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1968

To Save an Empire: The Earl of Dartmouth as American Secretary 1773-1775

Nancy Briska anderson College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Recommended Citation anderson, Nancy Briska, "To Save an Empire: The Earl of Dartmouth as American Secretary 1773-1775" (1968). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624654. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-tm56-qc52

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TO SAVE AH EMPIRE: jTHE EARL OP DARTMOUTH "i'i AS AMERICAN SECRETARY

1773 - 1775

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

By

Nancy Brieha Anderson

June* 1968 APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Nancy Briska Anderson Author

Approved, July, 1968:

Ira Gruber, Ph.D.

n E. Selby', Ph.D.

of, B Harold L. Fowler, Ph.D. TO SAVE AN EMFIREs THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH

AS AMERICAN SECRETARY

X773 - 1775 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first wish to express my appreciation to the Society

of the Cincinnati for the fellowship which helped to make my year at the. College of William and Mary possible, and to

the several teachers I studied under there for a deeper

and more delightful experience with the discipline of history than X had ever envisioned.

To Dr. Ira Gruber I am indebted not only for the topic of this thesis but for source material, guidance, encourage­ ment and patience, as well as a reading and criticism of the long-awaited manuscript. Dr. John E. Selby and Dr.

Harold Fowler were also kind enough to read the manuscript.

Without the kindness of Mr* Daniel Metz and the Mercer

University Library, and the helpfulness of Mrs. Dorothy

Henderson and the inter-library loan program of the Middle

Georgia Regional Library, my research would have been Incom­ plete and adequate conclusions for my investigations im­ possible.

In the last paragraph of their acknowledgments historians are wont to make some endearing tribute to their wife, who has listened intelligently, read critically,and encouraged selflessly. To that already impressive list this would-be historian needs to thank her husband for manfully coping with an empty stomach, dirty dishes,

iii unpressed pants, lonely evenings and hours of baby-sitting, while his spouse was engaged in a prosopographical pursuit of the amiable Earl.

iv TABLE OS’ CONTESTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ill

ABSTRACT ...... vl

CHAPTER

X, THE AMIABLE EARL ...... 2

II. IMPEDIMENTS! THE POLITICAL BACKDROP...... 30

III. IMPEDIMENTSs THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND CORRESPONDENCE ...... 50

IV, THE POLICY OF COERCION ...... 76

V, COERCION AND CONCILIATION...... 109

VI. A RELEASE FROM FATIGUE ...... 1^3

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ...... 161».

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... X67

y ABSTRACT

The Earl of Dartmouth was a gentle, good, amiable man* Like all Englishmen of his day he was a Whig in that he was a firm believer in Parliamentary supremacy! unlike some, he saw no danger in this supremacy for the liberties of America. He entered government because his stepbrother needed support, and while he had some sound ideas on colonial policy, he could not overcome the obstacles he faced in putting them into effect. His ideas were out of tune with those of the king and a majority of the cabinet, and he lacked the political talent to make them prevail. His office was not set up to give him full control over American affairs or even to give him full and accurate in­ format ion.

The Boston Tea Party horrified him as it did those in opposition who had made their politics a war on Lord north’s American policy. Before the tea party he had hoped to end dissension between mother country and colonies by letting contention subside and by separating the power of taxation from the exercise of it? if the colonists would forbear denying the former, Parliament would refrain from maintain­ ing it by the latter. After the tea party he believed that the colonists must be made to obey the laws of Parliament or suffered to become independent. He didn’t mean to con­ quer the Americans, but to create ”inconveniences” for them-- "Inconveniences" not unlike those the colonies had caused the mother country in 1765--which would bring them to a sense of their duties and privileges as members of the Empire. At the same time he hoped to quiet the unrest by capturing the incendiaries. He did not agree to the lengths his colleagues went, but he was with them in spirit if not in degree! while he would have prevented the Administration of Justice Act, The Quartering Act and parts of the Massa­ chusetts Government Act, had it been in his power, it was not and he was not so discomfited by them that he failed to steer them through the House of Lords. If America would once show submission to its laws, then Parliament could repeal the Tea Duty and thus demonstrate that It could be sovereign in name and not In deed.

When it become apparent that these measures had only succeeded in further exciting the colonists* "jealousy of their liberties”, Dartmouth hoped to restore the empire’s harmony by reminding its subjects that Britain’s resolution

vi to uphold its authority was tempered by benevolence, of which the Conciliatory Proposition was to be evidence. Behind the scenes he was seeking In every way he knew to explore the areas of agreement between the two parties. But he saw no inconsistency in continued firmness, which, for practical reasons, he had to acquiesce in anyway.

When his three policies, non-aggravation, firmness and benevolence, had obviously failed to achieve unity, his belief in Parliamentary authority and love of empire com- n biaed to convince him that force, with the ugly consequence of civil war, was necessary. To make room for its execu­ tion, he resigned his Seals, but unable to desert north, he remained in government as Lord Privy Seal.

vli CHAPTER I

THE AMIABIiE BGRD DARTMOUTH

11 HA IXI HAPPY DAYr'

It is customary, la a personality-oriented essay, to

begin with an introduction to the personality* In the case

of William Xegge, the second Earl of Dartmouth, and an

essay examining the crucial years leading up to Britain’s

loss of her first Empire, this introduction is tantamount

to putting the denouement in the first chapter. For it will

be evident, once the reader becomes acquainted with the

Earl, and certainly once he places him in his eighteenth-

century milieu, that Dartmouth was simply not constituted

to serve as saviour of the Empire, if indeed, any one

statesman could have saved it*

But this was not apparent when Dartmouth became Secre­

tary of State for the Colonies in 1772, either to him, his

English admirers, or the American subjects so unhappy with

their imperial connection* Dartmouth had warm feelings for

his "fellow subjects . . . who, notwithstanding their late excesses, * . . possessed * . , sound and sober principles n of both religion and government." He entertained high 2 hopes for a peaceful settlement of the difficulties and so

2 3 did the many friends who wrote to compliment him on his 3 appointment. The King welcomed him to the Cabinet with unusual ardor. It augured well to have "so great and good a man as lord Dartmouth’1^ take what had come to be a crucial place in the administration.

the news had its most enthusiastic reception in

America. There Dartmouth's accession was greeted with uni* versal ley and thanksgiving. From Boston, former slave

Phillis Wheatly summed up the prevailing mood in a congratu­ latory poem that began;

Hail! Happy Bay! when smiling like the morn Fair Freedom rose, Hew England to Adorn.6

Isaac Skillman, a Boston preacher, dedicated An Oration Upon the Beauties of liberty, or the Essential Bights of *7 A Americans f to Dartmouth* Benjamin Franklin, in London as agent for several colonies, put aside a pamphlet he had written on the dispute between Britain and America due to

”an expectation . . . from the good character of the noble lord (Dartmouth), that the grievances of the colonies would be . . . redressed," and wrote home of the "favourable appearances arising from the change of our American minis - ter.Another letter of Franklin's, this one anonymous, appeared in the Fublick Advertiser; But tho the Americans have been long oppressed, let them not despair. The administration of the colonies is no longer in the hands of a Shelburne, a Glare, or a Hillsborough; Thank Heaven that department is HOW entrusted to an EHGLISHMAB! Be it his glory to reverse those baneful and pernicious measures which have too long harrowed the colonies, and have given such a blow to the Credit, the Commerce and the NAVAL BOWER of the mother country.10

let far from effecting reconciliation, in less than three years Dartmouth found himself charged with waging war on his "fellow subjects". In contrast to the sunburst of expectation in which he entered office, his exit took place amidst storm clouds of failure.

The purpose here is to resolve this paradox. In searching for clues to such resolution we will study Dart* ) mouth himself, his office, the political situation of his day, and the years he served as American Secretary.

'ONE WHO WEARS A CORONET AND PRAXS*

The second Earl of Dartmouth was born William Legge on June 20, 1T31, with all the privileges and expectations of a member of the upper class. His family was not wealthy but their son inherited a sizable estate with houses at

St. James Square in London, Blackheath in Kenty Woodsome in Xorkshire, and what was to be his favorite residence,

Sandwe11 in Staffordshire. His father died when young

William was a little over a year old, so at his grandfather' death in 1?50, Dartmouth came directly into his title and 11 estate. When William was five his mother became the second wife of Francis, the seventh baron North who after­ wards became the first Earl of Guilford* This marriage proved to be as great an influence on the course of his future life as his own birth for it united him with Guil­ ford's family and after his mother's death, with that i of his stepmother, Guilford’s third wife. Guilford’s sod,

Frederick, was two years older than Dartmouth and the two became devoted friends, growing up in the same household, attending Oxford and taking the fashionable tour of the con* 11 tinent together.

The family circle was large and intimate, Dartmouth had two older sisters and a half brother and sister from his mother’s second marriage as well as his stepbrother Frederick*

Guilford was a doting parent to each without distinction, and the brothers and sisters Ignored their half and step relationships as well. 12

Jonathan Swift had written of the first Earl that "my

Lord Dartmouth is a man of letters, full of good sense and good nature, and honor) of strict virtue and regularity in his life but labours under one great defect--that is he treats his clerks with more civility and good manners than others in his station have done the Q u e e n . The words could have been applied equally to his grandson. He was generally known as "the good Lord Dartmouth" and Richardson let it be known soon after the appearance of his novel depicting the good man, Sir Charles Grandlson, that the young earl might have been the model for his bero.lif A moral and upright character was not his only virtue. As often as he is called good he is termed "amiable. 4 young Peggy Hutchinson wrote enthusiastically to her sis ter*in-law soon after her arrival in London in ITT**-* "He is the most amiable man I ever saw) and was he not married, and was he not a Lord, I /him . ,

**^d he teatpted + dowred kinswomen of o ®.e/ 12 ^^55 Da**.* Catherine Nicholl. An old hls st ur ePmoihe*^ new lady Dartmouth as "rather F&mtly - . / -1 ^lena civil" and, perhaps most significant-

P r e ■£ >/ j. _ * • * e is . * ." The marriage was long and ly f*as *. / ®°<&hared an interest in religion and their baPPy as yen. The Historical Mannscripts Commission*® ®ine ej A of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart- ««le/ concern for his immediate and larger families,

lasting many long letters dealing with such problems as his

9ons* education and his sister's marriage settlement. / Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a

large part of the private life he loved.

There were other activities of a personal nature that kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however* His stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the

Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group 18 had grown up. Not really dissenters, they were seeking to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on personal and "methodical" piety. Dartmouth was well ac­ quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America. So 7 universally known was the Bari’s religiosity, that in an

era of widespread latltudinarianism, characterized by vice

and evil on all layers of society,^ his ’goodness1 was

often ridiculed. Horace Walpole once described him as "in

the odour of devotion"and lord Hillsborough found him 21 unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.

If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on

this account, was the King* George Ill’s religious ideas were not too different from Dartmouth’s and he thought him op "a most excellent man." Quite a few of his letters bear

testimony to the esteem in which he held the Earl2^ but none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth’s ministry fell, To avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will ever be to my heart, and that I have ever esteemed him in another light than any of his companions . . ♦ What days it has pleased the Almighty to place me in when Lord Dartmouth can be a man to be removed but at his own request I But I cannot complain, X adore the will of Providence, and will ever resign obediently to His Will. My heart is too full to add more. ^

It followed naturally for a man of Dartmouth’s beat to have charitable and benevolent interests. Some of these were of a religious sort? for example, his support of

John Hewton# a slaver who became a parson, and the Eleazar

Wheelock Indian Charity School, an American institution designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their own people# The latter benefitted so much from his time and 25 money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor. 6 should be tempted to set my cap at him . , ,nJ‘

In 1755 Dartmouth married a well dowred kinswoman of his stepmother. Miss Frances Catherine Wlcholl. An old family friend described the new Lady Dartmouth as "rather pretty . . . cheerful, civil" and, perhaps most significant- 17 ly, "as good as be is . * The marriage was long and happy as they shared an interest in religion and their nine children, fhe Historical Manuscripts Commission1® calendar of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart­ mouth's concern for his immediate and larger families, listing many long letters dealing with such problems as his sons* education and his sister's marriage settlement*

Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a large part of the private life he loved.

Hhere were other activities of a personal nature that kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however. His stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the

Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group 18 had grown up. Hot really dissenters, they were seeking to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on personal and "methodical" piety. Dartmouth was well ac­ quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America. So 7 universally known was the Bari's religiosity, that in an

era of widespread latitudinarianism, characterized by vice

and evil on all layers of s o c i e t y , ^ his 'goodness1 was

often ridiculed* Horace Walpole once described him as "in

the odour of devotion" ^ and lord Hillsborough found him 21 unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.

If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on

this account, was the King* George Ill's religious ideas were not too different from Dartmouth's and he thought him 22 "a most excellent man." Quite a few of his letters hear

testimony to the esteem in which he held the Barl^, fcUt none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth's ministry fell,

Ho avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will ever he to my heart, and that I have ever esteemed him in another light than any of his companions . . * What days it has pleased the Almighty to place me in when lord Dartmouth can he a man to he removed hut at his own request! But I cannot complain, I adore the will of Providence, and will ever resign obediently to His Will. My heart is too full to add more.

It followed naturally for a man of Dartmouth's heat to have charitable and benevolent interests. Some of these were of a religious sort: for example, his support of

John Hewton, a slaver who became a parson, and the BXeaaar

Wbeelock Indian Charity School, an American institution designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their own people. £he latter benefitted so much from his time and 25 money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor. 8 Other philanthropies were cultural and artistic. The poet William Cowper and poet-essayist Dr* James Beattie

received financial aid as well as sympathy from Dartmouth and the Bari sought to encourage a variety of artists by 26 buying or commissioning their work. It was Cowper who celebrated Dartmouth in his poem ’’Truth" as "one who wears a coronet and prays." His patron's concern for the poet's well-being is seen in a score of letters in volume III of the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar of the

Dartmouth papers.

Thus his attachment to domestic life, religion, letters and philanthropy combined to keep him from assuming any public role. He had taken his seat in the House of Lords on May 31* 175^, upon his return from the continent; but while he had spoken with the Newcastle Whigs on the Cider

Tax in 17^3 and in denouncing the pamphlet Droit le Bol in 176h, these were the only two times he had raised his voice on an issue in ten years# He was not interested in politics.

A GENTLE MAN ENTERS GENTLEMAN’S POLITICS

Dartmouth was not interested in politics and he had little aptitude for its combative atmosphere. Possessed of the integrity of a statesman, he lacked the shrewdness of a Newcastle or the pugnacity of a Pitt. In 1766 when it was being considered whether his office would become a third 9

Secretary of State or continue as First Lord of Trade, his friend the Earl of Chesterfield wrote him to "lay aside upon this occasion your natural timidity and diffidence! spur on your friends who wish you extremely well,11 The failure of Dartmouth to achieve the third secretaryship at oR this time had as much to do with Pitt*s disapprobation as Dartmouth’s diffidence, but it is indicative of his na­ ture that Chesterfield should write to him in such a vein*

In spite of the fact that Dartmouth had spent the first years of his adult life engrossed in private matters, he must have known that his background and station could not allow him to avoid the responsibility of public busi­ ness forever* His grandfather had played an active role on the political stage, serving in the House of Lords, on the Board of Trade, as Secretary of State for the Southern

Department and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal until the death of Queen Anne * Two of his uncles, Heneage Legge and

Henry Bilson Legge, had served as Baron and Chancellor of 29 the Exchequer, respectively. It was the former who wrote to him during his grand tour:

Hobody wishes your success and good figure in the world more warmly than I do . * . (Ju-Q 1 can’t help crying ‘Fire!1 when I see any danger coming toward you* There is a huge dose of flattery preparing for you in high places, against your return to England * , * . We have an excellent hand at it in this country and if a young man of Quality and fortune can count twenty when he returns and does not absolutely pick pockets, we all cry, ’Tertius caelo cecidit Cato!* But I thank God youhavesense and spirit enough to take the substantial benefit of a good character and not let the 10

flattery which will attend it turn you [and North] into asses. 30

The young Earl apparently took this advice to heart. From his other uncle he acquired the political principles that led him to align himself with the old Whigs centered around the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords. It was the

Duke who at length convinced Dartmouth to hear the call of duty, forsake his own inclinations, and join the Rockingham

Ministry. The call from Newcastle must have been persuasive, for he was a cousin to North and his wife was a cousin of

Dartmouth's. Together the step brothers had visited him during their tour while he was in attendance to George II in

Hanover.^ In the decade that had elapsed since that intimacy, he had performed several favors of patronage for Dartmouth, and the two had corresponded at length concerning the last illness of Dartmouth's uncle, Henry Bilson Legge, who was a friend of Newcastle's.^ When he heard that

Dartmough had refused an invitation to join the new ministry as either First Lord of Trade or in a position at the

Treasury, he wrote him that

I must do justice to us all that it was essential in forming an administration that would satisfy the nation, and be able to carry on the business with credit and repu­ tation, to have your Lordship in such rank and station as should be most agreeable to you.

Perhaps more telling in its effect on Dartmouth than this flattery was his contention that:

The Duke of Grafton and my Lord Rockingham are both about your Lordship's age, and if 11

they had not got the hotter of their own inclination for the sake of the King, and the Public* I don * t know where the King would have got a Secretary of State* or a freasury.3^

Dartmouth could no longer refuse and in July he Joined

Rockingham as head of the Board of Trade.

Eis entrance into active politics separated him from

Horih* who* after taking a seat in Commons in 1?5^ and being appointed a Junior lord of the Treasury in IT59> had been cooperating with the Grenville administration* Moreover* in his only two speeches in Parliament Dartmouth had taken an opposite stand from his stepbrother.^ neverthe­ less* there does not seem to have been any alienation between them* for Hewcastle wrote Dartmouth in the fall in reference "to sound (i^sD OXLT friend* my lord Worth*" on an "honorable and advantageous offer*1’ apparently in an attempt to get him to come over to the Whigs.3^ Dartmouth was unable to obtain an affirmative reply* and it was not many years before the making of offers was reversed and

Worth was attempting to persuade Dartmouth to accept an

p O 111ri4*Tnm Oluw IIn tv «

If Dartmouth was reluctant to enter the political arena* once there* as was fitting for a man of his cons­ cience* he took his new duties seriously. He lacked experi­ ence and sometimes enjoyed only a tenuous relationship to the rest of the ministry*^ but these drawbacks did not hinder his zeal. He came into government in the midst of the Stamp Act crisis and that affair demanded immediate attention. Rockingham's group had accepted the King's

invitation to take office even though they had no solution for the conflict, and were undecided on what to do about

it for some months. On the one hand was the appeal of overturning an act of the Grenville Whigs, hut on the other the hesitation to set a precedent that might impair the power of Parliament. As Bargar points out, no true Whig 38 could he expected to support an unconditional repeal, which would impeach Parliamentary Supremacy. The ministry hedged until after Pitt had declared himself and the path of practical politics became clear.

Dartmouth never questioned Parliamentary supremacy, but he earnestly believed that this particular tax was inexpedient^ and should therefore be abolished. The non­ importation agreements had created hardships in England and the First lord of Trade declared in the House of Lords that "not less than 50,000 men in this kingdom were at this time ripe for rebellion for want of work, from the uneasy situation in the colonies."^0 The solution to this quandary of Parliamentary Integrity and colonial intransigenee lay in repeal coupled with the Declaratory Act stating unequi­ vocally Parliament's right to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatsoever. The strength of Dartmouth's belief in the correctness of this course is revealed in a letter to Rockingham urging him not to resign on its account: 13

The case is not yet desperate and while there is the least shadow of hope of doing good, I would on no account give up the game to those who will, undoubtedly, do mischief. The Act once repealed, I shall heartily congratulate your Lordship upon a release from your fatigue. Your successors may then he left to enjoy the sweets of an honorable coalition and hug themselves in possession of employment, which nothing but concern for the public good can make it worth your while to hold

Speaking for the bills in Lords, and securing proxies from

Huntingdon and Chesterfield, he helped secure the passage he felt so vital.

BockIngham’s ministry fell in the summer of 1766 and with Pitt’s refusal to allow a change in the handling of American affairs, Dartmouth went into retirement.

While he was doubtless pleased to give greater attention to his religious and philanthropic interests, he continued his association with the Rockingham group** 3 and the several pamphlets and papers relating to American problems that remain in his papers bear witness to his continuing interest in American affairs.****

At the end of 176? Horth Joined Crafton’s Ministry as

Chancellor of the Exchequer and it was natural that Dartmouth should have become less ardent in opposition once his step­ brother was a member of the administration. His passivity is apparent in his reply to Bockingham’s desire for him to attend a Lords’ debate on resolutions regarding the Townshend

Acts x My zeal for the welfare and prosperity of the Americans and in them of this country, the indignation X feel against those, who upon partial and unfair representations of a prejudiced and heated Governor, would drive them to despair and above all, the value I set upon your Lordship’s friendship inclines me to wish myself now in consultation with you upon the proper means to resist the resolu­ tions . . . At the same time, the shortness of the time to prepare myself for such an event, together with the distance I am at * . the snow that is in the air and will fall before tomorrow morning, and a variety of family reasons constrain me to lament that administration will bring on their measures at a time when they are not only sure of carry­ ing them (which I am afraid they would do at any time), but when many of those who do not probably entertain exactly the saae ideas with themselves are not in the way to declare their disapprobation. My comfort Is that it will be resolutely done by those who are present and that my absence will be of no more consequence than the loss of one in­ effectual voice from the member of the diesidents. ^ Later he fell out with the Rockinghamites over their policy concerning the radical John Wilkes, and the way was pre­ pared for his eventual political union with North.

Dartmouth’s love for and intimacy with North had not ceased during the years they had belonged to separate po­ litical groups. In a teasing tone bespeaking both he wrote to his stepfather in 1766, "Pray tell that perfidious swain

Lord North that we are not at all obliged to him for the concise and peremptory note he sent us the other day, in- stead of bringing himself and Lady North to see us.

His admiration of North’s performance In office increased liT at the same time his affection remained constant*

In 1771 the ministry entered a crisis over the question of war with Spain* Lord Weymouth, who favored war against

Lord Worth's opposition to it, resigned his Seals as Secre­ tary of State. In attempts to strengthen his position in the cabinet Worth offered this post first to Hardwicke^® and, on his refusal to Lord Dartmouth* The latter declined as well for reasons which Worth said he could not do justice 1^9 to in a letter^ apparently it was his personal preference for private life that made him disappoint his stepbrother.^

But while Worth understood Dartmouth’s reasons, his step­ father did not* In an anguished letter that must have brought a like anguish to its reader, Guilford told him:

The more I reflect upon your refusal yes­ terday, the more I am vexed. To have you appear to the world wanting in duty and regard to the King, love to your country, friendship to Lord Worth, and affection to me, is what I thought I should never live to see. I am too much hurt to talk upon the subject.^1-

This breach in an otherwise devoted family healed quickly; its significance lies in the pressure that memory of it would bring to bear on the lari not to refuse Worth's second bid to the Cabinet*

That came in August of 1772. In order to make Worth's need for Dartmouth's presence in the administration clear,

Bargar^2 details the Prime Minister’s difficulties with its other members. Worth had joined the ministry in 17&7, and 16 took the leadership In 17T0 when Grafton resigned the

Treasury. Though he had no particular following of his own, nor any set of principles that distinguished him, he kept his place by virtue of the "Mingfs confidence in him and his ability at the Treasury and in Commons. As a result he was supported by the King’s Friends and several conser­ vatives alienated from the Opposition by the Wilkes affair.

Grenville’s followers were weakened by his death in 1770 and then came over to ministry when Wedderburn and Suffolk accepted offices in it. north’s real difficulty lay in his relationship with the members of the Bedford group-- the "Bloomsbury Gang"--who were already in government when he came in in 1767, They were unreliable, often hostile, with ill-concealed hopes that Worth’s coalition would falter and they would be invited to head the government and control the resulting patronage plums. The only real friend Worth had in the ministry was the Earl of Hillsborough,

Dartmouth’s successor at the Board of Trade and now Secretary of State for the American Colonies. As such, he became the target of the Bedfords who hoped, in forcing him to resign, to oust Worth as well.

Hillborough*s difficulty came when he rejected plans for a western colony that many Influential Britons supported.

When the Privy Council overturned his recommendation that the petition of the newly formed Ohio Company be dropped,

Hillsborough chose to retire rather than put the distasteful project into effect* Finding himself friendless in his own IT

Cabinet, North then appealed to Dartmouth to take Hillsborough1© office, and preserve the ministry from the Bedfords. His letter to his stepbrother graphically demonstrates the reasons

Dartmouth re-entered government employments

You can not, I think, doubt of my earnest •wish to have you within the services of the Crown, in a situation becoming your rank, abilities, and character, and you must be sensible how much I stand in need of your friendship and assistance upon the present occasion . . « Cif) you decline my proposition, you will certainly distress (jnej, if not the public service. 53

Such a request could scarcely be refused in view of Dartmouth*® family relationships no matter how great his aversion to political life, or his inclination towards personal pur­ suits. It is also clear that Dartmouth’s accession had nothing to do with American policy. In fact, North's first attempt to solve the crisis had been to offer the Seals to

Lord Weymouth, who had refused. His offer to Dartmouth was made Mwithout taking any notice to the other ministers"^ who were doubtless disappointed by his acceptance. Hot only did Worth’s ministry not fall, but the American office itself survived,^ and its patronage failed to devolve upon the other two Secretaries.-^

0NE BMPIBB UNDER PARLIAMENT

Part of the general rejoicing in America that accompa­ nied Dartmouth’s appointment was due to his reputation as at once an amiable and a religious man. But the main 18

ground for Dartmouth’s popularity in the colonies was his part in the repeal of the Stamp Act. At that time he had

received many letters from the colonies, from private per­ sons, and from colonial assemblies* congratulating him and thanking him.-^ John Randolph even sent him a brace of young eagles in appreciation.*^

But in praising repeal, of the obnoxious Stamp Act, the colonists overlooked the Declaratory Act, and in thank­

ing Dartmouth for ridding them of the former they failed to understand his adherence to the latter. In 1766, writ­

ing to Mr. De Berdt as he left the Board of Trade,

Dartmouth had said of the Americansj

I should always have been happy to have assisted fthemj in promoting every wish they could reasonably form consistent with that subjection to the supreme authority of the mother country, upon which I think their own, as well as our welfare and prosperity much depend; and which upon the present principles of the general constitution, they undoubtedly owe. 58

Dartmouth had, after all, taken his political principles from his uncle and the old Whig Hewc&stle; like them he could admit of no impairment to the authority of Parlia­ ment. Parliament’s claim to supremacy over the Empire was'‘inherent in and inseparable from the supreme authority of the State;” to deny it was "wild and extravagant . . utterly inconsistent with any pretension to a share in the privileges and advantages of British subjects. ” 59 19

Yet with a touch of pragmatism seemingly out of charac­ ter, he ‘believed that Parliamentary supremacy, while it could not be denied, should not be argued about with the colonists. Perhaps he took his cue from an undated paper ^ A Of suggestions for America in his manuscripts. It recommended that the Declaratory Act remain unrepealed, without saying a word about it in subsequent negotiations. The unlimited supremacy of Parliament was not to be claimed on one side or questioned on the other. Then the aggrieving acts passed since 1T63 could be undone. Expressing this idea to Cushing he said, '*If my wishes and sentiments could have any weight with a British Parliament, the exercise of fits rightsj . . . should be suspended and lie dormant till some occasion should arise . . . in which the expediency and necessity of such exercise should be obvious . . . ."59

The altercation Governor Hutchinson got into with the Assembly of Massachusetts Bay in 1773 was exactly what

Dartmouth did not wish to happen. Hutchinson initiated the dispute by opening the session with an address claiming that the colony was either totally subject to Parliament or completely independent; the Assembly predictably re­ plied that Parliament had no authority to bind them what­ soever and further petitioned for Hutchinson’s removal.

