Is Fiscal Stimulus an Effective Policy Response to a Recession? Reviewing the Existing Research
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Fiscal Policy in an Unemployment Crisis∗
Fiscal Policy in an Unemployment Crisis∗ Pontus Rendahly University of Cambridge, CEPR, and Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM) April 30, 2014 Abstract This paper shows that large fiscal multipliers arise naturally from equilibrium unemploy- ment dynamics. In response to a shock that brings the economy into a liquidity trap, an expansion in government spending increases output and causes a fall in the unemployment rate. Since movements in unemployment are persistent, the effects of current spending linger into the future, leading to an enduring rise in income. As an enduring rise in income boosts private demand, even a temporary increase in government spending sets in motion a virtuous employment-spending spiral with a large associated multiplier. This transmission mechanism contrasts with the conventional view in which fiscal policy may be efficacious only under a prolonged and committed rise in government spending, which engineers a spiral of increasing inflation. Keywords: Fiscal multiplier, liquidity trap, zero lower bound, unemployment inertia. ∗The first version of this paper can be found as Cambridge Working Papers in Economics No. 1211. yThe author would like to thank Andrea Caggese, Giancarlo Corsetti, Wouter den Haan, Jean-Paul L'Huillier, Giammario Impulitti, Karel Mertens, Emi Nakamura, Kristoffer Nimark, Evi Pappa, Franck Portier, Morten Ravn, Jon Steinsson, Silvana Tenreyro, and Mirko Wiederholt for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to seminar participants at LSE, Royal Economic Society, UCL, European Univer- sity Institute, EIEF, ESSIM 2012, SED 2013, Bonn University, Goethe University, UAB, and in particular to James Costain, and Jonathan Heathcote for helpful discussions and conversations. Financial support is gratefully acknowledge from the Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM) and the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET). -
Working Paper
WP 2020-12 December 2020 Working Paper Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA Social Externalities and Economic Analysis Marc Fleurbaey, Ravi Kanbur, and Brody Viney It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be denied admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employmen t on the basis of any legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action prog rams which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 2 Social Externalities and Economic Analysis Marc Fleurbaey, Ravi Kanbur, Brody Viney ThisThis version: versio Augustn: Aug 6,us 2020t 6, 20201 Abstract This paper considers and assesses the concept of social externalities through human interdependence, in relation to the economic analysis of externalities in the tradition of Pigou and Arrow, including the analysis of the commons. It argues that there are limits to economic analysis. Our proposal is to enlarge the perspective and start thinking about a broader framework in which any pattern of influence of an agent or a group of agents over a third party, which is not mediated by any economic, social, or psychological mechanism guaranteeing the alignment of the marginal net private benefit with marginal net social benefit, can be attached the “externality” label and be scrutinized for the likely negative consequences that result from the divergence .These consequences may be significant given the many interactions between the social and economic realms, and the scope for spillovers and feedback loops to emerge. -
An Assessment of Modern Monetary Theory
An assessment of modern monetary theory M. Kasongo Kashama * Introduction Modern monetary theory (MMT) is a so-called heterodox economic school of thought which argues that elected governments should raise funds by issuing money to the maximum extent to implement the policies they deem necessary. While the foundations of MMT were laid in the early 1990s (Mosler, 1993), its tenets have been increasingly echoed in the public arena in recent years. The surge in interest was first reflected by high-profile British and American progressive policy-makers, for whom MMT has provided a rationale for their calls for Green New Deals and other large public spending programmes. In doing so, they have been backed up by new research work and publications from non-mainstream economists in the wake of Mosler’s work (see, for example, Tymoigne et al. (2013), Kelton (2017) or Mitchell et al. (2019)). As the COVID-19 crisis has been hitting the global economy since early this year, the most straightforward application of MMT’s macroeconomic policy agenda – that is, money- financed fiscal expansion or helicopter money – has returned to the forefront on a wider scale. Some consider not only that it is “time for helicopters” (Jourdan, 2020) but also that this global crisis must become a trigger to build on MMT precepts, not least in the euro area context (Bofinger, 2020). The MMT resurgence has been accompanied by lively political discussions and a heated economic debate, bringing fierce criticism from top economists including P. Krugman, G. Mankiw, K. Rogoff or L. Summers. This short article aims at clarifying what is at stake from a macroeconomic stabilisation perspective when considering MMT implementation in advanced economies, paying particular attention to the euro area. -
