Citigroup Annual Report 2001
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Wild Ride of Mortgage-Backed Securities
The Wild Ride of Mortgage-Backed Securities The roots of the current home ITWASN’TSUPPOSED to hap- pen this way. The market for home mort- mortgage market crisis. gage loans was never supposed to shut. No matter the crisis—war, banking fail- ure, or presidential impeachment—the mortgage market was not supposed to deny credit to American homeowners. So how could this happen? How could the mortgage industry, a close to trillion- dollar industry, suddenly collapse? Who is to blame for the ordinary Americans being denied a mortgage to buy into the American dream? How could $80 billion to $90 billion be wiped out virtually overnight? Blame it on Lew Ranieri, father of the mortgage market. I know. I STEPHENA.ROTH was there from the beginning. 3 4 ZELL/LURIEREALESTATECENTER In 1978, I applied to Stanford dollars in concession stand sales and say- University’s Graduate School of Business. ing good-bye to everyone from security to If there was anyone who should not have the back-stage hands. When the teacher’s been allowed to attend an MBA program, assistant for dummy math went around it was me. I was a graduate of public the room and made everyone give their schools, son of a car dealer without a col- name and prior occupation, there was lege education, and my first career had dead silence after I spoke. I heard some- been as a concert promoter. What a mis- one from the back, dressed in a polo shirt fit—and I was a misfit—for what Business with kakis and tassel-loafers, say: “You’re Week had called that year the “Best in the wrong room.” Business School in the U.S.” I managed to make it through two I had somehow managed to graduate years of preppie-dom because Stanford Phi Beta Kappa from Berkeley—although was on an “Honors,” “Pass,” or “Fail” sys- I think it was largely a recognition that I tem. -
(A) Bond Plaintiffs' Motion
Case 1:08-cv-09522-SHS Document 160 Filed 06/07/13 Page 1 of 89 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN RE CITIGROUP INC. BOND LITIGATION Master File No. 08 Civ. 9522 (SHS) ECF Case DECLARATION OF STEVEN B. SINGER IN SUPPORT OF: (I) BOND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF ALLOCATION, AND (II) BOND COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES Case 1:08-cv-09522-SHS Document 160 Filed 06/07/13 Page 2 of 89 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 II. PROSECUTION OF THE ACTION .................................................................................. 4 A. Bond Counsel’s Efforts to Identify and Preserve the Claims of Investors in Citigroup’s Bonds and Preferred Stock .................................................................. 4 B. Preparation of the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, and Summary of the Claims Asserted ........................................................................... 6 C. The Citigroup Defendants’ and the Underwriter Defendants’ Extensive Motions to Dismiss ............................................................................................... 12 D. The Court’s Opinions Largely Denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and Denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration ........................................ 15 E. Bond Plaintiffs Conduct Extensive Discovery and Motion Practice -
Annual Report
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ANNUAL REPORT July 1,1996-June 30,1997 Main Office Washington Office The Harold Pratt House 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (212) 434-9400; Fax (212) 861-1789 Tel. (202) 518-3400; Fax (202) 986-2984 Website www. foreignrela tions. org e-mail publicaffairs@email. cfr. org OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, 1997-98 Officers Directors Charlayne Hunter-Gault Peter G. Peterson Term Expiring 1998 Frank Savage* Chairman of the Board Peggy Dulany Laura D'Andrea Tyson Maurice R. Greenberg Robert F Erburu Leslie H. Gelb Vice Chairman Karen Elliott House ex officio Leslie H. Gelb Joshua Lederberg President Vincent A. Mai Honorary Officers Michael P Peters Garrick Utley and Directors Emeriti Senior Vice President Term Expiring 1999 Douglas Dillon and Chief Operating Officer Carla A. Hills Caryl R Haskins Alton Frye Robert D. Hormats Grayson Kirk Senior Vice President William J. McDonough Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. Paula J. Dobriansky Theodore C. Sorensen James A. Perkins Vice President, Washington Program George Soros David Rockefeller Gary C. Hufbauer Paul A. Volcker Honorary Chairman Vice President, Director of Studies Robert A. Scalapino Term Expiring 2000 David Kellogg Cyrus R. Vance Jessica R Einhorn Vice President, Communications Glenn E. Watts and Corporate Affairs Louis V Gerstner, Jr. Abraham F. Lowenthal Hanna Holborn Gray Vice President and Maurice R. Greenberg Deputy National Director George J. Mitchell Janice L. Murray Warren B. Rudman Vice President and Treasurer Term Expiring 2001 Karen M. Sughrue Lee Cullum Vice President, Programs Mario L. Baeza and Media Projects Thomas R. -
