April 4 (Class 9): Prison Litigation: Courts as a Source of Oversight & Reform
What is the role of courts in criminal justice reform? This class examines the relationships among courts, the administration of prisons, and prisoners’ rights. We do so by considering the work of William Wayne Justice, the federal judge involved in the Texas prison litigation (Ruiz v. Estelle); the development of congressional efforts to limit courts’ authority (the Prison Litigation Reform Act— PLRA); and the contemporary conflict over the most recent prison conditions case to reach the Supreme Court (Plata v. Brown). Our focus is on the various actors endowed with constitutional, legislative, administrative, political, and practical powers to oversee the administration of prisons. How did Judge Justice understand the role of judges in prison conditions cases? Is it different than in other kinds of cases? What were the concerns that animated the PLRA? How has the PLRA affected the balance of authority among judges, administrators, and legislatures? What are the metrics to assess the impact of litigation on conditions? The daily lives of inmates and administrators? The resources available to prisons?
Hon. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1990)
Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998
Statement of Senator Abraham, 143 CONG. REC. S14312 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995)
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558-69, 589-622 (2006)
Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 731, 731-37 (2010)
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (excerpts)
Marie Gottschalk, Prison Overcrowding and Brown v. Plata, New Republic (June 8, 2011) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/89575/prison- overcrowding-brown-plata-supreme-court-california
Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 327 (2014) The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle
William Wayne Justice*
On March 21, 1990, the Honorable William WayneJustice, as Herman Phleger VisitingProfessor of Law, delivereda speechto the Stanfordcommu- nity on the originsof Ruiz v. Estelle, the case in whichJudge Justice, after exercisingunusual initiativein orderingconsolidation of prisonercomplaints into a class action,finding counselfor theplaintiff class, and orderingthe U.S. Justice Departmentto appearas amicus curiae, held that state penitentiary treatmentand conditionsin Texas were unconstitutionallycruel. The Stan- ford Law Review is pleased to reprintthe text of Judge Justice'sremarks.
I would like to take up two issues in my remarkstoday. The first may be termed historical. I will begin by briefly setting out the sequenceof events that led to the initiation of the class action on behalf of prisonersincarcer- ated in Texas prisons in the case of Ruiz v. Estelle.1 In most class action litigation, of course, the plaintiffsprovide the impetus for maintainingthe proceedingas a class action. In contrast,the decision in Ruiz to classify and consolidate the representativepetitions that became the basis on which the case was litigated was my own. The remainderof my remarksare an attemptto analyzeand explainwhy it seemed necessaryfor the court to exerciseits own initiativeto bring about this consolidation. I wish to emphasizeat the outset, however, that my de- sire to explain the court's conduct in Ruiz does not amount to an apology. I am much less interestedin searchingout precedents,in the traditionallegal sense of that term, than I am in elaboratingsome broaderanalytical or theo- retical scheme for making sense of the court's responseto the hundredsof ill-drafted,handwritten prisoner's petitions that pouredinto the clerk'soffice in the Eastern District of Texas. I believe it is importantto elaboratethis broadermeans of understandingRuiz becausethe problemthe Texas prison case posed for our judicial system-specifically, how our courts can provide meaningfulaccess to legal institutionsfor the most disadvantagedmembers of our society-is one of the most importantand intractableissues that face judges, policymakers,and concernedlawyers of this generation.And there is no reason to expect the issue to become less important or less intractable during your careers in the law.
* Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas. 1. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part, vacated in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982).
1
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For me, the Ruiz litigationbegan before I went on the bench, when I was United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas. At that time, I would occasionallyattend hearingson prisonerpetitions held by my prede- cessor, the HonorableJoe W. Sheehy. At this point, I should make clear that most units of the Texas Depart- ment of Corrections(TDC) are in the SouthernDistrict of Texas. The Beto, Coffield,and Eastham units, however, are situated within the Eastern Dis- trict, in Andersonand Houston counties. For a good many years, prisoners in those units had been filing suits, primarilyon individualbases, protesting the conditions of their confinement. Judge Sheehy had developed a rather summaryform of hearing to deal with these cases. The procedure,which I observed on several occasions, was as follows: The plaintiffwould be sworn, and Judge Sheehy would ask him to tell his story. The prisonerwould then give, to the best of his ability, a narrative account of the incident or incidents that had led him to file his complaint. Frequentlythis narrativewould be difficultto follow, since most prisoners were, as prisonersare now, poorly educated, with only a rudimentaryac- quaintancewith the English language. The defendant state official would then have the opportunityto cross- examine the prisoner-plaintiff.Unlike the plaintiffs in these hearings, the defendantswere always representedby counsel;as state officials,they would have the services of an assistant attorney general of the State of Texas. Next, Judge Sheehy would ask the plaintiffif he had any evidence,other than his own testimony, to present to the court. Plaintiffs may have had such evidence from time to time, but I never saw any presentedat the hear- ings I attended. Defendants,on the other hand, usually would produceboth witnesses and documentaryevidence to bolster their accounts. After the witnessesfor the defense were examined,the plaintifftypically would attempt some halting cross-examination.This was more likely to be "backchat"and denial, ratherthan recognizablecross-examination. At the conclusion of the defendant's presentation,Judge Sheehy would ask the plaintiffif he had any rebuttalevidence to present. Invariably,the plaintiff would not. Judge Sheehy would then dismiss the plaintiff'scomplaint from the bench. I was struck at the time by the summarynature of these proceedings,but I want to emphasizethat I did not then find anythingin them to be a denial of due process. Nor, on the basis of what I heard in those hearings,did I have any sense of wrongdoing on the part of TDC. My attitude toward TDC at that time was probablysimilar to that of most Texans: I thought that the system was efficient,and while occasional problemscommon to all large organizationsmight exist, no grave, systemic difficultiesexisted. Since, as I have said, I did not find any failure of due process in the procedureJudge Sheehy had worked out, I adopted his approach when I went on the bench. However, the process appearedquite differentto me as participantthan it had when I was merely an observer. The message was
