ISIS and Innovative Propaganda: Confronting Extremism in the Digital

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda Confronting Extremism in the Digital Age Dylan Gerstel

In the wake of the horrific Paris terror rent digital environment, rather than recy- attacks in November President Obama de- cle counter-messaging tactics of the past. clared, “ISIS is the face of evil [and] our goal is to... destroy this barbaric organiza- There are several challenges to devel- tion.” (White House, 2015) Global leaders oping an e↵ective policy response to ISIS and organizations have echoed this call to propaganda. First and foremost is the arms. Yet it has been more than a year ungoverned and loosely regulated nature since the fall of Mosul and ISIS is not signif- of social media. Although it is possi- icantly weakened. In his statement to the ble to shut down individual Twitter ac- G20 President Obama outlined the United counts aliated with terrorist organiza- States’ military, diplomatic, and countert- tions, they often reappear within hours error strategy for containing ISIS. This ap- under a slightly di↵erent account name. proach is failing because it does not ad- While the hacker collective Anonymous equately challenge ISIS’s propaganda ma- boasts of suspending 20,000 ISIS-related chine. Although the President acknowl- Twitter profiles, (RT International, 2015) edged ISIS is “very savvy when it comes these users will simply create new accounts. to social media, and able to infiltrate the Second, the media airing “news-worthy” minds of. . . disa↵ected individuals around propaganda assists ISIS. The gruesome ex- the world” there has been no comprehen- ecution video of American journalist James sive counter-messaging response from the Foley circulated with the help of CNN and West. the BBC, rather than ISIS agents. Fi- nally, governmental agencies have lost the Despite ISIS’s brutality, they have re- fight over messaging with ISIS. Although cruited thousands of people from advanced many groups are dedicated to counter pro- democracies. Recent intelligence reports paganda, ISIS has thousands of social net- estimate that over 4,500 citizens have de- working accounts and media specialists fected from Europe and the United States who have crafted a more e↵ective recruit- to join ISIS since 2011.(Schmitt & Sen- ing campaign. gupta, 2015) Many of these people know little about Islam, are disillusioned with so- Counterterror organizations can work ciety, and are searching for a sense of mean- with motivated private stakeholders and ing. The Islamic State’s recruiting tech- third parties to blunt the e↵ectiveness of niques are unlike those of any other ter- ISIS propaganda and stem the tide of re- rorist organization since they have adapted cruits from Western countries. These ini- their propaganda to the digital age. ISIS tiatives should focus on three major objec- uses centralized propaganda to prey on tives: a target’s weak sense of identity and so- Restricting communication channels. cial networks to disseminate their mes- ISIS has a dominant position on social net- sage. Twitter accounts sympathetic to ISIS works that allows them to easily communi- use themes of purpose and camaraderie cate with potential recruits. Any social me- among jihadists to attract isolated Western dia counter-o↵ensive will not succeed with- youths. Visually and emotionally appeal- out community policing of social networks. ing videos and magazines depict a utopian Citizens should be encouraged to report society where all Sunnis are prospering. ISIS related accounts and tech companies The astonishing success of these methods should be pressured to more aggressively requires governments to adapt to the cur- suspend these users. This initiative should ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 2

aim to create a grassroots movement that on describing the reality of the situation, can keep up with the thousands of ISIS with an emphasis on the stories of defec- sympathizers online. This will allow gov- tors and refugees ﬂeeing the Islamic State. ernment agencies to focus on more complex outlets, such as shutting down apps and ac- Supporting at-risk youths who are likely counts made by ISIS. to be targets. Many Western recruits follow Delegitimizing the central messages of similar patterns of isolation from society. the propaganda. ISIS media presents a Improving outreach on a personalized ba- utopian society where recruits can ﬁnd sis can o↵er these people an alternative to meaning. Counter-messaging should focus jihad.

