Causes and Consequences of Persistently Low Interest Rates
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Bank of England Inflation Report November 2018
Inflation Report November 2018 Inflation Report November 2018 In order to maintain price stability, the Government has set the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) a target for the annual inflation rate of the Consumer Prices Index of 2%. Subject to that, the MPC is also required to support the Government’s economic policy, including its objectives for growth and employment. The Inflation Report is produced quarterly by Bank staff under the guidance of the members of the Monetary Policy Committee. It serves two purposes. First, its preparation provides a comprehensive and forward-looking framework for discussion among MPC members as an aid to our decision-making. Second, its publication allows us to share our thinking and explain the reasons for our decisions to those whom they affect. Although not every member will agree with every assumption on which our projections are based, the fan charts represent the MPC’s best collective judgement about the most likely paths for inflation, output and unemployment, as well as the uncertainties surrounding those central projections. This Report has been prepared and published by the Bank of England in accordance with section 18 of the Bank of England Act 1998. The Monetary Policy Committee: Mark Carney, Governor Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor responsible for monetary policy Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor responsible for financial stability Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor responsible for markets and banking Andrew Haldane Jonathan Haskel Michael Saunders Silvana Tenreyro Gertjan Vlieghe PowerPoint™ -
Japan and the Asian Financial Crisis: the Role of Financial Supervision in Restoring Growth
Japan and the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of Financial Supervision in Restoring Growth Takatoshi Ito Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University Working Paper Series Vol.99-10 July 1999 The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. No part of this article may be used reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in articles and reviews. For information, please write to the Centre. The International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development, Kitakyushu Japan and the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of Financial Supervision in Restoring Growth Takatoshi Ito Summary The crises of the Japanese and Asian economies in 1997-98 are reflection of the regional interdependence. One of the factors contributing to the baht devaluation of July 2, 1997 was yen depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar in 1995-1997. The weak Japanese economy and the Asian economies mutually reinforced each other in the fall of 1997. Both Japan and many Asian countries suffer from structural weakness in the banking system. Japanese banks are beset with nonperforming loans due to a sharp decline in land prices, and many Asian banks are burdened by excessive borrowing from abroad or nonperforming loans due to sharp currency depreciation. Japan and Asian countries did not have a legal framework to close insolvent banks before the crisis, which contributed to a protracted resolution of the problem. The current downturn of the Japanese economy was triggered by the tax hike of April 1997. -
“Interventions and Japanese Economic Recovery” Takatoshi Ito* Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
YenMacro(Michigan2004)v1 “Interventions and Japanese Economic Recovery” Takatoshi Ito* Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo 1. Introduction The Japanese monetary authorities (the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan) intervened in the yen/dollar market, selling 35 trillion yen, during the 15-month period from January 2003 to March 2004. The size of interventions were unusually large, reaching 7 percent of GDP, and exceeding the total amount of interventions during the 11-year period from April 1991 to December 2002. Why did the Japanese authorities intervene with such a large amount? This paper attempts to explain possible reasons and objectives behind interventions conducted by the Japanese monetary authorities in 2003 and 2004, and to discuss whether interventions achieved presumed objectives, flexible but rational foreign exchange markets and economic recovery. In the discussion of interventions, it is necessary to pay a significant attention to macroeconomic conditions, as decisions of interventions should be explained in the context of macroeconomic conditions at the time. When the 15-month episode of interventions started in January 2003, the Japanese economy was in a very weak condition. Several major banks were regarded in the market to be near-insolvent if proper accounting and evaluation of assets were applied.1 Deflation was worsening and the growth rate was very low. The stock prices were declining sharply. The start of intervention in January 2003 was to keep the yen from appreciating in the midst of financial and macroeconomic weakness. The stock prices continued to go down until April, and the economy looked quite fragile in the spring. -
Personal Information Education Professional Positions Other Affi
