© F. Enke Verlag Stuttgart Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8

Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis

Rainer C. Baum University of Pittsburgh, Department of Sociology

Autoritätscodes: Die Invarianzhypothese

In halt: Anders als ältere Theorien zeigen die Ergebnisse der neueren Forschung, daß in industriellen Gesellschaften die politischen Ordnungen nicht konvergieren. Fußend auf diesem Befund stellt der vorliegende Beitrag als Kontinui­ tätsfaktor sozialer Modernisierung namentlich die Codes politischer Autorität heraus. Hauptfunktion derartiger Stile ist es, wie sich zeigt, die Identität einer Gesellschaft im Generationenwandel aufrechtzuerhalten, sie zu vertiefen und zu schützen.

Abstract: Contrary to much earlier theory recent findings demonstrate that polities are not on a converging course in industrial societies. Exploiting this finding, this paper focuses on authority codes as a factor of continuity in moder­ nizing change. The main function of such invariance in authority codes is the maintenance, enhancement, and pro­ tection of societal identity from generation to generation.

Introduction

There was a time, not too long ago, when the con­ in such variance relative to some earlier stage of ventional wisdom of political sociology designated social evolution, and invariance denotes neither democracy as political modernity. Non-democratic one nor the other but continuity in such cross- forms of political regime appeared as various mo­ societal variance since a specified stage of evolu­ des of „tradition“, destined to be superceded by tion despite and through modernizing change oc­ democracy as a product of universal modernizing curring after the specified stage. Heeding BEN- change (LIPSET, 1960; CUTRIGHT 1963; OL­ DIX’s (1967) clarion call that a sociologist’s con­ SEN, 1968, PARSONS, 1964). Common-sense cern with modernization must focus on the way empiricism always objected to this extension of in which societies, at different stages of evolu­ convergence theory from the economic to the po­ tion, produce solidarities, the variety of dis­ litical sphere. But it has been only relatively re­ tinct types of solidarity they produce, as well cently that scientific facts deny the convergence as the way in which they organize such solidari­ thesis as regards politics. Over the last 170 years, ties into a system, this earlier work provided no drift towards democracy could be discovered some specifications concerning all three possibi­ in a large number of the world’s polities (GURR, lities. Continuing this effort, the business here is 1974). In fact, as regards their core normative exploitation of the findings of others for advance­ aspects, forms of polities such as democracy and ment of the invariance portion1. autocracy, known to mankind well before the age of industrialism, survived the changes associated 1 One short way to communicate the continuity of with the universal transformation of the economy this effort with earlier work may be to present, towards its industrial and post-industrial form. It without much explanation, the functional typology is, therefore, imperative that modernization theo­ of solidarities I have been working with (BAUM, 1974, 1975). Shown below, this locates the main ry come to grips with this fact. This paper aims at problem focus of the present piece. This is in the a modest contribution towards that objective by political realm with a minor theme devoted to moral proposing an invariance hypothesis as regards au­ solidarities where I shall use some of WEBER’s thority codes. findings as regards the generality of value systems that crystallized during the historical stage (stages are described below). With the political focus pri­ Elaborated at some length elsewhere (BAUM, mary here, the following comment must suffice. 1974; BAUM, 1975), modernization poses at Political solidarity requires the spending of time be­ least three distinct possibilities: convergence, cause all exercise of authority presupposes continui­ divergence and invariance. Convergence denotes ty in identity as regards leaders and led (BARNARD, 1938: 138; MAYHEW, 1968: 26). Having changed reduction of cross-societal variance in social struc­ behavior, legitimized in terms of collective goal ture and process due to modernizing change, di­ attainment, those who have changed must still vergence denotes further production or increases recognize themselves as the same at a later point in 6 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8

A concern with invariance is not new. Classic A more narrow, and hence more empirically sociological theory approached the problem of manageable, focus on societal identity is provided change always in terms of the diad change and by action theory. Here the integrative subsystem continuity. For if an entity was undergoing (societal community) is designated as the very change, it still must be the same entity, in some core of society (PARSONS, 1966: 10, 16-18; sense of its essential identity, at least at two 1971: 12—26). Following that lead, the most points in time. In the classic tradition such iden­ theoretically cogent conceptualization of societal tity conferring symbols were usually the struc­ identity has been EISENSTADT’s (1971a) desig­ ture of values. DURKHEIM’s conceptual struggle nation of stratification codes as the identity con­ with the relations between mechanical and organic ferring symbolic structure for society. Among solidarities across societal stages may serve as one functional theorists, he was also the first to for­ example, WEBER’s work on religion as another. mulate historical continuity in authority codes In the latter it was the organization of values into as a problem for functional system theory a meaningful symbolic whole, including the con­ (EISENSTADT, 1973). He thus identified one tents of the commitments involved, which gave object of invariance. But he did not describe it a socio-cultural system identity. The values in much, nor did he supply a theory as to why it question covered such diverse objects as religious should display continuity in the face of moder­ symbols, images of the good society to have, the nizing change. Doing both constitutes the cen­ good personality to be, relevant time-orientations tral objective of this paper. and the like. A classic of this genre and one with an acute interest in the problem of through-time To emphasize further how small a portion of a continuity in societal identity is CASTRO’s complex issue this paper deals with, two com­ (1954) work on the structure of Spanish history2. ments. First, authority codes constitute but one But for empirical work these formulations element of stratification codes, and it is all of proved almost inhibitively complex. A great the latter which are central in the invariance hy­ number of value-orientations had to be ascer­ pothesis. Very briefly and with respect to all in­ tained, and always at more than one point in stitutionalized inequalities, stratification codes time. are value standards that specify: i. how much ine-

time if they axe to generate a sense of goal attain­ system in question. Political process requires selec­ ment at all. But participants in authority relations tive attention to the relevant membership identity, may nevertheless engage in information-saving not to all aspects of the overall identity of persons. relative to other kinds of solidarities because politi­ This is true precisely to the extent that political cal process involves but the mobilization of those solidarities have been differentiated out from the components of the identity of actors which are made matrix of a more diffuse identity set which is a up of their memebership status in the cooperative function of social evolution.

Type of Solidarities R. C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 7 quality there ought to be; ii. the particular nature this paper deals with four issues, organized in of status crystallization that should prevail; iii. sections accordingly. First, examining the find­ how much crystallization there should be; iv. the ings of others, it distills facts now constituting units in question; v. the units responsible for im- a critical mass for theoritical concerns with inva­ plementing these desiderata; and vi. the reasons riance in political structure. Secondly, scope and why (EISENSTADT, 1971a). The present paper the general cause of invariance in authority codes selects but one element; namely, those legitimacy is examined. Thirdly, a detailed description of conceptions of authority specifying why one authority codes postulated as invariant is offered. should obey. I shall endeavour to show that such And fourth, specific causes or reasons why such conceptions crystallized during the late historical codes should be invariant are provided. and early modern stages of social evolution3 al­ ready at a level of generality which proved suffi­ cient for their persistence into modern society. I. Fact and Fancy in the Economy-Polity That does not mean that nothing even directly Relation related to such codes changed. But postulating invariance in these codes means that other rules, A review of post-WW II research in the economy - pertaining to the implementation of the former, polity relation relevant for the invariance pro­ involved rationalization in terms of legal elabo­ blem shows broadly three phases of effort. The ration which firmed up and secured the general first was clearly directly influenced by the Se­ value principles spelling out why one should cond World War which seemed to have engen­ obey. In this area, modernization served conti­ dered an ambivalent cognitive response. Illustra­ nuity in meaning and it did so through change in ted in PARSONS’ work, there was on the one legal procedures that affirmed one element of hand a concern with sources of aggression asso­ societal identity. ciated with universal structures of modern socie­ ty shot through as they are with arrangements in Secondly, in view of DURKHEIM’s well-known both the familistic and the occupational realms insistence on the relation between state centrali­ highly productive of anxiety related to chan­ zation and individuation, he who postulates more nelled „displaced“ aggression; but on the other than one form of political modernity must also hand, some notions about socio-political „under­ postulate more than one form of modern indivi­ development“ among the enemies just vanquished dualism. This issue is taken up elsewhere (BAUM, were also present coupled with policy recommen­ forthcoming). dations for „development“ even at a cost of com­ mitment to private property (PARSONS, 1947; Confined to invariance in authority codes then, 1945).

