Ti-Ie Viceroyalty of Lord William Fitzwilliam: a Crisis in Anglo-Irish Political History

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BURKE~ Gerard Francis~ 1936- TI-IE VICEROYALTY OF LORD WILLIAM FITZWILLIAM: A CRISIS IN ANGLO-IRISH POLITICAL HISTORY.

The American University~ Ph.D.~ 1968 History~ modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE VJCEROYALTY OF LORD WILLIAM FITZWILLIAM: A CRISIS IN ANGLO-IRISH POLITICAL HISTORY

Submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The Ameri0an University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Signatures of Committee: Chairman: (j1.14ht, /J tY~w u~L-·

1968

The American University AMERICAN UNiVERSIT• Washington, D. c. . LIBR.L\HY . JUL18 1968 W~HfNGTON. 0. f- .

.3~ 77. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE •••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0 iii

CHAPTER

I. THE COURSE OF EVENTS • •••••••••••••••••• 1

II. THE COALITION •• •••.•••••••••••••••••••• 22

III. THE TRAGIC ONE HUNDRED DAYS ••••••• ••••• 46

IV. THE AFTERMATH • ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 86

v. ON THE EVE • •••••••••••••.•••••••••••.•• 126

VI. CONCLUSION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• o. 164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

I am indebted to the American Irish Society for a generous grant in aid of research. I am also very grateful to Professor Alison Olson of The American Univer sity, my major supervisor, who assisted greatly in bring ing this thesis to completion, to Professor Robert Shipkey and to Dr. Robert E. Burns of Notre Dame University, who gave freely of their time and knowledge. I must mention with gratitude the'helpfulness and courtesy of the staffs of the libraries and repositories in which I have worked. To my wife Rosemary Burke I owe a special but wholly inadequate vote of thanks for taking time out from her busy domestic schedule to give her knowing attention to typing, proof-reading and enhancing the form of the entire dissertation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

THE COURSE OF EVENTS

In December 1794, the first scene of an histJrical tragedy began in the seemingly promising appointment of a ,.~-... new viceroy for Ireland. In return for the participation of the Portland Whigs in his coalition government Pitt was forced to appoint as Viceroy of Ireland one of Portland's leading followers, Lord William Fitzwilliam. A sensitive, intelligent man of considerable personal integrity, Fitz william was heir to the Marquis of Rockingham. He was not only a great English county magnate, but also one of the wealthiest Irish landlords. His passionate interest in Irish affairs, however, was not dictated solely by concern for his personal fortune. He was also a man of deep personal convictions. He believed in the urgent necessity to ameliorate existing tensions in Irish political and economic life, break the stranglehold of the Anglo-Irish governing group and guarantee the support of the Irish in England's struggle with France. His appointment as lord lieutenant aroused the hopes of Irish Catholics that substantial political concessions and full emancipation would shortly follow. For more than a decade before the Fitzwilliam viceroyalty conditions in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 Ireland had been unquestionably improving. The main articles of the penal code (those relating, for example, to ownership of land) were abolished by the Dublin Parlia ment. Catholics were acquiring civil rights; they were becoming merchants and beginning to make money in trade. With the removal of the few remaining religious disabili ties, a settlement of the tithes and a moderate reform of Parliament, it appeared certain that Ireland, under the guidance of a sympathetic and progressive viceroy like Fitzwilliam, would contribute much to the prosperity of the British Empire. And yet, despite these hopes, four months after his appointment Lord Fitzwilliam was back in England, summarily dismissed by his government for failing to ob serve the understandings he had entered into with his colleagues. His dismissal in late February 1795 signalled an end to all the high expectations of the previous year. There began immediately the very violence and revolutionary activ ity that his appointment was supposed to prevent. His firing doomed all prospect for further political concessions to the Catholics and ended for a· full generation the drive for Catholic emancipation. It very nearly.:ruptured the recently formed coalition between Pitt and the Portland Whigs upon which depended the whole policy of England in its struggle with France. It provoked the spread of dis-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 order throughout Ireland, culminating in a disastrous rebellion. Finally, the legacy of hate and mistrust caused by the Fitzwilliam incident and its aftermath ruined all chance for success of the Act of Union in 1801. Despite these results, the lord lieutenancy of William Fitzwilliam and its aftermath has failed to receive the attention warranted by its critical place in Anglo-Irish politics. Various authors have briefly alluded to the administration of_Fitzwilliam but usually in the context of discussing some aspect of William Pitt's Irish policy. None has considered it important enough for detailed study in its own right; one will search in vain for a satisfactory and comprehensive treatment of this tragic event and its consequences for Ireland.l

Those nineteenth century historians like Rose and

lThis neglect can be partially explained by the fact that Irish political history itself, particularly of the eighteenth century, has until recently received scant atten tion from historians. Lecky and Froude have treated this century on a generous scale, but special studies are essen tial if we are to have an adequate understanding of the period. Hopefully this deficiency will be remedied by an accumulation of detailed political monographs like Burns' "The Rise of John Fitzgibbon 1776-1789: A Study of Anglo Irish Politics in the Age of the American Revolutiorl' and Hamilton's "The Movement for Irish Catholic Relief 1790- 93." But these recent studies are on the period preceding Fitzwilliam's administration. For Fitzwilliam himself one must consult political histories wnich are now half a cen tury out of date.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 Rosebery, who have mentioned Fitzwilliam in a study of 2 Pitt, were very pro-Pitt and hence anti-Fitzwilliam. Their bias for Pitt colored their interpretation of Fitz- william-'s administration-they accused him of acting precip- itously in supporting Catholic emancipation and condemned him for a lack of foresight in his general conduct of Irish affairs in 1795. To these writers the blame for the political turmoil caused by Fitzwilliam's dismissal was his alone. He ignored instructions given him by the British ministers before he left for Ireland and allowed his hypo- critical self-rightousness to drive him to unwise actions. Further, he was an impulsive and politically inexperienced individual who knew next to nothing about the machinery through which Ireland was governed. He failed to antici pate the political disruption caused by his dismissal of John Beresford, the chief revenue officer, and other Irish officials. In sum, his whole disastrous administration was a consequence of his own ineptness. Their interpretation was, howevAr, quite wrong. They failed totally to see that Fitzwilliam's assessment of the Irish situation and his strategy of defusing

2Lord Rosebery, Pitt (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1892), pp. 174-185; Lord Ashbourne, Pitt: Some Chapters of his Life and Times (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1898), pp. 192-94; c. L. Fa1kiner, Studies in Irish History (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1902), pp. 126-29; J. H. Rose, Pitt and Napoleon (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1912), pp. 31-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 Irish radicalism by timely concessions was correct and

Pitt's and the Cabinet's was not. Thus, they failed to

appreciate the importance of the Fitzwilliam episode as

a critical turning point in Anglo-Irish history.

It is almost certain that had Fitzwilliam been allowed

to support the Catholic Relief Act of 1795 it would have

become law. The Irish extremists would not have been com

pletely satisfied, but tb~ Catholic question as a consti

tutional issue would have been taken out of Irish politcs

a generation before 1829 and the revolution of 1798 quite

probably would not have broken out.

This dissertation proposes to attempt an answer to

some i~portant questions directly related to the administra

tion of Lord Fitzwilliam: What led to the appointment of

Lord Fitzwilliam as viceroy of Ireland? Was his appoint

ment only the product of political arrangements in England

without any real meaning for Irish politics? What caused

his speedy recall? Who is to blame for his failure, Fitz

william or the British Government? What was the effect

of his recall in Ireland? Lastly, was it merely a personal

tragedy involving a sensitive man's determination to right

an obvious wrong and being summarily rebuked by his col

leagues; or was it in fact a greater catastrophe than the

length of Fitzwilliam's administration would lead one to

expect?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 The thesis will further deal with associated problems of 1795 brought about by the dismissal of Lord Fitzwilliam-<: the endowment of Naynooth College which so annoyed Protes tants in Ireland, the battle of the Diamond and the rise of the Orange Society, a major change in the Irish government, corruption of.' the militia, establishment of the yeomanry,

dissaffection of the United Irishmen, military rep~ession, spread of violence in the country-all of which culminated in the rebellion of 1798.

As Viceroy Lord Fitzwilliam, once appointed and sworn, exercised supreme authority in Ireland; he was the only official channel between the British cabinet and the entire government of Ireland. The powers of the viceroy were extensive: all ecclesiastical and civil appointments were made by the king on his advice and through his recommenda tions. In the case of the Church of Ireland the nomination to Bishoprics belonged entirely to him. The lord lieutenant was also the official channel for military recommendations. No new offices, pensions or peer ages could be created or given in Ireland without the vice roy's official recommendation. All financial business was directed through his office and he alone could grant leave of absence from the countryo

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 Before 1800 the chief task which faced every viceroy was the management of the Irish Parliament by mustering a sufficient majority in the House of Commons to ratify the policy laid down by the king and cabinet in London. The constitutional independence of the legislature made the posi tion of viceroy always a difficult one and, in time of crisis, virtually impossible. However, peerages, positions and pensions passed through his hands and all viceroys until the Act of Union in 1801 made it abundantly clear to the parliament that the lord lieutenant was the single source of all patronage and favors. In spite of this, Irish patronage was far from adequate for the heavy demands made upon it. Yet it had to serve as the link which joined the legislature to the executive and thereby provided the political cohesion essential for effective government. After granting of so-called legislative independence in 1782 the only hope of removing Catholic disabilities and alleviating economic distress by legislation lay in the hands of a Parliament which was by its very nature unable and unwilling to remove those restrictions. The unrepre sentative nature of this body made it difficult to pass legis lation which would ameliorate Catholic political restric tions or improve the position of the lower classes. Catho lics could neither vote for members nor be elected to Parlia ment. The Ulster Presbyterians could vote but could not be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 elected. A majority of the three hundred members were chosen from pocket boroughs oontrolled by a small number of owners and under those conditions the influence of the British government was still very strong. Sine e more than a third of the members of Parliament were placemen or pen- sioners, a lord lieutenant needed to win over only a few of the large borough owners to insure that there would be no divergence in the policies of the two countries.3

In eighteenth century Ireland the lord lieutenant was forced to cope with three distinct factions termed by his torians the native interest, the English interest and the Irish interest. The native interest was made up of the Gaelic Catholie population. They were, of course, opposed to the British government which maintained the minority that victimized them. The English interest (the most power ful of the three groups) was represented by Dublin offi- cialdom, mostly English appointees and the Anglo-Irish supporters of England's policies. The English interest was sometimes referred to as the ncastlen because the seat of government was located at Dublin Castle. Traditionally

3see Edith Johnston, Great Britain and Ireland 1760- 1800: A Study in Irish folitical Administration (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), especially Part III, pp. 206-269o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 the viceroys allied with this group. The ruling Anglican oligarchy who predominated in Parliament felt the only hope for maintaining their privi leged economic, political and religious position lay in the continuance of British supremacy. If British support were withdrawn this Anglican minority would be unable to hold onto its privileged position in the face of demands by the great majority of Catholics and Protestant dissenters. Be cause of the strong stand by the British government and the Anglican oligarchy on the one hand and the inability of the Irish reformers to agree upon a common plan of action, practically nothing was accomplished for more than a decade after 1782. The native and English interest had completely opposite attitudes towards England. To the native interest, England was the conqueror and despoiler; to the English interest, she was the motrer country to whom they owed their security and their power. The Irish interest maintained a position somewhere between these two ext·r..emes,. The Irish interest was a group of Anglo-Irish Protestants who acknowledged England's sover eignty over Ireland but who refused to submit without pro test to the economic and legislative restrictions imposed on them by the English Parliament. In their struggle against these restrictions, the Irish interest became the only or ganized opposition to England's Irish policy during the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 period of the Protestant Ascendancy, from 1691 to 1800. This resistance to British policy by the Irish inter est was founded on the theory that Ireland was dependent on the Crown of England but not on the British Parliament; that the descendants of the original English settlers of Ireland had equal rights with their fellow subjects in Eng land. Hence, the interference of the English Parliament in Irish affairs was an encroachment not only on the king's prerogative but also upon the rights of Englishmen in Ireland. The effectiveness of the Irish interest, however, was seriously impaired by their inability and their unwilling ness to speak for all Ireland. A minority whose very exis tence depended upon English power, they upheld through necessity and conviction the de facto rule of the Protestant Ascendancy. _ Most of them regarded the Irish Catholics- the "mere Irish" as they were called-as a conquered people and approved of the penal laws. It is ironic that the Irish interest was in a sense trapped by their loyalty to the established ecclesiastical and secular order, for that order made possible, if not inevitable, many of the ills which they sought to redress. Within the Irish interest Fitzwilliam could count on active support from two factions. One group was the Pon sonbys. In 1782 the Duke of Portland was appointed viceroy

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 of Ireland when the Marquis of Rockingham succeeded Lord North as Prime Minister. Portland had Irish cousins, the Ponsonbys, great borough owners and the leaders of an im portant group in Irish politics. The Duke thought his friends might form the nucleus of a whig party in Ireland which would be a source of strength to the sort of adminis tration he wiahed to see continuously in power in England. When shortly thereafter the English Whigs lost power the Ponsonbys suppressed their family loyalties and stayed in office until the regency crisis in 1789. Thenl)breaking with Pitt, they formed along with Henry Grattan, the Irish Whig party, a powerful parliamentary group with a program of administrative reform. By the time of Fitzwilliam's appointment in 1794 they were committed to Catholic eman cipation and a moderate measure of governmental reform, and they were the natural allies and strongest supporters of his administration in Ireland. The second group of potential friends Fitzwilliam would find upon his arrival in Ireland were the Ulster Presbyterians. They were the most powerful both in numbers and influence of the Irish dissenters. Although too well established to be denied a practical toleration, they were not legally granted the same status with dissenters in England under the Toleration Act of 1719; and the Sacramen tal Test Act (passed in 1704 and not repealed until 1780)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 excluded them from ·0ivil and military positions. While a good many members of the Church of Ireland disapproved of the dissenters on doctrinal grounds, a stronger reason

for the Church's hostility to them was fear~of their poten tial strength. Because of the Plantation-the Scottish migration to Ulster in the seventeenth century-the diss.enters were settled in one part of the country. Their common origin, doctrine and locale gave them a position much stronger than the dissenters in England. In total number the Ulster Pres byterians almost equalled the conforming communicants throughout Ireland. The established clergy naturally took every step to check this threat to their privileged status, and were supported by most of the members of Parliament, whose opposition to the dissenters was based largely on economic grounds. This combination of secular and religi ous opposition resulted in having the Protestant dissenters deprived of rights enjoyed by members of the Church of Ire land. They were thus the most unstable and potentially dangerous element in the precariously balanced Irish poli tical scene.

On July 14, 1789, a momentous event occured in the fall of the Bastille and the outbreak of the French Reyolutiono This event produced a profound effect in Ireland, both

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 north and south, and led directly to the formation of a coalition government in England which brought Lord Fitz william to Ireland.4

The hostile attitude of the regime in France towards the Catholic Church turned the Irish Catholics against the adoption of' "French ideas. 11 .5 It was a different matter in the north where the majority of people adhered to a dis- senting church whose government was democratic rather than authoritarian. It was in Ulster that the French Revolution had its greatest influence. The anti-British revolutionary movement not only began in Ulster, but until the dismissal of Lord Fitzwilliam, made very little headway beyond its borders. The Ulster Presbyterians had witnessed the failure of legislative independence after 1782 and had concluded there could be no hope of improvement so long as the alliance between the British government and the Anglican oligarchy existed. The radicals found an able spokesman in Theobald Wolfe Tone, a Belfast lawyer. He argued that the Irish administration, influenced unconsitutionally by England, would always resist the interest of the native

4For an interesting examination of the influence of the French Revolution on Ireland, consult Richard Hayes, Ireland and the Irishmen in the French Revolution (London: E. Benn, Ltd., 1932).

5See Robert B. 1800 (London: Faber

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 Irish-particularly in economic matters-whenever they clashed with those of Great Britain. To oppose the admin istration it was absolutely necessary that the weight of the whole people should be increased by a reform of the Irish Parliament. Experience showed, however, that reform was impractical when not combined with Catholic emancipation.6 In October 1791 Tone and his friends founded the Society of United Irishmen in· Belfast. It stood for com plete religious equality and parliamentary reform. It was to be national in scope and open to all religious denomi

nations. -U~til 1795 and the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam though, this society found a more sympathetic acceptance among Protestant dissenters than among Catholics. Wealthy and educated Catholics were willing to accept a less extreme solution than complete independence from England by aid of the French. William Pitt viewed the situation in Ireland with grow ing alarm. He had to guard against the effects of the French revolutionary doctrines on the Catholics and Pro testant dissenters and the possibility of a French invasion of Ireland. He decided, therefore, to offset any possible danger posed by the United Irishmen by attempting to gain the support of the Irish Catholics. Consequently, in February,

6Theobald Wolfe Tone, Autobiography (1763-98 )-, -edited by R. B. O'Brien (Washington: Whittaker, Tea~her and Arnot, 1893), Vol. II, pp. 365-67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1.5 1792, Sir Hercules Langrishe introduced a Catholic relief bill in the Irish Commons with the warm support of the British government. The Langrishe Bill repealed· the statutes forbidding Catholics and Protestants to marry, solicitors from having their children educated as Catholics and Catholic parents from sending their children abroad to be educated.? The bill, though generous, still excluded Catholics from a share in government; and as such it fell far short of what Cath- olics, particularly upper class ones, felt entitled to. Within a year, however, British newspapers carried information that the cabinet had decided the Irish Catho- lies should be admitted to the franchise without delay. As The Times put it, such a move was "highly expedient," since the Catholics were worthy of every indulgence that could be safely granted. A share in the franchise would strengthen England's influence over three million citizens while at the same time weakening the attraction of French ideas for them.8

The about face in the government's attitude towards Catholic relief is rather puzzling but nonetheless interesting and important. There can be little doubt that

?william H. Lecky, A History of Ireland in the Eigh teenth Century (New Edition, New York: D. A. Appleton and Co., 1842), Vol. I, p. 61. 8 The London Times, January 5, 7, 10 and 15, 1793.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 England's approaching war with France was an important factor (war was actually declared on February 1, 1793). Reports from Ireland showed unmistakably that the much feared combination. of Catholics and Protestant,,dissenters had reached a dangerous stage. Satisfaction of some at least of the Catholic demands might tend to isolate the Protestant dissenters. Also, as Pitt felt, satisfied Catholic opinion might be a valuable asset in the coming struggle. Accordingly, Pitt forced the Irish administration to pass a Catholic relief bill at the beginning of 1793. As the bill was virtually ordered from Westminster the "Castle .~ clique" was compelled to carry out a policy it violently opposed. The language of John Fitzgibbon, the Irish Chan cellor, and other members of the government during the de bate on the relief bill teatifies eloquently to their bitterness.9 The relief bill of 1793 gave Catholics both the parlia mentary and municipal franchise on the same forty shilling freehold basis as that possessed by Protestants. With cer

~ain exceptions it conferred the right to sit on grand juries and to become magistrates, to hold army and navy commissions and to hold civil offices. Catholics, however,

9Lecky, op. cit., III, PP• 168-175.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 were still excluded from parliament and from the higher offices of the Irish government.lO The bill was received with satisfaction by the Catholic lower classes throughout Ireland. In light of subsequent Anglo-Irish developments, however, the act proved to be a tactical blunder of the worst sort. For example, since Catholics could now vote it raised the political value to the Protestant landlord of;the Catholic tenant, thereby infuriating the Protestant, who had until then enjoyed a privileged position because of his sole possession of the franchise. It tended to alienate the Catholic landed, pro fessional and merchant classes from the Catholic masses by endowing the latter with political power which they were regarded as unfit to exercise. At the same time it barred wealthy Catholics from service in parliament, from the Privy Council and King's Council to which they considered their rank and civic responsibilities entitled them. Henry Grattan pointed out "the restrictions weighed most heavily on the Catholics who were most able."11 Furthermore, any gratitude the Catholic felt over the relief bill was directed to the king whom they considered their benefactor,

10Edmund Curtis, A History of Ireland, 6th ed. rev., (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1952), pp. 330-332. For an excellent treatment of the importance of the Catholic Relief Act of 1793 see Albert Hamilton, "The Movement for "Irish Catholic Relief 1790-93" (Unpublished Ph.D. disser tation, Department of History, Notre Dame University, 1966). llHenry Grattan, Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Rt. Hon. Henr~ Grattan (London: Henry Colburn PUblishers, 1B49), voi. ! , p. 7o.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 not the Irish government. The significance of this law in subsequent Anglo Irish affairs, particularly as it relates to the Fitz william episode, is difficult to overestimate. Having made a concession of the vote to Irish Catholics, Pitt found himself in an awkward predicament. Since he had granted liberal concessions to the Catholic lower classes, the educated and wealthy Catholics naturally expected their own right to sit in Parliament would soon be allowed. It seems evident that Pitt should not have forced the 1793 bill through the Irish Parliament or else should have coupled it with complete emancipation. The events of the Fitzwilliam viceroyalty (his advocacy of final removal of Catholic disabilities under tremendous public pressure, his dismissal, and the subsequent support of Catholics for radical reform movements) would demonstrate that Pitt gave either too much or too little in 1793. There were two other important results of the Catholic relief bill which deserve mention because of their relevance

to this study. First, it must have been obvious to~the least observant that in the ordinary course of political evolution the Irish Parliament, left to itself, could not

indefinitely resist the demand for full em~lcipation. Second, the manner in which the Catholic Relief Act of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 1793 was introduced provided a demonstration that, for the time being, the Catholic question was likely to receive more sympathetic treatment in an English than in an Irish Parliament; and even suggested to some that distasteful as English influence was in Ireland, it was preferable to a perpetuation of the local Protestant ascendancy. It was the first of these two considerations which pro vided the chief motivation for the sudden shift away from a policy of gradual political freedom for the Irish within their own institutions, to a policy of legislative union with the British Parliament. One has only to view the exchange of letters between Pitt and Fitzwilliam's predecessor, Lord Westmorland, to discover the unanimity of opinion on the desirability of a union. This opinion sug gested that in an Imperial Parliament, Catholics would be in a permanent minority and consequently, Protestant power, property and Church establishment wo.uld be secure.12 In the course of his speech on the relief bill, John Fitz gibpon, the Irish Chancellor, showed clearly that as confi dant of the lord lieutenant, he too was in on the plan.l3 The new Catholic relief act received the Royal assent