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 3 brought home forciblyto me that prisonerswho had no legal representation simply could not effectivelypresent their grievances. Pro se prisoners,like other pro se litigants, had great difficultyin framing any kind of pleading, and knew nothing of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureor the Federal Rules of Evidence. Their status as prisonersfurther exacerbatedsome of their difficulties.It would have been difficult,if not impossible,for them to engage in any discovery, had they even known how to do so. Occasionally,I was temptedto try to get counsel for these prisoners,but to do so would have been very difficult. I could not order lawyers to repre- sent them, and since at that time neither 42 U.S.C. ? 19882nor the Equal Access to JusticeAct3 was on the books, the prospectthat an attorneywould receive any fee for services renderedin such a case was extremelydim. I noted that the proceduralproblems of these cases were likely to pro- duce occasionalsubstantive injustices as well. Despite their unartfulexpres- sion, plaintiffswould occasionally say some things which had the ring of truth. Since my father had been a county district attorney and a criminal defense lawyer, and since I had been both a criminal defense lawyer and a prosecutor,I had been aroundjails since I was a boy. Having represented more than a few thieves, bootleggers,rapists, and murderers,I was not dis- posed to regardas the gospel truth everythinga miscreanttold me, even- and perhapsparticularly- if he said it underoath. However,since my expe- rience also encompassedany numberof sheriffs,policemen, and jailers, I was not likely to be wholly credulousas to claims made by peace officers,either. I have been lied to and I have been told the truth, and I think that I can usually tell the difference. Therefore,I was greatly troubled when I found myself, as I sometimesdid, dismissingprisoner suits that sounded credible. However, given the inept presentationsand lack of documentaryevidence in these cases, ruling in these prisoners'favor clearly would have been courting reversal. I was more than troubled by this state of affairs;I was offendedby it. Given the fact that TDC was always representedby counsel, while prisoners had to appearpro se, and given the consequencesthat inevitablyfollowed, one side of a controversywas routinelygoing unheard. This, it seemed, and still seems, did not accord with the goals and aspirationsof our adversarial system of justice. I made some initial, and very minor, attempts to correct the balance in these proceedingsby, in effect, cross-examiningthe state's witnessesmyself. This had little effect on the outcome of the cases, but apparentlya fairly large effect on my reputationamong prisoners. As William Bennett Turner pointed out in an article on prisonersuits in the HarvardLaw Review,"The 'liberal'decisions and reputationsof individualjudges appear to encourage
2. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, ? 205(c), 94 Stat. 2330 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. ? 1988 (1982)). 3. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, ?? 201-208, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. ? 504 (1988), 15 U.S.C. ? 634(b) (1988), 28 U.S.C. ? 2412 (1988), and 42 U.S.C. ? 1988 (1982)).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 STANFORDLAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 prisonersuits."4 This was borne out in my case, for I began to receive what amounted to bushel baskets of letters from prisoners,detailing their com- plaints. (These letters were individuallycomposed, and not the result of an organized letterwriting campaign. Having been the object of such cam- paigns launched from both within and without the prison walls, I have learned to recognize them.) As I read through these basketsof correspondence,I developeda strong suspicionthat vast wrongswere being systematicallyperpetrated on the pris- oners, and I began to wonder whether such wrongs could be addressedin a judicial forum. At about this time, I suppose as a result of the reputationfor judicial activism I was acquiring,I was invited to addressa seminarbeing conducted at Southern Methodist University (SMU) on prisons and prison reform. I made a brief speech outlining the problemsI had encounteredwith habeas petitions and ? 1983 complaints and recommendingthe development of some method for attorney appointmentin these cases. One of the other speakersat the seminarwas William Bennett Turner,whom I have already mentioned. Mr. Turnerwas alreadydeeply involved in institutionalreform litigation through his work for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Mr. Tur- ner's presentationmade an excellent impressionon me. After outliningmy feelingsabout the inadequacyof the processavailable in these cases at the SMU seminar,I decidedthat I wantedto see at least one case where the plaintiffs were adequately represented.Accordingly, I di- rected my law clerks to inventory the complaints we had received, and to determinewhich type of complaintsarose most frequently. The complaints fell into four main areas. The first problem we could identifywas brutality.Many of the petitionsalleged harsh and violent behav- ior on the part of wardens, guards, staff, and convict overseers who were called "buildingtenders." The buildingtenders, who becameone of the cen- tral issues in the Ruiz litigation, were convicts-frequently of the most bru- tal sort-whom the prison officials informally vested with all manner of supervisoryand disciplinarypowers, and who exercisedthat power through fear, physical assault, and the use of weaponstacitly or expresslyapproved.5 A second area about which many prisonersfiled complaintswas the lack of medical care availableto TDC prisoners. TDC's medical care was woe- fully insufficientin both its staffingand its facilities. Ill-trainedTDC and inmate staff had to deal with most routine medical problems,making judg- ments, prescribingtreatments, and in extremecases, even performingminor surgery that doctors ought to have done.6 The third major area of controversywas the grotesqueovercrowding of many of the units, a condition that grew worse over time. In many cases,
4. William Bennett Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 631 (1979). 5. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. at 1294-1303 (discussing staff and building tender brutality in Texas prisons). 6. See id. at 1307-28 (discussing Texas prison health care).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 5 two or three-in extreme cases, even five-prisoners were being housed in cells designed for single occupancy. This overcrowdingresulted in unsani- tary conditions, great stress for the prisoners,tension, and many assaults.7 The prisonerswere being subjectedto the same crowdingexperiment etholo- gists have performedon the common gray rat, Rattus norwegicus,and the experimentwas having the same results. The fourth topic of complaint was summarydiscipline. Prison officials allegedly were meting out various penalties to prisonerseither without any disciplinary hearings or with hearings bereft of any semblance of due process.8 After my law clerks identifiedthese four majorcategories in the prisoner complaints,I directedthem to find a representativeplaintiff for each kind of claim presented. One of the plaintiffsselected was David Ruiz. (It later developed that TDC had, in a manner of speaking,preselected David Ruiz as a plaintiff,when in November 1971, he was one of the writ-writersplaced in what was called the "eight-hoesquad" at the Wynne Unit. Considering the fact that the creation of the eight-hoe squad concentratedin one place the most experiencedjailhouse lawyersin the Texas prison system, it may be questionedhow prudentlythe TDC officialswho created it had acted.9) Once the cases were sorted out, they were orderedconsolidated for trial. I then tried to get in touch with William Bennett Turnerat his office at the Inc. Fund in San Francisco, but it developed that he was in Katmandu, Nepal, on a mountaineeringholiday. When Mr. Turner returnedfrom his Himalayanexcursion, I was able to get hold of him; he agreed to represent the plaintiffsand thereuponfiled an amendedcomplaint in the consolidated civil action styled Ruiz v. Estelle.10 As a result of his preliminaryinvestigation of the case, Mr. Turnerdeter- mined that it ought to be maintainedas a class action. Accordingly,he filed a motion for class certification,the class to consist of all present and pro- spective TDC prisoners. After an exceedinglyshort hearing, I granted the motion.1 Given Mr. Turner's experience and the resources on which he could draw, the prisoners in this action clearly would be far better represented than any I had heard heretofore. However, there was still a great disparity between the resourcesfor discoveryand investigationavailable to the plain- tiff class and those availableto the TDC. I attended the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conferenceeach year, where I al-
