New Perspectives on the Condemnation of 1277 and Its Aftermath

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 AND ITS AFTERMATH

In 1996 Kent Emery and Andreas Speer announced a project of research devoted to the aftermath of the Condemnation of 1277, sponsored by the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame and the Thomas-Institut der Universität zu Köln1. Between 1997 and 1999 thirty-five European and American scholars held four meetings at Köln, Notre Dame and Tübingen. The Acts of these meetings have been published in 2001 under the title Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte2. Not only for its impressive size (more than 1000 pages), this magnificently printed book is a major contribution to the history of later medieval thought. The essays collected and edited by the directors of this scholarly enterprise (Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery and Andreas Speer) present careful, detailed and fine analysis of very important issues in different fields of philosophy and theology at the University of Paris between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: psychology and gnoseology, natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics and, needless to say, the controversial topic of the relationship between theology and philosophy. Some articles are entirely devoted to the most outstanding thinkers of this period: Albert the Great (Henryk Anzulewicz), Thomas Aquinas (Joseph P. Wawrykow), Henry of Ghent (Christoph Kann, Kent Emery), Giles of Rome (Giorgio Pini), Godfrey of Fontaines (John F. Wippel), Thomas Sutton (Gyula Klima), Duns Scotus (B. Carlos

1. K. EMERY, A. SPEER, «After the Condemnations of 1277: the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century», in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 38 (1996), pp. 119-124. The project was sponsored by the German-American Academic Council Foundation under the auspices of the TransCoop Program. 2. J.A. AERTSEN, K. EMERY et A. SPEER (edd.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philoso- phie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Stu- dien und Texte (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin-New York 2001, pp. X-1033.

©RTPM 70,1 (2003) 206-229 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 207

Bazán, Stephen D. Dumont), Berthold of Moosburg (Stephen E. Gersh), Pietro d’Abano (Dag Nikolaus Hasse). Moreover, one can find in the volume remarkable philological acquisitions. Three essays (those by John F. Wippel, Richard Newhauser and Stephen D. Dumont) present relevant textual comparisons, and other five contributions provide in appendices unedited documents and texts: a question on the third book of the Sentences, preserved in Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek, Ms. 491 (Wouter Goris and Martin Pickavé, pp. 163-177); a part of the Prologue of Prosper of Reggio Emilia to the first book of the Sentences (Stephen F. Brown, pp. 328-356); the list of the Questions on Metaphysics attributable to Radulphus Brito, with the edition of some of them (Sten Ebbesen, pp. 467-492); a critical edition of two questions on the generability and perishability of the heavens, preserved in two different sets of Quaestiones supra librum De caelo et mundo written by Peter of Auvergne probably after 1277 (Griet Galle, pp. 567-576); a precise analysis of the manuscript tradition and an edition of a large selection of passages of an anonymous fifteenth- century commentary on the articles prohibited in 1277, discovered by Grabmann and generally called «Quod Deus» from its incipit (Claude Lafleur, David Piché and Joanne Carrier, pp. 946-995) 3. In the short space at my disposal I can scarcely give an exhaustive sketch of such a rich and interesting volume, which has already been celebrated and carefully discussed by several American and European Scholars in three seminars organized at the University of Notre Dame in April 20014. Therefore I will focus on only three points. I shall first report some contributions proposing new ideas and findings concerning the meaning and the influence of bishop Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’. Secondly I shall examine the historiographical categories and presup- positions that emerge from the entire volume. Thirdly I shall discuss some aspects of the Introduction written by two of the three editors,

3. Dealing with article 90, the anonymous commentator quotes Thomas as an authority against the ‘double truth’: «… quia ueritates non sunt distincte, ut dicit Thomas, et etiam omne uerum uero consonat». The latter sentence is a widespread scholarly adage extracted from the Nichomachean Ethics: see J. HAMESSE, Les auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique (Philosophes médiévaux 17), Louvain- Paris 1974, p. 233 §15. In the passage of his commentary on the Metaphysics mentioned by the editors at p. 969, n. 206, Aquinas indirectly echoes this adage. 4. «Philosophy and Theology at Paris after the Condemnation of 1277: Three Collo- quia» (5-7 April 2001). 208 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES which is a model of what introductions should be: not a boring abstract of the content of the volume, but a brilliant and provocative discussion of some pivotal questions at stake.

1. — As clearly stated in the Introduction (pp. 11, 18), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 does not intend to give a new, comprehensive account of the Condemnation of 7 March 1277 and its historical consequences. An excellent presentation of the origin and the significance of this intervention, based on the ‘classical’ works by Van Steen- berghen, Hissette, Wielockx and other recent interpreters, is however available in the ample «Commentaire historico-philosophique» to the new edition and french translation of Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’, published at the end of 1999 by David Piché5, one of the collaborators of the project directed by Aertsen, Emery and Speer. Yet, some participants in this project suggested new perspectives on such standard issues as the authors, the causes, and the influence of the Condemnation of 12776. Paradoxically enough, we know very little about its instigators and authors: bishop Tempier; Ranulphus de la Houblonnière, who was soon to become his successor; the University chancellor, John of Orléans (des Alleux); the papal legate Simon of Brion, future pope Martin IV. The latter’s rôle is as decisive as it is neglected7. It is therefore remarkable that the sixth and last section of Nach der Verurteilung

5. La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire par D. Piché (Sic et Non), Paris 1999, pp. 151-288. See also ID., «Commentaires sur quelques articles d'une nouvelle édition de l'acte de censure parisien de 1277», in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 65 (1998), pp. 333-352. 6. Another standard issue, i.e., the sources of the prohibited articles, is of course outside the scope of a book devoted to intellectual changes that occurred «after» the Con- demnation of 1277. Nevertheless in his remarkable contribution on «Siger of Brabant ver- sus Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Knowing the Separate Substances», Carlos Steel argues convincingly that article 82 «aims at a doctrine such as the one defended by Siger in his De intellectu» (p. 229). 7. This has been rightly emphasized by F. X. PUTALLAZ, R. IMBACH, Profession: philo- sophe. Siger de Brabant (Initiations au Moyen Âge), Paris 1977, pp. 169-170; P. PORRO, «Metaphysics and Theology in the Last Quarter of Thirteenth Century: Henry of Ghent Reconsidered», in: J.A. AERTSEN et A. SPEER (edd.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27), Berlin-New York 2000, pp. 276-277. For important remarks on Simon’s role in 1277 see however R. WIELOCKX, «Commentaire», in: Aegidii Romani Opera omnia. III.1. Apologia (Unione Accademica Nazionale. Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Testi e studi IV), Firenze 1985, especially pp. 99-100. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 209 von 1277, which deals with «The Condemnation of 1277 and its Aftermath», opens with an interesting article in which Götz-Rüdiger Tewes sheds more light on the juridical relations (and conflicts) between the Roman curia and the University of Paris, paying much attention to Simon (pp. 859-872). However some puzzling problems still remain. We know that at the beginning of 1277 the bishop charged a committee composed by sixteen Theology masters — that is to say, the greater part of the faculty of Theology — to draw up the list of ‘errors’ to ban8. But we know also that in that year none of the ecclesiastical authorities who promoted the doctrinal intervention was a master regent; that Tempier in 1264, when he had been chancellor of the University, presumed to impose himself as a regent master and dean, and for that reason he fell out with the faculty; that in the same year he put pressure on the faculty to accept as regent masters Ivus Bri- tus and John of Orléans; that, after having been raised to the episco- pacy, he supported the election of John, who was in very bad terms with the University, as a chancellor9; that some days after the Con- demnation of 1277 master Henry of Ghent (whose presence on the committee is certain) was intimidated by the legate Simon of Brion in the presence of Tempier, John of Orléans and Ranulphus de la Houblonnière10. Thus it is difficult to understand the nature and limits of the cooperation between Parisian theologians and ecclesiastical authorities11: did they feel themselves obliged to close their ranks in