Understanding ISIS Propaganda

ISIS’s propaganda machine di↵ers from several key videos. (Miller & Mekhennet, previous terrorist organizations in its so- 2015) Until his death former German rap- phistication, content, and distribution per Deso Dogg played a key role within Al- mechanisms. ISIS has two divisions dedi- Hayat Media. (Talbot, 2015) cated to propaganda, Al-Hayat Media and This wealth of foreign talent means Mu’assassat al-Furqan. The former focuses that ISIS has more media capability than on recruiting and presenting an idyllic so- Al-Qaeda and its aliates ever had, and ciety, while the latter focuses on spread- this is reﬂected in the high production ing fear. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 38) value of ISIS propaganda. In sharp These organizations have a prominent role contrast to the grainy videos of Osama within ISIS. According to one defector, Bin-Laden, ISIS disseminates Hollywood “The media people are more important style, hour-long movies about life in the than the soldiers and their monthly income Caliphate and the victories of the Is- is higher.” (Miller & Mekhennet, 2015) lamic State. John Cantile, a British news This bureaucracy includes many former hostage that was taken prisoner, hosted tech and news employees who are adept at many expose-style programs about life in video editing and graphic design. While the Caliphate. The ISIS magazine, Dabiq, the top media boss is a 36-year-old Syrian is visually impressive and is ﬁlled with ar- named Abu Amr al-Shami, there are sev- ticles written by Westerners. ISIS has even eral Westerners near the top of the hier- developed several original nasheeds, or ji- archy. (Talbot, 2015) Multiple reports ref- hadi songs, that play in the background of erence an American in charge of editing videos. (Schatz, 2015)

Appealing to Potential Recruits

ISIS propaganda in the West targets 16- the slaughter of their religious brothers at 25 year olds who are isolated from their the hands of the infidels. They are told societies and who do not have a strong that they will have an impact, that they sense of identity or purpose. (Callimachi, are fighting for the only legitimate Mus- 2015) (Yan, 2014) They often know lit- lim State, and that their actions will lead tle about Islam or have learned about to victory. (Fernandez, 2015) Viewers feel religion from ISIS operatives. A recent that they are needed and have an obliga- study identifies four themes ISIS uses to tion to fight for ISIS. Potential recruits are attract recruits: Urgency, Agency, Authen- shown a sense of purpose and identity that ticity, and Victory. All Sunni Muslims are they did not have before. If they come called to come fight immediately to prevent to the Caliphate then their life will have 3 Dylan Gerstel

