Country report of Asian Barometer Survey:
Support for Democracy in Thailand
Thawilwadee Bureekul 1
Ratchawadee Sangmahamad 2
Phathaphol Karnchanapimonkul 3
King Prajadhipok’s Institute 4
Introduction
Thailand has had more coups than any other country (thirteen successful military coups). Between late 2013 and early 2014, anti-government protests in Bangkok disrupted the general election in February 2014 to demand a regime without any influence from the Shinawatra family. They viewed the previous Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra as a puppet to her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was the most popular Prime Minister in Thai history, but was convicted of corruption charges in 2008. By considering the series of political protests in 2010 in favor of the Shinawatra family, it is clear that both Thai elites and rural workers are willing to use non- democratic means, and even violent methods to overthrow the ruling regime, and that there is no middle ground between them. The incumbent Prime Minister and head of a military junta, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, has been in power for over two years since the 2014 coup. Various experts believe that the current military junta will remain in power for the foreseeable future. Thailand’s status ranked by Freedom House - a highly regarded non-governmental organization which conducts research on democracy and political freedom - declined from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in 2015.
In Spirit of Democracy, Larry Diamond concludes that there is an overwhelming and universal support of democracy based on data from World Values Survey, a comprehensive survey of individual values and attitudes, in 2001; “at least [eighty
1 Director, Research and Development Office, e-mail: [email protected] 2 Researcher, Research and Development Office, e-mail: [email protected] 3 Assistant Researcher, Research and Development Office, e-mail: [email protected]
4 Address: The Government Complex (Building B) 5th floor (southern zone) 120 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Road, Thung Song Hong, Laksi District, Bangkok 10210 Telephone: +66 2 1419610 Fax: +66 2 1438177 1
percent] of people on average say democracy is the best system” (2008: 31). Nonetheless, in the late 2010s, there is a strong authoritarian temptation and democratic breakdown in numerous countries including Turkey, Bangladeshi, and Philippines. In this paper, we examine the support of democracy in Thailand over four different waves of Asian Barometers Survey, a cross-national research program that gauge public opinion. More specifically, we analyze the degree in which these individuals living in democracies would approve other authoritarian alternatives. In addition, we explore the factors affecting the support of and commitment to democracy in different regions.
Data collection
This study presents survey data based on face-to-face interviews in 2001, 2006, 2010 and 2014 (see Table 1) from the Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development in Thailand, as conducted by King’s Prajadhipok’s Institute. All interviews are conducted face-to-face, and are at least 18 years old representing a true sample of Thai eligible voters. This research also utilizes probability sampling, which implies that subjects are randomly selected.
Table 1. Summary of Asian Barometer Surveys in Thailand
Wave Year Period of data Prime Minister Sample size collection 1 2001 Oct. - Nov. 2001 Thaksin Shinawatra 1,546
2 2006 Apr. - Sep. 2006 Thaksin Shinawatra 1,546
3 2010 Aug. - Dec. 2010 Abhisit Vejjajiva 1,512
4 2014 Aug. - Oct. 2014 General Prayuth Chan-Ocha 1,200
Note that during the 4th wave, a coup d’etat occurred on 22nd May 2014 to remove an interim government that was formerly headed by Yingluck Shinawatra. Prior to the coup, anti-government groups held mass rallies against Yingluck Shinawatra’s government in Bangkok objecting a proposed political amnesty bill that would condone key political figures including Thaksin, her brother. Although the protestors demanded
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a snap election in February 2014, they disrupted the voting process forcing a large number of polling stations to close and subsequently, leading to the result being invalidated. In addition, Yingluck was threatened with legal action prior to the May 2014 coup over a poorly funded and managed rice subsidy scheme.
Meanwhile, the 2006 data collection was completed in the same months as the coup d’etat on the 19th of September 2006. Similarly to the events leading up to the 2014 coup, a large number of anti-governmental demonstrations had taken place throughout Bangkok. In addition to these demonstrations, Thaksin was also threatened with judicial proceedings, this time over allegations of corruption prior to the September 2006 coup. These series of events in 2006 and 2014 are important to this research because they have a significant impact on the political conditions and the environment within which the participants found themselves in preceding and during the survey period.
