Social and political attitudes of people on low incomes

Authors: Allison Dunatchik, Malen Davies, Julia Griggs, Fatima Husain, Curtis Jessop, Nancy Kelley, Hannah Morgan, Nilufer Rahim, Eleanor Taylor, Martin Wood Date: 30.08.2016 Prepared for: The Joseph Rowntree Foundation Contents

Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Politics 3 Welfare and Worklessness 4 Key Concerns and Front of Mind Issues 5 Feeling in Control 6 Taking Action 7 Conclusions

Appendix A Method Appendix B Panel sample profile Appendix C Case study sample profile Appendix D Variables included in the cross sectional analysis Executive Summary People living on low incomes have historically been excluded from politics and policy debates, even when the question at hand is how poverty can be reduced or its impacts mitigated.1 The aim of this research was to explore how people on low incomes perceive politics, understand how far they feel they can control or influence the impact of politics and policy on their lives, and provide a platform for them to speak out on the issues that most concern them. This report draws on three complementary projects: secondary analysis of Understanding Society and NatCen’s British Social Attitudes survey uncovering the social and political attitudes of people on low incomes, findings from a new high quality random web probability panel, and a deep dive case study with people living on low incomes in an Outer London borough. Politics Despite experiencing significant and persistent inequalities in living conditions and life-chances2, people living on low incomes have social and political attitudes that are broadly similar to their higher income peers. Over time, as attitudes change, the pattern of that change is also similar, suggesting that the same factors are influencing both groups. There are, however, some key differences in the political and social attitudes of people living on lower incomes. People on low incomes are significantly less likely to describe themselves as interested in politics. In 2015, only 25% of people in the low income group said they had ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of interest in politics, compared to 40% of people in the higher income group. However, the percentage of people on low income who are interested in politics is rising slowly but steadily: from 20% in 2000 to 25% last year. People living on low incomes also appear to have less trust in their political representatives. The most recent data shows that 61% of the lower income group don’t trust politicians to tell the truth (compared to 50% of the higher income group). Political party affiliation remains closely coupled to income, with people on low incomes less likely to support the Conservative Party, more likely to support the Labour Party, and more likely to not identify with any party than their higher income peers. Results also suggest that people on lower incomes are less likely to see voting as a civic norm or duty, a finding that reflects data on voting in general elections, where turnout is consistently lower among people from lower socio- economic classes. The UK and Europe Over the last decade and a half, attitudes to membership of the European Union have been relatively stable. Although no difference was found in 2015, in 7 years between 2001 and 2015, people on lower incomes were significantly more likely to believe that Britain should leave the EU, more likely to be undecided and less likely to believe that Britain should remain in the EU, but reduce its powers.

1 Elitist Britain? Report of the Commission on Social Mobility and Child Poverty, London 2014. 2 See for instance McInnes et al (2015) Monitoring of Poverty and Social Exclusion 2015, JRF, York and Wickham et al (2016) Poverty and Child Health in the UK: using evidence for action, Disease in Childhood. Figure 1 Proportion of respondents who say ‘Britain should leave the EU’ by income group

Interestingly, people on low incomes are also less happy with the way in which England is governed. While the most recent data showed no difference in views about the best way for England to be governed, time series analysis suggests lower income groups have both a higher level of dissatisfaction with the current system, and a slightly higher level of support for establishing an English parliament (22% compared with 20%). Welfare and Worklessness

As with attitudes to politics and the political sphere, there are similarities in the pattern of attitudes to welfare and worklessness across lower and higher income groups, which show a long term decline in support for the welfare state, and high levels of concern about income inequality. However, of the 14 questions asked, 11 were significantly related to a household’s income level, and just 4 showed no significant difference. This said, people on low incomes are more likely to see spending on benefits as a priority for government (11% compared to 4% among higher income groups), and to support increased public spending even when it requires increased taxation (45% compared to 37%). In the area of unemployment and benefits for working age adults, people on low incomes are consistently more sympathetic to unemployed people. They are significantly more likely to think that unemployment benefits are too low, empathise with jobseekers and oppose requiring people to take minimum wage jobs while they search for something better (only 50% support agreed that someone should ‘definitely’ take a minimum wage job, as opposed to 62% of the higher income group). They are also more likely to see welfare cuts as damaging (65% compared to 42%) and to oppose the benefit cap (31% compared to 22%). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 71% of people on low incomes feel that it is ‘mainly the government that is responsible for supporting people who become unemployed’ compared to only 56% of the higher income group. Overall, this paints a picture of attitudes to welfare and worklessness that are out of step with the long term direction of government policy which has increased transfers to pensioners at the expense of working age adults, and focused on labour market activation and conditionality. Key concerns and front of mind issues

The single most important concern identified by panelists was health and disability, followed by personal finances, crime, migrants or immigration, and housing. Although the priorities were the same across lower and higher income groups, people on lower incomes were slightly more concerned about crime and housing than their higher income peers. Figure 2 Proportion selecting issues by whether or not living on low income

In contrast to this picture, participants in the depth research were extremely concerned about immigration and its impact on public services. Participants were opposed to increased migration to the UK, and felt immigration was ‘out of control’. They believed that immigration had increased pressure on public services, making it harder for them and their family to access services or make choices about the kinds of services they wanted. Some participants believed that migrants had unlimited access to public services and more preferential treatment than UK citizens. Immigration was closely coupled in their minds with concerns about health, education and housing. Feeling in Control Overall, across both high and low income groups, people felt able to exercise some control over the issues they care most about. Figure 3 Level of control over issue

Bases: All participants selecting issue, Providing or requiring care (204); Education (386); Personal finances (615); Work or finding employment (319); Migrants or immigration (517); Housing or your home (453); Health, including disability (853); Crime (423)

Again, immigration stands out as the exception, with 71% of people on higher incomes and 76% of people on lower incomes saying they ‘can make no difference’ to the impact immigration has on their lives. This research was carried out in 2015, before the EU Referendum campaign had fully begun. For most issues of concern, where people on low incomes appeared to feel a much lower level of control, this was in fact being driven by demographic factors such as age, or health status. However, living on a low income was associated with feeling much less in control of housing, something that is unsurprising given the affordability problems that are endemic in the UK market. When asked about how far they felt they had overall control over their lives, those on higher incomes felt significantly more in control (even when age and other characteristics were taken into account). This also came across powerfully in the depth research. ‘I might have a nice council place, you can be given – there are nice council places. I might be put in a nice area but you just – it’s the unknown. It’s the – that it is out of your hands when they – when you’re given a council property that you are being told where you’ve got to go and that being out of your hands, you cant choose and that, that worries me, yeah’ For some of these participants, their family was the only thing they felt they could exercise real control and influence over. Conclusions This research set out to explore how people on low incomes perceive politics, and how much they feel they can influence the things they care most about. It is clear that people on low incomes have attitudes to politics and public policy that are broadly in line with the wider population, a finding that may be surprising given how entrenched inequality is in our society, and how much the impact of political decisions can vary for higher and lower income communities. Trust in politicians and the political system is low and falling, but interest in politics is rising slowly. Traditional party loyalties appear to be holding, as are longstanding differences in the way people on low incomes perceive welfare and worklessness. Importantly, people on low incomes feel less in control of their lives and have less faith in politicians to act in the national interest. Some believe that the decks are stacked against them, that changes will be pushed through irrespective of their views and they will be left to live with the consequences. Particularly in the depth research, immigration and concerns about its impact on public services and on culture emerged as a powerful and unifying theme. Immigration as an issue was also associated with an exceptionally strong feeling of powerlessness, and while this may reflect practicalities – individuals do not set border controls- it also reflects a more fundamental malaise. When this research was commissioned, the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU felt far away, and commentators and the electorate alike assumed a vote for ‘remain’. As we adjust to the realities of Brexit, we are also adjusting to a new political landscape. Many of the drivers of the referendum vote: a lack of trust in the political class, concern about the scope of the European Union and a desire to control immigration are reflected in the political and social views of people on low incomes. As politicians seek a way to unify and lead the UK through ‘Brexit’, engaging with the concerns and experiences of people on low incomes should be a priority. 1 Introduction Background to the research People living on low incomes have historically been excluded from policy debates, even when the question at hand is how poverty can be reduced or its impacts mitigated. Less engaged in formal politics or organised activism than wealthier peers, they are more likely to be poorly represented in the UKs democratic structures3 and to be misrepresented in the media, which often perpetuates a distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.4 Research into poverty has tended to focus on measuring poverty or material deprivation, and understanding how poverty intersects with demography, social outcomes and social services. Attitudinal research in relation to poverty has similarly focused on exploring and representing low income communities’ views on living in poverty and accessing services5. JRF commissioned NatCen to carry out this research to: • Explore how people on low incomes perceive politics • Provide a platform forpeople on low incomes to speak directly about the issues that matter most to them, through the establishment of a high quality poll, and • Understand how far they feel they can control or influence those issues. When this research was commissioned, the intention was to support the potential for a more direct engagement between citizens living on low incomes, politics and public policy. Since then, the turnout, pattern of voting and result of the EU referendum has shaken up mainstream thinking about the political landscape of the UK. Now, debates about the political dimensions of income and class as well as the unequal impacts of globalisation are front page news. In this context, a clearer understanding of and engagement with the political and social views of people living on low incomes is an important part of leading the UK through a period of significant political and social change. Research overview

