SUCCESSFUL BRADY/NAPUE CASES (Updated September 6, 2017) * capital case I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT *Wearry v. Cain 136 S.Ct. 1002 (2016) (per curiam) United States Supreme Court summarily reverses Louisiana court’s denial of postconviction relief on Brady claim, holding that state prejudicially failed to disclose material evidence including inmates’ statements casting doubt on the credibility of the testimony of the state’s key witnesses. Wearry was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to death, largely on the basis of testimony of two inmates, Scott and Brown, both of whose testimony was significantly different from the various statements they had provided to law enforcement prior to trial. There was no physical evidence linking Wearry to the crime and Wearry presented an alibi defense at trial. After Wearry’s conviction became final, he obtained information that the prosecution had withheld (1) police reports that indicated that one inmate had reported that Scott “wanted to make sure [Wearry] gets the needle cause he jacked over me” and another inmate lied to investigators at Scott’s urging, stating that he had witnessed the murder; (2) information that Brown had twice sought a deal to reduce his sentence in exchange for testifying against Wearry, and that the police had told him they would talk to the DA; and (3) medical records on Hutchinson, an individual whom Scott had reported ran into the street to flag down the victim on the night of the murder, pulled the victim out of the car, and shoved him into the cargo space and got into the cargo space himself. The medical records indicated that nine days before the murder Hutchinson had undergone knee surgery and would not have been able to run, bend, or lift substantial weight. The new evidence is sufficient to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict. “The State’s trial evidence resembles a house of cards, built on the jury crediting Scott’s account rather than Wearry’s alibi.” 136 S.Ct. at 1006. “Scott’s credibility, already impugned by his many inconsistent stories, would have been further diminished had the jury learned that Hutchinson may have been physically incapable of performing the role Scott ascribed to him, that Scott had coached another inmate to lie about the murder and thereby enhance his chances to get out of jail, or that Scott may have implicated Wearry to settle a personal score. Moreover, any juror who found Scott more credible in light of Brown’s testimony might have thought differently had she learned that Brown may have been motivated to come forward not by his sister’s relationship with the victim’s sister—as the prosecution had insisted in its closing argument—but by the possibility of a reduced sentence on an existing conviction.” Id. at 1006-07. The Louisiana court improperly evaluated the materiality of each piece of withheld evidence rather than all of them cumulatively. *Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) In Louisiana death penalty case, reversing denial of post-conviction relief where the prosecution failed to disclose statements by the only eyewitness to the five murders that he was unable to Habeas Assistance and Training 09/06/17 Successful Brady/Napue Cases -1 describe or identify any of the three assailants. The suppressed evidence was material given that the eyewitness provided the only evidence linking the defendant to the murders and the undisclosed statements directly contradicted the eyewitness' emphatic identification of the defendant at trial as the first gunman to enter the room where the killings occurred. That the eyewitness made inconsistent statements on the night of the murder suggesting that he could identify the first gunman did not render the undisclosed statements immaterial. Nor did the State's speculation that the undisclosed statements could have been made because of the eyewitness' fear of retaliation. (Dissent by Thomas.) *Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) Texas death row inmate was entitled to habeas relief from his death sentence due to the prosecution’s suppression of evidence of a trial witness's informant status where that witness's testimony was key to the prosecution’s claim of future dangerousness and the witness was not otherwise effectively impeached. Petitioner established cause for his failure to present the evidence establishing the Brady violation to the state court in that petitioner reasonably relied on the government’s pre-trial promise to disclose all Brady material, and the state had continued to deny that the witness was an informant at state post-conviction proceedings. *Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) Reversing denial of habeas relief as to capital conviction and death sentence where state withheld eyewitness and informant statements, and a list of license numbers. Withheld evidence is to be evaluated collectively, not item-by-item, and the standard is a "reasonable probability" of a different result. The Court also made clear that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." 514 U.S. at 437. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) Government failed to disclose impeachment evidence of a promise of immunity in exchange for testimony. Prosecutor's knowing creation of a false impression requires new trial "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the verdict." *Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) Illinois death row inmate entitled to habeas relief where prosecution knowingly misrepresented paint-stained shorts as blood-stained, and failed to disclose the true nature of the stains. Habeas Assistance and Training 09/06/17 Successful Brady/Napue Cases -2 *Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecution. (Here, the state court had concluded that Brady was entitled to resentencing because of the prosecution’s failure to disclose an extrajudicial statement by the co-defendant where he admitted to being the actual killer. The Supreme Court affirmed the state court’s ruling that Brady was not entitled to a new guilt-innocence trial.) Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) "When reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure of immunity deal with witness violates Due Process. In addition, “a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103; Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213. And “[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” See Alcorta v. State of Texas, 355 U.S. 28. II. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 2017) In conspiracy to launder drug proceeds case, appeals court vacates judgment of district court on Brady claim and remands for further consideration of the claim. Defendant was indicted and charged with counts of conspiring to launder drug proceeds with the Zetas, a Mexican gang, by buying, training, and racing quarter horses in the U.S. and Mexico. He was convicted and sentenced to 200 months in prison and forfeiture of his personal property and a $60 million money judgment. Prior to trial, he moved that the government provide all interview memoranda, and the district court granted the motion. The court reviewed the interview memoranda and denied defendant access to those relating to a particular witness, stating that nothing in them was helpful to the defense. The Court of Appeals holds that the district court did not consider all three prongs of Brady when determining not to disclose the memos; it is clear both from the court’s language and its timing that it considered only whether the interview memos were favorable, not whether they were material. Materiality of impeachment evidence may become clear only during or after a witness’s testimony and materiality of exculpatory evidence may become clear only upon a full review of trial evidence. Furthermore, the district court clearly erred in finding that the interview memos were not favorable to the defense. Some of the witness’s statements were exculpatory: they supported defendant’s theory that he did not buy the horses using Zeta money and instead bought the horses with his own money and gave them to the Zetas as gifts because he feared the Zetas, and that he did not join the conspiracy at all. Some of the witness’s statements in the memos were Habeas Assistance and Training 09/06/17 Successful Brady/Napue Cases -3 inconsistent with his trial testimony that the Zetas delivered money to defendant and that defendant was “friends” with one of the Zetas rather than afraid of him. Instead of addressing the second and third prongs of Brady (suppression and materiality), the Court of Appeals remands for full assessment of the memos and the interview notes associated with them (which the government contends not to have thoroughly reviewed). *Thomas v. Westbrooks, 849 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2017) (cert. pet. filed Aug. 17, 2017) Court of Appeals reverses district court’s denial of Thomas’s habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Tennessee conviction and death sentence. Thomas was convicted of felony murder arising from the shooting of an armored truck driver in the course of a robbery. Prior to his trial on this case, he was tried and convicted in federal court of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, all stemming from the same event.