Literature Review
Theory
Democracy is a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1950: 269). Political scientists define democracy differently. Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, asserts that democracy occurs if only citizens believe that democracy is “the most appropriate form of government for their society” (Diamond, 1990: 49). This comes as no surprise, because democracy requires the consent of the populace through the electoral process. This literature review will examine the basic definitions and terminologies, and then explore the notion of political culture, horizontal accountability and vertical accountability, as well as the importance of political legitimacy.
Various terms such as electoral democracy and liberal democracy are coined to describe the specific type of system and assess quality of democracy. Electoral democracy is established “if people can choose and replace the ruling body in regular, free, and fair elections” (Diamond, 2008: 22). Freedom House defines electoral
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democracy as one in which there are: (1) A competitive, multiparty system, (2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens, (3) Regularly contested elections, and (4) Significant public access of major parties to the electorate through mass media and through campaigning. Nonetheless, it should be noted that electoral democracies vary enormously in terms of quality and is only the most basic requirement.
Liberal democracy, on the other hand, describes a high-quality democracy in which there are high degrees of participation, and freedom, horizontal and vertical accountability, and a civic political culture. Participation is crucial to democracy, because citizens should participate not only by voting, but also by actively participating in their respective civil society organizations, public policy issues as well as monitoring of official conduct. Through their participation, citizens show how they know that their actions matter to the overall electoral process and democracy. Support of democracy is also only possible if citizens have freedom afforded by primarily political and civil rights. Political rights entail the right to vote, run for political positions, and organize political parties, while civic rights focus on personal liberty, security and privacy. With freedom, citizens will then care about and stands ready to defend rights and liberties of the electoral process.
Support of democracy depends on the political culture, which provides underlying rules and assumptions of a high-“quality” democracy. The most succinct and perhaps effective summary of the components of political culture is from Sidney Hook, a political philosopher:
“A positive requirement of a working democracy is an intelligent distrust of its leadership, a skepticism stubborn but not blind, of all demands for the enlargement of power, and an emphasis upon the critical method in every phase of social life” (Hook, 1940: 290).
The main takeaway is an emphasis on “distrust” and “skepticism”, which are important for the public to avoid developing an overly deferential attitude towards authority. Almond and Verba (1972) similarly highlight the need for balance between deference and skepticism and the appropriate level of competition.
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The importance of horizontal accountability and vertical accountability cannot be overstated in order to avoid democratic breakdown. Larry Diamond (2002) claims that horizontal accountability is a crucial component for the development of effective democratic government. More specifically, he posits that horizontal accountability can only be established when there is separation of powers among multiple branches and institutions, and when the executive power is constrained by legislature, judiciary and others (ibid.). In particular, horizontal accountability is strongest when there are institutions with overlapping authority and scrutiny over each other (ibid.). Horizontal accountability also minimizes corruption, the biggest obstacle of democracy that diminishes political legitimacy, crushes populace’s faith in the government, and impedes economic growth. Likewise, vertical accountability is the act of holding public officers accountable for their actions. Vertical accountability exists in two types: electoral accountability and societal accountability. Electoral accountability forces officeholders to become accountable for their actions and implies that they can be removed for poor performances, whereas societal accountability means that unpopular polices and abuses of power can be challenged and even reversed through pressure from civil society, mass media, and the public.
Support of democracy is only possible if there is political legitimacy. Political legitimacy provides the ruling party the moral right to rule. All political systems require legitimacy from the populace, and a lack of legitimacy justifies indignation of the mass public to replace the incumbent government with a new one. Nonetheless, political scientists also define democratic legitimacy differently. Seymour Lipset offers a simplistic definition for political legitimacy as the “capacity of the system to engender the belief that these democratic institutions are the most appropriate ones for society” (1960: 64). His definition describes idealized “democratic institutions” that are the “most appropriate” for society. Samuel Huntington takes a different approach to describe how political institutions must be historically contingent and based upon ideology, nationalism (Huntington, 1968: 11). Huntington continues that forming political institutions in particular requires a “breakup of a small homogeneous ruling class, the diversification of social forces, and increased interaction” among different social forces (Huntington, 1968: 11). This definition implies the dependency of political
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legitimacy by the historical development and cultural conditions of each country, and the need for dialogue between different social groups to create robust political institutions.
