Beyond State Drafting a Prospective Anthropology

Home , David Sloan Wilson

Beyond State Drafting a prospective anthropology

Avel GUENIN–CARLUT October 16, 2020

Kairos Research

1 Table of Contents

The deep roots of the State

The heritage of early Statedom

Navigating the near future of States

Conclusion

2 Hobbes’s Leviathan Rousseau’s state of nature • Violence is essential to state • Humans are naturally good of nature • Civilization corrupts human • The social hinders natural nature violence But what is ”civilisation” ?

Historical opposition between two understanding of the State

3 Rousseau’s state of nature • Humans are naturally good • Civilization corrupts human nature

But what is ”civilisation” ?

Historical opposition between two understanding of the State

Hobbes’s Leviathan • Violence is essential to state of nature • The social hinders natural violence

3 But what is ”civilisation” ?

Historical opposition between two understanding of the State

Hobbes’s Leviathan Rousseau’s state of nature • Violence is essential to state • Humans are naturally good of nature • Civilization corrupts human • The social hinders natural nature violence

3 Historical opposition between two understanding of the State

3 The State States are centralised executive systems under the control of an elite caste, whose power is mediated through taxation, symbolic domination, and monopoly of violence.

So how did State societies emerge ?

What is a State ?

4 So how did State societies emerge ?

What is a State ?

The State States are centralised executive systems under the control of an elite caste, whose power is mediated through taxation, symbolic domination, and monopoly of violence.

4 What is a State ?

The State States are centralised executive systems under the control of an elite caste, whose power is mediated through taxation, symbolic domination, and monopoly of violence.

So how did State societies emerge ?

4 The deep roots of the State Human evolutionary complex Humans individuals display extremely complex adaptive behaviour, which they acquire trough cultural transmission (Boyd et al., 2011). Human societies organise as adaptive units due to collective cultural traits, the enforcement of horizontal social norms, and other forme of coordination (Wilson et al., 2008, 2013).

Neolithic transition Wide scale transition in human societies toward dense settlement with specialised economies relying on intensive agriculture, starting from typically semi-nomadic and horizontal hunter gatherer societies dominating before 12 000 BC.

What was before States ?

5 Neolithic transition Wide scale transition in human societies toward dense settlement with specialised economies relying on intensive agriculture, starting from typically semi-nomadic and horizontal hunter gatherer societies dominating before 12 000 BC.

What was before States ?

Human evolutionary complex Humans individuals display extremely complex adaptive behaviour, which they acquire trough cultural transmission (Boyd et al., 2011). Human societies organise as adaptive units due to collective cultural traits, the enforcement of horizontal social norms, and other forme of coordination (Wilson et al., 2008, 2013).

5 What was before States ?

5 Hierarchy and agriculture Private property facilitates the emergence the labour-intensive production of captable surplus (Bowles and Choi, 2019). In turn, captable production surplus allow for the emergence of increasingly polarised societies (Darmangeat, 2013).

The development of the ”State complex”

6 The development of the ”State complex”

Hierarchy and agriculture Private property facilitates the emergence the labour-intensive production of captable surplus (Bowles and Choi, 2019). In turn, captable production surplus allow for the emergence of increasingly polarised societies (Darmangeat, 2013).

6 The development of the ”State complex”

6 Debt (Graeber, 2011) Coercion (Scott, 2017) Debt is an instituated Administrative elites exert legal obligation to provide an and military domination over economic service in the future, the wider population, and may often measured in standard coerce their sedentary exchange units (eg grain or population into providing work money). It typically results or surplus production for the from an agreement to exchange State. In addition, early States some service now for a greater typically made use of war, raids, service later, and therefore and trade to provide slave allows her to proﬁt from the workers for the State and elite. debted work’s at a bargain.

Economic captation in State societies

7 Coercion (Scott, 2017) Administrative elites exert legal and military domination over the wider population, and may coerce their sedentary population into providing work or surplus production for the State. In addition, early States typically made use of war, raids, and trade to provide slave workers for the State and elite.

Economic captation in State societies

Debt (Graeber, 2011) Debt is an instituated obligation to provide an economic service in the future, often measured in standard exchange units (eg grain or money). It typically results from an agreement to exchange some service now for a greater service later, and therefore allows her to proﬁt from the debted work’s at a bargain.