Such cognitive hesitancy whereby the recent win­ 2 He also used the term invariance to formulate the ners and losers shared centrally important pro­ problem of societal identity: „I am interested in life perties did not persist for long. Instead a kind of as a movement, a course, and direction - as some­ thing variable yet combined with an „invariance“ „main-line view“ emerged which in the hands of (to borrow a term from mathematics) that makes it an influential compact majority came to domi­ possible to grasp an identity as it passes through one nate the scene in the second phase. With theory mutation after another“ (CASTRO, 1954: 34). and fact it argued cogently for a powerful, be­ 3 For the present purposes, the critical features of cause very general equation, whereby political these stages are: i. during the historical stage, the modernity was set equal to democracy. Various birth of the idea of „seif“ as an acting, willing, auto­ authoritarian forms of regime were relegated to nomous, and responsible agency and the filtering „tradition“ in the „tradition-modernity“ con­ down of that idea to the masses during the early mod­ ern stage; and ii. the birth of hierocracy as well as its two trast. Designating the „democratic association“ possible outcomes, caesaropapism and theocracy, as an evolutionary universal, PARSONS (1964: which put sacred and secular authority into tension 356) endorsed this equation explicitly and un­ everywhere also during the historical stage, and the ambiguously slightly less than twenty years after spreading down into the masses of that tension dur­ the war and has yet to renege from it. Sensitive ing the early modern stage; cf. BELLAH (1964), PARSONS (1964), and WEBER (1922: 1158 — to the possibility of falling prey to ethnocen- 1211). trism, some tried valiently to avoid the equation 8 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 - 28 but still draft a conceptual map of the shape of short of violence? Using indicators of domestic political modernity. On inspection their efforts violence, FLANIGAN and FOGELMAN’s (1970) to evade the equation failed (PYE, 1966: 31—88; inquiry to this question yielded but qualified sup­ ALMOND & COLEMAN, 1960: 4-64). What­ port to the LIPSET thesis. In general, democratic ever the neutrality of terms such as interest artic­ polities have less domestic violence than non-de- ulation, communications, and interest aggrega­ mocratic ones but the difference declines as one tion, the specifications of political modernity moves from 1800 to 1960. Also, poor countries could not avoid covering indeed classic features attempting to democratize their polities need vio­ of democracy such as a free press, and electoral lence for success in that endeavour, while relative­ competition for the highest offices. These at­ ly rich countri es need domestic peace if they are tempts foundered on the inability to come up to democratize. The theoretical import of these with a credible non-democratic functional equi­ findings are essentially two-fold. First, they illu­ valent for that specific feature which marks de­ minate in new ways a venerated hypothesis about mocracy as a polity uniquely suited for any the „birth“ of democracy in the history of man­ complex society, viz. the fact that its very legiti­ kind which argued that inter-state conflict was ne­ macy principles enshrine the institutionalization cessary for the establishment of democracy in a of social conflict short of violence. Best illustrated context of „limited“ warfare among coreligionists in the work of LIPSET (1960: 45—96) this made (HINTZE, 1941). Second, they establish that ac­ the equation near unassailable, and voices of companying violence prevents successful demo­ doubt as well as expressions of scorn about the cratization in rich countries, presumably because equation (de SCHWEINITZ, 1964; MOORE, men have too much to lose. There is here at least 1966; FISCHER, 1968; HUNTINGTON, 1968) an implicit hypothesis: if a non-democratic regime found but a feeble echo if the most prominent succeeds in economic development, then it will quantitative empirical work at the time is any stay non-democratic wherever democratization indication. attempts cannot avoid domestic violence.

For that research, once it had quantified degrees The next important study, modestly and some­ of democracy, used the „cross-sectional correla­ what misleadingly entitled „Origins of Democra­ tion approximation“ to the study of historical cy“ (PRIDE, 1970), on inspection turns out to change with the advantage of many cases and be a test of a very general empirical moderniza­ many variables (CUTRIGHT, 1963; OLSEN, tion theory concerning the polity-economy rela­ 1968). The results tended to confirm the equa­ tion. Its relevant findings are amazingly strong con­ tion. This was partly due to concealing what firmations of six propositions: i. where democra­ qualitative research had already revealed, such tization precedes in time social mobilization, coun­ as HUNTINGTON’S law concerning „political tries have stable democracy into the first half of growth and political decay“ (HUNTINGTON, the twentieth century; ii. where the relationship 1968: 1—92). It was also due to quite prominent in the former variables is reversed, countries have failures in the mensurational distinction between stable nondemocratic polities; iii. when democra­ political modernity and democracy. For example, tization and social mobilization are associated with despite the fact that OLSEN(1968: 702) intended each other through time, i.e. with both expanding to improve on CUTRIGHT’s work in this specific at similar rates, the outcome is mixed with some respect, he too failed in that eight of his fifteen cases eventuating in democracy and others not. Es­ indicators of political modernity on inspection sentially the same relations obtain between mobi­ turn out to be indicators of democracy. lization and democratization, only clearer yet. Here again, iv. when the former outstrips the latter Only historical data archives permitting through­ in time, non-democratic regimes are the result; time studies inaugurated the third phase. Docu­ when the relation is reversed, democracy results mented in three studies, this has already achieved (v.); but vi. in the joint movement from low levels a definite refutation of the „dominant equation“ of political mobilization and democratization to of the sixties. First, with respect to LIPSET’s link higher levels in each, there ist a three-way out­ between democracy and its ability to institutiona­ come with some becoming stable cemocracies, lize conflict, a very relevant question is whether others stable non-democracies, and a third group democracy does in fact institutionalize conflict “quasidemocracies”. R. C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 9

The theoretical import of this study becomes ap­ their power, these are not centrally significant parent when one applies the knowledge gained with respect to the LIPSET-equation for iii. „lev­ from the CUTRIGHT-OLSEN correlational efforts els of political participation, that other bell­ of the previous phase. For then it becomes exceed­ wether of pluralist democracy, did not change ingly likely that PRIDE’S indicators of social mo­ significantly over time. In short, the typical 19th bilization (decline in agricultural employment, and century polity was an autocracy with mimimal urbanization) are at the same time indicators of functions. The typical mid-20th century polity economic development, and consequently of a was either an activist plural democracy or, only country’s wealth. So connected, PRIDE’s find­ slightly less likely, an activist autocracy.44 A fur­ ings show no less than this tenable generalization: ther significant finding is that persistence and wherever a polity successfully weathers the adaptability of regimes are not a function of storms of social mobilization which seem to be their type but rather of congruence in authority a near-universal accompaniment of industrializa­ relations. Thus, contrary to much theory before, tion without a change in the basic legitimacy of there is neither a trend towards democracy, nor center political authority, barring external inter­ is democracy more persistent and adaptable than ferences, that polity may well last into any fore­ autocracy. seeable future. For is very difficult to imagine domestic pressures for change subsequent to in­ The available evidence is prette conclusive: in­ dustrialization that could rival both the real need dustrialism is not associated with democracy. and the urgency to regulate conflicts which is However „systematic44 modernizing change and everywhere the outstanding characteristic of the its products may be in other respects (BLACK, industrialization phase. But one can lift these 1966), the universal transformation of an agrarian findings to a yet more general formulation using and/or commercial economy into an industrial the language of functional system analysis. one does not impact uniformly on politics. Auto­ cracy as well as democracy are forms compatible From the perspective of diachronic functionalism with instustrial society. These are the significant in the system’s analysis key (PARSONS, 1969a), facts for a theoretical interest in evolutionary in­ PRIDE’s findings suggest the following interpre­ variance4 . They tell us that, in terms of core le­ tation: whichever of the four functional sub­ systems of society is subject to subsystem for­ 4 They need but two further comments. First, GURR’s mation with genuine boundary maintenance be­ is the first mensurational work in coming to grips fore any other, that one will control the devel­ with the longstanding issue of central import to so­ opment of these others; and this will be the more cial system analysis, viz, distinguishing change in the system in service of its adaption to change in envi­ likely if the subsystem that develops prior to any ronments and change o f the system in terms of given other one is also one higher in the cyber­ termination of its „identity“. Taken at face value netic control hierarchy obtaining among all four. his findings here would certainly discourage one from even postulating invariance; less than 15% While probably not verifiable yet, other evidence of all his polities ever reached an age of 70 years (GURR, 1974: 1497). Following earlier work exists already showing that polity development (GURR & McCl e l l a n d , 1971), however, this is prior to industrialization is related to persistence due to using measures which rather liberally allow a in regimes thereafter. Covering the period 1800— polity to die. There are no less than twenty-two 1971, ninety-one national states with the excep­ “fundamental changes” that signal changes o f sys­ tem (GURR, 1974: 1489). Only five of these tion of the new states established since World- (GURR’s decision constraints) have any direct bear­ War II, and distinguishing three types of regimes, ing on change in the „meaning code of legitimate viz. democracy, autocracy, and anocracy, GURR center authority“ which constitutes the object of (1974: 1501) has just shown the following: i. evolutionary invariance. Furthermore, as a compari­ son of his Table 2 and Figure 1 shows, since GURR there is in fact a „decline of the ,minimal state4 (1974: 1487, 1489) defines a given regime multidi­ which prevailed in the 19th century and the mensional^ with attributes some of the very same of growth of the ,activist4 polities of both autocra­ which also „indicate“ fundamental change o f system tic and democratic form “ (emphasis supplied); when a change from one to the other is observed, ii. while there is a trend of greater prevalence in it is also clear that change o f system as measured by him does not equal change of regime. Thus it seems two „democratic44 indicators, viz. openness of very likely indeed that using cleaner methods would chief executive recruitment and constraints on show far longer longevity. If anything, this makes the 10 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 gitimacy principles involved, polity-forms known that intellectual action eventuated in value-gener­ to man for a long time have somehow survived to alization which postulated ethical precepts the present. Since what time? That is the next aiding men in coping with there paradoxes in a question. fashion that maintained rather than ultimately denied the tensions inherent in contradictory norms. These precepts are designated as codes II. Evolutionary Invariance: Problems of Scope here, and only authority codes will be given de­ and Cause tailed description in the next section. But at the historical stage the effects of this new level of Arguing for evolutionary invariance demands moral complexity were confined entirely to elites meeting scope restrictions and embedding the and inter-elite relations in society. The early cause(s), at least the most essential, into charac­ modern stage, conceived here as a cross-cultural teristics of sociocultural evolution itself. One universal, then served to push both the problems question is: invariance since when or what stage and the coping mechanisms in terms of codes and why? Another question pertains to socio-cul- down into the mass level, converting them into tural geography: invariance where, everywhere or problems that every man hat to confront and live only in specific civilizational areas? with.

