Velina Tchakarova Sofia Maria Satanakis

FOKUS | 4/2020

EU – NATO Relations: Enhanced Cooperation Amidst Increased Uncertainty

Introduction Article 5 commitment. Being a historically criticized by the Alliance. Furthermore, distant NATO member, announced President Erdoğan repeatedly threatened Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty its commitment to enhance European to reject defence plans for and the Organization (NATO) has been the main strategic autonomy, while pushing for a Baltics, if NATO did not classify the Kurdish framework for European security based on fundamental debate on the future of the YPG militia as a terrorist organization. the principle of collective defence.1 Despite Transatlantic Alliance. More recently, the opening of ’s occasional tensions between some of the borders to the EU brought a new influx of European NATO members and US President During the two-day Summit, the Allies migrants to , leading to renewed Donald Trump in recent years, the coopera- discussed the following topics: tensions between the two neighbors. Thus, tion between the European Union (EU) and the NATO-Turkey relationship has reached NATO has been deepened with unprece- was put on the agenda, as Secre- a new low, a situation that especially dented speed and scope on an institutional tary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed could benefit from. The majority level, which has an overall stabilizing effect the need for NATO to fully recognize the of NATO countries agreed that Russia on the transatlantic relationship. Under the country’s growing influence in Europe, Af- continues to pose an existential threat to Trump administration, the USA has increa- rica and the Arctic. Therefore, the London transatlantic security, which is why Secre- sed contributions to the Alliance, proving Declaration spoke of both “opportunities tary General Stoltenberg pleaded for unity that European members have not lost their and challenges” in relation to China.4 For towards Moscow once again. importance to Washington. the first time, the People’s Republic was characterized as a potential strategic The climate factor is also playing an incre- Against this background, the paper seeks threat to the West. In particular, the USA asingly important role in security policy to present an overall view of the latest is pressing for Chinese tech giant Huawei debates, as it could lead to renewed migra- trends and developments considering the to be excluded from the expansion of the tion flows, as well as novel security threats Transatlantic Alliance, as well as potential telecommunications infrastructure on the in various areas. In this regard, ’s implications on the future cooperation old continent. In this regard, NATO’s main prime minister, Erna Solberg, referred between the EU and NATO under the im- task would be to assess possible risks and among others to the lack of water facili- pact of the Covid-19 virus outbreak. find ways to maintain communications tating the rise of extremist movements in should (in line with American concerns) areas such as Mali and Burkina Faso, and NATO Summit in London cyber-attacks take place. The Alliance also stressed that NATO should submit itself reaffirmed the need to adjust its political to an intensive discussion on the security The London Summit in December 2019 orientation in the Far East and to continue implications of climate change. proved to be of particular importance, as it to monitor China’s military rise. However, marked the Alliance’s 70th anniversary. On due to the diverging interests of NATO The debate on financialburden-sharing this occasion, the Allies sought to demons- members towards Beijing, an effective and within NATO remains one of the most trate their unity as well as NATO’s sound coherent China policy could prove to be controversial items on the transatlan- functionality. The Summit, however, came difficult and Europe may eventually see tic agenda and is almost as old as the about at a delicate time for the Alliance itself confronted with a risky balancing act Alliance itself. Numerous US presidents and was overshadowed by major differen- between the USA and China. used to criticize the low contributions of ces and disagreements. It took place in the the European members of the Alliance midst of the UK’s turbulent exit from the Although NATO would undoubtedly be long before President Trump took office, EU (Brexit) and, at the same time, President weaker without Turkey, the country also and as a result of Brexit, 80 percent of the Trump was confronted with an impeach- poses a major source of insecurity: The Alliance’s defence expenditures will now ment inquiry at home.2 In addition, ahead gas dispute between Turkey, Cyprus, and come from non-EU countries.5 Therefore, of the Summit, President Macron sharply Greece could potentially escalate, leading the need for increased defence spending criticized NATO’s functionality by clai- to a deadlock situation which will have a was an important topic of discussion at the ming that the Alliance was experiencing negative impact on EU-NATO relations. London Summit. ‘brain-death’.3 According to him, the USA is The purchase of the Russian Triumph air becoming increasingly unreliable as a gu- defence system S-400 and Turkey’s military Despite the initial differences, the London arantor of European security, as is NATO’s actions in northern Syria were also heavily Declaration acknowledged the unprece-