Diamond (1999) instead offers one precise, mathematical definition of political legitimacy, though his definition does not always hold true in reality. In Developing Democracy, he claims that political legitimacy can be achieved if “more than 70 percent … believes that democracy is preferable to any other form of government” (1999: 69). Despite the difference in definitions among different political scientists, political legitimacy is extremely important for democracy, because democracy is based on the rule of law and thus, acceptance of order from the public. Without trust in the incumbent government, conflict and violence is inevitable, as people want a better party to serve their needs.
Factors
In this paper, we outline the importance of the following factors to the support of democracy: trust, following news, satisfaction, gender, age, education, household income, and rural vs. urban. Note that the difference in wordings between satisfaction “with the way democracy works” and satisfaction with the “current government” only serves to quantify the commitment to democracy. Note that previous paper by Bureekul and Albritton (2008) demonstrates that among different variables, the strongest variable for the support for democracy is the level of trust in political institutions, including to PM. This implies that the more people trust in political institute, the more they support from democracy. This paper also shows that other variables including age, gender, and education do not affect support for democracy as much, with the level of significance at .05.
Trust between citizens and the incumbent government is vital to any form of government and even more important for democracy. According to Blind, a member of UNDESA, trust occurs when citizens regard the government to be “promise-keeping, efficient, fair, and honest”. (Blind, 2006: 4) That is, it is the citizen’s perception of the political incumbents and their responsiveness to abide by what the citizens believe is
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correct. In the absence of trust, citizens exhibit cynicism towards the government by searching for alternatives and even starting a political riot. Inglehart has indicated that a high degree of trust is important to the evolution of democracy (quoted. in Memoli, 2011: 81). It goes without saying that trust in the executive office is an important factor to establish legitimacy of the country’s democracy, and instill support of democracy.
Because “journalism views itself as supporting and strengthening the roles of citizens in democracy” (Gans, 2003: 21) by providing necessary information, support for democracy depends on media. Citizens must be informed correctly before they can decide who to vote for and whether the government is upholding its promises. Likewise, the government relies on news and public surveys about citizens’ satisfaction and demands to establish its legitimacy. Inglehart has also indicated that an interest in politics is important to the evolution of democracy (quoted. in Memoli, 2011: 81). Therefore, the degree of how often an individual follows the news is an indicator of his or her support of democracy.
Satisfaction with democracy – arguably the most universal topic on democracy in public opinion survey research - is a means to evaluate the current government from the perspective of the citizens. A citizen’s assessments looks at the regime’s performance (mainly economic), commitment to the rule of law and transparency, as well as the direct benefits that they receive from the government. Because there are many factors to consider such as level of education, or income level, (Memoli, 2011: 81), this indicator is a superficial way to measure the support of democracy.
The quality of democracy is also contingent on the degree that different social groups participate and feel politically empowered. For instance, the link between gender equality and democracy is self-evident, because women account for at least half the population of societies (Moghadam, 2008). Nonetheless, in most cases, women are still heavily underrepresented (Inglehart et al, 2002: 1) Though recent research suggests that female gender plays a “contributing factor” in communal practice of political participation in Thailand (Albritton and Bureekul, 2013: 221), it is still unclear whether this trend is true universally in all regions and in other countries, and whether female voters show high support for democracy.
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Though there is no conclusive theory about the correlation of age and support of democracy, recent trends suggest that young people “do not exercise their democratic rights” (The Economist, 2014). This trend is true not only in United States, but also in European countries including Britain. A depressing explanation for the low youth turnout in certain places like France is that there is no political candidate worth voting for; “22% of French 15- to 24-year-olds said they believed society’s problems could be fixed only by revolutionary action” (The Economist, 2014). Hence, it is noteworthy to determine whether this theory is similarly true in Thailand.
Lipset’s claim that higher education leads to a more democratic politics (1959, 1960) has received a good deal of empirical support (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005). Papaioannou and Siourounis further explain that “education is … a significant predictor of the intensity and the timing of political transitions” (2005: 384). Nonetheless, earlier research suggests that education influences Thai people to become cynical about politics and resultantly, less likely to participate politically (Albritton and Bureekul, 2002: 17). Therefore, it is unclear whether education leads to support of democracy in Thailand, a country allegedly permeated with corruption.
