(Class 9): Prison Litigation: Courts As a Source of Oversight & Reform
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April 4 (Class 9): Prison Litigation: Courts as a Source of Oversight & Reform What is the role of courts in criminal justice reform? This class examines the relationships among courts, the administration of prisons, and prisoners’ rights. We do so by considering the work of William Wayne Justice, the federal judge involved in the Texas prison litigation (Ruiz v. Estelle); the development of congressional efforts to limit courts’ authority (the Prison Litigation Reform Act— PLRA); and the contemporary conflict over the most recent prison conditions case to reach the Supreme Court (Plata v. Brown). Our focus is on the various actors endowed with constitutional, legislative, administrative, political, and practical powers to oversee the administration of prisons. How did Judge Justice understand the role of judges in prison conditions cases? Is it different than in other kinds of cases? What were the concerns that animated the PLRA? How has the PLRA affected the balance of authority among judges, administrators, and legislatures? What are the metrics to assess the impact of litigation on conditions? The daily lives of inmates and administrators? The resources available to prisons? Hon. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1990) Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998 Statement of Senator Abraham, 143 CONG. REC. S14312 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558-69, 589-622 (2006) Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 731, 731-37 (2010) Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (excerpts) Marie Gottschalk, Prison Overcrowding and Brown v. Plata, New Republic (June 8, 2011) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/89575/prison- overcrowding-brown-plata-supreme-court-california Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 327 (2014) The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle William Wayne Justice* On March 21, 1990, the Honorable William WayneJustice, as Herman Phleger VisitingProfessor of Law, delivereda speechto the Stanfordcommu- nity on the originsof Ruiz v. Estelle, the case in whichJudge Justice, after exercisingunusual initiativein orderingconsolidation of prisonercomplaints into a class action,finding counselfor theplaintiff class, and orderingthe U.S. Justice Departmentto appearas amicus curiae, held that state penitentiary treatmentand conditionsin Texas were unconstitutionallycruel. The Stan- ford Law Review is pleased to reprintthe text of Judge Justice'sremarks. I would like to take up two issues in my remarkstoday. The first may be termed historical. I will begin by briefly setting out the sequenceof events that led to the initiation of the class action on behalf of prisonersincarcer- ated in Texas prisons in the case of Ruiz v. Estelle.1 In most class action litigation, of course, the plaintiffsprovide the impetus for maintainingthe proceedingas a class action. In contrast,the decision in Ruiz to classify and consolidate the representativepetitions that became the basis on which the case was litigated was my own. The remainderof my remarksare an attemptto analyzeand explainwhy it seemed necessaryfor the court to exerciseits own initiativeto bring about this consolidation. I wish to emphasizeat the outset, however, that my de- sire to explain the court's conduct in Ruiz does not amount to an apology. I am much less interestedin searchingout precedents,in the traditionallegal sense of that term, than I am in elaboratingsome broaderanalytical or theo- retical scheme for making sense of the court's responseto the hundredsof ill-drafted,handwritten prisoner's petitions that pouredinto the clerk'soffice in the Eastern District of Texas. I believe it is importantto elaboratethis broadermeans of understandingRuiz becausethe problemthe Texas prison case posed for our judicial system-specifically, how our courts can provide meaningfulaccess to legal institutionsfor the most disadvantagedmembers of our society-is one of the most importantand intractableissues that face judges, policymakers,and concernedlawyers of this generation.And there is no reason to expect the issue to become less important or less intractable during your careers in the law. * Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas. 1. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part, vacated in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982). 