A Primer on Modern Monetary Theory
2021 A Primer on Modern Monetary Theory Steven Globerman fraserinstitute.org Contents Executive Summary / i 1. Introducing Modern Monetary Theory / 1 2. Implementing MMT / 4 3. Has Canada Adopted MMT? / 10 4. Proposed Economic and Social Justifications for MMT / 17 5. MMT and Inflation / 23 Concluding Comments / 27 References / 29 About the author / 33 Acknowledgments / 33 Publishing information / 34 Supporting the Fraser Institute / 35 Purpose, funding, and independence / 35 About the Fraser Institute / 36 Editorial Advisory Board / 37 fraserinstitute.org fraserinstitute.org Executive Summary Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is a policy model for funding govern- ment spending. While MMT is not new, it has recently received wide- spread attention, particularly as government spending has increased dramatically in response to the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and concerns grow about how to pay for this increased spending. The essential message of MMT is that there is no financial constraint on government spending as long as a country is a sovereign issuer of cur- rency and does not tie the value of its currency to another currency. Both Canada and the US are examples of countries that are sovereign issuers of currency. In principle, being a sovereign issuer of currency endows the government with the ability to borrow money from the country’s cen- tral bank. The central bank can effectively credit the government’s bank account at the central bank for an unlimited amount of money without either charging the government interest or, indeed, demanding repayment of the government bonds the central bank has acquired. In 2020, the cen- tral banks in both Canada and the US bought a disproportionately large share of government bonds compared to previous years, which has led some observers to argue that the governments of Canada and the United States are practicing MMT. -
Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Policy Perspective Björn Lagerwall the Author Works in the Riksbank’S Monetary Policy Department1
NO 5 2019 Economic 27 May Commentaries Fiscal policy in a monetary policy perspective Björn Lagerwall The author works in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Department1 In Sweden and many other countries, the framework for stabilisation policy prior to the global financial crisis was aimed at monetary policy playing the lead role and fiscal policy playing a more passive role. But in the wake of the global financial crisis, this view has at least partly been reassessed – towards greater focus on fiscal policy. What are in fact the arguments for this reassessment? We will look Prior to the global financial crisis, more closely at some of them in this Economic Commentary, based on recent the framework for stabilisation research and discussion both internationally and in Sweden. policy, in both Sweden and many One argument has to do with low global interest rates having reduced the other countries, gave monetary scope of monetary policy to, where necessary, provide further stimulus to the policy the lead role. Afterwards, this view has been partly economy. But the low interest rates can also increase the scope of fiscal policy to reassessed – towards a greater stimulate the economy without jeopardising the sustainability of public finances. focus on fiscal policy. Based on Another argument is that many empirical studies have shown that the effects on recent research and discussion, two main reasons for why this household consumption of temporary fiscal policy stimuli may be significantly view has changed can be greater than previously thought. identified, both of which are This Economic Commentary also discusses the interaction between fiscal and discussed in this Economic . -
Fiscal Policy and Inflation Volatility
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 317 / MARCH 2004 FISCAL POLICY AND INFLATION VOLATILITY by Philipp C. Rother WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 317 / MARCH 2004 FISCAL POLICY AND INFLATION VOLATILITY1 by Philipp C. Rother 2 In 2004 all publications will carry This paper can be downloaded without charge from a motif taken http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network from the €100 banknote. electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=515081. 1 I thank Silvia Ardagna, Jürgen von Hagen, colleagues at the ECB and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. 2 European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main. Fax: +496913446000. Tel: +491613446398. Email: [email protected] . © European Central Bank, 2004 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Internet http://www.ecb.int Fax +49 69 1344 6000 Telex 411 144 ecb d All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non- commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. The statement of purpose for the ECB Working Paper Series is available from the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int. ISSN 1561-0810 (print) ISSN 1725-2806 (online) CONTENTS Abstract 4 Non-technical summary 5 1. Introduction 7 2. Literature 8 2.1. Growth effects of inflation volatility 8 2.2. -