12see Westmorland Correspondence, 1795 (Public Records Office, Ireland, Fane Papers), passim. Hereafter referred to as P.R.O.I., Fane Papers. 13Lecky, op. cit., III, pp. 168-175.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 in April, 1793. Thus the position of the Catholics had steadily improved since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The penal laws had at first been strictly en forced, but as Jacobite feeling quieted down they had gradually fallen into disuse. Between 1771 and 1782 the chief articles of the Code (those relating, for instance,

to the ownership of land) had been abol~ehed by Act of Parlia ment. It had become clear to most liberally minded Protes tants that if economic prosperity and parliamentary reform were to be secured the influence of all the people must be brought to bear on the government. Though there were some who considered that the granting of political power to the Catholics would endanger the stability of the state, Pro testant opinion as a whole was growing increasingly favor able to Catholic emancipation. The Catholics had now acquired civil rights, they had begun to buy land, they had become merchants and were taking a more active part in the economic life of the country. To enlarge and consolidate their gains they now hoped for political power. This was in some measure given to them in 1793. The government was alarmed by the increasing hostility of the Protestant dis senters, and in order to separate the questions of emancipa tion and reform, as well as to make a bid for Catholic friendship, the aforesaid act was passed granting Catholics the right to vote.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 That the Catholic Relief Bill of 1793 played an important part in determining the success or failure of Lord Fitzwilliam's viceroyalty is undeniable. By making a liberal grant of the franchise in 1793 Pitt had aroused the hopes of the Irish Catholics that this concession would be carried to its logical conclusion of admitting them to seats in Parliament. His appointment of Fitzwilliam as Lord Lieutenant in late 1794 raised the expectations of Catholics that this additional concession was imminent. But Pitt rudely shattered these hopes by summarily recall

ing Fitzwilliam~ The action plunged Ireland into a seething cauldron of revolutionary activity which culminated in the tragic revolt of 1798.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II

THE COALITION

For many years the wnig Party in Great Britain had i? mair~tained a precarious balance bwtween two essentially antagonistic factions which were united only'i~,~~eii opposition to George III. The French Revolution caused this tenuous coalition to break over fundamental questions of principle. The radical faction, headed by Charles James Fox, viewed the struggle for revolution in France with undisguised admiration. The other faction, known as the 11 0ld Whigs, 11 followed the lead of the Duke of Portland and included," among others, Lord William Fitzwilliam and his friend and political mentor, Edmund Burke. This group supported Burke's interpretation of events across the channel as represented in his Reflections on the Revolution in France and generally accepted their government's interven tion in the European war.1 As early as 1792 rumors were rampant that a coalition between the 11 0ld Whigs 11 and Pitt's government was imminent.2 The reason for the delay in

lPortland to Fitzwilliam, December 25, 1793 (Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, Sheffield Central Library, FJla). Hereafter cited as W.WoM.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 forming a coalition government was the influence of the Duke of Portland. Portland was a patriotic but also a very proud individual. An effective politician; he had the abil ity to inspire devotion and loyalty in his followers. In 1792 he was reluctant to split his party even though he

favored suppressing the ~read of Jacobin principles through out Europe. He was convinced the existence of the Whigs, a party based on the principles of the revolution of 1688, was vital to the well-being of the country. However, the war was going badly in 1794. Pitt was alarmed. Doctrines which he regarded as subversive to the foundation of good government found ready acceptance on the continent. Anti-monarchial views won advocates even within the walls of Parliament. In order to check their advance, to strengthen the hands of the executive and to broaden his basis of support, Pitt actively sought the co-operation of those Whigs who shared his dread of revolutionary principles and were alarmed at the storm rapidly advancing on all of France's neighbors. In the summer of 1794 negotiations between Pitt and the Duke of Portland and his political lieutenants resulted in a coalition government. Portland was made Secretary of State for Home Affairs, which gave him jurisdict-ion over Irish matters. Earl Spenser was made Lord Privy Seal. William Windham was made Secretary of War. And Lord

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24

Fitzwilliam became President of the Council with the understanding that he should in the near future succeed Lord Westmorland as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.3 Portland and Fitzwilliam believed, according to an understanding with Pitt, that they would be able to effect in Ireland the policy they desired--"to reform," as William Ponsonby, Fitzwilliam's intimate friend said, "the abuses which he (Portland) knew existed in the govern ment."4 Their chances of making substantial changes in Ireland, which included an amelioration of the position of Catholics, were at best slim, given the known suspi- cion and hostility of George III for most Whigs. More- over, many of Pitt's own colleagues, as Burke so aptly put it, "considered Mr. Pitt's enlarging his bottom as an interloping on their monopoly .• n5 As soon as the coalition was agreed to, Portland asked Fitzwilliam to

3Ibid., July 12, 1794. Westmorland was given the post of Master of the Horse in December, 1794 and subsequently held high office in successive British ministries for over a quarter of a century.

~istor of the Proceedin s and Debates of the House of Commons of Ireland Dubl1n: P. Byrne, J. Moore, 179 XV, p. 184. Hereafter referred to as Parliamentary Debates.

5nia Ri ht Honorable William Windham, ~d. Mrs. Henry London: Herbert Jenk1ns Ltd., 1866), p. 326.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 accept an important position in the new government. Unless he was "a very efficient party" in the affair, the enterprise would fail.6 Fitzwilliam was not coalition-minded. He at first declined, pleading personal reasons and protesting that he would in any event add very little weight to the new Cabinet either in ability or experience.7 Portland and his friends were persistent, however, and during August Fitzwilliam was prevailed upon to change his mind and to accept the viceroyalty of Ireland. a Both Portland and Fitzwilliam had more than a pass ing interest in Ireland. Portland had been Lord Lieutenant of Ireland when the nominal independence of the Dublin Parliament was granted in 1782, and he was known to favor Catholic emancipation.9 Portland had made a substantial

6Portland to Fitzwilliam, June 14, 1794 (W.W.M.F3lb). 7Fitzwilliam to Portland, June 23, 1794 (W.W.M.F3lb). 8Portland to Fitzwilliam, August 14, 1794 (W.W.M. F3ld). 9In fact, Portland had expressed serious interest in returning as Lord Lieutenant unless he could find someone in whom he could have the utmost confidence. T. A. Emmet, ed., Memoir of Thomas Addis and Robert Emmet (New York: The Emmet Press, 1915), p. 12o.

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of his predecessor, a rather curious factr~· when one con . eiders his attitude towards Fitzwilliam's attempts to effect similar changes on a more modest scale.lO The Duke told William Ponsonby later in 1794 that the direc tion of Irish affairs was now to be in the hands of the Whigs, who would not cooperate with Fitzgibbon, Beresford and the rest of the Castle junta. Portland said he supported the measures to which Ponsonby's friends in Ireland were committed, incluqing Catholic emancipation, and said the Irish arrangements had been the principle reason for his agreeing to the coalition with Pitt.11 Lord Fitzwilliam possessed very extensive holdings in Ireland, reputed to be in excess of eighty thousand acres, and was married to the daughter of a prominent Irish ear1.12 He was one of the wealthiest men in England, having fallen heir in 1792 to the extensive estatesl3 of his uncle, the Marquis of Rockingham. Of course, along

10portland replaced the following officials who had been acting under his predecessor, Lord Carlisle: the Attorney General, Under Secretary for War, Prime Sergeant, Council to the Revenue Board and the Solicitor General. llconversation reported in a letter of William Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam, May 4, 1795 (W.W.M.F29(a)). 12 Fitzwilliam was married to Lady Charlotte Ponsonby, youngest daughter of the Second Earl of Bessborough and Lady Caroline, the daughter of the Duke of Devonshire. l3Valued at forty thousand poUnds a year. Fitzwilliam

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with these extensive territorial possessions went their consequent political influence. Despite this political power Fitzwilliam had really very little practical experience in politics·,and almost no first hand knowledge of Ireland, although he had the services of his close friend Edmund Burke, probably the most knowledgeable man in English public life concerning Irish affairs. Burke's

son, Richar~had died a few days before Fitzwilliam accepted the office of Lord Lieutenant. The elder Burke told a friend 'Richard was greatly concerned with the unfinished task of Catholic emancipation. Edmund Burke had consistently pursued the aim of freeing Catholics from the remaining vestiges of the penal laws. He felt this particularly urgent at the time in order to encourage the Irish Catholics to support the British government. The problem of Catholic emancipation was to concern Burke for the rest of his life.l4 Fitzwilliam was an upright amwell-intentioned man, with considerable administrative ability as the efficient

kept up a princely establishment at Wentworth House, Yorkshire and had perhaps the finest stables and kennels in England. Dictionary of National Biography, pp. 235-37· 14 See Thomas H. D. Mahoney, Edmund Burke and Ireland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), particularly Chapters VII-X.

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management of his vast properties attes~ Even his most bitter political enemies paid tribute to his "high sense of honor, his courage and manly straightforwardness which influenced his conduct and character through life."l5 He was headstrong though, and, as one of his critics put it, lacked the caution one would expect from a man embark• ing as viceroy of a "troubled country in a troubled timeonl6 Towards the end of August, Fitzwilliam wrote to Henry

Grattan. The letter, dated August 23, 1794, giv~ a clear

picture of what Fitzwilliam hoped to accomplish in Irelan~ and for this reason it deserves to be quoted in full: Though I have not as yet the honour of an appointment to succeed Lord Westmorland, there certainly is great probability of that event taking place very soon. Trusting that neither my connexions nor my principles are quite un known to you, it seems almost needless to say, that upon entering upon the administration of the affairs in Ireland, I shall look to the system of the Duke of Portland as the model by

l5The Corres ondence of the Rt. Honorable John Beres ford, Ed. William Benesford London: Woodfall and Kinder, ~),II, p. XXI.

16Edward Gibson, Lord Ashborne, op. cit., pp. 193- 94. Fitzwilliam's viceroyalty is so surrounded by con troversy that a balanced assessment of the man is diffi cult to arrive at. For generally favorable estimates of him, consult: Lecky, op. cit., 1~I, pp. 298-99, 322-23; Grattan, op. cit., IV, pp. 171-72; Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 266-67; Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 28-29. For an oppo site opinion see: Beresford, op. cit. II, pp. 75 et seq; Johnston, op. cit., pp. 106-7, 116; Ashborne, op. cit., pp. 192-94.

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which I shall regulate the general line of my conduct. The chief object of my attempts will be, to purify, as far as circumstances and prudence will permit, the principles of government, in the hopes of thereby restoring to it that tone and spirit which so happily prevailed formerly, and so much to the dignity as well as the benefit of the country; but it would be vain to hope that any exertions of a Lord-Lieutenant could ever effect so desirable an end, unless he meets with the concurrance of the most eminent and distinguished characters in this very arduous attempt. It is, sir, to you and your firends, the Ponsonbys, that I look for assistance in bringing it to bear. Without hope, which I am vain enough to enter tain, of that assistance, I should decline engaging in so hopeless a task as the govern ment of Ireland. It is that assistance which I am therefore now soliciting. I know well the honourable, the useful, the important support government has received at your hands on many ·_. critical occasions, and at different periods; but excep~ during the momentary administration of the Duke of Portland, I 'believe it has so happened that younever have approached the Castle in confidence, and avowed friendship: great obstacle-s have always stood in:·the way. Should these obstacles be•. removed, I trust that distance will no longer be necessary; and that I may entertain a hope of seeing you form with the Castle, that sort ·or intimate, direct, and avowed connexion, as will render support doubly efficacious.l7

In a postscript, Fitzwilliam added, "I beg not to be quoted as having announced myself in the character of Lord

17 Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 173. Fitzwilliam wrote in a similar vein to Lord Charlemont on the same day. See Historical Manuscripts Commission XIII Rep. App. VIII Charlemont Manuscripts, p. 246. Hereafter cited as H.M.C.

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Lieutenant elect; my name not having been mentioned to the king, on account of his absence at Weymouth.nl8

Grattan, although determined not to accept office under Pitt's government, could hardly refuse independent support to Lord Fitzwilliam's administration which he termed "our salvation.nl9 This view of the projected viceroyalty of Fitzwilliam was shared by almost every responsible Irish Whig. Thomas Connolly, one of the most respected members of the Irish Parliament, told Fitz william what was expected of his administration--abolition of all superflous positions held by the junta, admittance of Catholic upper classes to Parliament and consultation with the Catholic aristocracy on matters of importance.20 At Fitzwilliam's invitation, Grattan, Sir John Parnell, who was the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, and George Ponsonby trayelled to London in September to consult with him and other members of the coalition cabinet on future arrangements in Ireland. On his arrival Grattan conferred first with the Duke of Portland, who told him, "I have taken office, and I have done so

18 . Grattan, op. clt., IV, p. 173. 19 Grattan to Fitzwilliam, August 31, 1794 (W.W.M. F29).

20connolly to Fitzwilliam, August 30, 1794 (W.W.M. F29).

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because I know there is to be an extensive change of system."21 In the course of subsequent conversations with Pitt and the others, the former's hostility to further amelioration of Catholic disabilities in Ireland at this time became evident. When Sir John Parnell spoke with satisfaction of the increasing cooperation between Pro- testants and Catholics, Pitt stated "that while this might be true, the question was whose side would they (Catholics) be on;1, Government or the opposition. 1122 On another occasion he said to Grattan, "what does Ireland want? She has already got much. "23 Upon his appointment it was customary for the proposed viceroy to communicate directly with prominent Irish politicians, inviting them to support his adminis- tion and seeking their advice on local matters. In this case, however, the premature disclosure that Fitzwilliam was to be made viceroy and that he intended to make

changes in the Ir~h administration produced an explosion in the British government. Portland and Fitzwilliam

21 Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 174. 22 Ibid., p. 17.5. 23 --Ibid.

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24Pitt to Westmorland, October 19, 1794 (Chatham Parers, Public Records Office, 30/8/325.) Henceforth re erred to as:Chatham Papers, P.R.O.

25Fitzwilliam to Windham, October 11, 1794 (W.W.M. F3li).

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the problem by asking Fitzwilliam if he really believed that Pitt could be expected to accept the dismissal of his friends in Ireland just because they had supported his measures. Was it sensible to think Pitt would desert his friends in the Irish Administration "to.the mercy of those who were to come in? Should you in similar cir cumstances have thought it right to do so? 11 26 Pitt, on the other hand, felt it should be made clear to the Portland Whigs that Fitzgibbon and the Irish supporters of his government should not be sacked, that Lord Westmorland was to be provided for, 27 and that any thought of Ireland being run differently from the rest of the government was to be emphatically denied. 28 These

26windham to Fitzwilliam, October 12, 1794 (W.W.M. F3ld) •

27westmorland was furious that he was to be re placed. This is understandable; the office of Lord Lieu tenant of Ireland was among the most honorable and lucra tive at the disposal of the British government. The post carried not only great dignity but a salary of 20,000 pounds a year, plus expenses amounting to an addi tional 3,000 pounds. He did not intend to let Pitt off the "hook" and would accept nothing less than a position of cabinet rank. Chatham Papers, R.i~O~ 30/9/33l,f253.

28see Earl Stanhope, Life of the Rt. Honorable William Pitt (London: J. Murray Company, 1861-62), II, pp. 289-91.

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points were raised at a mid-October meeting between Pitt and his Whig colleagues. Portland and Fitzwilliam were bewildered and reacted angrily. Fitzwilliam complained at this time that Pitt "never-speaks his mind freely."

It was hard to know just what Fitzwilliam's ~reogatives in Ireland would be. Pitt's attitude seemed suspicious to the Whigs. They suspected that Pitt was fearful that Portland and the Whigs would gain power and prestige from their better management of Irish affairs.29 For the moment it appeared the coalition would break up since "the Portlands ••• are so violent that nothing in common reason will content them."30

The Times openly speculated that the coalition would shortly be broken and that in any case Lord Fitzwilliam would not be going to Ireland, as his friends there had been ~epudiated by Pitt.31 Edmund Burke viewed the present crisis with extreme concern. He looked to Pitt as the only man capable of arresting the virus of Jacob inism. To the Whigs who had joined in the coalition he

29Fitzwilliam to Burke, October 21, 1794, copy in (W.W.M.).