The research is based on three complementary projects: • Secondary analysis, using NatCen’s British Social Attitudes survey (BSA) and Understanding Society (USoc) to explore the social and political attitudes of people living on low incomes; • Primary data from a new, high quality random probability panel, drawn from BSA 2015, with a particular focus on people living on low incomes. The panel was used to conduct survey work on social and political attitudes; • A ‘deep dive’ qualitative case study based on depth interviews with people living on low incomes in one Local Authority area in South London. The qualitative work explores the issues that are ‘front of mind’ for participants, and provides context and insight to complement the quantitative work.

3 Elitist Britain? Report of the Commission on Social Mobility and Child Poverty, London 2014. 4 Albrekt Larsen et al (2012) The Institutional Logic of Images of the Poor and Welfare Recipients: A Comparative Study of British, Swedish and Danish Newspapers, Working Paper 2012-78, Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies 5 http://www.poverty.ac.uk/system/files/PSE_press_release_final.pdf Our starting point for defining low income was the standard HBAI 60% of median income measure. In the secondary analysis this required the creation of a new BSA variable. For the panel, we introduced some flexibility to capture respondents who fell just above the 60% threshold, but scored highly on material deprivation measures. Throughout this report, ‘low income’ should be taken as meaning this group, and ‘higher income’ as all other respondents. A detailed description of the method and sampling approaches is set out at Annexes A-C. A table showing the full list of variables included in the cross- sectional analysis, along with the years they appeared in either BSA or USoc, is included at Annex D. 2 Politics

This chapter presents findings drawn from cross-sectional analysis of the latest available data from NatCen’s British Social Attitudes (BSA) and Understanding Society (USoc). Our analysis shows that while there are some differences between the way in which richer and poorer people perceive and engage with the political sphere, these differences are not always pronounced. Over time, we do see attitudes changing, but the pattern of that change is similar. This suggests that across the income spectrum people’s views about politics are being influenced by similar factors and to a similar degree. Taken together, these findings are telling. People living on lower incomes experience persistent and severe inequalities in both access to influence and social outcomes, yet this different experience does not appear to translate into a similar divergence in political and social attitudes. How have attitudes shifted over time?

BSA data from 2000-2015 was used to explore how attitudes have changed over time.6 It is important to note that BSA is an annual cross-sectional survey, meaning each year a new sample is selected. For this reason, it can tell us how the views of the population change, but not about the views of individuals. Many of the variables examined showed shifts in the attitudes of the population as a whole. For example, trust in government has declined over the past 15 years and public support for welfare spending has been in long-term decline, with only a slight increase in the past 5 years. The time series analysis also allowed us to examine whether the attitudes of the two income groups varied in different ways over time. We found no interaction effects that were significant (at the 5% level) between income group and time, for any of the attitudes analysed. Therefore, results suggest that while attitudes are changing over time, the pattern of this change is similar for both the lower and higher income groups. Trends observed among those on low incomes include: • Although people on lower incomes were less interested in politics, the proportion of lower income respondents expressing a high level of interest in politics increased from 20% to 25% from between 2000 and 2015. The proportion of higher income respondents also increased from 35% to 40% over this period. • The proportion of individuals believing they have no say in government fluctuated considerably between 2000 and 2012, ranging from 66% to 77%. The higher income group fluctuated between 56% and 67%. • Distrust in politicians to put the interests of the nation above political interests increased between 2000 (31%) and 2013 (40%), compared to 23% and 30% for the higher income group • Distrust in MPs to tell the truth increased between 2000 (49% said MPs ‘almost never’ tell the truth) and 2013 (61%, compared to 45% and 50% in the higher income group

6 Income thresholds calculated for the study using 2014 data Figure 4 Proportion of respondents who reported having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of interest in politics, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

So while people on lower incomes appear to be growing more interested in politics, they remain skeptical about the degree to which they can have any impact on the political sphere and are increasingly distrustful of politicians, seeing them as potentially dishonest and self-interested. For views on taxation and spending there is some suggestion that the pattern of change may differ between the two income groups (with the interaction effect significant at 10% level). Views were very similar between the two groups until 2008, when the lower income group became significantly more likely to support increased taxation and spending than those with a higher income. This difference remained in 2010, 2013 and 2014. In 2015 the gap closes again, as a consequence of an increase in support by the higher income group. Figure 5 Proportion of respondents who would choose for the Government to increase taxation and spending, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups This suggests that while the attitudes of people living on lower incomes are not particularly sensitive to entrenched inequalities, they are sensitive to shocks. In this case, the recession is correlated with a sustained increase in support for increased taxation and spending across the income groups. Differences of view between lower and higher income groups

The key domains where views differed between lower and higher income groups were politics, civic engagement, welfare and worklessness (the latter is covered in Chapter 3). Results suggested that those with lower incomes were less likely to view voting as a social norm or civic duty compared with those on higher incomes. This reflects data for voting in general elections, where people from lower socio- economic classes have a markedly lower rate of turnout than their wealthier peers.7 Evidence from both BSA and USoc suggested that those with low incomes were less likely to believe that they could influence political outcomes. In USoc, for example, those in the lower income group were significantly more likely to ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statements ‘I don’t have a say in what government does’ and ‘politicians don’t care what I think’ than those from higher income households. However, logistic regression analysis found that once background characteristics were accounted for there was no difference between the income groups in agreement that ‘I don’t have a say in what government does’. Similarly, the lower levels of trust in government among the lower income group in the descriptive analysis were found not to be significant when other background characteristics were taken into account. Other factors that are known to be related to income – namely age and education – were significant, and these factors may lie behind the differences found in the descriptive analysis. Higher levels of education were consistently associated with higher levels of trust in government, and a lower likelihood of agreeing with the statement ‘I don’t have a say in what government does’. The relationship with age was not linear. Ageing was associated with a lower level of trust until the age of 49, when trust levels begin to rise, and the feeling of having ‘no say’ rose until age 77, when it began to decline. Party affiliation

While there was no difference in the strength of party loyalty, the pattern of party affiliation differed significantly across the income groups. People on lower incomes were less likely to support the Conservative party, more likely to support the Labour party and more likely to not identify with any political party than higher income respondents.

7 See How Britain Voted in 2015, IPSOS Mori https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/ researchive/3575/How-Britain-voted-in-2015.aspx Figure 6 Political party affiliation, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

Few significant differences were found between the income groups in the prevalence of civic action and engagement, exceptions being that those in the lower income group were less likely to have signed a petition, raised an issue with an organisation they belonged to, or gone on a protest or demonstration. Similarly, those in the lower income group were significantly more likely to say that they had never taken action against a government policy they felt was unjust (64% compared to 48% in the higher income group in 2011). Believing that it is almost impossible to influence politics has important implications for whether people on low incomes choose to engage at all, but it also has implications for the choices they make when they engage. In 2012, approximately 65% of people on low incomes, and 55% of those on higher incomes stated that they feel they have no say in what government does. Immediately prior to the referendum, IPSOS Mori polling showed that only 26% of the public as a whole and 39% of leave voters believed that the outcome would be a vote to leave the EU8. Although there is no evidence that a significant proportion of voters regret their choice, the fact that for many the choice was made in this context is telling. National identity, devolution and the EU

In 2015, income made no difference to the strength of British identity. Time series analysis showed that in three years (2012, 2008, 2001) lower income respondents were significantly less likely to identify as British, but there is no clear pattern overall.