Turning to the first question, the invariance pro­ At the core of the development of ethical com­ blem was „born“ during the historical stage of plexity stood the emergence of monotheism and, socio-cultural evolution. Due to the differentia­ as an accompaniment, the birth of the idea of tion of personality from culture on the one hand a „responsible self, a core self or true self, deeper and society on the other as well as a further „fir­ than the flux of every day experience, facing a ming up“ of the differentiation between culture reality over against itself, a reality which has a and society as manifest in the emergence of func­ consistency belied by the fluctuations of mere tionally specialized elites for secular and sacred sensory impressions“ (BELLAH, 1964: 367). affairs (BELLAH, 1964), this stage gave rise to Thus monotheism concentrated contingency on a series of ethical paradoxes which defied ration­ ultimate meaning into one source, with one will alization in the logical key of variant but inter­ holding through time in all eternity; and it also nally consistent normative obligations. Of these involved the recognition of a self as a willing re­ paradoxes the present account must be restricted sponsible agency also holding through time, albeit to three: i. the relations between functionally the shorter span of an individual’s life-course. specialized elites, intercontingent yet each claim­ Religious symbolism and the relevant moral psy­ ing autonomy in its own field; ii. the relation be­ chology developed in a matched fashion. And tween central government and sub-units in society both of these developments involved a third, the whereby the latter demand autonomy vis ä vis idea of responsibility to history in the form of the former but the former bears responsibility a commitment to an ethical community lasting for the coordination of relations among the latter; from generation to generation. For once an and iii. the relation between individual and so­ injunction attains the status of a deistic com- ciety involving the paradox of ethical obligation mandmend, issuing from a monotheistic source, to serve the permanent interests of social organi­ it not only becomes relatively unalterable (inter­ zation far outlasting individual life-spans but also pretable but not alterable by man as regards its the mortal interests of persons confronting salva­ core meaning), it also becomes „binding“ on suc­ tion problems in the short-run. cessive generations as reagards implementation in this world. All monotheistic religions involve In response to these paradoxes it is very likely ethics of faith. These call for a meaningful total relationship of the pattern of life with a religious genuine finding of the persistence of autocracy into goal patterned in turn in the form of an abstract industrial society more significant. Secondly, regard­ order. And, finally, given the very abstractness of less how many changes from autocracy to democra­ such an order, situation-specific normative cy and vice versa may be hidden beneath GURR’s injunctions of expected conduct develop even­ data, for us the significant fact remains: there is no drift in politiy change either towards democracy or tuating in a functionally differentiated norma­ autocracy. tive social order shot through with antithetical R. C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 11 expectations in different situations (WEBER, - and one that was maintained ever since - that 1922: 207-209). polity centers had to assume the right and indeed the obligation to coordinate relations between In society the roles of believer and secular politi­ constituent groups which in turn were in prin­ cal subject become differentiated. Conduct in ciple accorded some degree of autonomy vis a vis each can undermine the ethical efficacy of con­ the center (SWANSON, 1967; EISENSTADT, duct in the other, but both too require relative 1963). Normative complexity here also called autonomy from each other such that the differ­ for articulating partial contrariness: on the part entiated norms involved remain distinct from each of the center, acknowledgedment of the idea of other. The same is true for the relation between “self-government” to some degree as regards elites with their varying functional responsibilities, constituent actors but at the same time an as­ the relation between the political center and the sumption of responsibility concerning their inter­ political peripheries, and the individual and his relations; on the part of constituent actors, a organizational attachments. Such mutual contin­ commitment to autonomous self-direction cou­ gency in functional variety creates problems of pled with one to rights pertaining to a dependency „right“ far more precarious and uncertain of so­ status. Once again, domination of the center over lution than was possible at earlier stages because constituent parts or the reverse constituted no these new levels of differentiation increased the solution in that it would undermine the principle tension between religion and „the world“ to de­ of the division of labor that stands behind all grees hitherto unknown (BELLAH, 1964: 367- normative complexity. 368; PARSONS, 1964: 345-346; WEBER, 1922: 209). The third paradox emerged in the relations bet­ ween individuals and their groups. Usually cap­ The tension between religion and the world called tured in the phrase “obedience to Caesar and to forth special social organization to deal with it, God”, the paradox derives directly from cultural­ but in a manner that itself enshrined the paradox ly stereotyped “individualism” which was also of ethics characterizing all complex systems since born in the historical stage. Individualism de­ that stage. Elite specialization for different func­ mands the assumption of self-responsibility for tions does not „solve“ the problem, it mitigates it outer conduct and inner experience and the abili­ and institutionalizes the tensions themselves. They ty to communicate that sense of responsibility to involve three elites and their inter-relations: cul­ others in the management of role-conflict. This tural elites for religious solvency, political-secular puts the individual into an irresolvable dilemma. elites for worldly solvency (maintaining the so­ His salvation chances are contingent on meeting ciety against internal and external foes, natural the demands of the world which when organiza­ and social), and legal elites for articulating and tional are always relatively long-run interests, integrating the other two. To be sure, the extent while responsibility for inner experience demands of organizational differentiation among such elites his attention to individual salvation needs which variad enormously in historic societies, being must be met within his limited life-span, one most distinct only in the feudal Occident (HINT- acutely short-run relative to the life-spans of ZE, 1941), but mutual inter-elite contingency as organizations. Church, state, oikos or army, regards the very legitimacy of functional speciali­ community or family are regarded practically as zation itself characterized all because everywhere “eternal” beings that do not die; but the individ­ “political acts could be judged in terms of stand­ ual owing valid obligations to the long-run in­ ards that political authorities could not finally terests of organizations also “validly” owes him­ control” (BELLAH, 1964: 368). In short, domi­ self in his short-run. And there is no final solu­ nation on the part of any one elite over another tion to the individual’s need to respond to the ex­ as in caesaropapism or theocracy, where it oc- pectations coded on contrary time horizons5. cured - amounted to a final denial of ethical complexity itself, constituting an evolutionary regressive “solution”. 5 Of course there are more time horizons. Time itself has an evolutionary dimension, to mention one. It is considered a scarce resource in some societies and The same obtained in political center-periphery not in others. Individuals too have their own long relations. For it was a characteristic of that stage and short-run perspectives, to mention another. But 12 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8

