Best Practices for Anti-Corruption Commissions
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BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS QUERY SUMMARY Could you please provide an overview of best practices for anti-corruption commissions? Inspired by the well-known and well-documented success of the Hong Kong and Singapore PURPOSE experiences, anti-corruption commissions have mushroomed across the world since the 1990s. This paper will serve as a resource for a Despite their varying levels of success, they are comparative assessment of anti-corruption often still considered by most stakeholders to be the commissions involving various countries. ultimate response to corruption. CONTENT The structures and activities of anti-corruption commissions differ significantly from one country to 1. General recommendations for anti-corruption another, affecting their respective effectiveness and commissions independence. In spite of the fact that anti- 2. Country examples of good practices corruption commissions have existed for several 3. References decades, common global principles for them were only agreed upon by representatives of anti- corruption commissions and international organisations in 2012, with the Jakarta Statement. This paper provides an overview of the principles \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ and standards endorsed in the Jakarta Statement, which can contribute to creating robust and Author(s) independent anti-corruption commissions that Sofia Wickberg, Transparency International inspire public confidence and effectively reduce [email protected] corruption. The paper also points to a number of Reviewed by country examples to illustrate these “best practices.” Marie Chêne, Transparency International Robin Hodess, PhD., Transparency International Date Submitted: 21 February 2013 Responded: 21 March 2013 © 2013 Transparency International. All rights reserved. BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS Anti-corruption commissions are mandated differently 1. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS depending on country contexts; in 2008 the OECD FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION developed a typology of the existing models: COMMISSIONS The multi-purpose agency represents the most common model of a single-agency approach, A number of international conventions, both at global combining the aspects of repression and and regional levels, establish the international legal prevention of corruption. This is the model on framework in which anti-corruption commissions which are shaped the Hong Kong Independent operate. There is agreement among international Commission against Corruption and the legal instruments, such as the United Nations Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), that states Bureau. ought to establish a body (or several bodies) to The law enforcement agencies model either prevent and combat corruption through law combines the three functions of detection, enforcement. The international legal framework investigation and prosecution of corruption advises that such institutions be independent, cases, or specialises in detection/ investigation or protected from undue influence and have adequate prosecution. This model is the most common in training and resources to undertake their duties. Anti- Western Europe. corruption commissions or agencies (ACCs or ACAs) The preventive, policy development and co- are one form of the above. ordination institutions focus more on corruption- related research, coordination of anti-corruption The first anti-corruption commission was set up in policies and action plans, monitoring conflict of Singapore in 1952, followed by Malaysia, Hong Kong interest regulations, elaboration of codes of and others. Asia has even been nicknamed the conduct, facilitation of trainings, etc. This is a “cradle of ACAs” (De Jaegere 2012). The explosion model that can be found in France, India, Albania of the number of anti-corruption commissions and Montenegro, for example. worldwide happened later, in the 1990s; there are currently nearly 150 such entities throughout the Despite their popularity, literature has become world. ACAs often emerge in a context of corruption increasingly sceptical about the effectiveness of anti- scandals, are formed through broad political corruption commissions (De Jaegere 2012). The consensus and are regarded by most stakeholders impact of ACAs varies greatly from one context to as the ultimate response to corruption (De Sousa another due to a number of key factors that condition 2009a). their success, such as political will to effectively fight corruption, public support for the cause and the ACA, ACCs or ACAs play a unique role in a country’s etc. De Jaegere states that many ACAs have institutional framework, complementing the role of suffered from their success, ending up failing their traditional anti-corruption actors or law enforcement duties because their zealous leadership are bodies. ACCs are publicly funded entities of a dismissed, imprisoned or forced to resign when they durable nature, whose specific mission is to fight start questioning the status quo. corruption and reduce the opportunities for it to occur in a country. It is the only entity mandated exclusively The challenges that anti-corruption agencies face are to combat corruption through a combination of both internal and external in nature. Some obstacles repressive, preventive and educational measures (De are linked to poor institutional design, lack of Sousa 2009a). Anti-corruption commissions often planning and lack of efficient management and work closely with other state bodies, such as law qualified staff, whereas other challenges have to do enforcement agencies, supreme audit institutions and with the environment in which these agencies ministries of education, and usually have the operate, lack of political will, lack of public trust, etc. responsibility of the coordination of anti-corruption (De Sousa 2009a). efforts. 2 BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS This paper lists some of the principles and standards “Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies”, executive that can contribute to creating solid anti-corruption orders or decrees are too easily annulled. commissions that inspire public trust and are sufficiently protected from external influences so that Neutral appointment of ACA heads they can effectively reduce corruption. Heads of anti-corruption commissions should be Common principles and standards for appointed through a process that ensures her/his anti-corruption agencies independence, impartiality, neutrality, integrity, apolitical stance and competence. In spite of the proliferation of anti-corruption agencies in the last decades, common global principles and A number of experts consider that the parliament standards were only developed and agreed upon in should be involved in the recruitment of the heads of 2012, when anti-corruption practitioners, ACAs, which should ideally represent a consensus representatives from ACAs, from regional networks, between the political majority and the opposition. and other stakeholders,1 as well as a number of international organisations met in Jakarta at the invitation of the Corruption Eradication Commission Removal of ACA heads and leadership Indonesia (KPK), the UNDP and the UN Office on continuity Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The participants came up with a set of key requirements to ensure the It is essential for the independence of anti-corruption independence, both formal and operational, and the commissions that their heads have security of tenure effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies. The and can only be dismissed through a procedure following draws on the 2012 Jakarta Statement, on established by law. These processes need to be the 2008 European Partners against Corruption, clear and transparent. “Common Standards and Best Practice for Anti- Corruption Agencies” and on Samuel De Jaegere’s Experts tend to agree that a dismissal procedure 2012 “Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A involving only the judiciary and the executive powers Game Changer.” is undesirable and that the parliament should have a say, through a two-thirds majority (IACC 2010). A broad and clear mandate If the ACA head were to be suspended, dismissed, to ACAs should have a clear mandate to tackle resign or retire, the authority of the ACA head should corruption through prevention, education, awareness be delegated by law to an appropriate official from raising, investigation and prosecution (see typology the ACA, within a reasonable timeframe until the above). According to De Jaegere, an ACA should appointment of a new head. Such a mechanism ideally have the mandate of investigation, prevention avoids ACAs becoming paralysed in the absence of a and education, plus the ability to prosecute. leader. Legally guaranteed permanence Ethical conduct and governance Anti-corruption commissions ought to be established ACAs ought to adopt codes of conduct that set high by a proper and stable legal framework, such as a standards of ethical conduct for their employees and constitution or in a special law, to ensure the have a solid compliance regime. permanence of the institution. As De Jaegere says in In a 2012 report on anti-corruption commissions, 1 KPMG states that ACCs ought to maintain a Such as the Network of National Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa, the Southeast Asian Parties against Corruption, the “stringent governance framework” to ensure that Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network, the European Partners investigative units operate lawfully and follow