CURRICULUM VITAE: PHILIP RICHARD LANE, April 2015 Address: Economics Department, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland Tel.: 353-1-8962259 Email: plane at tcd.ie Home Page: http://www.philiplane.org Personal Information Date of Birth: 27th August 1969 Citizenship: Ireland Education PhD, Economics, Harvard University, 1995. Thesis Title: “Essays in International Macroeco- nomics.” A.M., Economics, Harvard University, 1993. B.A. (Mod.) (Econ.), First Class Honours and Gold Medal, Trinity College Dublin, 1991. Professional Positions Whately Professor of Political Economy, Trinity College Dublin, 2012- Professor of International Macroeconomics, Trinity College Dublin, 2004-2012 Director, Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS), Trinity College Dublin, 2002-2008 Associate Professor of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, 2000-2004 Lecturer in Economics, Trinity College Dublin, 1997-2000 Assistant Professor of Economics and International A¤airs , Columbia University, 1995-1997 Other A¢ liations Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2002-. (Research A¢ liate, 1997- 2001). International Research Fellow, Kiel Institute of World Economics, 2005-. Member, Royal Irish Academy, 2007-. Selected Honours, Awards and Grants Irish Research Council Research Project Grant, “External Imbalances and External Adjustment: Lessons from the European Crisis,”2013-2016. Institute for New Economic Thinking Grant, “Financial Globalisation and Macroeco- nomic Policy,”2012-2015. Bhagwati Prize 2010 (best paper in Journal of International Economics; joint with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti). Fondation Banque de France Grant, “International Leverage,”2009-2010. NoeG Lecture, Austrian Economics Association, Vienna, May 2008. 1 Keynote Speaker, European Economics and Finance Society, Prague, May 2008. Scienti…c Leader, NORFACE Seminar Series Grant “Economic Globalisation and Eu- rope”, 2007-2009. -
Monetary Policy Oversight in Comparative Perspective: Britain and America During the Financial Crisis
Political Science and Political Economy Working Paper Department of Government London School of Economics No. 3/2014 Monetary Policy Oversight in Comparative Perspective: Britain and America during the Financial Crisis Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (LSE) Monetary Policy Oversight in Comparative Perspective: Britain and America During the Financial Crisis Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey Government Department London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE [email protected] http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schonhar/ This study examines deliberation on monetary policy oversight in the US and UK between 2006 and 2009. It employs reciprocity as the key criterion for judging the quality of monetary policy oversight deliberation (i.e., committee participants are expected to engage with one another, taking up and responding to the reasons offered by other participants). Using automated content analysis, the empirical finding is that reciprocity is clearly evident in the parliamentary oversight committee, but much less so in the two congressional committees. The two country cases represent very different approaches to legislative oversight, with the UK demonstrating a committee approach both in terms of the testimony of the monetary policy body and of the behaviour of the legislative committee, while the US demonstrates a focus on a series of individual contributions both from the Fed chairman and Members of Congress. In the US, this appears to allow greater scope to divert discussion away from the primary focus of hearings (i.e., monetary policy). 1 I. Introduction In normal economic times, clashes between politicians and central bankers in legislative oversight hearings on monetary policy are not typically considered worthy of headline news coverage. -
SIMULATING an OIL SHOCK with STICKY PRICES by Francesco Giavalli Mehmet ODEKON and Charles WYPLOSZ N° 81/26
SIMULATING AN OIL SHOCK WITH STICKY PRICES by Francesco GIAVAllI Mehmet ODEKON and Charles WYPLOSZ N° 81/26 Directeur de la Publication : Jean-Claude THOENIG Associate Dean: Research and Development INSEAD Imprimé par l'INSEP), Fontainebleau France SIMULATING AN OIL SHOCK WITH STICKY PRICES Francesco Giavazzi University of Essex and Università di Venezia Mehmet Odekon INSEAD, France Charles Wyplosz INSEAD, France Revised Version: November 1981 Abstract: This paper extends recent work by J. Sachs about the response of a two country plus OPEC neo-classical model to an oil shock with full inter-temporal optimization and perfect foresight. Here, the role of imperfectly flexible prices is studied under the assumption that firms are output constrained. The presence of expected inflation is shown to be pervasive. It affects the real interest rate term structure and therefore the valuation of all components of wealth, as well as the exchange rate and the attending distribution of world expenditures. Inflation also enters the wage adjustment mechanism and therefore the path of unemployment and capital accumulation. Address: Charles Wyplosz, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France I - INTRODUCTION As recently pointed out by Krugman (1980), the proper study of the effects of an oil shock on the exchange rate requires two essentiel fea- tures. First, because the exchange rates which are interesting are those linking the non-OPEC countries, the minimal set up consists of a model including two such countries and OPEC. The exchange rate then reflects how differently the two countries react to the shock. Second, there are two aspects in which the countries reactions may differ: trade and finance. -