The early modern or “Reformation” stage push­ The universal moralization of authority relations ed these paradoxes down into the everyday life of derives from the double commitment to “society the masses. Mention of that stage raises the second as a self-revising and self-perfecting entity” and to scope restriction, geographical space. All my exam­ “self as a self-revising, self-perfecting entity” ples will cover the Christian wold. West and East (BELLAH, 1964). But while society and person­ Rome. Thus at least one step beyond the Occident ality are now geared to “self-actualization”, the will be taken. And while it stell may be more former has more time than the latter. However prudent to let this piece serve as an exercise on indirectly, this was recognized by HEGEL in the theme of Occidental rationalization, interest his discussion of the question why the early in general theory suggests that one follow BEL- Christians transformed themselves from a sect LAH (1964) and treat the Reformation stage as a into a church (AVINERI, 1972: 14, 25-28). cross-cultural universal. Consequently, it is as­ HEGEL recognized four socio-psychological sumed that the Reformation stage, in those as­ aspects pertaining to the universal moralization pects specified immediately below, is treated as of authority relations. First, permanent collective having already had, having now, or going to have interests far outlasting individual lives form part a kind of Reformation fall-out for all societies. of the individual’s identity. Next, consciousness of death and its associated sense of uniqueness The Reformation fall-out hypothesis states three on the one hand and moral commitment to things. First, a potential for value-conflicts be­ short-run individual salvation interests on the tween relatively autonomous elites exists every­ other also make up an individual’s sense of iden­ where. Consequently, a potential for the mobili­ tity. The third element is the universal institu­ zation of mass fundamentalist resentment against tionalization and internalization of the idea of established authority and the extant order by contingency between social or role-identities and counter-elites exists. Second, the idea of the state subjective “personal” identities. The short-run as a value-implementive agency charged with “re­ interests of mortals in their ethical chances for vising the social order” in the name of abstract self-realization became contingent on collective ethics exists everywhere (BELLAH, 1964: 370). “immortals” and their long-run interests in ethical Third, the individual’s commitment to the idea self-revision. The role of authority in articulating of a “self-revising self’ or self-improvement and the two sets of interests and the placement of hence the need to balance time-contrary demands the burden of making sense out of inner and of obligation to self and obligation to society outer obedience on the individual (through the has become a cross-cultutal universal, though Reformation fall-out) constitutes the last ele­ self-consciousness about it may empirically corre­ ment. Institutionalized in the concept of the late with education thus retaining a certain elitist citizen-role as the simultaneous creator and sub­ character. ject of authority, these four elements seem to constitute the sociological core of HEGEL’s phi­ Looked at through the double lens of HEGEL’s losophy of history in terms of “the struggle for speculation and WEBER’s findings three conse­ freedom from meaningless nature through quences flow from the above: i. everywhere poli­ collective action” (HEGEL, 1837; FETSCHER, tics becomes moralized; ii. everywhere political 1970: 26-27). ethics become historically grounded calling for the engagement of authority relations for the If authority is to articulate long and short-run production of diachronic solidarity (BAUM and interests of an ethical character, one necessary BAUM, 1975); and iii. given inter-culturally requisite is that it be historically legitimized. variant ethics at the same level of generalization There is good reason why the historical stage is since the historical stage, everywhere authority called “historical”. The very function of authori­ relations serve also (among the many other things ty to articualte contrary time horizons presup­ they accomplish) the implementation of intercul- poses that there is diachronic solidarity, defined turally variant ethics over time. as a sense of continuity in ethical identity lasting from generation to generation, and that one function of authority relations is to maintain and the basic contrast between individual short-run and enhance such intergene rational commonality in collective long-run perspectives must suffice here. commitment to abstract values. This permits le­ R.C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 13 gitimizing the inevitable frustrations of individual Finally, none of the three paradoxes resting at short-run interests by appeal to social identities the core of the political implications of the hi­ of persons and the offer of a vicarious participa­ storical and early modern stages permit of logi­ tion in an ethically enhanced future societal state. cally clean solutions. They defy rationalization The efficacy of finding authority constraints legi­ in the logical key of the removal of contradict­ timate on such grounds clearly demands trust that ions. If functionally specialized elites are to be the ethical meaning of social identities learned in interdependent yet autonomous, no simple the past and experienced in a present will hold mode of hierarchization among them can avoid and is extensible to the future. The chance for the dilemma' of patterns of domination and so “civic” as against sheer “opportunistic interest” the destruction of autonomy. The same pertains politics as well as for maintaining the contingency to the relation between the political center and between social and subjective identity as against its peripheries. And if an individual is to be con­ “the privatization of morals” depends to a large stituted at one and the same time of identities extent on maintaining such trust. Thus intergene- reflective of enduring, permanent because collect­ rational invariance in societal identity became a ive as well as relatively ephemeral and non-endur­ universal precondition for maintaining the con­ ing because individual interests with a joint tingency between private and public selves and the ethical responsibility for both, there remains use of authority for both: societal and personal a contradiction in the temporal aspects of ethical self-revisions. conduct that no logic can overcome. Adaptation to rather than rationalization of these dilemmas is But maintenance of a distinct societal identity, all there is. The ethical rules developed in response hence cross-societal or at least cross-civilizational to the recognition of these dilemmas constitute variety in ethics, also became the problem since such mechanisms. Their intrinsic limits to ration­ the historical stage including the uses of authority alization is one reason for their persistence. De­ for such efforts. For as WEBER has shown, the scribing one of these, the codes of legitimate world religions developed variant ethical systems authority, is the next objective. by selecting from a common pool of archaic and primitive socio-morals variant elements. It was such variant elements as filial piety in China, III. Authority Codes: Objects of Invariance truth in Zoroastrianism, and the idea of volunt­ ary contractual ties in the West, quite anti­ In varying degrees of explicitness as well as vari­ kinship in spirit, which were subjected to the able format a case for continuity in the concep­ same amount of value-generalization. Such var­ tion of legitimate center authority over long iant elements thus came to serve as general blue­ time periods has been made for France, The Ne- prints for social organization at the same level of functional differentiation but with contrary sition to WEBER’s Protestant Ethic thesis as regards of at least radically different ethical precepts, the invention of the „factor of production“ free labor for the first time in human history. I am giving each civilization its distinctive ethos questioning the utility of using that insight in the (WEBER, 1922: 210). If this be true for the form of postulating some simple „social utilitarian­ historical stage, it follows that treatment of the ism” as necessary for modernization or modernity in early modern stage as a universal one amounts the case of follower societies, regardless of the de­ to a serious theoretical commitment to the pro­ gree of explicitness in doing so (MCCLELLAND, 1961; INKELES & SMITH, 1974). Whatever the position of variant societal identities in all sub­ utility of the facts generated under such presuppo­ sequent evolution into the modern stage. It is sitions for other purposes, advancement of moderni­ unlikely that such identities show either con­ zation theory in the area of politics and morals is vergence or divergence, and no change in cross- not likely among them. Although we do not know, in terms of utilitarian and „individualist“ attitudes societal variety remains the most likely prospec­ the Japanese may well turn out to be INKELES-man. tus for whatever form of post-modernity one But even were that so, for present purposes it re­ might envisage. As far as the ethos of everyday mains far more important to stress what is already life is concerned the image of universal modern known: when it comes to ethically relevant aspects of authority relations, neither workers nor managers man remains improvable6. in Japan behave or experience themselves and each other in ways comparable to their British counter 6 To avoid misunderstanding, I am not implying oppo- parts (DORE, 1973). 14 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 therlands, The German Democratic Republic, 79-100; DIETRICH, 1966: 99). According to Russia, and the United States. These studies de­ WOLFE (1974: 323-330) this mode of “corpor­ serve mention even though they do not permit atism from above” found its continuation in more than a preliminary identification of some recruitment to the senate {Bundesrat) by monar­ sort of code as the object of invariance. CRO- chical appointment in Imperial Germany (1871 — ZIER (1964) argues that neither the conception 1918), in the two legislatures of the Weimar of the nature of authority nor that of authority Republic (1919-1933) where the Economic relations have changed in France from the An­ Council of the Reich had separate legislative den Regime to the present. Here these constants powers, the guild controls over the economy at­ are two: what men perceive to be the intrinsic tempted by the National Socialist regime (1933 — nature of authority (in this case “a propensity 1945), and the practice of Blockpolitik that cha­ towards omnipotence”), and how men must re­ racterized the German Democratic Republic gulate interpersonal dependence to make subju­ (1949-present). The central feature of this sys­ gation to authority tolerable (in this case “a tem is that it “is representative”, of functional counterpropensity towards procedural formal­ interests “but not democratic, in that the choice ism” that forever searches for a utopia; where no of goals is dependent upon the outcome of a persons have power by reducing their discretion­ continuing struggle between private and functio­ ary powers to zero). nal interests” (WOLFE, 1974: 329-330) which seems essentially devoid of procedural regulation Another classic case is The Netherlands which at least when compared with the competitive served to develop the conception of consocia- electoral process in democracies7. tional democracy. Here again it has been demon­ Writing directly about legitimacy codes of politi­ strated that a code developed in the 17th century cal authority EISENSTADT (1973) has recently (GEYL, 1964: 148—172) has persisted to the claimed their continuity in Russia from Czarist present (LIJPHART, 1968a). The central days to the present. In this instance BENDIX characteristics here are great deference to func­ (1956) has been able much earlier to document tional authority on the part of followers for lead­ continuitiy in a related legitimacy element, viz, ers which secures unusual leadership autonomy, managerial ideologies. In Russia, and in contrast to and, among elites, an explicit accommodative the West legitimating economic activity always in­ style of mutual tolerance concerning variant volved the triangle state-entrepreneur-employee. value-commitments. Legitimate authority at the One can even generalize this to state that legitima­ center rests on acceptance of the veto from mi­ ting social action in Russia always involved the ar­ norities. ticulation of an agency presumed to represent the interest o f society and therefore “to hover above” In the German case there runs a line of continui­ all special interest in society, on the one hand, ty in corporatism which starts with the “absolut­ ist” strains of Prussia’s estate society in the 17th and the rights and obligations of dependent and 18th century and continues in identifiable strata on the other. constitutional features of Imperial 19th century Germany, the Weimar Republic, National Social­ Finally, though exaggerated, HUNTINGTON’S ism, and contemporary East Germany (GDR). To (1968: 93-139) claim that political development be sure, the corporatism at issue here which in the United States essentially remained stuck places the collective interest of all supraordinate at the level of the Tudor polity lends itself to an to the interests of constituent groups was weak­ interpretation of stability in the legitimate con­ est in early 18th century Prussia which still re­ ception of center authority as resting on “the sembled for the most part the reverse principle. divisions of power at the center” principle which Nevertheless, the rationalization of law during did not essentially change in the two-hundred that century (Allgemeines Landrecht) in Prussia year history of this nation. featured such characteristics as placing the legal burden of defense on the aristocratic estate 7 Far greater discontinuity in West German national politics has been stressed by DAHRENDORF (1965). which entailed classic characteristics of liturgical Probably due to occupation by democratic powers political resource mobilization (WEBER, 1922: and more democratic regional traditions, the matter 1006-1069; BÜSCH, 1962; SCHOEPS, 1966: cannot be elaborated here. R. C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 15

So much for some pertinent qualitative data on mines who shall form the government and who the theme of historical continuity in authority the opposition, this is not the case in consociatio- codes. But in stating a proposition of non-change nal democracies where the question is settled in a in this area, the most important question is: post-electoral process of negotiation among party which codes? It is a fair guess that history and leaders dealing with the problem of forming a sociology alike share MANNHEIM’s dictum of coalition government. Clearly the idea that nei­ “fundamental democratization” as a piece of ther the popular nor the electoral-college vote conventional wisdom. And it should be noted ought to determine who becomes President of that of the five classic cases enumerated above it the United States would meet with fierce resent­ was only the Netherlands and the United States ment in America. Yet that illustrates only differ­ which had democracy at the time of the Reform­ ent “surface” legitimacies involved. LIJPHARDT ation stage. The other three moved from the “di­ (1968a, 1968b, 1969) has demonstrated that vine rights” principle of absolutist monarchy to consociational and competitive democracies use the principle of “sovereignty of the people”8. opposite rules as regards the incumbency of exe­ cutive office; the former use an “anti-majoritari- The codes for which I argue “invariance” are not an conception of legitimay” the latter a “mojori- the more conventional ones. They do not directly tarian” one. But behind this contrast stands a regulate who has the right of command; they do common “hidden” element which asserts the not directly specify the mode of participation in need to let distinctive and different parts partici­ decision making at the national center; and they pate directly in the process of ultimately arriving do not immediately govern modes of succession at decisions which are to be binding on all. It to office. The codes at issue here are more abstract reflects the conviction that the societal whole is and more “hidden” than these other “surface never more and can be never more than a nego­ rules”. These “hidden” codes specify the mean­ tiated social order, a product of “somehow” ing of outhority relations by stating only the lesser reality which relies for its bindingness grounds on which an authoritative decision is bind­ on negotiation among units with greater reality ing on units of the collectivity in question. At the which are either voters directly, as in the compe­ micro-level these codes constitute normative ima­ titive case, or representatives as agents of aggre­ ges about the individual-group relation; at the gate votes constituting real social groups with macro-level they refer to the “society as a whole- diverse purposes and interests, as in the consocia­ constituent parts” relation. tional case.