3°Beresford to Lord Auckland, October 22, 1794, Beresford, op. cit., II, p. 41.

~~~~:-.~~~~·-Times, October 16, 18, 1794o

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was attached by ties of many years of personal and poli tical friendship •. He considered the feud that had arisen as a calamity of the first order. Pitt could probably have carried on a government without a coalition with the Whigs, but hiB ministry, which Burke considered so vital to Europe, could hardly have survived such a disruption for long. Burke reminded his friends of the immense power of the Prime Minister's office. It would be wise to stay on good terms with Pitt. After all, if the power of the Ascendancy in Ireland was to be crushed and the abuses of the Castle corrected, then Pitt and only Pitt could destroy or maintain them.32 On October 16, 1794, Burke wrote his friendzWindham again expressing his grave concern with the existing impasse in Anglo-Irish affairs. He agreed that Fitz william's conduct might be viewed as indescreet. But in a long talk with Fitzwilliam he was told that the latter considered the entire affairs of Ireland had been placed in his hands, without qualification. Burke further em phasized that Fitzwilliam had only accepted the post of lord lieutenant after a great deal of soul searching and then only because he felt he could be of some service to ------. 32 Windham Diary, op. eft., p. 329.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 his government.-- - He had then invited several prominent people to discuss the problem of administering Ireland even though he was not officially in office as yet. Because he had acted in this manner and because Pitt had no intention of allowing changes in the Irish admin istration, Burke concluded, "with infinite sorrow, with sorrow inexpressible," that Fitzwilliam would have to resign his position and those who had joined the coali tion with him should follow his example. Burke felt Fitz william could hardly go to Ireland with a direct negative placed on his power. He needed .. the active support of the Prime Minister. Westmorland appeared to govern Ireland smoothly because he didn't create waves by opposing the wishes of the Ascendancy party. If people expected Fitz william to follow a similar tack in Ireland, it would be better for all if he did not go.33 Ireland and what happened there, Burke insisted, affected all of Europe. She would either be a "strong digue to keep out Jacobinism or a weak bank to let it in." If the corrupt junta governing Ireland were not ousted, Burke saw nothing but calamity for England and destruction for her

33~., pp. 321-333.

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empire. They would open "a back door for Jacobinism to rush in." The Ascendancy had to be removed from power at the first opportunity.34

A few days later, on October 20, Burke wrote to Windham that after giving the matter considerable thought he had changed his mind. Fitzwilliam and Portland should not resign. They should wait until they were turned out. Burke did not mean that Portland and Fitzwilliam should surrender their principles, rather they should reiterate them. They had accepted a place in the government with the highest motives and intended only to oppose the cor rupt junta in Ireland which threatened the very existence of the empire. If they resigned it would mean political suicide for the Portland Whigs. The onus for the collapse

of the coalition should fall on ~itt, and Burke suggested his friends present their case personally to the King. He closed his letter by cautioning Windham that the Whigs must not resign and must not weaken their resolve to reform abuses in Ireland. The Irish system, he said, could only be defeated by "open, avowed, unappeasable:':War. n35

34rbid.

35rbid., pp. 337-et seq. In a subsequent letter to Fitzwilliam, Burke pointed out that by not resigning he would put the junta in a position where they would look as if they were fighting for their jobs. Burke to Fitz william, October 21, 1794 (W.W.MoO•

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 For the moment the breach betwoen Pitt and the Old Whigs seemed unbridgeable. The coalition seemed ready to split at the seams. The general situation in Europe, how ever, had grown so precarious36 that it tended to act as

a damper on political emotions and cooler he.ads were allowed time to arrange a compromise. In this critical moment Lord Loughborough, the British Chancellor, attempted the role of mediator between his old allies, the Portland Whigs and his more recent chief, William Pitt.37 The I Chancellor attempted to convince Pitt that the new system which Fitzwilliam and his friends in Ireland were planning to introduce was not actually new. It was rather an arrangement which would involve only a few changes in personnel at Dublin and in which all persons concerned could be satisfied in some way. Loughborough, however, felt that Fitzwilliam must be given a free hand, but that he would act with moderation.38 He believed further that the whole misunderstanding "might be cured by a frank

36 Holland was in danger of being overrun at any mo ment by Napoleon's forces, with all the horrible conse quences this event conjured up in the mind of every re..-· wonsible British statesman.

37J. H. Rose, op. cit., pp. 20-26. 38 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

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explanation."39 Thus on November 6, 1794, Edmund Burke and Henry Grattan, acting on behalf of Lord Fitzwilliam, called on the Chancellor to discuss'":the ministerial crisis. They explained that Fitzwilliam was determined to reform the abuses which prevailed in Ireland, but that he intended to proceed on the most temperate lines. They stated further. that Lord Fitzwilliam's view was: To support in Ireland the English Government, considering Mr. Pitt as the Prime Minister, without whom no material measure as to things or persons is to be concerted or done-not setting up a Government of Departments, but that each department acting under him should meet with its due and honourable support from him. No vindictive removals; those which may be· necessary for convenience to be settled here by amicable concert. Misrepresentations and indiscretions may have had effect on both sides; to wipe away all memory of them, and to start as on new ground. To arrange, in the best manser for the interest of both kingdoms, the state of Ireland. for this purpose to meet as soon as possible .40 ·

In exchange for this moderate attitude Fitzwilliam expected that the Prime Minister would support his administra tion "with dignity and honor."41 Burke and Grattan

39Loughborough to Windham, October 16, 1794 (Windham Papers, B.M. Add.MS. 37874).

40For the general statement of policy agreed to by Grattan, Burke and Lord Loughborough, see H.M.Co XV Rep. app. VI Carlisle Manuscripts, p. 722.

41Burke to Fitzwilliam, November 7, 1794, (W.WoMo).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 suggested to Fitzwilliam that now that the dispute was settled the best approach to the arrangement of Ireland would be to start with a clean slate 11 as if it had been but this day thought of. 11 42 Sometime in December a cabinet meeting took place between Pitt, Fitzwilliam, Portland, Spencer, Windham and Grenville for the purpose of discussing the entire Irish situation prior to Lord Fitzwilliam's departure.43 The subsequent controversy surrounding Fitzwilliam's tenure as lord lieutenant of Ireland invests this meeting with great significance. A memorandum summing up what trans pired was composed by Lord Grenville in March, 1795, corrected by Pitt, and then circulated to and sanctioned by all who had been present, except Fitzwilliam.44 It is the only existing evidence we have of the conference. It should be borne in mind, however, that the paper

43The date of this meeting is not given, but at.the end of the account of the conference Grenville states that Fitzwilliam left immediately for the country and soon went to Ireland. Since Fitzwilliam kissed hands on his appointment on December 10 and arrived in Dublin on Jan uary 4; i795, this meeting must have taken place some time in December.

44A number of copies of the document are available. see H.M.Co XIII Rep. app III, Fortesque Manuscripts, PP• 35-39; Ashborne, op. cit., p. 187. For Fitzwilliam's version of the meeting, see H.M.C. Carlisle op. cit., PP• 704 et seqo

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. represents the point of view of the ministry and that it was written ex post facto as a justification for Fitzwilliam's dismissal and agreed to by men Fitzwilliam accused of betraying him. During the negotiations which preceeded the cabinet meeting, Fitzwilliam suggested the removal of John Fitz gibbon, the Irish Chancellor, but gave in before the objections of the ministers. Later he insisted that at this time he told Pitt, who denied remembering such a statement, he intended to remove John Beresford from his position at the head of the revenue department.45

At the meeting itself si~ points were discussed. The most important ones concerned the appointment of the Pon sonbys to office, the provision to be made for certain officeholders who were to be supplanted, and the abolition of some offices established by Lord Buckingham, a former viceroy. Fitzwilliam, who strongly urged the necessity of promoting the fortunes of George Ponsonby, wanted him appointed Secretary of State, but it was decided that that office should be annexed to the Chief Secretaryship and that Ponsonby should be appointed Keeper of the Signet. The ministers suggested that if the Attorney General, Arthur Wolfe, and the Solicitor General, John Toler, were

45 Fortesque MSS., op. cit., p. J6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 placed on the bench, George Ponsonby could be made Attorney General. Finally they agreed that, for the time, Ponsonby could serve as Solicitor General under Wolfe, once the claims of Mr. Toler were satisfied. Fitzwilliam brought up the question of reforming the Revenue Board, but the ministers were able to persuade him to delay any action on this matter until he reached Ireland and was able to gather information on the subject so that the Cabi:rie.t "might have the opportunity to deliberate upon it" before any measure was adopted.46 Aside from the questions of patronage, the most important issue treated in the memorandum was that con cerning the admission of Catholics to the Irish Parliament. It was considered "a subject of much delicacy and no decided sentiments as to the line which it might ulti mately be right to adopt upon it was expressed by any person present." Fitzwilliam was instructed not to raise the question of Catholic emancipation as a government measure, and, if possible, to prevent its agitation and postpone action until the war with France was over. Yet, and this seems a very important exception in the light of subsequent events, if he found the Catholics so determined that evasion was not feasible he was authorized to

46 Ibid., p. 38.

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accept and support a bill for complete emancipation.47 Lord Fitzwilliam did not insist on an exact defini- tion of his powers being spelled out and his estimate of them appears to have exceeded Pitt's. Nor did he ask that the precise terms of his prerogatives be committed to paper, an almost inexcusable omission in view of the difficulty he had recently experienced and understandable only if one makes allowances for Fitzwilliam's lack of experience in dealing with politicians. He had written naively to his friend Edmund Burke a short time before the

December meeting that everything was fina~ly settled; he was to go to Ireland but "not exactly on the terms I had originally thought of. 11 48

Thus it seems the Whigs were going to have the opportunity of controlli.ng, to a certain degree, the adlninis- tration of Ireland. Fitzwilliam was faced with an unenvi- able, if not impossible task. Strongly conscious of his virtues, ill-supplied with tact, he set off to represent

a war-time coalition complete with all the muddl~mis-

understandings and hastily patched-up compromises -COiiim0iJ.,; in such agreements. He was ignorant of the fact that he

47Ibido

4SF.1tzw1ll1am · · to Burke, November 1 8 , 1794 , copy 1n. ( W. W.M o) o

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was to be the central figure in the most disastrous episode in eighteenth century Anglo-Irish relations. Even before he set sail for Ireland, however, a critical issue had surfaced which called for a solutiono The problem was Catholic emancipation, that "delicate subject" upon which nothing definite had been decided. "I was decidedly of the opinion, 11 wrote Fitzwilliam later, "that not only sound policy but justice required that the work which was left imperfect in 1793 ought to be completed and Catholics relieved from every remaining disqualifica tion."49 The only major disability the Catholics suffered under after the Relief Act of 1793 was exclusion from parliament. But this was an inequity which the Irish Catholics found particularly galling. "There is someting which rankles in their bosoms, 11 wrote Fitzwilliam the first week of his arrival in Ireland, "they conceive they are marked people. 11 5° To fail to rectify this situation would leave a grievance among the wealthy Catholics·. which

49H.M.Co Carlisle, op. cit., p. 713. Fitzwilliam stated that Portland concurred entirely in this statement. When this question arose in the meeting with Pitt and the Cabinet prior to his departure for Ireland, he wrote: "I found the majority of the Cabinet, with Mr. Pitt at their head strongly impressed with the same conviction. Had I found it otherwise, I never would have undertaken the Government." Ibid.

50Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 15, 1795 (Public Records Office, Home Office Papers, 100/56). Hereafter referred to as P.R.O.HoOo

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would taint the inauguration of the new administration. Henry Grattan had already set the political pot to boiling. Scarcely back in Ireland from his London talks in December, he began the system of conciliation for which he felt he had received sufficient authority. He immediately sent for Edward Byrne and John Keogh of the late Catholic Committee and 11 pledged Lord Fitzwilliam to them for the unqualified repeal of all the laws which affected

11 1 them. 5 He warned them, though, that strenuous opposition would be forthcoming from the Ascendancy party and that it behooved them to be prepared with petitions from every section of the citizenry to be presented to Parlia

ment.52 Within days Dublin was alive with rumors that-the new administration was wholeheartedly committed to removal of all remaining penal and restrictive laws against Catholics. Fitzwilliam set sail for Ireland at the end of December and the stage was set for the so-called "Fitz- william episode" which, as one scholar observed, "caused so much ill-feeling in Ireland that it must be considered one of the chief causes of the Rebellion of 1798o 11 53

51Fitzgibbon to Westmorland, March 25, 1795 (PoRoOoi. Fane Papers}.

52Emmett, op. cit., p. 12lo

53Maxwell, op. cit., p. 28o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III THE TRAGIC ONE HUNDRED DAYS Lord William Fitzwilliam landed in Ireland on

January 4, 1795, travelled to Dublin, and too~ up his post as viceroy amid a tumultuous welcome by all classes of the Irish people. 1 Addresses of Congratulations poured in from every large town and county in Ireland. Lord Fitzwilliam answered these salutations by stating the principles of his administration and the individuals who would carry them out: In the faithful discharge of my duty to his Majesty, it shall be my study to call to my councils, those who are distinguished and known for their wisdom, their integrity, and their talents, and who possess the confidence of his Majesty's people. Assisted by their advice and availing myself of their support, I trust that I shall be enabled to promote the first wishes of his Majesty's heart, by securing the full and cordial union of all his subjects, as the surest means of securing their happiness.2 The new viceroy believed firmly that strenuous effort had to be made to check the spread of revolution in Ire- land and was cognizant of the danger of a French attack on that country. Fitzwilliam's object, therefore, was to

lThe Dublin Journal, Janu~ry 7, 1795. 2Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 185.

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prevent both of the above dangers by riveting Catholic affections to government through the repeal of remaining disabilities. Thus he exhausted precious little time in determining that complete Catholic emancipation must be granted at once. "I was no sooner landed," he later wrote, "and informed of the real state of things here, than I found that this question would force itself upon my immediate attention. 11 3 Initially he was apprehensive and attempted to go slow in meeting complete Catholic emancipation. 11 I tremble about the Roman Catholics. I mean, about keeping them quiet for the session because I found the question already in agitation." Even the

nobility and landed gent~, most obsequious of all Catholics, were now looking for complete emancipation, while "the disaffection among the lower orders was universally admitted. "4 In a letter to Portland in early January, Fitzwilliam stated that even the most conservative Catholics were anticipating the removal of all remaining disabilities. He was also very aware there was widespread agrarian

3 Fitzwilliam to Carlisle March 23, 1795. HoM.C., Carlisle, op. cit., p. 714.

~itzwilliam to Portland, January 8, 1795 (P.R.Oo H.O. 100/56).

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discontent reflected in the crimes committed by 11 banditti." He felt that without extensive and permanent remedies there was much to be feared. He told Portland "not a day has passed since my arrival, without intelligence received of violence committed in West Meath, Meath, Longford and Cavan.u The whole structure of Irish government, he said, was miserably weak with scarcely any real responsibility among officials. The only real protection against the acts of violence committed by the Defenders was the mili tary.5 Fitzwilliam felt these outrages were not politically motivated, but reflected in clear fashion the feeling of bitter discontent which permeated the entire Catholic population. He was convinced that the discontent could be effectually counteracted solely by the abolition of all religious impediments. He would be negligent in his duty, he wrote, if he failed to warn that "not to grant cheerfully on the part of government all the Catholics wish will not only be exceedingly impolitic but perhaps dangerous."6 He requested Portland to discuss the matter

SFitzwilliam to Portland, January 10, 1795 (PoRoO. H.O. 100/56). Fitzwilliam requested a copy of the pre vious year's Yeomanry Act. He was interested in setting up a Yeomanry C~ahry, a volunteer force of farmers under the command of country gentry. Such a force had been established in England a short time before.

6Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 15, 1795 (P.RoOo H.O. 100/56) o

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with the Prime Minister and closed by stating quite explicitly that unless he received directions to the

contrary, 11 I shall acquiesce with a good grace in order to avoid the manifest ill effect. of a doubt or the @pearance of a hesitation." It was apparent, he stated, that the measure was acceptable to the vast majority of Protestants in Ireland.?

Meanwhile, before Parliament convened, Fitzwilliam made or suggested some of the anticipated changes at the 11 castle.n Less than two weeks after his arrival he removed several important officials. Sackville Hamilton and Edward Cooke who held subordinate but important posi tions were dismissed on January 15th.B Fitzwilliam wrote that neither he nor his Chief Secretary, Lord Milton, 11 with whom they were in hourly intercourse, felt inclined to give them that confidence, or to suffer the business

8 . • . Sackv1lle Ham1lton was Secretary for War and Edward Cooke was an Under-Secretary for Ireland. Cooke was a very influential person in Irish politics towards the end of the century. He was noted for his vehement hostility to Catholic emancipation and for his support of the most severe action by the government both before and after the rebellion of 1798. He was also a strong advocate of union between England and Ireland.

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of their respective offices to be conducted on the system which we found had been lately introduced there.n He continued that Cooke's "tone and style rendered his approach to a superior not to be supported.''9

These and "a thousand other reasons which I cannot detail, 11 wrote Fitzwilliam, 11 have compelled me to make up

my mind to this measure. nlO One of Fitzwilliam 1 s most prolific correspondents, Thomas O'Beirne, had earlier impressed on the viceroy his extremely poor opinion of these men and others in authbrity and that it was imperative to entrust power and positions of importance in Ireland to men who were politically sympathetic to Fitzwilliam's point of view.ll

Furthermore, Fitzwilliam proposed the dismissal of Arthur Wolfe, the Attorney General and John Toler, the Solicitor General to make room for George Ponsonby and John Curran. Wolfe and Toler were informed of their

imminent dismissal by 0 1 Beirne on January 9th. The two officials were to be suitably provided for. Wolfe was

9H.M.c. Carlisle, op. cit., p. 704.

1°Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 15, 1795 (W.W.M. F5f).

~lsee 0 1 Beirne to Fitzwilliam, August 20, 1794 (WoWo M.F.31); September 6, 1794, October 7, 1794 (W.W.M.F29)o O'Beirne had been private secretary to the Duke of

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offered a peerage and the first vacant seat on the bench. He declined the peerage requesting instead that it go to his wife and asked that Fitzwilliam obtain for him the position of chief justice.12 When told of his dismissal, Toler also requested a peerage for his wife, the first vacant seat on the bench and the promise of the chief baron's office.13

Far more important in its repercussions than these changes was the dismissal of John Beresford, First Commiss- ioner of the Revenue. By patient application Beresford had secured for himself and his family so many minor government positions, and organized such a network of political connections that he was one of the most powerful controlling and directing influences in the government of 1 Ireland. 4 He was closely allied to John Fitzgibbon, the

Portland when he was Lord Lieutenant. In 1795 he offered his services and became private secretary to Lord Fitz william and was later appointed bishop of Meatho His opinions appear to carry a good deal of weight with Fitz william.

12cooke to Westmorland, January 9, 1(95 (PoR.O. Fane Papers).

13cooke to Westmorland, January 10, 1795, t'biQ.~.

14rn addition to being Chief Commissioner of Revenue, Beresford held the office of Taster of Wines, with a sal ary of 1,000 pounds a year for life. His son Marcus was first Council to the Commission; his second son John held a lucrative position on the Revenue Board; his brother

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Irish Chancellor, who was bitterly hostile to Fitzwilliam and his proposed-program. Since the time of the announce- ment of Fitzwilliam's appointment, Beresford had written of it to London with great hostility and apprehension.l5 Fitzwilliam was not the kind of man who would accept this type of opposition from a subordinate. He made it clear that the men who worked in his administration should be men in whom he had confidence. It was essential to the dignity and safety of the English government in Ireland that nepotism, organized to monopolize positions of power, be broken up and all government patronage be in the hands of the lord lieutenant. Therefore, one of Fitz- william's first acts was to send his secretary, Bowes Daly, to inform Beresford that he was dismissed. Fitz- william appears to have suspected Beresford of some very corrupt practices for he justified the dismissal thusly:

William was bishop of Ossary and married to the sister of John Fitzgibbon, the Chancellor. Another brother was the fd.rst::?Marquis of Waterford and held the patronage of the counties of Waterford and Derry. And the influence was steadily growing. It was estimated that a few years after the Viceroyalty of Lord Fitzwilliam the Beresfords and their connections filled at least one-fourth of all the places in Ireland. Lecky, op. cit., III, pp. 2'72-74• 15 See Beresford, op. cit., I, especially pages 200- 206.

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When he was filling a situation greater than that of the Lord-Lieutenant himself, and when I clearly saw that if I had connected myself with him, it would have been connecting myself with a person labouring under heavy suspicions and subjecting my government to all the oppro brium and unpopularity attendant upon his mal administration-what was then my choice? ••• I decided at once not to cloud the dawn of my administration by leaving in such power ~nd authority so much imputed malversation.l

Fitzwilliam probably acted rashly. No doubt he was correct in reasoning that his intended program could not succeed in a situation where most of the important person- ages in the government were catagorically opposed to it. Yet the broom was applied so swiftly and within such a short time after his arrival that it appeared almost brutal. In his own mind he treated Beresford quite gen-

erously. Beresford was granted his full salary of 3,000 pounds for life and was assured that none of his family would be removed from office. 11 They we.r.e .still left," wrote Fitzwilliam, "in the full enjoyment of more emolu-

ments than eve~ accumulated in any country upon any one

16H.M.C. Carlisle, op. cit., p. 706. Beresford, in relating his conversation with Daly says he was told, 11 No Lord Lieutenant could exist with my power; that I had made a Lord Chancellor, a Chief Justice of the King's Bench, an Attorney-General, nearly a Primate, and certainly a commander-in-chief; that I was at the head of the revenue, and had the law, the army, the revenue and a great deal of the Church, in my possession, and he said expressly that I was considered the King of Ireland." Beresford, op. cit., II, p. 51.

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family."17 Fitzwilliam undoubtedly felt he was acting well within his powers in dismissing Beresford. Indeed, he reported to Portland that Beresford was on the whole satisfied with the arrangement and that he pledged his sup port to the lord lieutenant's administration.18 Besides, any doubts as to the propriety of his actions had been settled by the meeting he had with Pitt prior to his depar ture for Ireland. At that time he had purposely stated it might be necessary to remove Beresford and Pitt made no

o b j e c t i on. l9 Obviously, Fitzwilliam believed this and so was misled by unbounded optimism in thinking Pitt would not object. At any rate, Fitzwilliam certainly underestimated the strength of the existing system. Beresford and Cooke, un like the spiritless Wolfe and Toler, did not accept their

l7HoM.Co Carlisle, op. cit. Fitzwilliam told Portland that Beresford had been guilty of "extra-ordinary sale of a public lease during the last session of Parliament ••• Certainl~ this was grounds enough for suspension of con fidence. 1 He was lucky, thought Fitzwilliam, that his dis missal would be ascribed to other causes. Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 3, 1795 (W.W.MoF5)o

18Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 15, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56). Beresford initially appeared resigned to the situation, although feeling that he had been treated shabb ily. He was ready to accept his dismissal if this was what Pitt wanted and as long as his pen&on was safe-guarded. However, upon hearing of Pitt's displeasure at his firing, he picked up and headed for London. Beresford, op. cit., II, pp. 53-54.

19Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 3, 1795 (W.W.M.F5).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 fate meekly and took immedate steps to frustrate the actions of Fitzwilliam. Cooke fired off a whole series of letters to Lord Westmorland, Fitzwilliam's predecessor, denouncing the latter's policy on general grounds. He complained that since the arrival of Fitzwilliam the Pon sonby family had gained complete control over him. Once the Catholic emancipation question was ironed out, the Ponsonby faction would acquire the support of a large seg ment of the population. The resulting government would be able to influence the corresponding Whig party in England against the king. "Mr. Pitt," claimed Cooke, "seems to have tied all the old friends·of government to the stake for Fitzwilliam to flag." He stated that the dismissal of Beresford "is one of the sorest wounds English Govern- ment could receive." As for himself, "after twenty-five years of service and after all my fidelity to Mr. Pitt, I am to lose 1,300 pounds a year by thisnw· system of coalition."20 The incessant railing of Cooke against the actions of Lord Fitzwilliam certainly reached Pitt and the Cabinet in England and undoubtedly had a great deal of bearing of subsequent events. Beresford for his part was directing a stream of

20see Cooke to Westmorland, January 9, 15, 18, 23, 26, 1795 (P.R.O.I. Fane Papers).

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correspondence of his own to his associates in England. He complained that if any reason for his dismissal could be shown, "save only that I have supported government ••• I am ready to resign.u2l He referred to himself as a perse-

cuted man and directed emotional appeals to the Prime Minister to support him in his hour of need.22 Beresford even went so far as to travel to London to present his complaint personally to Pitt. Meantime, the tide of war was flowing strongly against England. Austrian and Prussian armies were in full retreat. The French had retaken the left bank of the Rhine and the Belgian provinces, retaken by Austria in 1793, were once more under French control. In January, 1795, the French invaded Holland and captured the Dutch fleet. It was believed by British military experts that this would almost certainly be followed by an invasion of England and Ire- lando Fitzwilliam advised Portland that he anticipated an invasion of Ireland at any time. He warned the Foreign Secretary that the Irish, in their present state of discon tent, could not be relied upon. 23 He urged again that

complete Catholic emancipation be granted and stated that it would easily pass in the Irish House of Commons. Since

21Beresford, op.·.cit., II, pp. 55 et seq.

22Ibid.

23Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 23, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56}.