7. See id. at 1277-85 (discussing crowding in TDC facilities). 8. See generally id. at 1346-56 (discussing TDC disciplinary procedures). 9. The "eight-hoe squad" was a punitive work detail of prisoners who were assigned to labor in the prison unit's fields using implements such as hoes and shovels. For a discussion of the Wynne unit's squad, see STEVENJ. MARTIN& SHELDONEKLUND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN 50-58 (1987). See also Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1367-70 (discussing official harassment of litigious prisoners). 10. No. H-78-987 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1974). 11. Ruiz v. Estelle, No. H-78-987 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1974) (Dk. No. 40) (order certifying that action may be maintained as class action).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 STANFORDLAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 ways met with my friend,Judge Frank M. Johnson,Jr. Judge Johnsonhad already spent several years dealing with the Alabama prison litigation, which also centeredon the issue of overcrowding.12We began to compare our prisoncases, and JudgeJohnson told me that I would be well-advisedto involve the United States in the litigation. I asked him how he had accom- plished that in the Alabama case, and he told me that he had orderedthe Departmentof Justice to appearas amicus curiae. I asked Judge Johnson to provide me with a copy of the order he had entered,and using it as a model-or, as we call it in East Texas, a "go-by"- I issued the same kind of order in Ruiz.13The order gave the United States all the discovery powers of a party to the litigation. The Departmentlaw- yers were apparentlyastonished at what they found after investigation-suf- ficiently astonished that the United States filed a motion to interveneas a party plaintiff.14 The appearanceof the United States as amicus had alreadyso disturbed the balance of forces as to cause TDC some unease. But when the United States, with all the resourcesat its disposal, moved to intervene,it is fair to say that the State of Texas began to raise hell. The state petitionedthe Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamusto set aside my order grantingthe interven- tion. The writ was denied,15 and the state thereuponpetitioned the United States SupremeCourt for certiorari. Certiorariwas denied, with three jus- tices dissenting.'6 In a somewhat unusual manner, the dissentingjustices filed a ratherblistering opinion writtenby then-JusticeRehnquist, question- ing the authorityof a districtjudge to do what I, and Judge Johnsonbefore me, had done.17 To obviatethe concernsthe Rehnquistdissent raised,Sena- tor EdwardKennedy drafted a specificstatute grantingsuch authorityto the district court.18 These, from my perspective,are the origins of the Ruiz litigation. I have no hesitation in accepting that what I did can properly be called judicial activism. I was surely not passive. No one told me to consolidate those cases. No one filed a motion for an attorney. I simply wantedto know what was going on. To borrow a phrase from my colleague on the Seventh Cir- cuit, Judge Posner (who borrowed it from Colonel North's attorney, BrendanSullivan), I was not a potted plant.19 Having made these historical observations,I will turn to the questions
12. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Ala- bama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). 13. Ruiz v. Estelle, No. H-78-987 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 1974) (Dk. No. 36) (ordering consolida- tion of cases and United States to appear as amicus curiae). 14. Motion of United States to Intervene, Ruiz v. Estelle, No. H-78-987 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 1974). 15. In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976). 16. Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976). 17. Id. 18. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. ? 1997(c) (1988)). 19. Richard A. Posner, What am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC,Sept. 28, 1987, at 23.
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 7 they raise. To be blunt, does a court have the authority to do the things I did? In a professedlyadversarial court system, to what extent can a judge wield inquisitorialpowers? These questions derive their force in large measurefrom the traditional way in which we understandour legal system to operate. As Professor Owen Fiss has outlined that understanding,the typical lawsuit involves two antagonisticparties of roughly equal strength who become embroiledin a dispute and who then turn to a third party, a stranger to them and their dispute, asking the strangerto resolve the quarrel.20The impartialityof the judge is symbolized, as ProfessorsJudith Resnik and Dennis Curtis have noted in their study of the iconographyof justice, by the blindfold that the goddess of justice traditionallywears.21 Our legal culture has instilled in us a very powerful conviction that the judge must act without fear or favor, showing no preferencefor either side. Americans tend to assume that an impartialjudge must be a passive judge, to whom the case is broughtand before whom the case is constructed by the parties. The court-particularly a federal district court-has rela- tively little discretionin deciding whether to hear a case. If the court does not have either personalor subjectmatter jurisdiction, it may not hear the case. If it has both, the court has scant ability to refuse the case. Chief Justice Marshallput the point plainly in Cohensv. Virginia: The judiciary cannot, as the legislaturemay, avoid a measure, because it approachesthe confinesof the constitution. We cannot pass it by, becauseit is doubtful.With whateverdoubts, with whateverdifficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exerciseof jurisdictionwhich is given than to usurpthat which is not given.22 ProfessorAbram Chayes adumbratesthe duties of the judge in the tradi- tional model. The judge is bound, accordingto ProfessorChayes, "to decide only those issues identifiedby the parties,in accordancewith the rules estab- lished by the appellate courts, or, . . . the legislature."23 The judge, in the traditionalmodel, is also not to assume the role of an investigator,but to remainpassive. He or she is conceivedto have "little or no responsibilityfor the factual aspectsof the case or for shapingand organizingthe litigationfor trial."24 We live in a judicial world that the traditionalmodel cannot always ac- count for-a world of special mastersand of bankruptingfines which would have seemed strange to Chief Justice Marshall (although both are judicial
20. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979). 21. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALEL.J. 1727, 1727-28 (1987). 22. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 23. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1976). 24. Id.