The ministry was, as Franklin so aptly put it, "Chagrined with his officiousness, their intention having been to let all contention subside, and by degrees suffer matters to 20

/T T return to the old channel.” Dartmouth wrote Hutchinson

that it was "vain to hope that the Council and House of

Representatives can he induced to yield due obedience to

the laws of Parliament,” and urged him to avoid further ^ o discussion. But the damage had been done and Dartmouth's attempts to mend it are illustrative not only of his rather naive approach but of the essential unmendability of the difficulties *

First he tried to avoid laying the dispatches about the affair before Parliament, knowing that it would feel called upon to take some action to defend its sovereignty which would only make the situation worse. Since accounts had already appeared in the newspapers this tactic was hopeless. Then he tried to get Franklin to convince the assembly to withdraw their Declaration. "I wish they could be persuaded to reconsider the matter, and do it of themselves, voluntarily, and thus leave things between us on the old footing, the points undiscussed," he told the agent in anrinterview. But Franklin replied, "If they were even to wish matters back in the situation before the governor’s speech, and the dispute obliterated, they cannot withdraw their answer till he first withdraws his speech, which methinks would be an awkward operation that perhaps he will hardly be directed to perform." Franklin then suggested that it would be prudent of Parliament to allow the dispatches to lie on the table and take no 21

further notice of them; it was, after all, quibbling over

"an authority they can never well exercise for want of

due information and knowledge, and therefore it is not worth hazarding the mischief to preserve it." Obviously

Dartmouth could not agree, and the conversation 6 ^ J closed with his Lordship still urging Franklin to get the

Assembly to withdraw their petition*

But what Dartmouth would have had both parties to the dispute ignore, was the one thing that was inevitably

driving them apart: their differing interpretations of the constitution. As time wore on the colonists added to

their denial of Parliamentary supervision an elevation of the King that could only horrify an English Whig and even the King himself. King-in-Parliament^in eighteenth-century

Britain, was omnicompetent, and no derogation of this

competence, or of the legislative dominance of the Monarch, could be suffered.

So the Americans* faith in Dartmouth as their advocate

in the administration was somewhat misplaced. Because of his association with the Bockingham Whigs and his role in repealing the Stamp Act, they had assumed he was all on fi it their side. But this was not the only source of their error. They were not mistaken in their assessment of the

American Secretary as one "disposed to concede every claim of the colonies which can consist with their continuing united to the Kingdom.He was, as Thomas Hutchinson 22 described him^as amiable a man as you know--a man of literature as well as good natural sense,Franklin had been treated rudely by Hillsborough, who had even balked at recognizing him as a legitimate agent from Massachusetts

Bay: by contrast the new Secretary was most pleasant. After a conversation with Dartmouth on one occasion Franklin remarked on the "complaisance in his contenance. Indeed

Dartmouth was courteous at all timesj he never said any­ thing unfavorable unless he had preceded it with some friend­ ly remark. In chastising Hutchinson on his dispute with the Assembly, Dartmouth acknowledged first that he had meant well, Later, in relating his denial of the proposition that taxation without representation was the equivalent of slavery in a letter he was discussing with John Vardill, he remarked first that he approved of its "good sense and some of the opinions.”^7 His kindness was more than mere diplomacy] it sprang from a real tenderness towards America and a genuine hope for the end of contention.

Yet while diplomacy is of real value in politics when it is insincere, Dartmouth's sincerity blinded him to the crude realities of the situation and severely limited his action. As Hutchinson lamented, ’’His greatest foible is an excess of humanity, which makes him apt sometimes to think more favorably of some men than they deserve."^5

Franklin came to understand this as he complained that "he is truly a good man, and wishes sincerely a good understand­ ing with the colonies, but does not seem to have the 23 strength equal to his wishes." 68 Arthur Lee was bitter:

The professions of Lord Dartmouth I own give me very little confidence; he was called upon last session of Parlia­ ment by our unalterable friend Lord Shelburne to account for his having done nothing to conciliate the colonies; he answered with fair promises; he will again be called on by this same noble Lord. I think he must then speak de­ cisively, as any further evasion will be palpable*^9

Such inability, in the light of future events, was indeed palpable. Aside from the nature of his own per­ sonality, there were other obstacles Dartmouth faced as he tried to reunite the mother country and her offspring.

Astute as ever Franklin guessed this when he wrote in

177k, "His Lordship expressed as usual.;much concern at the differences subsisting, and wished they would be accomo­ dated. Perhaps good wishes are all that are in his power. A closer look at these obstacles should de­ monstrate that the making of "fair promises" was the best

Dartmouth could hope to do. CHAPTER I

FOQTHOTBS

^Dartmouth to Dennys De Berdt, Aug. 13, 1766, in William Heed, ©d*. Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed (Philadelphia, 1847), I, 46-7* 2See below,

% © © Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part X, The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth (London, 1887), II, 86-90. Hereinafter""cit ©d as the Dartmouth Manuscripts.

^Richard Pares* King George III and the Politicians (Oxford, 1953), 64.

^William Smith to Reverend George Whitefield, Dec. 6 , 1765, Dartmouth Manuscripts I, 331#

6ibta.. 300.

*H. Trevor Colburn, The Lamp of Experience, Whig History and the intellectual Origins of the American Revo- lotion(Chapel Hill, 19^5). 61, 3 For further testimony of the colonist*s hopes see Thomas Hutchinson, History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay* Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed, (Cambridge, 1936), III, 325; Reed, Life. 45-6. ^Albert Henry Smyth* ed., The Writings of Benjamin Franklin,(Hew York, 1907)> VI, 205, and Franklin to Gallo- way, Ibid*, Jan, 6 , 1773, 5-6 . 10 Verner W. Crane, ed., Benjamin Franklin1 s Letters to the Press. 1738-1775 (Chapel' Hill," 1950), 235.

11^Dictionary of Rational Biography, Sidney Lee, ed., (London, 1892), XXXII, 417-19. Hereinafter cited ae P.H.B. 12 Bradley D. Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution (Columbia, South Carolina,1965), 3*

1 3P. H, 8 ., XXXII, 4l6*lf.

24 FOOTNOTES

Ibid., and Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 6.

15yThe Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principle's gives as a 1749 definition of this word nhaving pleasing qualities of the heart.” 1 A To Mrs. Elisha Hutchinson, Oct. 27, 1774, The Diary and Letters of His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson* Peter 0. Hutchinson, ed7,TBo'ston, l884-6),I, 275• 17 Mrs. Delany to Mrs. Dewes, Jan. 31, 1756, The Auto­ biography and Correspondence of Mary Granville* Mrs. Delany, Lady L1anover, ed. (1861-62), III, 405*6, quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 6 . Italics are Mrs. Delany1s. 18 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 9.

1^Laurence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the Revolution (Caldwell, Idaho, 1936), I, 92.

20 Worthington C. Ford, ed., The Papers of William Lee (Brooklyn, N. Y., 1891), I, 88, footnote.

^Hutchinson, Diary, I, 444, 377* 22 Sir J. A. Oughton to Dartmouth, Nov. 3, 1773, Dartmouth Manuscripts, III, 207* 23 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 11. See for example, the King to Worth, July 19, 1773, In The Letters of King George III, Bonamy Dobree, ed. (London, 1935), 138; Kingto Dartmouth, Dec. 23, 1780, ibid., 140, and the King to Dart­ mouth, July 17, 1773, Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 438. 24 King to Dartmouth, Mar. 2 7 , 1782, Dobree* Letters of George III, 153- 25 . Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 13-14.

26ibia., 10, 8. 27 May 24, 1766, Dartmouth Manuscripts, III, 182.

2^See C. R. Ritcheson, "The Elder Pitt and an American Department,” American Historical Review, LVII (Jan., 1952), 376-8 3 . After a year of coping with vast colonial problems FOOTHOTES

without the power needed to solve them, Dartmouth resigned rather than accept lees than a full third Secretaryship. As he wrote his friend De Berdt, "I should have been glad to have continued on any footing that would have put it in my power to be of real use, but after having been refused the only thing that . . . could have enabled me to be of any service . . . I thought it best to withdraw myself." Aug. 13, 1766, Reed, Life , 46. When political circumstances eventually dictated the creation of an American Secretary of State, Hillsborough held the office.

B. F. Stevens, "Introduction," Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, iv. 3°Aug. 2, 1713, Dartmouth Manuscripts at Patshull, quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth* 5* Bargar must have footnoted this date incorrectly for in referring to the letter in the text he places it in Aug., 1753* 31ibia., 1 9 . 32 Ibid., 4, 5 . 33 Ibid., 19. 3**July 12, 1765, Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 331.

35Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 16.

3^Nov. 15, 1765, Dartmouth]Manuscripts * III, 179* 37 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 25*

38ibia., 27. 39 Ibid., 29.

^William Crawle to Lord Hmtingdon, Jan. 16, 1766. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Bathhurst Papers, 146-7* as quoted in Charles R. Ritcheson, British Politics and the American Revolution (Norman, Oklahoma, 1954),42. ^Dartmouth to Rockingham, Feb. 2, 1766, Memoirs of Rockingham, quoted in Stevens, "Introduction,", Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, vi. roofsofBa

Ibid*> ?| and Huntingdon to Dartmouth, Jan. 29 , I?66, 33* 43 On one visit to Rockingham*e Wentworth House estate he reported to his step father with a twinkle that it was "near three in the morning before the state of the nation could be perfectly adjusted and settled ..." Oct. T# 1763, Worth MSS, d. 11, ff 68-9, quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth. b6* kk See Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 50*75*

^5To Rockingham, Dec. 13, 1T68, Rockingham MSS, R T5» f. 59, as quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, k*f.

Guilford, Aug. 22, 1T66, Worth MSS, d. 10, ff. 171*2 , as quoted in ibid., 5 0 . k7 Ibid.> 51. ^King to Worth, Jan. 16, 1771, The Correspondence of King George III. Sir John Portescue, eiT' (London, I9 2 S), II

^^Sorth to King, Jan. IT, 1TT1, ibid.. 210. 50 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth. 53* 51 The letters between Guilford and Dartmouth on this matter are summarized in Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 76-7, but the full text is cited from the Dartmouth Manuscripts at Patshull 336 in Bargar, ibid.» 5 3 .

52Ibid., 55-56. 53 Worth to Dartmouth, Aug. 3, 1772, Dartmouth Manuscript®, 373, as quoted in ibid., 56-7 . 54 William Knox, "Reminiscences”, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on Manuscripts in Various Collection®> VX, ManuecrIptis of '' Dapta 1 n Hi' V.''Kno ac'' (Dublint: 1909)'255* Hereinafter -cited as Knox Manuscripts. 55 Povnali to Knox, Aug. 1, 1772, ibid., 107* FOOMOtCES 28

See Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 42-6, for summaries of them# 57 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 33. 5 8 Aug. 13, 1766, Reed, Life, 46. Brea perceptive Franklin thought the Act designed only to quiet the opposition. Franklin to William Franklin, Sept. 1, 1773, Smyth, Writings. VI, 115.

^June 19, 1773, Dartmouth Manuscripts, 64l as quoted la Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 89* The letter is summarized in Dartmouth Manuscripts, 21# 158, but the date is mistakenly given as June 10.

Partaputh Manuscripts, II, 50* It is given a 1766 date in the calendar, but I believe from internal evidence it should be considered at least six years younger than that.

^*To Thomas Cushing, May 6, 1773, Smyth, Writings. VI, 48.

62June 2, 1775, C. 0. 5/7/65, P. R* 0. Microfilm, personal library of Ira Gruber, abstracted in Dartmouth Maau- scripts. II, 146* 63 Franklin reported this conversation in a letter to Thomas Cushing, May 6 , 1773, Smyth, Writings. VI, 48-63* Cushing later wrote Dartmouth that the temper and disposition of the two houses would prevent withdrawal and hoped FarXIament would ignore the papers. Dartmouth Manuscripts. II, 168. The draft to an unknown addressee, of a letter very similar to the one Dartmouth wrote Cushing on this affair is i m .ibId., I, 390, mistakenly dated 1775* In it Dartmouth concedes that ”1 must be free to own myself persuaded that til that unhappy bar (The Declaration of the Assembly] shall be removed out of the way by the same hands that laid it there, it will be fruitless to wish, It will be vain to attempt to alleviate the causes of uneasiness In other instances alluded to in your letter, to some of which I flatter myself an easy remedy might otherwise have been applied.M 64 The colonists would have been shocked to read a letter from Rockingham to Dartmouth dated 1769, la which he expounded on both Parliamentary supremacy and mercantilism. The occasion was this: Dartmouth had been sent (doubtless FOOTNOTES 29 because of bis inflated reputation as a friend to America) a plan for reconciling Britain’s differences with the colonies whereby America would have a lord lieutenant and a Parliament* The latter would apportion the Crown requi­ sitions, hut the British Parliament would he supreme in all other affairs, Dartmouth sent it, with his favorable comments, to Rockingham to be considered for the next session. Rockingham rejected it on grounds that it would increase the colonists1 ability to resist trade laws and would give the Crown a source of revenue uncontrolled by the British legislature. Dartmouth to Rockingham, Oct. 21, 1769, Rockingham Manuscripts, R. 1, f. 668, and Rockingham to Dartmouth, Nov. 8, 1769 R. 1, 1217-102 as quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth» 48. See also C, B* Bitcheson, British Polt'tlea and the Amerlean Revolution, 131, and abstract of RocktaghamT 6w1:Ye¥ter 'in"PartmpuW^anuscripts, IX, 6 8 ,

^Thomas Hutchinson to ?, Nov. 1774, Hutchinson, Diary, I, 284-5* Italics are mine. 66 To Thomas Cushing, Jan. 5, 1773, Smyth, Writings, VI, 1 . Ifoha Vardill to Peter Van Schaak, July 22, 177^, Columbia University Library, Van Schaak MSS, from the files Of Ira Gruber.

William Franklin, July 14, 1773, Smyth, Writings, VI, 96-7. 69 Arthur Lee to ?, Dec. 22, 1773, Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 344-5*

*^°To Thomas Cushing, Jan. 5, 1774, Smyth, Writings, VI, 173-2. Italic @ are mine. CHAPTER II

IMPEDIMENTS: THE POLITICAL BACKDROP

GOVERNMENT BY PACTION AND PATRONAGE

The political scene at the time of the American Revo­ lution has been convincingly recreated by many recent

authors; their revisions need only a brief description here

in order to create an appropriate setting for Lord Dart­ mouth .

Eighteenth-century England was an age marked by vivid and sometimes irreconcilable contrasts.1 The elegance of

Gainsborough shared a berth in history with the earthiness

of Hogarth; a kingdom deeply attached to a philosophy of rule of law tr&s peopled with subjects who freely indulged

in the bloodiest of riots. In retrospect, perhaps no con­ trast has done historians such a disservice as that between the political treatises and the political actualities of

the 1760’s and 1770’s. That this contrast is now apprecia­ ted is due to the work of many scholars, most notably

Lewis B . Namier.

As Namier pointed out, although this was a period which could have divided thoughtful men on many significant constitutional and theoretical questions, it was essentially

30 31 an issueless era. In spite of* the great decisions facing

Britain as a nation and an empire, political lines were drawn less upon principle than upon personality and place.

The motivations for holding public office were more often income and position than the desire to effect a given point of view. But saying this is not to condemn the men of whom we are about to speak for lack of integrity. As

Richard fares comments, "Our moral superiority is secured by many profess ions." la the eighteenth century public life was simply the only acceptable way for a gentleman to earn a living and the pursuit of personal interest in the service of the state was not only permitted but encouraged.

There was nothing stinking about a sinecure or a plea for an inherited office; these were necessary economic facts of life for the upper classes much as life insurance or stock portfolios are in twentieth-century America. The purchase of a parliamentary seat caused no raised eyebrows; it was a proper way of providing for your sister’s son.

Under these circumstances, to belong to a party out of office, without the prerogatives of patronage and influ­ ence attendant with power, was an unfortunate circumstance indeed. The only recourse was to go into opposition and, 3 in Namier's words, "trump up grave dangers",, in order to bring down the ministry then in office and thereby improve Tunwxn etoiUi one’s own position, not simply politically, but economically.

Herein is the genesis of what has appeared to our eyes, 32 clouded as they are by the political habits of our own time, as a genuine party system. Only as we have come to under­ stand the political and economic realities of the eighteenth century have we been able to place the words and the deeds of its actors on the proper stage.

Politics was personal and local. Political ideals assumed real importance only as they might affect personal interest. For example, the group around Newcastle, while they were Court Whigs at heart, were forced into opposition in the early 1760*s for fear of impotence when Bute controlled access to George III. Horace Walpole gives a typical illus­ tration of the workings of Georgian politics with this cryptic asides

The Court, about this time, made another conquest, which it seemed little worth their while to buy so dear, unless from the intrinsic satisfaction of corrupting a fair character. Cornwall quitted the Opposition for a pension of 500 pounds a year for life.

If there were no political parties in our sense of the word there were political factions. But the terms Whig and

Tory, so familiar to textbook readers on the American

Revolution, are almost idle distinctions in the task of understanding these factions and the competition amongst them. North and others in office in the 17701® referred to themselves as Whigs; the Rockinghamttes were Whigs also but prefixed their party title with the adjectives "true” 33

"high" "old” "grand" and "constitutional"; the Chatham!tes

were "independent" Whigs. Old Tories split up and followed

all three groups, and Toryism, something of a pejorative

in the late eighteenth century, became more concerned with local issues.^

To stay in office meant controlling as many places as

possible and insuring favorable occupancy of them. Much

of a ministers time was necessarily given up to this task

as indicated by this letter from Lord North to his political

stage-manager, John Robinson:

Mr. Legge can afford only 400 pounds. If he comes in for Lostwithiel he will cost the public two thousand guineas. Gascoign should have the refusal of Tregony if he will pay one thousand pounds, but I do not see why we should bring him in cheaper than any other servant of the Crown. If he will not pay he must give way to Mr. Best or Mr. Peachy .... As the Duke of Newcastle has come into our proposal we must strain every nerve for his service. Write my name to Mr. Luttrell to re­ commend Mr. Pownall. ^

Money, connections and influence skillfully manipulated kept

a majority in Parliament and a government in power. To say that the political process was completely without poli­

cies or principles would of course be an exaggeration, but as a matter of emphasis, opinions were less important than

position and place.

Naturally, debate on the American question was affected by such a political system. Richard Pares points out, 3 k

"only the Grenvilles could claim that their attitude was

determined by a consideration of policy . . . Even the

Rockinghamites hadn’t been clear on the Stamp Act . but once the colours were nailed to the mast, there was no 7 taking them down.' The Boekinghams, in spite of their

clear identification with the American cause, still had the

goal of office uppermost in their minds . To this end they pushed Pitt, who spoke strongly for the colonists, out of

their coalition and.took in the Bedfords who were anti- Q American. The American problems were often regarded sim- Q ply as weapons to use against political enemies. Such political opportunism on the part of their English adher­ ents confused and revolted the Americans as seen in this angry letter from William Lee, an American merchant in business in London, to his brother in Virginia:

Lord Shelburne I always thought as wicked a man in politics as any in the nation (Lord Mansfield not excepted) and now I am perfectly convinced of it, as we know for a certainty we owe the Boston Fort Bill meeting with no opposition in the House of Commons to his concurrence with Lord Worth in the measure, for which he was to be paid with the Lieutenancy for Ireland and Barre was to be his Secretary. I am rejoiced that Worth had cheated him for after the dirty work was done, they would not give him the bribe. He is a complete Jesuit and thereby has ever de­ ceived our Brother Templar [Arthur Lee) whom I cannot convince that he is a villain, though he cheated us in a bare­ faced manner about our first petition to the House of Lords against the Boston Port Bill. 10 35

Dartmouth, was no opportunist and was possessed of considera­ bly more principle than most of his peers, hut his entry into office was not influenced by his hopes for conciliating the Americans. It was simply his duty to help his step­ brother maintain his hold on his ministry.

The constitutional, as well as the political habits of

Great Britain, influenced the outcome of her difficulties with her colonies. The key figure in the political scene was still the King, or perhaps it should be said, was again the King, for part of George III* s difficulty lay in the fact that he sought to reassert kingly leadership at a time when Parliamentary leaders had taken the direction of government upon themselves. Newcastle had governed George II but George III governed Lord North.11 The King retained the power of appointing his ministers,' but his legislature could overturn them. Formerly ministers had used the majorities in both houses as a weapon for forcing their own policies upon the King, but George III countered by dismissing them before their position was consolidated.^

George had his own ideas about what policy should be followed and, being a conscientious man himself, he ex­ pected all men of good will as their duty, first to accept office and then and only then, to consider p o l i c y . ^ so, while, as illustrated above, parties existed to gain office rather than to chart a given course of action, 36

political circumstances and royal influence did cause each

faction to assume office with some understending of the In­ direction of government affairs.

All of this is not to say that the English government,

corrupt by our standards, was without justice. The English

constitution, greatly revered by all Englishmen and their

German King, provided a healthy balance of power by which

differing interests were protected. The King controlled

a vast patronages positions in the royal household,

government sinecures, deaneries, etc., and thirty or more

treasury boroughs, as well as pensions and peeragesbut

this power could be matched by a combination of several

families of wealth with a desire to purchase office for

their friends. And Parliament, as it was so vain in

reminding itself and the King as well as the Americans,

held the purse strings.

It was not only the purse strings, though, which gave

Parliament cause for vanity and made it so glorious in

the eyes of Englishmen. The Revolution settlement had made

it the guardian against prerogative, and by the late eighteenth century the results of the Revolution had come

to be almost universally admired. While the legislature was not a popular, democratic institution, it did repre­ sent the varieties of British thought and was fairly res- 15 ponslve to public opinion. It was, as Ian Christie allows, 37

"appropriate for a deferential and hierarchical society.'

The King in Parliament was omnicompetent, but Parliament was supreme.

THE PERSONALITIES OF POWER

The English constitution, it is duly noted, is not and was not a rigid guide to the conduct of power. In­ evitably, then its workings have been deeply affected by the personalities that have filled its offices. This is especially true of George III, reigning over great changes in English government and empire. In studying Dartmouth’s role it is of value to cons ider briefly not only the

King’s personality, but that of his Prime Minister in 177^ and 1775, Lord North.

Not surprisingly, no one person has borne so large a share of the blame for the difficulties of his reign as the unfortunate George III. Alternately caricatured as a tyrant, madman or idiot; even revisionist studies empha- size-'his failings of character. It is invariably pointed out that the young king was studious, conscientious, pious and dull, each in the extreme. It is equally asserted 19 that he loved Britain and adored her constitution. x It V is not hard to see the direction his reign took from these qualities; he knew he was more virtuous than the men 38

around him; he devoted himself to deep thought on the

problems of his day; he reached conclusions he felt were

right; and his strong sense of duty to God and country gave

him the strength to persevere In them. A youthful pro­

jection of his reign, part of an "Essay on King Alfred” written before he became King, embodies his estimate of

kingly authority: "excellent were his laws, and vigorously

kept to; for he examined into everything himself." And further,

When all this is carefully examined, we may safely affirm that no good and great Prince . , . fond of the cause of liberty will ever despair of restoring his country to virtue, freedom and glory, even though he mounts the throne in the worst corrupted times, in storms of in­ ward faction and the most threatening circumstances without .^0

Wnhappily, a person of George’s mentality was as bound to be as rigid in his opinions as he was incorrect, and his opinions on the American question were no exception. Like many Englishmen he regarded the colonists as dependents, obstreperous, undutiful, and ungrateful for the blood and silver that the mother country had expended in securing them. Sooner or later they must come to acknowledge their debt to the mother country. But, if England must stand firm in essentials, she could afford to be generous in de~ 21 tails, and most agreed she had been.

George’s view of the constitutional divergence between parent and offspring was simplistic--and indeed few in 39

England at that time could conceive of a ground between total subjection to Parliamentary authority and complete

independence. "We must either master them or totally leave them to themselves and treat them as aliens 22 Compromise would be a "sacrilegious weakness"*^ and if his ministers were not s t m g enough to maintain British rights, he would step in their stead:

I have no doubt but the nation at large sees the conduct of America in its true light and 1 am certain any other conduct but compelling obedi­ ence would be ruinous and culpable, therefore no consideration could bring me to swerve from the present path which I think myself in duty bound to follow.24

Without question in the King's mind, the Americans had to be humbled and disciplined. Writing to Lord Worth in 17?4 he said:

I was much pleased with your ideas concerning the suspension of boun­ ties and other regulations that may be effected this session towards bringing the Americans to the ir duty, but I am more afraid of the continuance of the dispute than the colonies and I cannot think it likely to make them reasonable; I do not want to drive them to despair but to submission, which nothing but feeling the inconvenience of their situation can bring their pride to submit to.

Be had in mind his own methods as to how to bring the

Americans to this submission.

