CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY & DEFENCE NO. 151 Published in Australia at The Australian National University, September 2003. © Commonwealth of Australia. This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publications entry Frühling,Stephan, 1979- . Ballistic Missile Defence for Australia: Policies, Requirements and Options Bibliography ISBN 0 7315 5438 8. 1. Ballistic missile defenses - Australia. 2. Australia - Military policy. I. Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. II. Title. (Series: Canberra papers on strategy and defence; no. 151). 358.1740994 Series editor: Meredith Thatcher Cover design by Emily Brissenden Cover map produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, available at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australia/australia_rel99.jpg> (19 August 2003) Pictures by the Missile Defense Agency: Seeker image of a Sea-based Midcourse Kill Vehicle, available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/images/impact2.jpg> (19 August 2003) Launch of a Ground Based Interceptor, available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/images/ift5_6.jpg> (19 August 2003) Animation of a Defense Support Program / Space Based Infrared System Satellite, available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/images/slide6.jpg> (19 August 2003) Printed by Pirion, Canberra Published and distributed by: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre The Australian National University ACT 0200 Australia Tel: 61 (0)2 6125 9921; Fax: 61 (0)2 6248 0816; Email: [email protected] BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE FOR AUSTRALIA: POLICIES, REQUIREMENTS AND OPTIONS Stephan Frühling Published by Strategic and Defence Studies Centre The Australian National University Canberra 2003 Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications that arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as arms control at both the global and Southeast Asian level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of New Series Canberra Papers please refer to the last pages of this volume. Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analyses and conclusions. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Publications Program: Editorial Board Professor Paul Dibb Professor Desmond Ball Professor David Horner Dr Alan Dupont Dr Coral Bell Professor Anthony Milner Professor Virginia Hooker Professor Ross Babbage ABSTRACT Ballistic missiles are central to rogue states’ strategies to deter and coerce Western democracies in the post-Cold War world. The proliferation of missiles of longer and longer range continues throughout the world, and Australia may come within the range of missiles from North Korea and Iran in the coming decade. Regarding rogue states’ ballistic missiles, the United States, Japan and some members of NATO are moving from a posture of deterrence through nuclear punishment to a posture of deterrence through denial. Australia, as a beneficiary of the extended US nuclear deterrent, will have to decide whether to participate in ‘extended’ US missile defence. Various elements of a ballistic missile defence system, effective against the whole threat spectrum, are under development. The technical limitations of these systems and the importance of the BMD systems architecture (shoot- look-shoot capability, layered defence) make it important to define what role Australian BMD systems should play in the overall BMD architecture and what exactly Australia wants to achieve with its BMD systems: defending the Australian homeland against direct or seaborne attack, defence of forward deployed troops or strengthening the US alliance. Each of these missions leads to a different prioritisation of available BMD systems, and no system (for example the SEA 4000 destroyer) will be able to achieve all missions. After looking at the technical aspects of several possible Australian BMD architectures, the paper concludes with recommendations for Australia’s BMD policy. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Stephan Frühling is a Visiting Fellow at the Defence & Strategic Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He received a Master of Science in Defense & Strategic Studies from Southwest Missouri State University, where he was a Fulbright Fellow and Earhart Scholar. He studied Economics in Kiel, Germany, and at the Sorbonne in Paris. During recent years he has regularly participated in archaeological excavations around the world. In memory of Carl Frühling and Dr. Ulrike Schumacher CONTENTS TABLES AND FIGURES xiii ABBREVIATIONS xiv I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES 5 Rogue State ‘Asymmetry’ Against Australia 5 Post-Cold-War Asymmetry 6 The Continuing Nuclear Age 7 Australia as a Rogue State Target 8 The Ballistic Missile Threat to Australia 11 Intelligence and Uncertainty 11 Ballistic Missile Proliferation 14 China 16 North Korea 18 Iran 22 Sea-borne Attack, FOB and Other Wildcards 24 III. DETERRENCE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE 27 Deterrence and Defence 28 Deterrence through Denial and Ballistic Missile Defence 28 (Nuclear) Deterrence 30 Friction and Deterrence through Punishment 30 Extended US Deterrence 32 US Missile Defence for Australia 33 Australian Missile Defence 35 Alone in the Cold? Options Outside the US-Australian Alliance 38 IV. TECHNOLOGY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS 39 Ballistic Missile Defence Basics 39 Flightpath of Ballistic Missiles 39 Sensors 42 Interceptors 43 Integrating Missile Defence Systems 44 Missile Defence Elements in Development 46 Sensors 46 Radars 46 Space-Based IR Sensors 48 Ground Based Interceptor 49 SM-3 49 Aster-30 and Landbased Terminal Defence Systems 51 Aster-30 51 Landbased Terminal Defence 52 Boost-Phase Intercept, Space-Based Systems and Advanced Interceptors 53 ‘Coastal Defence’ 55 V. AUSTRALIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE 57 A BMD System For What? 57 Defending Australian Territory and Population 57 Defending Deployed Australian Troops 58 Strengthening the US-Australian Alliance 60 The US Missile Defence Program and the Defence of Australia 61 Australian BMD Elements 66 JORN and other Sensors 66 SEA 4000 and Ballistic Missile Defence 67 Australian National Missile Defence 72 Groundbased Midcourse Defence 72 Defence Against Seaborne Attack 78 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENTATIONS 81 NOTES 90 BIBLIOGRAPHY 110 Books and Monographs 110 Periodic Papers 112 Journals 114 Magazines 115 Newspapers 118 Government Documents 119 Australia 119 United States 119 Testimonies before Congressional Committees 121 Other 122 Other Sources 122 Speeches 122 Websites 123 Other 124 TABLES AND FIGURES Tables Table 1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation 14 Table 2 Block 2004 Initial Defensive Capability 62 Table 3 Australian BMD Requirements and Options 84 Figures Figure 1 Ranges of Chinese Ballistic Missiles 18 Figure 2 Taepo Dong II Range Estimates 21 Figure 3 Potential Coverage by Iranian Ballistic Missiles 23 Figure 4 Vulnerability to Seaborne Missile Attack 25 Figure 5 Ballistic Missile Flight Phases 40 Figure 6 JORN Coverage 67 Figure 7 Missile Trajectories from Iran and North Korea 73 Figure 8 Possible X-Band Radar Site 75 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AAWS Anti-Air Warfare System ABL Airborne Laser ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence ADF Australian Defence Forces AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control ALI Aegis LEAP Intercept ANZUS Australia New Zealand United States AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System AWD Air Warfare Destroyer BMC4ISR* Battle Management, Command & Control, Communication & Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance BMD Ballistic Missile Defence BMDO [US] Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability CEP Circular Error Probable CIA Central Intelligence Agency DCP Defence Capability Plan DSP Defense Support Program DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organization DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea DUNDEE Down Under Early Warning Experiment EKV Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle FAS Federation of American Scientists FOBS Fractional Orbital Bombardment System FY Fiscal Year GBI Ground-Based Interceptor GEM Guided Enhanced Missile GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes HAA High Altitude Airship HEO High Elliptical Orbit HF High Frequency HMAS Her Majesty’s Australian Ship ICBM Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile IDT IFICS Data Terminal IFICS In-flight Interceptor Communication System IR Infrared IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Defence for Australia xv JLENS Joint Land-attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated, Netted Sensor System JORN Jindalee Operational Radar Network KKV Kinetic Kill Vehicle LEAP Leightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile LEO Low Earth Orbit MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MCS Master Control Station MDA Missile Defense Agency MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System MESAR Multi-function Electronically Scanned Adaptive Radar MIRV Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicles MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate NMD National Missile Defence NORTHCOM US Northern