8. On this point see R. WIELOCKX, «Commentaire», pp. 79-80, 98. 9. Cf. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, edd. H. DENIFLE et A. CHATELAIN, fac- simile reproduction of the Paris 1891-1899 edition, Culture et Civilisation, Bruxelles 1964, vol. I, pp. 438, 440-441, 441-442, 444-445, 494. In the light of these often neglected facts, one might wonder whether Courtenay’s claims about 1290 as a turning point in the relationship between Parisian bishops and theologians (pp. 237-238) could be accepted without qualifications: are we sure that before 1290 «the bishop carried into his office the perspectives and concerns of the faculty of theology, as the careers of William of Auvergne and Etienne Tempier illustrate» (p. 237, italics mine)? 10. Cf. Henri de Gand, Quodl. X, 5, ed. R. MACKEN, pp. 127-128. For recent discussions on this topic see below, n. 42. 11. Making reference to an unedited paper by J. Goering on the juridical status of the Paris and Oxford Condemnations of 1277, Kent Emery and Andreas Speer underline in their Introduction (p. 3) that «the verbal formulations of the articles looks like regulae iuris». This important remark raises another fundamental question, which should be carefully investigated: the possible participation of Canonists in the Condemnation. On this point see also below, n. 12. 210 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES the presence of the threat of ‘radical Aristotelianism’? To what extent did they really agree in evaluating the danger of the teachings of masters such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia? In what measure did the bishop and his supporters impose their opinions, as Giles of Rome later insinuated, complaining about the «stubborness (capitosi- tas) of a certain few»? In the light of these unanswered questions, the least one could say is that it would be misleading to present the Condemnation of 7 March 1277 as the decision of «Paris University». Nevertheless, that is precisely what we read in a passage of «Quod Deus», i.e., the anonymous fifteenth-century commentary on the articles mentioned above12. In their long and accurate introduction to their partial edition of this text, Claude Lafleur, David Piché and Joanne Carrier do not pay attention to this small though interesting detail, and make some general remarks on the efficacy of censorship: «la faillibilité du contrôle de l’orthodoxie doctrinale» is suggested by the manuscript transmission of the lists of condemned propositions, which sometimes distorted the original text and put in the mouth of censors statements they would have never uttered (pp. 933, 945). The example that Lafleur, Piché and Carrier give of this phenomenon is very striking: it seems to me, however, that misunderstandings, false readings or mistakes in textual transmission of the articuli condemnati prove less the inefficacy of doctrinal interventions than the well known fact that they often had unforeseen consequences. The difficulty of distinguishing intentional and unintentional results of censorship is evident if one considers the long debated question of Thomas Aquinas’ and Albert the Great’s implication in the decree of 7 March 127713. Roland Hissette, who in several important

12. «Et si articulus intelligitur de illa certitudine, tunc sacrasanta Uniuersitas Parisien- sis, conuocato consilio omnium magistrorum et omnium doctorum tam sacrarum paginarum quam sacrorum sanctorum iurium canonicorum, illum articulum approbat et firmiter tenet», p. 974, italics mine. If the reference to the Canonists seems unprecedented, the opinion that the Condemnation of 1277 was enacted by the faculty of Theology or by the entire University is rather common in the fifteenth century: see L. BIANCHI, Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l'evoluzione dell'aristotelismo scolastico (Quodlibet 6), Bergamo 1990, pp. 36-38. 13. See R. HISSETTE, «Saint Thomas et l’intervention épiscopale du 7 mars 1277», in: D. LORENZ et S. SERAFINI (edd.), Studi. 2, Roma 1995, pp. 204-258; ID., «L'implication de Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277», in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 64,1 (1997), pp. 3-31; ID. «Thomas d’Aquin directement visé par NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 211 contributions maintained that they were only indirectly targeted by this decree which was directed in the first instance against the teachers of the faculty of Arts, proposes now a detailed analysis of the presence of Albert the Great in two commentaries on Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’, that of Konrad of Megenberg and the so-called «Quod Deus» (pp. 873- 888). While Hans G. Senger presents Nicholas of Cusa as a late imi- tator of Tempier (pp. 1004-1014), Edward P. Mahoney collects many references to 1277 articles from the end of thirteenth century to the late sixteenth century, starting with the Correctorium fratris Thomae compiled by the Franciscan William de la Mare, and ending with the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (pp. 902-930). One should note that Mahoney’s contribution is a revised version of a paper presented «at the S.I.E.P.M. congress in Bonn in 1977» (p. 930, n. 134). Had it been published at that time, much work done later on the fortuna of these articles would have been greatly facilitated. In any event, thanks to Mahoney and other scholars working inde- pendently, we are now in a position to evaluate better the impact of Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’ on later Medieval, Renaissance and Early Modern thought; moreover, we have a deeper comprehension of its unexpected use in the process against Pico della Mirandola, the Galileo affair and the polemics surrounding Descartes philosophy14. Nonetheless, further research in this direction is still necessary. To give just an example, Mahoney seems to oppose Campanella’s strong interest in Tempier’s decree to the Jesuits’ more critical attitude toward its authority as a

la censure du 7 mars 1277?», in: J. HAMESSE (ed.), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria cul- turae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Age 10), Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 425-437; ID., «Thomas d’Aquin compromis avec Gilles de Rome en mars 1277», in: Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 93 (1998), pp. 5-26; J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN, «1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome», in: Vivarium 35 (1997), pp. 72-101; R. WIELOCKX, «Commentaire», pp. 67-225; ID., «Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin. Réponse à J.M.M.H. Thijssen», in: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 83 (1999), pp. 293-313; J.F. WIPPEL, «Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277», in: The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), pp. 233-272; ID., «Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: a Separate Process against Aquinas?», in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 44 (1997), pp. 117-136. 14. Several works devoted to the influence of Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’ are mentioned below. For a general account of its use from thirteenth to seventeenth century see L. BIANCHI, Il vescovo e i filosofi, pp. 31-40; ID., Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Université de Paris (XIIIe-XIVe siècles) (L’Âne d’or), Paris 1999, pp. 203-230. 212 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES touchstone of orthodoxy (p. 928). Campanella, however, is hardly the prototype of Renaissance Dominicans, and his provocative use of some articles in order to defend the libertas philosophandi is rather the exception than the rule15. For both Dominicans and Jesuits the main problem, during the sixteenth century, was to show that the Church always approved Thomism, and therefore that Thomas Aquinas was not touched by the Condemnation of 1277, as several critics of Pius V’s decision to proclaim him «Doctor Ecclesiae» (1567) insinuated. In this perspective, it is significant that Thomas’ involvement in the Condemnation was openly at stake even during the Jesuits debate de ratione studiorum. When in 1586 some Jesuits claimed that a few Thomistic doctrines should not be followed, others countered that the imposition of a critical attitude toward Thomas was a «very absurd» measure, which had proved to be historically unsuitable, as shown by Etienne de Bourret’s «recantation» of the articles prohibited by his predecessor Tempier: etsi in aliqualibus deserere divum Thomam nullum sit inconveniens, nec sit a nostro instituto alienum, si debito modo fiat; universam tamen Societatem constituere et obligare omnes, qui in ea sunt, ad deserendum ac impugnan- dum D. Thomam, etiam in paucis, visum est valde absurdum. Primo, durum nimis videtur, ut Societas audeat illud statuere, quod hucusque nulla univer- sitas fecit; vel si tentavit, ut fecit parisiensis, non sine universali et gravi scandalo id factum est; et postea sub Stephano episcopo parisiensi, cum maxime floreret, omnino retractavit16.