Had the Americans in prosecuting their ill-grounded claims put on an appearance of mildness it might have been very difficult to chalk out the right path to be pursued; but they have boldly thrown off the mask and avowed that nothing less than a total independence of the British Legislature will satisfy them; this indeed decides the proper plan to be followed which is to stop the trade of all those colonies who obey the mandate of the Congress for non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption, to assist them no further with presents to the Indians and to give every kind of assistance to those that conduct themselves otherways which will make them quarrel among themselves. Their separate (sic) in­ terests must soon effect this and experience will then show them that the interference of the mother country is essentially necessary to prevent their becoming rivals.26

Part of his belief that a firm policy was necessary stemmed

from the repeal of the Stamp Acts " * . .all men seem now to feel that the fatal compliance in 1766 has encouraged 27 the Americans annually to increase their pretensions." ’

Confident that Heaven was with him he rigidly refused to alter this policy even as the direction of the war should have begun to show him that its failure was imminent:

"I entirely place my security in the protection of the

divine disposer of all things, and shall never look to the

right or to the left but steadily pursue the tract which my

Conscience dictates to be the right one. jt was the

struggle to reach an unattainable goal, Namier says, that 2 9 helped to drive him insane. Lord North was the minister inevitably appropriate for such a King.^0 An even-tempered, affable man of character, 41

knowledge and parliamentary skill, lie possessed the

winning combination of appealing to the king and being able to maintain a majority in Parliament and thus hold

his government together.3^ He was a good speaker, capable

of managing finances and extremely loyal. But whether 32 from loyalty, indolence or vacillation, he was willing

to let his king be sovereign in deed as well as name.

When his own views differed from those of his king, his

own gave way to the royal judgment, no matter how deeply

held or how crucial the question. Though he disagreed with

George on American policy, and longed to resign, he

faithfully promised to remain in service and the eager

pleas of the King urging him to do so are amongst the most

pathetic of his letters. He too paid an emotional price

for this inner tension between his inner feelings and the

outward manifestation of them in the form of a nervous breakdown.33

George’s deep involvement in the conduct of government is well documented. Even so admiring a subject as Thomas

Hutchinson was surprised at the King's knowledge of the affairs of Massachusetts Bay. During Hutchinson’s inter­ view in the closet in 1774 he found that George not only was familiar with the general situation of the colony, but was aware of Hutchinson’s relationship to the Olivers and had participated in consideration of the newly appointed 34 council. But great interest in and study of the American k2

news did not guarantee that the King would deduce reasonable

conclusions. Dartmouth sent him news of Lexington and

Concord immediately upon Its receipt in London; in his

replies he minimised its import and demonstrated his own

ill-founded optimism:

It is not improbable that some detach­ ment sent by Lieutenant General Gage may not have been strong enough to disperse the provincials assembled at Concord .... I am far from thinking the general has reason to be displeased; the objectsof sending the detachment was to spike cannons and to destroy military stores; this has been effected. . I therefore hope you will not see this in a stronger light than it deserves.35

The King then, was sovereign in deed as well as name.

Possessed of zeal unfettered by wisdom and served by a

prime minister with neither heart nor stomach to alter his ideas, the directions of his policy would have been most difficult to effect.

MECHANICS OF THE EXECUTIVE

Like the political modes and personalities, the mechanics of the English government had considerable in­

fluence on the way in which the American business was

conducted,

Even a sovereign King had to have ministers to carry

out his directives and since Parliament was supreme, they 43 had to be men who could govern through its two Houses. A cabinet, composed of ministers of the first rank, was and had been for some time in existence, having grown out of the

Privy Council in the first half of the eighteenth century.

It was not, of course, developed to the point with which we are familiar. The King controlled it primarily by his power of appointment, which appointments, as mentioned before, he expected to entertain no particular policies upon entering office. Ministerial responsibility was as yet an undeveloped concept, for in order for the ministers to take a full collective responsibility they must be assured that the king would accept their collective advice, and certainly not veto bills that they had steered through

Parliament. But George III commanded a large amount of patronage and with this degree of political independence, he not only could, but often did, flout his ministers.3^

While Newcastle had used royal patronage to build a strength in Parliament with which to rule George II, George

III "called the bluff on this technique" by dismissing his ministers before they amassed such power. He regarded 38 them as his "tools". The necessity for coalition cabinets further increased his political power since he was able to play upon their internal divisions. 39

The main function of the cabinet was to give advice on policy and administration. It was questionable, however, 44 whether the King was duty hound either to request or to re­

ceive it. And although he did not attend cabinet meetings, his influence upon them was large: 4 he very subjects of 40 deliberation were within his discretion. He kept in close touch with his ministers both by correspondence and meeting with them individually in his "closet". At these sessions each minister was restricted to a consideration of affairs within the jurisdiction of his office; with the prime minister alone did the King discuss matters of a 41 general nature. If George and the minister concerned agreed upon a particular issue, it usually was not brought before the whole cabinet. Plainly, under such a system the

King was able to give full direction to government business.

A final note on the functioning of the cabinet helps to explain the dilemma in which Dartmouth found himself during 1774 and 1775* In reaching decisions upon the questions it did debate, and these included American policy, 4 2 a majority of members present ruled. Dissensions were rare once the minutes of a decision had been drawn up because the strength of the administration, i.e., its ability to remain in office, lay in unity. Thus it was possible that loyalty to his stepbrother might easily con­ flict with the Colonial Secretary’s personal views on

Colonial policy. 45

These were the political facts of life for Dartmouth

as well as his contemporaries, accepted without real ques­

tion as to their efficacy or justice. That they adversely

affected any meaningful search for a solution to the American problems has been indicated and will become clearer

as the course of events is studied more closely. That

Dartmouth, while a creature of his times in some ways was

temperamentally out of time with them in most instances,

should be apparent from the above and the sketch of his

personality and character in Chapter I. Had any statesman

been able to surmount these obstacles to bring peace and

understanding between mother country and her colonies, it would not have been the amiable Earl. CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

*J. H. Plumb, The First Four fleorget (London, 1956), Chapter I# 2 Pares, King George III, IT* ■5 Lewis Namier, Crossroads of Power (London, 1962), 12? * A* Francis Eteuart, ea., The Last Journals of Horace Walpole During the Reign of George"XX1 from 1771 tal7B3 (London, 1910), X, 25*27 5 Archibald 0* Foard, His Majesty^ Opposition, I?l5» ** 1830 (Oxford. 19610, 327 tt. 6 Lord North to John Robinson, Oct. 6 , 17?h, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Tenth Report, Part VI, Manuscripts of the Marquess of Abergavenny (London, 188?), ?. 7 Pares, King George III, 90. Q Ian Christie, Wilkes, Wyvlll and Reform (London, 1962), 38? see Rockingham to Dartmouth, July 9, 1767, and Aug. 15, 1767, Dartmouth Manuscripts, IX, 56-?. 9 Plumb, First Four Georges, 108, Franklin wrote to Thomas Cushing in July of 1773 that "A few members of Parliament in both houses and. perhaps some in high office, have in a degree the same ideas ffor conciliation} •, but none of these seem willing to be active in our favour, lest some adversaries take advantage . . . ,w Smyth, Writings, VI, 73-5-. And with the same perspicacity that characterized Poor Richard * s aphorisms he wrote: “if his Majesty * * servants had fortunately been possessed of . . . ae much of that « . ♦ attention . • • and dexterity . « # as statesmen of this country generally show in obtaining their places . . , “ good will might soon be restored., ibid., 28.

5-6 f W m W T M B

10 "'To Eichard Henry Lee, Sept. 1G, 1774, Worthington C* Ford, ed., The Papers of William Lee (Brooklyn, 1881), 9^* 11 Pares, King George III, 183*

12Ibld., 9k.

13lbia., 119. ^Ibld,, 112. 15 Vivian Herbert Howard Green, The Hanoverians« 1714 to 181$ (London, 1948), 39* 16 Lawrence H* Gipson, British Empire before the Revolution, I, 134 ft. IT Christie, Wilkes, Wyvlll and Beform, 4, 18 Pares, King George III, 63# 64* Wamier, Crossroads, 129, l40i and Lewis Hastier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, (London, 2nd Edition,I9S1TV"88-91*

19Hamlar, England la the Age of the American Sevola- tloa, 84; Green, The Hanoverians, 301 20 Bute MSS*, quoted in Wamier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, 93* pi Plumb, First Four Georges. 106-7* pp King to Lord Worth, ISov* 18, 1T?4, in The Correa** pondence of King .George III, from 1760 to December if83T sTrwJohcinForTeicue7*~^Tr^[Lon^ Indeed, with a king so actively engaged in political affairs as George III, it was not yet possible for the crown to rise above both nations as a unifying symbol. Bitcheeon, British Politica and the American Revolution, 44*

23Plumb, The first Four Georges» Chapter 3. 24 King to Lord Worth, July 5, 1TT5# Fortescue, Correspondence. Ill, 233.

King to Lord Horth, Deo. 15, 1T71*, Ibid.. 156. FOOTNOTES

26 Memo by the King, 1773* ibid *, bj. Fortescue dates this in 1773 but is obviously incorrect as the King makes reference to the Second Continental Congress.

^King to Lord North, Feb. 4, 1774, ibid.t 59* 28 King to Lord North, Feb. 15* 17f'5, ibid. , 1 75. 29 Namier, Cros sroads, 140. 30 There are many instances in which the King speaks affectionately of or to North in his correspondence, see for example the King to North, Nov. 9, 1775, Fortescue, Correspondence, 284* 31 Sir Charles Grant Robertson, England Under the Hanoverians (London, 1934), 251 ff- 32 Like George III, Lord North has created his share of the controversy as historians sought a place to lay the blame for England's failure to prevent civil war* Accord­ ing to J. H. Plumb, First Four Georges, 114, 115, the relationship between the King and his minister filled an emotional need for both: George needed a dependable, warm­ hearted friend, and North, having always been ruled by his father, a strong will upon which to lean. Compared to Plumb's indictment of him as a parasite, Robertson's description, (England, 79f) of North as charming, witty and administratively skillful seems to be of a different prime minister. Green (The Hanoverians, 313) damns him for mental Indolence and mediocrity, Pares paints him (King George III, 172-9 ) as indecisive and timid. This is not the place to examine historiography of the future Earl of Guilford, but elements of each of these analyses, as out­ lined in the text, are generally agreed upon and go far towards illuminating the position in which his step brother found himself as he tried to put forward his own thoughts on American policy.

Spares, King George III. 172.

^Hutchinson, Diary, I, July 1, 1774, 170 ft* 35 George III to Lord Dartmouth, 4;40 P.M., May 29, 1775 and George III to Lord Dartmouth, 8:37 P.M., May 29, 1775, Dobree, Letters of George III. 109-110. FOOTNOTES

spares, King George III, ^3-^-•

3TIbld,, 96. 38 Ibid., 173* ^ H e ceased doing this in ministries he considered as his, as in Lord north’ s, vibld., If 2. ko Ibid>, 153-59* Americans in London during the 1770* were generally surprised at the active participation of the Kingi at any rate they realized the extent of it. As Franklin wrote: "the measures have been, I suspect, very much the King’s own," he also realized the consequences of George’s role in politics; "and he has in some cases a great share of what his friends call firmness." To William Franklin, July lh, 1773* Smyth, Writings, VI, 96-7. 4l Pares, King George III, 148*

Usually seven, the Lord Chancellor, Lord President, First Lords of the Admiralty and Treasury and the three Secretaries of State, Dartmouth Manuscripts» I, 371-3* CHAPTER III

IMPEDIMENTS: THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND CORRESPONDENCE

THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

Though Britain's empire grew and developed during the eighteenth century its apparatus for handling imperial business did not. The joint stewardship of the Secretary of the Southern Department and the Board of Trade, with responsibility for various details left to other respective offices, such as the War Office, was woefully out of date.

Herein was reflected the English misconception that the colonies were so much a part of England that no separate administration was necessary. In 1J6S the government re- \ vised this system but, typically, the impetus was not \ improvement in the handling of Colonial affairs, but con­ solidation of George Ill's political position. If, as

Margaret Speetor points out, efficiency had been the goal of revision, the President of the Board of Trade could have 1 been elevated to a cabinet position. A third Secretary was instituted instead, with the intent of stabilising

Chatham’s ministry by partitioning Shelburne's patronage.

The Inception of the office was unfortunate, not only from

50 51 the point of view of the development of a sound American policy, hut because it always appeared to be inferior to that of the other two Secretaries of State creating a continuing and delicate problem throughout Dartmouth's 2 tenure.

The American Department was organised in a similar fashion to that of the other Departments of State| there were two under-secretaries, a first clerk, two senior clerks, seven ordinary clerks, a chamber and a deputy 3 chamber keeper and a necessary woman. As is often the case with civil servants, these officers retained their positions even when the secretaryship changed hands, While the others probably played an insignificant role, the under­ secretaries during Dartmouth's tenure, John Pownall and

William Knox, played important parts in the struggle to prevent separation.

Exactly how much influence they exerted on the direction of policy is difficult to ascertain though clearly it increased when they enjoyed the close personal relation­ ship that characterized Dartmouth's dealings with John b Pownall and Lord George Germaine's with William Knox.

Their significance becomes evident as their activities are examined.

Both men had what would seem to have been a sound background for their positions as undersecretary. Pownall, 52

the older brother of a governor of Massachusetts Bay, had

started his career in 17^1 as a clerk with the Board of

Trade and by 1758 had risen to first secretary, ranking just

below the President. Knox had actually lived in America for

several years, serving as Provost Marshall and a member of the Council for Georgia. Contemporaries seem to have

regarded them as intelligent and honest.^ But if their

acquaintance with colonial affairs and their native ability were extensive, their points of view, especially for the

Americans, were unfortunate.

Pownall shared the opinion and principles of Lord

Hillsborough, and at any rate, seemed less concerned with solving the American problems than protecting his depart­ ment and its patronage from encroachment by either of the 2 two "ancient" secretaries. While he was not as extreme

in his firmness as the Bedfords or even the King, he was far from sharing the liberal viewpoints of his brother

Thomas. Knox, who had been unimpressed with 'democracy1

in America, was in sympathy with the ideas of George Gren­ ville, even to the point of defending them in several 6 articulate pamphlets. Like Pownall, he was not wholly opposed to small concessions to the colonies, he was still 7 notorious enough to be hung and burned in effigy in America.'

At least some Englishmen were concerned with the effect of their presence in the office of the Secretary of State, for 53

Dartmouth received an anonymous letter warning him that they

would ”carry with them . . * all the injurious and illiberal 8 ideas . . * of their late Lord.” It was ironic, especially

in Knox’s case, that though they were widely regarded as experts on America, they failed to understand the American

psychology.

The chief responsibility of the undersecretaries, and

perhaps the chief way in which they exerted their influence,

was in the handling of the correspondence of the office,

with the colonies and with other departments. The bulk of

it concerned the governors who were required to report

periodically on their activities and the general and parti- 10 cular affairs of their colonies, Pownall and Knox read

this huge volume, and selected from it what it was necessary

for the secretary to see and give directions upon. Much

of the work was routine and easily--sometImes better--

handled by the undersecretaries, who drafted replies for 11 their superior’s signature. So the secretary, who at

any rate already had a full schedule attending to his pri­

vate and political business, was spared even reading a / ip great deal of the material. Some of the replies went out

under the undersecretary’s own signatures. Besides routine

matters, Pownall and Knox carried out their own correspon­ dence with some of the colonial governors, (for example,

Hutchinson, Tryon, Wright and Simpson) who trusted them to relay what was necessary to Dartmouth.

A look at an example of the handling of the more significant pieces of mail reveals the balance of Influence between King, cabinet, secretary and undersecretary. Using the principals with which we are presently concerned:

Pownall reads a dispatbh from Governor Hutchinson of

Massachusetts Bay concerning a serious matter. He brings it to Dartmouth's attention, who upon considering what his reply should be, consults North, George III and eventually the cabinet. Upon getting the sense of what he needs to Ik say, he then gives Pownall fairly specific directions but leaves the form and phraseology of the letter to the under­ secretary. Then a draft is submitted to the secretary for his signature.

The procedure takes on added significance when it is followed without the presence of the secretary. Dartmouth was often absent for weeks at a time, on trips to his estates at Staffordshire or Yorkshire, during which he expected to transact no official business. In such a case,

Pownall presented his problem directly to the Prime Ministe or King for instructions, or occasionally received His

Majesty’s wishes through one of the other Secretaries of I5 State. The resulting letter was then sent, f< accompli to Dartmouth at Sandwell for signing, or signed by the othe 16 Secretaries of State, Suffolk or Bochford. 55

The only fair conclusion to draw from the above is that the official papers reflect the policies of the secretary and his colleagues rather than the undersecretaries unless his subordinates happened to suggest or agree with them.

There is considerable evidence that they did both. Aside from the initiatives demonstrated in handling the colonial office correspondence, abstracting the year’s dispatches, 17 attending levees, preparing memos for cabinet meetings 1 18 and even calling a cabinet meeting occasionally, Pownall and Knox did originate several aspects of American policy and were called upon for their ideas in drafting royal speeches to Parliament and several pieces of Colonial 19 legislation. Something of the manner of origin of some legislation is sensed in a letter from Pownall to Knox of

December 3, 1T73: I am rejoiced to hear you are so much better. When you can think of business without being disturbed by it, I have got something for you that, whilst it amuses you*, will greatly lighten the burdens of your faithful servant. After so many years neglect of the business of Quebec, everything now is to be done in a hurry. Lord North has begged that he may have from us a precis of the affairs of Quebec from the first estab­ lishment of it, so far as regards the claims and complaints of the new sub­ jects, and what is passed there upon, etc. You know how little able I am to sit down to such a work, and you know that nobody but you or I can do it.^O

The Knox manuscripts provide information on other policies coming from the undersecretaries. Pownall 56

21 apparently recommended the Boston Port Bill and Knox

conceived the idea behind the Conciliatory Proposition in 22 1775 well as making military suggestions. Letters in

the Dartmouth manuscripts at Patshull further suggest that

Pownall was responsible for the recall of Hutchinson and

later the implementation of the proclamation for the

rebellion in August of 1J75* la these ways the undersecre­

taries "exercised an influence out of proportion to their 2k office*.*.

The picture that emerges from this examination of how the American business was conducted should be clear: the sole direction of American policy did not rest with the

American Secretary. The information received by him from the colonies was selected by subordinates, and they phrased the dispatches that went out. Prom their experience they were able to make acceptable and well regarded suggestions of proper courses of action. Major issues went all the way to the King and Cabinet before being resolved. Then the

American Secretary was indeed a "tool" for carrying out their 25 joint resolution.

HEWS FROM AMERICA

In terms of sheer bulk, the volume of news from America left in the records of the Colonial office is impressive. 57

But naturally, its significance is not to be found in its poundage, but in its content, and it is our purpose bere to examine and evaluate the official and unofficial information coming to Dartmouth from the thirteen colonies, and to speculate upon its probable effect on him.

The Colonial Office received, along "with the letters of the various governors describing conditions within their

Jurisdictions, many enclosures in the forms of newspapers, pamphlets, broadsides, assembly speeches and records, petitions to the governor, minutes of town meetings, etc. Besides these official communications, Dartmouth corresponded with several Americans, notably Joseph Reed and Thomas Cushing, 26 had the benefit of perusing intercepted private mail, and conversed directly with Colonial Agents and other

Americans in London. A first impression on studying this 27 mine of material is that British officialdom, despite the ocean of time and miles separating it from its American subjects, could not have been ignorant of their activities and opinions.

The governors’ letters, even those from Bull and Went­ worth which were not nearly so full and descriptive as those of Bunmore and Tryon, give a remarkable picture of the build-up of the revolutionary fervor and organisation.

Dartmouth entered office Just after the Gasp^e incident and it was shortly thereafter that the extra-legal Committees 58

of Correspondence were set up. Of this and all subsequent

rebel activity, he was vividly informed. Governor Hutchin­

son of Massachusetts Bay was writing as early as 1773 of

the spread of Boston’s truculence and its malevolent effect when he wrote that ’’the expectation of an union of measures

in . . . Pennsylvania, Hew York, and Massachusetts Bay, "2 8 has raised a higher spirit here than X have ever seen before.

After the Committees of Correspondence came the election of Provincial Congresses, selection of delegates to Congress, the Continental Congress with its restrictions on commerce and consumption, the arming of the rebels, Committees of

Safety, and the final erosion of royal authority in America, all of which were duly chronicled in the official corres­ pondence. But to know was not to sympathize and certainly a letter such as the following one from Hutchinson describing the manners of the Liberty Boys in intimidating the Tea

Consignees in Massachusetts Bay did little to ease tensions!

On the 17th in the evening between one and two hundred people beset the house . . . where Mr. Clark, another of the consignees lives, who was at home with his children about him. Their numbers, as they were passing greatly increased and though they intend to surprise yet they could not help discovering themselves by their horns and whistles, instruments appropriate to a Boston mob. Mr. Clark had just time to secure his door, and send his female visitors 59

to the upper part of the house and for himself and three or four male visitors to betake themselves to the lower chambers. The mob attempted to open the door but finding it se­ cured tried to force it. Some of the gentlemen called to them from the chamber windows, told them they were armed and would fire upon them if they did not desist. At length one of Mr. Clark’s sons aimed at the mob who was forcing the door but missed him. They withdrew for a short space and returned with double violence, broke the glass and frames of the windows and did other damage. Several of Mr. Clark’s friends found their way into the house, and after near two hours the mob dispersed. The next day a town meeting was held and a committee was appointed to inquire of the con­ signees whether they had not received such advices as would enable them to answer the request of the town. They gave a Joint answer that it was not in their power to comply with their request.^9

A man of Dartmouth’s mien was doubtless deeply shocked and indignant at such behavior, at not only the violence of the mob, but the thinly veiled use of it by the town meet­ ing .

Naturally, there was a different viet of the difficulties between the mother countries and her colonies coming to him from Joseph Reed. The brother-in-law of a London merchant friendly with Dartmouth, Reed had taken up a correspondence with the American Secretary from a sincere and not unfounded belief that the American cause in England had been hurt by the 6 o

30 ’'advices of either ignorant or interested men," Thus

he undertook an "endeavor to inform CDartmouthJ . . . truly 31 and faithfully of our present views and situation." His

letters attempt to present the Colonial grievances in a

tactful way so that "perhaps by a little temporising and

removing real grievances in the [[government’s mode of con-

ducting a particular measure'] the measure itself could be 32 preserved." He described the unfair and out-of-date pos-fed 32 rates, the "rudeness and incivility" of crown officials,

the incompetency of Admiralty Court Officers* Most espe­

cially, he struggled to present the constitutional reasons

for American resistance, "the principle which has given rise . 31 to the present commotion." He carefully distinguished

between a "supreme" and an "absolute" power--while he was

willing to grant the former to Parliament, he would withhold

the latter, for he could not imagine that there should be

"a more divine right . . . in Parliament, than in the

King," To Dartmouth’s argument that the colonists should

obey the laws once enacted, he responded with "the principles

of the Revolution showing that there are certain cases 30 wherein resistance is Justifiable."

Along with American grievances and rights, Reed stressed

unanimity and the prominence of Americans in opposition to

Parliamentary taxation and the Tea Act in particular. In sending Dartmouth news of the return of Philadelphia’a tea 6l

he assured him that those who effected it were "the most 3 3 considerable in both rank and property.” Throughout his

correspondence he discounted the dissentients with such

claims as ’’some divisions have arisen in this place, as to

the mode of showing our sympathy with Boston; but your

Lordship may rely upon it that nine-tenths of the inhabitants mean to show their sense of the conduct of the mother

country towards them, by adopting every prudent measure for

their relief." Always he tried to present an American

point of view. Congress was pictured as a "not illegal" body representing "the true and real designs" of Americans 35 and perhaps serving to prevent bloodshed. In describing Philadelphia, he wrote, "this city has been distinguished

for its peaceable and regular demeanor . . . there have been

no mobs, no insults to individuals, no injury to private

property."^

As 177^ wore on he became more urgent in his 37 representations as he warned of the impending civil war.

Still he found reason to hope for an accommodation, and suggested one to Dartmouth along these lines:

We are, indeed much misinformed if it is not your Lordship's opinion, as well as many others, that if you have the right [of taxation], it is not expedient to exercise it. Suppose this was declared by an act of Parliament, the Boston Acts repealed, and satisfaction for the tea made; with much deference, I submit, such 62

procedure would create such a confidence, and excite such gratitude as would dis­ pose the colonies to concur in any proposition for settling the Constitution of America upon reasonable principles^ and raising the so much desired revenue; if that be thought too hazardous an experiment, I verily believe a submission to all acts of Parliament of general superintendence, and control of trade without reference to revenue, might be relied upon. If any encouragement were given to commissioners from the several assemblies, to attend the conference in Great Britain, and the Boston Act suspended in the interim, I incline to think most of the colonies would now accede to such a measure."38

Terms such as these must have appeared incredible to

Dartmouth, and their coming from one calling himself a moderate, one who had "the most passionate and sincere 3 0 desire to see a reconciliation" must have discouraged

him. While Heed was writing him that America would never

submit to the Tea Act and that the Coercive Acts were

uniting the colonists in antagonism toward to the mother

country, General Gage reported that:

In Boston the greatest pains have been, and are taking to oppose all measures tending to open the port, by flattering the people with assistance from the other provinces--promises of collections and presents to enable them to subsist, and the happy effect of the general Congress, which they make no.doubt will force Great Britain into their own terms. On the other hand, several gentlemen, also through fear of the tyranny under which they live, dared not to act or speak, 63

encouraged now by the late resolutions of the government, have ventured to step forth and are endeavoring to persuade the people to comply with the act of Parlia­ ment as the only means to save their town from ruin. Til’ they are pinched and find they are deceived in their hopes of support by presents and collect ions, the affair will probably rest in this situation. But the Act must certainly sooner or later work its own way* They will not agree to non-importation either in New York or Philadelphia, or even in this province . .

A month earlier Reed had warned that if the Port Bill had

been founded on the belief that Massachusetts would be

isolated, that it was poorly founded--that every colony k-1 would come to her aid. In the previous December he had

advised Dartmouth that "severities have been tried . . .

I cannot but be firtily persuaded that the repeal of this whole Of©a} Act would ensure the future submission . . . )| p to any other act of the British Parliament now in force."

At the same time Tryon advised him that repeal would be 43 dangerous and encourage illicit trade. Dartmouth’s manuscripts are full of such conflicting observations. A

typical example: on May 15, 177^ Major General Haldimand wrote from America on the predicted reaction of Boston to

the Port Bill; "It is the opinion of many people here that they will acknowledge their fault." On May 20, 177^-> Joseph

Ward opined that "the violent measures which are adopted

to subject the Americans will never prosper and are pregnant 64

with ruin to the nation.'1^

While Heed recommended repeal of the 'Intolerable Acts', Governor Martin warned from Worth Carolina "that

forbearance, indulgence, relaxations and concessions serve

only to encourage usurpation and to beget new and unrea- 4 5 sonable demands." From Virginia Dunmore advised him to

close American ports, cut off American trade with foreign

countries and even shut each colony off from every other 46 colony. Despite his correspondence with the Americans

these voices of crown officials were the ones that Dartmouth heard.^

And what did they say? In the first place these men wanted to say what would be acceptable to the ministry.

