MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES

May 2019 MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... 3

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 4 2 ROLE OF COAL IN G20 COUNTRIES ...... 5 3 POLICIES TO PHASE OUT COAL IN G20 COUNTRIES ...... 12

References...... 25

Authors and Acknowledgements...... 27

This G20 coal brief is part of Climate Transparency’s activities to enhance ambitious climate action in G20 countries . The partnership convenes 14 climate research organisations and NGOs from the majority of G20 countries . Its Brown to Green Report is the world’s most comprehensive annual review of G20 climate action (mitigation, vulnerability, finance) . A series of papers on coal phase- out in India, Indonesia and South Africa is available on Climate Transparency’s website: www.climate-transparency.org RR Executive summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Japan and South Korea . China’s public finance institutions have financed at least 27 GW of coal plants overseas (and in According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s future will finance 24 GW), Japan’s 20 GW (future finance: 4 (IPCC’s) Special Report Global Warming of 1.5°C, a near-total GW) and South Korea’s 10 GW (future finance: 3 GW) . reduction in the use of coal and other fossil fuels for electricity generation by 2050 is necessary if the temperature goal of the Paris G20 actions to phase out coal Agreement is to be reached, with reductions of approximately RR Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom lead the two-thirds by 2030 . The G20 countries are the biggest users and G20 with Paris-compatible plans for phasing out coal exporters of coal . Therefore, it is of particular importance that they before or by 2030. In Germany, the Commission on Growth, embark on a process of phasing out coal . Structural Change and Employment recommended phasing out coal by 2038 – a crucial achievement, but not aligned with Role of coal in G20 countries the Paris Agreement . The G20 countries with the highest use RR About 30% of the primary energy supply of the G20 of coal, highest coal exports or highest planned coal capacity countries is derived from coal . In many G20 countries are lacking any action to reduce coal production and use coal is the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions . (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) and/or a Within the G20, South Africa (68%), China (64%), India long-term vision to phase out coal (India, China and South (44%) and Australia (33%) have the highest coal share in Africa) . domestic primary energy supply. It is even higher in their RR In advancing renewable energies, several of the G20’s electricity mix . big coal consumers or exporters – Australia, China, RR Absolute energy supply from coal in the G20 as a whole Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey – are rated low has been more or less constant between 2012 and 2017, according to a rating of Climate Transparency’s Brown with only a negligible decrease of 0.9%. While the share to Green Report 2018 based on the Allianz Climate & of renewables in the G20 energy mix increased, economic Energy Monitor. The combined scoring looks at the level development and rising energy demand have driven up coal of ambition of renewable energy targets against a pathway use simultaneously in nine G20 countries, particularly in Asia . towards full decarbonisation in 2050 and at whether there is In the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, France, the an adequate policy environment, including support policies United States and Canada absolute coal supply decreased and factors ensuring that projects are realised . Germany and rapidly between 2012 and 2017 . Reasons for this decrease India are the only G20 countries heavily reliant on coal that vary from country to country: air quality and climate policies, receive a high rating . coal phase-out commitments, carbon pricing, reduced costs RR In various G20 countries, the debate on just transition of renewables and abundant supply of natural gas have has begun to involve workers, trade unions, operators played a role . and the regions affected. There are national or regional RR Declining global coal demand will hit the largest G20 governmental initiatives to learn from in Australia, Canada, coal exporters the hardest – i.e. Australia (37% of China, the European Union, France, Germany, Indonesia, South global coal exports in 2017), Indonesia (16%), Russia Africa and the United States . (12%), the United States (9%) and South Africa (5%). RR The commitments of public finance institutions in G20 Export revenues and related taxes are often used to subsidise countries to end or restrict public spending for coal domestic coal power prices, establish infrastructure in coal can be tracked via three categories: 1) Germany and the regions and employ workers . Coal exporters thus need to United Kingdom (and formerly the United States) are the only anticipate the transition and plan to manage it . two G20 countries that announced that they would restrict RR Most G20 countries are currently constructing coal financing in their role as shareholders of multilateral additional coal plants and/or are planning to do so, development banks (over and above the 2013 commitments thus running the risk of stranded assets. The biggest of the World Bank Group, European Investment Bank and additions in new coal capacity are planned (or are already European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to under construction) in China (199 GW), India (94 GW), Turkey restrict coal-fired power finance); 2) national development (37 GW) and Indonesia (27 GW) . Turkey is to roughly triple its agencies and banks in Brazil, France, Germany, the United existing coal capacity and Indonesia to is to double it . States and the United Kingdom are divesting from coal; 3) export credit agencies in all G20 OECD countries, except for RR G20 governments continue to provide at least US$39 Mexico, follow the OECD restrictions on financing for coal- billion of government support per year for the fired power plants – Canada’s, France’s and the United States’ production of coal, including coal-fired power. This is export credit agency have in addition developed their own through fiscal support measures (tax breaks and budgetary export policies . support), public finance and investment by state-owned mining and utility companies . This is an underestimate as it is not possible to capture or quantify many measures and projects . The largest overseas financiers of coal are China,