2. — The study of the long-term influence of Tempier’s decree is just one aspect of the more general and controversial question of its historical significance. In this perspective, it is noteworthy that many contributors to Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 seem to mistrust and are prepared to criticise some conceptual schemes and categories introduced by historians of the first half of twentieth century and frequently used in interpreting the Condemnation and its aftermath. Kent Emery and Martin W.F. Stone raise serious doubts on the

15. For Campanella’s use of Tempier’s articles see L. BIANCHI, «L’Apologia pro Galileo e la condanna di Tommaso d'Aquino», in: Intersezioni 2 (1982), pp. 179-190. 16. Examen Tractatuum, qui «De opinionum delectu» et «Commentariolus» inscribun- tur, in: Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Iesu […] VI. Collectanea de ratione studiorum Soci- etatis Iesu (1582-1587) (Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu 140), ed. by L. LUKÁCS, Institutum Historicum Societatis Jesu, Romae 1992, p. 50, italics mine. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 213

«‘struggle’ between so-called ‘intellectualists’ or ‘voluntarists’» (Emery, p. 84; Stone, pp. 795, 809); Emery questions the habit of conceiving a sharp divorce between ‘mystical theology’ and ‘scholasticism’ (pp. 69- 70); Emery again, together with Stone and Steven P. Marrone, chal- lenges the expression ‘conservatism’, but the latter two scholars emphasize in the meantime that some changes that occurred after Tempier’s intervention might be seen less as novelties than as «a return to paths temporarily abandoned» (Emery, pp. 65, 95-96; Marrone, pp. 280, 297; Stone, p. 809); Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen argues that the adher- ence to a philosophical school such as Thomism did not consist in adopting a whole system of thought, but rather a philosophical methodology and a few basic principles (pp. 418-419, 435)17; finally, if Ebbesen — after recognising that «it is notoriously dangerous to describe the history of philosophy in terms of ‘isms’» — suggests that the terms «modism» and «optimism» are nevertheless useful tools for understanding the philosophical climate of the last decades of thirteenth century, general labels like ‘Aristotelianism’, ‘anti-Aristotelian- ism’ and ‘Augustinism’ are seldom used throughout the volume, and often openly refused (see for instance Marrone, pp. 278-280; Speer, pp. 249, 274; Ebbesen, p. 457; Stone, pp. 795, 805, 819). The most remarkable exception is — as one might expect — ‘Averroism’. If Albert Zimmerman contents himself with showing that Ferrandus of Spain was not only a critic of Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics but «ein Verteidiger des Averroes» (pp. 410-416), Carlos Steel demonstrates that the conception of human happiness developed by Siger of Brabant in his De intellectu

17. At p. 417 Hoenen affirms that the Franciscan William de la Mare compiled the Correctorium fratris Thomae «before August 1277». This seems to be a misprint, because at p. 418, n. 3, Hoenen declares to follow the dating of R. HISSETTE, «L’implication de Thomas d’Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277», in: Recherches de théologie et Philosophie médiévales (64) 1997, p. 6, n. 21, where one can read «avant le mois d’août 1279». It is however worth noticing that the earlier date can actually be found in recent litterature on this topic: in his book Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle. Le cas de Jean Pecham (L’Âne d’or), Paris 1999, pp. 86, 125-126, 134, 213, 344, A. Boureau suggests «spring 1277», or even «March 1277». This is rather unplausible, because the Correctorium makes reference to the Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condemnatorum, which opens with the Oxford Condemnations of March, 18, 1277. Even if one admits that the Collectio was redacted in a few days and immediately transmitted to William de la Mare, the latter would have had about one week to compile (or at least to finish) his pamphlet against Aquinas. 214 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES and De felicitate had «an undeniable Averroistic flavour» (p. 227). Steel’s analysis of the passages, first discovered by Nardi, where Agostino Nifo and Alessandro Achillini present Siger’s position, is very fine and elegant; yet one might wonder whether Renaissance testi- monies of opinions defended in only a couple of lost treatises of a single philosopher provide sufficient ground to argue, against Van Steenberghen, for the existence of so-called ‘Latin Averroism’ in the last quarter of thirteenth century (p. 214, n. 11, and p. 230). Doubt- less, Steel gives a precise meaning to this vague and ambiguous expression and uses it in order to define specific doctrines concerning intellectual knowledge and philosophical happiness, but are we sure that these doctrines were actually diffused and marked the birth «of the ‘Averroistic movement’» (p. 230)? It is well known that the idea that the ultimate end of human beings is a sort of intellectual union with the most divine things was at the centre of the debates at Paris in the 1270s, and Siger was not the only master of Arts proposing views on this point which sounded outrageous and heterodox to some theologians. Yet there were different ways to conceive this union, and if the possibility of knowing ‘naturally’ the separate substances or even God’s essence represented a threat that theologians could not leave without answer18, it would be misleading to reduce all to a conflict between Catholic orthodoxy and ‘Averroistic ethics’. As Guldentops shows, the ideal of philosophical felicity was not necessarily perceived to be in opposition to Christian faith, and even after the Condemnation it continued to attract many thinkers, such as Henry Bate (pp. 657, 680-681). Moreover, the problem remains open as to what extent precisely the renaissance of intellectual eudaemonism at Paris in the Arts faculty was the effect and the sign of Averroes’ growing influence. After reconstructing the theory of philosophical felicity ascribed by Nifo and Achillini to Siger of Brabant, Steel claims that it was «provocative and more original than what we read in the other treatise on happiness by a colleague in the Arts faculty, Boethius of Dacia» (p. 228, italics mine). To put it in different terms: in his De summo bono — the only extant work entirely