This is perhaps what led Gage to over-optimistically report

on the Port Bill soon after his arrival in America as

Governor of Massachusetts Bay that "I hear from many that

the act has staggered the most presumptuous; but minds so

inflamed cannot cool at once, so it may be better to give the shock they have received time to operate and I may find

the assembly in a better temper than usual and more inclined 48 to comply with the King's expectations at Salem." Only

a few months later he wrote to Barrington that "affairs here are worse than even in the time of the Stamp Act, I don't mean in Boston, but throughout the country. The New England

Provinces . . . are . . . in arms, and the question is not now whether you shall quell the revolt in Boston, hut 49 whether those provinces shall he conquered . . . "

Furthermore, colonial points of view were typically presented in an unfavorable light. Thus Governor Penn, in writing of an expected petition to convene the assembly for discussion of the Boston Port Bill referred to it as an "affrontive application," and promised darkly to "treat 50 it as it deserves." In struggling to exonerate them­ selves from any blame for the unhappy turn of events the

Governors attempted to show that it was the colonists who were responsible for the degeneration of relations. But they are not perhaps to be condemned for seeking approbation for their conduct for they were, after all, forced to follow instructions that time and distance often made irrelevant or inapplicable and yet binding; self-preserva­ tion dictated that they fully expiate their own behavior.

As part of this effort they tended to disregard the legitimate and constitutional grievances so emphasised by

Reed and ascribed the colonial resistance to ulterior motives on the part of the resisters. Martin wrote that the opposition to government, more "specious" than "real",

"hath arisen from the interested views of a few individuals.

The cause of Cone particular argumentj was the disappoint- 51 ment of two candidates for Treasurer's office ..." 5 P 53 This assertion was echoed by Hutchinson and Dunmore, 66 the latter suggesting he have more officers to appoint so that he could increase the friends of government and keep down faction. Lieutenant Governor Bull treated the Liberty

Boys with even more contempt when he wrote of the appeal of their cause that ’’the uniform of cloathing invites the young men to enlist, and after their exercise they go to the tavern, and there indulge in social joys and doubtless ck mix politics with their wine . * «. Martin talked of a

"mob" stimulated by "sedition” and "liquor” .55 All of the governors commonly referred to the patriots as the "lower ranks" and the "rabble"* As for the virtue of the American goals that Heed stressed, a letter from Martin countered in describing an inland trip from New York to North Carolina

In the late fall of 177k* "The most false, base, and scandalous suggestions, reports and insinuations that unprincipled men can invent . . * are readily swallowed by the poor deluded people, whose extreme Ignorance and credulity, exposes them to receive every imposition that 56 crafty and ill-designing men practice upon them."

The correspondence of the crown officials differs from

Reed’s in yet another way: while the Philadelphian sbessed the unity of the Americans in opposing the designs of

Parliament upon their liberty, the governor letters almost universally claim that the "liberty faction" is small, that, as Hutchinson wrote in 1773> the "body of people" were "far 57 from perverse", and only delufed by a few designing men. 6?

58 If the faction was small, it followed, as Cage claimed,

"that if a respectable force is seen in the field, the most obnoxious of the leaders seized, and a pardon proclaimed CA for all others, government will come off victorious*”

The feeling of several of the governors, especially those from the southern colonies, was .that even when the rebellion grew in daring and numbers, there were numerous moderates, / friend® of government who in fear of the admittedly rigorous retribution dealt loyalists, would not speak out. Hutchin­ son had warned in May of 177^ that the moderates would do be without hope until troops arrived. As late as the summer of 1775 Campbell was writing that the back country leaders assured him they wanted nothing but arms and 61 ammunition and 1,000 men would be raised. Bunmore pointed out the situation of "people of the first property, and

I believe the number greater than (might) appear, who foresee the ruin which these disorders must bring upon the country, and who place their hope® in the perseverance of

His Majesty and the parliament, of being rescued from the 62 tyranny of licentiousness." The plight of these loyal V subjects must have touched Dartmouth and he** "Likely winced at the indignation Campbell expressed at the "tojtal neglect” of the southern colonies $

Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse my warmth when I acquaint you that yesterday under the color of law they hanged and burnt an unfortunate wretch, a free negro of considerable property, one of the most valuable and useful men, in his way, in the province, on suspicion of instigating an insurrection for which I am convinced there was not the least ground, I could not save him my Lord I The very reflection harrows my soul! I have only the comfort to think I left no means untried. They have now dipped their hands in blood. God Almighty knows when it will e n d . ® 3

Finally, in reviewing the information coming into the American office, the difficulty of time must be con­ sidered. The letters took four to six weeks to get to

England, if the packet was on time. It took several more weeks for the news to be digested, action taken and replies made, and then another four to six weeks before these reached America. The Inherent obstacles are obvious.

After hostilities began the government packet was discon­ tinued and communication became still more uncertain, but even before this letters often didn’t get through. Several of Hutchinson's letters in the Public Record Office are 6 k marked "duplieate--original not received." Some very significant news was late in coming, for example, the offi­ cial version of Lexington and Concord arrived some 12 days after a patriot account had Jostled London. The time lag also made planning difficult, especially during debate of the Boston Port Bill. There was not enough time to send across the Atlantic to see whether Boston was willing to 69 pay for the tea before passing a punitive measure, or to give her the alternative. Similarly it would have taken too long to assess the effects of the Port Bill before passing 65 the other Coercive Acts . Other pitiful examples of this are seen in the fact that for all practical purposes the

Conciliatory Proposition was rendered obsolete by the news of Lexington and Concord, and in Dartmouth’s losing battle to postpone the Proclamation of Rebellion until after the

Second Continental Congress had been heard from.

To summarize, the news from America, while full, was conflicting and prejudiced. It was not a question, as some 66 sources have implied, of not having enough information, or not having seen the petitions of the colonists.

Unhappily, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters,

Dartmouth favored his official dispatches over unofficial

"advices1* $ and while they fanned his hopes for conciliation, the same time they alienated him from the very Americans he hoped to conciliate. CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

Margaret Marion Mitchell Spector, The American Department of the British Government, 1767*1782 (New York, 19^0), 2 5 ff. 2 The office was so tenuous that when Hillsborough resigned in 1772 and the Seals were offered to Bedfordite Weymouth, to whom King and ministry were under obligation for a cabinet seat, hit refusal, and Dartmouth's expected refusal, seemed to jeopardize its very existence. Pownall wrote to Knox on Aug. 1, 1772, that if they both declined "then I foresee the administration of the colonye (jsic) will undergo some new arrangement." Knox Manuscripts, 107* Dartmouth accepted, but he was warned to demand all the pre* rogatives of his office. Frederick Montague to Dartmouth, Aug. 10, 1772, Dartmouth Manuscripts» II, 87* To Pownall's grief the Earl was not vigorous in support of them. Spector, American Department, 70. It was particu­ larly Suffolk with aspirations for the prime ministership, who sought to encroach on the American department and the undersecretary was bitter in a letter to Knox that "all councils for American business . . . are held by Lord Suffolk . . . Lord North's blindness, or rather indolence, in respect to the arts that are practiced to ruin and disgrace our department, and ultimately, himself, is admonishing and unpardonable*" July 23, 1773, Knox Manu­ scripts, 110. Two years later the situation was the same, or aggravated as Dartmouth left his office vacant in the last few months that he held it: "As to measures for America I know nothing about them, for since I have been deserted by our principal, that business is got into other hands, and my friend Eden knows a great deal more and does a great deal more . . . than your faithful servant." Pownall to Knox, Oct. 10, 1775, ibid., 122. Not until Lord George Germain became secretary, and received hie oath at the same time that Weymouth took his as Secretary for the Northern Department (and, in any event, Suffolk had wanted

70 f o o t n o t e s

Germain in. office), were the three office© considered equal# See Knox * s "Memoranda”, Ho v., 1775, ibid#, 256-7, Spector, American Department, 66-70, and Gerald S. Brown, The American " S-'ecreTary" (Ann Arbor, 1963), 27# In this a© other areas, domestic politics played havoc with American policy* 3Spector, American Departments 33. 4 Dartmouth MSS, # 898, 1500, 1585, as cited in ibid#, 137# This personal relationship is also apparent in the Diary of Thomas Hutchinson as he makes many references to social events that included either Knox or Pownall or both and Dartmouth and his family. See I, 18b, 273, 351, b22, b?5 and 579. ^Spector, American Department, 100-10**# 6 See ¥. H. Lyttleton to Knox, Mar* lb, 1768, Knox Manuscripts. 95, George Grenville to Knox, Oct. 9," “175*8, ibid*. 101* 7 8 * C. Damns, "introduction”, Knox Manuscripts, xviii Q "A Londoner” to Dartmouth, Oct., 1772, Dartmouth Manuscript©., II, 103 *

^Spector, American Department» 10$, 15b.

^Leonard W. Labaree, Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors— 1760-1776 (Hew York. 1935) > W f * 11 Spector, American Department, 111. 12 Pownall, especially, went to great lengths to save hi© Lord from "worry and annoyance." Ibid., 157*

13Ibld.. 199. lb Pownall1© abstracts for drafting correspondence are In the Dartmouth Manuscript©, Box 18, #768, cited in ibid. 11b.

^Here again, the close involvement of the King in governmental business is seen. Typically, in the Gaspee F00TNQTS8

incident, instructions were drawn up by Pownall in conformity with what he considered to be the intentions of King and Cabineti when Dartmouth approved them they were sent to the King who read and signed them himself. Pownall to Dartmouth, Aug. 27* 1772, Dartmouth MSS, Box 10, #392, quoted in Spector, American Department. 112. The King’s partici­ pation was even greater as Dartmouth’s tenure wore on. When Dartmouth for all practical purposes, vacated his office in Sept., 1775# Pownall wrote to the King submitting drafts of letter© upon which he had received royal instruction© and some on which he had no^ saying, ”lf your Majesty approves these drafts the letters will be sent to Lord Dartmouth for his signing, in the meantime Mr. Pownall has in obedience to your Majesty’s command© taken the proper steps for forwarding the preparations of the arms and artilleries and also the ship© of war for a convoy." Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, III, 259* See also Pownall to King, Sept. 12, 1775, 2^0, Pownall to King, Oct. 13, 1775, S6k, and Pownall to King, Oct. 19, 1775, 272. In some cases Pownall sent draft© for the King himself to sign, Pownall to King, Oct. 14, 1775/ 264-65* The King read many of the dispatches, incoming and outgoing, occasionally suggesting some fuller Instructions after having ©eon them. See for example King to North, April 11, 1775/ ibid., 202, and King to Dartmouth, Oct.,10, 1774, Dartmouth Manuscriptst X, ^39* 16 See, for example, Pownall to Dartmouth, Aug. 27, 1772, Dartmouth Manuscripts. II, 9 1 * 17 For an example dated 1772, in Pownall* e hand, see Ibid.» 121. 18 Spector, American Department, 37*38. At least once Pownall did this precipitously: Thomas Hutchinson, in his Diary, reports a conversation at the American office in which Dartmouth expressed regret that the undersecretary had already called a cabinet meeting on the Lexington- Coneord crisis, as he wished to speak to Lord North before it convened, I, 467* 19 Thifc: was doubtless considered part of their Job. Spector, American Department, 138, 20 Knox Manuscripts» 111. footnotes 73

Knox Papers, X, 21 quoted in Spector, American Department, 138. 22 Knox Manuscripts, 289* Oo #671# #1^27, # 1 ^ , cited in Spector, American Department, 138-9- See also Hutchinson, Diary, I, 391, and Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 330* This was apparently not pleasing to Dartmouth, Zb . Spector, American Department, 15^* 25 See Lord George Germain to Guy Carleton, July 10, 1777# Knox Papers, III, 19# quoted in ibid., I5h» 26 There are numerous examples of these calendared in Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 381 ff and II, 295*300# 27 Large numbers of typical and extraordinary American documents were laid before both houses of Parliament in the sessions of 177^*1775* $/2%2 , P# R. 0 # Microfilm#

^Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Dec# 20, 1773# C. 0. 5/769# P. -R. 0, Microfilm.

Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Dec. 2, 1773, C. 0. 5/769, P. R. 0# Microfilm# 3°»We have often seen accounts published, and from persons high in office in this country that have been false within the knowledge of every reputable freeholder in it# Such men, my Lord, have wickedly practiced upon the unsus­ pecting integrity of our best friends in Britain, infused jealousies of independence . # # which the true friends of government in this country never perceived the least foundation for.” Joseph Reed to the lari of Dartmouth, Sept. 25, 177^, in Reed, Life, I, 76# 31 Reed to Dartmouth, Dec. 22, 1773, ibid., 51*

Reed to Dartmouth, April k$ 177^, Ibid.* 56.

^Beed to Dartmouth, Dee. 27, 1773, ibid., 5^-56.

3\ e e d to Dartmouth, June 10, 177^, Ibid.# 6 8 #

35Reed to Dartmouth, July 25, 1774, ibid#, 72. F00M02S8

36 ^ Reed to Dartmouth, Dee* 27, 1773, ibid., 55* 3T Reed to Dartmouth, Sept, 25, 177**, Ibid.t 76-8, and Reed to Dartmouth, Oct, 15, 177**, IbidT^ 52-3. *5 A •’Bee a to Dartmouth, Feb. 10, 1775, Ibid-, 9^-5- Bead to Dartmouth, June 10, 1771*, ibid., 6 S. ko Gage to Dartmouth, June 26, 177**, quoted in Reed, ibid., 7 0 . hi Reed to Dartmouth, May 30, 177**, Dartmouth Manuscripts I, 353* h2 Dec# 22, 1773, Reed, life, 51. i*3 fryoa to Dartmouth, Dec. 1, 1773, Dartmouth Manu­ scripts* 1, 3**3 ‘ hk Dartmouth Manuscriptst IX, 212* k«5 Martin to Dartmouth, Sept. 1, 177**, 0. 0. 5/318, P. R. 0. Microfilm.

^Dunmore to Dartmouth, Dec# 2%, 177**, 0. 0 . 5/3*353, P. R. 0. Microfilm* h7 B. D* Bargar, Lord Dartmouth» 100. ke Gage to Dartmouth, May 19, 177**, 0. 0* 5/769, P* R* 0. Microfilm.

^Gage to Barrington, Sept. 25, 177**, Clarence Carter/,- ed., ffhe Correspondence of Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of Haven/ 1933) V X* 65^-5* ' 50 Penn to Dartmouth, May 31, 177**, Pennsylvania Archives, 177**, 368, as quoted in Reed, Life» 67* 51 Martin to Dartmouth, Sept. 1, 177**, C. 0, 5/3X8, P. R. 0 . Microfilm* 52 Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Oct. 9, 1773, Dartmouth Manuscripts. I, 339. K O Dunmore to Dartmouth, Dec. 2^-, 177**, C* 0# 5/1353, P* R. 0 * Microfilm. 5% Bull to Dartmouth, Aug. 3, 17?**, C. 5/396, P* R. 0. Microfilm* FOOWIOTBS

55Martin to Dartmouth, Juna 30, 1T75, C. 0. 5/318, P. R. 0. Microfilm. 56 Martin to Dartmouth, Mar. 10, 1775, C. 0. 5/'3-1'.8, P. fi« 0, Microfilm. 5? Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Sept. 1T73, C. 0, 5/769, P. H. 0. Microfilm. 58 Hot only could Dartmouth take comfort in the dimuni­ tion of else of the patriot groups as seen by the Governor©, within each colony, but from the clear evidence that not all the colonies were equally ill-disposed to government. Massachusetts Bay was by far the most active and violent in opposition; by comparison, New York, and especially Georgia; were notably loyal. In fact, Georgia nearly repu­ diated the Continental Association. See Wright to Dartmouth Dec. 20, 177%, Colonial Records, XXXVIII, Part 1, 367-8, quoted in W. W. Abbot, The Royal Governors of Georgia, 175fr.1775 (Chapel Hill, 1959), 166.

^°Gage to Dartmouth, Jon. 18, 1775, Carter, Correa- poadenee of Thomas Gage, I, 39Q.

6°Hut«hlneoa to Dartmouth, May 17, 177*», C, 0. 5/769, P. R. 0. Microfilm. 61 Campbell to Dartmouth, C. 0. 5/396, P. R. 0* Micro­ film. See also Martin to Dartmouth, Mar, 10, 1775, C. 0, 5/318, Dunmore to Dartmouth, May 1, 1775, C. 0. 5/l353> and Wright to Dartmouth, June 9, 1775, Colonial Records, XXXVIII Part 1, %%6-%9, as quoted in Abbot, Royal Governors of Georgia. 175-6. 62 Dunmore to Dartmouth, Mar. 1%, 1775, C. 0. 5/1353* P. R. 0. Microfilm. 63 , Campbell to Dartmouth, Aug. 19, 1775, G. 0, 5/396, P . R. 0. Microfilm. 6k For example, Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Sept., 1773, Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Oct. 11, 1773* and Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Aug. 7* 1773* C. 0. 5/769* P. B. 0. Microfilm. 65 Bar,gar, Doted,,, Dartmouth, 10 3-%. ^ S e e Claude Van Tyne, The War of Independence, (Boston 1929), 140. ------CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF COERCION

INDEPENDENCY IN ACTION AS WELL AS DECLARATION

The Boston Tea Party was the turning point in Lord

Dartmouth1® thinking on the American guestIon* Before the

Tea Party he had hoped, albeit naively and vainly that a

policy of non-aggravation on both sides would suffice to heal the differences between colony and mother country.

He did not really desert this policy after the Tea Party, but he realised that the differences could no longer be

totally ignored*

When that ill-disguised tribe of Indians chose to

repudiate Parliamentary sovereignty by throwing the East

India Companyfs tea into Boston Harbor, they were destroy­

ing private property, a crime that cost them their best friends in England* More important for Dartmouth, however, they were committing an act that could not be tabled by the

British Parliament. In their conversation on the Declara­ tion of Independency that the Massachusetts Assembly had made in reply to Hutchinson*® defense of Parliamentary prerogative, Franklin had told Dartmouth that "It I® words

76 77 only. Acts of Parliament are still submitted to there.

Ho force is used to obstruct their execution. While that 1 is the case, Parliament would do well to turn a deaf ear.11

But here was outright disobedience. Dartmouth was stunned 2 and grieved. He had considered himself a "real friend to 3 the constitutional rights and liberties of America." He had thought it likely that the repugnant Tea Act would be overturned in the session of Parliament underway when news of the turbulence arrived* How, he wrote his friend John

Thornton, the colonists should know

how fatally and effectually they have . . shut the door against all possibility of present relief for any of the things they complain of, and how utterly vain it must be to expect that Parliament will ever give it to them till there appears to be a change in their temper and con­ duct . CO. would be thought as mad as they if were to say a word of repeal­ ing the tea duty now.^

To Dartmouth, whether or not Parliament had the right to lay the tea duty, to resist Parliament’s authority by opposing the execution of the law in the manner ©f Boston was "clearly treasonable . . . upon the principles of every 3 government upon earth* In his mind the taxation question- which he had felt and still did feel could be held in abeyance--must now be shunted aside by this larger question of whether the laws of Parliament would be submitted to in America* "If the people of America say no," he wrote 78 privately to Reed,

they say in effect that they will no longer be a part of the British Empire: they change the'whole ground of the controversy--they no longer contend that Parliament has not a right to enact a particular provision-- they say that if has no right to con­ sider them as at all within its Jurisdiction. 3

Either the colonists submitted, or they were independent.

While Dartmouth could pose this alternative in theory, he could not bring liimself to accept the latter choice.

"We are yet one Empire,11 he had told Franklin in 1773,^ and in 177^ there was still, for Dartmouth, "hope, that p principles of another nature will prevail."

At the same time it was obvious to him that some action stronger than hope must repair the assault to Parliament's authority. Franklin had wisely warned him some months before that "violent measures against the province will not change the opinion of the people. Force [can] do no g o o d ,

But lack of action had not preserved the peace. Sir Francis

Bernard wrote the Secretary a general rebellion could be averted if the government would pursue coercive measures, 5 an opinion that must have struck a responsive chord in

Dartmouth, for he wrote Hutchinson that

I am sensible how greatly the * constitutJfcnal imbecility of the government in . . . Massachusetts Bay is increased by popular preju­ dices, and yet, the vigilance, the firmness, and the activity of the civil power, are the only circum­ stances from which the subject can 79

expect . » . protection in the exercise of his lawful commerce * It is upon these efforts that the preservation of the public peace must depend . • . *

Ihat this civil power could not cope with its problems

at this time became evident from the Governor’s letters

that the ’Indians’ would not be tried and the tea would

not be paid fot J Clearly, Massachusetts must be made

to obey the laws of its mother country. As he wrote Gage concerning the governments

It is not only its dignity and reputa­ tion, but its power, nay its very existence depends upon the present moment; for shcuLd those ideas of independence, which some dangerous and ill-designing persons here are artfully endeavoring to instil into the minds of the King’s American subjects, once take root, that relation between this kingdom and its colonies, which is the bond of peace and power will soon cease to exist and destruction must follow disunion.

Further, Dartmouth’s sympathy towards the grievances

the Americans claimed was limited by his English point of view and the prejudiced accounts of the governors. He

failed to understand the very real American fear of British

tyranny; he was certain, he wrote Keed, that ”1 need not

take pains to convince you of the absurdity of the idea which has been held out to the common people in inflammatory papers on your side of the water, that the intention of government is to enslave the people of America ...” He 8o felt further that ’’the liberties of America are not so much in danger from anything Parliament has done, or is likely to do here, as from the violence and misconduct of

America itself.” The letters of the British governors had brought him to believe that the radicals were small in number and that while they had perhaps developed a wide following, the people had been duped by an unscrupulous, ambitious, few. Here the effects of the governors* view­ points on Dartmouth*s thinking were forceful and unfortu­ nate. He was also discouraged by their intransigence; writing to Wentworth in Hew Hampshire he had admitted that,

”1 cannot suggest any step to be taken that would not be more likely to strengthen, than remove their prejudices." 9

Boston had an old reputation as a bad apple in the barrel of colonial grievances. Her reputation sank even lower when Franklin*s part in the publication of the Whately letters became known only a week after the news of the tea 10 party arrived. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Apsley, wrote

Dartmouth that it was necessary "to mark out Boston and 11 separate that town from the rest of the delinquents."

In fact, North told Hutchinson after his arrival in

England, the mother country had been patient long enough;

'some changes should have been made before, especially after the Assembly's Declaration of Independency the previous 12 summer. "There was" Dartmouth had written "no room to hope for the restoration of order and regular government 8l

till the sentiments of those who see the necessity of a

due acknowledgement of the supreme power of the whole

empire, and the absurdity of a contrary doctrine, shall lo become the prevailing and ruling principle of the province." ^

SSCUBING THE DEPENDENCE OF THE COLONIES

Dartmouth's conclusion that a coercive policy was

necessary and justified is not surprising in view of the

general British reaction to the tea party. From the King

down, feeling was against the Bostonians. The colony's

own agent was shocked and hoped for a speedy reparation from

the town; even Chatham could not condone the destruction

Of the private property of an innocent party. ”1 suppose we never had since we were a people so few friends in Ik Britain," Franklin lamented to Cushing; "the violent

destruction of the tea seems to have united all parties

agains t (W) ." Most Englishmen not only believed that

coercion was justified, but also that it would succeed in bringing Boston to terms. The King wrote to North, relay­

ing a conversation with Gage, in which Gage said, "they will be lions whilst we are lambs; but if we take the resolute part, they will undoubtedly prove very meek, t^age] thinks four regiments . . . sent to Boston . . . are enough to prevent any disturbance." 15 In view of such sentiments, the political situation of the times, and the relationship 82

of North to his step-brother and to the King, Dartmouth

would not have been able to make his opinion prevail, even

if his personal opinion had been against coercion.

Accordingly, Dartmouth wrote Gage,

It is fit I should acquaint you that it is the King’s firm resolution, upon the unanimous advice of his confidential servants, to pursue such measures as shall be effectual for securing the de­ pendence ^gf the colonies upon this Kingdom.

Exactly what this "resolute part" was to be was a question of some difficulty.

Dartmouth had been aware, as in his letter to Rockingham

in 1768, that the letters from the governors must be

"partial" and "prejudiced"; but perhaps because of that

"foible" of which Hutchinson had accused him, of believing

people better than they were, he persisted in the wishful

thinking that the violences committed in America were the

actions of only a small group. It followed logically that

if that small group could be punished, if they could be weeded out of the troubled Boston garden, that the friends of

government would spring up and dutiful obedience to his

Majesty’s laws would return.

News of the destruction of the tea had arrived in

London on the twentieth of January, 177^• On the twenty- ninth began a series of cabinet meetings to determine what 17 particular measures would be adopted. Exhibiting his concern CO for the lawful conduct of government and Ills belle] w

narrowness of opposition to it, Dartmouth suggested

the King direct the Governor of the province to mov« ihe seat

of government to a place least likely to he influenced by

the town of Boston, and to move the customhouse to another 18 port# At the same meeting the Attorney and Solicitor

General were directed to consider whether the actions of 19 Boston were treasonous. The following day the cabinet

discussed measures to be pursued if the report of the law

officers should conclude that there was adequate ground to 20 warrant criminal proceedings against the Indians. A

fortnight later, though the idea of criminal proceedings

was still being considered, it had been agreed that the

Boston Port Bill and the Massachusetts Government Act would 20 be presented to Parliament*

The Port Bill, closing the port to ail commerce, was

the first of the acts to become law, and it passed with 20 almost no opposition in either house, Labaree reports

that the Earl of Buckinghamshire had vigorously proposed punishing the town by stopping Boston’s commerce with 10,000

troops and a fleet of Ik sail, on February 1. Dartmouth got

him to withdraw the motion then because all of the American 23 news was not yet In*

This particular action then was not extraordinary to

Englishmen in 177^, and the idea of assessing a whole town Qk for the crimes of some individuals was not regarded as novel either. North pointed out in Parliament that it could not be helped if the innocent were punished with the guilty, for the innocents had failed to act against the guilty and 2b therefore the whole town must make restitution. Even

Franklin told Cushing that "tho# the mischief was the act of persons unknown, yet as probably they cannot be found or brought to answer for it, there seems to be some reasonable 25 claim on the society at large in which it happened." In

Dartmouth’s papers is a memo in his own hand considering how

Boston was to be assessed, in which it is clear he planned 26 to assess the whole town. It is very probable then, in view of this and his own feelings as relayed to Thornton and Heed, that the American Secretary supported the Port Bill.