Board of Directors
Board of directors Sir David Clementi Mark Tucker Philip Broadley Tidjane Thiam Chairman Group Chief Executive Group Finance Director Chief Financial Officer Clark Manning Michael McLintock Nick Prettejohn Barry Stowe Executive director Executive director Executive director Executive director Sir Winfried Bischoff Keki Dadiseth Michael Garrett Ann Godbehere Non-executive director Non-executive director Non-executive director Non-executive director Bridget Macaskill Kathleen O’Donovan James Ross Lord Turnbull Non-executive director Non-executive director Non-executive director Non-executive director 86 Prudential plc Annual Report 2007 Chairman Clark Manning FSA MAAA Executive director Sir David Clementi FCA MBA Clark Manning has been an executive director of Prudential since January Chairman and Chairman of the Nomination Committee 2002. He is also President and Chief Executive Officer of Jackson National Sir David Clementi has been Chairman of Prudential since December Life. He was previously Chief Operating Officer, Senior Vice President and 2002. In 2005, Sir David was appointed as President of the Investment Chief Actuary of Jackson National Life, which he joined in 1995. Prior to Property Forum. In 2003, he joined the Financial Services Authority's that, he was Senior Vice President and Chief Actuary for SunAmerica Inc, Financial Capability Steering Group, and was appointed by the Secretary and prior to that Consulting Actuary at Milliman & Robertson Inc. Clark of State for Constitutional Affairs to carry out a review of the regulation of has more than 25 years' experience in the life insurance industry, and legal services in England and Wales, which was completed in 2004. Since holds both a bachelor's degree in actuarial science and an MBA from the 2003, he has been a non-executive director of Rio Tinto plc. -
Lilly Eli & Co
LILLY ELI & CO FORM 10-K (Annual Report) Filed 02/22/10 for the Period Ending 12/31/09 Address LILLY CORPORATE CTR DROP CODE 1112 For inspection purposes only. INDIANAPOLIS,Consent of copyright owner IN required 46285 for any other use. Telephone 3172762000 CIK 0000059478 Symbol LLY SIC Code 2834 - Pharmaceutical Preparations Industry Major Drugs Sector Healthcare Fiscal Year 12/31 http://www.edgar-online.com © Copyright 2010, EDGAR Online, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Distribution and use of this document restricted under EDGAR Online, Inc. Terms of Use. EPA Export 26-07-2013:18:49:24 United States Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. 20549 Form 10-K Annual report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 Commission file number 001-06351 Eli Lilly and Company An Indiana corporation I.R.S. employer identification no. 35-0470950 Lilly Corporate Center, Indianapolis, Indiana 46285 (317) 276-2000 Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of Each Class Name of Each Exchange On Which Registered Common Stock (no par value) New York Stock Exchange 6.57% Notes Due January 1, 2016 New York Stock Exchange 7 1 / 8 % Notes Due June 1, 2025 New York Stock Exchange 6.77% Notes Due January 1, 2036 New York Stock Exchange Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act: None Indicate by check mark if the Registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. -
Salomon Brothers, Inc
Investment Company Act of 1940/3c CR c44 14Y MAN GEORGE CLEARY R.3MINO M.XRR 1690- 19611 MARK PRAWLEY JR FOWLER HAMILTON GERGE 05 SIPIO lOll -1954 ANDRE NEWBURG CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN HAMILTON LEO GOTTLIEB JAMES BLAIR %LTER ROTHSCHILD MELVIN STEEN GEORGE BALL .RD PUGH ONE STATE STREET PLAZA OE WEISZ LYMAN TOMDEL.JR HA000RT JAMES JOHNSON JR STILES NEW YORK N.Y 10004 COUNSEL ...-IEYM.CONE.m 1752 STREET N.W ALAN APPELBAUM WASHINGTON D.C 00030 EDWIN MISHKIN 202 725-2700 GEORGE COHEN 212 344-0600 TELEX 440507 STEPHEN L.DINCES FAX OPS 513 lOll 409.0542 ..J.SPEED CARROLL FAX 003 /0/3 lOll 420-0046 PETER PAINE.JR CABLE CLEARGOLAW 41.AVENUE CE FRIEDLAND ANTHONY 000CH 75008 PARIS FRANCE ROGER W.THOMAS TELEX 1-563-1494 ALBERT PERGAM WUI 62985 TELEX 650021 GEORGE .1 ORUMBACHJR RCA 235438 FAX GPO 1-563-6637 PETER KARASZ FAX 0P3I 18633509 LOUIS KAHN FACSIMII.E RUE DE LA LQI 23 STE MARK WALKER TELEc0PIERGPS 1/2/3 212 480-0152 LESLIE SAMUELS 1040 BRUSSELS BELGIUM RAPIFAX 212 483-1361 2-030-2020 ALLAN SPERLNG FAX 2I2 344 0925 TELEX 22935 PETER GAPROW GP2 JAMES MUMSELL FAX GPO 12301635 SANDRA WEIKSNER FAX SF3 0-630-0006 EVAN DAVIS WINCHESTER HOUSE WEBB MON 12 77 LONDON WALL MARIETTA POERIO 17 LAND ALAN DUNNING Aor1 M_tco4zPrIoA.ENO CHRISTOPHER LUNDINO TELEX 67659 LAURENT ALPERT BARRY M.FOX pt _.i-C-ft JUDITH RIPPS VICTOR LEWKOW -4 -_.- f\ I0iCCNOUSC$TRCET LESLIE SILVERMAN RICHARD SUSKO SHALEN TELEX 00401 STEPHEN FAX 003 1-101100 RICHARD ZIEGLER JAMES PEASLEE ALAN SELLER -- ---- THOMAS .1 MOLONEY DAVID BABEL EDWARD KLEINBARD ReSIDENT PARTNERS __________ -
Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted the Reluctant Chairman Tells