For illustration three cases seem useful. Two of Now, at that level of abstraction, the Venetian these are contemporary types of democracy, an­ Republic was quite different as regards the con­ other is a historical one. Now being democracies, ception of differing realities and the associated all three share the idea that votes “legitimate” ge- norms. Venice had a Grand Council to which all vernmental authority. But the first two have one adult males belonged, “regardless of creed, oc­ kind and the third a different meaning code of cupation, and education” as we might say today. authority. That council elected an executive with very short terms of tenure (SWANSON, 1967: 39-41). Spe­ As is well known, while in Anglo-Saxon democra­ cifically then, Grand Council membership was cies the outcome of the electoral process deter­ premised on what all had indisputably in common as granted by nature. For the Venetians 8 „Divine rights“, „rule through dei gratia“ should this meant that a greater reality was attributed to not be confused with direct religious legitimation. what all had in common than to the diverse pur­ On the contrary, these terms appeared at the tail end poses of constituent groups. And it was to the of the struggle between princes and the Pope, a con­ flict about the question whether priestly coronation commong rather than the diverse parts that they constituted or merely affirmed temporal power, and assigned significant normative meaning as regards one that sealed the differentiation of sacred and se­ the legitimacy of authority. cular power. Ever after, governmental power rested on a presumed commonality of interests of units In sum, meaning codes of authority are at issue organized in a state. Thus sovereignty of the people merely signals an extension of the size of the rele­ here. They specify the grounds on which obe­ vant units (STERNBERGER, 1968). dience is owed. And it is these meaning codes 16 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 rather than other rules regulating legitimate au­ The dilemma of politics then is a product of a thority which should show evolutionary invar­ factually unequal contingency of central govern­ iance, such invariance pertaining to the meaning ment on the periphery and the normative need to principle involved but not to its legal codification promulgate a universal overarching common in­ as regards all situations. The latter remains sub­ terest as a source contingency which is credibly ject to continuous elaboration and refinement. devoid of group-discriminatory characteristics. For the sake of convenience in keeping them That dilemma cannot be “rationalized away” in distinct, I should like to propose new labels for the sense of making the contradiction disappear. them. Thus where a notion prevails that society A continuous search for greater normative ac­ as a whole is merely a negotiated social order ceptance of the dilemma probably constitutes deriving from the direct interaction of its “more the only “rationalization” to be found here. real” constituent parts one can speak of an “ex parte” code of legitimate authority; and where Finding such normative acceptance of the dilem­ the reverse is the case, as in the above example ma in the Occident involved the development of from Venice, one can speak of an “ex toto” code. meaning codes for legitimate authority which re­ These meaning codes of authority presuppose sulted from a correlated struggle about religious the separate existence of images of “parts” and ultimate and social meanings of political inter­ “whole” in the symbolic universe of a society. dependence.There was a relationship between the Given such separate images, the special nature of dilemma of politics of historical societies and the political relations comes into focus. These involve emergence of monotheism as well as between the articulation of the diverse and often conflict­ struggles about the nature of the deity as regards ing interests and purposes of the constituent the question of its immanence and the way the parts with those interests, activities, mobilization, dilemma of legitimate authority was “settled” as well as disposal of resources of the “whole” (SWANSON, 1967: 23, 42, 232). For purposes which must necessarily be expended to main­ of generalization beyond the Western case and tain the latter as a going concern (SWANSON, making the postulate of a Reformation fall-out 1967: 31-32). SWANSON called “the parts” hypothesis work, SWANSON’s analysis is very associations and “the whole” social system. useful. Stripped off its content-particularities, this correlated religio-political conflict resulted Accordingly, the essence of political relations in political legitimacy principles highly suggestive is to be found in the fact that they articulate the of the very nature of finding evolutionarily “associational” and “social system” aspects successful coping mechanisms with such dilem­ of collective life. Beginning with their differen­ mas. tiation and persistent since, every central govern­ ment faces the task to coordinate the activities The general formula seems to be this: At the of groups in society which a) have a certain auto­ higher stages of evolution men typically face di­ nomy vis a vis central control and b) are lemmas irresolvable in principle but needing re­ characterized by diverse and frequently conflict­ solution in practice. Coping with the dilemma in ing group interests. Consequently, ever since, the a fashion “adequate to” the evolutionary norma­ politics of center-periphery relations is saddled tive complexity achieved amounts to develop­ with a dilemma. Central government depends on ment of some interpretive schema that a) places the support of organized social interests with di­ the two horns of the dilemma into a hierarchical verse purposes. But it also claims a monopoly relation to each other but b) recognizes normative over the legitimate use of force. Therefore, contingency between the two thus avoiding central government must assert the existence of domination of one over the other. The interpre­ one common interest transcending all particular- tive schema must preserve the idea of a tension­ ist group interests. Since one can safely assume laden contingency including relative autonomy that some periphery groups are better organized between higher and lower components. In author­ than others which also means that they control ity relation the components are “parts” and “the more of a society’s scarce an unequally distributed whole”, or the “associational” and the “social resources than others, it follows that at any given system” aspects of social organization. moment in time central government is more con­ tingent on some groups for support than others. There are but two such interpretive schemas or R.C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 17 ideal-typical solutions to the politics dilemma in of authority, and thus showing one reason for the SWANSON data; and these are so general as their persistence through c) demonstrating that to suggest generalization beyond the West. In one they articulate antinomy functions in PARSONS solution intrinsic primacy was assigned to the so­ (1963a: 259—260) media paradigm applicable to cial system aspect of organization, in the other any differentiated polity. These issues are taken such primacy was assigned to the associational up below. aspect. In both, however, the element of lesser importance was explicitly recognized. For in both cases a monotheistic deity symbolized IV. Reasons for Invariance in Authority Codes men’s experience with the purposes and activities of independent organizations by emphasizing the There are three main reasons why such authority idea of “an overarching source of decision and codes proved resistant to fundamental change in purpose (providing) unity among groups diverse their meaning. Their very “hidden nature” facili­ in purpose” (SWANSON, 1967: 23, emphasis tates a double-function: their use in contributing supplied). to diachronic solidarity or the maintenance of so­ cietal identity over time and adaption to changes SWANSON’s Findings are the relevant facts. They in the legitimacy fashions of the international tell us that a correlated struggle about the nature system with which all polities become increasing­ of God and the nature of meaningful authority ly interdependent. Fascist symbolism, for example, evolved normative solutions concerning man’s happens to be in disrepute at this time and various contingency on man and God so general as to pro­ forms of democratic and socialist symbolism are bably apply elsewhere. in vogue9. Fidelity to “hidden” and adjustment of “surface” rules thus enables societies to remain Consequently, it is very likely that the Reforma­ the same yet get along. Secondly, such codes make tion fall-out produced or produces two “final” acceptable fundamental irresolvable contradictions ideal-typical solutions to the authority dilemma in center-peripheiy relations bearing on the “parts ”- of complex society in one restricted sense. The “whole” dilemma. Finally, it can be demonstraded sense covers principles on which obedience is owed. that both codes, the ex parte and the ex toto, Under the ex parte code one must obey because di­ permitted successful “encoding” of norms regu­ verse social identities have constructed a common lating all four political functions that any polity purpose;under the ex toto code one must obey has to cope with. These functional norms are also because commonalities have been mobilized to relatively “hidden” and they vary. Therefore, mo­ defeat diverse identities. Under the former, a dern polities, whether democratic or non-demo- common purpose is a negotiated social order, un­ cratic in “surface” appearance, have functionally der the latter the common purpose is an imma­ equivalent but ethically variant modes of political nent given that must be awakened. Only these so­ process which permit additional flexibility in lutions to the dilemma of politics are Final. But changing “surface” legitimacies yet maintaining elaboration in terms of spelling out their meaning continuity with the past. and codiFication particularly as regards coopera­ tive systems with different functional significance for society constitutes an ongoing evolutionary Locating the Authority Codes in a Functional process. Typology o f Modern Polities