It is interesting that the action was taken by the ministry, through Parliament. The Attorney General and

Solicitor General had ruled that the King could remove the customhouse on his own authority. As mentioned above, Knox tells us that Pownall made the suggestion of the Bill and

Labaree claims that the reason for It was to stiffen the punishment by not allowing ships to use another customhouse 27 in Boston harbor. But for Dartmouth this must have had a deeper meaning: his reason for supporting coercion was to bring the colonies to obey the laws of Parliament. When

Franklin had admonished him that mere troops could not 85 force an acknowledgement of Parliamentary supremacy from the colonists, Dartmouth had agreed. "I do not know, that force would he thought of; but perhaps an act may pass to lay them under some inconveniences . . . " 28 Now he believed that the "inconveniences” of the port closing would force the Bostonians to pay for the tea, and in doing so they would be submitting to an act of Parliament whether they admitted it or not* In an interview with Hutchinson and

George III in the King’s closet after the governor had arrived in London in July, Dartmouth clarified his feeling on what Bostonians needed to do to reopen their port. Hutchinson was concerned that no specific acknowledgement of the right of Parliament to tax them was required, as he knew it would not be forthcoming. Dartmouth agreed that this was not necessary and said that

Such orderly behaviour in the inhabitants in general as would enable the governor to represent to {the King) that there was an apparent disposition to give no molestation to persons who would carry on their trade . . * conformable to law; and the assembly and the towns abstain­ ing from these offensive roles and resolves and encouraging disorders . . . may be considered evidence of such sub- miss ion."29

"Actions speak louder than words", the King added, acquiescing in what Dartmouth had said. Here again is Dartmouth1s feeling that discussion of rights should be avoided; if the colonists would just obey and not argue about Parliamentary supre­ macy, Britain would not force them to admit it. Dartmouth had written Hutchinson that only two measures

"a suspension . . . of all the privileges at present enjoyed by the town of Boston as the seat of government and a place of trade, and an effectual and immediate punishment of

those who had been the ringleaders in the very criminal 30 transactions there*" -- were under review. If there was to be any hope for an end to the troubles however, some reform was necessary. Changes in the government of Massachusetts

Bay were first thought of in connection with moving the seat of government from Boston to a less turbulent place. It was a short step from this to altering the constitution in such a way as to cure its "democratical" evils--which

Dartmouth among others felt were the reasons that that province excelled all others in undutiful conduct. Knox apparently suggested changing the mode of securing members 31 of the Council from election to Crown appointment. This had been considered before, and now Dartmouth agreed to it.

It is not difficult to see why in reading some of Hutchinson letters, such as one speaking of the upper house which "by so many changes made in it for seven or eight years" is

"so modelled that nobody is left to oppose the designs of the new modellers of government with the least degree of spirit or, in most cases, to say nay to the proposals made 32 to them.’ Writing of the Council to Gage shortly after receiving this letter Dartmouth said "any hope of proper advice or assistance from them would be vain." 33 According to both Knox and the King, Dartmouth approved this part of the Government Act; but, Knox wrote, "neither of us wished to make any further alterations in the charter." 35 As it turned out this was a minority opinion in the Cabinet and

Dartmouth was overruled. Knox blames the extension of char­ ter changes to town meetings and juries on Sir Frances

Bernard who "unluckily came to town" at that time with plans for them. Pownall told Hutchinson that he had not favored altering the constitution, even the Council* since he believed that if the Governor would exert himself in using his negative he might get a good Council under the estab­ lished method. "Lord Mansfield," however, "pushed the matter and upbraided [the cabinet for] their late irresolution,"^ which resulted in passage of the Government Act. A letter from George III to North tends to support Pownall’s version as he says "the more I reflect on Lord Mansfield's opinion .. concerning the altering of the Charter; the more I am confirmed in the propriety (of In any event, the unit rule prevailed in the cabinet and though Dartmouth was outvoted on part of the Bill he was called upon to defend it in Parliament, where it received more opposition than had the Port Bill, but was in no danger of not passing.

Dartmouth was also anxious to bring to justice the particular individuals who had so flagrantly insulted the mother country. When the cabinet met on February 88

Dartmouth asked the legal officers; MD>o) these acts amount

to the crime of high treason? If so who Care! the persons

chargeable and how should they be p r o s e c u t e d ? The reply to the first question, gives on February IX was ”y««w* "Aa attempt, concerted with much deliberation and made with opes

force . . . to obstruct the execution of an Act of Parliament

imposing a duty on tea and to put a general restraint upon

the exercise of lawful trade” was treasonous, amounting to on “the levying of war against his Majesty.'' The further

conclusion was that the accused could be tried either in

America or in England, based on an old statute dating back

to the days of Henry Till. Since this answer was affirmative,

Dartmouth was anxious to ensure punishment of the guilty

because of his over-optimistic belief that their adherents were small in number and that punishment would set an exam­

ple. Besides they deserved punishment* His feelings were

well displayed in a conversation with Hutchinson* According

to the Governor, he "spake with great ©motion; that he was

hot one who thirsted for blood; but he could not help saying

that he wished to see H______K and A______jae brought to

the punishment they deserved: and he feared peace would not

be restored until some examples were made, which would deter

jj| A the others.*1 By the end of February it was decided that

there was not enough evidence to bring specific charges and hi the idea of Crown prosecution was dropped* While Dartmouth was anxious for the radicals to be

brought to justice, he did not support their being transported

to England for trial. He had opposed such a measure in 1772

when it was considered in connection with the Gaspee incident

because he believed "it legal for the person to take his k2 trial in the country where the offence was committed."

Hie position had not changed, in spite of the fact that

everyone in England realized that conviction would have been

impossible in Massachusetts. If the conviction of rebel

leaders was not possible, it was also apparent that crown

officers engaged to suppress defiance of Parliament's laws

might be brought to trial "before persons who do not ac- .>3 knowledge the validity of those laws. Their conviction

would be certain. The fear arising from this logic was that

the King's servants would be less than zealous in performing

their duties, which in the case of Massachusetts Bay might

prove disastrous. The solution, ae in the other instance

of a partial jury, was to bring such an offender to England

where he would be assured of a "fair trial." Dartmouth

could not support such a step in this case any more than he

could have when the accused were persons he very much wanted

to see convicted; but he was aware of the difficulty and

suggested "that offenders of that particular province should A3 be amenable to the Courts of Justice of Nova Scotia." The

Administration of Justice Act, drawn to protect those enforcing

the law in Massachusetts, was henceforth broadened to provide 90 for trial either in England or another colony, and Dartmouth, having effected what was for him a significant change, supported it.

The Quartering Act, despicable as it seemed to the

Americans, was only the natural result of the others as far as the ministry was concerned. Parliament had decreed that the laws would be enforced; it must send officers of the

Crown to enforce them and these must be housed. If the colony did not provide quarters, then the commander*-in­ chief could billet his troops in such empty houses, barns and outhouses as he thought necessary. Dartmouth could not have objected to this since he now felt that soldiers were, needed to keep order. The practice was essentially the same as that long employed in England itself.

The colonists included a fifth act, The Quebec Act, as part of this group they labelled "intolerable". This law is now generally regarded as a most enlightened act of statesmanship, carefully designed to meet the needs of non-English subjects. But in an atmosphere clouded by

Parliament's alteration of the Massachusetts Charter, it seemed in America to be part of a gradual plot to subvert liberties and establish tyranny. The Act legalized hated

Homan Catholicism, discontinued English law and land-holding practices in favor of French, and denied to Quebec the elected assembly promised at the end of the Seven Years War. Even a moderate like Joseph Reed could not place this act in its 91 perspective, for he wrote the Secretary:

The idea of bringing down the Canadians and savages upon the English colonies, is so inconsistent not only with mercy, but the justice and humanity of the mother country, that I cannot allow myself to think that your.Lordship would promote the {Quebec Bill.^j ^

The ministry, however, especially Dartmouth, knowing the purity of their own motives, was never able to fully com­ prehend the American reaction.

Considerable criticism has been heaped upon Dartmouth for his role in these proceedings. How could a "friend of America" take part in them with honor? The answer to this question should already be clear. Dartmouth believed in the supremacy of Parliament; he was horrified at the defiance of the law that had been exhibited by, as he thought, a small group of radicals; he was determined to vindicate the authority of the mother country. Although he supported a policy of coercion, he was still attached to his former plan of letting tempers cool, and he did not want to proceed beyond the necessary vindication to inflame the colonists further. He still hoped for an eventual repeal of the Tea Act. But when the general rancour of

British reaction drove his colleagues to harsher measures, he had no choice but to acquiesce in the decision of the

Cabinet. He could neither protest the policy aloud nor resign, since it would weaken his step-brother *s ministerial 92

position in a time of crisis. Certainly too he must have

felt that he had some leeway in putting the laws into effect.

For example, in spite of the fact that troops and a military

governor were sent, he Instructed Gage to

use every endeavor to quiet the minds of the people, to remove their preju­ dices, and by mild and gentle persua­ sion, to induce submission on their part . . . 4-5

As Bargar points out, a Hillsborough or a Germain would have

given a different spirit to coercion.

ROOM FOR HOPS

Gage left England in April with his instructions and

news of the Boston Port Bill, which was to take effect

June 1. Thus it was the middle of May before the colonies

received definite word of the ministry's action and well

into summer before they learned of the other "Intolerable

Acts", the Massachusetts Government Act, the Administration

of Justice Aet£ the Quartering Act, and the Quebec Act.

No one in England, Including, as has been seen, Dartmouth

and Gage, thought that these acts would have the desired

effects on the colonists immediately. So the familiar delay

of trans-Atlantic communication and the expected time of

adjustment to Parliament's firm intentions, combined to keep Dartmouth suspended in an agony of vain hope for the

summer and fall of 1774. 93

Optimism reigned at first. Writing to Gage in reply

to a letter of May 19, Dartmouth exulted:

The state in which you found things . . was better than I expected, and from what has passed since, . . . there is room to hope . . . that the tranquillity of the Province, and the authority of the Government in it, will speedily be restored . . . ^

As time wore on there was less and less "room to hope", but

Dartmouth, true to his nature, would not give up. In August

he wrote privately to Gage from Blackheath expressing con- kS fidence in his ability to restore peace. His feelings

at this time were further reflected in a letter that was

probably drafted by Pownall:

It is evident from the dispatches I had the satisfaction to receive from you . . that although the measures adopted res­ pecting the Province of Massachusetts Bay had not yet had, and will not perhaps for some time have their complete effect, yet that they have so far succeeded as to encourage many good men to stand forth in opposition to those who are wickedly, but, I trust, vainly, endeavouring to urge the people to violent . . . resolutions. 9

At this time there was still no expectation that the other

colonies would come to Boston's aid; when Boston realized

that no assistance would be forthcoming, the letter insisted,

"the hour of distress must soon come that will, I hope,

awaken the people to a right sense of their situation . . .

It is much to be lamented that . . . Boston . . . (could-)

still . . . believe that the measures they . * . adopt are likely to attain the . . . union with this count' 47 profess to desire." Wo redress would be possible obedience first.

During this period of waiting, great hopes were placed on the Congress, and Hutchinson wrote in his Diary that

Dartmouth had told him nothing would be done until news of 50 what had transpired there arrived. Apparently there were no great fears of the results of this convention in spite of its extra-legal origin. Worth told Hutchinson in early

August that he had heard that the orders of merchants had been large and he felt on this account that non-importation 51 agreements were unlikely. Most optimistic was William Knox who believed that Congress would consider some plan for a central government and find it so impracticable that they would accede gladly to the supreme controlling power of

Parliament, for defense against enemies and to prevent 52 quarrels amongst themselves. As for Dartmouth, he expressed

"great concern" at the method since grievances would have a more potent effect coming from the individual colonies, but he still "wishCed) that the result of their proceedings may be such as not to cut off all hope of that union which is so essential to the happiness of both." 5 3

Disillusionment came gradually. Bull wrote as early as July that far from having any "happy effect towards composing disturbances", the Acts of Parliament had "nised a universal spirit of jealousy against Great Britain, and 9 vn

5^ of unanimity towards each other.” Other governors were

telling a like tale; by September Gage was forced to write

that "the flames of sedition have spread universally through­

out the country." The only remedy he could suggest was "to

secure the friends of government in Boston, and to reinforce

the troops here with as many more as could possibly be 55 collected." Hutchinson found Dartmouth beginning to des- 56 pair. The Secretary wrote disconsolately to Gage that

while he "had entertained hopes” that the "popular phrenay"

would subside, it now appeared that:

notwithstanding the assistance of so large a military force sent purposely to support the authority of civil government! they still have it in their power to trample upon it with impunity and to bid defiance to all controul. £sic)" 57 Even with the writing so plainly on the wall, Dartmouth could conclude his letter with "X cannot but persuade myself

that even in the Hew England governments . . . there are many friends of the constitution who would stand forth, 57 under the protection of Government.”

Embarrassingly, it was not possible to protect them.

Ho troops could be spared from present forces or raised anew before winter. The Cabinet decided to send three ships 5 8 of the line and Dartmouth impractically inquired of Gage if it was possible to disarm the people of Massachusetts Bay, 59 Bhode Island and Connecticut. Gage could not keep order and yet the Secretary asks him to effect disarmament,* 9 6

Hiteheson says that the Cabinet had decided to postpone 6Q mobilization, to continue attempts to isolate Massachusetts*

We can only suppose that distance is partly responsible for this lack of realism on the part of Dartmouth and the ministry.

English opinion on the colonies had begun to harden.

Hutchinson had recorded in mid-October that Dartmouth*e earlier hopes for a repeal of the tea duty had faded. "*This could not be,* he said, * they would not believe the kingdom 61 was in earnest.1*’ What was the essence, the vital point of the dispute for the colonists, could not be given up.

Even as liberal a plan as that advanced by former Governor

Thomas Povnall, for a Congress of Deputies to be chosen by the American Assemblies with a Crown Moderator, did not envision the giving up of Parliamentary supremacy. As

Dartmouth himself put it "‘Parliament can do nothing which will do so much as carry any appearance of conceding to such 62 a claim.1" The King wrote Worth in September that while he had"no objection” to seeing that no "feeh taxes” were laid on the Americans, he was clear "there must always be /* Q one tax to keep up the right."

Worse news was yet to come: at the end of October word arrived that the Congress had adopted the Suffolk Hesolves urged by the Boston delegation. These resolves proclaimed home rule for the colonies, excepting only that "we cheerfully consent to the operation of such Acts of the

British Parliament, as (regulate) our external commerce

for the purpose of securing . . . commercial advantages 6^ (for) the whole empire.” They further stipulated the

Inviolability of their Charters, trial by their peers, and

right of assembly* the unconstitutional!ty of appointed

Councils, and ended by proclaiming that all acts adopted

since 1763, demonstrating “a system formed to enslave (Aljt America, must be repealed. In order to force Britain

into such repeal, the Congress voted "An Association"

providing non*importation, non*consumption and non**exporta­

tion, of British goods.

Dartmouth was "thunder struck" at the news and queried

Hutchinson anxiously as to whether the newspaper accounts

could be relied on. When the governor assured him they

were likely genuine the Secretary could only regret that it 65 65 was now impossible to give way. Both Pownall and Knox were similarly afffected, the latter "much altered" after his earlier optimism and told Hutchinson that "all treaty

is over . . . the first thing will be to let America know,

that Britain will support its authority and then concede what 66 shall be thought fit.” Barth was similarly disposed

saying that "it was no purpose any longer to think of expedients: the Province was in actual rebellion, and must be subdued . . , the Acts must and should be carried Into 6 7 execution,” He further informed Hutchinson: "I will 98 venture to tell you that Parliament was dissolved on this account-*that we might, at the beginning of a Parliament take such measures as we could depend upon a Parliament to 67 prosecute to effect.** The King may have influenced the darkness of Horth*s mood in this conversation with the gover­ nor, for George III had written his minister the night before that:

I am not sorry that the line of conduct seems now chalked out , . . . The Hew England governments are in a state of rebellion, blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or Independent. ^

Along with the Resolves and the Association, Congress had designed a Petition to the King praying for redress of their grievances. It is indicative of how far the

Americans had come towards a federal concept of empire that they desired Franklin, and several other agents and friends of America, to present it directly to the King, hoping for his intercession in their battle with Parliament. Franklin wrote Charles Thomson, Secretary of the Congress, that he had instead, decided to present it to Dartmouth "that being 69 the regular official method.”

Unfortunately the petition was not delivered until almost two months after news of Congress's other actions had arrived and obviously with the disposition of British officialdom already soured by those actions, the petition was destined for an unfavourable reception. Its first 99

difficulty, however, came from the 1 friends * Congress

had designated to submit it to the throne. Of the six

named, three, among them Edmund Burke, "declined being

concerned with itand another was out of town. Paul

Wentworth gave, as his reason to Pownall, that the petition

was "an assertion of all their claims in a very high tone TO and with very offensive expressions*” 1 Eventually,

Franklin, Lee and Bollan, immoderates in British eyes,

took it to Dartmouth. Diplomatic as always, and still

anxious not to shut the door on discussions that might bear T1 fruit, he called it a "decent and proper petition," ' and 69 promised, after looking at if himself, to deliver it to

George III. We can only assume that the Secretary caused

this added delay in order to be assured that it was not

so intemperate as to further alienate an already embittered

sovereign* Ironically, for the colonists, the King then

laid it before Parliament on the nineteenth of January, with

all of the other papers on America.

11 was Congress1s total action rather than the petition

itself which caused it to be eventually ignored by the

legislature. As Hutchinson wrote, in spite of its "decent and respectful language," it could not be approved because

"all the proceedings of Congress, from which the address 72 cannot be separated, are utterly inadmiesable. At his

Levee on December twenty-second North had told the governor; 100

"'They did not deny the right.*" But, Hutchinson replied,

"'They . . . accompany it with papers, which deny the right.1”

After further discussion on the composition and merits of the petition Hutchinson wrote:

I could plainly perceive that it would have been very agreeable to him to have found something in D O that would lead to an accomodation, and if if had not been for the extravagance of the Resolves, Association and Addresses passed by this convention, notwithstanding the illegality of their assembling, which would have been winked at, the Petition would have been attended to."73

Dartmouth echoed this attitude in a letter to an unknown addre ssee;

, . . The people of America have never taken one step that has the least appearance of a tendency towards reconciliation and accomodation: had the proceedings of the Congress, illegal as that assembly is, carried with them any disposition of this sort, I can have no doubt that government would have been ready to give all due encouragement to such disposition."7^

Without such disposition there was little the government could do.

In spite of growing disgust at America and the seating of a new Parliament, the ministry was slow to take action.

Amidst despatches from Gage warning that "civil government is near its end" and letters from New York demonstrating th&t even that colony wherein loyalty was anticipated as nowhere else, was on the verge "conspiring" with her sisters against 7h Parliamentary claims, the cabinet's only action was to IPX query the Attorney and Solicitor General on whether treason and rebellion were being perpetrated, and if so, to draft a proclamation calling on the guilty to surrender or 75 be treated as traitors* A circular letter was sent in mid-December notifying the governors of his Majesty’s

’’resolution" to withstand every attempt to weaken "the authority of the f^upreme legislature over all his Majesty’s dominions," and Parliament’s approbation thereof in order to remove those false impressions which have been made * . * and put an end to these expectations of support of their unwarrantable pretentions, which have been held forth by artful and designing men. !fhere was, as so much faith had been placed in his mission, a growing dissatisfaction with Gage for his "inactivity and irresolution" because things had not gone well.^ Any definitive action was postponed until after Christmas when the outcome of the petition would be clear, although no one questioned the need for some definitive action. As Dartmouth explained to

Hutchinson on one occasion when he asked the governor’s advices

fhere was no doubt that every one who had signed the Association, was guilty of treason, and if he was to be direc­ ted by the resentment natural upon the first news of such an insult, the most vigorous measures would immediately be pursued In order to punishment, {j3ie3 but it was an affair to be well considered, and deliberated upon. 80 102

Perhaps part of the Secretary*a decision to deliberate at length ataft&ed from a desire to give time for other at tamp t a at peace to show resalts* CSAPT8B IV FOOTHOTES

1 Franklin to Cushlag, May 6 , 1773* Smyth, Writings* VI, 48-53* 2 Typically, la view of the inefficiency of the handling of government problems and the lack of effective supervision of colonial affairs, Dartmouth was not informed that the Fast India Co. had shipped the tea* Pownall was embarrassed not to learn of it until after the first news of American discontent began arriving in England, and wrote to the company secretary to inquire, but probably never mailed the letter. Since Dartmouth was unprepared, naturally he was unable to inform and instruct the governors. Benjamin labaree, ffhe Boston tPea Party,(Hew York, 196k), 170-171$ and Knox Manuscripts, 259. 3 'Dartmouth to Heed (not dated* by reference in Reed's reply of September 25, 1774, it can be dated July 11, 177*0 Reed, life* 72-4. 4 Feb. 12, 1774, Dartmouth Manuscripts* II, 197* 5 'Jan. 23, 1774, ibid., 191. 6 Jan, 4, 1774, C. 0. 5/765, P. R. 0. Microfilm. tv Hutchinson to Dartmouth, Jan. 5, 1774, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 347, and same to same, Feb, 17, 1774, ibid,, 348'.'' ' 8 June 3> 1774, Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Cage* II, 163 ff. 9 Dndated, C. 0. 5/947* From internal evidence, early 1774. 10 ”Mr. Jenkinson says the ministry delayed over vigorous measures » . * and would have continued to do so if not for Dr. Franklin's extraordinary letter published relative to Hutchinson's letters." Hutchinson, Diary, July 7* 1774, I, 185.

103 roomorag

n Mar. 5, I?7*, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 8*9, as quoted In Dabaree, Tea. Party, X7 8. 12 Hutchinson, Diary» I, 181* 1 q Dartmouth to Hutchinson, April 9# 177*, Dartmouth Manuscripts 887# -quoted la Bargar, Dord Dartmouth, 9 2, 1* Mar, 23, 177** Smyth, Writings, VI, 2 2 3.

15 , Feb. *, 177*, Dobree, tattara of George III. 99*

l6 Feb. 3, 177*i C. 0. 5/765 2* K. 0, Microfilm. The same message uae sent to the governors. See Dartmouth to Ball, Feb, 5# 177*, C* 0. 5/369, P. B. 0, Microfilm, 17 The minutea of these meetings are calendared In Dartmouth Manuscripts# XX, 192*2 0 8, 18 Dartmouth Manuscripts II, 817, as quoted In Babaree, Tea Party. 10 Cabinet Minute, Feb, *, 177*, Dartmouth.Manuscripts, XX, 1 9 5* 20 Cabinet Minute, Feb, 5, 177*, ibid., 195-6, 21 Cabinet Minute, Feb, 19, 177*, ibid.. 1 9 8, 22 Dord Worth to King, Mar. 23, 177*, Fortescue, Correspondence of Oeerge III, III, 8&*3« 23Tea Party. 180. 2* Ibid., 184.

25Feb. 2, 1774* Smyth, Writlags. VI, 178-9. 26 * . Dartmouth Manuscripts« II, 2*6-7. 27 Tea Party, 175* Bargar makes no apparent distkrtion be tv* en' ’t*e idea of closing the port and the suggestion that FarIlament close the port. See Chapter XII "Securing Colonial1'"'Dependence, 11 especially 111. 28 Franklin to Cashing, May 6 , 1773, Smyth, Writings. VI, *8-52. W Q Q T m T E S XQ3

^Hutchinson to Cage, July %, 177%, Hutchinson, Diary,. X* U3-6. See* also* Dartmouth to Reed, July 11, 1?7%, Reed, t*H®» 72-%* *lt you suppose, as some have done, that the design of the Boston fort Bill is to obtain an express declare* tioa and the acknowledgment of that right you are very much mistaken# X see no such thing in the Act* It requires indeed a submission to the provisions of it* and if the sub* mission he duly paid things will return into their ancient channel *****

^Dartmouth to Hutchinson, Bar, 9, m b , C. 0. 5/765 F. R. 0. Microfilm. 31 ’’Proceedings in Relation to the American Colonies, 11 X77%**1775, William Knox, Knox Manuscripts* 257, and Bsbaree* fee forty* 19% * .32 Hutchinson to Dartmouth, fob*, 177%, Diary, X, 112# 11%* 33 April f, 177%, C* 0* 5/765, f* R. 0* Microfilm* 3% , King to Horth, Mar* 1%, 177%, Bohroe, letters * 100*

^ ’’Proceedings in Relation to the American Colonies,' 177%*1T75?# Knox Manuscripts, 257* 36July 5, 17?*, Plary. I, I8 3. 37Aj>ril 1%, m b , Forteecue, Correspondence of George •XXe # fX g *XXX e f £ aP'2 a e

*^C* 0. 5/I60 ff* %0*%2, P. S# 0* as quoted in labaree, _ 17%* 39 Ibid#, %0 Hutchinson, Diary, 1, 203* %1 babtre®, fee Party* 176* %2 Xeppel to Rockingham, Sept#* 1772, ffhomes Kcpple* life of Augustus. Viscount Keppa 11 (bondon,*TS%li7, 1, %S§, as quoted in Bargar, lord Dartmouth, 78* %3 "7he Administration of Justice Act**, 20 May, 177%, JSagliah Historical Bo-cuaetits* Vol* IX, American Colonial ed. (lev fork, 19557,'",n78%. FOOTNOTES

In a lettar to Berth the King wrote "I have seen Lord Dartmouth this day very firm as to the alteration of the Comae11 of Massachusetts Bay, but averse to the Bill for trying future offenders in Britain, wanting,' in lieu of that, that the offenders of that particular previne© should be amenable to the Courts of luetic© of Bova Beotia, and particularly anxious that the present offenders should be somehow or other punished and much takea with a proposition ©f Lord Bucfciahamsbir© to disable them at least by Act of Parliament from holding any office in the Province, or being members of the Assembly*" Mar* 1%, 177%, Fortescue, Corresuondenc© of George III,- III, do*Si* Dartmouth then, e:v©u”"thougli1"'tluT"Sabfn«t' kadabanConed the idea of punish* meat of individuals at the end of February, was still thtubing of it and wanting Parliament to do it, two weeks later* This last Idea must have been dropped for the same reason as that of triale**the impossibility of proving charges* Dartmouth was enough of a realist to understand that if the government attempted to enforce a decree and proved unequal to the task, the result would be a decrease in its dignity rather than an increase. 6e.pt* 25, 177%, Reed, Life, 76-9*

k5April 9, 1774, C. 0. 5/765 P. R. 0. Microfilm. %6 Bar gar, Lord Dartmouth*. 166*

.duly 6, 177%, Garter, The Correspondence of Thomas Gage. IX, 168-9. 48 Aug. 23, 1774, ibid., 171. 49 . Aug. 3, 177%, ibid.. 170-171.