Robert Rubin on the job he never wanted The reluctant chairman tells Fortune's Carol Loomis why Citi didn't see the subprime mess coming. By Carol Loomis, Fortune senior editor at large Fortune Magazine, November 2007 Rubin on his role: "I tried to help people as they thought their way through this." When the new chairman of Citigroup, Robert Rubin, is asked why he was so tenacious and outspoken in supporting the chairman who just left, Charles "Chuck" Prince, Rubin delivers a typically introspective answer: "People are what they are, and that's what I am." Besides, he asserts, Prince deserved to stay: "He was doing what was right and what needed to be done." Citi's write-downs: What did it know, and when did it know it? Rubin, 69, goes on to recall that he similarly supported Larry Summers in 2006 when the Harvard president was about to be forced out and that he also defended President Clinton in September 1998 during the bonfire days of the Monica Lewinsky affair. Just after prosecutor Kenneth Starr submitted his inflammatory report to Congress, Secretary of the Treasury Rubin declared on Tom Brokaw's NBC Nightly News that, regardless of the obvious problems, he believed Clinton to be doing "a very good job" as President. An extreme irony in all this is that it is Rubin who could right now use a Rubinesque defender. On Sunday, Nov. 4, the same day Rubin reluctantly moved from the job of chairman of the executive committee to chairman of the board, the company announced the startling news that it had $55 billion of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other subprime-related securities on its balance sheet and that large write-offs of an estimated $8 billion to $11 billion were imminent. -
Warren Buffett's Wild Ride at Salomon (Fortune, 1997)
Warren Buffett's Wild Ride at Salomon (Fortune, 1997) Warren Buffett, interim chairman of Solomon Brothers, Inc., gestures during testimony before a House Commerce subcommittee on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 1991. Photograph by Marcy Nighswander — AP Photos By CAROL J. LOOMIS October 27, 1997 As Sanford I. Weill, 64, the dealmaking CEO of Travelers Group, steps up to his biggest acquisition ever—the purchase of Salomon Inc. for $9 billion—a famous Wall Street figure, Warren E.Buffett, 67, steps out of Salomon. His days there began almost precisely a decade ago, in the early fall of 1987, when his company, Berkshire Hathaway, became Salomon‘s largest shareholder and he moved in as a director. But that was training-wheels stuff, nothing to the high- wire unicycle act that came later: Buffett was physically, emotionally, and really at Salomon for nine months in 1991 and 1992, when the firm’s trading illegalities created a giant sucking sound that brought him in to run the place. Though much has been written about Buffett and Salomon, a lot of what you will read here will be new. I have been a friend of Buffett‘s for about 30 years and have long been a shareholder of Berkshire (though never a shareholder of Salomon). As a friend, I do some editing every year on Buffett‘s well-known annual report, and we have for eons talked about collaborating on a book about his business life. All this has given me many opportunities to learn Buffett‘s thinking. Some of what I’ve gleaned has ended up in FORTUNE stories that I wrote, most especially in an April 11, 1988, article, “The Inside Story of Warren Buffett,” and in an accompanying box, “The Wisdom of Salomon?” But much of what I learned about Buffett‘s experiences at Salomon in 1991 was confidential, embargoed by him because Salomon was both struggling to regain its footing and dealing with big legal problems. -
Notice of AGM 2013
THIS DOCUMENT C M IS IMPORTANT AND Y K REQUIRES YOUR PMS 356 IMMEDIATE PMS ??? JOB LOCATION: ATTENTION PRINERGY 3 DISCLAIMER Approver If you have any doubt about the action you should The accuracy and the content of this file is the responsibility of take, it is recommended that you consult your the Approver. Please authorise approval only if you stockbroker, solicitor, accountant or other professional wish to proceed to print. Communisis PMS cannot accept adviser authorised under the Financial Services and liability for errors once the file has been Markets Act 2000. printed. Printer This colour bar is produced manually all If you have sold or transferred all your ordinary shares end users must check final separations to in Lloyds Banking Group plc, please give this and verify colours before printing. the accompanying documents to the purchaser or transferee, or to the stockbroker, bank or other agent 28 March 2013 through whom the sale or transfer was made. Dear Shareholder Annual general meeting Shareholder communications I am pleased to invite you to the annual general I would like to thank our shareholders for the meeting (the “AGM”) of Lloyds Banking Group huge support you have shown for paperless plc (the “Company”) which will be held at the communications, allowing us significantly to reduce Edinburgh International Conference Centre, the amount of paper used in producing our end of The Exchange, Edinburgh EH3 8EE on Thursday year and AGM communications. 16 May 2013 at 11.00 am. In conjunction with Equiniti, you can manage The notice of AGM is set out on pages 3 to 12 of your shareholding securely online, including how this document. -