Reform of the Bank of England a New Bank for a New Governor
Reform of the Bank of England A new Bank for a new Governor James Barty Policy Exchange is the UK’s leading think tank. We are an educational charity whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas that will deliver better public services, a stronger society and a more dynamic economy. Registered charity no: 1096300. Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with academics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy outcomes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. We also believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector. Trustees Daniel Finkelstein (Chairman of the Board), Richard Ehrman (Deputy Chair), Theodore Agnew, Richard Briance, Simon Brocklebank-Fowler, Robin Edwards, Virginia Fraser, Edward Heathcoat Amory, David Meller, George Robinson, Robert Rosenkranz, Andrew Sells, Patience Wheatcroft, Rachel Whetstone and Simon Wolfson. Acknowledgements We would like to thank all of the people who have given us their views on the Bank, its historic performance and what could be done to reform it. We would particularly like to thank Dan Conaghan whose book The Bank (Inside the Bank of England) is an excellent read and a great source of information. This project was also enhanced by the panel debate we had with Sir John Gieve and Andrea Leadsome MP on the future of the Bank, which prompted a number of extra lines of enquiry for us. Finally we would like to thank those who have contributed to the Financial Policy unit at Policy Exchange without whose financial assistance this report could not have been produced. -
The Tempered Ordered Probit (TOP) Model with an Application to Monetary Policy William H.Greene Max Gillman Mark N.Harris Christopher Spencer WP 2013 – 10
ISSN 1750-4171 ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES The Tempered Ordered Probit (TOP) Model With An Application To Monetary Policy William H.Greene Max Gillman Mark N.Harris Christopher Spencer WP 2013 – 10 School of Business and Economics Loughborough University Loughborough LE11 3TU United Kingdom Tel: + 44 (0) 1509 222701 Fax: + 44 (0) 1509 223910 http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/economics/ The Tempered Ordered Probit (TOP) model with an application to monetary policy William H. Greeney Max Gillmanz Mark N. Harrisx Christopher Spencer{ September 2013 Abstract We propose a Tempered Ordered Probit (TOP) model. Our contribution lies not only in explicitly accounting for an excessive number of observations in a given choice category - as is the case in the standard literature on in‡ated models; rather, we introduce a new econometric model which nests the recently developed Middle In‡ated Ordered Probit (MIOP) models of Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012) and Brooks, Harris, and Spencer (2012) as a special case, and further, can be used as a speci…cation test of the MIOP, where the implicit test is described as being one of symmetry versus asymmetry. In our application, which exploits a panel data-set containing the votes of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members, we show that the TOP model a¤ords the econometrician considerable ‡exibility with respect to modelling the impact of di¤erent forms of uncertainty on interest rate decisions. Our …ndings, we argue, reveal MPC members’ asymmetric attitudes towards uncertainty and the changeability of interest rates. Keywords: Monetary policy committee, voting, discrete data, uncertainty, tempered equations. -
ITO 9781785360121 PRINT.Indd
References Aizenman, Joshua, 2015. ‘Internationalization of the RMB, Capital Market Openness and Financial Reforms in China’, Pacific Economic Review, 20(3), pp. 444–60. Allayannis, George, Jane Ihrig and James P. Weston, 2001. ‘Exchange-Rate Hedging: Financial vs. Operational Strategies’, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 91(2), pp. 391–5. Bacchetta, Philippe and Eric van Wincoop, 2003. ‘Why Do Consumer Prices React Less Than Import Prices to Exchange Rates?’, Journal of European Economic Association, 1(2–3), pp. 662–70. Bacchetta, Philippe and Eric van Wincoop, 2005. ‘A Theory of the Currency Denomination of International Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 67(2), pp. 295–319. Bartram, Söhnke M., Gregory W. Brown and Bernadette A. Minton, 2010. ‘Resolving the Exposure Puzzle: The Many Facets of Exchange Rate Exposure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 95, pp. 148–73. Burstein, Ariel, Joao Neves and Sergio Rebelo, 2003. ‘Distribution Costs and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics During Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, pp. 1189–214. Campa, Jose and Linda Goldberg, 2006. ‘Distribution Margins, Imported Inputs, and the Sensitivity of the CPI to Exchange Rates’, NBER Working Paper No. 12121 (March). Campa, Jose and Linda Goldberg, 2008. ‘Pass-Through of Exchange Rates to Consumption Prices: What Has Changed and Why?’, in Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose, eds, International Finance Issues in the Pacific Rim: Global Imbalances, Financial Liberalization, and Exchange Rate Policy, NBER East Asian Seminar on Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 139–70. Cao, Shuntao, Wei Dong and Ben Tomlin, 2015. ‘Pricing-to-Market, Currency Invoicing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Producer Prices’, Journal of International Money and Finance, 58, pp. -
Speech by Martin Weale at the University of Nottingham, Tuesday