5°Aug. 31, 1774, ibid.. 233- 51 Aug. 11, 1774, Hutchinson, Diary. I, 211-12. 52 In a conversation with Hutchinson, Diary. I, 267. 53 To Governor Penn, Sept., 7, 1774, Reed, Life. 8 0 . 5% duly 31, 177%, G* 0. 5/396 F* R* 0, Microfilm* 55 iept. 2, 177%, Dartmouth Manuscripts« I, 361. 56 To Thomas Foster, Oct* 10, 177%, 262* 57 Oct* 17, 177%, Carter, Correspond©ace of Thomas Page» II, 173*5* FOOTNOTES 107

58 Hutchinson, Diary. I, 259, Oct. 10, 1T71*. 59 Oct, 17, ITT1** Carter* Correspondence of Thomas Gage* II, 173-75• Cn Oct. 10* a Circular vent out to all Governors ordering the® to arrest and secure gunpowder and arms, C. 0, 5/2%2 p. JR. 0. Microfilm. 60 Carter* Correspondence of Thomas Gage, II* 171* There was disagreement within the Cabinet over what steps should he taken on other grounds. Sandwich and Barrington were more concerned at the threat of France than Massachusetts andBarrington expressed doubt that the Bay colony could he conquered. Since it is likely that Dartmouth would also have been unhappy at employing more force* he probably supported their position, 61 Oct, 19* ITT1** Diary, X* 62 29* ITT1** Diary, X* 251* 63 Fortescue* Correspondence of George III, III* 131* 6 k S, I, Mori eon* ed.* Sources and Documents illustrating the American Revolution, 1?61**»1T&& TOkford, 1923) > 119*2 1 ,

Bov, 1 * 1TT%* Diary, I* 273- 66 Oct, 31* ITT1** ibid. *

Bov. 19* ITT1!-* Ibid,, 296. 68 * Bov. 18* ITT1!-* to Borth, Bobree* Letters of George III, I0 5 .

^Feb. 5* ITT5* Smyth* Writings, VI* 3Q3-7* TO Pownall to ?.(probably Dartmouth)* Dec, 20* 177k, Dartmouth Manuscripts, I* 372, 71 Cornelia Meigs* The Violent Men, A Study of Human Relations in The First Continental Congress (New York, 191+9)J ¥ T In a letter to Reed* DeBerdt gives him credit for this "gracious reception"! Reed had written Dartmouth warning him of the ill-effects of cutting off hopes of peaceful redress: when "all those deliberate measures of petitioning previous to opposition* were laid aside as inadequate" there was no other recourse than the illegality of Congress and eventually "war itself11. Reed to Dartmouth* Sept. 25* ITT1** P00TH0TES 108

MM* Burgar finds the reception surprising (lord Dartmouth, 147) because ha compares it to the Secretary * s "ofiieiaX^correepondence which reflected the view of the Cabinet and the phraseology of Pewhall rather than Dartmouth's private hopes* He then ("»( l48) ascribes it to the Secretary’s natural civility* but I believe there was an added dimension as noted in the text,

72Dec. 29, 1774, Diary. I, 336*7. 73 Dec. 22, 1774, ibid., 330. 7k Dee* 80* 1774* Hew Fork Public library* Miscalla* aeons Manuscripts* Dartmouth* from the files of Ira Oruber* Dartmouth still hoped that Hew York’s resistance to colonial radicalism, might produce some "happy effects*" 73 Excerpts of letters* dune 26* Oct* IT* 171k* Cage to Dartmouth* Dartmouth Maanscripta» II* 229* 76 Tom Smith to Tryon* lev. 25* 1774, ibid.* 255* «r«jr Cabinet Minute* Dec* 1* 1774* Dartmouth Manuscripts« I* 3T1* ?8 Dartmouth to the Governor** Dec* 10* 1774* C* 0. 5/242 P. R. 0. Microfilm*

^doha Fowaall to Dartmouth* Dec* 18* 1774, Dartmouth Manuscripts., II* 240, Hllliam Knox to Dartmouth* Hov. 15* ’'iblid* * fli* and "Proceedings in relation to the American Colonies}11 Knox Manuscripts * 257* 8o Dec * 14* 17?4* Diary, I* 324* CHAPTER 7

COERCION AID COHClIIATIQI

SEARCHING FOR COMMOH GEOUHB

When the neve of the summer of 1 7 ? 4 and finally the action.# of Congress- demonstrated that the colonies were united and that the coercive acts had failed to make them obey Parliamentary laws, Dartmouth saw the need of alter** lag the stance of mother country to colony. He did not desert his earlier belief that the colonies deserved tome punishment and must he brought* by "inconveniences" to 1 obey Parliament, but he realised that since the steps taken to bring this about had not succeeded, something else must be done# lie- approach in the winter of 1?75 was twofold? to remind the colonies publicly that the mother country was determined to maintain its authority, while nevertheless demonstrating its benevolence and good intention®! and to seek in person or privately to come to an understanding with

American leaders# Unfortunately, each party to the dispute had now reached an extremespo sit ion from which they could not compromise* Dartmouth, as a moderate, was caught in the middle and blamed by both sides*

109 110

While Congress and Parliament made their demands public,

Dartmouth was enough of a diplomat to know that some of them

had to be negotiated in private. He still believed that union "upon some general constitutional plan is certainly very just" and, he wrote to Lt. Governor Golden of Hew York,

"I have no doubt of its being yet attainable through some 2 channel of mutual consideration and discussion."

Early in the fall Dartmouth had supported an idea of

Pownall's for a royal commission to go from England to treat with the colonials, or in Pownall’s words "to enquire into the causes of the disorders and discontent existing at pre- „3 sent in America. Both sides must give way to settle a dispute he knew; as Knox wrote later:

However determined we all were that the colonies should obey the sovereign authority of Parliament, we all thought taxation ought to be given up in practice, and that the colonies should be invited to make some proposition for the equivalent. I went further, and thought there were many unjust as well as impolitic restraints on the foreign commerce of the colonies and Ireland. 4

This commission would facilitate negotiations by appointing three representatives of the King "to meet deputies from the 4 colonies, to discuss and settle all claims." Quite properly, for Pownall and his colleagues, Parliament was to confirm What had been agreed upon, providing of course, that it was approved by the legislature. The idea was tentatively accepted by the Cabinet on the condition that the charge to Ill the commissioners was satisfactory to them. Knox complains that Povnall then spoiled his own idea by maneuvering to become part of the Commission) when he found he would not be going to America as one of its members, he altered the format to provide one high commissioner to whom he would be secretary. This single commissioner, again according to

Knox, then had too much authority and dignity to suit the

Cabinet who feared it would seem too much like an American

Parliament and rejected the whole idea. While both Mansfield and Dartmouth still favored it, the King, Bedford and Suffolk did not, so for political reasons, the Prime Minister 5 dropped it.

But "Dartmouth still insisted that something should be If- held out to the colonies" and since this "ehannel of mutual consideration and discussion” had not worked out he began exploring another in the form of a series of private meetings between his personal physician, Dr. Fothergill, David Barclay, and Benjamin Franklin. For diplomacy's sake, the meetings were shrouded in secrecy and it is not now apparent how they 3 were initiated. Fothergill, a widely respected Quaker and a ”Whig of decided opinions,” with "close ties and sympathies with the American colonists, had been acquainted with

Franklin for a number of years. Sharing intellectual interests, they had corresponded on electricity before meeting, and had 5 become good friends when Franklin went to England in 1757* 112

Fothergill was seeing Dartmouth daily In a medical capacity and it is not unlikely that his anxiety over the current state of affairs compelled him to offer his services as an intermediary, Peeking to find some ground on which the two 6 sides could meet. David Barclay, a friend of Fothergill's, was similarly close to Lord Hyde, a minor member of the administration similarly disposed to conciliation, and together they approached Franklin. Later a further negotia­ tion, this one between Admiral Lord Howe and Franklin took place in which Howe broached the idea of the Commission to

Franklin. Franklin agreed to this, but his terms to Howe were not really any different than those he had held out to

Fothergill and Barclay.

An intermediary was necessary at this point, for while

Dartmouth and the colonial agent had had several frank dis­ cussions in 1773> Dartmouth and other members of the adminis­ tration had lost faith in him in the wake of the Whately 7 letters episode. Moreover, Franklin had been badly singed by Wedderburn's personal attack on him during the Privy

Council hearing on the matter. The American and the American 8 Secretary had not seen each other since, although Franklin was frequently in company with English radicals such as Mrs.

MacCauley and the Bishop of St. Asaph, and members of the

Opposition. This was unfortunate because the breach in their thinking had widened, especially in so far as Franklin was concerned. 1X3

In any event Franklin gave Barclay and Fothergill some

"Hints for a conversation upon the subject of terms that

may probably p r o d u c e a durable Union between Great Britain

and her CoXouie*,* which was then passed on to Hyde and 9 Dartmouth* Both read it, for there are notes on the manuscript 10 11 in both hands* It is probable that North saw it as well*

Dartmouth had expected to give some Inducement towards

conciliation, but Franklinf© proposals were far-reaching

and the concessions that the ministry was prepared to make

were entirely unacceptable to the American* He felt the 12 Hints" had been rejected "in spirit if not in form," and

he was probably correct. For although the mercantile theory

received its ©hare of colonial wrath, the main disagreement

arose over the constitutional issue©* Included in Franklin’s

demand© were: no taxation, no troops without consent of

the assembly, legislative control of the salaries of crown

officials, revocation of the law whereby person© accused of

treason might be transported to England for trial, and

reenactment by the colonial legislature© of the acts of trade

and navigation and the act for establishing the Admiralty

Courts* This, for all practical purposes, amounted to home 1*3 rule* The qualifications imposed on these demand© by the

ministers clearly demonstrated that they were not willing to

make such a concession* Their conception of the Empire

necessitated a sovereign Parliament* \ Agreement was further complicated hy the fact that,

gave Chatham, no one in England, including Dartmouth, could

think of repealing the Coercive Acta, which had been designed

to secure this essential submission to Parliamentary laws

from the colonists* But, Fothergill wrote Dartmouth, "as

a concession to pay a tax was the sine qua non on this side,

so a rescinding of those Acts, or rather repealing them, is 1 it the term of reconciliation on the other#"* He continued

that if the offensive acts were repealed "we have not the

least doubt but America would Immediately return to every 15 Just expression of duty both in language and conduct#* /

In view of the history of the last decade, Dartmouth and the

rest of the ministry must have doubted this and their doubt

certainly colored their reception of the last plan Barclay’s

optimism conceiveds the agents would petition for repeal,

promising to pay for the tea, and the acts would be suspended while commissioners went to America (Howe and Hyde were % 1 6 considered) in lieu of more troops. Franklin accepted this and Fothergill carried the plan to Dartmouth who regretfully

rejected it. Dartmouth was willing to repeal only one of

the Coercive Acts, the Boston Port Bill. Restitution for the

n It tea (upon which Franklin staked his personal fortune)

justified suspension of the Port Bill, for It signified obe­

dience to Parliament, but the other Acts had been for the purposes of reformation and in the case of the Quebec Act, 115 seemed to Dartmouth to hear no relation to "the present contest.Here the fear of Parliament’s intentions and power on the part of America, so Incomprehensible to the American Secretary, becomes significant, Franklin would not settle for less than total repeal for ”while Parliament claimed and exercised a power of altering our constitutions X8 at pleasure,” he wrote, Hhere could he no agreement,” fbUB this attempt at negotiation failed also, and, at this point it must be apparent that negotiation was really no longer possible.

Fothergill, in his letter to Dartmouth had lamented!

Was the whole of Administration as cordially disposed to peace and sensible of its advantages as Lord Dartmouth, I think there would be very little difficulty in accomplishing It, But X see and perceive so strong a current another way, that I despair , . , 15

Fothergill was correct in his assessment of Dartmouth’s concern and certainly other members of the Cabinet were unwilling to temporize with America at all* But for

Dartmouth, as for them, the essence of the dispute could not be given up without disaster* He was discouraged that the talks had produced no results, and exasperatedly asked

Hutchinson if he thought any proposals could be made to satisfy the Americans* In January DeBerdt had written Heed of Dartmouth’s assurance to him "that if the Americans expect that Great Britain will grant all their requisitions, as contained in the petition of Congress, an accomodation will 116

20 neyer take place*w Ae the Secretary had himself written his American correspondentt "You observe that if neither

Parliament nor America will recede, the most dreadful cause-* quencee will ensue* If that were the ease, can any reasonable man have a doubt which of them should recede, or ■ HI at whose door the guilt of those consequences would lie? * ■

So Dartmouth, while unwilling to end the hope of a channel for conciliation, (for example, he continued to solicit letters from Heed after Heed stopped writing in February,

v 22 17T5), ' was likewise unwilling to pay the great price the

Americans demanded for union*

His pragmatlam and over-optimism in seeking conciliation, as well as his differences with other members of the

Cabinet, are demonstrated in his response to Chatham1a

^provisional act for settling the troubles in America and asserting the supreme legislative authority and superintending power of Groat Britain over the colonies*Yhls omnibus included the repeal of all the Coercive Acts and the Quebec

Act, as well as recognising the Congress and making other concessions to colonial home rule, but uaequivocably stated the supremacy of parliament* After Its introduction in the

House of lords, Dartmouth asked for time to consider it and suggested it lie on the table* When he sat down, Sandwich, one of the hostile Bedfords, denounced the Bill in the strongest language, followed by Gower, Hillsborough and even Grafton* fhesa members of the administration urged that the colonies 11? were already in rebellion and must be subdued. When one of the opposition, speaking for the bill, commended Dartmouth for his "candid proposal" in giving time for consideration,

Dartmouth, realising that the bill could never pass and that he -would be taking sides against his fellow ministers in 2b public with nothing to be gained, reversed his position.

Rising, he said that "after hearing so many noble lords speak against permitting the bill to lie on the table," he had changed his mind* Typically, he declined the praise offered *« 1.2 k for his candor, since he would now vote to reject the bill*

As Bargar points out, "the real question was whetherto reject the bill now or later , for he knew it could never be approved, and it suited his purpose in hoping to find an accomodation that could be approved, not to alienate the rest of the Cabinet* Politics, after all, is the art of the possible.

TEE HOD AID TEE BRAICH

While Dartmouth had been concerning himself with seeking some channel of communication, through which he might dis­ cover a common ground with the Americans, others in the ministry had been concerned with how to enforce the actions

Britain had already taken. Gage was criticized for his

"inactivity” and because he reconmienaea repeal of the Coercive 2g Acts. Pownall had proposed sending Sir Jeffrey Amherst and two major generals to America# early la the fall and this vac considered la apita of reservations from both the

King and Dartmouth that It was harsh to Gage* Amherst*a

.2-6 refusal Jettisoned the plan*' '' Modest steps toward military reinforcement had been taken but no general plan was formed# probably because of a lack of neve from Gage and hope for a sign of reconciliation from the First Continental Congress*

Hutchinson commented many times on the lack of direction and 27 inertia in Aster team affairs# and at least one minister blamed it on Dartmoutht "What surprises me#" Rockford wrote to Sandwich# "is that lord Dartmouth does not come with some plan t© the Cabinet * * * X haw* been free ©nought to pg tell him to do it*”;

Dartmouth had a plan# but its preemption of force for communication and conciliation did not make it popular with the rest of the administration* late in 1TT& Horth had written his step-brother that he thought it right for

Dartmouth to bring "the whole of (your) measures soon before the Cabinet* where he would "consider (your) reasons go dispassionately* * Exactly what these measures were is not mentioned# but they probably included Fowaall#s commission idee* Apparently Berth already had reservations about them for he then remarks on his "wish to see some measure adopted which may prevent the bad effects which the too great appear* 29 ance of lenity and concession may produce." ^ Hot 1X9 surprisingly the Cabinet failed to adopt Dartmouth * s suggestion and in view of his hopes for the unofficial talks going on with Franklin, it is doubtful that he was willing to put forward detailed military plans in its wake.

He did attempt to give effect to his new faith in the idea of a firm hand and a velvet glove, however. When the new Parliament met Pownall and Knox wrote the American clause 30 in the King’s speech. It declared that a rebellion was In progress in Massachusetts Bay, and assured Parliament that

You may depend upon my firm and steadfast resolution to withstand every attempt to weaken or Impair the supreme authority of this legislature over all the dominions of my crown; the maintenance of which I consider as essential to the dignity, the safety and the welfare of the British Empire. 31 But it was temperate as well as firm. As Dartmouth pointed out to the House of Lords, it stipulated that the colonies

"would be tenderly and gently treated" when they returned to duty.^ The Cabinet finally reached agreement in meetings on January 13 stud January 21, upon a three-sided plan to 33 translate these words into action.

Immediate steps were taken to reinforms Gages a number of regiments including one of cavalry, 600 marines and 10 or

12 sloops of war were to be sent across the Atlantic. This continent was all that could be presently sent, but plans 120 *3l|. were made for more to be raised and dispatched later, which

Parliament approved in mid~February.35

A further "inconvenience" conceived was the bill to restrain the trade and fishing of the Hew England colonies.

In supporting his plan in Commons North declared "that as the

Americans had refused to trade with this kingdom, it was but just that we should not suffer them to trade with any other nation,” and that deprivation of the fisheries was justified since Massachusetts was in rebellion and the other New

England colonies were aiding and abetting her treason. ^

Since the purpose of thejsaot, like that of the Port Bill, was to compel obedienbe, the restraints were to be lifted by the

Governor upon his satisfaction that the purposes had been 3T achieved. Late in March official correspondence indicated that other colonies had become equally refractory and the trade ban was extended to all but New York, North Carolina and Georgia. Both bills passed with large majorities.

But while the colonies were to be brought back to duty by force and economic pressure, the ministry, still wanted to demonstrate its indulgence. Hence at their January 21st meeting they

agreed that an address be proposed to the two Houses of Parliament to declare that if the colonies should make sufficient and permanent provision for the support of the civil government and administration of justice and for the defense and protection of said colonies, and in time of war contribute extraordinary supplies, in a 121

reasonable proportion to what is raised by Great Britain, we will in that ease desist from the exercise of the power of taxation except for commercial purposes only, and that whenever a proposition of this kind shall be made by any of the colonies we will enter into the considera­ tion of proper law© for that purpose, and in the meanwhile to entreat his Majesty to take the most effectual method© to enforce due obedience to the law© and authority of the supreme legislature of Great Britain* 38

A® has been seen the view that taxation might be given up

In practice while not in principle had been held by Dartmouth for several years, was shared by FownalX and Knox, and even

Suffolk told Hutchinson that "he owned he looked upon an «19 attempt to enforce Internal taxation as desperate*” While the ministry was not willing to give up this right of taxa­ tion then, they were willing to give up the exercise of it if the colonies would solve the practical problem of finding

Yiateel&l support for themselves. The greatest opposition to it, a© Dartmouth told Hutchinson, was that it might

"encourage Ctbe colonlesj in their claim, of independency by concession, of which they had always been ready to taka #tk0 advantage* It 1© interesting that it was not brought into Parliament for a month after the Cabinet agreed on it and that it followed the Bestralnt of Trade Bill and the augmentation of military forces by nearly two weeks# Several explanation© might be plausible* 122

First, the negotiations with Franklin did not reach their unsuccessful conclusion until February 15 of 16 . It was the nineteenth when North wrote the King that the Cabinet had decided upon the Proposition Thursday the sixteenth, and it was presented to Parliament on the twentieth.

Secondly, north’s motives in presenting it have been questioned. It was widely believed that not all the colonies were as radical as Massachusetts, though her leadership had created a surprising unanimity. It was thought that a concession might disrupt this unity by causing some of the moderate coloaies-~highest hopes were held out for New Xork-- to accept the terms of the proposition and thus serve as a damper to the fires of rebellion. Less conciliatory was another motive ascribed to North for bringing the motion, as demonstrated in a letter to the King:

c o have reason to think it would give satisfaction here and . . . that it will greatly facilitate the passing of the Bill now in the House for restraining the trade of New England, and the other which must, do fear soon be brought in for subjecting Virginia, Maryland and other provinces to the same restrictions. ^1

While the "indulgence" 6 f his proposition may have

"facilitated" passage, it is very unlikely that North would not have succeeded in the Restraining Act, for as the King had written him a few days earlier: "The concurrence of the majority of the House of Commons In the measures to be pursued in New England was evident in the good humour of 123 receiving the motion for temporarily restraining the trade 42 and fishing at so late an hoar as six*IT

Finally, while Dartmouth clearly wanted to "hold some­ thing out to the colonies," he was not entirely happy with the Conciliatory Proposition* I'd Etchinson "he seemed appre- 43 henslve of the ill-effect it might have as it now stands."

Was this because he knew how far the Proposition was from meeting American demands, as he had seen them in Franklin*s

"Hints"? Or because he himself was willing to go so much further towards finding a common ground, than the others in the Cabinet? Or was it because he was still disappointed that the commission idea had been dropped? All three are probable, if not provable, together, Dartmouth and the

Governor agreed on alterations, some of which the Earl had 4-s proposed in the Cabinet. ^ Dartmouth then hesitated in regard to the dispatches which were to accompany news of the proposition to the governors* Hutchinson learned, albeit third hand, that Horth had written them and had some diffi­ culty in bringing Dartmouth to consent to them, although 44 he does not say why. In the end, he supported the

Proposition as the best that could be obtained, and he held out great hopes for it, since his other attempts at coneilid- 4*5 tion had failed.

His preference for personal negotiations and his laclc of faith in the popular assemblies are demonstrated in the private letter sent to the governors along with the dispatch containing the proposition. "For very obvious reasons," he wrote, the governor was not officially to communicate the dispatch to the assemblies! rather he was to give "a proper explanation of it to those whose situation and connex­

ions £sic3 may enable them to give facility to the measures „46 it points to* In another private letter accompanying the dispatch he wrote that:

There neither can nor will be the least relaxation from those measures which fthe Americans *3 conduct has made necessary for reducing the colonies to a state of due obedience to the constitution authority of Parliament. 47 4 This was, he assured them "the general sense of the nation." Dartmouth fervently hoped that once the colonists really understood Parliament's intention to be firm and ap­ preciated the good intentions behind this firmness that they must come round to a rightful idea of the constitution and their blessings under it. For this reason, he was unswayed by Governor Tryon who had written him in January that he could not "agree with [your} Lordship's idea of holding out the olive branch in one hand and the rod of K 7 chastisement in the other. Tryon advised either the removal of the stumbling blocks or rigorous measures. Dart- 49 mouth was against repealing the Coercive Acts and yet coercion had not been successful by itselfj if the colonists feared Parliamentary intentions as they seemed to, perhaps 125

some indication of its benevolence, coupled with its

determination, would help to restore harmony. These hopes

remained alive until after the Second Continental Congress

had completely rejected the Proposition and the outbreak of

civil war illustrated the lengths to which the colonists

were willing to go to end "inconveniences” by force rather

than submission to a sovereign Parliament. They must have 50 been fragile hopes, for Hutchinson described a very dispirited"^

Dartmouth through the winter of 1775> but they sustained

him though the disappointing news of the next months.

AH ACTIVE AHD DETERMINED PART

In November Knox had told Hutchinson that he would

welcome hostilities: "We shall then, be at no loss how to 51 proceed." In March, the governor had seen Dartmouth "who

seems very apprehensive that the Hew England people will

resist the King* s troops and does not know but what some 52 action between them will be best." Perhaps Dartmouth

hoped to forcibly subdue the most refractions colonies as

a means of leading the others back to loyalty.

The American Secretary believed that the sovereignty of

Parliament must be upheld and he participated In the January

Cabinet decisions specifying that force would be used to se>

cure that end, if necessary. Consequently, on January 27,

1775, he wrote Cage reflecting the opinion prevailing in 12 6 the ministry that the General should take a less passive stance?

Your dispatches . * . state proceedings that amount to actual revolt, and shew a determination in the people to commit themselves at all events in open rebellion. The King*s dignity, honor and the safety of the Empire, require that, in such a situation, force should be repelled by force « . •

More troops were to be sent, the letter continued, and the

Governor-General should seek to raise additional infantry from the loyalists.

It appears that your object has hitherto been to act on the defensive .... It is hoped, however, that this large reinforcement will enable you to take a more active and determined part .... There is a strong appearance that the body of the people in at least three of the Hew England governments are determined to cast off their dependence upon the govern­ ment of this Kingdom] the only considera­ tion that remains is in what manner the force under your command may be exerted to defend the constitution . . . 53

Dartmouth continued to emphasise that the disobedience was

"merely the acts of a tumultuous rabble, without any appear­ ance of general concert," in spite of Gage *s recent letters, and urged him to "imprison the principal actors" in a surprise move that would prevent bloodshed. But commerce must be protected from the association, even if that meant the people would take up arms. Finally he urged him to "recover into the King*s possession" the military stores collected by the 12?

colonists and dismantle fortifications at Hewport and Hew

Iondon.

While such a letter obviously does not exhibit Dartmouth's

total policy towards America, and while it represents the

thinking of the Cabinet on being firm towards the rebellion,

we can safely assume that a man of Dartmouth's conscience

would not have signed it without approving of what it said.

Gage received the letter on the sixteenth of April and on

the nineteenth sent a detachment on the ill-fated mission to

Lexington and Concord. Actually some plan of thi£ kind

had been in Gage's mind before he received the January 2?th

instructions] the dispatch simply confirmed his own anticipated

course of action.

It should, however, have prepared Dartmouth for the

May 28th arrival of a Captain Darby, employed to bring news

of the first battle as written by the Provincial Congress by

a fast ship from Salem, This version arrived a full twelve

days before Gage's official dispatch, which only added to

the uneasiness of the whole situation. 5 k Dartmouth was "much struck with it" and "too • . .

affected by the account to say much." 55 In hie distress he "hinted" to Hutchinson "at the puzzle the opposition would be In, if Administration should leave the reins to

them." 5 6 Despite the January dispatch, he apparently blamed 55 "the King's officers" and perhaps his greatest disappoint­ ment was that dispatches from other colonies indicated that 128 news of the encounter was ruining any good effects of the

Conciliatory Proposition -which had arrived in American 57 shortly after the battle. Typically, however, he continued 57 to have a favorable outlook upon the proposition and at the same time wrote Gage that the outbreak of hostilities had

"had no other effect here than to raise that just indigna­ tion which every honest man must feel at the rebellious con- ,,58 duct of the New England colonies. The real issue was still Parliamentary sovereignty and Dartmouth continued to believe it his duty to support it, even if this required military action. Not only must the rebellion be subdued, but the friends of government must be protected from the 59 increasingly vicious attacks of the "patriots". He gave up hopes of conciliating New England: she must be conquered.

