Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov ESTTA Tracking number: ESTTA979902 Filing date: 06/11/2019
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Proceeding 91243206 Party Defendant Andre Rozier Correspondence FRANCIS JOHN CIARAMELLA Address RICK RUZ PLLC 300 SEVILLA AVENUE CORAL GABLES, FL 33134 UNITED STATES [email protected] 305-921-9326
Submission Opposition/Response to Motion Filer's Name Francis John Ciaramella, Esquire Filer's email [email protected] Signature /Francis John Ciaramella/ Date 06/11/2019 Attachments Motion in Opposition to Opposer Rule 56d Motion for Necessary Discov- ery.pdf(174888 bytes ) Exhibit A.pdf(5949976 bytes ) Exhibit B.pdf(103293 bytes ) Exhibit C.pdf(156497 bytes )
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
______
HAVOC BOXING PROMOTIONS LLC,
Opposer,
v. Opposition No. 91243206
ANDRE ROZIER,
Applicant.
______
APPLICANT’S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S RULE 56(d) MOTION FOR NECESSARY DISCOVERY
In response to Opposer’s Rule 56(d) Motion (“Motion”), filed by the Opposer on May 22,
2019, the Applicant hereby responds as follows. Here, the Opposer requests that the Board allow them to conduct additional discovery in order to respond fully to Applicant’s currently pending
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Applicant on May 2, 2019. However, here, the
Applicant has already produced substantial evidence to the Opposer documenting its prior use of a confusingly similar trademark, all before filing its Motion for Summary Judgment on May 2,
2019. Here, additional discovery under Rule 56(d) is not required in order to fully respond to
Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.1
BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2017, Applicant filed Trademark Application Serial No. 87/475,869
(hereafter, “Applicant’s Mark”) for the mark HAVOC V ATHLETICS for use with “Clothing, namely, t-shirts, athletic uniforms, socks, hats, footwear, boxing trunks, coats, underwear, dress
1 It is also noted that the Opposer did file a Response to Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment alongside its Rule 56(d) Motion on May 22, 2019. Applicant filed a reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on May 23, 2019. Page 1 of 17
shirts, suits, ties as clothing, shorts.” See 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit A, which consists of a copy of
Applicant’s Trademark Application Serial No. 87/475,869 for the mark HAVOC V
ATHLETICS; see also 7 TTABVUE, Declaration of Francis J. Ciaramella in Support of
Registrant’s Motion to Compel Discovery (“Ciaramella Decl.”) ¶2.
Applicant, ANDRE ROZIER, claims first use of the mark HAVOC in commerce at least as early as 1996. See 4 TTABVUE 3. See also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶3.
On August 23, 2018, the Opposer filed the instant Opposition No. 91243206 to oppose registration of Applicant’s Mark based upon priority and a likelihood of confusion with trademarks for HAVOC BOXING and H HAVOC BOXING owned by Opposer (hereafter,
“Opposer’s Marks”). Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit B, which consists of a copy of the Notice of Opposition. See also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶4.
On September 20, 2018, Applicant filed its Answer and Counterclaim with the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and counterclaimed that Opposer committed fraud on the
USPTO, and that Applicant’s HAVOC mark had priority of use in commerce. Please see 7
TTABVUE, Exhibit C, which consists of a copy of the Answer and Counterclaim to the Notice of Opposition. See also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶5.
On January 30, 2019, the Opposer served Applicant with its First Requests for Production of Documents and First Set of Interrogatories, which were due no later than March 1, 2019.
Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibits D and E, which consist of copies of the requests for production and interrogatories, respectively. See also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶6.
On March 1, 2019, counsel for the Applicant contacted Opposer to secure a one-week extension, making the deadline March 8, 2019. The same day, counsel for the Applicant memorialized this conversation in an email to counsel for the Opposer. Please see 7 TTABVUE,
Exhibit F, which consists of a copy of said email. See also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶7.
Page 2 of 17
On March 8, 2019, Applicant timely served upon Opposer its responses to Opposer’s
First Request for Production (with documents) and First Set of Interrogatories. Please see 7
TTABVUE, Exhibits G and H, which consist of copies of Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s requests for production (with documents) and interrogatories, respectively. See also 7
TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶8.