18. For thirteenth-century discussions of God’s knowledge and its limits (with references to proposition 215 «Quo de deo non potest cognosci, nisi quia ipse est, siue ipsum esse»), see also Aertsen’s contribution (pp. 22-37). NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 215 devoted in the 1270s to the topic of human happiness — Boethius presents the doctrine that human beings find their supreme felicity when they contemplate God; yet this Arts master, considered one of the leaders of the philosophical movement often referred to as ‘Latin Averroism’, disregards completely the Averroistic interpretation of this doctrine and quotes Averroes just once, in all probability at second hand19. Howsoever it may be, it should be emphasized that ‘Latin Averro- ism’ is not one of the main topics debated in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, where one never finds the over-simplified picture of the Condemnation as a reaction of the ‘Augustinians’ against the ‘Aver- roists’. Kent Emery’s long and extremely rich essay (pp. 59-124) is significant also in this respect. Emery convincingly argues that Henry of Ghent was deeply influenced by the Augustinian notion of the abditum mentis, and shows, by thoroughly examining Henry’s Quodli- bets, that his doctrine of the continuity of natural and supernatural cognition is a philosophical development of his exegesis of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Yet Emery carefully avoids presenting Henry as the spokesman of the ‘Neoaugustinian movement’, who tried to counter the inroads of Aristotle and his supposedly uncritical advocates. Emery rather suggests that the only suitable label for Henry is «‘Christian Pla- tonist’, if such terms have any meaning at all» (p. 124); he stresses that the primary target of Henry’s criticism (as well as Bonaventure’s criticism) was not the Arts masters, but masters of theology prepared to use pagan ideas in their Summae; and he calls attention to the curious similarity between Henry’s account of Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul

19. See BOETHIUS OF DACIA, De summo bono, ed. by M. GRABMANN, p. 375, 171-173, italics mine: «Quaestio enim de intellectu divino est naturaliter sciri desiderata ab omnibus hominibus, ut dicit Commentator». In his first edition of this text (now in M. GRABMANN, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, München 1926-1956, vol. II, p. 214), Grabmann declared that he could not find this statement «verbotenus» in Averroes’ works. In the critical edition prepared for the Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum (p. 375), Grabmann made instead reference to Averroes’ commentary on Metaphysics, XI, c. 51 (Giunta edition, f. 335rD), which reads as follows: «Quia ista quaestio est nobilissima omnium, quae sunt de Deo, scilicet scire quid intel- ligit, et est desiderata ab omnibus naturaliter». Though all translators and interpreters of the De summo bono give this source, Boethius’ quotation seems to be a second-hand quotation from Albert the Great’s Metaphysics (ed. B. GEYER, p. 8, 1-4, italics mine): «Et ideo dicit Averroes in Commento super undecimum Metaphysicae Aristotelis, quod quaestio de intellectu divino est desiderata sciri ab omnibus hominibus». 216 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES and Siger of Brabant’s reading of the third book De anima (pp. 96- 97). This unexpected convergence between the presumed leader of the philosophical trend attacked by Tempier and one of the most outstanding theologians at bishop’s side is particularly instructive. How- ever, Franz Ehrle’s often-repeated story of the warfare between ‘Aris- totelianism’ and ‘Augustinism’ is not the only old, established interpretation the crisis of which will be evident to the readers of the volume. To mention just the most famous one, that of Pierre Duhem, it is reassuring to ascertain that in more than 1000 pages his views concerning the role of the Condemnation of 1277 as a providential intervention through which Church authorities freed Christian thought from its supposed subjection to Aristotelian philosophy and gave birth to modern science are mentioned in merely a very few places, and with great caution (Emery and Speer, p. 7; Donati, p. 593, n. 33; Mahoney, pp. 907-908, 921). It is true that Marrone’s beauti- ful essay is intended «to salvage at least some structural elements from the interpretative scheme erected by Duhem»; but this project is grounded precisely in his awareness that most duhemian claims are wholly unfashionable (pp. 276-298). If one remembers that The Cam- bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, published in 1982, still devoted a chapter to sketch all the duhemian topoi about the ‘spirit of 1277’ and its supposed effects, the apparent decline of this paradigm is striking20.

20. See E. GRANT, «The Effect of the Condemnation of 1277», in: N. KRETZMANN, A. KENNY et J. PINBORG (edd.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, pp. 537-539. A much richer and nuanced picture has been given by Grant in other important contributions: see at least the essays reprinted in his Studies in Medieval Science and Natural Philosophy (Variorum Collected Studies Series), London 1981, and especially essay n. XIII, «The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the late Middle Ages», originally published in: Viator 10 (1979), pp. 211-244; ID., The Foundations of Modern Science in the Midddle Ages. Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge 1996. Nonetheless one can still find there several traces of the ‘pre-1277/post-1277’ paradigm. For my criticism of this scheme, see below, p. 219. For a broader discussion of Duhem’s views on later medieval science and their influence, see the fundamental contributions by J.E. MURDOCH, «Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Latin West», in: R. IMBACH et A. MAIERÙ (edd.), Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra Otto e Novecento. Contributo a un bilancio storiografico (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 179), Roma 1991, pp. 253-302; ID., «1277 and Late Medieval Natural Philosophy», in: J.A. AERTSEN et NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 217

This leads us to a fundamental question: did Tempier’s intervention mark a watershed in medieval thought? William J. Courtenay remarks that this view «has far less support among historians of science, philosophy, and theology today than it once did» (p. 235), and calls attention to several institutional factors which might better explain intellectual developments after 1277. Reconstructing changes in moral psychology from Aquinas and Siger of Brabant to Duns Scotus, Stone emphasizes the risk of «overstatement» on one side, and of «sweep- ing generalization» on the other, and argues for a «prosaic assessment of the effect of the Condemnation» (pp. 796, 826). There are nonetheless good reasons to argue that the prohibited articles condi- tioned later medieval thought. For instance, their influence on Duns Scotus has been considered strong for a long time21. Focusing on his theory of knowledge, Bazán now asserts that his whole system might be considered «a brilliant expression» of the «cultural project embod- ied in the Condemnation of 1277»: if Tempier intended to reaffirm «the rights of theology over philosophy in a manner that seemed to legitimize a revision of philosophical doctrines in light of theological principles», Scotus did not content himself with repeating that philosophy is not the only source of truth, but went «to the heart of the matter by showing that philosophy is not entitled to give a proper account of human knowledge, of its scope and limitations, and must accept con- sequently a radical subordination to theology» (pp. 179, 210, italics mine). The numerous contemporary specialists in Scotus’s ‘philosophy’ must read Bazán’s brilliant essay, and face the challenge of his power- ful interpretation. More broadly speaking, the essays collected by Aertsen, Emery and Speer add new evidence to maintain that 1277 «does indeed signify or symbolize some critical turning-point in the history of medieval thinking» (Emery and Speer, p. 18). It is however remarkable that the authors of these essays seldom take Tempier’s decree as a cause or even as a starting point: Marrone does not hesitate

A. SPEER (edd.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médié- vale 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin-New York 1998, pp. 111-121. As Emery and Speer rightly emphasize in their Introduction (p. 7), Murdoch’s works show «contra Duhem, that the ‘scientific’ notions of fourteenth-century thinkers are incommensurate with the approach of modern science». 21. See below, n. 30. 218 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES to claim that «neither the Condemnation of 1277, nor in fact any of the Condemnations of the 1270s, was causal of the shifts within Scholasticism in late thirteenth century» (p. 297).