7 Economic captation in State societies

Debt (Graeber, 2011) Coercion (Scott, 2017) Debt is an instituated Administrative elites exert legal obligation to provide an and military domination over economic service in the future, the wider population, and may often measured in standard coerce their sedentary exchange units (eg grain or population into providing work money). It typically results or surplus production for the from an agreement to exchange State. In addition, early States some service now for a greater typically made use of war, raids, service later, and therefore and trade to provide slave allows her to proﬁt from the workers for the State and elite. debted work’s at a bargain.

7 The heritage of early Statedom ... for institutional power Human exploitation... State institutions are eﬃcient Rural State populations display for extracting work and markers of extreme deprivation ressources under centralised when compared to control, and consequently semi-nomadic population in display wider scale coordination similar ecologies. Urban than non-State societies. In populations, even more appropriate ecologies, they can disturbingly, displayed negative easily gain ground through demographic growth until trade and war Diamond (1997), recently Scott (2017). Turchin (2010).

Was the Neolithic transition any good ?

8 ... for institutional power State institutions are eﬃcient for extracting work and ressources under centralised control, and consequently display wider scale coordination than non-State societies. In appropriate ecologies, they can easily gain ground through trade and war Diamond (1997), Turchin (2010).

Was the Neolithic transition any good ?

Human exploitation... Rural State populations display markers of extreme deprivation when compared to semi-nomadic population in similar ecologies. Urban populations, even more disturbingly, displayed negative demographic growth until recently Scott (2017).

8 Was the Neolithic transition any good ?

... for institutional power Human exploitation... State institutions are eﬃcient Rural State populations display for extracting work and markers of extreme deprivation ressources under centralised when compared to control, and consequently semi-nomadic population in display wider scale coordination similar ecologies. Urban than non-State societies. In populations, even more appropriate ecologies, they can disturbingly, displayed negative easily gain ground through demographic growth until trade and war Diamond (1997), recently Scott (2017). Turchin (2010).

8 Major evolutionary transition Major evolutionary transitions are the emergence of new organims from groups of individuals due to the selection of in group cooperation (Wilson et al., 2008), typically mediated by new modes of information transmission (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006), and culminating in the institution of central control (Stewart, 2020).

States are characterised by :

• large scale cooperation... • enforced by elite and central institutions... • mediated by administrative or legal written systems (Goody and Goody, 1986)

Statedom as evolution’s last major transition

9 States are characterised by :

• large scale cooperation... • enforced by elite and central institutions... • mediated by administrative or legal written systems (Goody and Goody, 1986)

Statedom as evolution’s last major transition

Major evolutionary transition Major evolutionary transitions are the emergence of new organims from groups of individuals due to the selection of in group cooperation (Wilson et al., 2008), typically mediated by new modes of information transmission (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006), and culminating in the institution of central control (Stewart, 2020).

9 Statedom as evolution’s last major transition

States are characterised by :

• large scale cooperation... • enforced by elite and central institutions... • mediated by administrative or legal written systems (Goody and Goody, 1986)

9 The Axial transition (Mullins et al., 2018) The Axial transition is the institution of non-administrative modes of large scale cooperation (such as moralizing religions and money) and elite regulation (such as rule of law), resulting in the progressive growth of Eurasiatic states from 1000 BC on wards.

Capitalism Capitalism is the institution of private property of the means of production, typically through strong property norms and shared ownership of economic organisation based on stocks trading.

Did it change the fundamental dynamics of States ?

The domestication of States

10 Capitalism Capitalism is the institution of private property of the means of production, typically through strong property norms and shared ownership of economic organisation based on stocks trading.

Did it change the fundamental dynamics of States ?

The domestication of States

The Axial transition (Mullins et al., 2018) The Axial transition is the institution of non-administrative modes of large scale cooperation (such as moralizing religions and money) and elite regulation (such as rule of law), resulting in the progressive growth of Eurasiatic states from 1000 BC on wards.

10 Did it change the fundamental dynamics of States ?

The domestication of States

Capitalism Capitalism is the institution of private property of the means of production, typically through strong property norms and shared ownership of economic organisation based on stocks trading.

10 The domestication of States

Capitalism Capitalism is the institution of private property of the means of production, typically through strong property norms and shared ownership of economic organisation based on stocks trading.

Did it change the fundamental dynamics of States ?

10 Navigating the near future of States Structural-demographic cycles (Turchin and Nefedov, 2009, Goldstone, 2017) Pseudocyclic dynamic of institutional stability in State societies, mainly driven by work-capital balance & intra-elite conﬂict, which results in 250 year periodical crisis or collapse of dominant institutions.

