Social and Non-Social Mechanisms of Inequity Aversion in Non-Human Animals
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REVIEW published: 21 June 2019 doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2019.00133 Social and Non-social Mechanisms of Inequity Aversion in Non-human Animals Lina Oberliessen* and Tobias Kalenscher Comparative Psychology, Institute of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany Research over the last decades has shown that humans and other animals reveal behavioral and emotional responses to unequal reward distributions between themselves and other conspecifics. However, cross-species findings about the mechanisms underlying such inequity aversion are heterogeneous, and there is an ongoing discussion if inequity aversion represents a truly social phenomenon or if it is driven by non-social aspects of the task. There is not even general consensus whether inequity aversion exists in non-human animals at all. In this review article, we discuss variables that were found to affect inequity averse behavior in animals and examine mechanistic and evolutionary theories of inequity aversion. We review a range of moderator variables and focus especially on the comparison of social vs. non-social explanations of inequity aversion. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of considering the experimental design when interpreting behavior in inequity aversion tasks: the tasks used to probe inequity aversion are often based on impunity-game-like designs in which animals are faced with unfair reward distributions, and they can choose to accept the unfair offer, or reject it, leaving them with no reward. We compare inequity-averse behavior in such impunity- game-like designs with behavior in less common choice-based designs in which animals Edited by: actively choose between fair and unfair rewards distributions. This review concludes with Regina Marie Sullivan, New York University, United States a discussion of the different mechanistic explanations of inequity aversion, especially in Reviewed by: light of the particular features of the different task designs, and we give suggestions on Masahiko Haruno, experimental requirements to understand the “true nature” of inequity aversion. Tamagawa University, Japan Johannes Hewig, Keywords: inequity aversion, animals, social vs. non-social theories, moderator variables, task design, choice task University of Wuerzburg, Germany *Correspondence: Lina Oberliessen THE CONCEPT OF INEQUITY AVERSION [email protected] Other-regarding preferences, i.e., the consideration of the well-being of others when making Received: 16 February 2019 decisions, are pertinent in human behavior and economic decision making (Fehr and Schmidt, Accepted: 05 June 2019 1999). Such decisions are not solely based on egoistic, materialistic motives, but others’ outcomes Published: 21 June 2019 are considered as well. Other-regarding preferences have often been studied with economic Citation: games (e.g., Yamagishi et al., 2009; Margittai et al., 2015; Strombach et al., 2015). For instance, Oberliessen L and Kalenscher T in the dictator game, participants are asked to split an endowment between themselves and a (2019) Social and Non-social co-player. Decades of research with the dictator game has shown that people across many cultures Mechanisms of Inequity Aversion in Non-human Animals. and socio-economic groups voluntarily share money and other resources with others (Bolton Front. Behav. Neurosci. 13:133. et al., 1998; Engel, 2011). Another game is the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) in which one doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2019.00133 player, the proposer, splits a sum of money between herself and another player, the responder. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience| www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 133 Oberliessen and Kalenscher Social and Non-social Mechanisms of Inequity Aversion The responder can decide whether to accept or reject the share. with a human experimenter. In the equity condition, both If she accepts, both players can keep their share. If she rejects, individuals received a piece of cucumber reward for successfully both players receive nothing. Several thousand replications of the exchanging the token. In the inequity condition, one of the ultimatum game (Güth and Schmidt, 2013) have revealed that monkeys received a more valuable grape while the other monkey the vast majority of responders rejects offers that are perceived continued to receive the lower valued piece of cucumber for unfair, i.e., they forego own-payoffs, to punish unfair proposers. performing the same token exchange task. As a consequence, Yet another game is the impunity game (Bolton and Zwick, the disadvantaged monkey refused to exchange the token, or 1995). In this game, one player, the proposer, can share an rejected the cucumber reward entirely, tentatively