3. — After reading Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 I was impressed that it seems to confirm some of the most characteristic trends of recent interpretations of the affair of 1277. As a matter of fact, all of the most important works on this topic published in the last twenty years emphasize that the categories introduced between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (‘Aristotelian- ism’, ‘Augustinism’, ‘Averroism’, ‘intellectualism’, ‘voluntarism’, ‘neces- sitarianism’ etc.) often obscure our understanding of historical reality, which was much more rich and complicated. They all stress that the impact of the censured articles should be studied author by author, issue by issue, avoiding risky generalisations. They all agree that, though they took opposite sides during the conflicts of the 1270s, neither the masters of Arts nor the theologians formed monolithic groups. They all agree that doctrines of the intellect and the ideal of philosophical felicity — whether it be qualified as ‘Averroistic’ or not — were among the main problems at stake in that period. Alain de Libera’s brilliant and provocative book Penser au Moyen Age22 is emblematic in this respect, but in my opinion is less original than is often assumed: that the intellectual eudaemonism of the Artists «implied an whole new (or ancient) way of life» could hardly be considered «de Libera’s discovery» (Emery and Speer, p. 10)23. His most

22. A. DE LIBERA, Penser au Moyen Âge, Paris 1991. 23. A couple of pages before (p. 8), however, Emery and Speer had rightly emphasized that de Libera’s interpretation cannot be understood if one neglects «his Parisian neigh- bors, Pierre Hadot (ancient philosophy as a way of life) and Jacques Le Goff (the soci- ology of a new intellectual class)». On de Libera and Hadot see also Speer’s contribution, pp. 250-252. Previous bibliography on the intellectual eudaemonism of the Arts masters includes: R.-A. GAUTHIER, «Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’ sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque», in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 22-23 (1947-1948), pp. 187-336; G. DE LAGARDE, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Age. II. Secteur social de la scolastique, deuxième édition, Louvain-Paris 1958, pp. 28-50; J. LE GOFF, «Quelle con- science l’Université médiévale a-t-elle eu d'elle même?», in: P. WILPERT (ed.), Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des Mittelalterlichen Menschen (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 3), Berlin 1964, pp. 24-26; G. WIELAND, «Happiness: the Perfection of Man», in: KRETZMANN-KENNY- PINBORG (edd.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 680-683; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 219 significant, innovating (and controversial) contributions in this field are rather the following: the idea that the articles condemned are less the expression of doctrines actually taught by Parisian masters than fragments of a ‘philosophical project’ to come; the statement that Tempier’s intervention marks the ‘birth of the intellectuals’ (who therefore should be considered his bastards); and finally the elegant reconstruction of the so-called déprofessionnalisation of the ideal of philosophical life, disseminated by Dante and Eckhart outside the academic milieu and outside Paris24. As to Duhem’s views on 1277 as the ‘birth date’ of modern science, they have been criticised by such distinguished scholars as Alexandre Koyré, Anneliese Maier, Eugenio Garin and John E. Mur- doch25. Focusing on Duhem’s favourite topics (vacuum and plurality of the worlds), I recently argued that the Condemnation was only one factor among many that stimulated the discussion, correction and modification of Aristotle’s physics and cosmology. Moreover, I called attention to the danger of using too rigidly and schematically the ‘pre-1277/post-1277’ paradigm: from one side, if we take into con- sideration the original contributions of thinkers such as Richard Rufus, William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, it seems no longer possible to see that year as the watershed between the ‘dogmatic’ and the ‘critical’ phases of Scholastic Aristotelianism, as Duhem’s followers still do; from the other side, Tempier’s decree does not mark at all «the reflux of Aristotelianism», which in the fourteenth century consolidated its dominant role in university teaching, tied its fate to that of influential theological ‘schools’ and attained, for the first time, the open support of the papacy26. Thus, I have been greatly intrigued by the Introduction, where Kent Emery and Andreas Speer claim that Nach der Verurteilung von

L. BIANCHI, «La felicità intellettuale come professione nella Parigi del Duecento», in: Rivista di Filosofia 78 (1987), pp. 181-199; ID., Il vescovo e i filosofi, pp. 149-168. 24. On these points see K. EMERY, A. SPEER, «After the condemnations of 1277: the University of Paris in the last quarter of the Thirteenth century», p. 120. On de Libera’s turn to «Rhineland» see also their remarks in the Introduction to the present volume, p. 8, and Emery’s article, p. 69. 25. See Murdoch’s contributions quoted above, n. 20. 26. L. BIANCHI, «1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?», in: AERTSEN- SPEER (edd.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, pp. 105-110. 220 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES

1277, without pretending to suggest a new reading of the Condem- nation of 1277 and its historical significance, provides nevertheless «grounds for new interpretations» (Emery and Speer, pp. 14-19). Needless to say, the perception of novelties depends on the picture one has of previous scholarship. One of the novelties of the volume, of which the editors are rightly proud, is that most contributions focus on the ‘natural place’ where the force of the Condemnation should be measured: the faculties of Arts and Theology at Paris in the last quarter of thirteenth century. It seems however slightly exaggerated to claim that this intellectual milieu had been «strangely […] neglected» by medievalists (Emery and Speer, pp. 12-13, 18)27. This may be true for de Libera, whose book, as I remarked before, intended to recon- struct precisely how the Artists’ ideal of philosophical life was trans- planted outside the University of Paris. But what is true for de Libera’s book is not necessarily true for other works on the Condemnation and its impact, nor for contributions on single authors and topics, such as those by Gauthier, Hissette and Wielockx on Aristotelian commentaries of the 1280s and 1290s28; by Laurent, Wippel and Brown on Godfrey of Fontaines29; by Théry, Balic, and Rivera on Scotus and the Scotists30; by Livi and Imbach on the polemics against ‘Averroism’

27. Needless to say, this judgement concerns exclusively the influence of Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’. Of course, Emery and Speer are fully acquainted with the immense recent bibliography on thinkers such as Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, John Pecham and Henry Bate: see their Introduction, pp. 4-7, together with Emery’s well doc- umented contribution, especially pp. 59-62. 28. R.-A. GAUTHIER, «Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’ sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque», pp. 187-336; R. HISSETTE, «Etienne Tempier et le menaces contre l'éthique chrétienne», in: Bulletin de philosophie médièvale 21 (1979), pp. 68-72; R. WIELOCKX, «Le ms. Paris Nat. lat. 16096 et la condamnation du 7 mars 1277», in: Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 48 (1981), pp. 227-237. 29. M.H. LAURENT, «Godefroid de Fontaines et la condamnation de 1277», in: Revue Thomiste 35 (1930), pp. 273-281; J.F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study of Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington 1981, especially pp. 366-369, 381-385; S.F. BROWN, «Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent: Individuation and the Condemnations of 1277», in: S. WLODEK (ed.), Société et église. Textes et discussions dans les Universités d'Europe centrale pendant le Moyen Âge tardif (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale 4), Turnhout 1995, pp. 193-207. 30. G. THÉRY, «Le De Rerum Principio et la condamnation de 1277», in: La vie spiri- tuelle. Supplément 9-10 (1924), pp. 173-181; C. BALIC, «Johannes Duns Scotus und die Lehrentscheidung von 1277», in: Wissenschaft und Weisheit 29 (1966), pp. 210-229; ID., «Il decreto del 7 marzo 1277 del vescovo di Parigi e l'origine dello scotismo», in: Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 17/24 aprile 1974) Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 221 developed by Ramon Lull during his stay in Paris31; by Alvarez Turienzo, Ingham and Putallaz on moral philosophy between the thirteenth and fourteenth century32; by Dales, Grant and others on later medieval natural philosophy33. So the problem was less to «redress» an «omission» (Emery and Speer, p. 13) than to give new impulsion to scholarly research in this field, and doubtless the volume represents a decisive step in that direction: the contributions by Silvia Donati (pp. 577-617) and Sten Ebbesen (pp. 456-492) are particularly important, because we still have a superficial knowledge of the faculty of Arts in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, and there is much to be edited and read in order to evaluate the reactions to the Condemna- tion among the Artists34. This leads me to a second result of Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Emery and Speer remark that, despite Tempier’s claim that his decree of March 7, 1277 was directed in the first instance against the errors taught in the faculty of Arts, it had more significance for the theologians than for the Arts masters (p. 12). This had been noticed some years ago by Courtenay, who called attention to the fact that in most cases the lists of the articles proscribed by Tempier were attached to theological manuscripts35. I have recently suggested that the main