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 STANFORDLAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 responses to Andrew Jackson's alleged reaction to Worcester v. Georgia25). Though the increasing prevalence of institutional reform litigation has eroded the hegemonyof the model, it continuesto informmost of our think- ing about judges. For this reason, it is a very serious matter when political officialscontend, as they frequentlyhave done in the course of such institu- tional reformlitigation, that the judiciaryhas stackedthe deck againstthem. Such assertions,if credited,would deeply injurethe reputationof the judges in the eyes of all serious persons. However, the traditionalconception of the lawsuit is deficientin several importantrespects. First, our legal culture is prone to conflateand confuse two independentissues-the issue of arrivingat substantivelycorrect deci- sions and the issue of adequate proceduralstructure. For this reason, the proceduralstructure that most assume is the ordinaryway in which courts operateis inadequateas a means of making sense of the operationof a court in proceedingsin which the parties are not in at least roughly equal posi- tions, or in proceedingsin which the remedyis complex and requirescontin- ual judicial superintendencelong after the judgment is entered. We can better analyze the conflation,and indeed the confusion,of proce- dural structureand the necessity of a fair hearing for all parties if we con- sider the differencebetween our insistence on a passive judiciary and the approachesof other Westernjudicial systems. Judicialneutrality is a goal of most, if not all, such systems. Judicialpassivity is not. Within the American judicial system, the powers of a federal judge to examine witnesses and otherwiseengage directly in the proceedingsare broaderthan the powers of many state court trialjudges. Moreover,an Englishtrial judge, who also sits within the confinesof the Anglo-Americanadversarial system, has powersto comment on evidencethat are breathtakingin their expansiveness,at least if the highly entertaining"Rumpole" stories by John Mortimer,Q.C., are to be given any credence.26Thejuge d'instructionof the inquisitorialContinental systems has yet more authorityto engage, and ordinarilydoes engage,in the investigationof matters which come before him. Nevertheless,in all these cases the judge is charged with a duty to be an impartial,neutral arbiter. More important problems with the traditional model become visible, however, where the model's assumptionsabout the parties or the kinds of remedies necessary to fix things no longer hold. These are the types of problemswith the traditionalmodel that ProfessorsFiss27 and Chayes28dis- cuss. I want to distinguishhere the proceduraldifficulties I encounteredat the outset of the Ruiz litigation from those which developedlater on in the course of the case. In the remedial phase of the case, I noted all the
25. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 315 (1832). In response to the Court's holding that Georgia had no legisla- tive authority over Cherokee Nation lands, Jackson allegedly remarked: "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONALLAW 25 (11th ed. 1985). 26. See, e.g., JOHNMORTIMER, THE TRIALSOF RUMPOLE(1979). 27. See Fiss, supra note 20. 28. See Chayes, supra note 23.
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 9 problems with institutional reform litigation which Professors Fiss and Chayes have detailed. I know all too well the difficultiesthat a court en- counters in enforcing orders that compel the reform of an entrenchedbu- reaucracy, and the ways in which those encounters with official intransigencetransform the functions of the judge. But those are not the problemsI faced at the outset of the case. If I was an activistjudge in the initial phases of the case, that activism really came from a straightforward commitmentto the traditionalgoals of adjudication,in a situationin which the necessarybalance of forces that underliesthe traditionalconcept of adju- dication did not exist. Far more importantthan our commitmentto the image of the passive judge is our commitmentto the idea that the judge'sjob in the case before him is to get the right answer. Thus, in Greenholtzv. NebraskaPenal In- mates, the United States SupremeCourt held that "[t]he function of legal process, as that concept is embodiedin the Constitution,and in the realm of factfinding,is to minimize the risk of erroneousdecisions."29 Another way of saying this, in ProfessorHerbert Wechsler's words, is that the duty of the judge is "to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordancewith the law ....",30 Whether you call it avoiding the risk of erroneousdecisions, deciding the litigatedcase, doing substantivejustice to the parties,or simply getting to the truth, a judge has a duty to get right answers. It was, however,difficult if not impossiblefor me-as it would have been for any judge-to reconcile my duty to decide cases on their merits and to get to the truth of the matters assertedin the courtroom,with the ordinary proceduralstrictures under which judges routinelyoperate. If I had contin- ued with the routine I had adopted from Judge Sheehy, I would have spent the rest of my judicial careerpresiding over hearingsthat had the trappings of due process, but that were void of meaning. That, I think, would not have fulfilledthe requirementsof due process. And I draw some consolation from the thought that such hearings would not have received much support from the leading process-orientedcritic of institutional reform litigation, the late Professor Lon Fuller of Harvard. While I do not agree with all of ProfessorFuller's analysis in his essay on "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,"I do agree with the "one simple proposition"from which he starts: [T]he distinguishingcharacteristic of adjudicationlies in the fact that it con- fers on the affected party a peculiar form of participationin the decision, that of presentingproofs and reasonedarguments for a decisionin his favor. Whateverheightens the significanceof this participationlifts adjudication towardits optimumexpression. Whateverdestroys the meaningof that par- ticipation destroys the integrity of adjudicationitself.31
29. 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 30. Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.L. REV. 1, 6 (1959). 31. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.L. REV. 353, 363 (1978).
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It seems clear, if we take Fuller's simple proposition seriously, that a minimal requirementfor the judicial process to be legitimate is that both sides have an opportunityto be heard. Yet it would be ludicrousto contend that there was any real participationby the prisonersin the hearingsJudge Sheehy and I held prior to the Ruiz case. The prisonerswere not gagged, nor were they prevented from speaking. But the bare possibility of their presenting"proofs and reasoned arguments"did not afford them a means for doing so. The prisonershad, as I have said before,no earthlyidea of how to present their contentions in a legally significantway. To allow them to present their grievancesin a halting and semi-literatefashion may have of- fered them some formal right of participation,but that participationwould have been, and indeed was, a nullity. Hence, as Professor Fuller puts it, untutored participationwould have "destroy[ed]the integrity of adjudica- tion itself."32 Becauseone of the partieswas deprivedof effectiveparticipation in such hearings,I was unable to performthe central duty of a judge. I could not have decided those cases on their merits. The facts might well have been as the petitioners alleged, and the law on their side. But absent a coherent presentationof the facts and the law, I could not have so found. This defect was not accidentalor adventitious. The judicial process was systematically malfunctioning. The centralproposition of process-basedtheorists like Fuller and Wechs- ler is that the judicial process,when properlyfunctioning and adheredto by judges, is a means to assurecorrect legal results. This suggests,contrariwise, that a process that ceaselesslygenerates results of dubious merit must itself have some serious internal defect. My fellow Texan, Professor Charles Black, made essentially this point in his celebratedresponse to Professor Wechsler'sneutral principles argument. He asked how we would respondto a legal argument that tried to square the fourteenth amendmentwith the realities of segregation,and he then suggested that the only reasonablere- sponse was laughter.33 There is, after all, a world which exists indepen- dently of the way courts see it. And if courts cannot see that world correctly, then the judges need new pairs of glasses. Think of it this way. If systematic violations of the eighth amendment rights of prisonerswere occurring,how could I remainpassive and still be- come aware of those constitutionalviolations? When asked that way, the question refocusesthe way you conceive of constitutionalgovernment. You cease to ask whether the passive role is being maintainedor neutral princi- ples adheredto. Instead, you begin to ask whether a system of government that might permit systematicviolations of constitutionallyguaranteed rights to go unnoticedand unaddressedis, in reality,constitutional. The answerto that question is plainly no. Hence, any judge who develops a strong suspi-