On March 28, 2019, Applicant served upon Opposer Applicant’s First Requests for
Admissions, Applicant’s First Set of Interrogatories, and Applicant’s First Requests for
Production of Documents (hereafter, “Applicant’s Discovery”), which were due no later than
April 29, 2019. Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibits I, J, and K, which consists of copies of
Applicant’s First Requests for Admission, Applicant’s First Set of Interrogatories, and
Applicant’s First Requests for Production; see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶9.
On Thursday, April 25, 2019, at approximately 6:05 pm EST, counsel for the Opposer contacted counsel for the Applicant via email and asked for a two-week extension to respond to
Applicant’s Discovery, and to extend the discovery period by 90 days. Please see 7 TTABVUE,
Exhibit L, which consists of a copy of Opposer’s counsel’s April 25, 2019 email; see also 7
TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶10.
After conferring with the Applicant beforehand, counsel for the Applicant informed counsel for the Opposer during a phone call on Monday, April 29, 2019 (the deadline for answering) that he would not be able to consent to an extension of time to respond to Applicant’s
Discovery. Counsel for the Applicant made it clear to counsel for the Opposer during their phone call that after discussing the extension request with their client (i.e., the Applicant) that he would not be able to consent to an extension. During the same phone conversation, counsel for the Opposer asked whether Applicant had any further documents within its possession, custody, or control that were responsive to Opposer’s Discovery Requests. Counsel for the Applicant
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informed Opposer that he just received some additional supplementary material and was preparing it for Opposer’s counsel. See 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶11.
On May 1, 2019, Opposer served Applicant its second set of requests for production of documents, second set of interrogatories, and first requests for admission. Please see 7
TTABVUE, Exhibits M, N, and O, which consist of copies of Opposer’s First Requests for
Admission, Opposer’s Second Set of Interrogatories, and Opposer’s Second Requests for
Production, respectively; see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶12.
On May 1, 2019, Applicant served upon the Opposer additional documents as previously discussed with Opposer’s counsel on April 29, 2019. Applicant’s counsel also reminded
Opposer that its responses to Applicant’s Discovery were late. Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit
P, which consists of a copy of Applicant’s additional produced documents. Please see 7
TTABVUE, Exhibit Q, which consists of a copy of Applicant’s counsel’s May 1, 2019 email specifying which documents were responsive to which of Opposer’s requests, and reminding
Opposer’s counsel that their responses to Applicant’s Discovery were still late (originally being due April 29, 2019); see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶13.
The same day, on May 1, 2019, Applicant’s counsel reminded Opposer’s counsel that
Applicant had never provided an extension to respond to Applicant’s Discovery. Please see 7
TTABVUE, Exhibit R, which consists of a copy of Applicant’s counsel’s May 1, 2019 email; see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶14.
Later, on May 1, 2019, Opposer’s counsel emailed Applicant’s counsel and stated that
Applicant should have informed Opposer that it was not going to provide Opposer with an extension earlier than the deadline they were due (i.e., on April 29, 2019 during counsels’ phone call), and that it would be excusable neglect on the part of the Opposer under Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b)(1)(B) due to Applicant not providing an extension, despite the deadline being well-known in
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advance. Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit S, which consists of a copy of Opposer’s counsel’s
May 1, 2019 email; see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶15.
Under TBMP § 407.03(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), and Trademark Rule 2.120(a)(3)
“A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” Here, Opposer’s responses would have been due 30 days from March 28, 2019, on April 29, 2019. See 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶9.
Applicant timely responded to Opposer’s Discovery on March 8, 2019, and was prepared to do so a week earlier if Opposer was unwilling to provide an extension. On March 28, 2019,
Applicant served upon Opposer Applicant’s Discovery, serving upon Opposer: Applicant’s First
Requests for Admission, Applicant’s First Set of Interrogatories, Applicant’s First Requests for
Production. Please see 7 TTABVUE, Exhibits I, J, and K; see also 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella
Decl. ¶9.
As of May 2, 2019, Opposer has not served upon Applicant any responses to either
Applicant’s First Requests for Admission, Applicant’s First Set of Interrogatories, or Applicant’s
First Requests for Production. See 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶16.
Accordingly, Opposer’s Responses to Applicant’s Discovery are late.
Thereafter, on May 3, 2019, Opposer lately served Applicant its Responses to
Applicant’s First Requests for Admissions and filed a Motion to Withdraw and Amend its
Admissions. See 11 TTABVUE, Exhibit A, which consists of a copy of Opposer’s lately served
Responses to Applicant’s First Requests for Admission.