meaning. Recruits may discount the bar- life they can live in the Caliphate rather barity of ISIS as a necessary evil to cre- than the leaders. ISIS gives “the world ate a utopian society. Many defectors ex- access, willingly, to the daily lives of ji- plain their rationale for joining ISIS along hadists” and humanizes them in the pro- these lines. One thought he was going “to cess. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 43) Most help in a humanitarian sense the people of importantly, the propaganda is shown as Syria” and another wanted to live under inclusive to Sunni Muslims of all nation- strict Islamic law and accepted the stoning alities. Foreigners have no barrier to en- of adulterers. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015) try and can rise up the ranks as quickly as They only prepared to leave once they re- Arabs. alized ISIS was very di↵erent than the pro- To reinforce these themes, ISIS por- paganda. trays women in two di↵erent ways based This image of purpose is supplemented on the intended audience of the messaging. by the theme of camaraderie among the For propaganda aimed at women, they are soldiers of the Islamic State. ISIS goes to described as “jihadi brides,” participating great lengths to illustrate the multi-ethnic in the al-Khansaa police brigade and carry- background of its members. The first issue ing AK-47s. (Ali, 2015) Unlike the Taliban, of Dabiq contains pictures of jihadists from which hid women from all propaganda and many backgrounds embracing each other confined them to the home, ISIS media and huddling together like sports players “emphasize[s] themes of sisterhood and be- before a game. (The Clarion Project, 2014) longing—and highlight[s] the role of mar- Several videos showcase Western recruits riage and family.” (Talbot, 2015) Women in discussing the great friends they have made ISIS, such as UK defector Asqa Mahmoud, in the Caliphate and the acceptance of for- reach out to others on social media encour- eigners in their society. With these mes- aging them to travel to the Caliphate in sages ISIS emotionally appeals to its target order to fulfill their duty, contribute mean- demographic by o↵ering an accepting and ingfully to the Caliphate, and to actively inclusive community. ISIS operatives will participate in jihad. often chat online or Skype with potential recruits for hours, o↵ering them the hope The propaganda aimed at males gives a of friendship they do not have at home. much more accurate image of how women Rather than emphasizing religious al- are treated and exploited in ISIS terri- truism, which Western recruits may not tory. Magazine articles promote the idea engage with, ISIS propaganda focuses on of sexual jihad, which argues that men utopian living and the exploitation of are allowed to relieve sexual tensions so women. Instead of preaching abstinence they can fight more e↵ectively. Although from sex before marriage and alcohol, ISIS sex before marriage is impermissible un- gives viewers an image of the good life. One der normal circumstances, a highly contro- movie, entitled Five Star Jihad,“depicted versial Fatwa attributed to Wahhabi cleric life for Islamic State fighters as lavish, Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe in 20131 au- with access to hillside mansions, gleam- thorized this behavior during times of ji- ing SUVs and swimming pools overlook- had.(Ali,2015)ISIShasusedthistolegit- ing the group’s conquered terrain.” (Miller imize sexual slavery and abuse in the ter- &Mekhennet,2015)ISISmediadiscusses ritory it controls. One particularly graphic religion, but there is a much larger fo- Dabiq article boasts of selling captured cus on adventure, community, and personal Yezidi women and girls as young as nine power, once again appealing to the lonely into sex slavery. (Ali, 2015) Such material Westerner. There is also a clear empha- appeals to lonely, sexually frustrated young sis on the foot soldier and the purposeful males who are ISIS’s target audience. 1Some sources, including the report I use in this paper, link the concept to Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe during the unrest in Tunisia in 2013.‘ He has denied issuing the Fatwa. ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 4

Digital Age Innovations

A Quilliam foundation report lists three tag campaigns,” and “castigate ISIS oppo- major areas of innovation: the global dis- nents.” (Fernandez, 2015, 19) In addition, semination of threat, decentralized mes- there are many sympathetic “fan-boys” saging, and the development of new soft- outside ISIS territory that distribute videos ware. (Saltman & Winter, 2014) Social online and directly message potential re- networks allow ISIS sympathizers to dis- cruits. Between these two groups there are tribute propaganda more eciently than as many as 3,000 users that have the capa- previous terror groups were able to. At bility to produce as many as 90,000 tweets the peak of Al-Qaeda’s prominence, oper- a day. (Fernandez, 2015, 7) ISIS can flood atives could only air their videos through targets with messages and the sheer vol- the Al-Jazeera network or specific web- ume makes it hard for governments to keep forums. This meant that they could only up. Since the “fan-boy” accounts originate disseminate videos to a limited audience al- from outside the Caliphate, airstrikes have ready looking for terrorist propaganda. To- a limited e↵ect on limiting media distribu- day, an ISIS member on Twitter can hi- tion. Reports from soldiers are instanta- jack a thread on unrelated trending top- neously uploaded and sent across networks, ics. For example, during the 2014 World leading to “profound success in intimidat- Cup ISIS users tagged their tweets con- ing, recruiting, and fundraising.” (Saltman taining videos with #brazil 2014. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 41) Whereas previous ter- & Winter, 2014, 40) This gave them ac- ror groups needed rigid structures to dis- cess to a global network of casual Twit- tribute propaganda, ISIS has taken advan- ter users who were simply browsing for tage of technological advances to create a sports updates. The a↵ordability of smart- flexible and decentralized system that is phones and proliferation of social network- constantly being updated. ing means millions of people could see this To further streamline operations ISIS information. ISIS even dominates more has developed new software, an unprece- traditional media outlets. The sheer bru- dented move for a terrorist organization. tality of ISIS videos often makes them The most prominent innovation, a Twit- “newsworthy” material for Western net- ter app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” al- works. When these news channels contin- lows users to post tweets without manual uously play and analyze execution videos, input. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 41) The such as that of James Foley, it only in- Al-Battar battalion designs the tweets and creases the audience for ISIS’s propaganda. the app coordinates them based on a tim- Although most people will be repulsed by ing mechanism to avoid detection by al- these videos, a few will be receptive and gorithms. This app was available on the may be influenced to join ISIS. Google Play store until it was removed, Perhaps the most impressive aspect of and was “responsible [for] posting almost the ISIS propaganda machine is its use 40,000 tweets in a single day as IS marched of social media to rapidly spread its mes- into Mosul.” (Saltman & Winter, 2014, sage. In 2014 ISIS created the Al-Battar 41) Even when ISIS sympathizers are away media battalion, which was “designed to from their devices, their accounts continue push ISIS propaganda,” “coordinate hash- to update at a prolific rate.