Lipset also posits a positive relationship between income and support of democracy (1959). Nonetheless, recent research suggests that rising income level without economic development does not result in an increase in support of democracy. Simply put, in these countries, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer (Diamond, 2008: 98). Overall, income is still a good indicator of democratic support with the exception of oil exporting countries.
The analysis of the cleavages between Bangkok and hinterland voters has been researched previously: each group holds the other side in contempt (Albritton and Bureekul, 2007: 7). A golden rule is that Bangkok voters are generally more cynical and less supportive of democracy than rural workers. Hence, it is interesting whether Bangkok middle class, who are known to prioritize individual freedom will support the new military regime.
Conceptual framework
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The dependent variable is the support for democracy whilst the independent variables for this study include trust in the Prime Minister, following news about politics and government, satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country, satisfaction with the current government, gender, age, level of education, income, and place of residence. Support for democracy is calculated based on the degree of rejection of the four alternative types of regimes; having a strong leader in place of elections and parliament; a single political party system; military government; technocracy as detailed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The conceptual framework of the study
Results
Satisfaction with democracy and trust in the Prime minister
The results in Table 2 shows that there has been a decrease in satisfaction with the way democracy work from 90.4 percent in 2001 to 79.5 percent in 2014.
Table 2. Satisfaction with democracy and government
Survey Year The questions 2001 2006 2010 2014 Very satisfied and fairly satisfied with the way 90.4 83.6 82.5 79.5 democracy works
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Very satisfied and fairly satisfied with the current 89.7 81.4 68.4 90.2 government
When Thaksin Shinawatra was elected in 2001, satisfaction with the current government was very high at 89.7%. Satisfaction decreases continuously in 2006 and 2010 due to the 2005-06 military coup and 2010 protests resulting in at least 90 deaths and 2000 wounded (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Government satisfaction was at its highest in 2014 at 90.2%, which conforms to Table 3 which shows that trust in the Prime Minister in the same year was at its highest at 75.5%.
Table 3. Trust in Prime Minister
Survey Year The questions 2001 2006 2010 2014 A great deal of trust and quite a lot of trust in the -* 69.9 64.7 75.5 prime minister * This question was not asked in wave1
Democracy of Thailand
Where would you place our country under the present government?
Using a ten-point scale evaluating democracy, where one means completely undemocratic and ten means completely democratic, the mean among all regions decreases in every wave, except the fourth one, in which the mean increases from 6.26 to 6.68 (Table 4). Nonetheless, further analysis reflects how each region views democracy differently: there was an increase in the proportion of people believing that Thailand was a “full democracy” in every region with the exception of the population in Bangkok that suggests an increasing number believing that Thailand is “not a complete democracy”
Table 4. Results based on the question “Where would you place our country under the present government?” compared by region (1 – 10 scale)
Survey Year Regions Total Sig.
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Bangkok North Center Northeast South 2001 7.59 8.32 7.91 8.62 8.06 8.21 .000** 2006 7.31 7.76 7.48 7.75 6.56 7.46 .000** 2010 6.85 6.05 6.55 6.05 6.17 6.26 .000** 2014 6.06 6.90 7.13 6.36 7.06 6.68 .000** * sig at .01; ** sig. at .05; *** sig. at .001
a significant at the .05 level Figure 2. Regional perspectives on the democratic state of Thailand 2001 - 2014
Figure 2 plots the data from Table 4 and provides some interesting points of reference. These regional perspectives show that the period in which Thailand was considered to be the most democratic was while Thaksin Shinawatra was the Prime Minister (2001-2006). The decrease in support of democracy in 2006 is a result of the events leading up to the coup, in which large-scale, anti-government yellow shirt demonstrations were held. This is particularly pronounced for the Southern region, dropping by 1.5 from 8.06 in 2001 to 6.56 in 2006.