Unconventional monetary policy Speech given by Martin Weale, External Member of the Monetary Policy Committee University of Nottingham 8 March 2016 I am grateful to Andrew Blake, Alex Harberis and Richard Harrison for helpful discussions, to Tomasz Wieladek for the work he has done with me on both asset purchases and forward guidance and to Kristin Forbes, Tomas Key, Benjamin Nelson, Minouche Shafik, James Talbot, Matthew Tong, Gertjan Vlieghe and Sebastian Walsh for very helpful comments. 1 All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx Introduction Thank you for inviting me here today. I would like to talk about unconventional monetary policy. I am speaking to you about this not because I anticipate that the Monetary Policy Committee will have recourse to expand its use of unconventional policy any time soon. As we said in our most recent set of minutes, we collectively believe it more likely than not that the next move in rates will be up. I certainly consider this to be the most likely direction for policy. The UK labour market suggests that medium-term inflationary pressures are building rather than easing; wage growth may have disappointed, but a year of zero inflation does not seem to have depressed pay prospects further. However, I want to discuss unconventional policy options today because the Committee does not want to be a monetary equivalent of King Æthelred the Unready.1 It is as important to consider what we could do in the event of unlikely outcomes as the more likely scenarios. In particular, there is much to be said for reviewing the unconventional policy the MPC has already conducted, especially as the passage of time has given us a clearer insight into its effects. -
CURRICULUM VITAE Career
17 January 2019 CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Charles Richard Bean Birth Date: 16 September 1953 Nationality: British Career 1965-71 Brentwood School, Brentwood, Essex. 1972-75 Emmanuel College, Cambridge University. BA, 1975 (First in Economics and Mathematics; MT Dodds prize). MA, 1979. 1975-79 HM Treasury Economic Assistant, Short-Term Forecasting Division. 1979-81 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. PhD, 1981 (Essays in Unemployment & Economic Activity); Harkness Fellow. 1981-82 HM Treasury Economic Adviser, Monetary Policy Division. 1982-2000 London School of Economics Department of Economics: Lecturer (1982-86); Reader (1986-90); Professor (1990-2000); Chair of Department (1999-2000). Centre for Economic Performance: Deputy Director (1990-94). Academic Planning and Resources Committee (1995-98). 1990 Stanford University, Visiting Professor. 1999 Reserve Bank of Australia, Visiting Professor. 2000-14 Bank of England Executive Director for Monetary Analysis & Statistics (2000-08); Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy (2008-14). Monetary Policy Committee (2000-14, Vice-Chair, 2008-14); Financial Policy Committee (2011-14) G7 Deputies (2008-14; Co-Chair, 2013); G20 Deputies (2008-14; Co-Chair, 2009); OECD Working Party 3 (2002-14; Chair, 2010-12). 2014- London School of Economics Professor of Economics (part-time). 2017- Office for Budget Responsibility Member, Budget Responsibility Committee (part-time) Honours President, Royal Economic Society (2013-15) Knight Bachelor (Queen’s Birthday Honours, 2014) Journal Responsibilities Assistant Editor, Economic Policy (1985-86). Editor, special issue of Economica on Unemployment (1986). Managing Editor, Review of Economic Studies (1986-90). Assistant Editor, Economic Journal (1996-2000) Editorial Boards: Review of Economic Studies (1984-96, Chairman 1992-96); Moneda e Credito (1987-97); Journal of Applied Econometrics (1991-2003); Economica (1996-2000); World Economics (1999-2000); International Journal of Central Banking (2004-10, Chairman). -
Not for Quotation
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 201 http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2014/0201.pdf Stability or Upheaval? The Currency Composition of International Reserves in the Long Run* Barry Eichengreen University of California, Berkeley Livia Chiţu European Central Bank and Paris School of Economics Arnaud Mehl European Central Bank October 2014 Abstract We analyze how the role of different national currencies as international reserves was affected by the shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates. We extend data on the currency composition of foreign reserves backward and forward to investigate whether there was a shift in the determinants of the currency composition of international reserves around the breakdown of Bretton Woods. We find that inertia and policy-credibility effects in international reserve currency choice have become stronger post-Bretton Woods, while network effects appear to have weakened. We show that negative policy interventions designed to discourage international use of a currency have been more effective than positive interventions to encourage its use. These findings speak to the prospects of currencies like the euro and the renminbi seeking to acquire international reserve status and others like the U.S. dollar seeking to preserve it. JEL codes: F30, N20 * Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics, 508-1 Evans Hall, MC #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880. Tel: 510-642-2772. [email protected]. Livia Chiţu, European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Tel: + 49-69-1344-86-83. [email protected]. Arnaud Mehl, European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße, 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.