8 https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3752/Ipsos-MORI-EU- Referendum-Prediction-Poll.aspx accessed 27/07/2016. Figure 7 Proportion of respondents identify themselves as British, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

Similarly, income also made very little difference to attitudes to the European Union. Assessment of the benefits/disbenefits of membership, free movement of goods and free movement of people as well as access to welfare for migrants was similar across the groups. On the key question of whether Britain should leave the EU, no significant difference was found in 2015, but time series analysis revealed some differences in earlier years. In seven years between 2001 and 2015 people on lower incomes were significantly more likely to say that Britain should leave the EU. Conversely, they were less likely than people on higher incomes to believe that Britain should stay in the EU and reduce its power. Figure 8 Proportion of respondents who say ‘Britain should leave the EU’ by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups People on lower incomes were also more likely to identify themselves as being undecided about EU membership. Devolution On the issue of Scottish devolution, there were no statistically significant differences in the views of people on lower or higher incomes, with the exception of one year (2001) in which people on lower incomes were more likely to say that Scotland should leave the UK (23% compared with 17%).9 However, there are significant differences in how people on lower and higher incomes view spending in Scotland, with people on higher incomes more likely to say that Scotland gets ‘more than its fair share’ of government spending. Figure 9 Proportion of respondents who say Scotland gets ‘a little more’ or ‘much more’ of its fair share of government spending, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

Similarly, while the most recent data showed no difference in views about the best way for England to be governed, time series analysis suggests lower income groups have both a higher level of dissatisfaction with the current system, and a higher level of support for establishing an English parliament (22% compared with 20%).

9 The sample is taken from England, Wales and Scotland, and views on both spending and devolution are significantly impacted by country, but given the sample size it is not possible to analyse by both nation and income. Figure 10 England should be governed as it is now, with laws made by UK parliament, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups In past years, this difference in view about English self-determination would have been worthy of no more than passing comment. However, the highly polarized political landscape across the nations of the UK, together with the outcome of the recent referendum on leaving the EU, mean that federalism, including the potential for greater self-determination by and for England, are now live political issues, with the potential to both be influenced by, and influence attitudes to ‘the English question’. 3 Welfare and worklessness As with attitudes to politics and the political sphere, there are similarities in the pattern of attitudes to welfare and worklessness across lower and higher income groups, which show a long term decline in support for the welfare state, and high levels of concern about income inequality. However, of the 14 questions asked, 11 were significantly related to a household’s income level, and just 4 showed no significant difference. Although the difference is not apparent in the most recent data, in seven of the last 15 years, people on lower incomes were more likely to agree that ‘the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest achievements’. Figure 11 Proportion of respondents who agree or strongly agree that ‘the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest achievements’, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

In addition to this, people on lower incomes were more likely to see spending on benefits as a priority for government (11% as compared to 4%), and to support increased spending even when it requires increased taxation (45% as compared to 37%). Trend data on the question of increasing taxation to increase spending suggests that this difference may be becoming more pronounced over time. And while it is interesting to note that support for the welfare state as a whole is relatively high across the groups, there are significant differences when it comes to the focus of welfare spending, with people on lower incomes being consistently more sympathetic to spending on working age adults. Our analysis shows that people on low incomes are more likely to see unemployment benefits as being too low, and less likely to see benefits as encouraging dependency. Figure 12 Proportion of respondents who feel ‘unemployment benefits are too low’, by income group

Note: white data points indicate a non-significant difference between the two income groups

People on lower incomes are more likely to sympathize with jobseekers, and to disagree with pushing unemployed people to take minimum wage jobs while they search for something better (50% of people felt jobseekers should ‘definitely’ take a minimum wage job as opposed to 62% in the higher income group10). They show stronger support for the proposition that it is the government’s job to provide for people who become unemployed (71% as opposed to 56% of those on higher incomes), and for having a more equal distribution of benefit payments across the working age and pension age groups. Finally, people on lower incomes were more likely to see cuts to welfare as damaging people’s lives (65% compared to 42%) and to oppose the benefit cap (31% compared to 22%). Interestingly, over a third of people on low incomes also agree that ‘most people fiddle the dole’ (36% of people on low incomes compared to 34% of people on higher incomes in 2014).11 This compares to Department of Work and Pensions estimates, that in 2015 showed only 1.8% of total benefit expenditure being paid out as a consequence of fraud and error combined12. It is possible that this perception is being driven by media representations of benefit claimants, which focus on fraud to a disproportionate degree13. This said, it does not seem to impact on the degree of sympathy felt for unemployed people, suggesting that ‘fiddling the dole’ may be seen as a relatively normal part of managing on an inadequate income. What is striking about this pattern of attitudes to welfare and worklessness among people on low incomes, is that it runs counter to both the long running direction of welfare policy which has seen an increasing imbalance between transfers to working age adults and those to adults of pensionable age, and the more immediate welfare reform agenda, with its labour market activation policies and caps to entitlement.

10 It is important to note that an additional 24% of people on low incomes thought a jobseeker should ‘probably’ take a minimum wage job if it was offered to them.

11 Despite being included in all waves of the BSA since 2000, descriptive analysis shows just one significant difference between the income groups, in 2001, on the ‘fiddling the dole’ measure. In this case a higher proportion of those in the lower income group agreed or strongly agreed that ‘most people on the dole are fiddling it one way or another’.

12 DWP (2015) Fraud and Error in the Benefit System 2014/15 Biannual National Statistics, GB.

13 Larsen et al (2012) 4 Key concerns and ‘front of mind’ issues

Panel participants were asked to identify the political or social issues that were most important to them. The list of issues used for the panel comprised the following: • Crime; • Health, including disability; • Housing or your home; • Migrants or immigration; • Work or finding employment; • Personal finances; • Education; • Providing or requiring care, e.g. day care or social care; • Other (please describe); • None of the above. Panellists were asked to select up to three of the issues from the list and to indicate which one of the issues they considered the most important in their life. In the depth case study, participants were asked to spontaneously identify the issues that mattered most to them, without reference to any lists or guides. Overall, when presented with a closed list of possible options, there was strong agreement between lower and higher income respondents about which issues mattered most. Although none of the differences were statistically significant, when asked to identify the single most important issue, lower income respondents placed a stronger emphasis on health, education, work and housing. Health and personal finances were the most commonly identified issues, followed by crime, immigration and housing. Figure 13 Proportion selecting as top three ‘front of mind’ issues by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants, Not on low incomes (1227); On low incomes (228)

There were no statistically significant differences found between the lower and higher income groups when asked to identify the single most important issue. Health was the issue most commonly cited, with 30% of panel participants identifying this overall. Almost 20% of all panel participants identified personal finances as their most important issue. Providing or requiring care was chosen as the main issue by the least number of panellists (4%). Figure 14 Most important ‘front of mind’ issues by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants selecting anissue, Not on low incomes (1173); On low incomes (227)

The panel research asked people to identify their most important issue and their top three issues from a closed list of key public policy areas. In the depth research, we asked people to spontaneously identify the concerns that were front of mind for them. Interestingly, the responses in the depth research were quite distinct, with immigration, crime (and policing), and the NHS/health identified as of most concern. In the following sections the key issues raised both in the panel survey and in the depth research are explored further, starting with immigration, education and health, as these appeared to be particularly closely associated in people’s thinking. Depth Research Participants

The qualitative deep dive included 18 participants living on low incomes in an outer London Borough. Participants could be grouped into the following categories: • Singles and couples without dependent children: men and women aged 30-59. They included single people living alone and couples without children (or resident children), or whose children had grown up and left home. These participants were working in either part-time or full-time jobs and spent some of their spare time caring for grandchildren or elderly parents. • Lone Parent families: women aged 35-52 with 1-2 dependent children aged 6-16. They were either working part-time, including on a self-employed basis or were unemployed and doing ‘odd jobs’ such as hairdressing and bar-work. These participants’ incomes were supplemented by child tax credits and where relevant, working tax credits. • Two parent families: couples aged in their mid-20s to early 50s with one to four dependent children. These participants were in full-time or part-time employment or described themselves as doing ‘odd-jobs’ while seeking work. • Pensioners: women living alone in their late 60s and drawing state pensions. These participants had always lived in the local area and had family nearby. They spent time looking after their grandchildren. These participants had developed health issues such as osteoarthritis. Immigration