1 This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 STANFORDLAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 For me, the Ruiz litigationbegan before I went on the bench, when I was United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas. At that time, I would occasionallyattend hearingson prisonerpetitions held by my prede- cessor, the HonorableJoe W. Sheehy. At this point, I should make clear that most units of the Texas Depart- ment of Corrections(TDC) are in the SouthernDistrict of Texas. The Beto, Coffield,and Eastham units, however, are situated within the Eastern Dis- trict, in Andersonand Houston counties. For a good many years, prisoners in those units had been filing suits, primarilyon individualbases, protesting the conditions of their confinement. Judge Sheehy had developed a rather summaryform of hearing to deal with these cases. The procedure,which I observed on several occasions, was as follows: The plaintiffwould be sworn, and Judge Sheehy would ask him to tell his story. The prisoner would then give, to the best of his ability, a narrative account of the incident or incidents that had led him to file his complaint. Frequentlythis narrativewould be difficultto follow, since most prisoners were, as prisonersare now, poorly educated, with only a rudimentaryac- quaintancewith the English language. The defendant state official would then have the opportunityto cross- examine the prisoner-plaintiff.Unlike the plaintiffs in these hearings, the defendantswere always representedby counsel;as state officials,they would have the services of an assistant attorney general of the State of Texas. Next, Judge Sheehy would ask the plaintiffif he had any evidence,other than his own testimony, to present to the court. Plaintiffs may have had such evidence from time to time, but I never saw any presentedat the hear- ings I attended. Defendants,on the other hand, usually would produceboth witnesses and documentaryevidence to bolster their accounts. After the witnessesfor the defense were examined,the plaintifftypically would attempt some halting cross-examination.This was more likely to be "backchat"and denial, ratherthan recognizablecross-examination. At the conclusion of the defendant's presentation,Judge Sheehy would ask the plaintiffif he had any rebuttalevidence to present. Invariably,the plaintiff would not. Judge Sheehy would then dismiss the plaintiff'scomplaint from the bench. I was struck at the time by the summarynature of these proceedings,but I want to emphasizethat I did not then find anythingin them to be a denial of due process. Nor, on the basis of what I heard in those hearings,did I have any sense of wrongdoing on the part of TDC. My attitude toward TDC at that time was probablysimilar to that of most Texans: I thought that the system was efficient,and while occasional problemscommon to all large organizationsmight exist, no grave, systemic difficultiesexisted. Since, as I have said, I did not find any failure of due process in the procedureJudge Sheehy had worked out, I adopted his approach when I went on the bench. However, the process appearedquite differentto me as participantthan it had when I was merely an observer. The message was This content downloaded from 130.132.173.82 on Sun, 9 Jun 2013 23:21:09 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions November 1990] PHLEGER LECTURE 3 brought home forciblyto me that prisonerswho had no legal representation simply could not effectivelypresent their grievances. Pro se prisoners,like other pro se litigants, had great difficultyin framing any kind of pleading, and knew nothing of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureor the Federal Rules of Evidence. Their status as prisonersfurther exacerbatedsome of their difficulties.It would have been difficult,if not impossible,for them to engage in any discovery, had they even known how to do so. Occasionally,I was temptedto try to get counsel for these prisoners,but to do so would have been very difficult. I could not order lawyers to repre- sent them, and since at that time neither 42 U.S.C. ? 19882nor the Equal Access to JusticeAct3 was on the books, the prospectthat an attorneywould receive any fee for services renderedin such a case was extremelydim. I noted that the proceduralproblems of these cases were likely to pro- duce occasionalsubstantive injustices as well. Despite their unartfulexpres- sion, plaintiffswould occasionally say some things which had the ring of truth. Since my father had been a county district attorney and a criminal defense lawyer, and since I had been both a criminal defense lawyer and a prosecutor,I had been aroundjails since I was a boy. Having represented more than a few thieves, bootleggers,rapists, and murderers,I was not dis- posed to regardas the gospel truth everythinga miscreanttold me, even- and perhapsparticularly- if he said it underoath. However,since my expe- rience also encompassedany numberof sheriffs,policemen, and jailers, I was not likely to be wholly credulousas to claims made by peace officers,either. I have been lied to and I have been told the truth, and I think that I can usually tell the difference. Therefore,I was greatly troubled when I found myself, as I sometimesdid, dismissingprisoner suits that sounded credible.