Opposer did not serve Applicant with any responses to its First Set of Interrogatories or
First Requests for Production, which were originally due April 29, 2019.
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On May 30, 2019, Applicant served upon Opposer its Responses to Opposer’s Second
Request for Production (with documents), Second Set of Interrogatories, and First Requests for
Admission. See Exhibits A, B, and C attached hereto, which consist of the respective copy of each response.2
ARGUMENT
I. Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Should Not be Denied Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)
A party that believes it cannot effectively oppose a motion for summary judgment without first taking discovery, may file a request with the Board for time to take the needed discovery, which must be accompanied by an affidavit stating facts essential to justify its opposition to the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Opryland USA Inc. v. Great American
Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Keebler Co. v. Murray
Bakery Products, 866 F.2d 1386, 9 USPQ.2d 1736 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
As a general rule, the Board is liberal in its treatment of requests for discovery in response to motions for summary judgment. However, when a request for discovery under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(d) is granted by the Board, the discovery allowed is limited to that which the nonmoving party must have in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment. See T.
Jeffrey Quinn, TIPS FROM THE TTAB: Discovery Safeguards in Motions for Summary
Judgment: No Fishing Allowed, 80 Trademark Rep. 413 (1990). Cf. Fleming Companies v.
Thriftway Inc., 21 USPQ.2d 1451 (TTAB 1991), aff’d, 26 USPQ.2d 1551 (S.D. Ohio 1992).j
Here, Opposer submitted the Declaration of Peter S. Sloane (the “Sloane Decl.”) which attempts to explain what particular discoverable information is sought by the Opposer, how it
2 It is noted that the deadline to respond to Opposer’s Second Requests for Production, Second Set of Interrogatories, and First Request for Production is stayed due to Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. However, Applicant, in an effort to continue its discovery obligations and good faith participation, still timely served responses on May 30, 2019. Page 6 of 17
would preclude summary judgment, and why it has not previously been obtained. Specifically, the Sloane Decl. stated that the “Opposer is unable to allege facts necessary to fully oppose
Applicant’s MSJ, because discovery has been stayed since Applicant moved for summary judgment, preventing Opposer from receiving responses to discovery requests served on April
30, 2019.” See 10 TTABVUE, Sloane Decl. ¶13.
Moreover, the Opposer stated that they are “unable to allege facts necessary to fully oppose Applicant’s MSJ because the Board has yet to decide on Opposer’s Motion to Withdraw and Amend its Admissions. Id., Sloane Decl. ¶14. This is an improper basis upon which deny
Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(d). Specifically, here, Opposer’s admissions are deemed admitted because the Opposer knowingly missed the Applicant’s April
29, 2019 deadline to serve responses. The fact that the Opposer’s admissions are deemed admitted automatically does not deprive the Opposer of any facts necessary to fully oppose
Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. This is nothing more than a transparent attempt to avoid summary judgment based upon Opposer’s lately served admissions responses. A determination as to whether the Opposer is allowed to withdraw its admissions is made separately from a motion under rule 56(d), and the Opposer cannot rely upon its pending Motion to Withdraw its Admissions as a basis upon which to deny Applicant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56(d).
The Opposer also states that in order to fully support its opposition to Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the “Opposer requires discovery of information in Applicant’s possession, including any and all documents, information and testimony regarding, inter alia: (i) the specific nature and extent of the relationship between Applicant and Opposer from 2010 to present; (ii) Applicant’s use in commerce of its mark between 1996 to present; (iii) Applicant’s intention in filing a trademark application alleging an intent to use the mark; (iv) facts upon
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which Applicant bases its claim of superior rights to the marks at issue; and (iv) [sic] facts upon which Applicant bases its claim that Opposer has committed fraud on the USPTO.” Id., Sloane
Decl. ¶16.
Here, the Opposer’s Rule 56(d) Motion should be denied because the Opposer has not demonstrated that it is unable to oppose the motion for summary judgment without the discovery already in its possession. The Opposer’s reliance upon Opryland USA Inc. Great American
Music Show, Inc. is misplaced, as the current situation is highly distinguishable.
In Opryland USA Inc., the nonmoving party had not conducted any discovery, nor did it have any documents, testimony, or responses in order to respond to the moving party’s motion for summary judgment. See Opryland USA Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d
847, 23 USPQ.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Here, the Opposer seems to believe that its outstanding second requests for production, second set of interrogatories, and first requests for admission entitles it to relief on Section 56(d). This is improper for several reasons.