Immigration was seen as an important issue among panel respondents (although it was the ‘main’ issue for only 11%). However, it was the by far the most important front of mind issue for respondents in our depth study, and they made connections between immigration and other key areas of concern. Participants talked about migrants, refugees and asylum seekers interchangeably, and while in some cases they drew distinctions between more recent (first generation) migrants and settled communities, for other people their concern about immigration related to longer term patterns of migration and settlement. On the whole, immigration was a front of mind issue because participants were opposed to increased immigration to the UK, and felt immigration was ‘out of control’. Views on the extent to which immigrants should be granted residence in the UK varied. Some participants made the distinction between providing safe haven for people fleeing conflict and war and enabling economic migration. Other participants felt that further immigration to the UK should not be tolerated at all. Across all participants there were two interrelated reasons why immigration was a matter of such concern. Firstly, participants believed that immigration into the UK creates pressure on public services. They felt that this would not only make these services harder to access, but also that it would reduce their ability to choose the type of service they wanted for themselves and their family. Secondly, though to a lesser extent, participants felt that migrants were given preferential treatment and unlimited access to public services. In some cases participants reported direct experiences that they attributed to this kind of preferential treatment. So concerns about immigration intersected in a significant way with other ‘front of mind’ issues, such as health, housing and education. In some instances participants explained that the issue of immigration had become important to them when they began to notice the cultural impact it was having on public services, mainly the education system. Participants who had children or grandchildren in school explained that they had noticed that schools had made changes to become more inclusive in terms of religion:

“Silly little things that affect you. Like Christmas plays don’t seem to be what they used to be no more, cause you have to take into account other people’s religion”. JRF 12

Less commonly, participant’s views had been influenced by direct experiences of perceived injustice. For example, a lone parent with two children, one at primary school, reported that her daughter did not get a place in her first choice of school. She was aware that two children from a family she identified as immigrants were awarded places at the school:

“I think, two Polish ladies looking and there was only, I don’t know, two places, and Shelly never got a place because the two Polish kids got a place because they were nearer the school and that kind of did piss me off….I was kind of like, well it sounds really awful, well I was kind of like ‘that’s not fair’”. JRF 4 Participants explained that a lot of the knowledge they had about immigration came from watching the news or reading the newspaper. In some cases, participants had been following reporting on immigration over recent years and this had gradually raised their level of concern. For others recent reporting, specifically relating to the migrants’ camp at Calais (which had been in the news a great deal at this time), had fostered their interest in and concern about the issue. Amongst the group, there was awareness that some of their views on immigration might be perceived as racist. As a result they limited their discussion of immigration and its impacts to family and friends they were confident shared their views. Education and schools

Just under a third (30%) of panel participants identified education as an important front of mind issue. As we might expect, this was more likely to be chosen by those with children in the household (39% compared to 22%). Case study participants who had children and grandchildren cited education as a ‘front of mind’ issue. As noted above, this concern was closely linked in people’s minds with immigration. The perceived influx of migrants was believed to have had a detrimental effect on the number of school places available (compounded by selective grammar schools in the area) as well as the quality of teaching, with non-English speaking children reportedly dominating teachers’ attention. The curriculum and school activities were also thought to have changed as a result of immigration, and this was thought to detract from the teaching of British or ‘traditional’ values:

“There’s no nativity plays now and I do think that’s unfair, because obviously it is a British country”

Attitudes towards education and schooling were largely shaped by participants’ own observations and experiences or those of others around them. Participants with little or no education, had, over time realised the importance of a good education for the future prosperity of their children and grandchildren. The implications of this linking of education and migration are significant. In the deep dive we can see that education is (rightly) perceived as key to children’s life chances. For migrants to be seen as encroaching on or limiting those life chances has profound implications for cohesion, and for the importance attached to immigration as a political issue. Health and the NHS

Unsurprisingly, health was more likely to be reported as an important issue in the panel survey by those with a long standing health condition (70%) than those without (48%), and this pattern was also visible in the depth research. In instances where individuals or a family member had experienced a serious issue such as a heart attack, or had a long-term health condition (for example, rheumatism), maintaining good health and health care were in sharp focus.

“As you get older, because I’m diabetic and also because I’ve got bad arthritis and what have you, I think it’s nice to know that they’re there for you.”

Waiting times for GPs, hospitals, and ambulances as well as poor hygiene standards in hospitals were cited as explanations for why health was a ‘front of mind’ issue. An additional concern, especially for older participants, was the much discussed closure of a local hospital. For disabled participants and participants with ongoing health needs the cost of prescriptions and changes to the assessment process for disability benefits were central concerns. In addition, some participants were worried about the social stigma of being labelled a ‘benefit scrounger’ if disability benefits were spent on visible items such as mobility scooters. Long waiting times to access health care services generally and emergency care, in particular, were seen as the direct consequence of immigration:

“It’s the same with the NHS you know, that erm, sometimes their attitudes aren’t very good, they just assume that they can just walk [in] and ‘I’ve got six kids, they need to be seen now’ type of attitude you know, so. I know they don’t all do it, but you know.”

As with education, the fact that migration is perceived as having a direct negative effect on access to an essential service is likely to have impacts that go well beyond the health sphere. Crime and Policing

Over a third (35%) of those on low incomes identified crime as an important issue. However, only around five per cent felt this was the main issue they were concerned with at the moment. In contrast, crime and policing was selected as a key ‘front of mind’ issue by case study participants. Antisocial behaviour was thought to have increased locally and those living on housing estates mentioned longstanding issues with drug-dealers, knife crime and the presence of paedophiles in the area. Notably, older participants were concerned about crimes increasingly being committed by young people, particularly gang-, knife- and drug-related crime. Budget cuts to police services had led to local police stations being closed and long-term residents of the area, mainly older participants, reported that they had noticed a reduced police presence on the streets.

“When I was a girl you had bobbies walking up and down the roads and everywhere...now you’re lucky if you see one”

Participants were also worried that police resources were not being well targeted and that they were ignoring ‘big issues’ such as local paedophiles.

“I’ve passed six police vans today that have just been stopping random people, you know, or random teenagers why aren’t they concentrating more on these huge sort of paedophile scams that are coming around” (Female, age 30-44 JRF5)

Despite these crime and policing issues being at the forefront of people’s minds, they did not report feeling unsafe and had not generally experienced any crime directly. Participants said they had not taken any action relating to crime or anti- social behaviour in the local area because it did not really tend to affect them. For some, this was combined with a more general reluctance to seek police help:

“I like to think I can kind of resolve stuff myself yeah. I also come from a background where you don’t really grass people up unless you need to, yeah, but then that’s really bad.” (Male, 30-44, JRF2) Interestingly, it may be that attitudes and beliefs about crime and policing, like those about immigration, were formed not because of direct experiences, but because of budget cuts to the local police force and media coverage of local and national crime.

“The news as well you hear of all the stabbings on these young children. It sort of just makes you more cautious I think that this is happening.” Employment and personal finance

Over a quarter of those on low incomes (26%) identified work or finding employment as an important issue, with 12% saying it was their main issue. It was significantly more likely to be selected as one of their three issues by participants who were unemployed (63%), than the rest of the panel population. However, this did not emerge as a dominant issue in the case study research even though unstable and low-paid employment appeared to be the norm. Employment status is closely linked to personal finances, which was identified by 41% of those on low incomes as one of their key issues, and by 15% as their main issue. Again, the issue of personal finances or money was not substantially touched on by case study participants. Perhaps surprisingly, a higher proportion of those not on low incomes identified personal finances as their main issue compared with thoseon low incomes (although this was not statistically significant). A possible explanation could be that for those on low incomes, surviving on inadequate income is a normal aspect of day to day life. This was a clear finding from the case study participants, who described going to great efforts to keep spending as a minimum, control the potential for debt (by using pay-as- you go rather than billing), and prioritise key areas of spending:expenses such as household repairs or birthday presents were considered unaffordable and could set people back. Careful budgeting strategies were in place; participants described going to great efforts to keep spending at a minimum by for example limiting energy use and always buying reduced or sale items. Despite being more costly, ‘paying-as-you-go’ was the preferred option, particularly compared to large periodic bills and to direct debits which could pose the risk of falling into debt.

“Mortgage and council tax are your top priorities. They can cut your gas, they can cut off your electricity because you can survive without, you can have candles or you can put extra layers on, but your mortgage and your council tax are the most important” (Female, 45-59, JRF9) “You keep the roof over your head. Let the electricity go...as long as you’ve got that roof over your head. At least you can wrap up and get bits and pieces” (Female, 60+, JRF11) Housing

Housing was an important issue for both those panellists on low incomes and those not on low incomes with over 30% choosing it as one of their top three issues. It was significantly more likely to be selected by panellists in ‘other’ (assumed private) rented accommodation (52%) than those in social rented accommodation (32%) or that owned their own home (26%). Housing, although seen as important, was not one of the top three ‘front of mind’ issues reported by case study participants. The case study research found that access to secure and suitable housing was a concern for those who were on a low income and were living in rented accommodation, either private or social housing. These concerns were driven by personal experiences of overcrowding, precarious housing and affordability. In one case, a family household with parents, three children, and a grandparent lived in a two-bedroom flat. Another example was of living under the threat of eviction in privately rented accommodation owned by liquidators. Older participants identified housing as an issue in relation to poor access to secure affordable housing for their children and grandchildren. Attitudes to housing were also affected by negative experiences of local authority support. The result of a housing needs assessment was given as an example.