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they had been granted so much by the Relief Bill of 1793,

it was only no~mal that they should feel entitled to what has been refused them. The Viceroy reminded Portland that the defense of Ireland was almost totally dependent on the attitude of the Catholics. It is apparent that Fitzwilliam hoped to gain the loyalty of the Catholics in this critical time by timely concessions. It was in this tension-filled atmosphere that the Dublin Parliament met on January 22, 1795. In his Speech from the Throne Fitzwilliam, in keeping with his instructions not to raise the Catholic question, omitted reference to that important subject. He did say a good deal on the danger of invasion and "the present awful state of affairs," and expressed the hope that the ' 1~i ted strength of every description of subjects would be elicited in this time of travail." Fitzwilliam closed by citing his "cordial affec tion to the whole of Ireland."24 Henry Grattan in a brilliant speech laid down the general lines on which the new administration would proceed. He began by giving a lengthy and eloquent discourse· sup porting England in its struggle against republican France and pleaded for a union of all men of property against the dangers that menaced England, Ireland and the Continent.

2 4 Ir1sh· Parl1amentary· Dbe a t es, op. c1't • , XV , pp. 1 - 3 •

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In an effort to get Parliament to open up the purse strings, Grattan alluded to the danger which Fr•ance posed to Ireland: You know enough of the levels of Europe to forsee that that great ocean, that inundation, that dissolution of government, and that sea of arms, if it swells over the continent must visit our coast ••• Great Britain vulnerable in Flanders, vulnerable in Holland, is mortal here (in Ireland). Here will be the engines of war, the arsenal of the French artillery, the station of the French army, and through this wasted and disembowelled land will be poured the fiery contents of their artillery. 25 During the next few weeks the government's program emerged in specific measures--an increase in the militia, an appropriation for the navy, an act regulating the issue of public money, a new Dublin police bill, and a Catholic emancipation act.26 The support given government by the Irish Parliament certainly consisted of more than rhetoric. The combined force of regulars and militia was increased to more than 40,000 men. A vote of 20,000 pounds for the British navy, moved by Grattan, was adopted. An attempt was made to attach some strings to this grant of money. Laurence Parsons, an Independent, made a motion to have the House accompany the grant with a proviso for a reform of Parliament. Such a measure was anathema to the English Government. It would result in separating the Irish

25Ibid., pp. 4-11.

26Ibid., PP• 77-78, 98-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 legislature from the executive and render the government of Ireland totally impossible. British statesmen had always felt that for Irish affairs to run smoothly, the executive had to be guaranteed a permanent majority. This security could be achieved only through legislative union. Though Pitt favored Catholic emancipation in the abstract, he feared that should Catholics be allowed to utilize their powers to the full, their actions would highlight the anomalies of the representative system in Ireland and force a reform of the legislature. The fears of government proved ground less on this occasion since Parsons had practically no support in the House of Commons. The grant of money was passed, states Fitzwilliam, "without thought of stipulation, all subjects of bargain between the two countries as to this point being kept out of sight."27 The Catholic question was, however, rapidly surfacing. Fitzwilliam, in a letter to Portland, made reference a second time to the idea of a yeoman cavalry. This appeared to him the only possible means of ending the local outbreaks of violence plaguing the country. He cautioned that the plan should be deferred until Catholic emancipation was a fact, for should the measure fail to pass, "we must think twice before we put arms into the hands of men newly

27Fitzwilliam to Portland, January 31, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56).

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irritated.JJ28 Fitzwilliam felt that with his support the measure for Catholic relief would carry without serious opposition in Parliament or from the_Protestants at largeo In fact, John Fitzgibbon, the Irish Chancellor and the most vigorous opponent of Catholic emancipation, stated that if he (Fitzwilliam) gave his full support to the Catholic bill "there was no doubt of its being easily carried."29 Peti-

tions were pouring in from every level of society. Fitz- william had just received one from the pre-eminently Pro- testant Corporation of Londonderry expressing a desire to "see all of Ireland united in one interest.n30 The Prates-

tant gentry were frightened. They were ready to concede emancipation if only to deprive the United Irishmen of the potent weapon which Catholic grievances provided them in their struggle to turn the mass of people to revolutionary 1 aims.3 Even Cooke, certainly no friend of Catholic

2 eFitzwilliam to Portland, January 28, 1795, Ibid.

3°rbid. A contemporary estimated that over half a - million signatures in favor of emancipation were obtained. Dr. Hussey to Burke, February 19, 179.5, requoted in Lecky, op. cit., III, p. 285.

31The United Irishmen had made very little headway up until this time in attracting Catholics to their revolu tionary cause.

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emancipation, stated at this time, "I never saw an instance that Government could not carry a single measure, if there was no general opposition, and of that I see no probabi lity."32

Meanwhile the mails were being kept busy between Dublin and London.33 On January 8 Lord Fitzwilliam declared that agitation for Catholic emancipation was rampant throughout Ireland. He advised it would be absolutely impossible to prevent its being proposed in Parliament when the legisla ture convened on January 22. On January 15, as we have seen, he declared that he would acquiesce in complete emancipation unless he should be explicitly instructed to the contrary. The subject was not touched on in either of the Duke of Portland's letters prior to the second of February. On January 13 Portland sent an answer to Fitzwilliam's letter of the eighth.34 He informed him that the king agreed to a peerage for the dismissed Wolfe, but made no reference to the Catholic question. It took approximately

32 Cooke to Westmorland, January 23, 1795, (P.R.Ooi., Fane Papers).

33In order to understand the sequel it is necessary to pay close attention to the dates of the correspondence. Even under the strictest objectivity they will demonstrate on the part of the British Cabinet a lack of decisiveness regarding a critical situation, which is hard to comprehend.

34Portland to Fitzwilliam, January 13, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. l00/56)o

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three or four days at this time for a letter to travel from Dublin to London or vice-versa. Yet Fitzwilliam received no instructions, no intimation of what course to pursue regarding the vital question of Catholic emancipation, a measure which was certain to be the first order of business for the Irish Parliament when it opened its session. It was not until a month later, on February 9th, that the lord lieutenant received his first notification from Whitehall. By this time Parliament had been in session for three weeks; Catholic hopes were in a state of great excitement and petitions supporting Catholic emancipation were inundating the legislature. The logical con- elusion drawn by Fitzwilliam from this rather inexplicable silence was that the British Government was at least in tacit accord with his thinking regarding the expediency of permitting the emancipation bill to be introduced in Parliament.35

35Lecky holds that Fitzwilliam was absolutely right in following the line of action he chose, especially in view of the lack of instructions to the contrary from his super iors until long after Parliament had convened. Lecky, op. cit., III, pp. 288-89. I am indebted to Professor Thomas Mahoney for the information on this subject con tained in his book. Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 396-97. This interpretation went unchallenged, at least in the academic sphere until 1912, when J. Holland Rose published his Pitt and Napoleon: Letters and Essays (London: 1912), p. 31. In this fine work Holland declares: 11 Unfortunately owing to a stress of we~t~er a long delay occured in the despatch of the mails 1for.1 England; namely, from the lOth to the 23rd of January, a fact which fully explains the astounding neglect of duty of the Pitt ministry against

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 From February 2nd events began to move with rapidity. On that date Lord Milton received a letter from Wyndham mentioning Pitt's dissatisfaction with the news of Beres ford's removal. This letter was mentioned by Fitzwilliam to Portland and the viceroy found Pitt's attitude "very odd.n36 When Beresford's name had come up at a previous

which Lecky disclaims." Professor Rose bases his conclusion concerning the weather on a letter from John Beresford to Lord Auckland, dated January 19, 1795. (Beresford, op. cit., I, pp. 58- 59). Which version of the delay, Lecky 1s or Rose's is correct? It seems certain indeed that the weather was stormy during the period in question, although this cannot be officially certified. The files of the newspaper The Oracle, however, found in the National Maritime Museum-fn Greenwich, contain shipping news of the time. From its reports on the Irish mails it can be seen that no corres pondence from Dublin arrived in London until the 27th of January, when two came in, followed by nine more batches of mail on the 28th. So it appears the earliest date (under the circumstances) on which the Duke of Portland could have received Fitzwilliam's letter of the 15th of January was the 27th. Ordinarily it would have taken, at most four days and would have been received in London on the 18th or 19th; thus, the unfavorable weather caused a delay of only eight days. That Portland did receive Fitzwilliam's letter can be verified by a look at the Home Office files. The records show that John King, the Home·office Under Secretary, in a dispatch to Lord Milton, Chief Secretary to Lord Fitzwilliam, notified him that on January 27th he received his letters "dated the 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th." It is almost certain that Fitzwilliam's letter of the 15th to Portland was in the same mail. In retrospect it seems at most debatable whether Lecky's interpretation has been refuted by Professor Rose. Fitz william's action in allowing the Catholic emancipation bill to be introduced in Parliament appers understandable. He had no instructions from London to the contrary and his letter of the 8th informing Portland that Catholic emanci pation was a certainty had drawn no comment from the Home Secretary in his reply of the 13th. 36Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 3, 1795 (W.W.M.F5).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 meeting and Fitzwilliam said he had to be removed, Pitt had not raised the slightest objection; in fact, he had said nothing at all. Fitzwilliam had found the Prime Minister's attitude on this occasion very strange and had mentioned the incident to Portland. He now refreshed Portland's memory on the whole business.37 On February

5th Portland showed the king Fitzwilliam's correspondence announcing Grattan's proposals for admitting Catholics to the Irish Parliament and his own agreement with them. George III was flabbergasted.38 He was particularly opposed to the creation of a yeomen cavalry which would be nothing less than a "Roman Catholic police corps • 11 He said that Catholic eman cipation was 11 beyond the decision of any Cabinet of Minis

1 ters • ' Rather than acquiesce in this matter it would be better "to change the new administration in Ireland, if its

continuance depends on the success or this proposal.~39 Since his recovery from the illness which struck him in 1788, George IIIbad not taken as active a part in government as earlierjand that, for two reasons: first, he relt such confidence in Pitt after the Regency crisis and was so convinced that their views were essentially the same on nearly all important issues that he could leave

37Ibid.

38conversation reported in a letter to Pitt. February 6, 1795, Earl Stanhope, op. cit., II, pp. XXIII-XXV.

39Ibid.

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the detailed work to this trustworthy servant, and second, he wished to conserve his strength in order to prevent a repetition of the illness. Such a change of attitude, how ever, had not necessarily meant a significant constitutional change. In fact, George III's view of the constitutional monarchy did not change one iota. He still firmly believed in the right of the king to choose his own ministers and to veto bills passed by both houses of Parliament. In a memorandum of March 7, 1795 George III set forth his doubts and thoughts concerning complete Catholic eman cipation. The proposed bill for Catholic relief appeared to the king to be a direct violation of the Act of Charles II which forbade a person sitting in Parliament until he

had taken the oaths of a~legiance and supremacy and had subscribed to a declaration against popery. These terms were extended to Ireland by the Irish act of George III. It appeared further to the king that the-proposed measure would repeal the sections in the Declaration of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement which were expressly enacted to remain 11 the Law of the Realm for

11 ever ; also it would be a direct violation of the Act of Union with Scotland. Finally, George III felt that by the Coronation Oath an inviolable observation of these laws was made obligatory upon every sovereign of Great Britain. So decided a stand by the king undoubtedly played a significant part in the eventual dismissal of Lord

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Fitzwilliam. On February 9th Pitt wrote to Lord Fitzwilli!lrri repri manding him on the dismissal of Beresford and the treat ment accorded Wolfe and Toler. Pitt apprised him tha·t: "the change which has thus been announced, could never take effect but by a direct authority from hence. 11 4° The letter significantly said nothing about the Catholic question. He did close his letter with an apology "for interrupting his lordship's attention from the many .important considerations of a different nature to which all their minds ought to be directed.n41

By the same mail a letter arrived from Portland, dated the 8th of February. In it the Foreign Secretary finally expressed an opinion on the subject which for a whole month Lord Fitzwilliam had insisted was of the utmost importance. The Cabinet had met the day before (February 7th} to consider the question of Catholic emancipation, that is, admitting Catholics to the Irish Parliament. It was the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet, wrote Portland, that more informa tion was required on this vital question; pending this information Fitzwilliam was not to commit himself either by engagements or by encouraging language. Postponing the question, declared Portland, would be 11 the means of doing

4°Pitt to Fitzwilliam, February 9, 1795 (WoW.M.F5J.

41 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a greater service to the British Empire than it has been capable of receiving since the Revolution or, at least since the Union."42 Portland went on to state that the dismissal of Beresford created "a very considerable and unpleasant sensation amongst our best and most attached friends." Beresford had gone to London, he said, and complained to Pitt that he had been forced out of office, denied his pension and, instead of accepting his fate, as Fitzwilliam had indicated, was "the reverse of satisfied.n43

A few days later, not having as yet received Portland's letter of the eighth ordering him to hang fire on the Catholic question, Fitzwilliam sent off three letters to London in rapid succession. He implored the Foreign Min- ister to understand the urgency of the Catholic question and requested that the king be informed of the reasons which had impelled him to follow the course he had chosen in this matter. According to the plan which he had given Grattan permission to introduce, Catholics would be eligible for all offices which were not royal or ecclesiastical. Though he

42Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 8, 1795 (W.WoM.F5). See also H.M.C. Carlisle, op. cit., p. 717. This refer ence to the Union could be a freudian slip on the part of Portland. As we shall see, Fitzwilliam's friends claim this was the ultimate objective of Pitt and so both Fitz william and Catholic emancipation were expendable.

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considered himself "fully authorized11 to decide how the Catholic question should be handled, Fitzwilliam thought it was still possible to have the bill modified before it was introduced to the House of Commons.44

On the twelfth of February Henry Grattan proceeded to initiate th~easures which he believed he and his friends \ had agreed to with the British Cabinet.45 He obtained permission to bring in a bill which would repeal the police laws. The latter were particularly obnoxious to the people of Dublin. Next he obtained leave to introduce the Catholic emancipation bill; its opponents were able to muster only three votes against it. Catholics throughout all of Ireland were in an expectant mood.46

Fitzwilliam now received Pitt's letter of the ninth. The Viceroy was extremely irritated. He sent Pitt an immediate reply expressing shock and surprise at the Prime Minister's objection to Beresford's expulsion. After all,

he had been told this action was necessary and h~d offered no opposition. Beresford's power was so great, said Fitz- william, that he could seriously injure the government if

44Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 10, 12, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/56).

45 rrish Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., XV, pp. 97 et seq.

46see Dublin Journal, February 16, 1795; Northern Star, February 20, 1795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 he chose to oppose it. In these critical times one had to have subordinates on whom one could rely. Thus the dismissal would stand. Fitzwilliam then puts the issue squarely on the line: The question therefore lies with you. I shall send the official document for a new board of Revenue, without his (Beresford's ) name, & after the receipt of this, you will be prepared to decide between Mr. Beresford & me--that the matter has come to this issue is well known here ••• from the event therefore Ireland will form its judgment, which of the two possesses th~ confidence of the British Cabinet, He or I. 7 At the same time in a letter to Portland Fitzwilliam expressed amazement and regret that the Cabinet failed to see the urgency of the Catholic question. He refused point blank to delay the measure. "I will not be the person," announced Fitzwilliam, "to raise the flame in the country that nothing short of arms will keep down."48 The two angry letters of Fitzwilliam crossed two from the Duke of Portland, both written on the sixteenth of February. The first was marked "private" but could be shown if necessary • The second was for Fitzwilliam's eyes alone. It was clear from this correspondence that the British Cabinet was absolutely opposed to the measure which Irish Catholics, with real justification, had now come to believe was immin- ently obtainable. In the first letter Fitzwilliam was

47Fitzwilliam to Pitt, February 14, 1795 (W.W.M.F5).

48Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 14, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56).

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asked to send a complete report of the objections to, as well as the arguments for, Catholic emancipation. Also, the Cabinet would appreciate est.imates of the strength the Catholics were likely to attain in Parliament should they be admitted to that body.49 Portland confessed to see no need for a yeoman cavalry since the Irish Parliament had so generously voted money for no less than 40,000 soldiers and militia. Besides, he was mistrustful of'making concessions to the Catholics. This had been tried in the past and they were still dissatisfied. Perhaps, suggested Port- land, the establishment of Catholic seminaries might be a possible solution to Catholic discontent. If the government allowed Catholic priests to be trained in Ireland instead of going to France as they were now required to do, the results might prove beneficial. A provision might also be made for their parochial clergy. This would take a burden off the upper-class Catholics, while at the same time it would allow the clergy to escape from dependence on the masses. Portland felt that if this were done then thoughts of further concession (Catholic emancipation} could be dis missed. He was sure the Catholics would rally to their government in this time of crisis.50

49Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 16, 1795 (W.W.M. F3lf).

50ibid. The idea of offering the Irish Catholics seminaries as a substitute or sop for political emancipation

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In his second letter of the sixteenth, ':.the Foreign Minister went to great lengths to elaborate his reasons for opposing further concessions to the Catholics. Boiled down to their essentials they were simply a fear that the exist ing political and religious establishment might be destroyed. The superior number of Catholics, once the barrier of Pro- testant political monopoly was down, wouln give them power to overthrow both the parliamentary system and the monopoly of the Protestant Church of Ireland. The striking feature about the makeup of the Dublin House of Commons, continued Portland in a rather patronizing manner, was the number of boroughs in which the privilege of election was vested in 1 not more than twelve electors.5 This protected the Pro- testant Ascendancy. How long would this borough system be allowed to last, once the Catholics got into Parliament? The whole Protestant establishment would be in similar danger. No declarations, assurances or oaths would save a Protestant establishment once the dominant power in civil government fell into Catholic hands. Speculating further, Portland asked Fitzwilliam to envision hypothetically that

displays. a ·~trange na~.t~ on Portland's part. It also presages a change in Irish policy from what had hitherto been agreed upon by the English Whigs, foremost among whom was Portland.

51For an .exce.llent study of the Irish electoral system, see Johnston, op. cit., Part II, pp. 118-201.

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the Protestant Church's position in Ireland was taken over by the Roman Catholic Church. What would happen, he asked? "You may be assured the profession of the gospel would very shortly get into disrepute, that dissentions and confusion would succeed. 11 52 Portland next took aim at Fitzwilliam's pet scheme of a yeoman cavalry. Being chiefly composed of Catholics, it would place the real power of the country in the hands of the 11 enemies of the Church, 11 and the tithe system, which supported the established Church and which was so disliked by many Protestants (Ulster), would not last long.53

Despite the complexity of the Irish question and the resulting confusion in London and Dublin, Fitzwilliam was convinced that, given the present excited state of public opinion, repeal of all anti-Catholic laws was absolutely necessary to prevent a revolution. He made one last effort, in a lengthy communique, to convince the Cabinet that his assessment of the situation was more accurate than theirs. He declared the government apparently wished to delay the measure of Catholic emancipation in hopes of obtaining the legislative union which they had so long desired and which Lord Westmorland had told them could only be gained by

2 5 Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 16, 1795 (PoRoO. H.O. 100/56); (W.W.M. F3lf).

53 rbid.

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keeping the Protestants and Catholi~ divided. This policy, he warned, was "rash and ill-advised" and was more likely to lead to a union of Ireland and France than with England. He wasn't worried about the richer class of Catholics whose interest was the same as those of the Protestants. If a union was ever needed to protect private property they would be as eager for it as the wealthy Protestants. The danger from the upper class Catholics was that, if they become sufficiently irritated and frustrated, they might allow passion rather than cool self-interest guide their actions. As far as he could see, from his vantage point in Ireland, there was no danger of any serious Protestant resistance to the Catholic bill: I receive no remonstrance from Protestant Corp orate bodies ••• On the contrary, in the addresses presented me from the Protestant Corporations, particularly from Londonderry and Waterford, very different sentiments from those of jealousy and dissent are expressed. They mark approbation of the principle and do not hesitate to declare that it is called for by the exigencies of the times, and anticipate the happies~ consequences from its being carried into effect./4 Before this last appeal by Fitzwilliam was composed, the Cabinet had aiready determined the course of action they would follow. Portland fired off a letter to the Lord Lieutenant on February 18th the tone of which was extremely

54Fllitzwilliam to Portland, February 20, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 harsh. He expressed astonishment that Parliament, with the backing of the administration, had given permission for a Catholic relief bill to be introduced. He reprimanded Fitz william for allowing a measure of this importance to be initiated without first laying a draft of it before the Cabinet for their perusal. It was the wish of the: .ministers, said Portland, that the bill be held up until after the war with France was over. Portland closed his letter by order ing Fitzwilliam "in the plainest and most direct terms" to prevent the measure going any further.55 While Fitzwilliam was still smarting over-::.the tenor of this letter, Portland informed him, executing what he said was the "most painful task" he had ever assumed, that the true interest, I mean the cause of Government abstractly considered, requires that you should not continue to administer that of Ireland. Whatever may be the determination respecting the concessions of the Catholics, the ultimate fate of Mr. Beresford & or the Attorney Genl., or the designation of the Office destined. for Mr. Ponsonby, or any of the ques tions ••• there appears such a concurrence in the views, such a deference to the suggestions and wishes & such an acquiescence in the prejudices of Grattan & the Ponsonbys, that there seems to me no other way of nescuing you & English Govern ment from the annihilation, which is impending over it but by the distressful and af5gcting measure which I venture to propose •••

55Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 18, 1795 (P.R.O. H.O. 100/56). 56Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 21, 1795 (W.W.M. F3le).

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Fitzwilliam appeared to constitute a psychiatric problem to Portland, for the latter continued: Forgive me if I dwell so much on the state of your mind, but that is the very problem which __ has alarmed me. It is that which has created these serious apprehensions in mine, and in the minds of all your friends ••• I want you to get to some safe & dry spot from v:hence you may contemplate the flood, which was overwhelming you & see the inundation subside.57 He was afraid Fitzwilliam had fallen under the dominance

11 11 of Grattan and the Ponsonbys. Do you feel , wrote Portla.Ii.<;l, 11 the government of Ireland is really in your hands?" He warned Fitzwilliam against heeding the 11 siren call of popu larity" and advised him to reject its allurements. He told the Viceroy to choose the time and manner of his resignation and then, caught up in the emotion of the situation, warned Fitzwilliam somewhat melodramatically that 11 at this moment probably the existence of the civilized world is in your power and at your mercy." What hurt Fitzwilliam most was the information that Portland was the person who first suggested his recall and the only member of the Cabinet to maintain this position unequivoca~ly.58

The attitud~ of Portland and his followers on this critical occasion are most interesting. As we have seen they had accepted office under Pitt on the condition that

5?Ibid.--

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 Fitzwilliam received the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland and had threatened to resign when, in late 1794, the appoint ment was held up. The reasons why the Portland Whigs did not now support Lord Fitzwilliam with the threat of mass

resignation to this day ~emains something of a puzzle. One writer has offered three possible explanations for the be havior of Fitzwilliam's colleagues:59 the belief that Fitz william had not remained consistent to the policies agreed to before his departure for Ireland; a change in attitude by the Whigs towards additional concessions for Irish Catholics; and their agreement with Pitt that the collapse of the coalition at this critical time would be disastrous for England. Most likely all three influences played a part

in Portland's decision not to stand by his colle~gue. The first explanation was obviously not decisive in view of Portland's enthusiastic support for Fitzwilliam upon the viceroy's return to England. Pitt had written Fitzwilliam the same day and said he agreed with the Cabinet that the Catholic bill should not be allowedLto progress any further. In this regard he con curred entirely with the sentiments of the Duke of Portland. Pitt was very outspoken in his displeasure over the removal of Beresford and the other supporters of government.

59see Donald G. Barnes, Geerge III and William Pitt, 1783-1806 (Stanford: University Puess, 1939), p. 345.

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His sentiments on this ''came from a regard to the king 1 s service and to my own honour, however sincerely I lament the consequence (Fitzwilliam's dismissal) which must arise from the present situation.n60