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dented progress of EU-NATO cooperation ordinated the transport of supplies across defence-related issues is underlined time and reaffirmed both the strong transat- the member states using two additional and again. lantic bond between Europe and North programs – the Strategic Airlift Capability America, as well as the commitment to and Strategic Airlift International Solution Before the London Summit, Stoltenberg Article 5 on collective defence. (SALIS).9 announced that in 2019, defence spen- ding across European Allies and NATO and the response to the Covid-19 Obviously, existing EU and NATO struc- increased in real terms by 4.6%, making virus outbreak tures and mechanisms were applied this the fifth consecutive year of growth.13 to coordinate logistical, transport, and He also revealed that by the end of 2020, No country was spared from the spread medical help to the member states. Both those Allies will have invested $130 billion of the Covid-19 virus to Europe and North the EU and NATO recognized the need for more since 2016, and while in 2017 only America and various NATO members, such cooperation and coordination, in order to five Allies reached the two-percent-target, as the USA, UK, , and , were most create synergies through complementary meanwhile the number increased to heavily affected in terms of infection and capabilities and launch a pool of adequate nine countries: the USA, Greece, , death rates. Secretary General Stoltenberg resources based on the best practices and , Poland, the UK and the Baltics. addressed the dire situation and the seve- experiences in each of the organizations. However, as a consequence of the current re economic consequences of Covid-19, One of their main tasks was the transpor- Covid-19 crisis, European defence bud- while stressing the important role of NATO tation of patients to countries with free gets are in danger of being (once more) during the pandemic outbreak.6 Further- hospital capacities, as well as medical per- severely cut – a repetition of what had more, Stoltenberg called on NATO member sonnel and supplies. Repatriation flights happened after the financial crisis in 2008. states to adhere to their commitments to for citizens of the EU and NATO members Nowadays, armed forces in most Euro- military spending despite the economic were also conducted. In this context, the pean countries are still in the process of shock caused by Covid-19. A main argu- pandemic revealed existing gaps in their recovering from the damage done in those ment for maintaining the membership fees coordinated responses but also highligh- years, and considering that the range of is the increasingly important role of the ted “both the need for and the potential of security challenges currently facing Euro- military in containing pandemics. Howe- NATO-EU cooperation.”10 pe is broader and more complex than ten ver, the commitment to spend $400 billion years ago, it would be ill-advised to slow more by the mid-20s will likely be tested in Implications for the EU’s Common Security down this repair and modernisation cycle the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis.7 and Defence Policy by a new round of defence budget cuts.