Consolidated Amended Complaint
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 2 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE......................................................................................... 9 III. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................ 9 A. Plaintiffs.................................................................................................................. 9 B. Defendants ............................................................................................................ 12 1. Citigroup, Citigroup Funding, and the Citigroup Trusts........................... 12 2. Individual Defendants............................................................................... 14 3. Underwriter Defendants............................................................................ 20 IV. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS.................................................................................. 34 A. The Public Offering Materials Misstated and Omitted Material Facts Regarding Citigroup’s Exposure to as Much as $66 Billion of CDOs Backed by Subprime Mortgages........................................................................................ 36 1. Overview of Citigroup’s CDO Business................................................... 36 2. Beginning in 2006, the Housing Market Plummets, Exposing the Holders of Citigroup’s CDO Securities to Large Losses................. -
Commercial Banks and the Capital Markets
Size Matters: Commercial Banks and the Capital Markets CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD* The conventional story is that the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act broke down the Glass–Steagall Act’s wall separating commercial and investment banking in 1999, increasing risky business activities by commercial banks and precipitating the 2007 financial crisis. But the conventional story is only one-half complete. What it omits is the effect of change in commercial bank regulation on financial firms other than the commercial banks. After all, it was the failure of Lehman Brothers—an investment bank, not a commercial bank—that sparked the meltdown. This Article provides the rest of the story. The basic premise is straightforward: By 1999, the Glass–Steagall Act’s original purpose— to protect commercial banks from the capital markets—had reversed. Instead, its main function had become protecting the capital markets from new competition by commercial banks. Once the wall came down, commercial banks gained a sizeable share of the investment banking business. To offset lost revenues, investment banks pursued riskier businesses, growing their principal investments and increasing the amounts they borrowed to finance them. In effect, they assumed the features of commercial banks—a reliance on short-term borrowing to finance longer-term (and riskier) investments. For the investment banks, combining the two was lethal and eventually triggered the financial meltdown. The divide between two sets of regulators, those regulating commercial banks and those regulating investment banks, enabled the change. The need for greater regulatory coordination has grown with convergence in the financial markets. Although new regulation has addressed some of the concern, the gap between regulators continues today—raising the risk of repeating mistakes from the past. -
The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
The Big Short Inside the doomsday machine Also by Michael Lewis Home Game Liar's Poker The Money Culture Pacific Rift Losers The New New Thing Next Moneyball Coach The Blind Side EDITED BY MICHAEL LEWIS Panic The Big Short INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE Michael Lewis W. W. NORTON & COMPANY NEW YORK LONDON Copyright (c) 2010 by Michael Lewis All rights reserved For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110 ISBN: 978-0-393-07819-0 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110 www.wwnorton.com W. W. Norton & Company Ltd. Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT For Michael Kinsley To whom I still owe an article The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him.--Leo Tolstoy, 1897 Contents Prologue Poltergeist Chapter 1 A Secret Origin Story Chapter 2 In the Land of the Blind Chapter 3 "How Can a Guy Who Can't Speak English Lie?" Chapter 4 How to Harvest a Migrant Worker Chapter 5 Accidental Capitalists Chapter 6 Spider-Man at The Venetian Chapter 7 The Great Treasure Hunt Chapter 8 The Long Quiet Chapter 9 A Death of Interest Chapter 10 Two Men in a Boat Epilogue Everything Is Correlated Acknowledgments PROLOGUE Poltergeist The willingness of a Wall Street investment bank to pay me hundreds of thousands of dollars to dispense investment advice to grown-ups remains a mystery to me to this day.