIC R. KELLOGG* INTRODUCTION Judicial restraint is a subject properly bound with the interpretation, and hence the definition, of law. The nature and contours of what judges interpret dictate what is appropriate for them to do. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was a scholar and a philosopher before a judge, espoused a pronounced form of judicial self-restraint in constitutional law.' Restraint is generally identified with forms of judicial activism.! Much of the literature on judicial restraint focuses on constitutional law.3 In form and explanation, Holmes' judicial self- restraint is unlike versions found in recent literature. 4 Its most * Visiting Scholar, Department of Philosophy, The George Washington University. I would like to acknowledge and thank Andrew Altman, Brian Bix, Philip Bobbitt, Catherine Kemp, David Lyons, Mark Medish, Mark Tushnet, Ferdinand Schoettle, Thomas L.