32. Id. 33. Charles Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 11 cion, as I did, that the integrity of the judicial process-that is, its capacity for generating decisions that reflect the legal and factual merits of the cases before it-has been violated, is obliged to do something to move the process back onto track. In Ruiz, I was faced with three choices. First, I could have continued to hear large numbers of prisoner petitions for the rest of my judicial career with full knowledge that such petitions were destined to fail. Second, I per- sonally could have attempted to right the balance in the hearings I was con- ducting. Professor Fuller addresses the main problem with that alternative when he tries to imagine what an arbiter would have to do without lawyers as advocates: [T]he arbitermust put aside his neutralityand permit himself to be moved by a sympatheticidentification sufficiently intense to draw from his mind all that it is capableof giving-in analysis,patience and creativepower. When he resumes his neutral position, he must be able to view with distrust the fruits of this identificationand be ready to reject the products of his own best mental efforts. The difficultiesof this undertakingare obvious. If it is true that a man in his time must play many parts, it is scarcelygiven to him to play them all at once.34 Finally, I could find some means of classifying and consolidating the com- plaints and seeking out an attorney with the resources to present the prison- ers' case adequately. The first choice would have been wearisome, absurd, and a violation of my duty as I understood it. The second would have transformed me from judge to advocate, a transformation which would not only have been un- seemly, but which also would have violated the integrity of the court. It was not my business to be an advocate. But it was emphatically my business to find an advocate, because the truth could not have been ascer- tained without one. This concern with enabling the inarticulate to tell their stories is the central theme of what is called the "due process revolution," but the concern is older than the Warren Court. It can be found in the opinion of the court in Powell v. Alabama,35 the Scottsboro Boys case, writ- ten by that redoubtable conservative, Justice Sutherland: The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehendthe right to be heardby counsel. Even the intelligentand edu- cated laymanhas small and sometimesno skill in the science of law .... He requiresthe guidinghand of counsel at every step in the proceedingsagainst him.... If that be true of men of intelligence,how much more true is it of the ignorantand illiterate,or those of feeble intellect.36 The right to appointed counsel has, of course, progressed by fits and starts, from capital cases in Powell to felony cases in Gideon v. Wainwright37
34. Fuller, supra note 31, at 382-83. 35. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 36. Id. at 68-69. 37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 STANFORDLAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 to all criminal cases involving imprisonmentin Argersingerv. Hamlin.38 The contoursof the right in civil cases are uncertain,thanks to the Supreme Court'sruling in Lassiterv. Departmentof Social Services.39But the general applicability,and indeed necessity,of the right to appointedcounsel in Ruiz was clear. Due process of law does not requirethat all those who feel aggrievedbe able to get what they want from a court. But it does requirethat when such a person comes to court with a potentially cognizable claim, he be given a chance to say what he wants. Often enough, as any lawyer knows, the right to say what one wants, to get the ear of the court, is itself what a complain- ant most desires. The right to be heard, whetherone's conditionsbe exalted or lowly, is a right the courts have a duty to vindicate. It was to vindicate that right, and to get at the truth about the conditionsof some of the lowliest offscouringsof our society, that I helped bring Ruiz v. Estelle to birth.
38. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 39. 452 U.S. 18 (1980).
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S14316 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE September 26, 1995 require compliance with the requirements of 1. How warm the food is. Over 100 persons in Philadelphia have the remedial action plan. 2. How bright the lights are. been killed by criminals set free under ‘‘(B) COMPLIANCE ORDER.—If, after the 30th 3. Whether there are electrical out- the prison cap. Moreover, the citizenry day after the Administrator issues a notice lets in each cell. has understandably lost confidence in of violation under subparagraph (A), a State 4. Whether windows are inspected and has not taken appropriate action to require the criminal justice system’s ability to compliance with requirements of the reme- up to code. protect them. And the criminals, on dial action plan, the Administrator may 5. Whether prisoners’ hair is cut only the other hand, have every reason to issue an order or commence an action under by licensed barbers. believe that the system can’t do any- paragraph (1) to enforce the remediation 6. And whether air and water tem- thing about them. waste management requirements of the re- peratures are comfortable. All of this would be bad enough if it medial action plan.’’. Elsewhere, American citizens are put were the result of a court order to cor- (e) RELEASE, DETECTION, PREVENTION, AND at risk every day by court decrees. I rect serious constitutional violations CORRECTION.—Section 9003 of the Solid Waste have in mind particularly decrees that committed by the Philadelphia correc- Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6991b) is amended by adding at the end the following: cure prison crowding by declaring that tions system. But it is not. ‘‘(i) PETROLEUM-CONTAMINATED MEDIA AND we must free dangerous criminals be- Indeed, a different Federal judge re- DEBRIS.—Petroleum-contaminated media fore they have served their time, or not cently found that conditions in Phila- and debris that fail the test for toxicity incarcerate certain criminals at all be- delphia’s oldest and most decrepit fa- characteristics due to organics issued by the cause prisons are too crowded. cility—Holmesburg Prison—met con- Administrator under section 3001, and are The most egregious example is the stitutional standards. subject to corrective action under this sec- city of Philadelphia. For the past 8 These murderous early releases are tion, shall not be considered to be hazardous years, a Federal judge has been over- the result of a consent decree entered waste for purposes of subtitle C.’’. seeing what has become a program of into by the prior mayoral administra- By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, wholesale releases of up to 600 criminal tion from which the current adminis- tration has been unable to extricate Mr. HATCH, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. defendants per week to keep the prison itself. KYL, and Mrs. HUTCHISON): population down to what she considers Finally, in addition to massive judi- S. 1275. A bill to provide for appro- an appropriate level. cial interventions in State prison sys- priate remedies for prison condition Under this order, there are no indi- tems, we also have frivolous inmate lawsuits, to discourage frivolous and vidualized bail hearings on a defend- litigation brought under Federal law; abusive prison lawsuits, and for other ant’s criminal history before deciding this litigation also ties up enormous purposes; to the Committee on the Ju- whether to release the defendant before resources. Thirty-three States have es- diciary. trial. Instead, the only consideration is what the defendant is charged with the timated that Federal inmate suits cost THE PRISON CONDITIONS LITIGATION REFORM them at least $54.5 million annually. ACT day of his or her arrest. The National Association of Attorneys ∑ Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I in- No matter what the defendant has done