The Alliance, like other international orga- Current developments confirm that NATO It is also necessary for Europe to conti- nizations, had to take preventive measures remains the most important collective de- nue its efforts towards a more balanced to minimise the risk of further infection. fence organization for European security. burden-sharing within NATO. A new During the Covid-19 crisis, NATO initiated In its annual report on the implementati- formula for sharing these costs was agreed an active exchange between the Allies and on of the Common Foreign and Security with the USA and covering 16% boosted coordination with the European Policy (CFSP)11, the European Parliament of NATO’s budget respectively starting in partners. The Alliance had its own medical stressed the importance of the Transat- 2021.14 Furthermore, the Trump admi- personnel at disposal and was strictly lantic Alliance, while expressing concerns nistration considerably increased the US monitoring the potential Covid-19 impact about the USA’s withdrawal from the outlays for military operations in Europe on NATO forces in international operations. multilateral world order. The report advo- within the framework of the European De- Despite the pandemic, the work of the cates for strengthening the EU’s capacity terrence Initiative (EDI). In fact, the USA tri- organization remained uninterrupted. to act autonomously in the field of security pled the EDI spending to boost European Although initially some military exercises, and defence, underlining that a strategic defence and even increased the presence such as ‘Defender Europe 2020’, had to autonomy of the Union would not pose a of US troops in Europe.15 Moreover, the be postponed, the continuation of NATO threat to NATO; if anything, it could rather long-standing debate on increased de- operations abroad was further assured. contribute to further strengthening the fence spending is missing the heart of the One important step was the utilisation Alliance. This notion was also reaffirmed in problem: even though the EU’s ‘Big Two’, of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response the recent report on the implementation France and Germany, have ambitious goals Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to provide of the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) ‘The Eu- for European defence, they follow tradi- support for allies and partners during the ropean Union’s Global Strategy: Three Years tionally different paths – Paris relies on pandemic. Spain was one of the most On, Looking Forward’.12 Brussels emphasi- depth and hard power, on breadth affected countries, and Madrid received ses that a strong EU-NATO partnership is and soft power. Europe needs a common support from EADRCC, specifically from evidence of an increasingly interconnec- strategic culture in order to safeguard its the , Turkey, Germany, Lux- ted transatlantic security area, and the interests and values in a coherent way embourg and .8 The Alliance co- importance of far-reaching cooperation on and be a credible NATO partner. The EU

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member states should therefore focus on The Transatlantic Alliance evokes a  The Covid-19 crisis could trigger a crisis making defence spending more effective, reminiscence of past times, and yet it has of confidence and solidarity in Europe, by avoiding duplications and cooperating proven to be an adaptive institutional which might result in a growing frag- more closely in the field of defence as a relict from the Cold , even though mentation within the EU institutions actor. many have declared it to be obsolete over or between EU member states along the last three decades, including Trump the geopolitical and geoeconomic In this regard, Brussels should also aim recently. In fact, NATO has not only proven interests of the main external actors on to add more credibility to the goal of en- its ability to adapt to a changing environ- the old continent; hancing its strategic autonomy. Concrete ment by constantly developing new tools measures and action plans for the better and instruments to interact with it, but  Potential cuts in the defence spending pooling of capacities and capabilities also demonstrates comparative advanta- of many EU member states might should continuously be adopted, in order ges in dealing with a potential new rival become obstructive for future invest- to launch a stronger European presence such as China, based on