To appear in Philosophy of the Social Sciences | Revised draft, 2016-05-25 – please do not cite! Pragmatism, Ontology and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice Simon Lohse Institute of Philosophy / Centre for Ethics and Law in the Life Sciences Leibniz Universität Hannover Am Klagesmarkt 14-17, 30159 Hannover, Germany Email:
[email protected] Abstract In this paper, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences respectively, namely ontological foundationalism and anti- ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the paper will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases. Keywords Social ontology, explanation, philosophy of science in practice, pragmatism, ontological foundationalism 1 To appear in Philosophy of the Social Sciences | Revised draft, 2016-05-25 – please do not cite! 1 Introduction This paper1 aims to contribute to the debate revolving around the relevance of ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences (POSS). More precisely, the paper is an attempt to respond to those neo-pragmatist philosophers who contest the usefulness of ontological investigations for the social sciences tout court and, hence, propose that we should stop pursuing ontological projects in POSS in favour of epistemological and methodological investigations (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006, 2007; Van Bouwel and Weber 2008; Tsilipakos 2012).2 My goal here is to defend the view that ontological investigations of a certain kind can indeed be relevant for the social sciences.