Shortly thereafter Portland informed Fitzwilliam that the king wished him to rejoin the Cabinet when he returned to London. Apparently suffering pangs of conscience, Port- land said that if there were any recriminations he was the person they should be directed at. He was prepared, he told Fitzwilliam, "to make any expiation or atonement that can satisfy you," even if it meant quitting the Cabinet himself. "If my renounciation of the world will restore you·!:to the public service, God forbid that I should hesitate a moment or be base enough to deem it a sacrifice. 11 6l Strong words from a man who only a few days before had recommended Fitz- william's dismissal as Lord Lieutenant. Fitzwilliam wrote Portland on the twenty-fifth of February in a mood of de- pressed capitulation. He declared it was pointless to argue any further. Pitt had made his decision; he was recalled. The Viceroy would see to it all action on the Catholic bill was halted. Also, the project for the education of the clergy would be attended to and he would cooperate in every

60 Pitt to Fitzwilliam, February 21, 1795 (W.WoM.F3le}.

61Portland to Fitzwilliam, February 23, 1795 (W.W.M. F3lf). Fitzwilliam later refused a post in the Cabinet. Fitzwilliam to Grattan, April 25, 1795 (W.W.M.F5).

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other respect.62

A few days later Fitzwilliam requested that Portland assure the king of his continued devotion. He wanted the king to know that his only duty while Lord Lieutenant had been to care for the safety of his majesty's subjects in Ireland. He had done this to the best of his ability. Would Portland kindly arrange for an interview between his majesty and Fitzwilliam? He was positive that he would be able "to rest the whole account of it in so clear and irre- proachable a light ••• as to justify myself in his opinion and so wipe away whatever false and groundless insinuations have been charged upon me.rr63

Thus, the attempt by Fitzwilliam to steer a middle course between Irish radicalism, on the one hand, and the obsequious subservience to British opinion of the Ascen- dancy on the other, was brought to an abrupt end. What were the real reasons which compelled the Pitt government to adopt a course of action which they had been repeatedly warned would lead to disaster? The subject, like so many others in Anglo-Irish political history is shrouded in mys- tery and controversy. Fitzwilliam was convinced that the Catholic question had very little, if indeed anything, to do with his dismissal.

62Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 25, 1795 (PoRoOo H.O. 100/56) o

63Fitzwilliam to Portland, February 28, 1795 (P.R.Oo H.O. 100/56).

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The change of front of the Pitt Cabinet and Fitzwilliam's

recall were due, he believed, sole~y to the influence which John Beresford and his English friends (Westmorland, Buck ingham, and Auckland) exercised over Pitt. 11 Let my friends no longer suffer the Catholic question to be mentioned," said Fitzwilliam, "as entering in the most distant degree into the cause of my recall ••• Had Mr. Beresford never been dismissed ••• I should have remained. 11 64 George Ponsonby, speaking before the Dublin Parliament qnnounced that the Catholic question had no more to do with the recall 11 than Lord Macartney's embassy to China.n This was "just the most popular pretext for the measure. 11 65 There certainly appears to be sufficient evidence to lend the charge some semblance of truth. And yet, Fitz-

william told ~dmund Burke that his dismissal was due principally.to Pitt who had pressured the lord lieutenant's friends in the Cabinet to desert him. Pitt was 11 indifferent as to the ground ••• he decided on my removal with or without cause.?66 This opinion of Fitzwilliam's was sup-

6~.M.C. Carlisle, op. cit., p. 719. 6 5rrish Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., XV, p. 175. This was particularly unfortunate for the recall of Fitz william was generally attributed throughout Ireland to his advocacy of the Catholic claims. The event produced an enormous revulsion of public feeling against British rule and led to the most appalling calamities. These will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 66 Fitzwilliam to Burke, March 21, 1795 (copy in W.W.M.F5J.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 ported by Henry Grattan who told Burke that Pitt, not Beresford or the Catholic question, was responsible for the viceroy's dismissal.67 The Catholic question, however, which is closely connected with the patronage issue, was very important. Although he did not actively push Catholic emancipation as a government bill, Fitzwilliam did very little to disuade the Irish Whigs from pursuing an aggressive course of action in this regard. When word was received in London that the viceroy was at least giving personal encouragement to the hope for further Catholic concessions the reaction was one of great concern. The Prime Minister

felt Fitzwilliam was not adhering to~~the spirit of the understanding arrived at in December before the latter's leave for Ireland. The King agreed with this sentiment and wrote to Pitt that "I wish also to mention the great change that seems coming forward in Ireland without the smallest attention to what was understood on the depar ture of Lord Fitzwilliam."68 While it is apparent that

67see Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 195. 68 George III to Pitt, January 29, 1795. Requoted in J. H. Rose, Pitt and Napoleon, p. 236.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 George III most likely was making reference to the dis missal of Beresford and the other Castle officials, he was very quickly to show even greater anger over the Catholic emancipation bill. Pitt certainly did not ignore the Catholic question and his correspondence of February 21 to the Viceroy stated that he concurred with the Cabinet that the Catholic bill should be pushed no further. Yet Pitt could afford to give scant attention to Irish affairs being occupied with the many responsibilities of conducting a European war. He probably realized he had conceded too much power to the Whigs and now wished to circumscribe their policy. Pitt had become convinced that the ideal, indeed the only, solution to the Irish problem was a legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland. Once this was done Catholic emancipation would. follow almost as a matter of course. The dismissal of Lord Fitzwilliam appears to have come about at least partly because of his sacking of Beresford, Wolfe, Toler and other supporters of Pitt's government. Grattan recorded a letter he· received at this time from one of Pitt's confidants, Lord Loughborough, the British Chancellor, This letter is principally devoted to the sub-

;.I,, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 ject of Beresford's dismissa1. 69 What is not said is more interesting than what is. Catholic emancipation is not men tioned. Grattan quotes Edmund Burke as saying that "a

certain family cabal are in the sole p~ession of the ear of government." In a rather interesting letter to the Duke of Portland, Henry Pelham, Chief Secretary to Lord Fitzwilliam's successor, spoke of the unpopularity of the Beresford clique and stated: ·If any sacrifices are necessary which you know I never admit a priori in politics, Pitt must submit .to Beresford's removal. I am sorry to say ••• that Pitt seems more animated about men on this occasion than he ought to be; I am by ~~r::~;d~,aisfied with his conduct about .

It is not too difficult to understand Pitt's thinking in regard to the Fitzwilliam administration. The Prime Minis ter was in daily contact with the two previous Lord Lieutenants. Both these men were bitterly resentful towards Fitzwilliam and hostile to his ideas concerning Ireland. They must have had a good deal of influence on Pitt's thinking. regarding Irish questions. On the other hand, Fitzwilliam had gone to Ireland,

69 Grattan, op. cit., IV, pp. 197-98. 70 Pelham to Portland, March 22; 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rather naively, with powers ill-defined and the inevitable misunderstandings came about. Fitzwilliam had intended to end the shocking mismanagement of Ireland first by ridding the administration of people like Fitzgibbon and Beresford, men 11 who had been described to me for years back, as the bane of good government in Ireland. 11 71 However, he agreed to accept Pitt's dictum that Fitzgibbon remain and that therewere to be no wholesale removals. The Viceroy did believe, though, that he had the tacit approval of the Prime Minister to dismiss Beresford. Within two days of

his arrival in Ireland he had removed th~ official and proposed several other changes in personnel. Immediately the Ascendancy entreated Pitt to protect those officials who had served under the preceding Lord Lieutenant. These appeals were accompanied by dire predictions of what Lord Fitzwilliam's actions would do to British government in Ireland. Pitt was warned that should the Ponsonbys and Grattan gain control of patronage in Ireland and subsequently liberalize British rule through a reform of Parliament, then the entire edifice of English government, as Pitt knew it, would be demolished, along with his cherished legislative union. As for the "Irish clique, 11 even the mast generous

71 Fitzwilliam to Burke, March 4, 1795 (PoR.O.HoOo 100/57).

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treatment of their motives leaves one with the feeling that Burke's assessment of them is probably quite accurate. He said their sole object in holding office was 11 to derive security to their own jobbish power. 11 72 As for the dis-

missal of Fitzwilliam, to them 11 the Catholic question is a mere pretense. 11 73

While in the minds of the ministers, the Catholic question played only a secondary part in the dismissal of Lord Fitzwilliam, it is likely the king's opposition to the measure certainly carried a great deal of weight with Pitt. The king was vehemently opposed to Catholic emancipation under any circumstances. John Fitzgibbon wrote an elaborate legal memorandum which maintained the king would vio- late his cor.onationcoath if he consented to a measure which allowed Catholics to sit in Parliament. George III

had written a lengthy letter to Pitt on Februa~ 6, 1795, outlining his hostility to Catholic emancipation and stating that the fact Catholic emancipation was even contemplated was proof positive the Ascendancy had been right all along in opposing concessions to the Catholics.74 It thus

72Requoted in Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 204.

73rbid.

74Quoted in tecky, op. cit., III, pp. 306-307. Ironically the king's hostility to Catholic emancipation caused Pitt's own downfall when he proposed that measure in 1801, the year following the act of union between England and Ireland.

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appears quite probabl~ that even had the Catholic emanci pation bill passed, the king would have vetoed it. Lord Fitzwilliam, writing to Burke shortly after his dismissal, said, "I have been abandoned, deserted and denied by those to whose earnest solicitations I yielded my opinion and embarked on their desire in the present government. 11 75

Whatever the reasons for t4e recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, the defeat of Catholic emancipation, and the vote of confi dence given the Ascendancy, the aftermath was to be parti cularly detrimental to British rule in Ireland and the event marks a most important turning point in the history of Ireland.

75Fi tzwilliam to Burke, Marc:h 4, 1795, copy in (WoW .M. F5).

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THE AFTERMATH

At first, the news of Lord Fitzwilliam's recall was received with stunned disbelief in Ireland. Lady Ann Roden wrote to one of Dublin's social lights, "the events relating to the Government are so surprising and so un- accountable that it seems as if one was dreaming ••• it is a strange business altogether."l Disbelief soon gave way to outright consternation among the people as it became apparent that the rumored dismissal was indeed a fact. The unwelcomed news was quickly followed by dire predic tions that "Ireland faced the most awful and alarming crisis she had ever known." 2 In view of future events, this proved to be a prophetic remark. Indeed, so mena cing were the signs of public outrage that Fitzwilliam, who was now understandably anxious to leave Ireland, was prevailed upon by the beleagured government officials to stay on a while. He was told that the government would

1Lady Anne Roden to Harriet Skeffington, March 7, 1795 (Masserene-Foster Papers, Public Record Office, Northern Ireland), Hereafter referred to as Masserene Foster Papers.

2speech of Sir Laurence Parsons, February 26, 1795, Irish Parliamentary Debates, XV, op. cit., p. 133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 not be safe in the hands of the designated Lords Justices until his successor arrived.3

Not everyone, of course, was displeased at what had ;occurred. . During the whole Fitzwilliam episode the Irish radicals cautiously and critically viewed the man- euvers of the Whigs, ready to support or push their cause as circumstances might require. The Northern Star, chief organ of the Society of United Irishmen, had from the start cautioned its readers to await the results of the new administration of Lord Fitzwilliam, and to hold any praise in abeyance. Only time would tell whether the change had been one of men or measures. A few months later the paper made as much capital as possible out of

the British government 1 s behavior in recalling Fit zwilli·am and cautioned against effusive and uncritical praise for Henry Grattan. It was only a few weeks since Grattan

had given unqualified support for a~ unjust war, while evading the important issue of Parliamentary reform. No doubt he was a good man, but on more than one occasion he had voted against the interest and desires of what the Northern Star called the Irish people. Yet he was with the liberals on the question of Catholic emancipation and

)Fitzwilliam to Portland, March 7, 1795 (P.R.OoH.O. 100/56).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 events might finally have convinced him that Ireland's only salvation lay in a reform of Parliament. The article concluded with the advice that a sound policy would include cooperation with Grattan while holding back from unlimited confidence in him.4 Thomas A. Emmet, leader of the Irish radicals at this time states: The active republicans and new United Irish men were not sorry that the fallacy of ill founded political hopes had been so speedily exposed, and they rejoiced that the agitatfuon and controversies which were springing up would so entirely engross the attention of their opulent, interested, and ambitious ad versaries, as that they and their proceedings would pass unnoticed. They well knew, that in the midst of disputes for power, places and emoluments, neither the great nor their con nections would condesce~d to bestow a thought upon despised malcontents, or the advances of an obscure system. They therefore, not unwill ingly, assisted in keeping the attention of government, and of the higher ranks, occupied with party contests; and even themselves yielded to that indignation, which disinterested spec tators naturally feel, at the commission of perfidy and injustice.5 Most people, however, were sincerely shocked. Pro- testations poured into the Irish Parliament from every section of the country requesting that the government

4Northern Star, January 15, 16; March 19, 1795.

5Emmet, op. cit., p. 128.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 reconsider the dismissal of Fitzwilliam.6 As word of Fitz- william's recall gained wider currency, the mood of the people grew progressively uglier. By the end of February, Dublin was the scene of increasing disorder. On the twenty- ninth of that month the Catholics of the capital staged a mammoth protest meeting which was attended by over ten thousand persons. The rally was a tumultuous affair, by the time it had ended a petition to King George was drawn up urging Catholic emancipation and the continuance of Lord Fitzwilliam in office. The address was dispatched to London via a committee of delegates. The secretary of the delegation was the radical Wolfe Tone, "wh.ose inten tions with regard to France were a matter of public know ledge."7 Tone's appointment could be regarded as a subtle warning to the king and his cabinet that Catholic loyalty to Britain had its limitations. At least some of the British officials viewed it in this light. Chief Secretary Pelham wrote to London that he had received "very alarming reports" of the proceedings of the Catholic Committee. A select and secret group, entrusted with great

6seven cities and towns and nine counties published addresses regretting Fitzwilliam's recall. The Belfast Newsletter reported so many addresses of regret had come 1n that 1t would be impossible to insert them all. March 27, 1795. 7Emmet, op. cit., p. 129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 powers, was forming and they were to be bound by an oath of secrecy and perserverance. He continued: It is said that upon the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, they (the Catholic Committee) are led to despair of anything effectual without the assistance of the French and it is seriously in their contemplation to send an embassy to Paris, if the Catholic question shQuld be lost in the Irish Parliament.~

Similar Catholic protest meetings like that of February 29 were staged throughout Ireland. Regrets over the dis missal came from Protestant meetings as well. On March 4, at a town meeting of the inhabitants of Belfast, the Pres- byterian stronghold, it was resolved to prepare and pre sent to Lord Fitzwilliam an address. In the course of this message it was stated that tl1ey regarded his departure as a day of national mourning.9 The Protestant merchants and traders of Dublin, headed by Abraham Wilkinson, governor of the Bank of Ireland, expressed their sorrow and consternation at the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam and stated their willingness to see the removal of all remaining Catholic disabilities. None of these expressions of public sentiment had the least effect on the policy of the British government. The

8 Pelham to Portland, March 30, 1795 (British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 33,113). Hereafter referred to as B.M.ADD.MS.

9Belfast Newsletter, March 6, 1795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 delegation of the Catholic Committee was received politely in London by the King and the Duke of Portland. However, they received little satisfaction. Fitzwilliam left Dublin on the twenty-fifth of March. As a gesture of sympathy, his coach was drawn by some of the citizens to the harbor through an enormous crowd esti mated to be over one hundred thousand.lO The city itself was in a state of mourning and all the shops were closed. In fact, no public business of any kind was transacted.11 One newspaper stated that "yesterday will be remembered as the most ominous and fatal to the interest of Ireland that has ever occurred within the present century."l2 Another

journal had earlier expressed regret at even the rumor of Lord Fitzwilliam's recall. It cited such action as "one of the most impolitic measures that has ever been imagined.nl3

0 L Northern Star, March 27, 1795. Ironically this same ship deposited Beresford back in D~blin from his endeavors in London. 11 Pelham told the Duke of York that only the extra- ordinary appearance of military force kept the town or Dublin quiet on the day of Fitzwilliam's departure. March, N.D. (B.M. ADD.MS 33,113). 12 Northern Star, March 27, 1795. 13 Belfast Newsletter, March 2, 1795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. '!'he Earl of Camden, the new viceroy, arrived in Dublin in early April. He was greeted by wholesale riot ing and only the arrival of troops saved the lord lieutenant and his officials from serious danger.l4 Fitzgibbon, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, was almost equally unpopular. He was a very able and dedicated official, but he represented the most bigoted section of the ascendancy. He had supported Pitt on the Regency question, he was opposed to Parliamentary reform, an~e hated even the idea of making concessions to the Catholics. On the day of the

new viceroy 1 s arrival he too was attacked by the mob. The

following account of the a!'fair was published by his siste~, Mrs. Je!'!'ereys of Blarney Castle, County Cork, some years after the Union: On the day Lord Fitzwilliam was recalled, when my brother (as Lord Chancellor) was returning from the Castle, after having assisted at the swearing-in of the newly arrived Lord-Lieutenant, a ferocious mob of no less than 6000 men, and several hundred women, assembled together in College Green, and all along the avenue leading to my brother's house (6 Ely Place). The male part of the insurgents were armed with pistols, cutlasses, sledges, saws, crowbars, and ·every other weapon necessary to break open my brother's house; and the women were all of them armed with their aprons full of paving-stones. Tnis ferocious and numerous mob began to throw stones into my brother's coach, at his coachman's head, and his horses; they wounded my brother in the temple, in College Green; and if he had not sheltered

~4lbid., April 6, 1795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 himself by holding his great square official purse before him, he would have been stoned to death before he arrived (through the back yard) at his own house; where, with several smithy sledges, they were working hard to break into his hall door, while some others of them had ropes ready to fix up to his lamp i~on1~ hang him the moment they could find h1m.

The Catholics df Dublin met on· April 9 to hear the report of their delegation following their futile trip to London. The principal speakers were John Keogh, a Dr. Ryan and Dr. MacNeven, all prominent United Irishmen. The resolutions passed at this meeting indicate a new awareness on the part of the middle-class Catholics brought about by the exposure of the fallacy of their political hopes, commented on by Thomas Emmet and cited above. The Cath olics unanimously thanked Wolfe Tone for his many impor tant services. They then stated: We fieriive '.·consolation under the loss which we have sustained by the removal of the late popular administration, in contemplating the rising spirit of harmony and co-operation among all sects and descriptions of Irishmen, so rapidly accelerated by that event; and we do earnestly recommend to the Catholics of Ireland to cultivate by all possible means, the friendship and affection of their Protes tant bretheren; satisfied as we are that national union is nati.onal strength, happi ness and prosperity.lb

~ 6 Emmet, _o.P~·---c_i_t., p. 130.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This stress on friendship with the Protestants and on the value of national solidarity has the air of a warning. The words might have come from the address of the United Irishmen. Another resolution referred to the rumor that repeal of the remaining 11 popery laws 11 might be reserved as a bait to win Catholic support for a legislative union with England. Regarding this the meeting was unanimous in adopting the following resolution: That we are sincerely and unalterably attached to the rights, liberties and inde pendence of our own country; and we pledge ourselves, collectively, and individually, to resist even our own emancipation, if pro posed to be conceded upon the ignominious terms of an acquiescence in the fatal mea sures of a union with tresister kingdom,l7 Another incident occurred that day and deserves mention since it was peculiarly characteristic of the public sentiment. It was the custom of the University of Dublin to present a solemn address of Congratulation to every new viceroy and April 9, 1795 was the day appointed for pre- senting the address to Lord Camden. The practice was for the Provost, Fellows and Scholars of Trinity College to walk in procession, bearing their address, from the institution to the Castle, and they assembled and left the college as usual. Upon reaching the Castle, however, the scholars gave three groans and departed, leaving the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 college officials to make what appearance they could before the lord lieutenant.l8 Meanwhile, Fitzwilliam had returned to England and demanded a private audience with the king. He received his meeting with George III at which, following Burke's instructions, he left a memorandum justifying his conduct as Lord Lieutenant and emphasizing that he had been a "cordial, communicative and practical fellow servant." Fitzwilliam said that the king appeared rather impressed at his presentation and was cordial to him, but refused to express an opinion one way or the other.19 While coming out of this meeting with the king Fitz- william bumped into Windham and Spencer, apparently wait- ing their turn to see George III. "The former , " wrote Fitzwilliam somewhat pompously, "came up to me with an open

countenance. ~ received him with decent openness. He is the only one who deserves the least amount of candour ••• As for Lord Spencer, shame was upon his countenance and I did nothing to wipe it off. It was in its proper place."20 Regarding his other former colleague, Fitzwilliam stated, "Yesterday

18Dublin Journal, April 12, 1795. l9Interview related in letter to Grattan, April 25, 1795 (W.W.M.F5). George III was not impressed at all.

20Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 I saw for the first time the Duke of Portland. We passed with the coldest bow. Lord Grenville does not deign to lay his eyes upon me and mine do not seek his •1121

At the suggestion of Edmund Burke, Fitzwilliam had the question of his dismissal raised in Parliament. When he challenged the government ministers to defend their charges against him, he was told that it was the preroga tive of the Crown to dismiss ministers without reason if it wished.22 The refusal of Parliament to take up his dismissal led Fitzwilliam to present his case in two lengthy justificatory letters to his friend, Lord Carlisle.23 The letters have been alluded to throughout this paper. Re- duced to its bare essentials, Fitzwilliam stated the case as follows: That the Catholic emancipation·question nentered for nothing into the real cause of my recall"; and that from the outset he had conducted his administration "in perfect harmony with the original outline 11 agreed to by the ministers before he left to assume his duties as viceroy. These two letters found their way into print and caused quite a bit of excitement.

21Ibid. 22 Debate reported in letter to Burke, May 10, 1795, copy in .,(W .w .M.F5). 2 3see H.M.Co Carlisle, op. cit., pp. 704-713; 713- 722.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 One outgrowth of the publication of the letters to Lord Carlisle was an incident that even had its comical aspects. Beresford had been angered by a passage in the first letter in which Fitzwilliam states he had fired Beresford for 11 malversation in office." Beresford promptly challenged Fitzwilliam to a duel. The incident actually reached the field of honor at Paddington. They were about to exchange shots when the rather mysterious but fortuitous arrival of the police put an end to the affair. Both parties appeared relieved and Fitzwilliam now felt able to apologize and the incident was closed.24

While the matter may very well have been settled between Fitzwilliam and Beresford, the British government was faced with the very real threat of armed rebellion in Ireland resulting at least partly from the ignominious "dishing" of the man the Catholics had come to regard as their political savior. The affair ended in London, it is true, without disrupting the coalition with the Portland Whigs,and, it would appear, without serious loss of face on the part ·of the government. The effect in Ireland,

24Beresford Correspondence II, op. cit., pp. 114-119. Fitzwilliam, in writing to Beresford prior to their meeting at Paddington, denied that the letters in question were printed with his knowledge or consent. This does not appear to be the case, however, since Fitzgibbon states that the clerks employed in Dublin Castle were authorized by Fitzwilliam to ':make up a supply of the letters. See Beresford Correspondence, II, pp. 88, 113.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 however, proved to be much more serious. The influence on Anglo-Irish relations was tragic in the extreme. One of the lamentable aspects of British policy toward Ireland was the persistent and deliberate utilization of the animosities between Protestants and Catholics. This spirit of mutual hatred was gradually disappearing. The relations between the London Government and the Catholics steadily improved throughout the eighteenth century. The penal laws had for the most part been allowed to lapse even before formal abolishment and the British ministers, particularly under William Pitt, had endeavored to use their influence on the side of the Catholics. On the accession of Lord Camden, however, a most unfortunate change appears to have taken place. He was sent over as lord lieutenant to reconcile the incompa tible factions, to assuage the ruffled Protestants and to propitiate the disappointed Catholics. The British Cabinet, though, was now determined to resist the emanci pation of the Catholics, contrary to the outspoken wishes of the Irish Protestants. Therefore, it instructed its representatives in Ireland to excite anti-Catholic feelings and to use its great influence to organize an Irish party of resistance.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 The "secret" instructions to the new viceroy, Lord Camden, clearly indicate this aim. The policy which Lord Fitzwilliam should have pursued, states Portland, was to prevent, if possible, the agitation of the Catholic ques tion. Failing this, he was to collect the opinions of all parties on the subject for the information of the Cabinet, and to await their decision before he took any definite action. "Although the business is far from being in the same state, the outline which I have to mark out for your lordship's conduct must be the same, as nearly

as circumstances will ad.mit."25 Portland went on that it

was now impossible to prevent the Catholic emancipation question from being brought to a vote, but Camden should do everything possible to convince the "important people" of Dublin that the concessions envisioned -in the bill would be detrimental to the Protestant establishment.26

The Lord Lieutenant must do his utmost to organize Pro- testant resistance against the contemplated concessions.