its past experi- ments in this field and would also not just in the political and economic, ence with the . The organiza- make it difficult to achieve the planned but also in the military and technological tion already disposes of rich know-how on increase in NATO defence spending field (a ‘Europe first’ narrative). Initiatives the broad spectrum of non-kinetic warfare, until 2024; like the Permanent Structured Coopera- from cyber-attacks to Russia’s all-out tion (PESCO)16 and the European Defence information war, and is thus best equipped  A trend towards the “bilateralisation” Fund (EDF)17 surely have the potential to face an assertive China in the future. It of international relations, as well as to become game changers and provide is also clear that none of the transatlantic the risk of a continuous erosion of the a meaningful framework for European members, aside from the USA, could tackle role of the EU and NATO in internati- defence procurement, but only if member a potentially deepening systemic coordi- onal multilateral forums, might have states show willingness to go beyond the nation between Moscow and Beijing in the a negative impact on the cohesion of political and industrial hurdles to jointly field of security and defence on their own. Transatlantic policies and strategies; deliver the capabilities they need. A fundamental common feature of the EU  As a result of the withdrawal from the Future Outlook and NATO is their willingness to integrate EU, the UK might start playing France new members. Following the accession of and Germany off against each other The EU will continue to face an increasin- Montenegro to NATO (2017), the Republic by pursuing bilateral negotiations gly complex and unpredictable security of joined the Alliance and agreements with each of the two environment, which includes a weakened in March this year18; the Alliance is now countries. This might produce new multilateral order, enhanced hybrid and comprising of thirty states. At the Brussels tensions between Berlin and Paris and terrorist threats, growing instability in Summit in 2018, Allies welcomed the his- make it more difficult to deepen the the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), toric Prespa agreement between Athens Franco-German cooperation in the a more self-confident China, as well as a and Skopje and invited the government field of security and defence policy. more assertive Turkey and Russia. The Uni- to begin accession talks.19 The inclusion of on must therefore adapt to this new global North Macedonia is seen as an important  A united front of several European political reality and find ways to better step towards stabilising the entire Balkan NATO members (Poland, the Baltic protect what has been politically built in region and EU accession negotiations countries, Romania, etc.) is emerging Europe over the decades, without relying would be the next realistic step. They were as a result of an increasingly benevo- solely on American help and protection. originally scheduled to start in the summer lent position of France and Germany of 2019, but integration efforts suffered towards Russia, which might shift the This year is already proving to be crucial a setback when France refused to open focus on strengthening the bilateral for both the EU and NATO because of the accession talks with North Macedonia relations with the USA (and NATO) and Covid-19 crisis, which – apart from its and .20 This, in turn, showed how thus slow down the EU‘s attempts at disruptive socio-economic and political quickly security and stability in the Wes- deepening integration in the field of consequences – is expected to have a tern Balkans could be decisively jeopar- security and defence policy. negative impact on all countries’ defence dized and how other actors, such as China, budgets and planned expenditures, lea- Russia and Turkey, would fill the vacuum  A trend towards a systemic coordi- ving Europe in a more vulnerable position. instead. nation and cooperation between In the , the upcoming presi- China and Russia (the Dragonbear) dential elections will reveal whether the With regard to future EU-NATO cooperati- in the field of security might lead to ‘Trump effect’ is just a temporary pheno- on, the following potential trends should the intensification of coordination menon or represents a deeper transforma- be carefully followed and assessed: and cooperation between the EU and tive trend in US politics. NATO. The EU and its members have