settimo centenario, Napoli 1975-1978, vol. II, pp. 279-285; E. RIVERA, «Juan Duns Escoto ante la condenación de 1277», in: Cuadernos Salamantinos de Filosofia 4 (1977), pp. 41-54. 31. F. LIVI, «Lullo e S. Tommaso: qualche osservazione sulla Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita», in: Sapienza 29 (1976), pp. 82-91; R. IMBACH, «Lull face aux aver- roïstes parisiens», in: Raymond Lulle et le Pays d’Oc, Fanjou 1987, pp. 261-282. I remark incidentally that Lull is one of the most significant figures missing in the volume. 32. S. ALVAREZ TURIENZO, «Incidencia en la ética de la condena parisiense de 1277», in: Cuadernos Salamantinos de Filosofia 4 (1977), pp. 55-98; M.E. INGHAM, «The Condemnation of 1277: Another Light on Scotist Ethics», in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 37 (1990), pp. 91-103; F.-X. PUTALLAZ, Insolente liberté. Con- troverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Vestigia 15), Fribourg-Paris 1995. 33. R.C. DALES, «The De-Animation of the Haevens in the Middle Ages», in: Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (1980), pp. 531-550. For Edward Grant and his critics see the works mentioned above, n. 20. 34. See also S. EBBESEN, «Radulphus Brito. The Last of the Great Arts Masters or: Philosophy and Freedom», in: J.A. AERTSEN et A. SPEER (edd.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin-New York 2000, pp. 231-251. According to Ebbesen (p. 232) «1277 had no appreciable effect on the way the artists did philosophy». 35. W.J. COURTENAY, «The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condem- nations at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages», in: B.C. BAZÁN, E. ANDÚJAR et L.G. SBROCCHI (edd.), Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge. Actes du 222 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES reason for this is the Franciscans’ use of these articles in their polemics against Aquinas. If we remember that William de la Mare quoted many articles in his Correctorium, that the anonymous author of the Declarationes used them as the most important auctoritas against Thomas, and that already from 1279 all Franciscans were obliged to avoid «the opinions censured by the bishop and the masters of Paris», it is not surprising that Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’ — which was originally directed against Arts masters and had only a local scope — soon become an authoritative document for theologians, inside and outside the University of Paris36. Whether or not one accepts this explanation, I do not see why the apparent paradox of the theological audience of a Condemnation connected with the teaching in the Arts faculty should challenge «institutional interpretations» of the Condemna- tion, as Emery and Speer seem to suggest (p. 12). In my opinion it simply confirms the necessity of distinguishing three interrelated but different historical problems: first, the meaning and purpose of Tempier’s action, secondly how contemporaries perceived it, and thirdly its rather unexpected outcome. In order to consider the first problem, we must remember what we said above: despite tensions existing between Parisian ecclesiastical authorities and University theologians, and probably among theologians themselves, the committee charged with preparing the list of ‘errors’ was composed by sixteen masters of theology37, whose main target were the writings of their most outstanding colleagues in the Arts faculty such as Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and James of Douai. Therefore the Condemnation was doubtless an attempt by the faculty of Theology to control philosophical teaching in the Arts faculty. Things however change if we look at the second question. Even if one accepts the subtle distinction between ‘directly touched’ and ‘indirectly implicated’ introduced by Hissette (who now applies it also to Albert the Great, pp. 273-288), it is hard to disagree with John Wippel when he emphasizes that many contemporaries thought Thomas’ doctrinal positions were at stake already on 7 March (to say

IXe Congrès international de Philosophie médiévale, New York-Ottawa-Toronto 1995, vol. III, pp. 1659-1667. 36. L. BIANCHI, Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Université de Paris, pp. 207-217. 37. See above, p. 209. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 223 nothing of subsequent phases of Tempier’s ‘March campaign’)38. As to the third question, it is well known that, whatever the bishop’s intentions, which in my opinion were pastoral rather than doctrinal, his decree of 7 March became a sort of inventory of heterodox doctrines, and offered for centuries a practical means of distinguishing what one was or was not free to affirm during a philosophical or theological disputation39. In this perspective, one might say that Emery and Speer dismiss perhaps too quickly the problem of intellectual freedom and its limitations in the University of Paris (Emery and Speer, pp. 17-18) and have sometimes a tendency to evaluate the evidence provided on this point by the volume itself using the medieval method called interpre- tatio benevolentior. It is doubtless difficult to judge «the extent to which late thirteenth-century teachers of natural philosophy in the faculty of Arts were deeply concerned about, or felt curtailed by, the Condemnation of 1277» (Emery and Speer, p. 18). Thanks to Silvia Donati we already knew a passage where an anonymous master of Arts at the end of thirteenth century openly declared his ignorance concerning the existence of condemned articles treating the multiplication of immaterial substances40. Among the interesting texts now edited by Sten Ebbesen we find a question where Brito, though accepting by faith that accidents might exist «per se», emphasizes that Aristotle would have refuted the argument that the First Cause can produce an accident without the help of a substance: in doing so, Brito disregards the fact that the so-called ‘principle of immediacy’, according to which God can do directly all that he can do through secondary causes, had been claimed as a norm of orthodoxy by