“The four of us in one room, isn’t overcrowded and I think that’s ridiculous. I think whoever thought of that needs to be smacked in the face. How dare you try and sit there and say that living in a room with two children who have to share a bed isn’t overcrowded.” 5 Feeling in Control

In the previous chapter we explored the issues that most concern people living on low incomes and that are ‘front of mind’ for them. In this chapter we explore whether people feel that they have the ability to control or shape the issues they feel matter most. Panellists were asked to what extent they believed they could make a difference to their front of mind issues:

Figure 15 Level of control over ‘front of mind issue’ by issue

Bases: All participants selecting front of mind issue, Providing or requiring care (204); Education (386); Personal finances (615); Work or finding employment (319); Migrants or immigration (517); Housing or your home (453); Health, including disability (853); Crime (423)

Overall, panel survey participants tended to feel that they could make at least some difference to the issues they care about, but this varied significantly. Participants appeared to feel more able to influence the impact of issues with a direct relationship to personal choice (for example personal finances, employment status, or health), than issues that implicitly include other people (e.g. crime or providing/requiring care). However, this pattern varied somewhat between panellists that were in and not on low incomes. Figure 16 shows that participants on low incomes were significantly more likely to say that they could make no difference to how issues of health, housing, employment, and personal finance impacted their lives. Figure 16 Proportion saying they have no control over ‘front of mind issue’ by issue and whether or not living on low incomes14

Bases: All participants selecting each front of mind issue, Not on low incomes: Education (329); Personal finances (509); Work or finding employment (254); Migrants or immigration (432); Housing or your home (362); Health, including disability (714); Crime (340) On low incomes: Education (52); Personal finances (98); Work or finding employment (59); Migrants or immigration (76); Housing or your home (87); Health, including disability (130); Crime (75) Migrants or immigration again stands out sharply here. Only 6% of participants felt they had any real control over immigration and its impact on their life, with 72% stating that they have no control at all, rising to 76% of people living on low incomes. For some important concerns, such as health, employment and personal finances, living on low incomes appeared to be associated with a lower level of agency. However, when we controlled for other demographic factors, this difference was no longer statistically significant. By way of example, Figure 17 shows that participants on low incomes who identified ‘health’ as a front of mind issue were significantly more likely than those not on low incomes to say that they can make no difference to how it affects their life (19% vs 7%).

14 Personal care is not included due to small sample sizes - only 24 participants on low incomes identified this as a front of mind issue Figure 17 Levels of control over ‘health’ issue by whether or not living on low income

Bases: All participants selecting ‘health’ front of mind issue, Not on low incomes (714); On low incomes (130) Further analysis of the profile of panellists (Appendix A) shows that those on low incomes were significantly more likely to report having a longstanding physical or mental health condition or disability, which may explain some of this difference. Controlling for demographic factors such age and whether or not the participants have a longstanding health condition, those on low incomes were no longer significantly more likely to say that they can make no difference to how the issue of health impacts their life. This suggests thatin some cases the underlying characteristics of people living on low incomes, rather than low income per se, is driving feelings of powerlessness. Housing

Figure 18 shows that participants on low incomes who identified ‘housing’ as a front of mind issue were significantly more likely than those not on low incomes to say that they can make no difference to how it affects their life (36% vs 15%).

Figure 18 Levels of control over ‘housing’ issue by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants selecting ‘housing’ front of mind issue, Not on low incomes (362); On low incomes (87) Further analysis shows that participants on low incomes were also more likely to report living in rented, rather than ‘owned’ accommodation, which may explain some of this difference. The fact that they were more likely to be aged 18-34 (whereas those not on low incomes were more likely to be aged 45-59), which is likely to be related to housing (in)stability. Controlling for demographic factors such age and tenure, the difference between those in and out of poverty remained statistically significant, suggesting that living on a low income has a direct relationship to whether participants felt able to control their housing situation. Given the direct relationship between income and housing, and the very high level of housing costs in the UK, this correlation is unsurprising. Overall level of control

On average, when participants were asked to rate the level of control that they had over what happens in their life on a scale 0 (no control) to 10 (complete control), they gave a score of 6.3. However, this varied significantly by income status, with those on low incomes giving a significantly lower average score (5.6 vs 6.5). Figure 19 shows the distribution of answers between these two groups. Participants not on low incomes were significantly more likely to select scores in the top half of the scale, while those on low incomes were more likely to select scores at the midpoint (5). There is also a notably higher proportion of participants on low incomes giving a score of 0 – ‘no control’.

Figure 19 Overall level of control over what happens in your life by whether or not living on low income

Bases: All participants, Not on low incomes (1227); On low incomes (228)

The lower perceived level of control for those on low incomes remained even when demographic factors were controlled for; participants identified as on a low income were significantly more likely to give a score of 0-5 than identified as not on a low income. This suggests that being on a low income is, in itself, associated with a sense of having less control over what happens in your life. Little or no control over ‘front of mind’ issues

Feelings of powerlessness dominated conversation in the depth research. The three issues that stood out where case study participants felt they had little or no control were employment, housing, and money (personal finances). Participants felt that these areas of life were controlled and determined by employers, landlords, and local and national governments. Work and quality of work was perceived as entirely driven by the wider economic environment. Reduced working hours, low pay / no pay cycling, redundancies and long term low incomes were factors that participants felt they had no control over. This feeling of powerlessness formed part of their coping strategy, enabling them to accept and adapt to the ebbs and flows of work and income. Associated with employment status, was a feeling of being disempowered in relation to personal finances. Despite the budgeting skills and strategies demonstrated by participants, there was a strongly held belief (for people in and out of work) that employers and the government had control over their finances, because they determine the level of income. Participants on out-of-work benefits felt additionally disempowered by the barriers to understanding their entitlement and decisions made about their benefits. Particularly for those living in rented accommodation, housing was an issue that was considered to be completely controlled by private and social landlords. Lack of choice and affordability were factors that contributed to people feeling that they had little control, as was the housing allocations system:

“I might have a nice council place, you can be given - there are nice council places. I might be put in a nice area but you just - it’s the unknown. It’s the - that is out of your hands when they - when you’re given a council property that you are being told where you’ve got to go and that being out of your hands, you can’t choose and that, that worries me, yeah.”

Participants felt strongly that issues such as immigration, crime and policing were completely out of their control, and responsibility for addressing these issues rested wholly with government. Areas of control

The depth research explored agency in more depth, looking at issues where participants did feel that they could exercise some measure of control, as well as those issues associated with feelings of powerlessness. The predominant view was that they were able to control their personal and family life and their personal and family health. Personal and family life

Participants with children described strong family units within which they asserted control and influenced decisions. Parents felt they had the power to influence the personal development and decision making of their children, and parents and grandparents felt they also had an important role in influencing the attitudes and beliefs of children in the family:

“It’s my job to teach and train them and educate them into being proper adults…..so my role is to control them into being, becoming good adults.” In some cases, those who lacked influence and were unable to control other aspects of their life, recognised that their locus of control was their family. They retreated from decisions that involved the wider world, including management of their personal finances, and focused their time and effort on their family life:

“I have real control over is my family …. So I can influence them.” Personal and family health

While the panel findings show that those on low incomes felt they had no control over their health, case study participants identified personal and family health as an area where they felt they could make important and high impact decisions. For many participants this was exemplified by the ability to manage their health condition or overcome illness and injury. However even those without a health condition believed that their health was an aspect of life they could influence by controlling aspects of their lifestyle, such as diet and exercise. However, it is important to note that on broader issues related to the health care system, participants felt they had little control, even though they had tried to take action by signing petitions and complaining about the care received. Overall, the degree to which participants felt in control depended largely on their circumstances and was closely related to their income. They tended to focus on issues (such as their children’s upbringing and education) that they felt they had some control over. Participants appeared to be making considered decisions about where they felt they should focus their energy and effort, and where taking action would be futile. 6 Taking Action

Case study participants, whether they voted or not in the 2015 general election, described themselves as having little or no interest in politics. Yet many demonstrated a high level of interest in political issues, were abreast of policy debates in some areas and had a good awareness of the activity of political parties. Other participants were interested in political or social issues that affected themselves or their loved ones directly. The perception of being uninterested in politics, even among those who appear very interested, seems to be a consequence of the idea that politics is what politicians do coupled with negative views of the political class. First, participants viewed politicians as dishonest; making ‘promises they don’t keep’, and second, as having entrenched middle and upper class worldviews and would protect their own class:

“I’m afraid that I just feel that they all feather their own nests and we have to get on with it.”