The steepest fall, however, can be seen between 2006 and 2010 in the North and Northeast, with both dropping by around 1.7 from 7.75 in 2006 to 6.05 in 2010. During 11
2006-2010, Thaksin’s regime was replaced a weak, unelected government, and later, an anti-Thaksin government. Thus, the 2010 results reflect the malaise and discontent among Northerners and Northeasterners. When Yingluck Shinawatra (Thaksin’ brother) was elected as Prime Minister in 2011, it is clear that in 2014, perspectives of Thai democracy recovered to an extent among all regions with the exception of Bangkok, which has seen annual falls over all four surveys. However, the recovery in the Northeast was muted by the resignation of Yingluck and May 2014 coup d’état. Finally, it is interesting to note that the only period in which Bangkok saw Thailand as more democratic than any other region was in 2010 under an unelected government.
Commitment to democracy: Testing undemocratic forms of government
To determine support or commitment for democracy the following four questions were posed:
1) We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. 2) Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.
3) The army (military) should come in to govern the country. 4) We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people (technocracy).
Each category is scored from 1-4 points in which 1 indicates strong acceptance of the proposed regime while 4 indicates strong disapproval. Higher scores therefore indicate a greater level of support for democracy, with a total of 16 equating to total commitment to democracy.
Table 5. Percentage of acceptance for the alternatives to democratic government
Survey Year (%) Alternative to democratic 2001 2006 2010 2014 Regime Accept Deny Accept Deny Accept Deny Accept Deny Strong leader, no elections or 22.93 77.07 23.94 76.06 25.6 74.4 37.6 62.4 parliament
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Single Party System 38.02 61.98 19.32 80.68 19.6 80.4 34.8 65.2 Military government 18.37 81.63 21.51 78.49 20.3 79.7 54.3 45.7 Technocracy 21.44 78.56 -* -* 18.7 81.3 32.3 67.7 * This question was not asked in 2006
The results from Table 5 suggests that there has been increasing support for a strong leader to run the country without elections or a parliament over the full period of 2001 to 2014. This rise was particularly marked between 2010 and 2014 in which support for this type of regime increased from 25.6% to 37.6%. This is consistent with the political protests between 2006 and 2014 against the leadership of both Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. Throughout this period it appears that many lost faith in democracy and desired a strong leader devoid of electoral politics. Hence, we can conclude that support for democracy decreases during times of political unrest and extended periods of political instability.
Support for a single party system decreased over the period of the surveys, declining from 38.02% in 2001 to around 19% in both 2006 and 2010 and again rising to 34.8% in 2014. It appears that people are becoming increasingly fatigued by the current political impasse, with Thaksin supporters in particular feeling increasingly disillusioned. As the political crisis runs on - for nearly a decade now - support for non- democratic regimes, particularly for military governance, has increased.
Support for military government was by far the highest in 2014 at 54.3% of respondents, having gradually risen from 18.37% in 2001 before substantially rising between 2010 and 2014. It appears that generally people have become exhausted by the vicious cycle of protests and counter protests and hope that the military might restore peace and order to conclude this stormy and restless period of Thailand’s politics.
Finally there is an increasing tendency of support for technocratic government, that is, rule by experts. In contrast to the aforementioned alternative regime types, technocracy is perhaps the most apolitical charged as it limits biased elections and has not previously (on its own at least) been a central feature of Thai governance in the past.
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These results show that there has been increasing support for all alternative forms of government over the course of the survey period 2001-2014. As of 2014, military government has the highest level of support at 54.3%, while a strong leader with neither elections nor parliament sits at 37.6%, Single party system at 34.8% and technocracy at 32.3%. Of these, only military government (54.3%) makes up a majority of the population, however it is unclear whether a mixture of these features - for example military-technocratic rule – would be more widely accepted.
As a final note on Table 5, there is appears to be a correlation between the most commonly supported alternative regime and the actual government during the survey period. In 2001 Thaksin was elected as Prime Minister and built a very large coalition to ensure that he could not be removed by parliament in a vote of no confidence. In effect, Thaksin had built a politically complicated semi-single party system in which he as Prime Minister had widespread executive and legislative power. Moving on to 2006 the most widely supported alternative regime was for a strong leader without elections or parliament. By this point, Thaksin’s personality and executive power had become much greater than in 2001, and he won a much larger straight majority in 2005. In 2010 the Prime Minister was Abhisit Vejjajiva, who was appointed to the position in 2008 after the parties in the elected government were dissolved. Despite not being a particularly strong leader in comparison to Thaksin, Abhisit was unelected and the parliament weakened. During the first month of the 2014 survey, Prayuth Chan-Ocha was appointed as Prime Minister, correlating precisely with the 54.3% in favor of a military government.