First, the Applicant has already responded to Opposer’s second requests for production, second set of interrogatories, and first requests for admission with supporting documentation (see
Exhibits A, B, and C attached hereto).
Second, even before submitting to Applicant its second requests for production, second set of interrogatories, and first requests for admission, the Applicant had already responded to
Opposer’s First Requests for Production and First Set of Interrogatories with supporting documentation before the filing of its Motion for Summary Judgment. Please see 7 TTABVUE,
Exhibits G and H, which consist of copies of Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s requests for production (with documents) and interrogatories, respectively; 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl.
¶8; 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit P, which consists of a copy of Applicant’s additional produced documents; 7 TTABVUE, Exhibit Q, which consists of a copy of Applicant’s counsel’s May 1,
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2019 email specifying which documents were responsive to which of Opposer’s requests, and reminding Opposer’s counsel that their responses to Applicant’s Discovery were still late
(originally being due April 29, 2019); and 7 TTABVUE, Ciaramella Decl. ¶13.
All of these responses, including admissions, declarations, interrogatory answers, and documents, provide to the Opposer numerous facts and information regarding the specific nature and extent of the relationship between Applicant and Opposer from 2010 to present, the
Applicant’s use in commerce of its mark between 1996 to present, the Applicant’s intention in filing a trademark application alleging an intent to use the mark, the facts upon which Applicant bases its claim of superior rights to the marks at issue; and the facts upon which Applicant bases its claim that Opposer has committed fraud on the USPTO.
Furthermore, Rule 56(e) states that a party opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). However, “[t]his requirement in turn is qualified by Rule 56(f)’s provision that summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Id. Consequently, it follows that if the nonmoving party has had the opportunity to discovery information, which the
Opposer has had on two separate occasions here, a motion for summary judgment should not be denied under Rule 56(d).
Quite simply, the Opposer already has enough discovery within its possession to fully respond to Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. Opposer’s Admissions Are Deemed Admitted
Opposer knew that its responses to Applicant’s discovery requests were due April 29,
2019. An Admission is admitted by operation of law by virtue of Opposer’s failure to timely
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respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Even now, Opposer provides no explanation for its original delay, or for its delay in seeking to reverse the automatic effects of Rule 36.
Moreover, Opposer has also failed entirely to respond to Applicant’s First Set of
Interrogatories and First Requests for Production of Documents, both of which were concurrently served with Applicant’s First Requests for Admission. Notably, Opposer does not even address the fact that as of the filing of this responsive motion, it has still not responded in any manner to Applicant’s other requests.
Opposer’s course of conduct evidences a refusal to participate in discovery. As such, permitting Opposer to withdraw its admissions-by-operation-of-law would not “promote the presentation of the merits” of this action. See 8 TTABVUE, at 3-4. Instead, allowing Opposer to withdraw its admissions now would also serve to prejudice Applicant, who would be forced to prepare and file a motion to compel due to Opposer’s failure to respond to its other requests.
If Opposer is held to the automatic effects of Rule 36 – as it should be – then it is undisputed that this matter is ripe for resolution by an order of summary judgment in Applicant’s favor, pursuant to Sections 2(d) of the Lanham Act, as well as fraud upon the USPTO.
III. Opposer’s Claim of First Use Date is Not Supported by Any Evidence of
Record
Opposer has made overtures in its Motion that due to the mere registration of its marks
(Registration Nos. 4,457,464 and 4,457,499) that its priority is presumed. See Motion at 7. The
Opposer, therefore, argues that its registrations have been used since 1994 (1996 in commerce), and that the Applicant only possess rights to a trademark that was filed based upon intent to use
(Applicant’s Serial No. 87/475,869). Id .at 7-8.
A presumption of validity attaches to a service mark registration, and the party seeking cancelation must rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. West Fla.
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Seafood Inc. v. Jet Rests. Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ.2d 1660, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Section 14(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 USC § 1064(1), provides that a cancellation action may be brought on the ground of likelihood of confusion before a registration is five years old. Here, the Applicant counterclaimed priority and a likelihood of confusion before the
Registrant’s marks turned five years old.