Existing Counter-Measures

Governments and independent organiza- to counter ISIS propaganda but have had tions have implemented several programs very limited success. Many of these focus 5 Dylan Gerstel

on delegitimizing ISIS and presenting an sive, leads to racial proﬁling, and turns alternative narrative. teachers into spies. (Khaleeli, 2015) Ironi- In the United States, the Center for cally, Saudi Arabia claims to have one of Strategic Counterterrorism Communica- the more successful programs in the Al- tions (CSCC) has released several videos Sakinah campaign, which is run by an in- aimed at discrediting ISIS. “Think Again dependent NGO that is supported by the Turn Away,” a similar program run by the government. This online service matches state department, has been called an em- Islamic scholars with users on jihadi web- barrassment by counterterror experts and sites vulnerable to radicalization. (Casp- does not have source credibility. (Singal, tack, 2015) After this initial contact, par- 2015) In the UK, the “Prevent” program ticipants are sent to a rehabilitation clinic, aims to curb non-violent extremism. Under and their families are ﬁnancially compen- this initiative, schools need to identify vul- sated. This program boasts a remark- nerable2 children and since 2012 over 2,000 able 90% success rate3 with those that en- students have been sent to the govern- ter counseling. (Casptack, 2015) Yet Saudi ment’s anti-radicalization program. (Min- Arabia remains one of the largest terror- istry of Justice, 2012) (Khaleeli, 2015) Crit- ist recruiting grounds, and the government ics argue that this program is too inva- continues to fund many extremist groups.

Policy Challenges

ISIS’s innovative propaganda presents mul- ISIS-related Twitter accounts. While this tiple policy challenges that will require makes for a good headline and adds some Western counterterror agencies to adapt to extra work for ISIS sympathizers, it does the digital age. The primary obstacle to not seriously hamper their ability to dis- e↵ective policy is the ease of access to so- seminate propaganda via social media. cial media. If a Twitter account is suspended, an individual can just open a new Counter-messaging programs have one. Filtering and blocking profiles man- struggled to match the quality of ISIS ually is a time costly endeavor with al- content. “Welcome to the ”Islamic most no results. The Quilliam Foundation State” land”, the most viewed US anti- tracked several ISIS related accounts and propaganda video, seems like an ama- found that many suspended accounts reap- teur production made on iMovie and was peared within days with a slightly di↵er- mocked by comedian John Oliver. These ent handle. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42) agencies have little funding and sta↵ and Surprisingly, these accounts were quickly cannot compete with ISIS. The US CSCC able to re-gain their followers by instruct- has a meager $5 million annual budget, ing them to search for similar usernames4. a sta↵ of fifteen, and access to 350 State One user was blocked twenty times and his Department Twitter accounts. (Miller & twenty-first account still has 20,000 sub- Hingam, 2015) ISIS has hundreds of peo- scribers. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42) ple working in its media division and thou- Anonymous, the hacker collective, recently sands of social media profiles. Up to this declared war on ISIS and reported 20,000 point governments have lacked the required talent to create high quality videos or to 2The UK government website specifies 22 factors that may induce someone to join a terrorist group. Many of these categories are vague, such as a desire for political or moral change, relevant mental health issues, and a desire for status. 3The program claims that 90% of participants are de-radicalized and rejoin society. This number may be so high because many potential recruits never entered counseling. These figures are all reported by the center and are thus dicult to independently verify. 4For example, an account would reappear with an extra letter or number in the handle. ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 6