As illustrated in the case of the Venetian repub­ There seem to be four basic types of political lic, a democracy with an ex toto code, there was regime extant in industrial societies: consulta­ no longer any tight correlation between type of tive authoritarianism, corporatism, competitive polity and code already during the Reformation democracy, and consociational democracy. stage. One should not expect one in subsequent stages either. But that does not mean complete in­ Following WEBER in the recognition that charis- dependence between code and type of regime. Us­ ing PARSONS’ four-function paradigm aids in the 9 I owe the idea of international fashions in political following: a) classifying polity types in industrial legitimacy to a public lecture of JUAN LINZ at the society, b) locating these “hidden” meaning codes University of Pittsburgh, 1976. 18 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 ma exists purely only in status nascendi rules 15th century rather than featuring the political out totalitarianism as a stable type. Furthermore, policentrism characteristic of feudal hierocracy, while the one case where it occurred in a society the long-term military use of religious beliefs, with a fully developed economy, Nazi-Germany, and the forging of Iberian consciousness out of had little chance in developing routinization of the encounter of Christianity with Islam and Ju­ charisma, the decline of STALIN’s personality daism supplied historic and early modern Spain cult and the subsequent failure in the Soviet with a certain amount of theocratic tendencies, a Union to develop another, points to the transfor­ “theobiosis” (CASTRO, 1954: 17,19,132, 153). mation of totalitarianism in the modern world into Towards modernity, and particularly overseas, what is called here “consultative authoritaria­ this history worked itself out in a caesaropapist nism.” Studies of conflict management and more direction characterized by an uncanny mixture general analyses (PLOSS, 1965; KOLKOWICZ, of obsessive idealism and slipshod ideological 1967; STEWART, 1969; MEYER, 1965; FI­ sloganeering with imported models of and for SCHER, 1968; HOUGH, 1969) seemto permit society behind which seem to stand neither un­ the following clues as regards the authority code derstanding nor genuine commitment as regards at work. First, functional interests must be dis­ anything fundamental in the political structure robed of their functional particularisms before of society (CASTRO, 1954: 127; TANNEN­ they can legitimately float demands or the pro- BAUM, 1965: 136-137; LINZ, 1964)11. The fering of advice. Wheter the issues are “general caesaropapist tendencies are mild, mostly avoid­ education” as against “early specialization”, ing real domination and occuring only as a last “conventional” as compared with nuclear de­ resort if there is conflict at the same level. fense technology, build-up of industrial capital or expansion of the consumer goods branches in the The distinctive feature of contemporary corpora­ economy, contenders of influence on center-de­ tism is “expressive” politics organized around per­ cision makers must present their case not in sonalism. This demands the use of power in the terms of particular interests and their rights, service of a reputedly common belief officially in but in terms of every one’s duty to advance so­ theory, and its expenditiure in response to par­ cialism or some other formulation stressing the ticular group interests in practice. There is also supravening interests of the whole over the parts insecurity concerning feasibility of the promise of society. Second, interest articulation requires of common beliefs and a near-selfconscious re­ the appearance of stalactite (from the top down­ fusal to escape from the importance of believ­ wards) mobilization (NETTL, 1967: 271ff), ing towards a more practical ordering of author­ while interest aggregation proceeds according to ity relations through reduction of diffuseness in shifting alliances among functional interest in obligations (CASTRO, 1954: 55). Somehow, fact, though in theory according to superiority in divining the meaning of unchanging Marxist- Leninist principes under changing environmental 10 While not as much industrialized as seems desirable for claiming polity compatability with industrial so­ conditions. Finally, whatever the reality in the ciety, one should note that when one defines a met- balance of forces between bureaucratic vested tro-city in terms of a population density of 100.000 interests and the interest of clients, the parallel­ or more and with 65 percent or more of the labor ism of “technical” and “leadership” hierarchies force in the non-agricultural sector of the economy, serves to symbolize the supremacy of party, re­ the metropolitan population of Latin America aver­ aged 27.4 percent in 1960 with a range of 48 percent presenting “the whole,” over all other interests, in Uruguay and 6 percent in Haiti. Also during that representing “the parts.” Yet the capacity of year, of 20 Latin American countries one had a metro leadership to draw on special expertise in policy­ of 6.7 million, three countries a metro of 4 to 5 mil­ making has certainly been institutionalized to lion, and six countries metros of 1 to 2 million in­ habitants (HARRIS, 1971: 172-175, 179). the point where any obvious inferiority to the United States (ROSE, 1967) on this score is no 11 Ideological „mimicry“ (LINZ 1964) according to longer discernible. which such issues as fascism and communism „amount to frivolous sideshows, in servile imitation of foreign models“ (CASTRO, 1954: 127), pertains The classic case of corporatism can be found in to political not necessarily other structures of society the Iberian Peninsula and its Latin American off­ such as education, economic relations, and foreign shoots10. Already a “centralized state” in the policy. R.C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 19 authority relations must remain personalist and cognition of the need to represent functional universally moral (TANNENBAUM, 1965: 68). interests with genuine quasi-autonomous rights of their own which seems to coexist with the no­ Though pertinent available research remains less tion of the absolute need to “dictate obligations” clear than in any of the other types of regime from a supravening perspective, interest articula­ (STEVENS, 1974; MALLOY, 1974; SCHMIT- tion takes a mixture of stalactite and stalacmite TER, 1971), the following aggregate picture may (from the bottom up) forms which tends to be be offered. positively correlated with the rank position of a given hierarchically organized functional inter­ The whole-parts dilemma in terms of a differing est in the pecking order of all such interests. “reality” ascribed to society as a whole and its constituent parts remains compromised in the In sum, the most telling difference between con­ Hispanic authority code. Such compromise in­ sultative authoritarianism and corporatism is the volves a conception that some greater and lesser presence of a systematically rationalized ideology forms of cultural traditions must interact if a in the former and its relative absence in the latter. common weal is to become manifest. Hierarchi­ At the same time, despite the compromises, the cally organized functional interests of diverse authority code displays more ex toto then ex kinds must engage in contest seeking to subor­ parte features. dinate each other if the true interest of the whole is to become visible. This follows in part a histo­ Following the work of LIJPHART and rically conditioned instability in the corporate HUNTINGTON already referred to, the principle stratification typical in this case. For where “be­ features of the competitive and the consociation- lief rather than deed counted,. . . and the shining al types of democracy would seem to be summa- sword of the Apostle . . . made them all equal” rizable as follows. They share a notion of the (CASTRO, 1954: 157), respect for hierarchy constructed collective interest assigning greater was potentially challenged by appeal to ascriptive reality to constituent parts of society. They differ egalitarianism. Practically and in contemporary in that pursuit of this construction by pure con­ forms this means that inequalities among inter­ test can be afforded only in those cases charac­ nally hierarchically organized corporate groups terized by a relatively homogeneous politica cul­ which form the relevant units of stratification in ture. In the consociational case where the latter this case cannot be institutionalized in as stable a is fragmented and historically based on ascriptive fashion as in the other regimes. Stratification in collectivities, such a path is precluded, and all Iberain societies remains subject to continuous efforts are geared toward aggregating those inter­ challenges and reassertions through the political ests compatible with a shared commitment to the process (ROGOWSKI and WASSERSPRING, maintenance of essentially segregated political sub­ 1971). Such struggles take the form of multiple cultures. Consequently, stalacmite mobilization is parallel hierarchies attempting to construe an quite legitimate in competitive but factually “bro­ overall hierarchy on their relations. Whosoever ken” in consociational democracy where the elec­ gains supremacy, for however long, claims the toral process is completely divorced from interest role of promulgator of the interests of all. If this aggregation and amounts to a legitimation ritual is not a fundamentally wrong interpretation of engaging parallel hierarchies of zuilen or Lager HUNTINGTON’S (1968: 192-263) “praetorian with stalactite mobilizations all oriented to fixed society” metaphor, it is essential to keep in mind constituencies. As to administration in terms of that relative constancy in executive control of the patterning of bureaucracy-client relations, de­ one institution, such as the military, does not at mocracies, regardless of type, seem to be charac­ all amount to the dominance of one functional terized more by clients sharing responsibility with institution. For these systems are support-con- administrators for policy implementation or a tigent, and policy outcomes are a function of near-egalitarian basis than is the case in consulta­ changing institutional alliances on which executive tive authoritarianism and corporatism. imcumbents depend. The other contrast feature to consultative authoritarianism rests with the A more systematic account of the elements of compromise on interest articulation patterns typ­ authority codes used above will be rendered be­ ical for corporatism. Following the explicit re­ low. At this point one needs to emphasize that 20 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 what has been outlined is in the nature of ideal- functional interests in society (the i-primacy types. So conceived, it is possible to locate these case), or iv. constituting primarily an expressive types in a four-function classification. arena o f constituent parts (the 1-primacy case).