These may be coincidental, but could also point to a bias in the way that the participants responded to the surveys, or in the way that the data collection was approached. Prayuth Chan-Ocha’s coup d’etat of May 2014 was under a banner of reconciliation, with the coup and subsequent military government acting as a large reset button for the country’s recent turbulent political environment. Perhaps this rhetoric had become widely accepted, or even that very rhetoric was sourced from a general public malaise.
Table 6. Mean of not support for the alternatives to democratic government
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(1 = support the alternatives to democratic government,
4= not support the alternatives to democratic government or fully favor for democracy)
Survey Year Questions 2001 2006 2010 2014 Not support for ‘strong leader, no elections 3.15 3.00 3.15 2.83 or parliament’ Not support for ‘single party system’ 2.76 3.11 3.28 2.89 Not support for’ military government’ 3.27 3.11 3.30 2.42 Not support for ‘technocracy’ 3.20 -* 3.32 2.87 Support for democracy (total of 16) 12.38 12.28[9.22]** 13.05 11.01 * This question was not asked in 2006
** Because the final question was not asked in 2006 this figure has been adjusted in line with the other responses for that year (3.072)
Figure 3. Commitment and support for democracy
Table 6 shows a small decline in support for democracy in 2014, having peaked in 2011. Figure 3 however provides greater clarity of the whole data set. Military government had the least support in 2001, and this held true until 2011 when it became the second least favorite next to technocracy. By 2014 however, support for military government increased dramatically to less 2.42. This switch in support may be indicative of political fatigue that set in after almost a decade of political crises and divisiveness.
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Comparing by region, in 2001, bangkokian is the most support for democracy. The single party system is the one alternative regime which almost regions accept, consisting of the northeast, the center, the north, and the south, respectively. After that, the people are lower support for democracy because of Thailand’s political crisis. The demonstration occurs in Bangkok by the anti-Thaksin group. Thus, the people in Bangkok become to not support for democracy.
In 2010, the center is most support for democracy. On the other hand, the south is not support for it. They accept the strong leader, the military government, the experts, and the single party system, respectively. In 2014, people don’t believe in democracy, especially the north and Bangkok. Moreover, the northeast accepts the military government with 2.16 point from 4.00. The details are as in the previous table.
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Table 7. Mean of not support for the alternatives to democratic government, comparing by regions
(1 = support the alternatives to democratic government,
4= not support the alternatives to democratic government or fully favor for democracy)
Not Wave 1 (2001) Wave 2 (2006) Wave 3 (2010) Wave 4 (2014) support BKK N C NE S BKK N C NE S BKK N C NE S BKK N C NE S for.. 3.44 3.00 3.18 3.20 2.97 2.85 3.09 2.80 3.13 3.12 3.37 3.15 3.37 3.12 2.66 2.67 2.66 3.19 2.81 2.55 Strong leader P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00
3.25 2.81 2.57 2.70 2.81 2.98 2.98 3.05 3.17 3.33 3.55 3.40 3.32 3.29 2.89 2.82 2.89 3.25 2.72 2.79 Single party system P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00
3.51 3.24 3.15 3.28 3.34 2.92 3.17 3.01 3.11 3.39 3.18 3.21 3.41 3.50 2.77 2.74 2.59 2.55 2.16 2.54 Military government P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00
3.25 3.23 3.10 3.28 3.12 * 3.44 3.35 3.47 3.36 2.82 2.69 2.74 3.20 2.81 2.67
Technocracy P = 0.37 P = 0.00 P = 0.00
Support for 13.43 12.23 11.93 12.37 12.14 11.67 12.32 11.81 12.55 13.12 13.09 12.08 13.12 12.97 10.84 9.98 9.77 11.55 10.47 10.29 democracy (total of 16) Sig P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00 P = 0.00 * This question was not asked in 2006
** Because the final question was not asked in 2006 this figure has been adjusted in line with the other responses for that year
BKK = Bangkok, N = North, C = Center, NE = Northeast, S = South
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Factors affecting the support for democracy in Thailand
The variables used to determine support for democracy in Thailand consisted of trust in the Prime Minister; frequency of following political news; satisfaction with the democratic process; satisfaction with the current government, gender, age, level of education, household income and residency either within or outside of Bangkok. The following tables (Tables 8 - 12) show the statistical results of these.