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Working Together to Create an Economy That Behaves Reasonably Under All Conditions
Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Following the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the market from becoming dangerously severe. The people cited the United States’ free market as its key government primarily influences the economy through its advantage over the state-controlled economy of the use of the federal monetary and fiscal policies. USSR. Capitalism seemed to have won the day and many Americans reaped the benefits of an unfettered Fiscal Policy market. U.S. fiscal policy is simply how the government uses taxation and spending (i.e. the U.S. budget) to influence But it is a mistake to believe that our “free market” the economy. When the economy is running above or stands completely detached from the government. The below its optimal level, the government can alter the truth is the government uses numerous policies and budget to influence its level of output. plans to influence the economy and keep swings in the market from getting out of hand. If, for instance, the economy is on a powerful upswing and in danger of overheating, the government may Government and the Economy choose to raise taxes or decrease spending to remove The drawback to the fierce competition and effort some money from the market. Or, if the economy is required by capitalism is that the economy can be slow, the government might increase its spending as a subject to boom and bust cycles. When an economy is way to create jobs until consumer demand rises. strong, people tend to spend more and invest in long- term plans. -
Revisiting Stimulus and the Great Recession
The Daily Dish Revisiting Stimulus and the Great Recession DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN | OCTOBER 21, 2020 Eakinomics: Revisiting Stimulus and the Great Recession There has been a steady drumbeat of calls for additional “stimulus” to counter the fallout of the COVID-19 recession. I want to stipulate that I think the case can be made for an appropriately structured fiscal bill, but the case is not being made in a compelling fashion. A key part of the argument has been that stimulus got cut off after the 2008-09 recession and doomed the economy to slow growth. A New York Times article, entitled “ Why the U.S. Risks Repeating 2009’s Economic Stimulus Mistakes,” is typical. “‘The initial response was good, but we need more,’ said Karen Dynan, who was chief economist at the Treasury Department in the Obama administration and now teaches at Harvard. The decision to pull back on spending a decade ago, she said, ‘really prolonged the period of weakness after the great recession.’” (This argument is most often made by former Obama Administration officials.) Maybe. But maybe there is another lesson from that era. The first is that if you are going to do fiscal stimulus, do fiscal stimulus. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) contained some tax cuts and social safety net transfers of the typical stimulus ilk. But it contained a slew of provisions – e.g., health services information technologies and green investments – that were transformative in nature and core parts of the Obama domestic agenda. Transformation is not stimulus, which is just putting back in place what was previously there. -
Deflation: Economic Significance, Current Risk, and Policy Responses
Deflation: Economic Significance, Current Risk, and Policy Responses Craig K. Elwell Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy August 30, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40512 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Deflation: Economic Significance, Current Risk, and Policy Responses Summary Despite the severity of the recent financial crisis and recession, the U.S. economy has so far avoided falling into a deflationary spiral. Since mid-2009, the economy has been on a path of economic recovery. However, the pace of economic growth during the recovery has been relatively slow, and major economic weaknesses persist. In this economic environment, the risk of deflation remains significant and could delay sustained economic recovery. Deflation is a persistent decline in the overall level of prices. It is not unusual for prices to fall in a particular sector because of rising productivity, falling costs, or weak demand relative to the wider economy. In contrast, deflation occurs when price declines are so widespread and sustained that they cause a broad-based price index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), to decline for several quarters. Such a continuous decline in the price level is more troublesome, because in a weak or contracting economy it can lead to a damaging self-reinforcing downward spiral of prices and economic activity. However, there are also examples of relatively benign deflations when economic activity expanded despite a falling price level. For instance, from 1880 through 1896, the U.S. price level fell about 30%, but this coincided with a period of strong economic growth. -