beat ISIS at its own game. clerics have had a minimal impact. While almost all prominent Muslim religious lead- The final major policy challenge is ers have publicly denounced ISIS, this has reaching potential recruits with these mes- failed to slow their recruiting e↵orts. (Fer- sages. Since many of these individuals are nandez, 2015, 14) These approaches may disillusioned with their societies, it will be have failed to connect because they are im- dicult for government agencies to appeal personal. ISIS operatives speaking directly to them on an emotional level. Videos to recruits on social media for hours will with the State Department seal, such as the have more influence than distant figures of widely-viewed “Welcome to the ”Islamic authority. Once these people believe they State” land,” which sarcastically displays are friends with jihadists, they will likely brutal ISIS videos in an e↵ort to scare away ignore blanket messages. More personal- recruits, do not have credibility among peo- ized rehabilitation that is tailored to the ple who distrust the government. (Miller & profile of each at-risk individual is neces- Hingam, 2015) Even the e↵orts of Islamic sary.

Policy Recommendations

A multifaceted approach is required to re- ganda, and reach out to at-risk individuals. spond to ISIS’s sophisticated propaganda These strategies must adapt to the nature machine. Governments and counter-terror of social media and the global appeal of the organizations must destabilize ISIS’s sys- Islamic State. I recommend the following tem of messaging, delegitimize their propa- policies:

Taking ISIS O✏ine

ISIS enjoys unprecedented dominance in port an account that is distributing ISIS social media that has led to ease of dis- materials. This will allow companies to fo- tributing propaganda. A combination of cus on reviewing and suspending suspicious community policing, cooperation with tech proﬁles, rather than looking for them. Bil- companies, and selective airstrikes will lions of people are active on social media. If hamper ISIS’s ability to attract recruits. even a small percentage of them are watch- As discussed earlier, e↵orts to suspend ing for suspicious accounts, this will limit social media accounts linked with ISIS have ISIS’s ability to distribute propaganda. largely failed due to the public nature of To supplement this community polic- these platforms. This current response is ing, tech companies should be encour- frustrating ISIS, but it has a minimal long- aged to utilize existing software to au- term impact once new accounts are cre- tonomously identify ISIS-related accounts. ated. However, the e↵ort to identify sus- One such program is PhotoDNA, a ser- picious accounts has been limited to small, vice currently used by Facebook, Twitter, dedicated groups of hackers (Cottee, 2015) Google, and others to track down photos or resource-constrained government agen- of child pornography. PhotoDNA “tags” cies. Encouraging a larger proportion of o↵ending images with a unique ID that al- the social media community to participate lows computers to remove similar photos in this e↵ort will lead to more success. without the intervention of humans. (Bur- Facebook and Twitter already allow any gett, 2014) This minimally invasive ser- user to report a suspicious account, and vice only runs through metadata of im- both sites prohibit threats of violence and ages without searching through personal other abuses. (Altman, 2014) It does not inboxes. (Burgett, 2014) Tech companies take a skilled hacker to recognize and re- should expand the scope of PhotoDNA to 7 Dylan Gerstel