38. See above, n. 13. It is worth noticing that in their Introduction, following Wie- lockx’s lead concerning the censure of Giles of Rome and intended censure of Thomas Aquinas, which followed quickly upon the ‘great’ Condemnation of 7 March, Emery and Speer imply that Tempier’s ultimate intention was theologians (pp. 5-7). 39. See L. BIANCHI, «1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?», pp. 93-96. On pastoral intentions of bishop Tempier see also ID., Il vescovo e i filosofi, pp. 199-200. 40. «Et ideo sequitur correlarie quod substantiae separatae a magnitudine non sunt divisibiles in partes consimiles; et ideo in eis est tantum unum individuum sub una specie secundum philosophos […]. Nescio tamen si est ibi articulus, dico tamen hoc secundum intentionem philosophorum…», quoted by S. DONATI, «A New Witness to the Radical Aristotelianism Condemned by Étienne Tempier in 1277», in: AERTSEN-SPEER (edd.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, p. 378, n. 25, italics mine. At least two articles (81 and 96) condemned on March 7, 1277 deal with the multiplication of immaterial substances. 224 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES article 6341. Nevertheless, it would be incautious to think that after 1277 Parisian Arts masters were in a position to do philosophy without any ‘ideological’ limitation: Ebbesen shows that in discussing the problem of the will Brito «clearly felt the breath of the theologians in his neck» (p. 465); Mahoney calls attention to the fact that John of Jandun «alludes at least once to the Condemnation in his questions on the De anima» (p. 918); Dag Nikolaus Hasse remarks that the case of Pietro d’Abano — accused of fifty-five errors by the Domini- cans but later rescued with papal help — «remind us that intellectual freedom was seriously threatened and that it was particularly dangerous to express one’s opinion freely on the theory of the soul» (p. 653). If we move from Arts masters to theologians the situation appears more complicated — even if one dismisses Henry of Ghent’s famous interview with Simon of Brion concerning the plurality of substantial forms42. It is true that Pini’s contribution on Giles of Rome (pp. 390- 409) shows that the Condemnation may have «inspired a deeper understanding of metaphysical principles» (Emery and Speer, p. 17), but it shows also that after 1277 he repudiated his doctrine of cre- ation, abandoning Aquinas’ late and strongest position that there is no contradiction between being created and being eternal, and adopting a more cautious thesis (Pini, p. 402). Again, it is true that «Godfrey

41. See EBBESEN, p. 484, especially ad 1.1 (italics mine): «Cum dicitur ‘Substantia est aliqua causa accidentis et omnem causalitatem quam habet accipit a causa prima, et quicquid facit causa prima mediante secunda potest facere per se’ diceret Philosophus quod causa prima potest facere quicquid et secunda, sed effectum causae secundae non potest facere sine causa secunda, …». This statement is clearly contrary to article 63, which prohibited to teach: «quod deus non potest in effectum cause secundarie sine ipsa causa secundaria» (ed. D. PICHÉ, p. 100, italics mine). Concerning the ‘principle of immediacy’ (thus defined by H. BLUMENBERG, The Genesis of the Copernican World, transl. by R.M. WALLACE, Cambridge (Mass.)-London 1987, pp. 163, 478-480), see BIANCHI, Il vescovo e i filosofi, pp. 79-80. 42. Though recognising that Henry «was disturbed» by Simon’s prescriptions, Emery and Speer suggest that the inner dynamic of Henry’s thought required the twofold form in the human being (pp. 17-18). On this specific point, their interpretation is close to the one recently proposed by A. BOUREAU, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle, pp. 118- 127; ID., «La censure dans les universités médiévales (note critique)», in: Annales HSS 55 (2000), pp. 318-322. I discuss Boureau’s interpretation of Henry’s doctrinal evolution concerning the plurality of forms in L. BIANCHI, «Un Moyen Age sans censure? (Réponse à Alain Boureau)», in: Annales HSS, 57 (2002), pp. 738-739. On Henry of Ghent’s theory of knowledge and its metaphysical and theological background, see Emery’s fundamental contribution to the volume here reviewed (pp. 59-124). NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 225 of Fontaines was downright disrespectful of many of the condemned articles» (Emery and Speer, p. 17); thanks to Bonnie Kent (pp. 704- 718), however, we know also that he made no effort to Christianize the Nicomachean Ethics, the only work of Aristotle openly mentioned in Tempier’s ‘Syllabus’. Yet, if one looks at Godfrey’s references to the Condemnation, collected by Wippel (pp. 386-389), one can easily find the well known passage where this outstanding theologian, about twenty years after 1277, still refuses to resolve a question on angels «propter periculum excommunicationis», a passage quoted also by Mahoney in order to show that the Condemnation «appears in fact to have had a somewhat stultifying effect on the intellectual life of the university» (pp. 908-910). So I would think it much safer to say that Tempier’s Condemna- tion had a «heuristic capacity» (to use de Libera’s terminology)43, but at the same time a repressive and preventive force. As I have elsewhere presented evidence on both these points44, I will underline that if there is one case in which 1277 really marked a turning point, it is the history of censorship. As a matter of fact, at the end of his prefa- tory letter the bishop of Paris gave instructions introducing within the University a system of denouncement of false or suspect teachings that had previously been used only in the Dominican convents. The practice of reporting on others was soon imposed by a specific oath (clearly reminiscent of Tempier’s letter), which bachelors of theology had to swear before starting to lecture on the Sentences; and we know that this oath was taken seriously from the end of the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, at Paris and in other universities45. So if 1277 was — as Courtenay rightly remarks (p. 246) — the last attempt by theologians to «control aspects of teaching in the arts faculty at Paris»46, it was also the beginning of a period of much stronger doctrinal control within the Theology faculty. This does not mean, of course, that in the later Middle Ages theological masters at Paris were intimidated or prevented from expressing their ideas; but freedom of

43. A. DE LIBERA, Penser au Moyen Âge, p. 15. 44. See at least L. BIANCHI, «1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?», pp. 97- 101. 45. See L. BIANCHI, Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Université de Paris, pp. 50-52. 46. Theologians and other ecclesiastical authorities, however, did not renounce to impose discipline upon single Artists. 226 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES thought and censorship coexisted uneasily and condemnations, the number of which increased significantly during the fourteenth century, are not the invention of alleged ‘rationalist’ historians. A few pages of the Introduction to Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 are devoted to present and criticise some recent works on the Con- demnation, which are supposed to give a sort of ‘standard interpretation’ of the event and its aftermath (Emery and Speer, pp. 8-11). I feel highly honoured to be considered, together with Alain de Libera and David Piché47, as one of the ‘founders’ of this ‘standard interpretation’; nonetheless I wonder whether it really exists48. Probably I am the best interpreter neither of myself nor of my francophone colleagues, but I have the impression that one could give further details on the relationship between our interpretations and notice some significant dif- ferences among them49. Moreover, and most important, I think that what we actually share are not the old-fashioned positivist assumptions ascribed to us. As a matter of fact, none of us intended to «view the Condemnation and its historical aftermath through the lens of modern categories» and present it as a conflict between «a free, autonomous philosophy, on one side, and authoritarian, extrinsically imposed religious dogmas that repress the dynamic thrust of the immanent principles of thought, on the other» (Emery and Speer, p. 9, italics mine). To the best of my knowledge, such an interpretation has had no supporters for a long time. Even Kurt Flasch, who in 1989 suggested that ‘radical Aristotelianism’ might be considered as a sort of Enlightenment avant la lettre, openly denied that Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia had the monopoly of rationality and recognized that one can find «light» and «shadows» on both the side of the ‘Averroists’ and of Tempier50; and the most Manichean account of the