before, even, for example, if he or General have extrapolated that number troduce legislation that I believe is es- to conclude that nationwide the costs sential if we are to restore public con- she was previously convicted of mur- der, if the charge giving rise to the ar- are at least $81.3 million. Since, accord- fidence in government’s ability to pro- ing to their information, more than 95 tect the public safety. Moreover, it will rest is a non-violent crime, the defend- ant may not be held pretrial. Moreover, percent of these suits are dismissed accomplish this purpose not by spend- without the inmate receiving anything, ing more taxpayer money but by sav- the so-called non-violent crimes in- clude stalking, carjacking, robbery the vast majority of the $81.3 million ing it. being spent is attributable to non-mer- This legislation removes enormous with a baseball bat, burglary, drug dealing, vehicular homicide, man- itorious cases. obstacles the Federal Government has Mr. President, in my opinion this is slaughter, terroristic threats, and gun placed in the path of States’ and local- all wrong. People deserve to keep their charges. ities’ ability to protect their residents. tax dollars or have them spent on As a result Philadelphia, which be- I would like to highlight three of these projects they approve. They deserve fore the cap had about 18,000 out- obstacles and explain what we are better than to have their money spent, standing bench warrants, now has al- going to do to remove them. on keeping prisoners in conditions First, in many jurisdictions includ- most 50,000. In reality, though, no one some Federal judge feels are desirable ing my own State of Michigan, judicial is out looking for these fugitives. Why (although not required by any provi- orders entered under Federal law raise look? If they were found, they would sion of the Constitution or any law). the costs of running prisons far beyond just be released back onto the streets And they certainly don’t need it spent what is necessary. These orders also under the prison cap. on defending against frivolous prisoner thereby undermine the legitimacy and In the meantime thousands of defend- lawsuits. punitive and deterrent effect of prison ants who were out on the streets be- And convicted criminals, while they sentences. cause of the cap have been rearrested must be accorded their constitution Second, in other jurisdictions, judi- for new crimes, including 79 murders, rights, deserve to be punished. I think cial orders entered under Federal law 959 robberies, 2,215 drug dealing virtually everybody believes that while actually result in the release of dan- charges, 701 burglaries, 2,748 thefts, 90 these people are in jail they should not gerous criminals from prisons. rapes, and 1113 assaults. be tortured, but they also should not Third, these orders are com- Looking at the same material from have all the rights and privileges the plemented by a veritable torrent of another vantage point: In 1993 and 1994, rest of us enjoy, and that their lives prisoner lawsuits. Although these suits over 27,000 new bench warrants for mis- should, on the whole, be describable by are found non-meritorious the vast ma- demeanor and felony charges were the old concept known as hard time. jority of the time (over 99 percent, for issued for defendants released under The legislation I am introducing example, in the ninth circuit), they oc- the cap. That’s 63 percent of all new today will return sanity and State con- cupy an enormous amount of State and bench warrants in 1993 and 74 percent trol to our prison systems. It will do so local time and resources; time and re- of all new bench warrants for the first by limiting judicial remedies in prison sources that would be better spent in- 6 months of 1994. cases and by limiting frivolous prisoner carcerating more dangerous offenders. Failure to appear rates for crimes litigation. Let me start with the problems in covered by the cap are all around 70 First, we must curtail interference my own State of Michigan. percent, as opposed to, for example, by the Federal courts themselves in Under a series of judicial decrees re- non-covered crimes like aggravated as- the orderly administration of our pris- sulting from Justice Department suits sault, where the rate is just 3 percent. ons. This is not to say that we will against the Michigan Department of The Philadelphia fugitive rate for de- have no court relief available for pris- Corrections, the Federal courts now fendants charged with drug dealing is oner suits, only that we will try to re- monitor our State prisons to deter- 76 percent, three times the national tain it for cases where it is needed mine: rate. while curtailing its destructive use.
VerDate Aug 31 2005 06:56 May 28, 2008 Jkt 041999 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 0637 Sfmt 0634 J:\ODA15\1995_F~1\S26SE5.REC S26SE5 mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS September 26, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S14317 Most fundamentally, the proposed only for fees directly and reasonably prospective relief unless the court finds that bill forbids courts from entering orders incurred in proving that violation. such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no for prospective relief (such as regu- In addition, attorney’s fees must be further than necessary to correct the viola- lating food temperatures) unless the proportionally related to the court or- tion of the Federal right, and is the least in- trusive means necessary to correct the viola- order is necessary to correct violations dered relief. No longer will attorneys tion. In determining the intrusiveness of the of individual plaintiffs’ Federal rights. be allowed to charge massive amounts relief, the court shall give substantial weight It also requires that the relief be nar- to the State for the service of cor- to any adverse impact on public safety or the rowly drawn and be the least intrusive recting minimal violations. operation of a criminal justice system means of protecting the federal rights. And no longer will attorneys be al- caused by the relief. And it directs courts to give substan- lowed to charge very high fees for their ‘‘(2) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.—In tial weight to any adverse impact on time. The fee must be calculated at an any civil action with respect to prison condi- public safety or the operation of the tions, to the extent otherwise authorized by hourly rate no higher than that set for law, the court may enter a temporary re- criminal justice system caused by the court appointed counsel. And up to 25 straining order or an order for preliminary relief. percent of any monetary award the injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctive re- No longer will prison administration court orders the plaintiff wins will go lief shall automatically expire on the date be turned over to Federal judges for toward payment of the prisoner’s at- that is 90 days after its entry, unless the the slightest reason. Instead, the torney’s fees. court makes the order final before the expi- States will be able to run prisons as The bill also prohibits prisoners who ration of the 90-day period. they see fit unless there is a constitu- ‘‘(3) PRISONER RELEASE ORDER.—(A) In any have filed three frivolous or obviously civil action with respect to prison condi- tional violation, in which case a nar- nonmeritorious in forma pauperis civil rowly tailored order to correct the vio- tions, no prisoner release order shall be en- actions from filing any more unless tered unless— lation may be entered. they are in imminent danger of severe ‘‘(i) a court has previously entered an order The bill also will make it more dif- bodily harm. for less intrusive relief that has failed to ficult for judges to release dangerous Also, to keep prisoners from using remedy the deprivation of the Federal right criminals back into the population, or lawsuits as an excuse to get out of jail sought to be remedied through the prisoner to prevent the authorities from incar- for a time, pretrial hearings generally release order; and ‘‘(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable cerating them in the first place. will be conducted by telephone, so that To accomplish this, the legislation amount of time to comply with the previous the prisoner stays in prison. forbids courts from entering release or- court orders. Mr. President, these reforms will de- ders except under very limited cir- ‘‘(B) In any civil action in Federal court crease the number of frivolous claims with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner cumstances. The court first must have filed by prisoners. They will decrease release order shall be entered only by a entered an order for less