But there was still some chance that the colonies to the southward could be returned to duty by application of enough force to bring the moderates to power. He failed to appreciate the truth in what Lieutenant-Governor Bull had written him from South Carolina in February: "Boston (is) 60 the North Star by which our political courses are shaped."

While he wrote Dunmore that ”the madness of the people of

Virginia . . . leaves no room for any other consideration than that of suppressing . . . rebellion," and Wentworth that "almost every . . . colony has catehed the flame and . . ,,62 a spirit of rebellion has gone forth; he wrote Campbell 129

that "there is still some room to hope that the colonies to

the Southward may not proceed to the same lengths as those ,,63 of New England* In these separate letters he advised each

governor that "the proper measures are now pursuing , . .

for augmenting the Army and (adding} to our naval strength.

To Dunmore and Martin however, he sent an additional note

urging them to encourage association in the western counties

of North Carolina against the rebels, and the raising of a

loyalist battalion of Highlanders. 65 Something of Knox's .

belief that once the Americans had tasted what the rebels

had to offer they would gladly accept the supervision of

Parliament shows in his letter to Dunmore:

Support of Council on May 2 . . . affords good ground to hope, that men of spirit and property will at l&ngth be awakened to a sense of their situation and the inevitable ruin which must follow from such a state of total anarchy and confusion as your Lordship represents the colony to be in. 65 If Dartmouth still had hopes of reconciliation, the rest

of the Cabinet was more concerned with the pursuit of

"vigorous measures." In a conversation with Hutchinson,

Hillsborough claimed that "Lord Suffolk, Lord Rochford,

Gower, Sandwich, and the Chancellor, with Lord North, were

all of one mind . . . that Lord Dartmouth was alone." 66 This

cryptic comment apparently puzzled Hutchinson, for he added,

after writing it in his diary, "perhaps he meant, not equally 66 engaged." Certainly Dartmouth did not oppose the military steps he described as necessary and Just in his letters to 130 the governors, if he did still hope for a short and narrow span of hostilities. The cabinet met on June 15 and 21 to plan the increase in forces froip Great Britain, Ireland and

Canada, with regiments from Gibraltar and Minorca to join those raised from Scotland in America.^ And clearly, if, as

Pownall put it, the Cabinet had to choose between "leaving the colonies independent or acting more vigorously in 68 reducing them to government," Dartmouth's preference would have been the same as his colleagues.

The King, as seen above, was of a similar mind. He was undisturbed by even Captain Darby's partial account of

Lexington and Concord as he had expected "blows" to decide 69 the question of independence or submission for some time.

He played an active part in making plans to augment army TO and naval forces in the colonies. His determination was revealed in a letter to North:

I am clear as to one point, that we must persist and not be dismayed by any difficulties that may arise on either side of the Atlantic; I know I am doing my duty and therefore can never wish to retract. 71

Even with the outbreak of war, however, there was optimism. As North expressed it,

Our wish is not to impose on our fellow subjects in America any terms inconsistent with the most perfect liberty. I cannot help thinking that many of the principal persons in North America will, in the calmness of the winter, be disposed to bring 131

forward a reconciliation, Now they are too angry, too suspicious, too much under the guidance of factious leaders • • • J2

Dartmouth was similarly inclined to look on the bright side at this point. He wrote to Knox who was at Spa, a letter touching in its warmth and futile hope:

Your confident ce) of success has sometimes kept up my spirits when they were beginning to einkj let me now prevail upon you to believe that all will yet do well, notwith­ standing the gloom that covers the horizon. The fate of empires often depends upon events that are little foreseen until the moment of their appearance. 73

With no real evidence of a happy ending, the American

Secretary was forced to look to what had not yet occurred for a solution. He was still in this mood a month later when he wrote to Knox from Sandwell, that

I rather wish than expect a settlement of our differences upon the ground of the terms stated in the article from Philadelphia. However, I see no reason why we may not now set our feet upon that or any ground that can be given and though both sides will have a great way to go before they will be within the sound of each others voice, it is not impossible that they may come near enough to shake hands at last.” 7^

Dartmouth put his own terms at the end of the letter:

Parliament would regulate trade and the colonies would provide

"revenue for the support of civil government, and such military force as they . . . desire." It ie on these terras of the Conciliatory Proposition that Dartmouth still hoped for agreement! "God send that day as soon as it may be," he finished, but this prayer could not be answered, for the

Americans would never again settle for those terms. 132

OUT OF THE SOUHD OF EACH OTHER * S VOICES

The spring and summer of 1775 witnessed more than the outbreak of civil war and extensive military preparations on both sides of the Atlantic# The Americans mad© two last attempts at conciliating their differences with the mother country; their failure represents just how far apart the two parties to the dispute were, and the end of any moderate

Influences in the colonies#

As noted above, Hew York had long been regarded as the most loyal of colonies. There are more items relating to

Hew York remaining in Dartmouth* s papers (as calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission) than any other colony except the problem child of Massachusetts, doubtless for this reason. lew York had no official delegation at the

First Continental Congress and the Hew York Assembly

“disapproved and rejected*' the measures of that body “in one „T5 grand blow* The Restraining Act was not applied to Hew

York, and more than any other colony It was expected that

Hew York would accept the Conciliatory Proposition. But the

Idleness of such expectations became apparent when the King received a conciliatory petition from the Assembly stating the necessity for “such a system of government . . . as will ascertain and limit the authority of the British legislature.11 ^

Obviously with the King determined to support the sovereignty 133 of Parliament as the essence of the constitution which brought peace and harmony to the Empire, such a petition t o , not acceptable* Both houses of Parliament likewise declined even to hear the petitions addressed to them read, on the grounds that they denied the right of Parliament to tax the colonies in all cases whatsoever. As Bargar points out, it was '"unreal!stic for the two house© of Parliament * . to stand on their dignity . * * when the supremacy they claimed was rapidly vanishing in a revolutionary war*"^7

Yet they were unable to see any alternative. Conformable to hie desire to open channels of communication, Dartmouth favored receiving the remonstrance, though he could not agree to it, and North was "rather inclined;" but they were 7 8 alone in this preference. The Secretary*© own lack of realism is evident in his letter to Tryon explaining the re­ jection of the petitions, for he expressed confidence "that the resolution of the House of Commons of the 27th Febfruarjy will remove all obstacles to the restoration of public .*79 tranquillity* ^ Surely this can only be described as grasping at straws; Dartmouth must have reallad how far even

Hew York was from accepting the Conciliatory Proposition when he read their Remonstrances. This is especially true since

Dartmouth had been Informed by the time he wrote his letter of New York*© progress toward© the same extra-legal actions her northern brethren were taking* 13k

•1? If American moderates vere disheartened by the reception, or

lack of it, of New York’s gesture, they vere totally dis­

illusioned toy the treatment accorded the Olive Branch

petition to the King of the Second Continental Congress.

Dartmouth, as seen in his letter to Knox above, had hopes for

this petition and took pains to ensure that a proclamation,

putting into effect a resolution of the House of Commons

declaring some of the colonies in a state of rebellion, vas 8l postponed until after lie delivery. These efforts vere

only partially successful, since an unofficial copy of the

petition reached the American office before the Privy Council

approved the Proclamation on August 2k, 1?75> hut Dartmouth

did not receive it in person until September 1.

Bargar speculates on Dartmouth’s state of mind as he

received Richard Penn and Arthur Lee, special delegates from

the Congress, vith their petition. Certainly he must have had mixed feelings. On the one hand David Barclay had told

him that this vae a sincere attempt at reconcillation, the

rejection of which would completely undermine the position 82 of moderates in America. On the other was the urgent belief

of another old friend that to treat "with rebels, while they

have arms in their hands,” would demonstrate a fatal 83 weakness. J In the end Dartmouth’s action was probably

dictated by his own conception of what the petition said.

After accepting the petition Dartmouth shoved it to the

King and then declined to make any comment on it saying 135

"that as hie Majesty did not receive It on the throne, m no answer would he given. ** Dartmouth took this approach

■since it was apparent to hi® that no accomodation could he reached on the basis of the petitloot the colonists in addressing themselves to the crown above Parliament were,

In effect, repealing the Glorious Revolution. When a motion was made in the House of Lords the following November that the petition afforded ground© for reconciliation, Dartmouth defended its rejection# To accept it, the product of Congress, would be to reliatulsh the sovereignty of Parlia* meat. Furthermore, some of John Adams* intercepted letters had convinced the ministry that independence wa© the real aim of the Americans} hence Dartmouth claimed that, "the petition, in terms, was unexceptionable, but there was rea&m to believe that the softness of language was purposely .,85 adopted to conceal the most traitorous designs#”

Dartmouth was a moderate} the petition had been framed by American moderatesi and yet eo far as had the two sides to the dispute travelled by the fall of 1775, that even the moderate© were out of the sound of each others* voices. CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

He demonstrated his and the cabinet's continued faith in both of these in two separate letters to two governors in the spring of 1775* First, to Dunmore in Virginia, Mar. 3, 1775, he said of the Association: "It is . . . an evil, which, from the situation and circum­ stances of Virginia, where the people must ultimately depend for subsistence upon a export of the produce of their lands, will . . . work out its own cure." C. 0. 5/1353 P* R* 0* Microfilm. To Wentworth in New Hampshire on May 3, 1775* "It is very much to be wished that those offenders may suffer the punishment due to their crimes by a fair and impartial trial within the Province, but if there is no prospect of obtaining Justice in such a case, in the ordinary course of proceeding, there seems no other alternative than that of sending them to England ..." C. 0. 5/9^7 P* R * 0 . Microfilm. 2 Jan. 7, 1775, New York Colonial Documents. VIII, 529, as quoted in Bargar. Lord Dartmouth, 1$?^ 3 Sketch by Pownall for a Resolution in the House of Lords, (No date - (1775)), Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, Jj-08-9. A conversation on the Commission between Dartmouth, Hutchinson, and Pownall's brother, Thomas, is recorded in Hutchinson's Diary, I, on Sept. 29, 177^, 251. k "Proceedings in relation to the American Colonies, Knox Manuscripts, 257*8 . 5 Ritcheson, British Politics and the American Revolu­ tion. 173. Hutchinson recorded a conversation at a levee of Dartmouth's on Jan. 25, 1773 in which the secretary expressed his disappointment at rejection in the Cabinet, of the commission idea; "I told his Lordship that I had proposed that thing . . . formerly. The difficulty now would be to steer so as to keep clear of affording them a pretense for triumph .... He thought that might be done: hoped some­ thing would yet be done, though he added, when I proposed it, it was scouted at." Diary, I, 362*3. 6 Ibid., 327.

136 FOOTNOTES 137

T Sea Dartmouth to Bead, July 11, 177**-, Reed, Life. 72-7^. 8 Franklin to Jane Mecom, Sept. 26, 177**, Smyth, Writings, VI, 2^6-7* Hutchinson sav him only once, from a distance. Feb. 2, 1775, Diary, I, 367- Q Dec. 6 , 177**, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 236. 10 According to B. F. Stevens, ed. of Dartmouth Manuscripts, 236, quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 13^**

U lbid.

iaibid., 1 3 5.

I3Ibid., 136-7 . ^Feb. 6 , 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 266.

^Kingston R. Fox, Dr, John Fpthergill and His Friends (London, 1919), 332. ^Ibid., 33** and "Plans of Conciliation and Union," Feb. 16, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 270.

*-7Quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 136. 18 Sparks, Franklin*s Works, V, 56, quoted in Ritcheson, British Politics and the American Revolution, l8o.

19Feb. 15, 1775, Diary. I, 377. 20 Jan. 6 , 1775, Reed, Life, 101. Italics De Berdt's. 21 To Reed, Jply 11, 177**, Life, 72-**, 22 Reed to ?, Aug. 20, 1775, ibid., 97*

^3Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 131* 2k Ibid., 132,

2^ibid., 133- "Proceedings in relation to the American Colonies," Knox Manuscripts, 257* Hutchinson wrote of this dissatis­ faction with the General on several occasions; see for example, conversation with the Lord Chancellor, Jan. 17, 1775, Diary, I, 351* FOOTNOTES 138

See, for example, Dee. 29, ITT^, Diary. X, 336-T- 28 Dec* 10, 177h, Hinchlngbrooke Papers, as quoted in Bitcheson, British Politics and the American Revolution, 178*

177*0 , Dartmouth Manuscripts, IX, 251* Although the letter was not dated it is clear from its contents that it was Nov. or Dec* of I77b» 30 „ „ Proceedings, Knox Manuscripts, 257* Si Journals of the House of Commons, XXXV, 8, as quoted in Gipson, British Empire before the Revolution, XIX, 272*

^Parliamentary History* XVIII, 292, as quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth^ !5¥7 33In a conversation with the undersecretaries on the 20th of Jan., Hutchinson discovered that ’’matters were determined in part only”; (Diary, I, 357-8); on the 2 5 th Dartmouth told him "that measures were now determined with respect to America,” (362-3) and it was at this time that the Secretary lamented the fate of the commission idea. See Cabinet Minute, Jan. 13, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 258, and Cabinet Minute, Jan. 21, 1775, ibid., I, 372-3. The Commission was discussed at the first meeting, but the Conciliatory Proposition adopted at the second. 3b Conversation with Cornwall, Jan. 26, 1775, Hutchinson, Diary, I, 363* 35 Gipson, British Empire Before the Revolution, XIX, 294- 95* ^Parliamentary History, XVIII, 298-300, quoted ibid., 297. 37 Ibid., 300, 38 J Cabinet Minute, Jan* 21, 1775* Dartmouth Manuscripts, I, 372-3. 39Jan. 22, 1775, Diary. I, 360.

Jan. 30, 1775, ibid.. 364-65. 4l Feb. 19, 1775, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, III, 176-7 . FOOTNOTES 139

k2 Feb. 11, 1775, Ibid., 173* k ^ Feb. 22, 1775, 3B7. The copy in the papers includes an interpolated paragraph in Dartmouth’s hand. See Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 272*

May 23, 1775, Diary, I, 448. 45 This interpretation differs from that of Bradley Bargar (see lord Dartmouth, XIV) who sees Dartmouth as a "chief defender" of the Conciliatory Proposition, apparently without reservation. At the same time Bargar claims that the Secretaries1 support of the j^estisining Bill was "uncon- genial." As seen in the text, I disagree. Dartmouth was not wholeheartedly in favor of North's proposition and he was not opposed to restraining New England's trade, although as Bargar points out he did not wish the Bill extended to New York. Even the second restraining bill did not in­ clude that colony, but because New York was the most loyal of the provinces, not because the colonial Secretary was trying to "cover" America from the Bedfords. Bargar does not discuss Dartmouth's affection for the commission plan. . Private Circular, Mar. 3, 1775, C. 0. 5/2k2, P. R. 0. Microfilm. k7 Ibid. k 8 - Jan. 19, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscriptst II, 26l. ko Hutchinson, Diary, I, 377 and Fox, Dr. Fotherglll, 33^. 5°Jan. 30, 1775, Diary. X, 364-5, and Feb. 15, 1775, ibid., 377, are samples. 51 Hov. 16, 1774, Diary, I, 295.

5 Mar. 29, 1775, Ibid.. 419.

^Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage. II, 179-83- 54 May 29, 1775, Hutchinson, Diary, I, k55* 55 DeBerdt to Reed, June 1, 1775, Reed, Life, 103. FOOTNOTES 1^0

56 June ih, Hutchinson, Diary, I, 47Q. Dartmouth's reaction can hardly be attributed to surprise: that he had faced the possibility of hostilities is shown in a private letter to Gage in which he said of the New Englanders: "If they come to be involved in a civil war it will be the conse­ quence of their own intemperance and folly, and of their ignorance of the real disposition of this country towards them." April 7# 1775, (Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, II, 189)* Rather it can best be explained by discourage­ ment. Gage had written him that the tempers there were cooling down. (Jan. 18, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 260) Dartmouth's response had been "I cannot help flattering myself . . , that light is beginning to break upon their minds ..." (April 7, 1775# Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, II, 189)*

■^June 12,1775# Dartmouth Manuscripts. II, ^67* 58 June 1, 1775# Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, II, 198-9* 59 He may have been influenced by Gage's Jan. lo letter in which he claimed the moderates would stand forth if they could be assured of England's intention to pursue her measures. Gage also believed that "government would come off victorious . . . if the most obnoxious of the leaders were seized and pardon proclaimed for others," which Ideas had long been held by the Secretary. (Jan. 18, 1775# Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 260). Probably as a result of this letter the cabinet approved a "commission under the great seal to be given to the Governor of Massachusetts Bay, that governor to be empowered to issue a proclamation offering pardon to rebels who shall surrender within a certain time ..." (Cabinet Minute, Mar. 30# 1775# ibid., 283.) Dartmouth told Hutchinson in June that this pardon was something he had long wished. (June 12, 1775* Diary, I, h67.) 60 Feb. 22, 1775, C, 0. 5/396 Pi R. 0. Microfilm.

6lJnly 5# 1775# C. 0. 5/1353 P- R* 0. Microfilm.

^2July 5, 1775# C. 0. 5/9^7 P* R- 0. Microfilm.

^3July 5# 1775# €. 0. 5/396 P. R. 0. Microfilm.

6^For example, to Martin, July 5# 1775# C. 0. 5/318, P. R. 0. Microfilm.

65July 12, 1775, C. 0. 5/1353 and July 12, 1775, C, 0. 5/318, P. R. 0. Microfilm. Dartmouth had written happily to FOOTNOTES

Martin In May concerning the Addressees of Loyalists in several -western counties, commending their "spirit of loyalty" and saying that a "proper association of the peo­ ple in support of government" could not "fail to cast a damp upon the machinations of factions and disconcert any desperate measures they may have in contemplation. X hope we may yet avoid the fatal necessity of drawing the sword* " he wrote* and yet suggested arming these loyalists "to provide . . . against . , . mischief." May 3* 1775* C. 0, 5/318* P. R. 0. Microfilm. 66 June IT, 1775* Diary, X* 1*71-2. 67 Cabinet Minute* June 15* 1775* Dartmouth Manuscripts, II* 316* and Cabinet Minute* June 21* 1775> ibid.t 318 • 68 June 28* 1775* Hutchinson* Diary* I* h80.

^Klng to North* Bov. 18* 177&, Fortescue* ibid.* 154. 70 On July 28* 1775* he wrote North "I shall be extremely glad to see Lord Dartmouth and you as soon as it is conve­ nient to you both* that we may talk over whatever is still necessary towards forwarding the American business. A little council of this hind will do more than several separate conversations." Fortescue* Correspondence of Georg# III. Ill* 236-7 . 71 July 26* 1775* ibid., 235- 72 To Burgoyne* July 31* 1775* Historical Manuscripts Commission* 10th Report* Part 6 * Manuscripts of the Marquess of Abergavenny (London* I8 8 7 )* 9* 73 July 3* 1775* Knox Manuscripts. 118-19. 74 Aug. 6 * 1775* Knox Manuscripts, 120-21. 75 Capt. Thomas Webb to Lord Dartmouth, Mar. 1* 1775* Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 2 7 6 . 76 Mar. 25, 1775* Dartmouth Manuscripts, as quoted in Bargar* Lord Dartmouth, 150-51* 77 Ibid., 151. FOOTNOTES

78 May 12, 1775, Hutchiaaoa, Diary. I, 444-5. 7 9 May 23, 1775, Nev Yorit Colonial Documents. VIII, 574-5, as quoted in Barger* Lord Dartmouth, 15X1 80 Dennys DeBerdi to Lord Dartmouth CX775 April)* Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 2 9 3 , describes Provincial Conven­ tion* etc. 81 See Bargar* Lord Dartmouth, 154-5* Pownall and Knox* letters to the Secretary on this affair are calendared in Dartmouth Manuscripts, II* 348«59» George 0. Trevelyan* The American.Revolution# (Hew York* 19®3) I* 21* claims that the ministry refused to see Penn* hut these letters make it clear that they were waiting on Penn. 82 Barclay to Dartmouth* Aug* 23# 1775* Dartmouth Manuscripts* as quoted in Bargar* Lord Dartmouth, 155* 83 Gughton to Dartmouth, Aug* 24* 1775* quoted in ibid* 84 Journals of Congress* III* 343* n. 1 * as quoted in ibid*1 3 2 * 85 Parliamentary History, XVIII* 919*20* as quoted in Bargar* Lord Dartmouth* 157* CHAPTER VI

A RELEASE FROM FATIGUE

fO ESTABLISH AH IHDEPBHDENCX

The year 1775 'was a disillusioning one for Dartmouth. In February he had written Gage that

I am convinced that whilst Great Britain continues firm, tempering at the same time her firmness with such indulgence to Any reasonable proposition that shall be offered by the colonies in respect to taxation,as shall consist with justice to them and a resolute attachment to the principles of the Constitution anarfcy, confusion & disobedience must give way to peace and good government. 1

In July he could ’’still entertain a hope . . . that when the middle colonies have recovered from the prejudices . . . created by . « * artful misrepresentations of the affair of

, . * the 19th of April, they will be induced to take up the # * . Resolution of the 20th of Febr{[uar)y . . . 11

There was loss of faith behind this hope, however, as Dartmouth revealed in the next paragraph:

At the same time we must not trust tb appearances . . . the conduct of the people of Connecticut, who, in the moment of their preparing for an expedition against Ticonderoga had the affectation to propose to you a suspension of hostilities, is an instance of such consummate duplicity, as ought to put us very much on our guard against such proposals# 2

ll»3 ikk

Dartmouth was becoming discouraged, and the dispatches from America only added to his pessimism by demonstrating the total failure of his policies, Lieutenant Governor Bull wrote that the conciliatory proposition "seems rather to alarm them and to raise their jealousies than to in. * Invite them to a separate application, and will , , . strengthen their unanimity," If indulgence had not been effective, neither had firmness, for Wentworth advised him that "diffi­ culties increase here every day, more especially sinee the

Hestaining Bill took place, There was no longer any doubt,

Campbell wrote, that the rebels were planning "to establish 5 an independency,” and "scarce a shadow of authority (wasj left" to government, 6 Gage informed him that nearly every colony had "overthrown its government and . . , lodged , , . all power in Congress and committees,” Perhaps most dis­ turbing to the Secretary was the termination of that affection and reverence for the mother country that Reed had 8 spoken glowingly of as late as February. As Wentworth described iti In that early stage of the opposition ♦ , . the people condemned the insult and attack on his Majesty1s fort and violation of his property, which now, that violence hath got such a head as to bring on a civil war, they applaud and commend as highly meri­ torious, 9 If the lari's official correspondence was disconcerting, the intercepted private letters that came to his attention were even more so. Here he learned that "a motion has been 1*5

made at the Continental Congress for an independency, ,,i0

and that if England "thought Congress would Insist on nothing

but no taxation" they were solely mistaken. This was “not

so since blood (had been] spilled." The writer, in this

ease none other than Thomas Jefferson, continued:

I wish no false sense of honor, no ignorance of our real intentions, no vain hope that partial concessions of right will be accepted may induce the ministry to trifle with accommodation til it shall be put even out of our own power ever to accommodate. 11

By the end of the summer of 1775 it was clear from all accounts that civil government in America had been almost

totally usurped, most governors having had to flee to the

safety of naval vessels or British forts, and that civil

war was being vigorously waged by both sides. 12 Moreover,

colonial demands had risen beyond the possibility of ful­

fillment by the ministry then in power, including the good

Lord Dartmouth.

The only option for the ministry, given its interpre­ tation of the constitution, was to militarily reduce the

colonies to submission. The Proclamation of Rebellion

issued August 2* gave notice to America and the world that

this was exactly what Britain intended to do. While the

colonial Secretary was more willing to temporize with

America than the King and the rest of the cabinet, he too, was unwilling to accept the alternative to war; a dimunition

in Parliaments ability to supervise the colonies. ~ Ik6

Like hi© colleague© mud all Englishmen, he was unable to

perceive the impracticability of insisting on the maintenance

of a right that no longer existed. The Conciliatory Propo*

sltioa had been vehemently rejected* not only by each indivi~

dual colony, but by the Second Continental Congress* Yet

la it© address to the King* tie House of Common© reiterated

the same plan. "When the colonise ©hall have made sufficient

provision for the support of their respective civil

governments * # . % they---advised, it would no longer be

necessary for Parliament to raise a revenue in America. But

Parliament could *fnever so far desert the trust reposed in

them a© to relinquish any part of the sovereign authority

over all his Majesty*© dominions* nor allow that any of them ought to be exempted from the common burden necessary

to the Whole."12

The administration* accordingly, had thrown itself wholeheartedly into preparation for carrying out its military p o l i c y * The only ray of light for Dartmouth at this point was the loyalty of the western counties of Morth

Carolina of which Martin had written so confidently!

consequently hie major contribution to the war effort© in

the making was to insure that an expedition to the southern colonies would be dispatched before winter. Even this hope wae dim* however, for he wrote Martini

In such a situation I must confess to you that 1 think you are too ©anguine in your Ib7

expectation of being able, if properly supported, in the manner you suggest, to induce a large part of the inhabitants of North Carolina to take up arms in support of Government, l^f

Arms, and later an expedition were sent, the dispatches concerning them being the last Dartmouth wrote before leaving office.15

This sort of business however, was not at all to Dart­ mouth 1s liking. It was normal for him to spend several weeks la Staffordehire in August and early September, but in

1775 his absence continued until much later in to the fall*

While he returned to town for brief periods, he left the 16 disagreeable direction of military matters to Pownall.

Naturally with the Secretary absent some^of the old quarrels over the status of the American department flared open and

Pownall wrote exaggeratedly to Knox that, As to measures for America, I know nothing about them, for since I have been deserted by our principal, that business is got into other hands and my friend Eden knows a great deal more . . , than your faithful servant.17

Perhaps such friction was part of Dartmouth*© determination to stay away but unpleasantness did not emanate from the

Northern Department alone. Secretary at War Barrington wrote

Dartmouth to disagree with his plans for supporting Martin and Campbell and rather petulantly reminded him "of the 148 necessity for consulting able military men before taking „l8 Steps in military matters.

While such criticism increased the onerousness of

Dartmouth's already unpalatable employment, he could not resign for two reasons. First, he was in substantial agree- ment with the cabinet’s policy even if he disliked imple­ menting it. Secondly, he remained, as in 1712,North's only ally in an otherwise hostile cabinet. To desert his step brother in a time of crisis would leave him politically vulnerable, especially in view of the defection of another member of the administration, the Duke of Grafton.

AH HOBOBABLE BETBEAT

It was Grafton’s defection, however, that ultimately provided for Dartmouth’s escape and bolstered Worth’s position by appeasing the Bedfords and Suffolk with the addition of lord George Germain to the cabinet.