2 5Portland to Camden, March 26, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57). 26 The Ascendancy party was not asleep and they had carried this same argument personally to George III. "Let ters have been written by Ld. Fitzgibbon to the king ••• with more effect than could be wished to prejudice his mind and to alarm his conscience against the concessions to the Catholics." Portland to Pelham, March 21, 179.5, "Secret" (B.M.ADD.MS. 33, 101, fl.59).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 Camden was to assure the Protestants that if they coop erated the government was prepared nto take any action necessary to prevent the admission of Catholics to seats in tbe legislature. n27 In the existing tense state of Ireland such instructions made certain a renewal of bitter religious warfare. While the Society of United Irishmen was doing everything in its power to minimize the distinction between Protes- tant and Catholic, albeit for their own personal aims, the government was endeavoring to make that distinction indel- ible and to inflame Protestant jealousies. While he was instructed to assume the lead of the Protestant interests and to pursue a policy of uncompromising resistance to Catholic emancipation, Camden was also told to conciliate the Catholics, as far as possible, given the main objective of his course. This could be done, suggested Port- land, by executing the measures already suggested to Lord Fitzwilliam.28 These proposals were the establi~hment of a seminary to educate Irish priests and a provision for the maintenance of the parish clergy which would lessen their dependence on the lower classes. It was decided that there would be no Speech from the

27 Portland to Camden, March 25, 1795 (P.R.O.HoOo 100/57). 28 --Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10]/102 Throne by the new viceroy. Also, no explanation was to be given of the passage from the confidential letter cited by Fitzwilliam, which was generally held as pointing to a union between England and Ireland. The silence of Portland on this subject would seem to indicate that this interpretation was a valid one. The first few letters of the new Lord Lieutenant and his Chief Secretary indicate that they were fully cognizant of the precariousness of the job they had undertaken. 1'The quiet of the country depends upon the exertions of the friends of the estab lished government, backed by a strong military force. 11 Also, ni confess I am more alarmed at the general want of attachment to government than to any consequences that may arise from any violent or bigoted attachment to reli gious opinionso 11 And again, "all will be quiet if there is no invasion, and if troops are immediately sent." The rejection of the Catholic bill, they felt, could be ob tained and the better Catholics had no wish to embarass the administration. The danger would come principally from "the correspondences which persons of another description have established throughout the whole country. These per sons are connected with, and directed by, the Society of United Irishmen, who to promote their own views, have chosen that Catholic emancipation ••• should become the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 watchword of their party."29

It was in this atmosphere that Parliament convened on April 13. On the twenty-first Henry Grattan moved for a Committee on the State of the Nation, and a debate ensued, in which the whole question of the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam was discussed, as well as whether bo adopt or reject the various measures of his administration. These comprised a measure for relieving the poorest classes from the hearth tax, an attempt to diminish drunkeness by increasing the duties on liquor and removing them on beer, a plan of education, a measure to equalize trade between England and Ireland, and a more stringent regulation of public expenditures.30 The bills for regulating the treasury, the alteration of the police laws, and the regulations restraining the abuses of spiritous liquors were all allowed to pass and take effect. The project to equalize the commercial duties between the two countries was evaded by adjournment. The persistent Grattan brought forward the Catholic bill which Lord Fitzwilliam had supported and which was

29 camden to Portland, April 6, 7; Pelham to Portland, April 6, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

3°Irish Parliamentary Debates XV, op. cit., pp. 165- 192.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 the ostensible reason for his recall. The new Lord Lieutenant was well prepared to defeat it when the debate took place on May 4. Grattan called upon all his abilities of oratory and argumentative power. His con- eluding speech had such an electrifying effect that the House galleries burst into uncontrollable applause, and the galleries had to be cleared.31 The effect of his oratory, however, had no appreciable influence on the vote. Grattan and his supporters were defeated 158 to

84;32 a disparity that invites conjecture as to what the number would have been if Lord Fitzwilliam had continued as chief governor.

The ~ragic consequences that would inevitably follow the rejection of the Catholic bill were predicted by one supporter, George Knox: If we drive the rich Catholic. from the legislature and from our society, we force him to attach himself to the needy and dissafected ••• Take then your choice; re enact your penal laws, risk a rebellion, separation, and Union ••• the hour is already come when we ought to decide ••• We shall admit the Catholic, I forsee it well. But we shall withhold that admission so long, that at length we shall give without genero sity that which will be received without

3lEmmet, op. cit., pp. 135-36.

32Irish Parliamentary Debates XV, op. cit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 gratitude; we shall yield not to reason but to clamour •• oand that day which shall record the last triumph of the Constitution will be to us a day of humiliation and dis grace.33

There were others who were more sanguine. 11 I have no apprehension that the rejection of Catholic emancipation will be attended without any bad consequences,'' stated one of Lord Westmorland's correspondents. 11 Depend upon it, it will not ••• there will be no rebellion. ''34 History would show which was the more realistic appraisal. Another question relating to the Catholics was still in agitation--the establishment of an ecclesiastical seminary at Maynooth. Some such institution was badly needed because those seminaries on the c·ontinent where Irish priests had been trained were almost all destroyed by the French Revolution. It was the hope of the British govern ment that the creation of such an institution in Ireland might result in diminishing the anti-British prejudices. Dr. Thomas Hussey had been sent over to Ireland by the British Cabinet to prepare and supervise a plan for educa- ting the Catholic clergy and a proposal was accordingly

33Ibid., pp. 251-259.

34John Pollock to Lord Westmorland, April 15, 1795, (P.R.O.Io Fane Papers}.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 submitted to the Irish Parliament.35 The bill had the strong support of the Catholic bishops. A long petition was nevertheless presented against it by a number of Catholic laymen, ?n whose behalf Henry Grattan acted as spokesman. The petition need not be stated in detail. Essentially its objection to the Maynooth project was as follows: in the college which the proposed bill would establish, trustees different from the professors were empowered to regulate the course of education and also to appoint professors and scholars on the foundation, without any kind of examination into their merits or qualifications. Also, the plan, as far as it operated, obstructed the education of Catholics and Protestants to- gather. This would, the opponents said, perpetuate a line of separation which the interest of the country required abolished.36 While such arguments might be worthy of attention, they were entirely disregarded by Parliament and the bill was adopted without alteration- almost without discussion or debate.37 According to a

35A copy of the bill was sent by Camden to Portland, April 14, 1795 (P.R.O.H.Oo 100/57).

36see Irish Parliamentary Debates, XV, op. cit., pp. 201-3.

37Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 letter by Dr. Hussey, who was appointed first President of the Catholic college, the bill provided eight thousand pounds a year for maintenance of the institution. The college was to be free from control of any party or patron age and the Board of Trustees was composed of four Law Officers of State, six Catholic laymen and eleven Catholic bishops.38 Despite the good intentions of the England ministers, Maynooth college did not produce the expected reduction of anti-British feeling.39 The Catholic question appears by the spring of 1795 to have just about lost any real importance it may have held in the eyes of the Irish Parliament. It is difficult to· say with absolute certainty if the calamities which are the chief elements of subsequent Irish history, culminating in the bloody rebellion of 1798, could have been averted by removing all Catholic disqualifications. Certainly most Irish Protestants wished to see it done. The rela- tiona between the two religious groups that were to be con - .vulsed by the uprising of 1798 were growing progressively

38Dr. Hussey to Lord Fitzwilliam, May 4, 1795 (W.W.M. F5). Camden wrote to Portland that the superintendance of the seminary was to be under the real control of the Pro testants. April 14, 1795 (P.R.~.H.O. 100/57).

39see Denis MeEhan, Windows on Maynooth (Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds, Ltd., 1949).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108

better. The country ha~ been without a clash of arms for over a century. However, it appears most unlikely that any permanent solution would have been, ·possible unless amelio ration of religious disabilities had been accompanied by a moderate reform of the parliamentary structure and also a lessening of the burden of the tithe system. And so, the actual train of cause and effect is evident and one can state positively that the pussillanimous and contra

dictory government policy of the cri~ical years from 1795 was a significant factor in the uprising of 1798 and the calamitous consequences which followed it. If the defeat of the Catholic emancipation bill had left the country in doubt as to what the new government policy would be, that doubt was dispelled by one of the first acts of Lord Fitzwilliam's successor. Camden singled out for special recognition the man who, more than any other, was conspicuous for his implacable hostility to reform and Catholic relief--John Fitzgibbon. Without doubt: Fitzgibbon was one of the most talented men in the Irish government. An able public servant, sincerely honest, he nonetheless viewed Catholic emancipation as incompatible with. the maintenance of British rule in Ireland. His career had prospered amazingly in the previous

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 few years.40 He had been made chancellor in 1789, prin cipally as a reward for his stand in the Regency crisis. In 1793, after his spirited fight against Catholic emanci pation, he had been created a viscount. Now having played a vital role in the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, he was made Earl of Clare. The Lord Lieutenant, in recommending his promotion, cited as the government's chief reason the need to support and solidify the anti-Catholic party. No act would do more to encourage those who were opposed to emanci pation. This would certainly convince them the government was steadfastly behind them.41 The significance of the pro motion was not lost on the Catholics or Protestant reformers. Once again the government showed the kind of man it placed confidence in. Ireland was now rapidly plunging into a state of utter moral and political disorganization. Discontent was rampant through every class of Irishman. The Society of United Irishmen, whose meetings had been repressed in 1794, now discovered new vitality following the recall of Lord Fitz william. They reconstructed their society in 1795 along new lines and they now became distinctly republican and treasonable. For the first time they began to plan

40see Faulkiner, op. cit., pp. 101-154.

41camden to Portland, May 4, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 seriously for a general uprising against the government and to count on support from the French. The vehicle for carrying through this revolution was a most elaborate organization based on numerous lodges and hierarchy of committees with a directory at the top. The practice was to elect a captain for every sixty members and a colonel for every six hundred. The colonels in each county formed a military committee with power to nominate an adjutant-general who was appointed by the National Directory and whose duty was to act as liaison officer between his county area and the central executive.42 The subordination of all other considerations to the idea of a successful revolution made the leaders of this organization see the necessity of bringing in the great mass of Catholic peasants, whose overriding interest, however, was not in political democracy but in the abolition of the tithe. Therefore, the United Irishmen attempted to take over the Defender movement.43

Defenderism was the product of long-standing economic grievances of Catholic peasants. It represented the blind resistance of the peasantry to the misery which they had suffered throughout the eighteenth century. Although

4 2see Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 234-239; Emmet, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

43~.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 111 primarily economic, religion did enter into it. When resorting to retaliatory violence, the peasants most often destroyed the homes and property of Protestants. As its name indicated it was intended as a protective asso ciation but upon occasion its members forgot this. Since this attitude of the Defenders was so diametrically opposed to that expressed by the United Irishmen, the government and the Ascendancy felt there was little likelihood of the two groups uniting for concerted action. The Fitzwilliam episode rendered this assessment obsolete and dangerously shortshighted. The rapid growth of Defenderism among the Irish Cath olics alarmed the government. It first manifested itself in the County of Armagh and developed out of a quarrel between Protestants and Catholics, but with this serious difference; a strong political element was .now mixed with it. Numerous letters in the government correspondence of the day atest to the rapidity and simultaneity with which Defenderism spread in several counties and to the manner by which all grievances, agrarian, religious and political were incorporated into the system and the demoralization that it produced. In reporting on the movement to London, the Lord Lieutenant stated one of the first steps by the organizers was to requisition all the smiths in a parti-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 cular area and compel them to make pikes and spears.44

Groups of Defenders went maurading the countryside rob- bing houses of weapons. Their information on the Where-

abouts of thse arms was so accurat~, stated Lord Camden, that it was evident they were in close contact with the servants. In many sections of Leitrim, Sligo, Galway,

- . Longford and Mayo disturbances had increased markedly since the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam.45 General Robert Cunningham, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's forces in Ireland, wrote to the Chief Secretary, that disorders in the above named counties were so numerous and preva- lent that 11 it appears more cavalry wil.l be necessary for preserving the internal peace of the country."46 Owners of large farms in County Roscommon were "so afraid of their cattle being houghed and killed, that they yielded to the

44Camden to Portland, May 28, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

45see Dublin Journal, May 1, 21; Belfast Newsletter, May 15, 22, 23; Ngrthern Star, May 14, 22.

46cunningham to Pelham, April 27, 1795 "Military Correspondence" (P.R.OoH.O. l00/54J. I think it worthy of note that a review of the military correspondence of Lord Westmorland and Lord Fitzwilliam's terms of office reveals an almost total lack of reference to disturbances necessitating the use of military force.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 demands of the people, by agreeing to raise their wages and lower the rent of the potato ground." The Viceroy admitted that both these measures, just and necessary in themselves, were impolitic since they were agreed to under intimidation and thus gave tremendous encouragement to the rioters.47 The area of disorder in the space .of a few weeks had spread into the counties of Meath, West Meath and Kildare.48 The incidents of nightly meetings and robberies of firearms continued and grew alarmingly frequent. Agents of the Defenders "swear the lower Roman Catholics to secrecy and to the French when they land," reported Lord Camden.49 From the North came the disquieting news of the swiftness with which Defenderism was catching on. Unlawful oaths were being administered. Those who refused to take the Defender oath would have their turf burned and their:potato patch dug up or worse still, their home burned and them-

selves murdered. Large, aggressive groups of Def~nders appeared, sometimes as numerous as two or three thousand

47 Camden to Portland, July 25, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/58). 48 Camden to Portland, May 28, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

49camden to Portland, July 24, 1795 (P.RoO.H.O. 100/58).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 strong to overawe the uncommitted. No less than thirteen counties were infected by Defenderism during the interval between March and December, 1795. In a period of eight months there were 147 acts of murder, robbery, or rape in the single county of Longford.50 The British government was most anxious to determine whether or not there was any collusion between the Defenders and the United Irishmen. The Viceroy admitted that at this time he was unable to produce any clear proof of such coop eration. He did, however, submit a detailed report of the objectives and views of the two organizations. A compari son of these plans and objects accompanied the report to London. Camden found the characteristics common to both groups to be: fraternising, numbering their committees, naming delegates, providing themselves with firearms and pikes, seducing the militia, abolishing tithes and roy alties, separating the two kingdoms, expecting assistance from the French and looking forward to a general uprising.51 The disturbances followed the. pattern of guerrilla warfare that we have become familiar with_.in the twentieth century. Agitation would come and go at times,

5°camden to Portland, July 29, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/58).

51camden to Portland, July 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/58).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 almost disappear in some counties only to break out in others. The Viceroy complained: It is difficult to overcome the impression, so gen~ral in the kingdom, of its inhabitants considering it a conquered country, and the jealousy of the English can only be lessened by the greatest attention to the interest of the lower ranks, who, in many parts of the kingdom are grievously neglected.52 This might be accomplished in part he suggested by restoring the old power once exercised by English justices at the quarter sessions, of proportioning the price of labor to that of food.53 While the Lord Lieutenant toyed with ideas on how to alleviate the economic distress of the poor, Irish radicals were using that very condition to stir up the masses against the government. The tension and anxiety in some areas of the country was almost unbearable. Country gentlemen and large farmers found life practically impossible without the presence of military force. Among the lower classes conspiracy was almost universal, though it seems probably many conspirators took the Defender oath merely to save themselves from injury. Yet to con tempories it appeared the whole fabric of society and the

2 5 camden to Portland, September 25, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/58).

53 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 principle of law on which it rests was collapsing. It is difficult, even with our acquaintance with widespread civil disobedience in the twentieth century, fully to realize the strain of such a situation on the nerves of· the Protestant gentry. Almost isolated, in the midst of an alien population, ignorant of whom whey could trust, with perpetual rumors of invasion, rebellion and intended massacre coursing around them, it is little wonder that the Irish country gentlemen struct out savagely in all directions. 54 The new aggressive spirit of the Catholics was not allowed to go unchallenged. Particularly in the North, the widespread disturbances· resulted in an intensification of bitterness between Protestants and Catholics. One mani- festation of this bitterness and alarm was the establishment in September, 1795 of the Protestant Orange Society. This was a sign of the times. Its formation marks a definite revival in Ireland of anti-Catholic feelings among Protestants. Generally the Catholics were favorable to the French Revolution. That revolution had made a violent attack upon private property, and the Protestant

54Interesting accounts of the attitude and fears of the Irish gentry can be seen in the Rebellion Papers, (P.R.O.I. 620/22 Nos. 5 et seq.).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 Ascendancy was founded and maintained upon property. If the Catholics were granted complete emancipation (admitted to Parliament) they would assuredly vote against Protestant interests. Logically, then, it was in the best interests of the Protestants to prevent this from happening. The old animosity between the lower-class Catholics and the Presbyterians in the counties of Ulster is under standable enough and recent events in the political sphere had exacerbated this bitterness. A group which had possessed unchallenged superiority now saw this ascendancy slipping from their grasp. On the othor hand, a class which had heretofore been in subjugation was buoyed by new privileges and looked forward expectantly to a com plete abolition of political disabilities. The most disconcerting change as far as the Protestants were con cerned was the attitude of Catholics towards them. This had undergone in the space of a short time a none too subtle metamorphis. Boasts were made that Protestant landowners would soon be divested of their land and the decendants of the original proprietors restored. It was a poorly kept secret that clandestine societies were being formed whose object was a great rebellion. The riots and lawlessness of the Defenders and United Irish-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 men only served to embitter feelings all around. Outrages and lawlessness were by no means confined to one side. The alternating of hope and despair that followed the appointment and recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, the persistent rumors of rebellion and invasion, and the alarming spread of Defenderism throughout Ireland served to aggravate the already precarious situation. In the important county of Armagh, for example, the Protestants were definitely in control, although there were a sizable minority of Catholics who were generally Defenders. Dur ing the latter half of 1795 there were several clashes between the two religious groups. In September riots broke out in Armagh and continued for several days. The skimishes culminated on September 21 in a full scale battle at a place called the Diamond, near Portadown. The Catholics were on this occasion clearly the aggressors. The Defenders outnumbered their antagonists, but the Protestants had an immense advantage in point of preparation and skill, many of them having been members of the old Volunteer Corps. A serious conflict ensued and the Catholics were decisively defeated, leaving many--perhaps thirty--dead on the field.55

~~For details of the battle, see Patrict Tohall, The Diamond Fight5.~ 1795 (R.I.A., 1958); Emmet, op. cit.,- PP• 141-142.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 It was on the night of this battle that the name of Orangemen was officially adopted. The Orange Society in its origins is undeniably an Irish institution. It was the legitimate successor of the Protestant 11 Peep-of-Day

Boys" who h~d been active in County Armagh towards the end of the eighteenth century, particularly after the Catholic Relief Act of 1793 when it appeared that in the normal course of political evolution their local ascendancy would be threatened. When Orangemen met on festive occasions it was long the custom to partake of 11 sheep 1 s trotters" as a standing dish--a reminder of the hurried retreat of King James from the Boyne. This was followed by the toast to "the glorious, pious and immortal memory" of King William III.56 The Orange Society was in the beginning a league of mutual protection which bound its members to maintain the laws and peace of the country, and also, the Protestant Constitution. No Catholics were to be admitted and members were bound by oath to secrecy. Yet from the start a very different spirit from that embodied in the oath showed itself. Following the Battle of the Diamond a

6 5 see R. M. Sibbett, Orangeism in Ireland and Through out the Em}ire, 2 Vols. (London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., 1939 • Hereward Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain 1795-1836 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 brutal persecution of the Catholics commenced. It is probably true that, like the Defenders, the title of Orangemen was assumed by many who never joined the organ ization and who were really "Peep-of-Day Boys" whose conduct was certainly not what the originators of the society had in:Cended. Nevertheless, the Catholics of Armagh and neighboring counties were the victims of repeated attacks. Their cabins were papered with the pi thy notice, 11 to hell or to Connaught" and a time limit when the removal of persons and property was to be made. So punctual were the Orangemen in execmting their threats that, after a few experiments, none were found rash enough to refuse com- pliance. In this way almost seven hundred families in the County Armagh alone were forced to abandon their farms without due process of law, even without being

charged with a crime, exc~p't their religion. The persecution, once begun, spread rapidly to the counties of Tyrone, Down, Antrim and Derry.57 While these outrages were going on the resident magistrates did little or nothing to halt them. When Catholics attempted to defend themselves and the incident

57see Dublin Journal, September 29; Belfast Newsletter, September 25; Northern Star, September 24, November 23, 28, 1795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121

resulted in a court proceeding, the decision was almost always against the Catholic party. The partiality of the judges was so blatant that even Lord Camden was forced to comment: the Magistrates in some districts not finding the regular mode of endeavoring to convict the offenders (Catholics) had the effect which was objected have ••• sent them on board the tender and entered them for the King's service. I am afraid some of the magistrates have been in cautious enough not to carry on this measure so secretly as. to have escaped'~the notice of the public and I think it probable it may make some noise. It has certainly however done much to quiet the country, and I shall of course take care to pro tect those gentlemen ••• who may have erred upon this sub-ject .58 Not all the government officials were as complai- sant about the in,j.ustice as the Viceroy. On December 28, the Earl of Gosford, Governor of County Armagh, called together a number of magistrates to consider the state of the country. All were Protestant, some were clergymen of the Established Church. The opening speech of Lord Gosford is significant since it gives vivid evidence of the seriousness of the persecutions and bears witness to the near anarchy to which Ireland had fallen. "It is no secret" he said, 11 that a persecution ••• is now raging in

58 Camden to Portland, November 6, 1795 (P.R.O.H.O. 100/57).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 this country. Neither age nor acknowledged innocence ••• is enough to excite mercy, much less afford protection." The only crime committed by the persecuted was a pro fession of the Catholic faith. A 11 lawless banditti," he claimed, have made themselves judge and jury and the sentence they impose 11 is nothing less than a confiscation of all property, ::.and immediate banishment." He omitted detailing the horrors that attended so widespread a pro scription. History did not record, he told the gathering, a parallel instance where more than half the inhabitants of a heavily populated country were deprived of their home and livelihood and forced to seek shelter in the midst of winter. "This is no exaggerated picture of the country ••• the Spirit of impartial justice has for a time.-disappeared11 .59 The meeting unanimously passed resolutions stating the Ro man Catholic inhabitants of the County Armagh were "grie vously oppressed by persons unknown who attack and plunder their houses, unless they abandon their land and inhabita tion."60 A committee was created to look into the situation and the meeting adjourned after several measures were ·voted to repress the disturbances •

.59see particulars of the meeting in Gosford State Papers, December 28, 179.5, (P.R.O.I.). 60 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 The houa rackings in Armagh and similar action taken against the Defenders in Counties Leinster and Connaught had one unanticipated and unwelcomed result as far as the government was concerned. The Catholics who fled the per secutions in Armagh were forced to seek shelter in Belfast, Antrim and Down. The hospitality shown them by the Pres byterians caused the Catholics to lose much of their hereditary prejudice against the northern dissenters. When they.returned home the dispossessed Catholics spread the fame of the United Irishmen to remote districts where the system was heretofore unknown. Thomas Addis Emmet later referred to the manner in which the United Irish- men were succeeding, especially throughout the counties of Antrim and Down, in lessening that antipathy between Catholic and Protestant which had been so apparent in the old Volunteers.6l The rapid increase of United Irish lodges in southern Ireland during 1795 was due, however, to more than the hospitality shown the 'Ca.tholics by the Presbyterians in Ulster. The spread of these lodges among the Catholic pea£antry was facilitated by the fact that the gentry and priests did not attempt to exercise the restraining influence which they had before the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam.