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shown some worrisome levels of nai- tic partnership. Currently, NATO continues vety towards China as recent mistakes to present a divided picture. The debate NATO, another way is building long-lasting indicated21, despite the definition of that has been going on for years about the strategic relationships with NATO allies Beijing as an economic partner and a unequal distribution of defence spending and partners in all parts of the world. strategic competitor by the European among the Allies cannot be cited as the Commission.22 Meanwhile, NATO has sole reason for this. The transatlantic co- Velina Tchakarova, AIES Head of Institute already started “thinking about some hesion and NATO’s ability to adapt to new basic principles and guidelines for challenges and changing environments Sofia Maria Satanakis, AIES Research Fellow dealing with China.”23 are often undermined by actions of the members, particularly as some of them are Conclusion reluctant to coordinate, preferring indivi- dual approaches. Within NATO itself, there Endnotes The transatlantic relationship is currently has been no rupture – despite the critical facing complex and extensive challen- statements and threats of US President 1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Collective Defence – Article 5. (2019). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/to- ges as the USA and Europe are in disag- Trump, the USA has even increased its pics_110496.htm reement with each other due to their contributions to NATO, a fact that testifies 2) Baker, Peter. Mocked Abroad and Assailed at Home, Trump Returns to Face Impeachment. (2019). https://www.nytimes. diverging approaches towards and to an increasingly interconnected trans- com/2019/12/04/us/politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry.html climate change, the tariffs on steel and atlantic security architecture. All of this 3) The Economist. Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is aluminium introduced by the USA, as well clearly indicates that the European NATO becoming brain-dead. (2019). https://www.economist.com/ europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe--is- as the future approach towards China and members have not lost their importance becoming-brain-dead multilateral institutions. Europe continues for the US. 4) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. London Declaration. (2019). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ to face shrinking geostrategic importance texts_171584.htm and the fact that the era of the ‘American Thus, the importance of continuing to 5) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Joint Press Statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the High Repre- world policeman’ seems to be coming to work closely together on all defence-rela- sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Union, an end is the real game changer. Countries ted issues and effectively addressing the Josep Borrell. (2019). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opini- such as Russia, Turkey and China are now complex security challenges facing both ons_171929.htm?selectedLocale=en 6) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Press Statement by NATO filling the emerging geopolitical gaps sides of the Atlantic cannot be overstated. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the Release of his Annual in the direct European neighbourhood, Overall, based on current developments, Report 2019. (2019). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opi- nions_174389.htm particularly in the MENA region and it can be concluded that NATO is largely 7) Ibid. Eastern Europe. Therefore, a degree of self- viewed in a positive light and continues 8) Gobierno De España. Minister for Defence underlines “need criticism within the European institutions to be the most important instrument of for coordination between NATO and European Union” to tackle COVID-19. (2020). https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/go- and capitals is appropriate: the serious European security. Despite this fact, Euro- bierno/news/Paginas/2020/20200415covid19-nato-eu.aspx consequences that a possible withdrawal pean defence integration will be further 9) Lye, Harry. NATO could support members more through COVID-19: Army Technology poll. (2020). https://www.army- of the USA from international treaties and promoted, above all, through the Perma- technology.com/features/nato-could-support-members-more- foreign policy engagements could entail nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and through-covid-19-army-technology-poll/ 10) Ibid were deliberately ignored on the old conti- the European Defence Fund (EDF). Alt- 11) European Parliament. Annual Report on the Implementation nent for a long time. hough the USA perceives an autonomous of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (2019). https:// European defence as a threat to NATO, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/seance_pleniere/textes_ad- optes/provisoire/2020/01-15/0008/P9_TA-PROV(2020)0008_ However, the current security threats there are strong arguments supporting the EN.pdf are too complex for a single nation or assessment that an enhanced EU defence 12) EEAS. The European Union’s Global Strategy – Three Years On, Looking Forward. (2019). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ organization to cope with. Neither NATO would be to the Alliance’s advantage. Thus, files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf nor the EU members have the necessary it is expected that the institutional conso- 13) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Secretary General instruments at their disposal to protect lidation of a strong European pillar within announces increased defence spending by Allies. (2019). https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171458.htm their populations effectively and sustai- NATO will continue to be a priority for the 14) Welna, David. Under Trump, NATO Nations get more nably on their own, with the exception of EU in the coming years. U.S. Troops and Military Spending. (2019). https://www.npr. org/2019/12/03/784444270/under-trump-nato-nations-get- the United States. And yet, even the most more-u-s-troops-and-military-spending?t=1588922382956 powerful military in the world could not In conclusion, Europe should avoid con- 15) Ibid. 16) PESCO Secretariat. PESCO. (2020). https://pesco.europa.eu/ prevent a pandemic such as Covid-19 from tributing to the growing systemic rivalry 17) European Defence Agency. EDF: Opening new ‘Windows’ for entering its borders and seriously affecting between the USA and China, by pursuing Defence Support. (2020). https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/ the American people. a unique European way of navigating issue18/cover-story/european-defence-fund-(edf) 18) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Macedonia joins through the new Global System’s bipolari- NATO as 30th Ally. (2020). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ As indicated at the NATO Summit in ty with emerging regional hotspots and an news_174589.htm 19) North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Relations with the London, a process of reflection should be increasing polarization between the two Republic of Northern Macedonia. (2020). https://www.nato.int/ initiated in the sense of a profound politi- power centres. One possible way is the ins- cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm cal debate on the future of the transatlan- titutional cooperation between the EU and

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20) Financial Times. France objects to North Macedonia and Albania EU accession talks. (2020). https://www.ft.com/content/ fce9e9a0-ef36-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195 21) Guillot, Louise. Europe has been ‘naïve’ about China, says Josep Borell. (2020). https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-has- been-naive-about-china-josep-borrell/ Financial Times. EU draws criticism over consent to China censorship of coronavirus article. (2020). https://www.ft.com/ content/d56978b7-4404-4457-906d-f9eda5980610 22) European Commission. EU-China – A strategic outlook. (2019). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf 23) Mehta, Aaron. NATO struggles with its China conund- rum. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-2020-defi- ned/2019/12/03/nato-struggles-with-its-china-conundrum/

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