The Duke of Grafton, Lord Privy Seal, had fallen out with Horth’e ministry over its refusal to repeal the tea duty, and had not attended a cabinet meeting since 17?0 »

The Olive Branch precipitated his final breaks he wrote the

Prime Minister of his plan for Parliament to receive the petition and ask the King to offer suspension of hostilities

If the colonies would depute persons to England to negotiate 19 with the mother country* Grafton waited seven weeks before 20 north replied in the negativej by this- time Parliament was in session and the Privy Seal was speaking out in Lords against his own administration* Suspicions that he would not he part of that administration for long were widespread, as were rumors of what would become of his office* "They talk of

Lord Dartmouth for the Privy Seal if the Duke of Grafton goes out , « * hut it is a moot question If Orafton will he * . without a salary*"^ Perhaps it was his reputed avarice that made Orafton delay hi© resignation in spite of the embarrassment he caused the ministry! finally, the King wrote lorth that his Seale would be sent for if he did not bring them himself*

Dartmouth too, knew of Grafton*a impending retirement, and asked to have Grafton*® office when he left it* As

Grafton*s successor had been apparent to those observing

British politics in 1775, so was Dartmouth*ss Lord George Germain is talked of to succeed Lord Dartmouth who is to be Privy Seal* 1 wish the talk may be confirmed, because our friend Lord Dartmouth will have repose, and an honorable retreat, & Lord George Germain will have a very distinguished com** plement to his abilities, and both will be well provided for, & I should think to both their satisfactions. 23

Lord George Germain presents a great contrast to the pious Lord Dartmouth** Politically, Germain had been a

Grenvillite when Dartmouth was serving at the Board of Trade 150

in Boekingham*s ministry, and later supported the Towoshend 2b Duties and vigorous measures to enforce them* The contrast was also personal. Germain was typically military*'

aggressive, vehement, dogmatlc***and an adroit politician 25 as well# His career had supposedly been eclipsed in

the late fifties by a eourt~msrtial for cowardice after which he was designated as unfit ever to serve his Majesty

again, and yet he bad worked his way back into royal and ministerial graces in ©lightly more than ten years. He had

spoken energetically and often la favor of the Coercive

Acts in Common© and made a favorable impression on Lord 26 Borth who was in need of oratorical support in that house*

An 1TT5 brought the outbreak of hostilities he played a larger role in the thinking of the ministry; Suffolk, in particular, wrote to him on American affairs and obtained his ideas on political and military matters* Suffolk1®

Dndersecretary Idea sent him frequent and detailed letters 27 to keep him informed. In early October of 17T5 he wrote

**at the special request of Lord north,1* outlining plans and including a draft of the King* s speech and saying, ”1 shall proceed to tell yon without form or flattery that Lord 2 $ Horth * * * thinks you the fittest man in the kingdom.**

So Germain was being consulted on matters within

Dartmouth*© authority weeks before Dartmouth went out of office# That he had little use for the amiable Earl is evident from a letter shown Hutchinson in which Germain said

that the ministry would not fall after Lexington and Concord ,29 though "Lord Dartmouth, in a fright, may go out* ' He

thought it improbable that Dartmouth would "give the necessary 30 orders for decisive and vigorous measures." Such a persona­

lity and^such political ideas could not fall to be appealing 31 to the King, determined as he was to cn^i the rebellion) and Horth would have been eager to have had an able advocate

in Commons during a session when he feared a strong attach on government*

Dartmouth, who had never wanted to enter office in the first place, was discouraged by the events of late 1775 and eager for a refuge consonant with his own integrity and the honor of Lord Horth. He was willing to lose j£2000 annually 33 in salary in order to change his office. But while his quest of the Privy Seal was self-initiated, it was not unwelcome to the King and cabinet.

It is an over-simplification to see Dartmouth's exit and Germain's entrance as a change of policy on the part of the ministry) Dartmouth believed the waging of war against the rebellion was necessary, as his speeches in the House of Lords after he became Privy Seal demonstrate. In November,

1775, he defended rejection of the Olive Branch, and in

March, 1776, he opposed Grafton's conciliation proposal at length, declaring that the only remedy to the current diffl- 3^ culties was an overpowering force. There was, however, 152

a difference in the two men and Germain's accession does

signify a change in tone at least. He reversed several of

Dartmouth's military policies immediately.^ The contrast

between the two is further seen in their approach to the

Peace Commission of 1776 in which Germain demanded a recog­

nition of Parliamentary supremacy as a sine qua none for

the negotiations, which Dartmouth opposed from sure Knowledge

that such a stipulation would doom the talks before they got

steated, The then Privy Seal felt strongly enough about

this to threaten resignation, as did Germain, until a com­

promise was worked out.

Some of the confusion over the meaning of this change

of office can be traced to quite uncharacteristic behavior

on the part of the Earl of Dartmouth, Though all seemed

to desire the changes, there was a fly in the ointment:

Lord Weymouth, who had not only a prior claim to the office

Grafton was vacating but some powerful friends in the Duke

of Bedford and his followers in the cabinet, Sandwich and

Gower. In spite of this claim, Dartmouth refused to accept

any other office than the Privy Seal, The King at first

urged him to become Groom of the Stole, which was an honorary

post, but, Dartmouth apparently felt, did not carry enough

weight for him adequately to support North. Later North

arranged for Rochford to retire that his step brother might

have the Southern Department, but this office carried too much of the business from which Dartmouth desired to escape. 153

As he wrote John Bob inarms "If I take the Seals that are

offered me X shall reader myself tea. times more miserahle

than X am*The anguish of his situation Is quite appa-

rents

The dread of a situation in which 1 see no satisfaction to myself on one hand* and ay love for lord Horth and regard to his peace of mind on the other tear me to pieces* 1 would with all my heart go quite out of employment, hut that would look unkind to him * * * 11 36 lord Horth threatened to resign if Dartmouth did and his

situation was rendered even more embarrassing since he had ventured to negotiate with Germain about the American

Department before Dartmouth reefgnedj when Dartmouth was

told the Privy Seal was unavailable he ©aid he would remain

in his present position. Clearly Iforth had to find a place

to his step brother*© liking in order to extricate himself from hie predicament, which was further complicated by

Weymouth*© threat to resign if he did not get the Privy Seal, which as the king ©aid, would certainly make hie friends un­ happy. Horth thought he had come up with an excellent solu* tion when he wrote the King asking him to provide a j£2500 pension for Lord Bochford who was fortunately In ill health, which would open up one of the older secretaryships for 31 either Weymouth or Dartmouth. The king, piqued at Dartmouth for not Mpermit(ting) his amiable temper to examine the 38 state of affaire coolly” and end the crisis, agreed to the: pension plan "though my finances are in a very disgraceful

situation.Since Dartmouth would not accept the

Secretary*s Seals, Weymouth was finally persuaded to do so and the way was at last cleared for Dartmouth to become

Lord Privy Seal and Germain to become American Secretary.

The Seals of each were received on November 10, 1775• On November 28, Hutchinson visited Dartmouth, f,who I found reading my History and more cheerful than at any time of late,

CONCLUSIONS

Dartmouth*s role in the unhappy events leading up to the loss of the first British Empire has been obscured and distorted by partisan and superficial descriptions of secon­ dary authors. As a former "old Whig" he is treated favorably by George Otto Trevelyans "if Dartmouth could have ruled the colonies according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience « , . independence would have been postponed hi until he ceased to be secretary of state," When he is not praised for differing with the rest of North's ministry, he is damned for being too weals: to overcome their dlslifce of his policies. Benjamin Labaree, somewhat more sympathetic than others, nevertheless believed "a more determined states- k2 man could have succeeded." Ritcheson calls him amiable, pious and commonplace" and says his colleagues treated him 155

"aB a veil-meaning non-entity and sought to engross American business all they could# 1*^3 Lewis Einstein claims that he was regarded as "boringly over-sanctimonious*’ and ascribes his failure to "the cynical political atmosphere of that age#like Labaree, Fothergill’s biographer, H. H* Fox, faults the Earl for having "no firmness of character."

John Alden dwells not on his weakness, but criticizes his attempts at conciliation as "half-hearted.When Dartmouth’s attachment to the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is adequately appreciated, he is held to account for not having developed the concept of dominion status to satisfy home rule and the imperial superiority of the mother country, a concept that was not feasible for several more decades and until numerous changes in the internal constitution of Great Britain had taken place#

Part of the difficulty these authors faced can be traced to their sources# There are conflicting pictures drawn of

Dartmouth, as of any figure in a place of public importance by hie contemporaries. During the debate on the Coercive

Acts, Attorney-General Thurlou claimed that the ministry was pursuing coercion with

Lord Dartmouth, who was then American Secretary, taking the lead, to exeulpatb himself for having formerly moved the repeal of the Stamp Act in the Lords. 48

William Lee1s description of the American Secretary * s motives during this debate is quite different? 156

Lord North, Dartmouth and, some say, Lord Mansfield, have been against these measures; but the Jc£ing3 with his usual obstinacy and tyrfanaica^l disposition, is determined . . . to enslave you; the Bedford Party, Lord Temple and the remnant of the Grenville Party, Lords Suffolk and Wedderburn, wished the same as well as to make their court to the King, so that Lords North and Dartmouth have been overruled in the Cabinet*" kj

This was the same Mansfield Pownall blamed for the Massachu­

setts Government Act. The Americans could not even agree amongst themselves as to how to assess Dartmouth. While

Benjamin Franklin wrote, "He is truly a good man and wishes sincerely a good understanding with the colonies, but does not seem to have strength equal to his wishes,Arthur

Lee sneered "I am apt to think he will not attempt any thing 50 in our favor that will hazard his place.’1

Many of these primary accounts can be disregarded as obviously prejudiced; others present a more difficult interpretive problem. Shelburne wrote Chatham, again during the debates on the Coercive Acts;

I accidentally met Lord Dartmouth yesterday . * . without entering into the particular measures in question, he stated with great fairness, and with very little reserve, the difficulties of his situation, the unalterableness of his principles, and his determination to cover America from the present storm, even to repealing the Tea Act. 51

At first glance, I this letter seems to indicate that

Dartmouth was opposed to the steps in process by the ministry and most authors who have quoted Shelburne have stressed (T 2 the "to cover America.’’^ part of a very full sentence. It 15?

is as important to notice his attachment to his political principles, which are well-known to us from his letters to Reed and Cushing. These principles called for coercion, hence my reading that Dartmouth’s was a pragmatic approach.

Bradley Bargar * s book length study naturally does more

Justice to the complexities of Dartmouth's role as American

Secretary than the dime store analysis of a generalized narrative. He rightly points out that Dartmouth's reputa­ tion as a friend to America was inflated; the subsequent deflation of the bubble of optimism after his acceptance of the Secretary’s Seals is doubtless what originated much of the misunderstanding about him. Bargar emphasizes the Earl’s belief in Parliamentary sovereignty, his natural kindliness and.piety and his naivete in expecting his policies to be effective. He comprehends the obstacles Dartmouth faced in trying to effect conciliation from an office that was not designed to plan policy and in a Cabinet where he could not create turmoil for fear of undermining his step brother's position.

On the other hand there are some distinctions the present study makes. Bargar does not present Dartmouth’s desire for negotiation, especially through a commission, as forcefully as I believe Dartmouth felt it. He makes what was sometimes careful diplomacy on the Secretary’s part an act of mere courtesy. The consistency of Dartmouth's support of coercive 153

and conciliatory policies simultaneously is not fully demon­

strated. Finally, Dartmouth is criticized for favoring the

information in his official dispatches over that from perhaps

less biassed sources, such as Reed. But no one in Georgian

England could have been freed from their misconceptions of

the situation. Franklin and Hutchinson demonstrate the

universality of this failing, as Franklin confidently wrote

to America many times that the ministry must surely fall and

that unanimity would produce results; Hutchinson just as

confidently told the ministry that the colonists would never

unite. Dartmouth believed Parliament sovereign but he believed

that its sovereignty could be maintained in name only, without a tax to demonstrate it. This sovereignty could even be denied by Americans, as long as it was a denial in words

and not in deeds. Once the latter occurred he maintained

that the denial must be revoked or the colonies would be­

come independent, an evil second only to the derogation of

Parliamentary authority. At the same time he realized that

extreme measures would only create extreme responses. Bo while he adhered to a policy of coercing Massachusetts into obeying the laws of Parliament, he hoped not to offend her

in the process. He was not totally successful nor was he

completely unsuccessful in influencing the Cabinet along

these lines. In any event he did not oppose the measures 159 ultimately adopted. As a moderate, he sought to bring the two extremes together through the give and take of negotia­ tion, thus his abortive efforts with Franklin and towards obtaining commissioners to treat with America. The extremes were farther apart than he thought: Franklin's unyielding demands were as unacceptable as the unyielding force advocated by the Bedfords. As a pragmatist, he got each to make what concessions they would, and over-optimistically hoped for the beat. In the end, the constitutional diver­ gence was too great to be negotiated, and too great even to be suffered to continue in silence until time and progress could produce a peaceful solution. CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

Pels. 22, 1775* Carter, Correspondence of Thomee Gage. II, 185. 2 To Gage, July 1, 1775. Ibid., 200.

3May 1, 1775, C. 0. 5/396, P. R. 0. Microfilm.

Aug. 1 8, 1775, C. 0. 5/9W, P. R. 0. Microfilm.

^July 19»2Q, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts. II, 331.

6July 2 3, 1775, C. 0. 5/396, P. R. 0. Microfilm, ^June 25, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts. II, 319-2 0.

®Feb. 10, 1775, Reed, life. 9 3.

9Aug. 8, 1775, C. 0, 5/9W, P. R. 0. Microfilm. 10AZ to Rev. John Vardill, July 5, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts. I I , 328. 11 Thomas .Tefferson to ?, Aug# 25* 1775, ibid., 3 6 1 .

^Address, 1775# Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, There are alterations la Dartmouth’s head#

^Dartmouth vas active in the early stages of this preparation, see King to Dartmouth, *Iuly 21, 1775* Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, III, 3.39* and King to Borth, ‘jiSy' 28, 1 7 7 5 # ibid. > ^3(a-'l.

Sept. 1 5, 1775, C. 0. 5/318, P. R. 0, Microfilm. It is likely that Dartmouth actually wrote this letter since he came down from the country for a few days at Fovnall’s urging. Pownall to Dartmouth, Sept. 12, 1775# Dartmouth Manuscripts# IX, 38O.

^Dartmouth to Campbell, Hov. 7, 1775, C. 0. 5/396 and Dartmouth to Martin, JJov. 7, 1775, C. 0. 5/318, P. R. 0& Microfilm. 160 FOOTNOTES 161

16 See Pownall to Dartmouth, Sept. 5, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 372, Pownall to Dartmouth, Sept. 7, 1775, ibid., 375, and Pownall to Dartmouth, Oct. 7» 1775* ibid., 392. 17 Oct. 10, 1775, Knox Manuscripts, 122. 18 Oct. 26, 1775, Dartmouth Manuscripts, II, 39^* 19 Duke of Grafton to Lord North, Aug* 30, 1775,

Abergavenny• ■ - - U - - - — .. ■•...«#■ Manuscripts, , . ! ■ * J 11. 20 Trevelyan, The American Revolution, I, 24. 21 Selwyn to Carlisle, Oct. 28, 1775, Carlisle Manuscripts, 299. 22 Nov. 3, 1773, Portescue, Correspondence of George 21, III, 2 7 5-6 . Hutchinson credited Grafton's defection with the increase in the minority. Oct. 26, 1775, Diary, I, 5^7-8 . 23 Greville to Hamilton, Oct. 31, 1775, Hamilton-Greville Correspondence, Huntington Library. From the files of Ira Gruber. 24 Brown, American Secretary, 17-2 3 . 25 Ibid.. 30, 40. 26 Ibid., 24-5* Se© also Lord North to the King, Jan. 26, 1775, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, HI, 169* 27 Brown, American Secretary, 27-8* 28 ' Historical Manuscripts Commission, Stopford- Sackvllle Papers, II, p. 11, as quoted in ibid. 29 June 16, 1775, Diary, I, 470-1* 30 Lord George Germain to Irwin, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Stopford-Saekville Papers, I, 13^-5, as quoted in Brown, American Secretary, 2 5 . 31 "Memoranda, Nov. 1775”, Knox Manuscripts, 256. FOOTHOTES 162

50 Lord North to the King, Sept* 9, 1775, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III* III, 255* and Nov. 9, 1775, Hutchinson, Diary. I, 555* 33 "It was said today a Secretary of State*s place is 'worth 5200 L a yearclear: the Privy Seal only 3000 L annum." Nov. 12, 1775, Hutchinson, Diary. I, 555* 3% D. N. B,, XXXIX, 4X7-1$; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth. 183** 4. 35 Nov, 8 , 1775, Abergavenny Manuscripts,, 12, 38 Same letter, more fully transcribed in Dartmouth Manuscripts, IX, "introduction"* 37 Lord North to the King, Nov, 7, 1775, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III. Ill, 279** 80. 38 King to Lord North, 4:22 p.m., Nov. 7, 1775, ibid., 278-9. 39 Same to Same, 9:08 p.m., Nov. 7, 1775, ibid., 280-1, 40 Diary. I, 572, 41 Ibid., 119* 42 „ Ibid., 181. 43 British Politics and the Revolution, 149, Divided Loyalties, 160*

^5Pr. Fotharglll. 325. 46 John Alden, The American Revolution 1775-83 (Sew fcrfc, 1962), 16,

^ 1 o S. H. tee, Mar, ih, I T T 1!', tetters. 8l, 43 Knox Manuscripts, 259*

9To William Franklin, July th, 1TT3, Smyth, Writings. VI, h6-T- FOOTNOTES

^°To Mr. Heed, Feb. 18, 1T75, Reed, life. h7. 51 Shelburne to Chatham, Mar. 15, 1774, Chatham Correspondence, IV, 335, and Fitmaurice, Shelburne, I, 4 7 2 , uas 'quoted in Bargar, Lord Dartmouth. 108 ,^and Ritcheson British Politics and The American Bevolatlon* 161; This version, the fullest, came from Heed, Life, §3* 52 For example, Biteheson, British Polities and the American Bevolution, 161 and Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, 107* BXBL'X00BAPHICA& NOTES

The sources used in this study, for reasons pecuher to the topic, are barely adequate to support its conclu­ sions* In trying to get at what the Bari of Dartmouth thought about the events of hi© term of office X used a threefold approach.

First, X consulted his official correspondence with the governors, manuscripts from the Public Record Office on microfilm. All the colonies were not available, though the sampling was fairly good; those used were South

Carolina, .North Carolina, Virginia, New York, New Jersey,

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and one group that was simply circular letters from Whitehall* The letters to Dartmouth do give their reader an insight into what he knew, with the advantage of guessing what his reaction would he (although one can*t be certain he read all of them, at least he read most)* The main difficulty with this source, as noted above, is that letters from Dartmouth reflect the decisions of the cabinet and the phraseology of the under­ secretary, especially those dated at times he was usually in the country* Carter*e The Correspondence of General Gage, fits in this category, as does The Correspondence of Joseph

Reed. The latter is distinguished, however, by the in­ clusion of a letter from Dartmouth to Reed which was almost certainly written by h|m since it is of a private nature-

164 165 and was most useful in determining hit real feelings*

The second attempt to probe Dartmouth1® mind was through, a study of the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar of the Earl*a paper®. Unfortunately, a calendar leaves much to be deaired since most of the letters are abstracted and described and those that are actual quotations from the original are cut and some of the context is missing-. How discouraging to read something likes "Tells of news from

America and gives opinions on what should be done*" What newetl What opinions?* Nevertheless, there was some valua­ ble information here. A final regret is that Dartmouth must not have kept a letterbook for there were few of his personal letters.

The third approach, and in some ways the most fruitful, was to read what his contemporaries had to say about him*

Hutchinson1# diary, Franklin’s letters, and the correspon­ dence of 0#orge III, were the most revealing as each had extensive contact with Dartmouth and frequently recorded their conversation© with him* Kn&x*n papers, calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission were also of some help* Obviously the defect with such sources is the preju* dice of the reporter; the point of view of each influenced the light in which they saw the American Secretary.

Since a trip to the William Salt Library and a perusal of what remains of Dartmouth’s papers was out of the 166 question, and ©inoe my primary so ureas were not Ideal* I

relied on several secondary worfc© whose authors had seen

the Dartmouth manuscripts* In particular these were Bradley

Bargar*© Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution, Margaret

Specter1© ffhe American Department of the British Government

1766-178%» and Benjamin Babaree*© The. Bo a ton fee Party,

Although my conclusions on Dartmouth differ ©lightly from

hie I am most heavily Indebted to Bargar, especially for

confirmation of the suspicion that Dartmouth was not as pro-

American a© the Americans thought, which became the feulwarh

of my thesis.

Other secondary vorfc© influenced my understanding of

Dartmouth*s milieu, especially Blchard Bree* Qeorge IXX and

the BollticIans4 My own limited experience with primary material© verified the analyse© of the author© I used.

One final notes in view of the fact that I have quoted from so many different primary and manuscript sources, I have modernised all capitalisation and punctuation in order

to aahe the thesis consistent. While this detracts con­

siderably from the color of elghteenth-eeatury language it unclutter© a twentieth-century essay, BiB&xoaiyypM*

36AHCSCRXPT8 (Public Record Office Microfilm la the personal

library of Ira Camber)

Colonial Office 5/396 South Carolina c* 0« 5/1353 Virginia c. 0* 5/100 7 lew fork c« 0. 5/1008 Hew fork c. 0. 5/765 Maseachusetts, from Dartmouth c. 0# 5/?69 Massachusetts, from the Covernor c< 0. $/$k6 Hew Hampshire, from the Covernor e* 0. 5/9**t Raw Hampshire, from Dartmouth c. 0* 5/993 Hew Jersey o. 0. $/2k2 circular Letters c. 0 . 5/318 North Carolina PRXMARV SOORCRS

BaXlagh, James Curtis, ed. ffhe Letters of Richard Henry %*mm Z toIs, New fork, 1912*

Carter, Clarence, ed, The Correspondence of Thomas Gage with the .]BmoretarloTjf TfffB-lfff* BroxS* lew Haven, 1931-1933.

Crane, Varner W., ed. Beadamia Franklin* s Letters to the Press. 1 7 5 8 * 1 7 7 5 » Chapel Hill, Horth Carolina, 1950.

Boferee, Boaamy, ed. The Betters of King George III. London, 1935* 168 Ford, Worthington C., ed. The Letters of William Lee. Brooklyn, Hew York, l891.~ “ *

Fortescue, Sir John, ed. The Correspondence of King George III from 1760 to December178?* 6 volsLondon, 1928, vol. III. :

Greig, J ♦ T. T. » ed. The Letters of David Hume, Oxford, 1932...... Historical Manuscripts Commission, 10th Report, Fart 6, Manuscripts of the Marquess of Abergavenny, London,

1887. ' mm*.^ 15 th ROpOrt, AppClld iX, Fart 6, Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle, London

«>«*<».*»«.*m«*mu***■*».**.■»m «► •»*>«»*.«*.».•«»*»•»^ ihth Report, Appendix, Fart 10, Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth. London, 1 8 9 5 .

— 15 tU RCpOrt , VOl. VI, Manuscripts of Captain B« V. Knox. Dublin, 1909#

Hutchinson, Peter Oliver, ed. The Diary and Letters of His Bxeellency. Thomas Hutchinson. 2 vols. Boston, i8oh*6, vol. I .

Hutchinson, Thomas, The History of the Colony and Providence of Massachusetts Bay, Laurence Shaw Mayo, ed. 3 volt. Cambridge, 1936, vol. III. Reed, William B*, ed-. Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed. 2 vole. Fh 11adeIphi a , 1 §&7. ' ****"""

Smyth, Albert Henry, ed. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. 10 vols. New York, 1907, vol. VI.

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Butterfield, Herbert, George XXI. and the Historians* London,

Christie, Ian R*, Wilkes* Wyvlll and Reform, The Parliamentary Reform Movement" and British PolTtlca/l76Q~l tBsT London,

Colburn, H, Trevor, The Lamp of Experience* Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolu* tlon. Chapel Hilt, Uorth Carolina, 19^5.

Dictionary of National Btck&aphy* ed* Sidney Lee, London, :, Vol. tXUX*

Einstein, Louis, Divided Loyalties, Americans in England Puring the War of lnd e deace. bonXon$'' 1933* *

Foord, Archibald $**, g|s Majesty10 Opposition I71**-lS30» Oxford, 1 9 6%.

Fox, R* Hingeton, Dr* John Fotherglll and His Friends* London, 1919*' Gipeoa, Laurence Henry, The British Empire Before the American Revolution* 12 vols* Caldwell, Idaho,and Hew York,' 1 9 3 6 , 19^6 . Vol. I and XII.

Green, Vivian Herbert Howard, The Hanoverians 171**- London, 19^8*

Harrell, Isaac Samuel, Loyalism in Virginia* Durham, Worth Carolina,

Labaree, Benjamin Wood, The Boston Tea Party♦ Hew York, 196h* Labaree, Leonard W*, Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors «. 1760** 1776. Hew York, 1935. 170 Meigs, Cornelia I**, The Violent Men, A Study of Human Rela­ tione la the F i r K T,'jSeric'fiLa Congress/ Hev orkt 19W*

Hamier, Sir Louie Bernstein, Crossroads of Pover. London,

la the ^ Age, of the American Revolution* Pad sdT hondo n, 19617

Bares, Richard, King Oeorae, III and the Polltldaaa. Oxford

Plumb, John Harold, the First Four Georges* London, 1956.

Men and Centaur is s* Boston,

Ritcbefon,! Charles R«, British Politics and the American Revolution-* Herman,' Oklahoma, 1954V * "The Elder Pitt and an AmerA** can Department,w American Historical Reviev, LVII (Jan., 1952), 376-83. Robertson, Sir Charles Craat, England Under the Hanoverians. London, 193k#

Salley, W# T., England In the Eighteenth Century. London,

Specie?,. Margaret Marion Mitchell, The American Department of ..the British Government 11&Wl?B§"« Hev York/ 19^0. ’

Trevelyan, Sir Ceorge Otto, The American Revolution. 6 vols. m v York, 1903, Vol. I.

VanTyhe, Claude H*, The '. War ...of X n d e p e a d e n e e Boston, l$Bp, v m

Haney Jane Brlsfea Anderson

Born la St* Benin, Missouri, Bovemher 1%, graduated from Barien High School, Darien, Connecticut

in 195®, mad received the A. b* from Wellesley College

in X$6%* taught American history at A* X»* Miller Senior

High School in Macon, Georgia, from 1963*65*

171