Table 8. Model of factors affecting the support for democracy in Thailand, ABS (2001)
Model Unstandardized Standardized Sig. Coefficients Coefficients t Std. B Beta Error
1 (Constant) 10.702 0.709 15.105 0.000
Gender (male = 1 female = 2) -0.092 0.143 -0.017 -0.642 0.521
Age -0.002 0.005 -0.011 -0.403 0.687
Education 0.053 0.037 0.046 1.430 0.153
Household income 0.042 0.070 0.018 0.594 0.553
How often do you follow news about 0.361 0.060 0.157 5.974 0.000*** politics?
Satisfaction with the way democracy 0.088 0.117 0.020 0.747 0.455 works in our country
How satisfied with the current 0.213 0.119 0.049 1.799 0.072 government
Resident (BKK = 0 Non BKK = 1) -1.359 0.238 -0.155 -5.707 0.000***
Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy R2 = .057 F = 11.209 sig. = 0.000 * sig at < .05; ** sig. at < .01; *** sig. at <.001
a significant at the .05 level
Using Table 7, one can interpret that there are only two factors which significantly affected to support for democracy of Thai in 2001; the frequency to follow political news, the more following the political news the more support for democracy. 1
Moreover, respondents from Bangkok had greater support for democracy than those from outside of the city.
Table 9. Model of factors affecting the support for democracy in Thailand, ABS (2006)
Model Unstandardized Standardized Sig. Coefficients Coefficients t Std. B Beta Error
1 (Constant) 9.291 0.734 12.659 0
Gender (male = 1 female = 2) -0.027 0.138 -0.006 -0.194 0.846
Age 0.006 0.005 0.039 1.181 0.238
Education 0.091 0.038 0.089 2.378 0.018*
Monthly Household Income -0.126 0.076 -0.063 -1.665 0.096
Trust in Prime Minister or president -0.366 0.099 -0.127 -3.692 0.000***
How often do you follow news about 0.068 0.072 0.028 0.935 0.35 politics and government
On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied 0.041 0.106 0.013 0.39 0.697 are you with the way democracy works in [country]?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with -0.15 0.103 -0.053 -1.463 0.144 the [name of present] government?
Resident (BKK = 0 Non BKK = 1) 0.489 0.245 0.069 2 0.046*
Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy R2 = .037 F = 4.726 sig. = 0.000 * sig at < .05; ** sig. at < .01; *** sig. at <.001
a significant at the .05 level In 2006, the level of education, trust in prime minister and area of residency were the greatest factors affecting support for democracy. People with higher education and living outside of Bangkok had the highest support for democracy. Moreover people with little trust in the Prime Minister in turn had little support for democracy. Since, a
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series of events occurred in Thailand as a result of unrest with Thaksin Shinawatra that was supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and his coalitions in 2005 - 2006.
Table 10. Model of factors affecting the support for democracy in Thailand, ABS (2010)
Model Unstandardized Standardized Sig. Coefficients Coefficients t Std. B Beta Error
1 (Constant) 13.727 0.889 15.436 0.000
Gender (male = 1 female = 2) -0.555 0.177 -0.089 -3.137 0.002**
Age -0.002 0.007 -0.010 -0.296 0.767
Education 0.083 0.046 0.061 1.800 0.072
Monthly Household Income -0.055 0.051 -0.032 -1.073 0.284
Trust in Prime Minister or president 0.097 0.126 0.028 0.772 0.441
How often do you follow news about 0.273 0.081 0.095 3.359 0.001** politics and government
On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in 0.003 0.122 0.001 0.023 0.982 [country]?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with -0.567 0.132 -0.162 -4.314 0.000*** the [name of present] government?