Here, the Opposer claims use in commerce as early as 1996. However, the Opposer has provided no evidence to support this claim, and has produced no documents to the Applicant, and has produced no responses to Applicant’s interrogatories. In contrast, the Applicant has supplied to the Opposer a substantial amount of documentation and answers to its two sets of interrogatories demonstrating that Applicant has used the mark as early as 1996. Not only has the Opposer not provided any evidence as far back as 1996, it has not produced any evidence showing use as far back as 2010 (when the Opposer through its CEO first met the Applicant).
Opposer has produced no evidence whatsoever to the contrary and has failed to participate in any meaningful way in discovery. The Applicant, in contrast, has timely responded to Opposer’s first and second requests for production, Opposer’s first and second sets of interrogatories, and
Opposer’s first request for production.
Consequently, a preponderance of the evidence currently of record demonstrates that the
Applicant is in fact the prior user.
IV. There is No Material Dispute of Fact
To establish a likelihood of confusion on a motion for summary judgment, the Applicant must establish that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that (1) Opposer’s use of the marks HAVOC BOXING and H HAVOC BOXING is likely to cause confusion among consumers as to the sponsorship, affiliation or connection of goods offered under the parties’ respective marks; and (2) that Applicant has priority of use. See, e.g., Lipton Indus., Inc. v.
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Ralston Purina Co., 213 USPQ 185, 187 (CCPA 1982); Hornblower & Weeks, Inc., 60 USPQ.2d
1733, 1735 (TTAB 2001).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) provides that requests for admission are deemed admitted as a matter of law if the receiving party failed to respond within the required time period.
“A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” 37 CFR § 2.120(a)(3).
Here, Opposer has submitted no timely esponses to Applicant’s Discovery (including
Applicant’s Requests for Admission). If a party on which requests for admission have been served fails to timely respond thereto, the requests will stand admitted by operation of law.
Fram Trak Industries v. Wiretracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2005 (TTAB 2006) (requests for admissions deemed admitted by respondent’s failure to respond to petitioner’s requests for admissions); Pinnochio’s Pizza Inc. v. Sandra Inc., 11 USPQ2d 1227, 1228 n.5 (TTAB 1989)
(requests for admissions deemed admitted by respondent’s failure to respond to petitioner’s requests for admissions).
To avoid the requests being admitted by operation of law, the party must show that its failure to timely respond was the result of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); Giersch v. Scripps Networks Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1306, 1307 (TTAB 2007) (counsel’s mistaken belief that opposing counsel would grant an extension for responding to admissions did not constitute excusable neglect to reopen time to respond under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, because Opposer has failed to provide any responses to Applicant’s
Discovery, Applicant’s First Requests for Admissions are conclusively admitted and established.
Hence, there is no dispute of material fact. See 7 TTABVUE.
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a. Opposer Has Not Demonstrated Excusable Neglect
Insofar as excusable neglect is concerned, it is without merit. Id., Exhibit S. To avoid the requests being admitted by operation of law, the party must show that its failure to timely respond was the result of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); Giersch v. Scripps
Networks Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1306, 1307 (TTAB 2007) (counsel’s mistaken belief that opposing counsel would grant an extension for responding to admissions did not constitute excusable neglect to reopen time to respond under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)) (emphasis added).
Here, the requisite showing to be made by the moving party (i.e., Opposer) is that of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); TBMP §§ 509.01(b)(1). In determining whether there has been excusable neglect, four factors are considered: (1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the moving party; and (4) whether the moving party has acted in good faith. See Pioneer Investment Services
Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); Vital
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Conrad J. Kronholm, Jr., 99 USPQ.2d 1708 (TTAB July 22, 2011).
i. There is a Danger of Prejudice to the Non-Moving Party
In the current proceeding, there is measurable prejudice that would be incurred by the
Applicant. As stated above, the Opposer has completely failed to respond to either Applicant’s
First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production. Accordingly, the Applicant is otherwise prejudiced as it is left with no other recourse but to file a motion to compel, and again, waste the Board’s time and resources in forcing the Opposer to respond to the Applicant’s other discovery requests.
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting Applicant’s Motion.
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ii. The Reason for Delay Was Within the Control of the Opposer
Here, the Opposer has completely failed to explain why it did not timely serve its responses to Applicant’s First Requests for Admission, or why it still has not responded to either
Applicant’s First Set of Interrogatories or Applicant’s First Requests for Production. Moreover, the Opposer has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances as to why it did not timely answer Applicant’s First Requests for Admission. As such, the delay was wholly within the control of the Opposer.
