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ON TRACK Vol 13 No43indd.Indd OON N TTRACK R A C K WINTER /HIVER 2008 VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 The Afghan War: The Pakistani Dimensions Canada’s Air Force: On Course, On Glide Path Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow Transition in American Effects Based Doctrine - Should Canada Be Concerned? DND Photo / Photo DDN : Master Corporal/Caporal-chef Karl McKay DONOR PATRONS of the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEUR PATRONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD Mr. Keith P. Ambachtsheer Mrs. Kathleen Birchall Colonel (Ret’d) John Catto Dr. John Scott Cowan Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Roger Girouard Jackman Foundation (1964) Brigadier-General (Ret’d) Don W. Macnamara Mr. David Scott Senator Hugh D. Segal COMPANIONS of the CDA INSTITUTE COMPAGNONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD Mr. Paul Chapin Colonel (Ret’d) J.H.C. Clarry Brigadier-General (Ret’d) James S. Cox Mr. John A. Eckersley Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard J. Evraire Colonel (Ret’d) Douglas A. Fraser Colonel the Honourable John A. Fraser Dr. J.L. Granatstein Major-General (Ret’d) Reginald W. Lewis Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Donald (Pablo) MacKenzie General (Ret’d) Paul D. Manson Colonel (Ret’d) Gary H. Rice Royal Military College Club of Canada Foundation Colonel (Ret’d) Ben Shapiro Brigadier-General (Ret’d) T.H.M. Silva Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Jack Vance Mr. Robert G.Tucker Gemeral (Ret’d) Ramsey M. Withers OFFICER LEVEL DONORS to the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEURS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD - NIVEAU d’OFFICIER Major-général (Ret) Clive Addy Dr. Charles D. Alleyn Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) J.A. Bélanger Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile Colonel (Ret’d) Samuel E. Blakley Captain Herbert G. Brookhouse Mr. Paul Brunelle Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) L.W.F. Cuppens Honourary Colonel Bernard J. Finestone Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Roger Girourard Honourary Colonel Blake C. Goldring Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Ralph Hennessy Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Allan L. Hepburn Mr. Ian D. Isbester Colonel (Ret’d) the Honourable R.A. Jacobson Mr. Jon Jennekens Colonel (Ret’d) Charles R. Keple Mr. Albert Kranenburg Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) William Leach Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald Lieutenant-Colonel Markus C. Martin The Honourable Dwight Mason Major (Ret’d) George D. Mitchell Colonel (Ret’d) Conrad A. Namiesniowski Captain (N) (Ret’d) Charles M. Nicholson Major Angus V. Read Major (Ret’d) John W. Richmond Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) David L. Stinson Lieutenant-Commander Arnold R. Westerbert Mr. W. H. Young OON N TTRACK R A C K contents contenu VOLUME 13 NUMBER 4 WINTER / HIVER 2008 PRESIDENT PRÉSIDENT From the Executive Director..........................................4 Dr. John Scott Cowan, BSc, MSc, PhD Colonel (Ret’d) Alain Pellerin Le mot du Directeur général..........................................4 VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRÉSIDENT General (Ret’d) John de Chastelain, OC, CMM, CD Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin Canada’s Air Force: On Course, On Glide Path...........10 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL Lieutenant-General Angus Watt Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow...............14 SECRETARY-TREASURER SECRÉTAIRE TRÉSORIER Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Gordon D. Metcalfe, CD Putting Procurement Back On Track............................17 Commander (Ret’d) Ken Bowering and PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELATIONS PUBLIQUES Captain (Ret’d) Peter Forsberg, CD Jerrod Riley The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan.....................22 PROJECT OFFICER AGENT DE PROJET U.S. Major Scott Taylor, Jr. Ms. Bonnie Butlin, MA Broken Command in Afghanistan.................................24 SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICER Colonel Ian Hope Mr. Arnav Manchanda The Afghan War: The Pakistani Dimensions................31 Louis Delvoie Conference of Defence Associations Institute 222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B Afghanistan - A Personal Perspective..........................34 Ottawa ON K2P 2G3 Major-General Dennis Tabbernor U.S. Joint Warfi ghting Developments...........................38 PHONE TÉLÉPHONE (613) 236 9903 Major Bob Near Transition in American Effects Based Doctrine............40 FAX TÉLÉCOPIEUR - Should Canada Be Concerned? (613) 236 8191 Bonnie Butlin e-mail courriel: [email protected] The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies..............44 website site web: www.cda-cdai.ca Nancy Pearson Mackie and Andrew Sullivan 11th Annual CDA Institute ON TRACK is published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute). The views ex- Graduate Student Symposium.....................................46 pressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and Bonnie Butlin do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute Book Reviews ON TRACK est publié par l’Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (l’Institut de la CAD). Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK refl ètent les vues des “The Post-American World”.........................................47 auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l’Institut de la CAD. Arnav Manchanda Copyright © 2008. ISSN 1916-6699 ON TRACK (Print) “The Way of the World:................................................49 (imprimé) - A story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism” Copyright © 2008. ISSN 1916-6702 ON TRACK (Online) Anne Frances Cation (en ligne) Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from ON TRACK. COVER PHOTO: Corporal Lurette makes up A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Public Af- part of the security cordon at the Dand District fairs Offi cer, Captain (Ret’d) Peter Forsberg, CD , at: (tel) (613) shura. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: 236 9903; (fax) (613) 236 8191; (e-mail) [email protected]. Le Caporal Lurette, aide à assurer la sécurité du Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des articles de ON TRACK. Nous souhaitons que la source soit mentionnée. Pour demander des ren- pérmètre de la choura dans le district de Dand . seignements, contactez l’agent des affaires publiques, le Capitaine (ret.) Peter Fors- berg, CD au (tél) 613-236-9903; (fax) 613-236-8191; (courriel) [email protected] ON TRACK FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL ON TRACK provides a medium ON TRACK offre des débats éclairés of informed and non-partisan debate on et dénués de partisanerie sur les questions de defence and security matters of importance défense et de sécurité qui ont de l’importance to the interests of Canada. The Conference pour les intérêts du Canada. L’Institut de la of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Conférence des associations de la défense Institute) publishes credible, informed (ICAD) publie de la recherche crédible research as well as opinion which will et informée ainsi que des opinions qui provide Canadians with insight to the fourniront aux Canadiens des aperçus sur les concerns of the defence community. préoccupations qui ont cours dans les milieux de la défense. We are pleased to feature in this Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD Dans ce numéro de ON TRACK nous edition of ON TRACK articles that are refl ective of global sommes heureux de présenter des articles qui se font le events that are challenging Canada and the Canadian refl et des événements mondiaux qui mettent au défi le Forces, and that can have an infl uence on the federal Canada et les Forces canadiennes, et qui peuvent avoir government’s foreign and defence policies. The articles une infl uence sur les politiques du gouvernement fédéral express the views of the authors – and may not necessarily en matière d’affaires étrangères et de défense. Ces articles coincide with those of the CDA Institute. expriment les points de vue de leurs auteurs, lesquels peuvent ne pas nécessairement coïncider avec ceux de l’Institut de la CAD. In recent years the Federal Government has Ces dernières années, le gouvernement fédéral committed to increase Canada’s investment in her Armed s’est engagé à accroître l’investissement du Canada dans Forces. As the investment continues we are pleased to ses Forces armées. Alors que l’investissement continue, include in ON TRACK ‘Canada’s Air Force: on course, nous avons le plaisir d’inclure dans ON TRACK l’article on glide path’, by Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, the Canada’s Air Force: On course, on glide path, par le Canadian Forces’ Chief of the Air Staff. He provides us Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, chef d’état-major de la with a focus on the strategic vision for the Air Forces and Force aérienne des Forces canadiennes. Il nous donne un the Challenges of rejuvenating the Air Force. gros plan sur la vision stratégique pour la Force aérienne et sur les défi s que soulève son rajeunissement. The Government has also made the commitment Le gouvernement a aussi pris l’engagement de to renew the maritime force, over the next 20 years. Vice- renouveler la Force maritime au cours des 20 prochaines Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff has années. Dans l’article Renewing for Success Today outlined in ‘Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow’, and Tomorrow, le Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, chef those plans and the challenges the lay ahead to meet the d’état-major des Forces maritimes examine les plans objectives of renewal. de réalisation de ces objectifs et les diffi cultés qui font obstacle à leur réalisation. Ken Bowering, Vice-President Maritime Affairs, Ken Bowering, vice-président aux affaires The Navy League of Canada, examines the process that maritimes de la Ligue navale du Canada, examine, dans has been followed by the navy over the past 60 years in Putting Procurement Back on Track, le processus qui a été acquiring most of its ships, in ‘Putting Procurement Back suivi par la marine au cours des 60 dernières années dans on Track’. Mr. Bowering’s article is a condensed version l’acquisition de la plupart de ses navires. L’article de M. of the CDA Institute Sir Arthur Currie Paper, “Military/ Bowering est une version condensée du Sir Arthur Currie Naval Procurement in Canada – A Flawed Process”. Paper de l’Institut de la CAD intitulé Military/Naval The Paper is available online at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/ Procurement in Canada – A Flawed Process.
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