intrusive re- three-judge court in accordance with section lief, which must be shown to have prisoners’ incentives to file suits over how bright their lights are. At the 2284 of title 28, if the requirements of sub- failed to cure the violation of Federal paragraph (E) have been met. rights. If a Federal court reaches this same time, they will discourage judges ‘‘(C) A party seeking a prisoner release conclusion, it must refer the question from seeking to take control over our order in Federal court shall file with any re- of whether or not to issue a release prison systems, and to micromanage quest for such relief, a request for a three- order to a three judge district court. them, right down to the brightness of judge court and materials sufficient to dem- This court must find by clear and their lights. onstrate that the requirements of subpara- graph (A) have been met. convincing evidence that crowding is This is a far-reaching bill, Mr. Presi- dent. One aimed at solving a complex, ‘‘(D) If the requirements under subpara- the primary cause of the violation of a graph (A) have been met, a Federal judge be- Federal right and that no other relief costly, and dangerous problem. Its sev- fore whom a civil action with respect to pris- will remedy the violation of the Fed- eral provisions will discourage frivo- on conditions is pending who believes that a eral right. Then the court must find, lous lawsuits and promote State con- prison release order should be considered by a preponderance of the evidence, trol over State prison systems. At the may sua sponte request the convening of a that the crowding had deprived par- same time, this legislation will help three-judge court to determine whether a ticular plaintiffs of at least one essen- protect convicted criminals’ constitu- prisoner release order should be entered. ‘‘(E) The court shall enter a prisoner re- tial, identifiable human need, and that tional rights without releasing them to prey on an innocent public or keeping lease order only if the court finds— prison officials have either deliberately ‘‘(i) by clear and convincing evidence— subjected the plaintiffs to this depriva- them in conditions so comfortable that ‘‘(I) that crowding is the primary cause of tion or have been deliberately indif- they lose their deterrent effect. the violation of a Federal right; and ferent to it. I urge my colleagues to support this ‘‘(II) that no other relief will remedy the As important, this legislation pro- legislation. violation of the Federal right; and vides that any prospective relief order I ask unanimous consent that the ‘‘(ii) by a preponderance of the evidence— may be terminated on the motion of ei- text of the bill be printed in the ‘‘(I) that crowding has deprived a par- ther party 2 years after the later of the RECORD. ticular plaintiff or plaintiffs of at least one There being no objection, the bill was essential, identifiable human need; and grant of relief or the enactment of the ‘‘(II) that prison officials have acted with bill. The court shall grant the termi- ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as obduracy and wantonness in depriving a par- nation unless it finds that the original follows: ticular plaintiff or plaintiffs of at least one prerequisites for granting it are S. 1275 essential, identifiable human need. present at that time. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep- ‘‘(F) Any State or local official or unit of No longer, then, will we have consent resentatives of the United States of America in government whose jurisdiction or function decrees, such as those in Michigan Congress assembled, includes the prosecution or custody of per- under which judges control the prisons SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. sons who may be released from, or not ad- literally for decades. This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prison Con- mitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner Finally, the bill contains several ditions Litigation Reform Act’’. release order shall have standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of measures to reduce frivolous inmate SEC. 2. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES FOR PRISON CONDITIONS. such relief, and shall have the right to inter- litigation. The bill limits attorney’s vene in any proceeding relating to such re- fee awards. In addition, prisoners no (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3626 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as lief. ‘‘(b) TERMINATION OF RELIEF.— longer will be reimbursed for attor- follows: ney’s fees unless they prove an actual ‘‘(1) TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.— statutory violation. ‘‘§ 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to (A) In any civil action with respect to prison prison conditions No longer will courts award attor- conditions in which prospective relief is or- ney’s fees simply because the prison ‘‘(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIEF.— dered, such relief shall be terminable upon ‘‘(1) PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.—Prospective re- the motion of any party— has changed pre-existing conditions. lief in any civil action with respect to prison ‘‘(i) 2 years after the date the court grant- Only if those conditions violated a pris- conditions shall extend no further than nec- ed or approved the prospective relief; oner’s rights will fees be awarded. essary to correct the violation of the Federal ‘‘(ii) 1 year after the date the court has en- Prisoners who succeed in proving a right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. tered an order denying termination of pro- statutory violation will be reimbursed The court shall not grant or approve any spective relief under this paragraph; or
VerDate Aug 31 2005 06:56 May 28, 2008 Jkt 041999 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 0637 Sfmt 0634 J:\ODA15\1995_F~1\S26SE5.REC S26SE5 mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS S14318 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE September 26, 1995 ‘‘(iii) in the case of an order issued on or challenging the fact or duration of confine- this subsection, if the fee is paid by the indi- before the date of enactment of the Prison ment in prison; vidual rather than by the defendant pursu- Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such ‘‘(3) the term ‘prisoner’ means any person ant to section 2 of the Revised Statutes of date of enactment. incarcerated or detained in any facility who the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988). ‘‘(B) Nothing in this section shall prevent is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or ‘‘(g) TELEPHONE HEARINGS.—To the extent the parties from agreeing to terminate or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of practicable, in any action brought in Federal modify relief before the relief is terminated criminal law or the terms and conditions of court pursuant to section 1979 of the Revised under subparagraph (A). parole, probation, pretrial release, or diver- Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) ‘‘(2) IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PROSPEC- sionary program; by a prisoner crime confined in any jail, pris- TIVE RELIEF.—In any civil action with re- ‘‘(4) the term ‘prisoner release order’ in- on, or other correctional facility, pretrial spect to prison conditions, a defendant or in- cludes any order, including a temporary re- proceedings in which the prisoner’s partici- tervener shall be entitled to the immediate straining order or preliminary injunctive re- pation is required or permitted shall be con- termination of any prospective relief if the lief, that has the purpose or effect of reduc- ducted by telephone without removing the relief was approved or granted in the absence ing or limiting the prison population, or that prisoner from the facility in which the pris- of a finding by the court that the relief is directs the release from or nonadmission of oner is confined. Any State may adopt a narrowly drawn, extends no further than prisoners to a prison; similar requirement regarding hearings in necessary to correct the violation of the Fed- ‘‘(5) the term ‘prison’ means any Federal, such actions in that State’s courts. eral right, and is the least intrusive means State, or local facility that incarcerates or ‘‘(h) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, necessary to correct the violation. detains juveniles or adults accused of, con- the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incar- ‘‘(3) LIMITATION.