reminiscent endowment between herself and a second player, the responder. of the behavior of human responders in the impunity game The responder can either accept or reject the offer. If she (see below for critical discussion). Since this early study, IA accepts the offer, both players keep their share, if she rejects, was replicated in capuchin monkeys (van Wolkenten et al., the responder receives nothing while the proposer keeps her 2007; Fletcher, 2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; Takimoto and share. Unfair offers are often rejected by responders (Bolton Fujita, 2011), and reported in macaques (Massen et al., 2012; and Zwick, 1995), thus leaving them empty-handed with no Hopper et al., 2013), chimpanzees (Brosnan et al., 2005, 2010), economic consequences for the proposer. Rejections are puzzling cotton top tamarins (Neiworth et al., 2009), dogs (Range et al., at first sight, but are likely fueled by an emotional response to 2009, 2012; Brucks et al., 2016; see McGetrick and Range, unfairness, revealing that responders derive more disutility from 2018 for an overview), wolves (Essler et al., 2017), crows small, but unfair gains than from no gains at all. (Wascher and Bugnyar, 2013), rabbits (Heidary et al., 2008) and Even though such fairness-driven behaviors appear rats (Oberliessen et al., 2016). economically unreasonable on the surface because of their However, some studies failed to demonstrate disadvantageous costliness (recipients forego rewards or accept costs to punish IA in non-human animals, for example in capuchin monkeys fairness violators), they are often considered the consequence (Dubreuil et al., 2006; Roma et al., 2006; Fontenot et al., of so-called inequity aversion (IA), an affective, cognitive 2007; Silberberg et al., 2009), chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and behavioral response to unequal outcomes (Oberliessen and gorillas (Bräuer et al., 2006, 2009), cleaner fish (Raihani et al., 2016). Generally, two forms of IA can be distinguished: et al., 2012), keas (Heaney et al., 2017), and dogs (Horowitz, (1) aversion against outcome distributions that yield a higher 2012). While the lack of IA in less cooperative species like payoff for a partner relative to one’s own payoff, given orangutans (Bräuer et al., 2009; Brosnan et al., 2011) or squirrel matched efforts to obtain the payoff (disadvantageous IA); monkeys (Talbot et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2013) might not and (2) aversion against outcomes that produce a lower payoff come unexpected, given the hypothesis that IA is primarily a for a partner relative to one’s own payoff (advantageous IA; mechanism for maintaining cooperation, it is hard to explain Oberliessen et al., 2016). its absence in cooperative species like capuchin monkeys, dogs, But what is the benefit of costly IA if it does not increase, or chimpanzees and cleaner fish (see Table 1 for an overview of even lowers, an organism’s immediate (economic or Darwinian) all studies). Consequently, there is an ongoing, relatively heated fitness? IA has been hypothesized to function as a mechanism to debate about the true nature of IA, whether it truly serves ensure the sharing of payoffs and, thus, to enable and maintain to maintain cooperation, and whether it even exists at all in long term cooperation with non-kin. It is proposed to serve as non-human animals. an unfairness detector, protecting individuals from exploitation (Brosnan, 2006, 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). Cooperation ONE CONCEPT—MANY THEORIES allows individuals to achieve goals that they could not achieve alone (e.g., teamwork in humans, or cooperative hunting and In this section, we will more closely consider different theories cooperative breeding in non-human animals) and offers the of IA that have been proposed to account for the heterogeneous possibility to exchange favors over time (direct, indirect and results. Some of these theories refer to social motives, but generalized reciprocity; e.g., delousing behavior in monkeys; others explain previous alleged IA-like behaviors with non-social Stevens and Hauser, 2004; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). cognitive mechanisms. INEQUITY AVERSION IN NON-HUMAN Social Hypotheses: Maintaining ANIMALS Cooperation vs. Social Disappointment Brosnan(2006, 2011) posits that fairness preferences, ultimately This explanation already foreshadows, and the examples imply, leading to IA, are advantageous for an organism because, that IA might not solely occur in humans, but can also be as mentioned above, they serve as a mechanism to ensure expected in social non-human animal species that engage in the sharing of payoffs and thus, to enable and maintain cooperative behaviors. Indeed, evidence has accumulated over long term cooperation with non-kin. However, other the last years suggesting that disadvantageous IA exists in various authors