This disillusionment was reflected in the panel survey data. Over a third of those identified as being on low incomes were likely to strongly agree that ‘public officials don’t care much about what people like me think’, and that ‘people like me don’t have any say in what the government does’:

Figure 20 ‘Public officials don’t much care about what people like me think’ by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants, Not on low incomes (1227); On low incomes (228) Figure 21 ‘People like me don’t have any say in what the government does’ by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants, Not on low incomes (1227); On low incomes (228)

Voting and civic action

Panel survey participants identified as being on low incomes were significantly less likely to report voting in the 2015 general election than those identified as not on low incomes (58% compared to 77%). Those that were on low incomes were also significantly less likely than those not on low incomes to say that they don’t know who their MP is (35%). The depth research found that voting behaviour in the 2015 general election specifically and elections generally was informed by a range of factors: • Understanding of politics: regular voters demonstrated a good understanding of political issues and debates. In contrast participants who never voted found it difficult to understand politics and did not feel informed enough to vote.

“I don’t understand politics whatsoever....Never voted, ever. Never, ‘cause I don’t under….I don’t understand it, I don’t understand it.”

• Interest in politics: regular voters generally demonstrated some interest in social and political issues (if not ‘politics’ per se). Those who found politics ‘boring’, were disinterested in political participation and did not vote regularly.

“I don’t get involved I don’t take note of it. Whether that’s the right or wrong thing, I don’t know, but I never have.”

• Habits and upbringing: always voting as a habit was believed to be a way to demonstrate respect for the past generations who had fought for the right to vote. • Family and peer influence: the behaviour and views of parents, and to a lesser extent, of friends were strong influences on the decision to vote and who to vote for. Only political issues considered to be ‘major’ events (examples given were the Paris shootings and the refugee crisis) were discussed with family and friends. • Experience of specific issues: those who did not usually vote because of a lack of interest in politics changed their behaviour where they felt specific issues were having a direct impact on their lives. Examples included the introduction of the ‘bedroom’ tax which had forced a family member to leave their home and concern about the possible closure of local schools and hospital which had prompted someone to vote for the first time. • Time: a lack of time to vote was identified as an issue that prevented people from voting. This was particularly true for parents who felt there were too many demands on their time. Overall, participants struggled to explain the factors and beliefs that shaped their attitudes towards political engagement and voting. It appears that media narratives were the strongest influences on interest in political issues while a general distrust of the political system guided voting behaviour. Beyond voting, the pattern of broader civic action was similar across the income groups: panellists were more likely to have taken part in ‘low effort’ activities such as speaking to friends/family, or signing a petition/showing support online, but less likely to have done ‘high effort’ activities such as taking part in a strike or protest, or organising a campaign. Figure 22 Actions ever taken when wanted to do something about an issue by whether or not living on low incomes

Bases: All participants, Not on low incomes (1227); On low incomes (228) Participants on low incomes were somewhat less likely to have taken all of the actions except contact their local councillor or MP/MSP, and significantly more likely to have taken none of them. In particular, they were significantly less likely to have: • Signed a petition (in person or online) or shown support for a group on social media; • Organised a campaign/action group or petition (in person or online); • Attended a public or council meeting; • Boycotted certain products; • Donated money or raised funds for that cause. Evidence from the panel and the depth research paints a stark picture: people on low incomes feeling powerless in the face of the issues they care most about, retreating to the personal and family sphere, and facing significant barriers to taking action, whether by voting or taking part in other forms of activism. This picture reflects long term trends about trust in politicians and political institutions, as well as voter turnout. It does not, however, reflect the level of engagement in the EU referendum. 72% of the UK population voted in the referendum: turnout not seen in a general election since 1997. Being from a lower socio-economic class (C2, D, E), being out of work, having left school at 18 or younger and having a stronger English identity were all associated with a vote to leave the EU15. And while other factors, notably age, were also strongly associated with the leave vote, the aftermath of the referendum has left us looking at poorer communities in a new light.

15 How the UK Voted and Why http://lordashcroftpolls.com/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and- why/ 7 Conclusions

This research set out to explore how people on low incomes perceive politics, identify the issues they feel matter most, and understand how far they feel able to influence or impact on those issues. It is clear that despite significant and persistent inequalities, people on low incomes have attitudes to politics and public policy that are broadly in line with the wider population, and appear to shift and change in a similar pattern over time. This said, the areas of distinction between lower and higher income groups are telling. Party loyalties remain relatively stable, with people on low incomes less likely to vote Conservative, more likely to vote Labour and more likely to have no party allegiance. On the basis of the secondary analysis of BSA and USoc, there is little support for the proposition that party loyalties are fracturing. There is, however, evidence that people on lower incomes have consistently lower levels of trust in public officials and MPs and feel like they have less control over or say in political decisions. This lack of trust and agency has important implications for the quality of our democracy and policy making. People on low incomes remain consistently more sympathetic to the unemployed, and supportive of the idea that it is the role of the state to support people who are out of work, rather than employ active labour market policies. The medium term direction of welfare policy, and the current welfare reform agenda is in many ways at odds with the perspectives of people living on low incomes. In the panel research, both low and high income groups agreed on the public policy issues that matter most: health, personal finances, crime, immigration and housing. This congruence suggests the possibility that politicians might build a policy platform that responds to the concerns of the public as a whole. However the depth research illustrates that the lived experience of people on low income has a significant effect on how they view these issues and the connections between them. In particular, it suggests that immigration may occupy a unique space in low income communities, both in terms of its perceived impact on public services (competition for resources and quality) and on culture. Immigration as an issue is associated with an exceptionally strong feeling of powerlessness and while in many ways this is a reflection of practicalities – individuals do not set border controls - it also reflects a more fundamental malaise. When this research was commissioned, the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU felt far away, and commentators and the electorate alike assumed a vote for ‘remain’. As we adjust to the realities of Brexit, we are also adjusting to a new political landscape. Many of the drivers of the referendum vote: a lack of trust in the political class, concern about the scope of the European Union and a desire to control immigration are reflected in the political and social views of people on low incomes. As politicians seek a way to unify and lead the UK through ‘Brexit’, engaging with the concerns and experiences of people on low incomes should be a priority. Appendix A Methods Defining low income/on low incomes groups Each element of the research investigated the attitudes of low income groups in relation to social issues that matter to them, and the extent to which they feel able to engage socially and politically to address these. An important aspect of the research which covered all three elements was to establish an effective method to identify people on low incomes. Using similar income thresholds for different household types, a range of measures on material deprivation and subjective income were also considered for the panel. Secondary analysis To explore variation in attitudes by household income, it was necessary to create a new low-income variable for use in the BSA analysis. The nature of the dataset meant that there were considerable limitations16 in how this variable could be created. The option selected was to replicate the proportion of different types of household categorised as low income in HBAI (using the 60% median income BHC measure). For example, where HBAI reported that 19% of single parent households fell below the low income threshold, the gross income band that categorised approximately 19% of single parent households as low income in BSA was selected. This method was used for each of the BSA datasets from 2000-2014, using corresponding figures from HBAI. Because banded gross monthly income in the BSA is unequivalised it was necessary to compare, and try to replicate proportions falling below the poverty threshold separately for different household types and sizes,17 rather than the total proportion (household types are listed in Table 1 below).

Table 1 Comparison of proportions of low income households – HBAI (2013-14) and BSA (2014) Proportion below Proportion below BSA income band - Household type 60% median low income poverty threshold income BHC, HBAI threshold, BSA Single adult, pensioner 22% £591 - 770 30% Single adult, no children 18% £591 - 770 27% Single adult, 1+ children 19% £591 - 770 27% Adult couple, pensioner 13% £911 - 1,000 14% Two adults, no children 9% £771 - 910 9% Three or more adults, no children 9% £911 - 1,000 10% Two adults, 1+ children 15% £1,201 - 1,300 14% Three or more adults, 1+children 15% £911 - 1,000 17% All household types 16% - 15%

The income bands identified for each household type were used to derive a new binary variable for low income in the BSA dataset.