identify accounts that share ISIS propa- dia division, (The Guardian, 2015) and Ju- ganda videos and images. Once a database naid Hussein, a leader in ISIS’s hacking di- of this content is assembled it will be easy vision. (Post, 2015) Although ISIS will be to begin reporting users. Most impor- able to replace these people, killing high tantly, this process will be able to keep up value targets will severely delay, if not dis- with the fast pace of social media because rupt, the capacity of ISIS to develop propa- it does not require human identiﬁcation of ganda. At some point ISIS will run out of accounts. This algorithm will be able to skilled developers. The threat of airstrikes track down new accounts once they post alone will force high-ranking ocers into a video with the same ID as ISIS propa- hiding, further hindering this process. Any ganda. air strikes should be highly selective and seek to avoid civilian casualties. The ur- Cyber-policing will be most e↵ective if ban setting of ISIS’s media headquarters paired with surgical airstrikes on high-level complicates this but does not make it im- ISIS media operatives. Recent airstrikes possible. Strikes should target convoys and have killed German rapper Deso Dogg, a rural areas to minimize collateral damage. high ranking operative in the Al-Hayat me-

Improving Counter-messaging

E↵orts by governments to provide an al- of them left once they became disillusioned ternate message to ISIS propaganda have with ISIS. Governments should focus their not been successful because they do not messaging on these stories to delegitimize match the content, volume, and emotional the utopian image of ISIS with voices that appeal of ISIS media. With their compara- have experienced the Caliphate first hand. tive lack of talent, counter-messaging agencies cannot hope to match the quality of An alternative communication policy ISIS videos. Instead, they should empha- should focus on personal interventions with size the stories of defectors and the truth at-risk individuals. If ISIS has estab- about life in the Islamic State. lished direct contact with someone, they The most viewed counter-propaganda are unlikely to interact with counter pro- videos are sarcastic, emotionless, and do paganda. The only way to reach them not focus on creating a compelling nar- may be through direct messaging. This rative to oppose ISIS. (Fernandez, 2015, would be modeled in a similar fashion to 15) This is a flawed approach since it fails the Al-Sakinah program in Saudi Arabia to understand the psychological profile of that matches potential extremists with Is- most Western recruits, who are isolated, lamic experts. Online users that have been emotional and idealistic. They are drawn reported as potential targets will be paired to ISIS since they believe it will give them with a counselor who can answer questions purpose and meaning, and they are un- about Islam and discuss the true nature of likely to trust State Department ocials ISIS. It should also incorporate e↵orts by arguing otherwise. smaller organizations to de-radicalize people over the Internet. For example, the Governments should use the stories of London think tank Strategic Dialogue ran ISIS defectors to reach potential recruits. experiments “in which it found people at The stories of defectors will be credible and risk of radicalization on Facebook and tried relatable, will appeal on an emotional level, to steer them away.” (Talbot, 2015) Al- and most importantly will dispel false ideas though the sample size was small, this indi- about ISIS. 58 defectors, nine of them from vidualized approach could have more suc- the West, have gone public with their sto- cess than broad, de-personalized messaging ries. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015) Almost all campaigns. ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 8

Helping Those at Risk

Most people who join ISIS from the West ISIS, namely isolation and a search for are not making a well-informed decision, meaning. Once at-risk individuals are iden- though there will always be a small per- tiﬁed online, there must be o✏ine e↵orts to centage of hard-liners that truly believe in reintegrate them into society. Connecting what ISIS stands for. They leave isolated them to ISIS defectors and former targets lives in developed societies for a barbaric can provide networks of assistance. Local state because they are inﬂuenced by false leaders, such as imams, and family mem- ideas and a misguided sense of purpose. bers can contribute to this process. Exist- Based on the stories of defectors, we know ing de-radicalization programs for return- that many are desperate to leave ISIS once ing defectors, such as peer-to-peer counsel- they realize its true nature. (De Freytas- ing, should also be extended to these po- Tamura, 2015) Community outreach can tential recruits. eliminate the reasons why most people join