Resident (BKK = 0 Non BKK = 1) -0.436 0.312 -0.042 -1.398 0.162
Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy R2 = .050 F = 7.067 sig. = 0.000 * sig at < .05; ** sig. at < .01; *** sig. at <.001
a significant at the .05 level
In 2010 gender become the most important factor, as well as following political news and satisfaction with the government. Males had greater support for democracy than females by a significant margin. Those dissatisfied with the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva and follow the political news had greater support for democracy.
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Table 11. Model of factors affecting the support for democracy in Thailand, ABS (2014)
Model Unstandardized Standardized Sig. Coefficients Coefficients t Std. B Beta Error
1 (Constant) 9.067 1.195 7.585 0.000
Gender (male = 1 female = 2) -0.335 0.216 -0.051 -1.557 0.120
Age 0.052 0.009 0.204 5.530 0.000***
Education 0.114 0.057 0.081 2.016 0.044*
Monthly Household Income 0.334 0.111 0.114 2.999 0.003*
Trust in Prime Minister or president -0.309 0.155 -0.068 -1.990 0.047*
How often do you follow news about 0.033 0.100 0.011 0.333 0.739 politics and government
On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in -0.967 0.167 -0.197 -5.788 0.000*** [country]?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with -0.255 0.170 -0.051 -1.504 0.133 the [name of present] government?
Resident (BKK = 0 Non BKK = 1) 3.024 0.468 0.242 6.455 0.000***
Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy R2 = .127 F = 13.672 sig. = 0.000 * sig at < .05; ** sig. at < .01; *** sig. at <.001
a significant at the .05 level In 2014 there were six factors which affected to support for democracy, consisting of age, level of education, household income, trust in prime minister, satisfaction with the way democracy works, and residence. The older, higher educated and higher income groups had more support for democracy, whilst younger, lower education and lower income had less support for democracy. Those will little trust in prime minister and who were dissatisfied with the democratic process had the most
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support for democracy. Finally, those residents outside of Bangkok had the least appetite for undemocratic government.
Table 12. The important factors that affect the support of democracy, comparing by the period of survey
Correlation coefficients Model 2001 2006 2010 2014
Gender (male = 1 female = 2) (-0.555)**
Age (0.052)***
Education (0.091)* (0.114)*
Monthly Household Income (0.334)*
Trust in Prime Minister or president (-0.366)*** (-0.309)*
How often do you follow news about politics (0.361)*** (0.273)** and government
On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in (-0.967)*** [country]?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the (-0.567)*** [name of present] government?
BKK/Non BKK (BKK = 0 Non BKK = 1) (-1.359)*** (0.489)* (3.024)***
* Correlation coefficients are expressed as values between +1 and -1. A coefficient of +1 indicates a perfect positive correlation: A change in the value of one variable will predict a change in the same direction in the second variable. A coefficient of -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation: A change in the value of one variable predicts a change in the opposite direction in the second variable. Lesser degrees of correlation are expressed as non-zero decimals. A coefficient of zero indicates there is no discernable relationship between fluctuations of the variables. * sig at < .05; ** sig. at < .01; *** sig. at <.001
(This table highlights the important factors that affect the support of democracy in each survey. Analysis of the result is shown earlier.)
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Conclusions
Similar to the results in Thailand Country Report: Public Opinion and Political Power in Thailand (Second Wave of Asian Barometer Survey), the data in 2014 also show that there is less support for democracy in Bangkok than outside of the capital. That is, the Bangkok populace is skeptical of the way democracy works in Thailand. This is shown by the general decrease in the belief that the government is democratic in Table 4, Figure 2 and Table 11.
Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest how there is an increase in satisfaction and trust during the period before the coup in 2014. Nonetheless, from the results of the fourth wave in Table 2, there is a constant decline in satisfaction with the way democracy works, yet an increase with satisfaction over the performance of the Prime Minister after the 2014 coup. This contradicts with theories that suggest that trust in prime minister and satisfaction with the way democracy works are indicators of support of democracy. Regarding other factors, the results also conform to the worldwide trend that younger people are more pessimistic about politics than the older generations, though it is unclear why this is the case in Thailand. In addition, education is an indicator of support of democracy in Thailand proving Lipset’s claim but disagreeing with recent empirical trends. Likewise, income as a factor of support of democracy also is supported by Lipset’s theory. More importantly, support of democracy generally decreased in 2014, as the Thai public display more acceptances of alternatives to democracy.
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