16 The development of the income measure is provided in a separate report. 17 Differences in the way household type is reported in HBAI meant it was necessary to use the proportion of couple households with/ without children categorised as low income (9%/ 15%) for households with 3 or more adults with/ without children. The panel The panel survey used a very similar approach to both the qualitative and secondary analysis strands, using the same household income thresholds for different household types. However, in addition to this, the panel survey collected data on material deprivation (being able to afford a defined set of basic items) and subjective income (participants’ own assessment of how well they were managing financially). Where a participant was identified as ‘on low incomes’ using either of these two measures, the poverty threshold was relaxed so that if that participant had an income one band higher than the threshold, then they would also be identified as on low incomes by this measure. The profile of those identified as on low incomes by this measure, and how it compares to those identified as not on low incomes, or the population as a whole can be seen in Appendix A. The case study The income thresholds for different household types, identified at the secondary analysis stage, were used to select people on low income for this element of the study. Individuals were included in the research if their self-reported total household monthly income (from all sources and before tax) fell below the amount listed in Table 2 based on their household type. The primary selection criterion was income as identification by a combined measure (as was the case with panel respondents) would have been too onerous an exercise as the recruitment stage.

Table 2 Monthly household income thresholds by household type Household type Monthly income Single pensioner £910 Single non-pensioner £1200 Single parent, 1 child £1300 Single parent, 2 children £1700 Couple pensioner £1300 Couple non-pensioner £1900 Couple, 1-2 children £2400 Couple, 3+ children £2700 3+ adults, no children £2400 3+ adults, 1+ children £3000

It is important to note that due to the income measures used, findings from the survey refer to people on low incomes and not in poverty whilst case study participants were defined as living on alow income based on the above income thresholds and self-reported sources of income. The panel approach and sample profile The quantitative findings in this report are based on a survey of a specially-built, representative panel of adults in Great Britain. Conducted in November 2015, a total of 1,478 interviews were achieved. The panel was established as part of a feasibility study conducted for JRF during 2015 which aimed to create a high-quality random probability panel that could be used for timely research into topical concerns. It had a particular focus of ensuring good representation of those on low incomes. The approach was to recruit individuals to the panel during the fieldwork for the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey – a random probability face-to-face survey. Various approaches to maintaining engagement were trialed, with the November survey (on which this report’s findings are based) consisting of sequential web then telephone data collection and the use of reminders and incentives. A good quality sample was achieved and weights applied to ensure representativeness. Based on the definition of poverty described above, 22% were identified as living on low incomes. The demographic profile of the panel is provided in Appendix A. Key points are summarised below. Age The age profile of the panel shows that those living on low incomes tended to be younger, with a higher proportion of those on low incomes aged between 18 and 34 years. A significantly larger proportion of those not on low incomes were aged 45 to 59. This difference in age is a consideration in relation to issues that are of importance to respondents and the extent to which they feel they can address these. Health Of those living on low incomes, over 50% reported that they had a long standing health condition or disability. This stands in stark contrast to over a quarter who were not on low incomes. Housing tenure Three quarters of those not on low incomes owned or were in the process of buying their own home compared to less than a third of those on low incomes. Although owning/buying a property was the most common tenure for those on low incomes too, the spread across other housing tenures was more even with 24% of panellists on low incomes renting from a local authority and 21% renting from a housing association or trust, compared to around 5% of those not on low incomes. A slightly higher proportion of those on low incomes were renting ‘other’ which we assume includes those renting from private landlords. Education There were significant differences between the education levels of those on low incomes and those not on low incomes. 30% of those not on low incomes had a degree level qualification whereas only 4% of those on low incomes were qualified to this level. Over a third of panellists on low incomes had no educational qualifications compared to less than 10% of those not on low incomes. It is well known that level of educational qualification is linked to income, so it is not surprising that this difference exists. The qualitative case study

The qualitative case study focused on one geographic area and comprised 19 face to face in-depth interviews with local residents of a South London Local Authority living on a low income. The interviews explored ‘front of mind’ issues and civic participation (the ways people choose to act on issues that are important to them and barriers to taking action). A local advisory panel was set up to gather evidence on issues affecting local residents and to promote the research amongst their networks. The case study sample A set of income thresholds, identified at the secondary analysis stage, was developed across a range of household compositions to define ‘low income’ groups. Individuals were included in the research if their self-reported total household monthly income (from all sources and before tax) fell below the amount listed in Table 3 based on their household type. Table 3 Monthly household income thresholds by household type Household type Monthly income Single pensioner £910 Single non-pensioner £1200 Single parent, 1 child £1300 Single parent, 2 children £1700 Couple pensioner £1300 Couple non-pensioner £1900 Couple, 1-2 children £2400 Couple, 3+ children £2700 3+ adults, no children £2400 3+ adults, 1+ children £3000

The sample was designed to achieve diversity on a number of primary characteristics: gender; age; ethnicity; household composition and voting behaviour. A total of 19 interviews were completed. The distribution of the final achieved sample of 19 interviews across these primary characteristics (as well as economic activity) is shown in Appendix B. There were four main groups of participants in terms of their household and socio-demographic profile: • Singles and couples without dependent children: men and women aged 30-59, living alone or as couples without resident children. These participants were working in either part-time or full-time jobs. • Lone Parent families: women aged 35-52 with 1-2 dependent children aged 6-16. They were either working part-time, on a self-employed basis or were unemployed. Their incomes were supplemented by child tax credits and where relevant, working tax credits. • Two parent families: couples aged in their mid-20s to early 50s with one to four dependent children. They were either seeking work or were in full- time or part-time employment. • Pensioners: women living alone in their late 60s and drawing state pensions. Employment People who were working tended to be in full-time or part-time low paid jobs in sectors or roles such as construction, service industry, social care, retail, cleaning, taxi driving, administration and factories. Those who worked part- time did this due to caring responsibilities for children, grandchildren or elderly relatives. For some, health issues had led to reducing their working hours (and pay) or stopping work altogether. Education Generally, participants had low or no qualifications. Those with higher qualifications had either left well paid jobs due to ill health or were underemployed because they could not find work in the professions they had trained in. For example, a trained osteopath who was unable to find work was working ‘odd jobs’ in cleaning or painting to earn money. Report structure The second chapter presents the secondary analysis conducted using the BSA and USoC survey data. It presents descriptive analysis of attitudes and also explores attitudinal trends and change over time. The remainder of the chapters present the findings from the panel survey and the qualitative case study. Chapter 3 sets out the experiences of people living on low incomes and patterns in how people manage their finances. The next chapter discusses the social and political attitudes identified by both panel and case study participants as being ‘front of mind’. The penultimate chapter explores political participation and sets out the ways in which people on low incomes/living on low income engage with the issues that are important to them and the level of control they have to resolve these issues. The final chapter sets out a range of high level messages that emerge from this research. Appendix B: Panel sample profile

Appendix Table 1: Sample profiles by whether or not identified as ‘on low incomes’ Not on low On low Total incomes incomes Sex Male 49% 46% 48% Female 51% 54% 52% Age 18-24 9% 14% 10% 25-34 18% 22% 18% 35-44 17% 18% 17% 45-54 20% 11% 18% 55-59 8% 4% 8% 60-64 7% 7% 7% 65+ 21% 24% 22% Ethnicity White (Any) 88% 83% 87% Black (African/Caribbean) 2% 2% 2% Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other) 7% 11% 8% Mixed 2% 2% 2% Other 1% 3% 1% Region North East 4% 3% 4% North West 10% 14% 11% Yorkshire and The Humber 8% 10% 8% East Midlands 7% 9% 8% West Midlands 8% 11% 9% East of England 11% 6% 10% London 13% 16% 13% South East 15% 10% 14% South West 9% 7% 9% Wales 4% 8% 5% Scotland 10% 6% 9% Political affiliation Conservative 37% 15% 32% Labour 27% 41% 30% Liberal Democrat 6% 2% 5% Other party 14% 13% 14% Appendix Table 1: Sample profiles by whether or not identified as ‘on low incomes’ None 10% 23% 13% Other/DK/Ref 6% 6% 6% Highest level of education Degree or higher 30% 4% 24% A level or above 33% 23% 30% GCSE or other 28% 37% 30% No qualifications 10% 36% 16% Long-standing physical or mental health condition or disability Yes 28% 51% 33% No 72% 49% 67% Tenure Owned 74% 31% 65% Rented (social) 10% 45% 18% Rented (private) 15% 18% 16% Other 1% 6% 2% Household type Single pensioner 8% 16% 10% Single, non-pensioner 9% 10% 10% Single parent 6% 14% 8% Couple pensioner 16% 12% 15% Couple, non-pensioner 19% 7% 16% Children, multiple adults 42% 41% 42% Working status In full-time education/training 4% 7% 5% In work, waiting to take up work 63% 25% 54% Unemployed 3% 15% 5% Retired 22% 26% 23% Other 9% 27% 13% NS-SEC Managerial & professional occupations 47% 12% 39% Intermediate occupations 12% 9% 12% Employers in small org; own account workers 9% 7% 9% Lower supervisory & technical occupations 9% 13% 10% Semi-routine & routine occupations 21% 59% 29% Benefits recipient Yes 49% 74% 54% No 51% 26% 46%