47. The name of Kurt Flasch is suddenly added at p. 10. 48. This is explicitly, and in my opinion rightly, denied by Steven Marrone, at p. 278. 49. The alleged identity between the interpretations proposed by the present writer in Il vescovo e i filosofi and by Alain de Libera in Penser au moyen age is perhaps the effect of Piché’s large use of both these sources. Piché, however, distinguished carefully our positions in his review-article «Penser au Moyen Âge d’Alain de Libera: une perspective nova- trice sur la condamnation parisienne de 1277», in: Laval théologique et philosophique 52 (1996), pp. 199-217 (see especially p. 217). 50. K. FLASCH, Aufklärung im Mittelalter. Die Verurteilung von 1277 (Excerpta classica 6), Mainz 1989, pp. 84-86. See also p. 73, where Flasch suggests that sometimes it is not clear whether the Arts masters or Tempier should be considered the Aufklärer. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 227

Condemnation which has been recently proposed sees it not in terms of a warfare between ‘rationalism’ and ‘religious dogmatism’, but as a feud between the different intellectual «parties» existing in Paris51. To avoid any misunderstanding it is nonetheless useful to recall once again that we certainly need neither an apology for, nor an unfair criticism of the bishop’s conduct, but a better understanding of the multiple reasons that might explain his intervention, the attitude of the theologians who (willy-nilly) upheld him, the causes of their conflict with the Arts masters52. In this perspective de Libera, Piché and the present writer simply aimed at emphasizing that this conflict resulted in the emergence of a new class of professional philosophers, fully conscious of their intellectual function and freedom, who introduced a new conception of the nature and the scope of philosophy in Chris- tendom: according to ‘radical Aristotelians’ such as Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and James of Douai, philosophy was an autonomous discipline independent from Revelation, which ought to be appreciated and practiced not only as a component of the theological enterprise, but in and for itself. In other words, we called attention to the fact that from the middle of the thirteenth century Arts masters challenged the old accepted scheme of the ‘ancillarity’ of philosophy, developed a growing awareness of their methodological and epistemic attitudes, and made a large use of the distinction between speaking ‘theologically’ and ‘philosophically’ or ‘naturally’53. This of course does not mean at all that those who did not accept this distinction, or used it in a different way, were not philosophers, and none of us ever made a statement such as: «philosophy cannot be philosophy unless it is liberated from the theological context in which […] it was inextricably bound» (Emery and Speer, p. 10, italics mine). As a matter of fact, de Libera recently devoted a long article to argue that, strictly speaking, a ‘faculty of Philosophy’ did not exist in the late Middle Ages, because only the whole University — and first

51. See R.C. DALES, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 18), Leiden 1990, pp. 175-177. 52. See L. BIANCHI, Il vescovo e i filosofi, pp. 150, 197-200; D. PICHÉ, La condamnation parisienne de 1277, n. 1, pp. 173-174. 53. On the origin and use of the clause «loquens ut naturalis» see L. BIANCHI, E. RANDI, Le verità dissonanti. Aristotele alla fine del medioevo (BCM 991), Roma-Bari 1990, pp. 33-56; French translation by C. Pottier, Vérités dissonantes. Aristote à la fin du Moyen Age (Vestigia 11), Paris-Fribourg 1993, pp. 39-70. 228 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES of all the faculty of Theology — could then provide the institutional context for doing philosophy. Moreover, he emphasized that «les théologiens se sont souvent présentés comme les contempteurs de la philosophie, mais beaucoup d’entre eux ont été plus philosophes que leurs supposés adversaires»54. In his Penser au Moyen Age, he already made the following remark: Il importe peu de décider si les intellectuels étaient plus nombreux chez les ‘artistes’ misérables et censurés que chez les ‘théologiens’ […]. La philosophie médiévale n’a jamais été l’apanage des seules philosophes, la pensée philosophique a essaimé en dehors de la philosophie55. As far as I am concerned, although I insisted on the importance of the institutional distinction between professional philosophers working in the Arts faculties and Theology masters, I am of course prepared to recognise that in the Middle Ages there were different ways of conceiving and practicing philosophy. If I called attention to the obvious but often neglected fact that the few thirteenth- and fourteenth-century thinkers who overtly considered themselves ‘philosophers’ were precisely those (Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun, John Buridan etc.) who decided to remain Arts masters for a long time, I would never refuse this title to a thinker because of his theological training or his use in his inquiries of theological principles and notions. I frankly admit to being little fascinated by the

54. A. DE LIBERA, «Faculté des arts ou Faculté de philosophie? Sur l'idée de philosophie et l'idéal philosophique au XIIIe siècle», in: O.WEIJERS et L. HOLTZ (edd.), L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles (Studia Artistarum 4), Turnhout 1997, pp. 429-444 (I quote from p. 444, italics mine). It is undoubtedly true that medieval ‘intellectuals’ did philosophy in both faculties, and it would be foolish to deny that the best of medieval philosophy can generally be found in theological works. It seems however excessive to say that «la Faculté des arts est une Faculté où la philosophie a sa place parce qu’elle n’est pas une Faculté de ‘philosophes’. […] Une Faculté de philosophie au sens moderne du terme est impossible et impensable dans les premières décennies du XIIIe siècle […]. Bref, il n’y a de place pour la philosophie à la Faculté des arts qu’à condi- tion qu’elle soit et reste institutionellement une Faculté des arts» (ibidem, p. 437, italics mine). At least from the middle of the thirteenth century, when the works of Aristotle were adopted as ‘textbooks’, Parisian Arts faculty actually became and was perceived to be a faculty of philosophy. See for instance the letter sent by the University in February 4, 1254, where the following four «faculties» are distinguished: «… qui in quatuor facultates, videlicet theologiam, jurisperitiam, medicinam, necnon rationalem, naturalem, moralem philosophiam,…», in: Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, p. 252, italics mine. 55. A. DE LIBERA, Penser au Moyen Age, p. 352. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 229 question as to whether the production of such thinkers as William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Ockham and Bradwardine should be qualified as ‘theology’, ‘philosophy’ or ‘Christan philosophy’, and I see no advantage in abstract discussions about what philosophy was or should have been during the Middle Ages. As an historian, I am much more interested in examining the multiple factors which explain intellectual changes, and for this reason I emphasized that in the Later Middle Ages most of the general areas of philosophy were fruitfully influenced by theology; I included the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power among the main causes which acceler- ated the metamorphosis of Scholastic discourse in the fourteenth century and introduced significant departures from the Aristotelian framework; I recognized that Tempier’s Condemnation was, «for good and ill, one of the motors of intellectual movement» and, far from being «the end of the honeymoon» of philosophy and theology, it «gave birth to new forms of cohabitation (if not of marriage) between them»56. In conclusion, I fully agree with Emery and Speer that it would be simplistic to see in 1277 the «failure of Scholastic syntheses» (Emery and Speer, p. 15; cf. p. 16), and the thirty-five essays they edited give proof of that assertion. Yet, if this is one of the most important results of Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, a question still remains: does this result disprove «recent» and «enlightened» (Emery and Speer, p. 8) interpretations of the Condemnation, or rather Gilson’s account of the history of later medieval philosophy?

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56. L. BIANCHI, «1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?», pp. 100, 104; see also ID., Il vescovo e i filosofi, passim.