Figure 1: Structural-demographic Figure 2: Insurrection trends, from instability, from Turchin and Turchin and Korotayev (2020) Korotayev (2020)

Exploitation and instability

11 Figure 1: Structural-demographic Figure 2: Insurrection trends, from instability, from Turchin and Turchin and Korotayev (2020) Korotayev (2020)

Exploitation and instability

Structural-demographic cycles (Turchin and Nefedov, 2009, Goldstone, 2017) Pseudocyclic dynamic of institutional stability in State societies, mainly driven by work-capital balance & intra-elite conﬂict, which results in 250 year periodical crisis or collapse of dominant institutions.

11 Exploitation and instability

Figure 1: Structural-demographic Figure 2: Insurrection trends, from instability, from Turchin and Turchin and Korotayev (2020) Korotayev (2020) 11 We know that : • Socio-political stability will remain low for the forseeable future • It will remain so until massive shift of wealth and power toward smaller-scale institution happen • Social coordination will remain paralysed until then, resulting in events such as epidemics, famine, or civil war

We know that we don’t know : • The intensity of the crisis, and which scale of organisation may collapse (Tainter, 1988) • The date and nature of upcoming crisis events • What will be the next statu quo

What do we know about the future ?

12 We know that we don’t know : • The intensity of the crisis, and which scale of organisation may collapse (Tainter, 1988) • The date and nature of upcoming crisis events • What will be the next statu quo

What do we know about the future ?

We know that : • Socio-political stability will remain low for the forseeable future • It will remain so until massive shift of wealth and power toward smaller-scale institution happen • Social coordination will remain paralysed until then, resulting in events such as epidemics, famine, or civil war

12 What do we know about the future ?

12 • Commons-based governance is more robust against economic captation and ensuing instability (Ostrom, 1990), and may stabilise major infrastructure (see eg Railcoop). • Smaller scale institutions are more robust to captation and structual-demographic ﬂuctuations, and constitue a counterpower to State governance. • Knowledge and work intensive industries (eg low techs, permaculture) limit the opportunity of environmental and human extraction (Hartmann et al., 2017). • Norms and narrative that emphasize relations, sobriety and resilience over growth and domination will reinforce sustainable behaviour (eg Pignocchi (2017)).

What can we do now?

13 • Smaller scale institutions are more robust to captation and structual-demographic ﬂuctuations, and constitue a counterpower to State governance. • Knowledge and work intensive industries (eg low techs, permaculture) limit the opportunity of environmental and human extraction (Hartmann et al., 2017). • Norms and narrative that emphasize relations, sobriety and resilience over growth and domination will reinforce sustainable behaviour (eg Pignocchi (2017)).

What can we do now?

• Commons-based governance is more robust against economic captation and ensuing instability (Ostrom, 1990), and may stabilise major infrastructure (see eg Railcoop).

13 • Knowledge and work intensive industries (eg low techs, permaculture) limit the opportunity of environmental and human extraction (Hartmann et al., 2017). • Norms and narrative that emphasize relations, sobriety and resilience over growth and domination will reinforce sustainable behaviour (eg Pignocchi (2017)).

What can we do now?

13 • Norms and narrative that emphasize relations, sobriety and resilience over growth and domination will reinforce sustainable behaviour (eg Pignocchi (2017)).

What can we do now?

• Commons-based governance is more robust against economic captation and ensuing instability (Ostrom, 1990), and may stabilise major infrastructure (see eg Railcoop). • Smaller scale institutions are more robust to captation and structual-demographic ﬂuctuations, and constitue a counterpower to State governance. • Knowledge and work intensive industries (eg low techs, permaculture) limit the opportunity of environmental and human extraction (Hartmann et al., 2017).

13 What can we do now?

13 Conclusion There existe no foreseeable trajectory, especially in the long term State collapse is probable in the near future, and entirely outside our control The institution that will rule us are the institutions we build now

Beyond State

14 State collapse is probable in the near future, and entirely outside our control The institution that will rule us are the institutions we build now

Beyond State

There existe no foreseeable trajectory, especially in the long term

14 The institution that will rule us are the institutions we build now

Beyond State

There existe no foreseeable trajectory, especially in the long term State collapse is probable in the near future, and entirely outside our control

14 Beyond State

There existe no foreseeable trajectory, especially in the long term State collapse is probable in the near future, and entirely outside our control The institution that will rule us are the institutions we build now

14 References

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