In subsequent applications of the Pioneer test, several courts and the Board have stated that the reason for the delay and whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, is generally considered the most important factor in a particular case. See Pumpkin, Ltd. v. Seed
Corps, 43 USPQ.2d 1582 (TTAB 1997).
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting Applicant’s Motion.
V. Applicant’s Fraud Claims are Supported by the Record
In its original counterclaim against Opposer, Applicant asserted that the Opposer committed fraud upon the USPTO, namely, that Opposer knew of Applicant and his HAVOC mark at least as early as 2010, roughly two years prior to its filing of Trademark Serial Nos.
85/740,903 and 85/747,962. See 4 TTABVUE at 4-7.
To prove fraud, the Applicant must establish that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the Opposer knowingly made false, material representations with the intent to deceive the USPTO into issuing registrations to which it knew it was not entitled. In re Bose Corp., 580
F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
When reviewing the previously produced evidence alongside the discovery responses the
Opposer now makes, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Opposer knew of both Applicant and his HAVOC mark at the time it filed Trademark Serial Nos. 85/740,903 and 85/747,962. In
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other words, the Opposer, through its CEO Robert Diaz, knowingly lied when he stated that “he believes the applicant (here, the Opposer) to be the owner of the trademark/service mark sought to be registered…[and] to the best of his knowledge and belief no other person, firm, corporation, or association has the right to use the mark in commerce, either in identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; and that all statements made of his own knowledge are true; and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Applicant requests that the Board reject Applicant’s Rule
56(d) Motion and enter summary judgment in its favor and cancel Registration Nos. 4,457,464 and 4,457,499 on the basis of a likelihood of confusion.
Alternatively, the Opposer’s actions and subsequent admissions establish that it has committed fraud upon the USPTO and, thus, the Opposer’s Registrations should be cancelled as a matter of law.
It is in the best interests of judicial economy that TBMP § 407.03(a) be strictly enforced by the Board. The Board has great discretion in determining whether to allow late responses should the Opposer decide to submit any. However, in deciding whether to exercise that discretion to allow late responses, the Opposer should be required to explain why it has not submitted any responses on time, and why it has still not submitted responses to Applicant’s
First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production.
Opposer should not be rewarded with the ability to submit late responses, when it has wholly failed to respond to any of Applicant’s Requests for Production or Interrogatories and has failed to respond to Applicant’s Requests for Admission within the proper time frame.
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Further proceedings would waste the Board’s and the parties’ resources. Applicant therefore requests summary judgment in its favor and dismissal of the opposition.
By:
_/Francis J. Ciaramella/______Francis John Ciaramella, Esquire Florida Bar No. 111927
Rick Ruz, PLLC 7355 SW 87th Avenue Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33173 Phone: (305) 921-9326 Fax: (888) 506-2833
Attorneys for Applicant
Dated: June 11, 2019
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that a true copy of the foregoing APPLICANT’S MOTION IN
OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S RULE 56(d) MOTION FOR NECESSARY DISCOVERY has served on the following via email:
PETER S SLOANE LEASON ELLIS LLP ONE BARKER AVENUE, FIFTH FLOOR WHITE PLAINS, NY 10601 UNITED STATES [email protected]
By:____/Francis John Ciaramella/_____ Francis John Ciaramella, Esq. Florida Bar No. 111927
Dated: June 11, 2019
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Exhibit A IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
______
HAVOC BOXING PROMOTIONS LLC,
Opposer,
v. Opposition No. 91243206
ANDRE ROZIER,
Applicant.
______
APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO OPPOSER’S SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
Pursuant the Trademark Rules of Practice and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Applicant, ANDRE ROZIER (“Applicant”), through his undersigned counsel, hereby responds to Opposer’s Second Request for Production of Documents propounded by Opposer, HAVOC
BOXING PROMOTIONS LLC (“Opposer”), as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
In addition to the objections separately set forth in response to certain of the requests,
Applicant’s responses are provided subject to the following General Objections, which are hereby expressly incorporated by reference into each and every one of the specific responses below. The failure to include at this time any general or specific objection to a request is neither intended as, nor shall in any way be deemed, a waiver of Applicant’s right to assert that or any other objection at a later date.