Conclusion

Governments have been unable to stop the depth discussion is beyond the scope of flow of ISIS recruits from Western coun- this paper, policy makers should take sev- tries. Understanding the innovations and eral ideas into account when debating this appeal of ISIS propaganda is the first step issue. First, such measures should be as to developing a successful counter narra- minimally invasive as possible. The right tive. Unlike previous extremist groups to privacy should not be unnecessarily vi- like Al-Qaeda, ISIS has exploited social olated. The PhotoDNA software I dis- media and other digital age technology cuss fits this criterion by tagging o↵ending to e↵ectively spread their message. This media without searching personal inboxes. propaganda emphasizes purpose and ca- Similar initiatives should strive to balance maraderie that potential recruits lack at the privacy of citizens with the value of home. By utilizing social networks and the knowledge obtained. Second, questions preying on a lack of identity in recruits, of censorship should be publically debated ISIS has developed an unparalleled mes- with the goal of reaching a consensus. If we saging operation. Successful responses to can establish child pornography guidelines, this propaganda should take ISIS accounts a similar set of laws can be reached with re- o✏ine, delegitimize the promise of utopia gards to extremist propaganda. Stopping in the Caliphate, and improve outreach to ISIS’s propaganda machine is a crucial pri- at-risk individuals in developed countries. ority for Western governments. However, if The policies I suggest raise critical these important issues are left unsolved we questions of the ethics of surveillance and risk undermining our fundamental rights in censorship of the Internet. While an in the process.

References

Ali, Mah-Rukh. 2015. ISIS and Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.

Altman, Alex. 2014. Why Terrorists Love Twitter. Time, September.

Burgett, Gannon. 2014. PhotoDNA Lets Google, FB and Others Hunt Down Child Pornog- raphy Without Looking at Your Photos. PetaPixel, August. 9 Dylan Gerstel

Callimachi, Rukmini. 2015. ISIS and the Lonely Young American. New York Times,June.

Casptack, Andreas. 2015. Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study. Middle East Institute,June.

Cottee, Simon. 2015. The Cyber Activists Who Want to Shut Down ISIS. The Atlantic, October.

De Freytas-Tamura, Kimiko. 2015. ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment. New York Times, September.

Fernandez, Alberto M. 2015. Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, October.

Khaleeli, Homa. 2015. ’You worry they could take your kids’: is the Prevent strategy demonising Muslim schoolchildren? The Guardian, September.

Miller, Greg, & Hingam, Scott. 2015. In a Propaganda War against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the Enemy’s Rules. The Washington Post,May.

Miller, Greg, & Mekhennet, Souad. 2015. Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine. Washington Post, November.

Ministry of Justice. 2012 (October). Channel: Vulnerability assessment framework.Tech. rept. Crown Copyright, United Kingdom.

Post, New York. 2015. British ISIS Hacker Killed in US Airstrike. New York Post,August.

RT International. 2015. ‘You’re a virus, we’re the cure’: Anonymous takes down 20,000 ISIS Twitter accounts. Autonomous Non-Proﬁt Organization, November.

Saltman, Erin Marie, & Winter, Charlie. 2014. Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism. Quilliam Foundation, November.

Schatz, Bryan. 2015. Inside the World of Jihadi Propaganda Music. Mother Jones and the Foundation for National Progress, February.

Schmitt, Eric, & Sengupta, Somini. 2015. Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global E↵orts. New York Times, September.

Singal, Jesse. 2015. How to Save Lives by Countering ISIS Propaganda. Science of Us, December.

Talbot, David. 2015. The Lonely E↵orts to Counteract ISIS’s Mastery of Social Media. MIT Technology Review, September.

The Clarion Project. 2014. The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine. Clarion Project, Inc., September.

The Guardian. 2015. Syria Air Strike Killed Isis Rapper from Germany, Says US. The Guardian, October.

White House. 2015 (November). Tech. rept. Oce of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., United States.

Yan, Holly. 2014. Why is ISIS so successful at luring Westerners? CNN, October.