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a New Keynesian Model with Capital Accumulation and Non-Ricardian Consumers
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 649 / JUNE 2006 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND NON-RICARDIAN CONSUMERS ISSN 1561081-0 by Campbell Leith 9 771561 081005 and Leopold von Thadden WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 649 / JUNE 2006 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND NON-RICARDIAN CONSUMERS 1 by Campbell Leith 2 and Leopold von Thadden 3 In 2006 all ECB publications will feature This paper can be downloaded without charge from a motif taken http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network from the €5 banknote. electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=908620 1 Comments on an early version of this paper by Martin Ellison, George von Fuerstenberg, Heinz Herrmann, Leo Kaas, Jana Kremer, Eric Leeper, Massimo Rostagno, Andreas Schabert, Harald Uhlig as well as seminar participants at the European Central Bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the University of Konstanz, the CEPR-conference on “The implications of alternative fiscal rules for monetary policy” (Helsinki, 2004), and at the annual meetings of the Econometric Society (Madrid, 2004), the German Economic Association (Dresden, 2004), and the Royal Economic Society (Nottingham, 2005) are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. 2 Department of Economics, Adam Smith Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RT, United Kingdom; e-mail: [email protected] 3 European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: [email protected] © European Central Bank, 2006 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Internet http://www.ecb.int Fax +49 69 1344 6000 Telex 411 144 ecb d All rights reserved. -
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Incentives to Spend and Constraints on the Executive
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Incentives to Spend and Constraints on the Executive Cristina Bodea Michigan State University Masaaki Higashijima Michigan State University Accepted at the British Journal of Political Science Word count: 12146 Abstract Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. We argue that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. More, we suggest that CBI may not affect fiscal deficits in a counter-cyclical fashion, but, rather, depending on the electoral calendar and government partisanship. We test our hypotheses with new yearly data on legal CBI for 78 countries from 1970 to 2007. Results show that CBI restrains deficits only in democracies, during non-election years and under left government tenures. 1 1. Introduction In the 1990s countries worldwide started to reform their central bank laws, removing monetary policy from the hands of the government. This means that the newly independent central banks can change interest rates, target the exchange rate or the money supply to ensure price stability or low inflation1, without regard to incumbent approval ratings or re-election prospects. Because central bank independence (CBI) has been designed as an institutional mechanism for keeping a check on inflation, most analyses focus on the effect of such independence on inflation and its potential trade-off with economic growth (Grilli 1991, Cukierman et al. -
Income, Liquidity, and the Consumption Response to the 2020 Economic Stimulus Payments Scott R
Income, Liquidity, and the Consumption Response to the 2020 Economic Stimulus Payments Scott R. Baker, R. A. Farrokhnia, Steffen Meyer, Michaela Pagel, and Constantine Yannelis NBER Working Paper No. 27097 May 2020, Revised in September 2020 JEL No. D14,E21,G51 ABSTRACT The 2020 CARES Act directed large cash payments to households. We analyze house-holds’ spending responses using high-frequency transaction data from a Fintech non-profit, exploring heterogeneity by income levels, recent income declines, and liquidity as well as linked survey responses about economic expectations. Households respond rapidly to the re-ceipt of stimulus payments, with spending increasing by $0.25-$0.40 per dollar of stimulus during the first weeks. Households with lower incomes, greater income drops, and lower lev-els of liquidity display stronger responses highlighting the importance of targeting. Liquidity plays the most important role, with no significant spending response for households with large checking account balances. Households that expect employment losses and benefit cuts dis-play weaker responses to the stimulus. Relative to the effects of previous economic stimulus programs in 2001 and 2008, we see faster effects, smaller increases in durables spending, larger increases in spending on food, and substantial increases in payments like rents, mortgages, and credit cards reflecting a short- term debt overhang. We formally show that these differences can make direct payments less effective in stimulating aggregate consumption. Scott R. Baker Michaela Pagel Kellogg School of Management Columbia Business School Northwestern University 3022 Broadway 2211 Campus Drive Uris Hall Evanston, IL 60208 New York, NY 10027 and NBER and NBER [email protected] [email protected] R.