1. Applicant objects to Opposer’s instructions and definitions to the extent they require disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. Furthermore, Applicant objects to the Requests to the extent they request information from any and all agents, attorneys, investigators, consultants, experts, and other representatives Applicant has retained.
2. Applicant objects to each and every Request to the extent it calls for information to which Opposer has equal or greater access than Applicant.
3. Applicant objects to each and every Request to the extent it requires Applicant to obtain and compile information from third parties.
4. Applicant objects to Opposer’s definition of "you" and "your" to the extent Opposer seeks to obtain information outside Applicant’s personal knowledge and/or seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and or work product doctrine.
5. Applicant objects to these Requests to the extent they purport to impose duties and obligations which exceed or are different from those imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or court orders in this action.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
23. Applicant objects to this request to the extent to which it requires Applicant to provide
Opposer with documents to which Opposer has equal access. Specifically, the instant
request asks for documents relating to the incorporation of the Opposer-company.
24. Applicant objects to this request to the extent to which it requires Applicant to provide
Opposer with documents to which Opposer has equal access. Specifically, the instant
request merely asks for all documents relating to the funding of the Opposer-company.
25. To the best of Applicant’s knowledge, and after a diligent search, no such documents are
in existence, or otherwise within the possession, custody, or control of the Applicant.
26. To the best of Applicant’s ability, Applicant will produce representative documents
showing Applicant’s history with the word HAVOC, and its origins. Opposer is also directed to the many news articles already produced demonstrating Applicant’s affiliation
with the term HAVOC.
27. Applicant objects to this request as duplicative of earlier and similar requests made by
Opposer. Specifically, the instant request refers to clothing items bearing Applicant’s
HAVOC mark. The Opposer is directed to the previous documents submitted in response
to its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories.
28. Applicant objects to this request as duplicative of earlier and similar requests made by
Opposer. Specifically, the instant request refers to social media advertisements by the
Applicant. The Opposer is directed to the previous documents submitted in response to
its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories.
29. Applicant objects to this request as duplicative of earlier and similar requests made by
Opposer. Specifically, the instant request refers documents showing that Applicant sells
his products at boxing events. The Opposer is directed to the previous documents
submitted in response to its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories.
30. To the best of Applicant’s ability, Applicant will produce representative documents
demonstrating how Applicant sells or distributes its goods sold under the HAVOC mark.
Opposer is also directed to the documents already produced showing Applicant’s use of
its HAVOC mark.
31. To the best of Applicant’s ability, Applicant will produce representative documents
showing Applicant’s history with the Opposer. Opposer is also directed to the documents
already produced showing Applicant’s relationship with the Opposer.
32. Applicant objects to this request as duplicative of earlier and similar requests made by
Opposer. Specifically, the instant request refers use of the Applicant’s HAVOC mark in
commerce. The Opposer is directed to the previous documents submitted in response to its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories, which show use of
Applicant’s HAVOC mark over many years.
33. Applicant objects to this request as duplicative of earlier and similar requests made by
Opposer. Specifically, the instant request refers use of the Applicant’s HAVOC mark in
commerce. The Opposer is directed to the previous documents submitted in response to
its first requests for production and first set of interrogatories, which show use of
Applicant’s HAVOC mark over many years.
34. Applicant objects to this Request as overly broad and unduly burdensome. Specifically,
the instant Request is a “catch-all” designed to seek additional documents beyond those
already identified to be produced and is duplicative. Furthermore, the instant request
lacks proportionality and is unlikely to lead to additional discoverable evidence.
By: _/Francis J. Ciaramella/______Francis J. Ciaramella, Esq. Florida Bar Number: 111927
Rick Ruz, PLLC 7355 SW 87th Avenue Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33173 Phone: (305) 921-9326 Fax: (888) 506-2833
Attorneys for Applicant
Dated: May 30, 2019
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that a true copy of the foregoing Applicant’s Response to Opposer’s Second
Request for Production of Documents has been served on the following via email:
PETER S SLOANE LEASON ELLIS LLP ONE BARKER AVENUE, FIFTH FLOOR WHITE PLAINS, NY 10601 UNITED STATES [email protected]
By:____/Francis John Ciaramella/_____ Francis John Ciaramella, Esq. Florida Bar No. 111927
Dated: May 30, 2019
5/30/2019 Rozier wrecking Havoc in the corner and behind the sewing machine