Following PARSONS (1959, 1953, 1951: 180- In this light competitive democracy figures as 200) any subsystem of action can be analyzed an a-primacy case. Historically the United States from a perspective of having to solve four univer­ is the classic example. Here modernization of so­ sal functional problems (adaption, goal-attain­ ciety occurred through private economic and so­ ment, integration, and pattern maintenance). cial forces, not through government. Thus the Since no system can fully solve all four problems polity mainly adapted to social and economic at the same time, one can classify them on the change (HUNTINGTON, 1968: 93-139). LIJP- basis of which of the four problems is given pri­ HARDT’s (1968a) analysis of The Netherlands mary emphasis. This applies to systems at any makes her the classic example of consociational level of analysis and therefore to the polity. The democracy which has i-primacy. The Soviet notion of one-function primacy as a classificatory Union ranks as the most important empirical device does not vitiate the need to solve all pro­ example of consultative authoritarianism, a case blems through phase-movements of a system of g-primacy, and the “praetorianism” of many (PARSONS, 1953). All it says is that polities can Latin American cases are the ones best approxi­ be usefully classified according to which one of mating corporatism with 1-primacy. For ease of their four functions they seem to assign para­ overview, Figure 1 locates these ideal types in mount inportance. The focus of classification is a the usual format of Parsonian functionalism. functional perspective of the polity-society rela­ tion. One can distinguish overall organization If the most salient feature of feudal hierocracy to utilitarian interests (the a-primacy polity), ii. was indeed the curious mixture of the contrary maximizing the provision of direction for all elements of “personalized fealty” and yet a functional interests in society (the g-primacy “contractual stipulation of right and duties”, of case), iii. maximally serving the integration of “hereditary controls over land” and yet “a de-

FIGURE 1: The Modern Societal System and Its Polity Types*

Economy Polity

Fiduciary Subsystem Societal Community

* Following GOULD’s (1976) revised interchange paradigm clarifies the polity types’ one-function primacy through the lens of mediated interchanges. R.C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 21

personalized rent nexus” (WEBER, 1922: 1074), tralized form, the other, an extension in central­ then Figure 1 illuminates how the rudimentary ized form. parliamentarism of the waning middle ages in the Occident constitutes a precursor of the two Turning to the most general explanation why modern democratic types. “Personalized fealty” there is invariance in authority codes, it is useful and “hereditary controls over land” stress the to reemphasize two points. Following the logic famous integrative aspects of the medieval syn­ of one-function primacy, it must be clear that all thesis which found their extension in consocia- modern polities have their consultative authori­ tional democracy where fealty has been trans­ tarian, their competitive, their consociational, formed into accommodative elite behaviors pre­ and indeed their corporatist elements. As ROSE’s supposing a shared primary commitment to (1967) study makes clear with the case of medi­ jointly work against all divisive forces in society, cine, there certainly is representation of function­ and where the “hereditary control over land” al interests in American political process. The has been institutionalized into the ascriptive or­ same is true for Britain as well as the Soviet ganization of political support. On the other Union (GILISON, 1972). Indeed functional in­ hand, the “contracutal stipulations” and “the terest representation is a moral duty of institution­ depersonalized rent nexus” display the maximi­ alized expertise in modern society in general zation of adaptive functions of the polity to so­ (BAUM, 1972). Though the modes vary pro­ ciety so characteristic of competitive democracy. foundly in detail, professionalism means auto­ As all summarizing devices carry the danger of nomy, hence a corporatist element is ineradicable misleading oversimplification, it should be from modern political process everywhere. stressed that the “bordering” of competitive Equally, executive functioning involves an ele­ democracy on the economy does not imply the ment of authoritarianism, interest aggregation predominance of unmitigated cash-nexus poli­ one of consociationalism, and the pursuit of tics; but it does refer to the dominance of re­ office an element of competitiveness. gulating autonomously adaptive groups of all Next, the opposite function types of polities types relative to other political objectives. Histori­ share one meaning code each. In the democratic cally, a parallel case holds for the two non-demo- case this is the ex parte code, in the non-demo- cratic modern polities. Both of these would seem cratic cases the ex toto code. In the present pers­ to have retained important elements of liturgical pective of the universal functional elements of political resource mobilization so prevalent in any polity, this means that elements of each code patrimonial bureaucratic empires. One, the corpo- are also present. They cannot be spelled out here. ratist form, constitutes an extension in decen­ But displaying these features, as in Figure 2, shows

FIGURE 2 Universal Functional Aspects of the Modern Polity

Polity

* Where: MA. = Moral Authority Code; JO. = Jurisdiction of Office; PR. = Property Law; SR. = Stratification Rules (PARSONS, 1963a, 1963b, 1968) 22 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 that these contrary elements of codes regulate an- authority codes further reveals additional reasons tinomious functions in the polity. for their stability.

The ex parte elements regulate interchange across the double functional boundary between external- Invariant Codes: 'Tarts'' and “Wholes" instrumental and internal-consummatory function; the ex toto elements perform such regulation for The codes at issue here constitute normative internal-instrumental and external-consummatory rules which specify the grounds on which a deci­ functions. Important is that each of these “hidden” sion by central geovernment ought to exact obe­ authority codes encompasses the codes of media dience by all units in society. Thus an ex parte specialized for opposite functions and that they code asserts that such a decision is binding on all involve positive or negative-sanction media, respec­ units of society because special and particular tively. The ex parte code encompasses the codes interest in society have participated in its making of money and influence, both positive-sanction in their status as such special and particularist in­ media despite specialization for opposite func­ terests. This implies a theory about finding the tions, which gives democratic political process its common or general will. That theory states: the voluntaristic flavor with its emphasis on “rights”. only way to find what the common unitary pur­ The ex toto code encompasses the codes of moral pose of a society is all about is to let the diverse authority and power, both negative-sanction me­ and particularist purposes of constituent groups dia despite specialization for antinomy functions, engage in direct negotiation, whatever its form; and this gives non-democratic political process its for it is constituent groups which make up a so­ flavor of constraints with the emphasis on “dut­ ciety and only their direct encounter will render ies”. But in so encompassing the codes of societal what all have in common. In contrast, an ex toto media with opposite functional specialization, code asserts that a center decision is binding be­ the authority codes permit a polity to oscillate cause none of the many and diverse special parti­ between opposite functions without threat to cularist interests in society have participated in stability in the primacy of one authority code. its making in their status as diverse particularist Since one-function primacy in any system means interests. This, too, implies a theory about find­ relative under-servicing of the functionally oppo­ ing the general will, and it proclaims: the only site needs and interests (placed diagonally in the way to arrive at the common will is to let special usual functions table), it is not only analytically roles designed for its discernment do their work likely that primary phasing in political process undisturbed and unemcumbered by divisive inter­ involves oscillation back and forth across diagon­ ests, because society in its essence is an imma­ ally opposite functions because the typically nent reality rather than a negotiated order and all neglected needs demand attention first when its constituent particularist parts derive their le­ strain builds up, it is also probable, by virtue, gitimate status only from the function they per­ that the function-adequate societal media come form for the whole. into play without threatening a stable commit­ ment to the meaning codes of legitimate autho­ These types of codes show impressive historical rity. This is the most general reason for stability stability over long time periods. Counting only in such codes. polities which maintained their independence throughout the periods under review, and classi­ Thus societies can engage in continuous self-re- fied in this dichotomous fashion, SWANSON’s visions through the use of stability in the mean­ data reveal the following information: (1) Over a ing of authority because the two meaning codes 290 year period from 1490-1780, 20 of 26 poli­ under consideration regulate opposite functions. ties maintained stability in these codes;(2) over This feature not only constitutes a long-term so­ about a century from the Reformation Settle­ lution to the political paradox “born” during ment to 1780, 26 out of 27 maintained stability the late historical stage, it also enables societies (SWANSON, 1967: 238-241). to engage in continuous self-revisions yet main­ tain their distinctive political character over time The codes at issue here simply say nothing in which in turn constitutes one element of conti­ themselves concerning who participates in center nuity in societal identity. Describing these decision making but they say a lot about the R.C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 23 symbolic legitimations of such participation. involves a double dilemma. One is that it is the Under the ex toto rule legitimate participation in center’s obligation to make and enforce such goal-choice action at the political center on the choices and a kind of sin to evade, and some­ part of the technical periphery demands that times even to delay, the need for choice. The such periphery symbolically divest itself of its other dilemma is that these are real choices in the periphery characteristics, while the ex parte rule short run for individuals, though not in the long insists on the opposite: symbolic retention of pe­ one for society. They do involve differential re­ riphery characteristics. source allocation drawn from a symbolically equal, common pool of citizen obligations yet One should note that the latter rule is more affect various individual and group interests within easily practiced than the former. One can simply society quite differently. But normatively they rely on the “integrity” of “societal nature”, as it serve an ongoing entity, immortal society, where were, drawing on the relevant resources from the the presumption of eternity precludes the agony division of labor in the occupational complex. of trade-offs. That rule indicates what the respective functional primacies of adaption to and integration o f socie­ Dilemmas of this kind permid of no “final solu­ tal forces imply, viz. leaving the drive towards tion”; they cannot be rationalized in the sense the implementation of societal values largely to of making the illogical logical after all. As con­ non-political organizations while letting the cerns the contrasting principles of legitimate polity concentrate on their facilitation and regu­ authority which connect the short and longrun lation, respectively. interests, interpretable meaningful acceptance is all they permit. And people manage with both But the tasks of politics is relatively more diffi­ codes by symbolizing the construction of a kind cult unter the ex toto rule. Here periphery parti­ of differential social reality of shared interests cipation at the center’s goal-setting and choice­ across the divisions of labor and time. With the making activities has to be subjected to a kind of ex parte code it is achieved by postulating a prior laundering process that strips off particular­ greater reality of “the parts” in terms of asso­ isms of value differences inevitably associated ciations as well as individuals;using the ex toto with possession of special skills and knowledge. code manages the problem in opposite fashion: Such a laundering process must achieve the awak­ reducing parts and their diverse purposes — and ening of value commonalities, however, without ultimately even individuals12 — to the function significant costs in special knowledge and skill ca­ they play for society as a whole. pacities. To illustrate, it is rather likely that an economist’s image of society is largely composed Yet such general reasons concerning the invariance of economic data. Indeed in his role as economist of authority codes scarcely suffice. There must be it is part of his special professional morality to more specific reasons yet, demanding systematic see his society in terms of economic requisites. presentation. The psychiatrist’s image of his society is probably a product of his mental health lenses and, once 12 That individuals have principally a shorter life-span again, that is part of the professional obligation. than society is clear; but the difference in relevant Yet when it comes to value choice, that is, the time horizons seems less clear in the case of associa­ tions in society, be these economic organizations, po­ political center’s most salient political obligation litical parties, religious, relational, or civic organiza­ which is to determine what men shall be made to tions. Nevertheless, in comparison to the relation care more about: economic growth or distributive between citizens and their government which are au­ justice, defense or mental health, then the ex thoritative relations, the electoral period apart, affi­ toto code commands that no particularist lens be liation with sub-collectivities in society are symboli­ cally treated as far more voluntaristic. Consequently, permitted a chance to pollute what men shall be associations within society are more dependent on so made to care about, by the use of power, and the individual interests of their members in day to hence at the recipients’ risk of negative sanctions, day operative affairs than is government. This whether situational such as jail or internal such as suggests that society’s parts, the associations within the division of labor, are more short-run-contingent guilt (PARSONS, 1963a, 1963b, 1968). organizations most of the time than is government when claiming to represent the enduring interests The moral use of power at the center always of society as a whole. 24 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8