61 Emmet, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 This recently discovered community of interest and desire to co-operate on the part of the United Irishmen and the Defenders was viewed as an obstacle in the path of governfueRt policy, and certainly it was a growing menace to the existing system. The sympathy of the Defenders gave the United Irishmen access to the militia regiments as they arrived in the North. Although largely officered by Protestants, these were mostly composed of Catholics, having come from other provinces.62 In many instances they were already Defenders. The progressive steps were now made easy; the Catholic soldier had no reluctance to become a Defender; the Defender was quickly induced to follow the example of those where he was stationed, and to become a United Irishmen. The union thus spread among them quite rapidly and extensively and the militia regi ments were often vehicles by which both systems were carried in different and remote parts of the country. Especially in the north, by the end of 1795, large numbers of Defenders had been absorbed in the Society of United Irishmen. The fate of the Fitzwilliam administration and the rejection of even a modest parliamentary reform had clearly shown the United Irishmen that the government

62 See letters of Camden to Portland, August 24, September 21, 1795 (P.R.O.H.Oo 100/58}.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125. was deaf to agitation by legal m·athods. It was obvious the political system was too rigid to include them. So the United Irishmen felt the only policy left them was to

destroy the system, and the method to accomplish this ~as rebellion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V

ON THE EVE

In order to obtain a balanced picture of the general situation at this critical time in Ireland, it is neces- 'Sary to sketch brie.fly events as they unfold during 1796 and 1797. These occurrences, it should be understood, were caused in indirect and diffuse ways by the tragic circumstances surrounding the Fitzwilliam viceroyalty of January to March, 1795. The obvious partiality shown by the government in proceedings against one side only in the bitter business of the Orangemen and Defenders, especially in counties

Armagh, Antrim and Down; the knowledge that all progress in the direction of reform and Catholic emancipation along constitutional lines was completely blocked by the action of the "Castle"; the realization by the United Irishmen that without Catholic support their efforts were doomed to failure and the consequent merging of much Defender activity in the United Irish Society: all these factors tended to set men's minds travelling in the direction of more radical measures and to convince them of the necessity for armed action and French assistance.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 Thus by midsummer 1796 the government, briefed by an informer, Leonard McNally, was aware not only of the growing armed strength of Irish extremists, especially in the north, buta·l·so of French plans for an invasion.l By Novem- ber the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended and at this cviti- cal juncture the situation was aggravated by the statement of the Chief Secretary (Pelham) that "the exclusion of Catholics from Parliament and the State was necessary for the Crown and the Connection ••• that he was ready to sup port it with life and fortune.v2 Henry Grattan pointed out the inconsistency.: in this language from an official of the government at a time when the ministry "was in closest alliance with the Chief Catholic powers of the Continent, including the Pope him self. 11 He warned that if the Catholics of Ireland "were forced from under the hospitable roof of the Constitution ••• they will at length repose under the dreadful tree of Liberty. n3 As autumn approached the government received

1 On June 13, 1796 it was reported at a meeting held in Clough, Co. Antrim, that in that county 5000 men were armed with Flintl·ocks, 700 with pikes and 4000 not yet armed but ready for action. See Rebellion Papers, (P.R.O.I.).

2 Requoted from0Speech by Grattan in Parliamentary Debates, XVII, P• 48.

3Ibid., PP• 44-50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 assurances that in the south and west there was no cause for alarm, but that in the north a rising was expected.4 The Irish militia was causing great anxiety since many soldiers were known to be members of the Society of United Irishmen. At this time Lord Camden revived the idea of a yeomanry cavalry and infantry.5 The new yeomanry dif- fered from the old Volunteers in being sponsored and paid by the government with commissions from the Crown. As far as the north was concerned, it was almost entirely a Protestant pody, particularly the infantry, and it was in reality a scheme for arming the property of the country. In some northern counties it was composed largely of Orangemen and it exerted a powerful influence in arousing religious animosities.6 As early as February 1796, an Insurrection act was passed. In December part of a large French invasion fleet reached Bantry Bay, County Cork, but did not succeed in landing either troops or arms.7 Ten months prior, Wolfe

~.Boyle to E. Cooke, June 21, 1796 (P.R.O.Io).

5Camden to Portland, August 24, 1796 (P.R.OoHoO. 100/65).

6see Downshire Manuscripts, November 25, 1796 (P.RoO.N.I.).

7For the story of this abortive invasion see J. B. Bradley, Bantr Ba :. Ireland in the Da s of and Wolfe Tone Londvn: Mauncel & Co.,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 Tone had urged that such a landing be made in the North, as close to Belfast as possible and the fiasco at Bantry Bay convinced him of the correctness of his judgment. Later he noted in his ·journal that 11 i t was indispensable that the landing should be effected in the county of Down or Antrim, but especially the former where there were in

~une last twenty-four regiments af a thousand men each, organized with all their officers and sub-d:ifficerso118 Tone had, however, no first hand knowledge of the situation in Ireland later than the Spring of 1795, and he was dependent on reports, which, no doubt, were far more optimistic than the actual state of affairs called for. But he himself admitted that·he was "not of a very despon dent temper" and he easily persuaded himself that the reports were accurate. Even had the weather been more favorable when the French fleet reached Bantry Bay, there were other circumstances which supported Tone's preference for the North. It must be admitted that a search of the evidence indi- cates that Munster as a whole was neither than nor later ready or willing, except in isolated areas, to take part in an insurrection. In that province the strength of

8 Tone, II, op. cit., p. 274.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 the Society of United Irishmen was, in comparison with the northern counties, almost negligible. Insofar as there was anti-government activity there, it stemmed rather from the Defenders and other agrarian and anti- tithe organizations., It was, in addition, not to be expected that in a population so overwhelmingly Catholic a movement which was now definitely republican would receive the same support as in the Presbyterian north. It was in the autumn of 1796 that the government began to act on the reports of their 11 secret agents." We have it on his own authority that Edward John Newell was first a Defender and then a United Irishmen, and it was probably on his information that warrants were issued for the arrest of thirty-nine persons from Belfast and County Antrim on -clrarges of High Treason. 9 Nearly all of these men were Protestants; and at the same time anti-Catholic persecution continued with increasing violence. Thus on June 2, Hold Waring wrote to his father concerning events near Dromore, County Down. He mentioned the mistaken clemency of government in not hanging those (Orangemen) convicted of outrages at Armagh:

9 see The Apostacy of Newell written by himself (London: privately printed, 1798}. He dedicated the book to the Right Hon. John Fitzgibbon, Earl of Clare.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 Magill's mill at Tullycairn was burned last week and a great deal of meal and corn con sumed because he would not turn off Popish servants; Fairley's mill is also threatened from the same reason and Mr. Wadeel is in daily expectation of having his mills also consumed ••• the People are so frightened that none have come forward to give any informa tion tho' many of them could; if the People are threatened with the severity of the Law they say how many were hanged at Armagh? none-you dare not execute them.lO In Parliament ministers sought to minimize the extent and importance of widespread disorder of this kind and Pelham declared that the suffering "of his Majesty's Catholic subjects in the county of Armagh has been greatly exaggerated.1111 Doctor Dickson, the Protestant Bishop of Down, told Lord Holland that 11 he had seen families returning peaceably

from mass assailed without provocation by drun~en troops and yeomanry and the wives and daughters exposed to every species of indignity, brutality and outrage from which

neither his remonstrances nor those of ot~er Protestant

10 Rebellion Papers, (P.R.O.I. 62/23/141). 11 . Th1s type of remark had prompted George Ponsonby to state on an earlier occasion that 11 Immediately upon your Lordship's (FitzwilliamJ recall the government gave out orders that the country should be declared in a state of perfect tranquility ••• How they represent these matters to the Cabinet I do not know but I presume the disturbances have been too serious for them entirely to suppress their nature or extent." G. Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam, September 18, 1795 (W.W.MoF5).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 gentlemen could res cue them. n12 Lord Moira wrote Pelham in October, 1796, a letter of protest from Ballynahinch, County Down, in which he refers to 11 the number of inhabitants who have left this neighborhood which cannot be easily ascertained but by the most modest computation may be rated at 150; many more are preparing to go.n The letter is accompanied by a list of names and the paper is endorsed by 11 Charles Hamilton, Vicar of Tullylish and a magistrate for the County of Down.nl3 Another gentlemen writing from Dromore, County Down, to 11my lord" (undated but about the same time) states that "the opinion amongst the Roman Catholics prevails - that Govt. are Inimical and wink at the outrages committed against them, as well as many of the Magistrates and that it has caused many loyal subjects amongst them to be dis affected and to join the United Irishmen. 11 14 There also was trouble among the yeomanry. Some who had no objection to swearing allegiance to the king objected to that part of the oath which required them to 11 defend the existing

12 Quoted in Lecky, op. cit., IV, pp. 265-74. 13 Lord Moira to Pelham, October 19, 1796 (P.RoOoio)o 14 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 laws.nl.5:

The arrival of the French Fleet in Bantry Bay at the end of 1796 thoroughly alarmed the government authorities, although their agents on the Continent had fully briefed them on preparations for the attack many weeks in advance. A direct result of the abortive invasion was the appointment of General Lake and it is significant that it was to Ulster that he was sent. In this year (1796) an attempt was made by the Irish radicals to deal with informers whose activities were beginning to be realized. But, as events proved, those on whom the government relied most either remained undetected altogether, or were dealt with only after they had served their purpose as Secret Service agents. As a result the government had fairly accurate information not only con- earning the altered direction of the policy of the United Irishmen, but also about the identity of most of the mem bers of prominence or importance.16 Undoubtedly large numbers of yeomanry had by this time taken the United Irishmen's oath, and, if the turn

1.5 McCartney to Cooke, January 4, 1797, (PoR.O.I.). 16 see Harold Nicholson, The Desire to Please, A Story of Hamilton Rowan and the United Irishmen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 of events favored the extremist side later, it is most probable that there would have been wholesale desertions. As it was, desertions were taking place from a compara- tively early date. Thus, in January 1797 three deserters from the 22nd Light Dragoons were arrested who had been employed in drilling United Irishmen in the neighborhood of Ballynahinch, for which they received board and lodging and sixpence a day. 17 The appearance of the French fleet in Bantry Bay at the end of December 1796 had had a dual effect in the north of Ireland--of disappointment in its failure to land and of encouragement as showing at least the good faith of the French Government. As a consequence of the latter impression, there were a great number of people who joined that group which the authorities termed the "disaffected. 11 Thus, on January 24, 1797, one member of the gentry wrote from Rostrevor, County Down in the following manner: After leaving Belfast I proceeded through the most part of the County Down and find the greater part of the lower class of the People, and some in a higher rank in this county are United Irishmen-destitute of

17 Lord Downshire to Cooke, January 17, 1797 (PoRoO.Io). On May 17, 1797 seventy members of the Monaghan militia were discovered to have taken up the United Irishmen's oath and four were shot at Blaris Camp, :.:near Lis burn.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 argument or reason in support of their pro ceedings, they even force Honest and well disposed people into their association by the most gross threats •• oi am sorry to add that this once pleasant and peaceful little village (as I am well informed} swarms with United Irishmen as does Hilltown four miles distant and their vicinities.l~ James Waddell writing from Dromore, County Down, to the Rt. Honorable Ross states: I for some time was proud of our Rathfryland gentry, they were perfectly quiet until very lately, but are now the most disaffected of any in the Co. Down and that is saying a great deal; they are all uniting and threatening any one who will not join them; the Murphy's are in a dreadful situation, dare not stir out at night, particularly Sam.l9

Government propaganda aimed at ~errifying moderate men who were disposed to join the United Irishmen. One device was to spread the idea that examples in France would be copied in Ireland in the event of a successful rebellion. Pelham writing in January 1797 declared: the enormities committed in France were executed upon a system of terror: the friends of the Revolution in the beginnings, who in tended only reform, were the first victims. I knew many of them, although I thought them mistaken, believe their intentions were good; and all those of that description have been massacred.20

l8R. Johnston to John Lees, Rebellion Papers (PoR.O.I. 62/28/143).

19Ibid. The Murphys were presumably informers. 20 Pelham to C. Skeffington, January 4, 1797 copy in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 From 1796 onwards the government was well served by their intelligence officers who, as time went on, succeeded in recruiting a collection of spies and informers. Some of these may have been honest enough members of the United Irishmen until arrested and offered the alternative of serving the government or suffering death or prolonged imprisonment. Others entered the organization with the sole object of selling its secrets and betraying its members. There were probably some also who, having had no intention of supporting any measures beyond constitutional action, hoped to see the defeat of violent agitation.

Mo~tt of the people, however, who gave vital information were in the business for money. This, of course, does not include the small army of correspondents who sent along such information as came their way in their respective districts but with whom there was no question of remuneration. 21

Although both the Lord Lieutenant, Camden, and the Chief Secretary, Pelham, had been brought up in the Whig tradition, they found it almost impossible to cope with

Letter Book of Thomas 2nd Earl of Chichester 1795-1797 (British Museum Additional Man~scripts 33, 113.). Here after referred to as Letter Book (Add.MSS. 33, 113.J.

21A large collection of such communications may be seen in the Irish Public Record Office.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 the existing situation left by the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam. Circumstances were forcing the hand of government in Ireland. Realizing the dangerous increase in the number of United Irishmen during the cirtical months of 1797, the Lord Lieutenant decided to disarm Ulster. Lord Pelham, the Chief Secretary, wrote to General Lake that 11 the insurrectionary spirit which has manifested itself in certain districts of Ulster had rendered it necessary to the Lord Lieutenant and Council to issue a Proclamation."22 This proclamation which aimed at disarming the northern province was issued in Belfast on March 13, 1797, and it was signed by General Lake. It had the effect of placing a large area of Ireland under virtual martial law, ordering the surrender of arms and promising "inviolable secrecy11 to informers. It was in reality an ill-disguised scheme for disarming the old Volunteers and United Irishmen. For that reason, when the measure was debated in the House of Commons, Grattan denounced the government for attainting the men who had put William III on the throne and who, as armed Volunteers, "when the English Parliament had trampled on your rights,

22Quoted in Parliamentary Debates XVII, p. 129. !~'or a copy of the proclamation, see Ibid., pp. 129-JO.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13~ enabled you to claim those rights and, armed as Vol- unteers, to defend their country against foreign enemies and domestic tyrants."23

He expressed clearly his fear 11 that you may fret and irritate to a state of disaffection a people determined to be free, and by practices of this sort you may make enemies of Royalty when you only intend to make slaves for ministers."24 He added: You must perceive the stronger you govern in the Statue boo~ the weaker you grow in the country; the more devoted your majori ties, the more adverse your people; the more penal laws you obtained, the more dis turbances you create; the more liberties you destroy the more power you lost; the more you hang and the more you transport, the more you inflame, disturb and disaffect ••• '£he North complains that Belfast is per secuted and goaded to work her up and sting her to madness.25

The proclamation was defended by Mr. Sargeant Stanley on the gounds that "treason and rebellion have made such gigantic progress in that part of Ireland that it could not now be repressed by the slow and gradual progress of

ordinary justice.1'26 He continued that the Lord Lieutenant 1 s

23rbid., p. 131.

24rbid., p. 135.

25rbid., p. 137.

26Ibid., p. 144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 order ucould only operate upon the traitors who refused to join the yeomanry corps ••• and so far as it operated on the well affected it was a measure of prevention - a measure of their own protection to prevent their arms falling into the hands of the rebels and murders."27 John Beresford stated that 11 the North is in a state of concealed rebellion. The United Irishmen, it was notorious, has more influence there than government. 11 He hoped the yeomanry co:rp·s would be sent to quell the North and wished they (the North) were in open rebellion 11 because he was persuaded that the Government was strong enough to suppress it."28 The Attorney General did not bother to deny that the perogative of the Crown was stretched "be yond the letter of the law 11 and he made no effort to dis- tinguish between the activities of the United Irishmen, the Orangemen or the Defenders.29 Ponsonby pointed out that it had lately become the fashion in the House of Commons to abuse the province of Ulster. The people of Ulster had committed two great crimes he said:

27rbid., p. 14.5. 28 Ibid., pp. 146-47. 29 . Parliamentary Debates XVIT, pp. 147-48o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the lapse of a century they have suffered religious prejudice to wear away and they have buried religious bigotry and religious animosity in oblivion. They have committed another crime, they have found out that the representation of Ireland, after having been mangled and mutilated and corr~pted by a long succession of English viceroys is not, at the end of the eighteenth century, such as a people call~ng themselves free, have a right to expect.::S The campaign to destroy the 11 growing cooperation between Catholics and Dissenters 11 referred to by Ponson- by was now intensified. Five days after the Proclamation was issued, Brigadier-General Knox wrote General Lake that he proposed 11 to scour a district full of un:Vegis- tered arms ••• and this I do not so much with a hope to succeed to any extent as in increase the animosity between Orangemen and the United Irishmen, or liberty men as they call themselves. Upon that animosity depends the safety of the centre counties of the North. "31 He opposed any general or genuine seizure of arms as that would involve the Orangemen and he added: Were the Orangemen disarmed or put down, or were they coalesed with the other party, the whole of Ulster would be as bad as Down and Antrim.::S 2

30Ibid., pp. 157-58.

3lKnox to Lake, March 18, 1797, (Lake Manuscripts, 56 National Library Ireland) •

32Ibido

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the spring of 1797, at a meeting of freeholders convened by the High Sheriff of County Armagh, it was declared: that the people were being goaded to madness by accumulated oppressions; that in the richest and most prosperous province of Ireland military coercion had taken the place of common law and useful citizens are dragged to the fleet without trial by jury like the mrn t atrocious felons ••• and that the Government has been deliberately propagating religious animosities and per secutions.33 On May 8 in Ballymena, County Antrim, at a meeting of the freeholders a petition was issued to the king in which they pointed out that: his Ministers have laboured with the most remorseless perserverance to revive those senseless and barbarous religious antipa thies so fatal to morals and to peace as so abhorrent to the mild and merciful spirit of the Gospel ••• they have endeavored through the medium of spies and informers ••• to destroy public confidence and poison the intercourse of private life ••• Had your Majesty's people of Ireland, without regard to religious distinction been fully and fairly represented in the Commons House of Parliament, the events of ~hich we complain could never have existed.34 Evidence showing the direction of Government policy apart from the severities of martial law could be

33Requoted from Grattan IV, op. cit., p. 277; Northern Star, April 21, 1797.

34Lecky IV, op. cit., p. 51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. multiplied further. Perhaps enough has been mentioned to show that one of their main objects was to break up the alliance between the Catholics and Protestant Dis- senters. This was to be accomplished by stirring up sectarian discord in regions where it had been gradually disappearing. In all this they were, however, merely having recourse once again to the policy which had been enunciated long before by Strafford when he found that the balance of Catholic against Protestant in Ireland might be used to make both parties dependent on royal authority.3.5

A letter from Gene:ra'l Lake to the Chief Secretary, Pelham, written twelve days after the issue of the proclamation states: I much fear these villians will not give us an opportunity of treating them in the summary way we all wish. You may rest assured they will nQt have much mercy if we can once begin.36 A few days later he declared, "Belfast ought to be proclaimed and punished most severely, as it is plain every act of sedition originates from this town ••• Nothing

3.5 See J. R. Green, History of the English People (London: Macmillian and Co., 1911), p. 520. 6 3 General Lake to Pelham, March 2.5, 1797, Letter Book (Addo MSSo 33, 113J o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 but terror will keep them in order. 11 37 In the months that followed it appears as if a free hand was given to undisciplined gangs of militia and yeomanry to work their will on what was, except in a few isolated instances, an unresisting population. At the beginning quantities of arms were seized while others were concealed. Since the yeomanry contained many land- owning Protestants who were fearful of the threat to property and religion, the disarming was accompanied by acts of considerablevd.ol.enc·e. Charles Cornwallis who succeeded Lord Camden as Viceroy in June, 1798, has described the Irish militia and yeomanry in very unflattering terms: The Irish militia are totally without disci pline, contemptible before the enemy when any serious resistance is made to them, but ferocious and cruel in the extreme when any poor wretches either with our without arms come within their power; in short murd~r appears to be their favorite pastime.3~ These methods seem to have been part of what were regarded in theory as legitimate steps in the policy admitted by Castlereagh--namely, that of causing a

37General Lake to Pelham, March 29, 1797, Ibid.

38charles Ross, Corres ondence of Charles First Marquis Cornwallis (London: J. Murray, 1 9 , II, pp. 357-58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1~ premature rising before preparations were complete and before the arrival of a further French expedition.39 The means adopted to carry out this policy had the additional object of terrifying those whose interests were represented in Parliament into overcoming their objec• tions to a legislative union. Arrests occurred in Belfast in the spring of 1797 with increasing frequency. Many of these arrests were again due to the informer Edward John Newell, a painter of minatures in that city. His brother Robert published a rather interesting statement in the public press in the course of which he declared that his brother had been: for some time past in the practice of going through the town of Belfast disguised in the dress of a light horseman with his face blackened and accompanied by a guard of sold iers pointing out certain individuals who have in consequence been immediately appre hended and put in prison ••• I think it justice to my own character to express my abhorrence to so unworthy a proceeding ••• This young man has been unluckily disconnected for some years past from his family and me. I trust that but for the circumstance he never could have fallen into such company, or such a course of life as he appears to have done. 40 A serious military incident involved the Welsh

39 Robert Steward, Lord Castlereagh, a nephew of Lord Camden, replaced Pelham as Chief Secretary in the spring of 1798. See Hereford M. Hyde, The Rise of Castlereagh (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933).

~ . Northern Star, May 5, 1797.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 fencible regiment, the Ancient Britons, near Newry.41 The Newry area was United Irish, and had, until June successfully evaded government efforts to seize arms. A Captain Gifford was carrying out the search for arms in accordance with the terms of the proclamation. He states that attempts to discover armed insurgents were invari- ably unsuccessful. As an alternative, he says, the Ancient Britons burned a great number of houses and "the object of emulation between them and the Orange yeomen seems to be who shall do most mischief to wretches who certainly have seditious minds, but who are at present quiet and incapable of resistance." He adds: I was directed by the smoke and flames of burning houses and by the dead bodies of boys and old men slain by the Britons though no opposition whatever had been given by them and as I shall answeT to Almighty God, I believe a single gun was not fired but by the Britons or Yeomanry ••• I declare there was nothing to fire at, old men, women and children excepted. From ten to twenty were killed outrign~, many wounded and eight houses burned.4 Sixteen prisoners were marched into New.ry where it was suggested that they be killed, yet the following day

41Pelham to Lake, June 6, 1797 (B.Mo ADD. MSo 33, 104)o 42 .. John Gifford to Edward Cooke, June 5, 1797, Rebellion Papers 620/31/36 (P.R.O.I.J. The fencibles were merely carrying out the orders of General Lake. Captain Gifford

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 the whole sixteen were found innocent of any wrongdoing.43 The action of the Welsh fencibles is condemned by so many sources that there is no reason to believe they have been slandered by biased witnesses.44 Yet such was the state of the country that even the viceroy hesitated to condemn them. Pelham wrote to Portland that, from their activity and loyalty (the Ancient Britons) had become the terror of the disaffected "and in some instances have proceeded too far but I have written to General Lake to make inquiries.45

In the fact of such actions what is one to thin~ of the statement in the "Report of the Secret Committee (page 9) that: in carrying Lieut. General Lake's proclamation into effect no acts of severity whatever were used by the military towards persons concealing or refusing to give up their arms; but on this

WaS: courtmartialled the -~·tr.ollowing year on four counts. He was acquitted on all but that of disrespect to his commanding officer for this he received a reprimand. See Haliday Pamphlets (Roi.A.) No. 785.

43 Ibid.

44arattan, Iv, op. cit., p. 378; MacNeven, op. cit., p. 202.

45Pelham to Portland, November l, 1797 (B.M.Add. MSS, 33, 105).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 contrary, the search for the arms of the dis affected was conducted with all possible mildness ••• 46 They admitted, however, that at a later date more vigorous methods were adopted, but that these were strictly defensive. There is little doubt that the reputation which the Ancient Britons established by indiscriminate killing had a sobering effect on the population, and this reputation served as a deterrent to republican sympathizers. If the Ancient Britons could be unleashed by the government, the population of any district would hesitate to give aid to the United Irish. It was by such terrorist methods that the Irish republicans were overawed. The National Directory of the Society of United Irish- men was growing daily more concerned with the impulsiveness of the northern leaders. As a consequence of this anxiety, messages were sent to Paris emphasizing the danger of a premature uprising and urging the sending of a supply of arms since many pikes and firearms had been seized or surrendered as a result of the proclamation. They received assurances that aid was in the course of preparation, and indeed it was, in the guise of the assembly