Base 1227 228 1478 Appendix C Case study sample profile

Criteria Characteristic Total Single 4 Lone parents (dependent children) 4 Household composition Couples without children 2 Couples with dependent children 9

Whether voted in 2015 Yes 8 General election No 11 18-29 1 30-44 9 Age 45-59 7 60+ 2 Female 13 Gender Male 6 BME 6 Ethnicity Non-BME 13 In paid work – part time 8 In paid work – full time 3 Economic activity Not in paid work – on out of work benefits 3 Retired 2 Self-employed 3 Appendix D: Variables included in the cross-sectional analysis

Politics and civic engagement and activity

Sig Variable Survey Survey year* Question summary difference by P value name income BSA Partyid1 2000-2015 Party identification ü .000 Strength of party BSA Idstrng 2000-2014 X .597 identification Level of interest in USoc Vote6 2009/10-2012/13 ü .000 politics BSA Politics 2000-2015 Interest in politics ü .000 People like me have BSA GovNoSay 00-03,05,10-12 no say in what the X .060 government does Politics too BSA GovComp 00,02,03,05,10-12 complicated to ü .001 understand Qualified to USoc Poleff1 2011/12 ü .000 participate in politics Better informed about USoc Poleff2 2011/12 ü .000 politics than most Public officials don’t USoc Poleff3 2011/12 care about what I ü .000 think I don't have a say USoc Poleff4 2011/12 in what government ü .000 does Perceived political USoc Perpolinf 2011/12 ü .042 influence Not worth voting / everyone's duty BSA VoteDuty 00,0,04,05,08-11,13 X .136 to vote in general election Voting as a social USoc Votenorm 2011/12 ü .000 norm Voting is the only way BSA VoteOnly 00,02-04,10-12 people like me can ü .039 have a say Trust the government BSA GovTrust 00-07,09-13 to put nation’s needs ü .033 first BSA MPsTrust 00,02,03,5-7,9-13 Trust MPs to tell truth ü .028 BSA NHSRun2 09,12,14 NHS well run X .695 BSA policrn2 09,12,14 Police well run ü .019 Whether signed a BSA SocAct1 2004, 2014 ü .006 petition Whether has boycotted, or BSA SocAct2 2004, 2014 X .521 deliberately bought, certain products Whether took part in a BSA SocAct3 2004, 2014 X .581 demonstration Whether attended a BSA SocAct4 2004, 2014 political meeting or X .309 rally Whether contacted a politician or a civil BSA SocAct5 2004, 2014 X .261 servant to express your views Whether donated money or raised funds BSA SocAct6 2004, 2014 X .157 for a social or political activity Whether contacted or BSA SocAct7 2004, 2014 appeared in the media X .607 to express your views, Whether expressed BSA SocAct8 2004, 2014 political views on the X .815 internet ever contacted BSA DoneMP 00,02,03,05,11 your MP about a X .142 government action ever spoken to an influential person BSA DoneSpk 00,02,03,05,11 X .121 about a government action ever contacted a government BSA DoneGov 00,02,03,05,11 X .218 department about a government action ever contacted radio, TV or newspaper BSA DoneTV 00,02,03,05,11 X .082 about a government action ever signed a petition BSA DoneSign 00,02,03,05,11 about a government ü .000 action ever raised an issue in an organisation BSA DoneRais 00,02,03,05,11 ü .014 you belong to about a government action ever gone on a protest or demonstration BSA DoneProt 00,02,03,05,11 ü .038 about a government action ever formed a group of like-minded people BSA DoneGrp 00,02,03,05,11 X .605 about a government action never done any of BSA DoneNone 00,02,03,05,11 these things about a ü .000 government action People willing to help USoc Nbrcoh2 2011/12 ü .000 their neighbours People in USoc Nbrcoh3 2011/12 neighbourhood can ü .000 be trusted People in this neighbourhood don't USoc Nbrcoh4 2011/12 ü .000 get along with each other Volunteered in past 12 USoc Volun 2011/12 ü .000 months Frequency of USoc Volunfreq 2010-11, 2012/13 X .479 volunteering Importance of being USoc Britid 2011 /12 X .978 British Which of the following BSA BNationU 2001-2015 best describes your X .243 nationality Leave / reduce / stay / BSA ECPolicy 1993-2015 X .279 increase EU powers How important British BSA euimpor1 1997, 2014 free to get jobs in any X .412 other EU countries? How important British BSA euimpor3 1997, 2014 can sell goods in EU X .199 without customs? Britain benefits or not BSA UKBenEU 1995, 2013 from being member X .371 of EU Benefits of migrants BSA benfEU 2013 from EU outweigh X .390 costs Whether Scotland BSA UKSpnGBE 01,03,07,11-13,15 gets fair share of ü .038 government spending Whether Scotland should be BSA ScoPar2 01,07,11-13 X .102 independent or part of UK Best way to govern England? UK BSA EngParGB 99, 01-03, 07-13, 15 parliament, regional X .197 assembly or English parliament Better for England to BSA EngLvUKE 2007, 2013 remain part of UK or ü .002 independent

* The BSA survey was analysed from 2000 onwards only, therefore some questions may have been asked in years before 2000. Welfare and worklessness

Significant Variable Survey Survey year* Q summary difference by P value name income BSA First and second Spend1/2 1983-2014 priority area for ü .000 public spending Gov. should reduce/ BSA TaxSpend 1983-2015 increase taxes and X .900 spending More spending on BSA MoreWelf 1987-2015 ü .000 benefits needed First and second 1983-2014 (alternate BSA SocBen1/2 priority area for social ü .000 yrs) benefit spending Unemployment BSA Dole 1983-2015 ü .000 benefits too high/low Benefits cuts would BSA DamLives 2000-2014 ü .000 be damaging Benefits discourage BSA WelfFeet 1987-2014 people from standing ü .001 on their own two feet Welfare state is great BSA ProudWlf 2000-2015 X .381 achievement 83-90,94,98- Many people falsely BSA FalseClm X .785 04,06,08,0,12,13 claim 83-90,94,98- Many eligible people BSA FailClm ü .033 04,06,08,0,12,13 don't claim Many people who BSA SocHelp 1987-2014 get social security X .090 don't deserve help Most recipients are BSA DoleFidl 1987-2014 X .516 fiddling Should YPs be BSA Ypelig 2014 eligible for same ü .009 benefits as 25+? Hhlds receive all BSA BenHH 2014 bens OR less than ü .005 average hhld income Work is only a means BSA NwEmpErn 00-03, 07, 12 ü .034 to live Why say working is BSA NwEmpLiv 00-02, 07, 12 X .316 only means to live Would enjoy having USoc scwkimp 2012/13 a paid job even if not ü .029 need money Would like to start USoc jblkchd 2010/11, 2012/13 ü .000 own business 05-07, 10 How satisfied are you ü .006 BSA/ USoc jobsat3/ jbsat 2010/11, 2012/13 with your job? X .142 How satisfied are you BSA hrssatis 2005, 2007, 2010 X .842 with your hours? Would you prefer a BSA prefhr2 2003-2010 job with more/fewer ü .000 hours? Would you prefer fewer hours even BSA earnhr2 2003-2010 X .475 if you earned less money? Would like to give up USoc jblkche 2010/11, 2012/13 ü .000 paid work Satisfaction with USoc sclfsat7 2009/10-2012/13 amount of leisure ü .000 time Unemployed don't BSA UnempJob 1987-2014 ü .004 try hard enough Take minimum wage BSA UBJwage 2007, 2012 ü .000 or benefits Take short term work BSA UBJcontr 2007, 2012 ü .000 or benefits Take job not BSA UBJint 2007, 2012 interested in or ü .006 benefits Redundancy: who BSA UnemResp 2001, 2003, 2011 responsible for ü .000 supporting Extent of gap BSA IncomGap 00-04, 06-10, 12-13 between high/low X .645 earners Gov should top up 2000, 2003, 2005, BSA TopUpChn low paid couple ü .000 2010, 2013 parents 2000, 2003, 2005, Gov should top up BSA TopUpLPa ü .006 2010, 2013 working lone parents LowWage/ Employers will pay BSA 2012-13 X .765 LowWage2 lower if gov tops up

* The BSA survey was analysed from 2000 onwards only, therefore some questions may have been asked in years before 2000.