Further Reasons for Invariance in Ex Parte and whole was “born” with the “two class system” Ex Toto Codes of archaic societies. (BELLAH, 1964: 365; PARSONS, 1964: 342-345). Now while true A first, most obvious, weakest, and empirical that some primitive societies were already charac­ “reason” of invariance is this: Insofar as change terized by wider networks of solidarities organ­ in these codes calls for a significant reduction in ized on principles of loyalty other than kinship power itself, a characteristic in much of contem­ (EISENSTADT, 1971b), the birth of stratifica­ porary talk about “participatory democracy” at tion proper brought about a general situation, least in its more anarchic versions, change in codes one applicable to all societies at that and later would seem to have no chance whatever. Whether levels of development, where raw kinship alone one considers GURR’s (1974) demonstration of could not coneivably suffice for societal solidari­ the universal decline of “the night watchman ty in general. Organized differential possession state”, trend data in public (DEUTSCH, 1970: and/or control over scarce resources that lasts 66—67) or in welfare expenditures (CUTRIGHT, from generation to generation has to be justified 1965), the whole drift of modernizing change cov­ in terms of postulating a collective interest sup- ers importantly and centrally increase in society’s ravening the seamless web of kinship simply be­ capacity to act as a cooperative system. Whatever cause families are no longer equal. This provides the indicators, whatever the type of regime and an entirely new dimension to the extension of its ideology, long-term expansion of power is a ascribed and diffuse loyalties from the kin net­ characteristic of all, long-term reduction of power works to wider groupings which EISENSTADT a feature of none. This reality of world historical (1971b) had already discovered in primitive so­ trends seems adequately reflected in social theo­ ciety. The new dimension is that this non-kin ry. Whatever may divide opinion among theorists, society-wide solidarity now had to attain a po­ the indispensability of power in human organiza­ litical cast, articualted through authority. For tion is not among contentious issues. Whether whereever there is stratification legitimized in the perspective is philosophical (RUSSEL, 1938: terms of society’s capacity to act as a whole, 10), focussed on conflict (DAHRENDORF, 1959: political ensocialization into citizenship loyalty 219), systemic-functional (PARSONS, 1964) or of some form becomes a necessary condition small group-empirical (JACOBSON, 1972: 11), of a stable stratification system itself. Further­ the fact that a definite power structure is essential more, after the historical and early modern stages to organizing social existence unites them all. stratification serves more than integrative func­ And powerlessness as an aim of modernization tions. All these more developed societies are has found no serious proponent. “active ones” in the sense of using stratification for the implementation of values, sacred and A second reason for invariance in authority codes, secular (BELLAH, 1964). more theoretical in nature, involves changes in the stratification system that the historical and Consequently, obedience to authority — and not early modern stages wrought. The net effect of only to that of the state but to all those of the these changes was a new role for authority as a cooperative systems a person is involved in a high mechanism of articulation between obligations to division-of-labor society — now faces the problem society as a whole and obligations to subcollecti­ of simultaneously serving two moral needs. On the vities in society. one hand, obedience is now postulated as the duty to make contributions to society’s long-run There seems to be consensus that primitive socie­ path as a self-revising system. Symbolically this ty was characterized by inequality, not however, duty is expressed in loyalty to law and center in­ stratification in the sense of multiple and distinct stitutions. On the other hand, persons are also dimension of rank, posing the problem of legiti­ expected to be loyal to the many subcollectivities mating correlations among them as well as the in the economy, the polity at various levels of relatively stable standing of units on them. Stra­ government, the societal community, and the tification in terms of the organized and institu­ educational complex which in the aggregate con­ tionalized concentration of resources and the stitute society’s capacity to act collectively. With assumption of differential responsibility in their a division of labor, there is no way to perceive use on the part of some units for society as a consistency of purpose between subunits and so- R. C. Baum: Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis 25

ciety at large in any concretely convincing way at (A). What is suggested here is that the two codes any particular point in time. And that is why at issue had implicit rules covering all four as­ loyalty to differential association has to be sym­ pects. Drawing on terminology familiar in bolically matched with loyalty to society as a political sociology and on the work of well- whole (PARSONS, 1963a: 260-261). known authors permits presenting these features in tabular format. Such symbolic matching occurred through the development of authority codes at a level of ge­ nerality sufficiently hiegh to encompass all au­ TABLE 1 Meaning Codes of Authority thority relations in society. Empirically such commonality in authority relations as regards Function Ex Toto Ex Parte Source their legitimacy bases varies and, as a result, so does the stability of polities not only hypotheti­ Legitimation symbolic di- symbolic re- EISENSTADT cally (ECKSTEIN, 1961) but also in fact (GURR, (L) vestment of tention of (1973) 1974). Analytically, however, growing consisten­ periphery periphery cy in the legitimacy beliefs underlying all author­ Interest presumption contest theo- DAHRENDORF ity relations in society is an evolutionary product; Aggregation of raison d’ ry ofarriv- (1965: 161-244) or, put otherwise, one mode in which societies (I) etat and spe­ ing at com­ evolve pertains to their growth in internally cial roles for mon will consistent authority codes which constitutes its discern­ ment the backbone of their very ability to act as actors that are geared to reform and growing “self-re­ Interest stalactite stalagmite NETTL visions” from generation to generation. That not Articulation mobilization mobilization (1967: 271 ff.) only requires that authority codes be very general (G) so that a common interpretative legitimacy over­ Administra­ domination cooptation BENDIX layer can cover function-differentiated associa­ tion (A) of client by patterns and (1947) tions, it also requires their stability through time. the state greater equa­ And while there seems to be no direct empirical bureaucracy lity between bureaucrats evidence with respect to either, indirect evidence of the state supports this claim. That loyalty to society as a and clients whole does not conflict with loyalty to sub­ collectivities is an impressive cross-national fact in industrial society precisely in an area where ol­ der theory predicted the opposite; namely, class To be sure, the theoretical perspectives from and national loyalty (DEUTSCH, 1970: 80-81). which these familiar themes were developed vary profoundly. DAHRENDORFis an outspoken con- A third, and more empirical, reason why the vergentist and NETTL’s stalactite-stalagmite di­ basic principles enshrined in authority codes may chotomy also involves a traditional-modern dimen­ be exempt from further evolutionary change sion. BENDIX comes closed to a maintenance of after the early modern stage rests on a very high difference position, while EISENSTADT origi­ probability that they had already then crystallized nated the idea of evolutionary invariance. What is a dichotomous set of rules for the four principal important here, though, is that the compatible spe­ functions that any authority code has to regulate. cial function rules are general enough to regulate Again, there seems to be no direct historical evi­ political process in regimes with quite varying dence available yet. But PRIDE’S (1970) findings concrete features. Therefore, first, if such rules regarding the relation between economic and de­ already existed in however rudimentary a form mocratic development discussed above strongly establishing but the principles indicated at the suggest that two such sets of rules go back to the early modern stage, they should suffice for con­ era of state formation. A PARSONian perspec­ tinuity after because of their ability to cover tive identifies the four functions in question as with appropriate interpretive layers all four func­ follows: i. legitimation (L); ii. interest aggrega­ tions despite massive subsequent changes in their tion (I); iii. resource mobilization or interest arti­ detail and concrete implementation such as mass culation (G); and iv. bureaucratic administration participation in politics, the increasing role of ex­ 26 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 6, Heft 1, Januar 1977, S. 5 -2 8 pert counsel in the policy formation process, the AVINERI, S., 1972: Hegel’s Theory of the Modern growth in governmental load through state wel­ State. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. fare development and a universal decline in the BARNARD, C, 1938: The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1962 financing of cultural development (most notably printing). science and technology) from private sources. BAUM, C., 1972: On Political Modernity: Stratification Therefore, second, if it is these rules within each and the Generation of Societal Power. Pp. 22-49 in code that permit a polity to oscillate between Harvey, Edward B. (ed.), Perspectives on Moderni­ zation: Essays in Memory of Ian Weinberg. Toronto: antinomious functions across the diagonal in the University of Toronto Press. four-function table, as pointed out before, persis­ BAUM, R.C., 1974: Beyond Convergence: Toward tence of such rules is possible because through Theoretical Relevance in Quantitative Modernization such oscillation a capacity for continuous change Research. Sociological Inquiry 44(4): 225-240. in the face of historical continuity of the ethics BAUM, R.C., 1975: The System of Solidarities. Indian Journal of Social Research. Vol. XVI, Nos. 1 & 2: of politics has been institutionalized. 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