6 4 A secret committee of the House of Commons was established in April 1797 to investigate the doings of the United Irishmen. Their report appeared on May 12, 1797. See Parliamentary Debates, XVII,pp. 518-22, for a summary of the report.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the Dutch fleet and a large French military force. Once again, however, the weather proved to be England's best ally and after more than three months of enforced and demoralizing inactivity this ambitious project ended in the humiliating destruction of the Dutch fleet by Admiral Duncan at the battle of Camperdown on October 11, 1797. Following the defeat at Camperdown the Irish radi cals were in a state of uncertainty and indecision. There now remained only rumor to indicate that another expedition would be forthcoming. That organization and preparation did continue with some degree of enthu siasm can only be understood on the assumption that French aid was confidently expected. Also there was al most total ignorance of the extent to which government was in possession not only of the plans of the United Irishmen, but also of the identity of their committee members. And so the drama continued to its tragic end. The government in an effort to thwart the extremists extended martial law through the North. The cruelties of the Ulster disarmament were repeated over and over on an ever widening scale. The flogging and shooting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 of suspects and the burning of houses produced a veri table reign of terror. And yet these stern measures, instead of averting a rebellion, brought on the bloodiest uprising in Irish history.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Toward the end of 1794 and during the first few months of 1795 events took place in England and Ireland which had at first very promising and later very disastrous

results for Anglo~Irish relations. Because of the mena cing war situation a section of the Whig Party in England consented to be absorbed into a coalition with the Pitt government. Unquestionably there were conditions attached to so serious a transaction. One of these conditions was an understanding that there was to be a change of policy in Ireland and that the conduct of affairs there was to be in accordance with Whig rather than Tory ideas.1 Lord Westmorland was replaced as Viceroy and Lord Fitzwilliam, with some reluctance, took his place. It would have been manifestly absurd for Fitzwilliam to accept office with the intention of carrying out a definite policy, if at the same time, he could not exercise the right (possessed by all previous Viceroys) to remove from office those who would effectively oppose him. Accordingly, he relieved of his various offices (though with ample

compensation) John Bere~ford, the head of the Ascendancy

lsee letter of William Ponsonby to Fitzwilliam, May 4, 1795 (W.W.M.F29(a)); Grattan, op. cit., IV, p. 173.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. party, and two confidential state servants, Edward Cooke and Sackville Hamilton. He also asked for the resignation of the Attorney General, Wolfe and the Solicitor General, Toler. Since Beresford and Lord Fitzgibbon, the Chancellor, were the most influential members of the Castle group who represented Dublin offi cialdom and the Anglo-Irish supporters of England's poncies, and since Fitzwilliam quickly made it known that he supported the position of the opposition party headed by Henry Grattan and the Ponsonbys, the dismissal of Beresford was tantamount to a declaration of war. In light of the existing political situation in Ireland, Fitzwilliam's actions were realistic, although one might cviticize him for applying the broom too swiftly. The position of Lord Fitzwilliam in relation to the Catholic question is somewhat obscure, but he certainly

understood that ·~he had been given a free hand, though with the general reservation that definitive Parliamen tary action should, if possible, be deferred until the war situation was less menacing, unless the demand be came so insistant that delay would be dangerous. This

was a difficult, if define~ task. A man of strong aon victions who had already committed himself on Irish issues, Fitzwilliam was expected to represent a coalition

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cabinet which, preoccupied with a menacing military situation, was inclined to go slow on domestic issues. The Catholic emancipation bill wofuld almost certainly have been accepted and passed by the Irish Parliament since most members of the Dublin House of Commons were willing to grant the measure under pressure of a possible French invasion. This was obvious to Fitzwilliam within a few days of his arrival in Ireland in early January, 1795. His letters pleading for instructions in the matter went unheeded despite his warning that affairs could not be allowed to drift and that, if he received no instruc tions to the contrary, he would support emancipation. The first indication Fitzwilliam had that his actions did not meet with approval came indirectly from his Ohief Secre tary, Lord Milton. The latter had been informed in a communication, dated February 2, that Pitt was disturbed over the news of Beresford's ouster. Pitt's own corres pondence of February 9 to Fitzwilliam was occupied with this matter. When, in replying to this letter, Fitz william said heatedly that Pitt had to choose between Beresford or him, the Prime Minister took him at his 1.·1ord and dismissed the viceroy.- - . Fitzwilliam had measures in mind as well as men. He had undertaken the assignment as viceroy 11 to purify as

'·.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 far as prudence and circumstances would permit the principles of Government, to conciliate the Catholics and to put the country into a proper state of defense.a He was well aware of the danger of a French attack on Ireland and conscious there was widespread agrarian dis content, reflected in the actions committed by 11 banditti. 11 Thus while he requested military reinforcements, he was

also eager to establish a yeomanry force, that i~, a volunteer corps of farmers officered by the "country gentry. This force, he felt, would be useful in the event of an invasion and could also aid the justices of the peace in preserving order throughout the countryside. The rank and file of the force would be drawn from the "first tenants." Since this class throughout the country was composed of Catholics, the formation of such a new force was closely connected with the Catholic question. Fitzwilliam's objective was by an act of grace, the repeal of Catholic disabilities, to fasten Catholic affections to the government. Pitt himself had earlier been persuaded of the abstract justice of Catholic emancipation. His difficulty

~See Fitzwilliam to Grattan, August 23, 1794. Copy in Grattan, IV, op. cit., p. 173.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 was only as to the manner in which this boon could safely be conceded to the Irish people. He evidently felt he could put through or postpone the measure at will. The

relative~ease with which the Prime Minister had forced through the Relief Act of 1793 appears to have convinced Pitt he could do the same thing when the time came for granting additional rights to the Catholics. In that year he had considered the idea of a legislative union and had advanced as one argument in its favor that it would remove whatever dangers might be supposed to lie in concession to Catholic claims. He was convinced that 1n an Irish Parliament, emancipation would be accompanied with all the evils forseen by John Fitzgibbon, that is, the end of Protestant monopoly and local ascendancy. Pitt believed that in an Imperial Parliament, however, where the Irish representation would contribute less than one-sixth of the whole House of Commons, the influence of the Catholics would no longer be dangerous. Thus Catholic emancipation would have to be put off until a legislative union could be effected. Pitt had to con- - sider the many commitments he had--to Portland and his own Cabinet, and to the King. In Ireland the views of the Ascendancy party, as well as the pro and anti-Catholic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 Parliamentary groups, had to be taken into account. Nor was the Prime Minister making a purely political decision. He sincerely and earnestly wished to see the completion of Catholic emancipation as his resignation over this measure six years later was to demonstrate. But in 1795 with war abroad and bitter opposition at

home he thought the;:t.inie il~chosen and wished for a post ponement of the question until after the peace. In other words, Pitt was ready to risk the immediate reaction in Ireland and take his chances on the future. He lost his gamble as the revolution of 1798 shows. Pitt's handling of the Irish situation can be par tially explained, as one of his biographers3 maintains, if we realize his extreme confidence in his own judgment

and integrity. So great was t~is. self-confidence that he was willing to risk such steps as the appointment of a Viceroy with Lord Fitzwilliam's unpopular views on the Catholic question. The weakness of this ·confidence was, that once Pitt had elected a bold action of this sort, he was likely to ignore subsequent events until he was compelled by circumstances to intervene and either to check or to reverse the results of his earlier decision.

JBarnes, op. cit., pp. 266-326.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the case of Ireland from 1793 to 1795, Pitt first raised the hopes of the Catholics by the law of 1793 and then failed to carry these concessions to their logical conclusion of admitting them to Parliament. In 1795 he aroused the hopes of Catholics that the additional concession was to be made by appointing Fitzwilliam Lord Lieutenant, and then rudely,dashed these hopes by dismissing the viceroy. The fact is indisputable that throughout the whole of Ireland (except in scattered areas like Armagn) there was at this time increasing good will between Protestant and Catholic.4 The final removal of Catholic disabilities

would have met with little effective Protestant opposi~ tion in Parliament since most members were willing to con cede the measure under the stress of the French threat and the danger of a rebellion, as long as they thought the proposal had the backing of Westmin~ter.5 Petitions requesting immediate action and warning of the danger of delay poured in from Protestant and Catholic groups. Fitzwilliam did not make emancipation a government measure, but he obviously did.little to disuade Grattan from introducing such a bill. He kept

4see McDowell, op. cit., especially Chapter 10; Lecky, op. ·cit., III, passim.

5There was an opposition organizing which after the defeat of the Catholic bill claimed to have 140 supporters in the Commons. John Pollock to Westmorland, April 15, 1795 (P.R.O.I. Fane Papers).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 the English cabinet fully informed of the situation as his correspondence shows and yet, for s.everal weeks, he received no information that any change of policy was contemplated. Catholic expectations had by this time reached their highest pitch when in mid-February the engine was

opponents o~ Catholic emancipation, Fitzgibbon, Beresford and the rest of the Castle group, were hard at work

trying to convince George III and Pitt of the justic~ of their cause. The king was known to be hostile to Catholic .. emancipation an

of February 6, he stated that the s~bject of admitting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 Catholics to the Irish Parliament "was beyond the power of any cabinet of ministers 11 and that it would be

.,,, better to change the administration in Ireland than to countenance such a plan. He was convinced that emanci pation meant the separation of Ireland from England. So upset was the King regarding the Catholic question that he was convinced should he consent to the admission of Catholics to the Irish Parliament, he would be violating his coronation oath and could be made to abdicate his throne. He sought the advice of a number of legal and ecclesiastical experts including the English Chief Justice, Lord Kenyon, and the Archbishop of Canterbury. John Fitzgibbon, the Irish Chancellor, wrote a long

memorandum which fully sup~orted the King 1 G worst fears. The reaction of George III to the proposals of the Fitzwilliam administration played a crucial part in the

recall of the Viceroy. It is highly probabl~· that even if Pitt and his cabinet had given their approval to Catholic emancipation at this time, the opposition of the King would have proven insurmountable. The result of all this was that Catholic claims were unceremoniously tossed aside, except for the endow

ment of the "Royal College at Maynooth11 ; conciliation was brought to a sudden halt, and Lord Fitzwilliam was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 dismissed f:rom office. ·The ,proximate cause of the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam was the influence of John Beresford and John Fitzgibbon. Certainly Fitzwilliam was convinced that his recall was due chiefly to the influence which Beresford and Fitzgibbon exercised over Pitt. And yet, Fitzwilliam somewhat emotionally told Edmund Burke that his downfall was the work of Pitt who was indifferent as to the reason: "he.decided on my removal with or without cause." In this questionable opinion Fitzwilliam is sup ported by Henry Grattan who wrote Burke that it was not Beresford nor the Catholics but Pitt who was responsible for Fitzwilliam's dismissal. Doubtless both the Catholic question and patronage contributed to the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, but the paramount reason for the dismissal of Fitzwilliam appears to lie deeper. As has been mentioned, legislative union was an ambition already shared by Pitt, Westmorland, .Fitzgibbon and a majority of the Ascendancy party. It is hardly likely that Pitt would sacrifice the very instruments (Fitzgibbon, Beresford, Cooke, Toler, etc.) on which he was to rely for the completion of his designs. The officials of Dublin Castle who feared dismissal and the members of the established order in Ireland who feared further concessions to Catholics stirred up sufficient alarm in the minds of George III, Pitt and the Portland Whigs to make any change at this time

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 impossible. Shortly before his recall Fitzwilliam showed that he was beginning to realize what was going on when he wrote to the Duke of Portland: I am at a loss to conjecture what those benefits are which, it is expected, will accrue to the British Empire by deferring ·the consideration of this question ••• Can it be in the contemplation of any man, that a state of disturbance or rebellion here will tend to find the desirable end (which I think I discover to be alluded to in your letter) o[ an act of Union between the two Kingdoms? He agreed that such methods might bring about a union, but it seemed to Fitzwilliam morellikely to be a union with France rather than Great Britain. This declaration by Fitzwilliam is, I think, of considerable importance. He held the most responsible post in Ireland under the Crown; he was a sensitive, dedicated man and as one of the wealthiest of the Irish landlords he had a great stake in this country. Certainly his dismissal was a bitter personal humiliation, but what compounds the disaster is that, if one can fault Fitzwilliam on his tactics, his general strategy of attempting to weaken Irish radicalism by timely concessions was quite accurate, as the revolution of 1798 was to painfully demonstrate. He clearly foresaw the very real danger of further

H.Oo tg~Y5~t~liam to Portland, February 20, 1795 (P.R.O.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 denial of reform and emancipation in a country where informed opinion was almost unanimously demanding them- the danger being that of forcing a constitutional move ment into other channels. The hopes of the Catholics had been fanned by the laws of 1778, 1792 and 1793, and then dampened by the

failure to car:-_y these concessions to their natural con~ elusion of admitting Catholics to Parliament. Again in 1795 Catholic hopes were aroused that additional con cessions were to be made by the appointment of the liberal Lord Fitzwilliam, and once more these hopes were shattered by his peremptory removal. The cat and mouse game of grandiose promises made and not fulfilled helped to generate a feeling of bitter betrayal and des pair on Wh1ch the Irish revolutionaries played with alarming effect. One has only to think of the present day crisis with negro civil rights to realize what the practice of arousing high expectations only to dash them rudely to the ground can produce. The ignominious dishing of a Whig viceroy cannot have been unwelcomed to the Tori.es who resented the pre sence of their opposite numbers in the Cabinet or to George III who, during his lucid intervals, detested most Whigs. Indeed his attitude towards the proposals of the Fitzwilliam administration were at least as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 decisive as any reason for the recall of that official. Arguments which were used then and later in Parliament in resisting full Catholic emancipation, such as refer ence to the Coronation Oath and the Bill of Rights, were of such a nature as to demonstrate quite clearly that such opposition ·was regarded as permanent. This was particularly true of the King, who regarded the dismissal of Fitzwilliam not as a postponement of the question of Catholic emancipation but as a definite termination of it. This was forcefully demonstrated when George III's oppo sition to Catholic emancipation caused Pitt's fall from office in 1801, the year following the Act of Union. Since the opposition to emancipation was permanent, it is difficult to discover what constitutional course was open to those who stood for the removal of intolerable inequities, who were sincere in their professions and who possessed the courage of their convictions. Thus the

leaders~ip of the movement for emancipation and reform passed over to the Irish radicals who boldly set out to destroy the government which stood in the way of what the rebels considered reasonable rights. Lecky, who cannot be regarded as an extremist, has summed up the ' situation in these words:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. One fact, however, is as certain as anything in Irish history - that if the Catholic ques tion was not settled in 1795 rather than in 1829, it is the English government and the English gover~ent alone, that was responsible for the delay •. · Tije administration of Lord Fitzwilliam was a personal tragedy--the calamity of a spirited, dedicated man intent on the solution of a problem and convinced he was correct, abruptly losing the confidence and support of his colleagues and government. What is profoundly saddening and infin- itely more grievous and distressing was its effect on subsequent Anglo-Irish relations. If the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam was not a fateful turning point in Irish history, it certainly was in Lord Roseberry's phase "a landmark." It signalled a pause in that policy of concession which had culminated in Fitzwilliam's appointment and which had excited extravagant expectations in the Irish mind. It was followed by renewed bitterness towards England, a guerrilla war which culminated in the sanguinary rebellion of 1798 and which cost tens of thousands of lives and a political union between England and Ireland, a union passed only after what must rank as

one of the most corrupt incidents in Anglo-I~ish history. The Fitzwilliam episode;was, in truth, a political catastrophe for all concerned.

7:· Lecky, III, op. cit., P• 287.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is divided into seven sections for the sake of convenience: one section of bibliography and catalogues, three sections of primary sources, and three sections of secondary materials. The standard bibliography for the period covered by this thesis is s. M. Par.gellis and D. J. Medlay, Biblio graphy of British History, the Eighteenth Century, 1714- 1789 (Oxford, 1951). This excellent work can be supple mented by the useful bibliographies contained in Constantia Maxwell's Short Bibliography of Irish History

(Historic~l Association Leaflet no. 23, 1921) and her works on Georgian Ireland, Dublin Under the Georges 1714- 1830 (London, 1946) and Country and Town in Ireland Under the Georges (London, 1949) which lists just about every thing worth reading on eighteenth century Ireland. Also useful for this period is R. B. McDowell's Irish Public Opinion, 17.50-1800 (London, 1944) and the "Catalogues of Irish Microfilms" compiled and stored by the staff of Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massa chusetts. Finally, a most recent and important biblio graphy for documents of this era is Manuscript Sources of the History of Irish Civilization (Boston, Massachusetts:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 G. K. Hall and Company, 1965), especially volumes nine and eleven.

PRIMARY SOURCES

I UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS British Museum. Additional Manuscripts. 34, 317-34, 318. Auckland MS.

------~· Additional Manuscripts. 33, 113. Letter Book of Thomas, 2nd Earl of Chichester.

Great Britain~ Public Record Office, Chatham Manuscripts. Westmorland Correspondence. 30/8/330-331. Great Britain. Home Office Papers 100/53-60. Irish State · ·Papers. 1794-1796. Ireland. Public Record Office. Letter Books, Chief Secre tary's Office (Private and Official) 4 vols. 1789-1855. Ireland. Public Record Office. Rebellion Papers 1790- 1807. Vols. I-VI. Ireland. Public Record Office. Westmorland Correspondence. Fane Papers 1789-1806. 2 vols. Library of Congress. The Parliamentary Register or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons of Ireland. Commencing 1790 and ending in 1797, seventeen volumes of transcribed debates and forty-five volumes of Short hand notes. Dublin: Byrne and Moore, 1$95. National Library of Irelando Fitzgerald Papers. MSS. 622. Northern Ireland. Public Record Office, Downshire Manu scripts DOD 600/.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 Northern Ireland. Public Record Office. Masserene-Foster Papers DOD 562/. Sheffield City Library. Wentworth-Woodhouse Muniments. Papers, Correspondence, of 2nd Earl Fitzwilliam. F.l - F.32. Sneyd Archieves. Auckland Correspondence 1794-1796. University of North Staffordshire. Keele.

II NEWSPAPERS Belfast Newsletter, 1794-1796. Belfast Northern Star, 1795-1796G Dublin Journal, 1794-1797. Freedman's Journal, 1795-1796. London Times, 1792-1796. III PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES Parliamentary Debates, Speeches and Reports Ireland. Journals of Ir~e~l~a~n~d~,~l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3~- l oo. . . Ireland. Journals of the House dom of Ireland. Vola. I-XX.

Memoirs and Correspondence Beresford. The Correspondence of the Right Honorable John Beresford. edited by William Beresford. 2 Vols. London: Woodfall and Kinder, 1854. Bolingbroke. (pseud.}. Six Letters Addressed to His Excellenc Fitzwillia~ Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Dublin: Privately pr1nted, 179 • Burke, Edmund. Letters, Speeches and Tracts on Irish Affairs. Edited by Mathew Arnoldo London: 1881.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 • The Works of Edmund Burke. 5 Vols. London: ------B~ohn's Standard Library, 1896. Charlemont. Memoirs of the Private and Political Life of James Caulfield, Earl of Charlemont. Edited by Francis Hardy, 2 vols. London: G. Sidney, 1812. ------=·· The Manuscripts of James Caulfield, Earl of Charlemont. Historical Manuscripts Commission. Thirteenth Report: Appendix, Part VIII. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1894. Carlisle. The Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle. Historical Manuscripts Commission. Fifteenth Report: Appendix, Part VI. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1897. Cornwallis, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis. Edited by Charles Ross. London: J. Murray Company, 1859. Cloncurry (Valentine Lawless). Personal Recollections of the Life and Times of Lord Cloncurry. Dublin: Folds, 1849. Drennan. The Drennan Letters (1776-1819}. Edited· by D. A. Chart. Belfast: HisMajesty 1s Stationary Office, 1931. Drennan, William. A Letter to His Excellency Earl Fitz william, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Dublin: Privately printed, 1795. Emmett. Memoir of Thomas Addis and Robert Emmett. Edited by T. A. Emmett, New York: The Emmett Press, 1915. 11 First Letter from a Nobleman," Haliday Pamphlets. Vol. 686. Royal Irish Academy (1780-1799). Fitzwilliam, William. A Letter from Earl William Fitz william, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland recently retired from that countr to the Earl of Carlisle ex lain ing the causes of that event. Dublin: 179 • Fortesque. Manuscripts of William Henry Fortesque. His torical Manuscripts Commission. Thirteenth Report: Appendix, Part III. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1892.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 Grafton. Autobiography and Political Correspondence of Augustus Henry, Third Duke of Grafton. Edited by William R. Anson. London: John Murray, 1898. Grattan. Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Rt. Hon. Henry Grattan. Edited by Henry Grattan, Jr. 5 Vols. London: Henry Colburn, Publisher, 1838-46. 11 Groans of Ireland. 11 Haliday Pamphlets. Royal Irish Academy (1793) • Jones, William Todd. 11 A Letter to the Societies of United Irishmen of the Town of Belfast,n Haliday Pamphlets. Royal Irish Academy (1792}. Leinster. Correspondence of the Dutchess of Leinster. Edited by Brian Fitzgerald. Dublin: Stationary Office, 1949. ' Rutland. Correspondence Between the Rt. Hon. William Pitt and Charles, Duke of Rutland. Edited by John, Duke of Rutland. London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1890. Swift. The Corres ondence of Jonathan Swift. Edited by F. Elrington Ball. Vols. London: Bell and Sons, 1910-1914. windham. Diary of William Windham. Edited by Mrs. Henry Baring. London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1866.

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.I BOOKS Aspinall, A. Politics and the Press, 1780-1850. London: Home and Vanthal, Ltd., 1949. Barnes. Donald G. George III and William Pitt 1783-1806. Stanford: Uni.versity Press, 1939. Bradley, J. B. Bantry Bay: Ireland in the Days of Napoleon and Wolfe Tone. London: Mauncel and Company, 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 Brown, Stephen J. The Press in Ireland. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Ltd., 1937. Connell, K. H. The Po ulation of Ireland 17 0-18 Oxford: University Press, 19 o. Cronne, H. A., T. w. Moody and o. B. Quinn (eds.) Essays in British and Irish Histo in Honour of James Eddie Todd. London: Fred Muller, Ltd., 19 2. Curtis, Edmund. History of Ireland. Sixth edition. London: Methuen and Company, ntd., 1952. Dunlop, Robert. Ireland From the Earliest Times to the Present Dayo London: Humphrey and Milford, 1922.

1 ---~· . "Ireland in the Eighteenth Century ' The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. VI. New York: Macmillan Company, 1925. pp. 479-505. Falkiner, c. Litton. Studies in Irish History and Biography mainly of the Ei~hteenth Century. London: Longrilafis,. Green and do., 1 02. Froude, J. A. The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. ··.-III Vols. New York: Schribner, Armstrong and Co., 1894. Gibson, Edward. (Lord Ashbourne). Pitt: Some Chapters of His Life and Times. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898. Gilbert, John T. Documents Relating to Ireland 1795-1804. Dublin: J. Dollard, 1893. Gale, Samuel. Nerva or A Collection of Pa ers Published in the Montreal Press. Montreal: William Gray, 1 1· •

Hayes, Richard. Ireland and Irishmen in the French Revolu~ tion. London: E. Benn, Ltd., 1932. Hobson, Bulmer. A Short History of the Irish Volunteers. Dublin: The Candle Press, 1918. Hyde, Hardford M. The Rise of Castlereagh. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933.

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MeEhan, Denis. Windows on Maynooth. Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds, Ltd., 1949. Madden, Richard R. The United Irishmen, Their Lives and Times. 2 Vols. Ph1ladelph1a: Lea and Blanchard, 1842. Mahoney, Thomas. Edmund Burke and Ireland. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960. Mansergh, Nicholas. Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution. London: George, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 194o. Maxwell, Constantia E. Country and Town in Ireland Under the Georges. London: Dundalk, Dundalgan Press, 1949.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 ------· Stranger in Ireland. London: Gape Ltd., 1954. Namier, L. B. Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III. 2 Vols. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1929. Nicholson, Harold. The Desire to Please, A Story of Hamilton Rowan and the United Irishmen. New York: Brace and Company, 1943. O'Brien, George o. The Economic History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. London: Maunsel and Company, Ltd., 1919.

O'Brien, R~ Barry. Dublin Castle and the Irish People. London: Kegan, Paul, French, Truber and Co., Ltd., 1909. O'Flanagan, J. R. Lives of the Lord Chancellors of Ir.eland. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1870. Porritt, E. The Unreformed House of Commons. 2 Vols. London: Cambridge University Press, 1903. Rogers, Patrick. The Irish Volunteers· and Catholic Eman cipation 1778-1793. London: Burns, Oats and Washington, Ltd., 1934. Rose, John H. Life of William Pitt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924. ------=· Pitt and Napoleon. Londop; G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1912. Roseberry, Lord. Pitt. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1892. Senior, Hereward. Orangeism in Ireland and Britain in 1795-1836. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. Sibbett, R. M. Oran eism in Ireland and Empireo 2 ols. London: eorge Co., Ltd., 1914. Sigerson, George. The Last Independent Parliament of Ireland. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd., 1918.

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Turberville, A. A. The House of Lords in the A~e of Reform 1784-1837. London: Faber and Faber, 193 • Webb, Alfred. A Compendium of Irish Biography. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Sons, 1878.

II ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS Dictionary of National Biography. of Ireland,

III UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATION Burns, Robert E. "The Rise of John Fitzgibbon 1776-1789: A Study of Anglo-Irish Politics in the Age of the American Revolution." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961. -- Hamil ton, Albert, "The Movement flor Irish Catholic Relief 1790-93." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1966.

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