—Prospective relief shall victed of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delin- cerated or detained in any facility who is ac- not terminate if the court makes written quent for, violations of criminal law; cused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adju- findings based on the record that prospective ‘‘(6) the term ‘prospective relief’ means all dicated delinquent for, violations of criminal relief remains necessary to correct the viola- relief other than monetary damages; and law or the terms and conditions of parole, tion of the Federal right, extends no further ‘‘(7) the term ‘relief’ means all relief in any probation, pretrial release, or diversionary than necessary to correct the violation of form that may be granted or approved by the program.’’. the Federal right, and that the prospective court, and includes consent decrees and set- SEC. 4. SUCCESSIVE CLAIMS IN PROCEEDINGS IN relief is the least intrusive means to correct tlement agreements (except a settlement FORMA PAUPERIS. the violation. agreement the breach of which is not subject Section 1915 of title 28, United States Code, ‘‘(4) TERMINATION OR MODIFICATION.—Noth- to any court enforcement other than rein- is amended by adding at the end the fol- ing in this section shall prevent any party statement of the civil proceeding that such lowing new subsection: from seeking modification or termination agreement settled).’’. ‘‘(f)(1) In no event shall a prisoner in any before the relief is terminable under para- (b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT.— prison bring a civil action or appeal a judg- graph (1) or (2), to the extent that modifica- (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 3626 of title 18, ment in a civil action or proceeding under tion or termination would otherwise be le- United States Code, as amended by this sec- this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more gally permissible. tion, shall apply with respect to all relief (as prior occasions, brought an action or appeal ‘‘(c) SETTLEMENTS.— defined in such section) whether such relief in a court of the United States that was dis- ‘‘(1) CONSENT DECREES.—In any civil action was originally granted or approved before, missed on the grounds that it is frivolous, with respect to prison conditions, the court on, or after the date of the enactment of this malicious, or fails to state a claim upon shall not enter or approve a consent decree Act. which relief may be granted, unless the pris- unless it complies with the limitations on re- (2) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Subsections oner is under imminent danger of serious lief set forth in subsection (a). (b) and (d) of section 20409 of the Violent bodily harm. ‘‘(2) PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS.— Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of ‘‘(2) As used in this subsection, the term (A) Nothing in this section shall preclude 1994 are repealed. ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or parties from entering into a private settle- (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of detained in any facility who is accused of, ment agreement that does not comply with sections at the beginning of subchapter C of convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated the limitations on relief set forth in sub- chapter 229 of title 18, United States Code, is delinquent for, violations of criminal law or section (a), if the terms of that agreement amended to read as follows: the terms and conditions of parole, proba- are not subject to court enforcement other tion, pretrial release, or diversionary pro- ‘‘3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to than the reinstatement of the civil pro- gram.’’.∑ prison conditions.’’. ceeding that the agreement settled. f ‘‘(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTI- any party claiming that a private settlement TUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT. ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS agreement has been breached from seeking Section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institu- S. 581 in State court any remedy for breach of con- tionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e) is tract available under State law. amended by adding at the end the following At the request of Mr. FAIRCLOTH, the ‘‘(d) STATE LAW REMEDIES.—The limita- new subsections: names of the Senator from Mississippi tions on remedies in this section shall not ‘‘(f) ATTORNEY’S FEES.—(1) In any action [Mr. LOTT] and the Senator from Ari- apply to relief entered by a State court based brought by a prisoner who is confined to any zona [Mr. MCCAIN] were added as co- solely upon claims arising under State law. jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in sponsors of S. 581, a bill to amend the which attorney’s fees are authorized under ‘‘(e) PROCEDURE FOR MOTIONS AFFECTING National Labor Relations Act and the PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.— section 2 of the Revised Statutes of the ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—The court shall promptly United States (42 U.S.C. 1988), such fees shall Railway Labor Act to repeal those pro- rule on any motion to modify or terminate be awarded only if— visions of Federal law that require em- prospective relief in a civil action with re- ‘‘(A) the fee was directly and reasonably ployees to pay union dues or fees as a spect to prison conditions. incurred in proving an actual violation of condition of employment, and for other ‘‘(2) AUTOMATIC STAY.—Any prospective re- the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute purposes. lief subject to a pending motion shall be pursuant to which a fee may be awarded S. 949 automatically stayed during the period— under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and At the request of Mr. GRAHAM, the ‘‘(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after ‘‘(B) the amount of the fee is proportion- such motion is filed, in the case of a motion ately related to the court ordered relief for name of the Senator from Maryland made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection the violation. [Ms. MIKULSKI] was added as a cospon- (b); or ‘‘(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is sor of S. 949, a bill to require the Sec- ‘‘(ii) beginning on the 180th day after such awarded in an action described in paragraph retary of the Treasury to mint coins in motion is filed, in the case of a motion made (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed commemoration of the 200th anniver- under subsection (b)(3); and 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the sary of the death of George Wash- ‘‘(B) ending on the date the court enters a amount of attorney’s fees awarded against ington. final order ruling on the motion. the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees ‘‘(f) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section— is greater than 25 percent of the judgment, S. 1093 ‘‘(1) the term ‘consent decree’ means any the excess shall be paid by the defendant. At the request of Mr. REID, the name relief entered by the court that is based in ‘‘(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an ac- of the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. whole or in part upon the consent or acquies- tion described in paragraph (1) shall be based SIMPSON) was added as a cosponsor of cence of the parties; on an hourly rate greater than the hourly S. 1093, a bill to prohibit the applica- ‘‘(2) the term ‘civil action with respect to rate established under section 3006A of title tion of the Religious Freedom Restora- prison conditions’ means any civil pro- 18, United States Code, for payment of court- tion Act of 1993, or any amendment ceeding arising under Federal law with re- appointed counsel. spect to the conditions of confinement or the ‘‘(4) Nothing in this subsection shall pro- made by such Act, to an individual who effects of actions by government officials on hibit a prisoner from entering into an agree- is incarcerated in a Federal, State, or the lives of persons confined in prison, but ment to pay an attorney’s fee in an amount local correctional, detention, or penal does not include habeas corpus proceedings greater than the amount authorized under facility, and for other purposes.
VerDate Aug 31 2005 06:56 May 28, 2008 Jkt 041999 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 0637 Sfmt 0634 J:\ODA15\1995_F~1\S26SE5.REC S26SE5 mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS Kraft, Claudia 6/9/2013 For Educational Use Only
§ 1997e. Suits by prisoners, 42 USCA § 1997e
KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Enacted Legislation Amended by PL 113-4, March 7, 2013, 127 Stat 54
KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Unconstitutional or Preempted
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Proposed Legislation