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1. INTRODUCTION Coal-fired electricity generation accounted for 30% of global This brief assesses the role of coal in G20 countries and reviews carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 2018 . In fact, coal-fired power existing actions . plants were the single largest contributor to the growth in Section 2 compares the role that coal plays in G20 countries . emissions in that year 1. Several G20 countries rely heavily on coal . It analyses the share of coal in primary energy supply and At the same time, a shift away from coal is attractive for countries electricity generation, coal imports/exports, planned coal for several reasons: it combats climate change, increases health capacities and coal subsidies and financing overseas . benefits, reduces costs of electricity production through low Section 3 compares the policies that G20 countries input prices for renewable energies, reduces risks of stranded have in place to phase out coal including: 1) a rating on assets, offers energy independence and fiscal benefits, and actions to reduce coal use or plans to phase out coal; 2) a provides energy access through alternatives such as off-grid rating on advancing renewable energies; 3) an overview of renewables . While these and other factors have already triggered approaches for a socially and economically just transition; and action in some G20 countries to reduce coal use, and will 4) an overview of government commitments to end public continue to do so, the ongoing transition is not happening fast spending on coal . enough to safeguard the climate . Reaching the Paris Agreement goals requires additional policy measures in G20 countries with high coal use and/or export . It is in governments’ interests to proactively shape this transition . This would allow them to maintain energy security and to provide alternatives for affected workers and regions .

Six incentives to phase out coal: RR Climate change: Reaching the Paris Agreement goals all countries around the world, rendering coal increasingly of limiting global warming to well below 2°C with efforts unattractive economically . By 2025, electricity generation to keep it to 1 .5°C requires a rapid coal phase-out in G20 from new renewable energy infrastructure will be cheaper countries . According to the IPCC’s Special Report Global than from new coal infrastructure 5. Regarding the flexibility Warming of 1.5°C, a near-total reduction in the use of coal of electricity systems, batteries are increasingly cost-effective and other fossil fuels for electricity generation by 2050 is (with a 79% decrease in costs since 2010) and are starting to necessary to limit global warming to 1 .5°C, with reductions compete with fossil fuel alternatives 6. of approximately two-thirds by 2030 2. RR Stranded assets risk: Economic shifts and policy changes RR Health benefits:Coal is a major – and is often the leading may turn coal-fired power plants into stranded assets – i .e . – contributor to air pollution . Although global and G20-level non-performing assets that rapidly lose value or become data is limited, estimates have found that coal burning is liabilities . This process has already started in some G20 responsible for more than 800,000 premature deaths per countries . year globally and many millions of cases of serious and minor RR Energy independence and fiscal benefits: Reducing coal illness 3. This also has economic implications, e .g . increased imports fosters energy independence, improves balance of healthcare costs and a higher number of lost working days 4. payments and can reduce geopolitical tensions . RR Costs: Renewable energy has rapidly emerged as the RR Energy access: Off-grid renewables allow increased energy lowest cost option of new power generation (without even access in developing and emerging markets . taking into account the external costs of coali) in almost

i Including the costs of air and water pollution, ecosystem degradation, damage to infrastructure, human injuries and loss of life etc .

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2. ROLE OF COAL IN G20 COUNTRIES i. South Africa, China, India and Australia have RR Italy has always had a comparatively low level of coal in its the highest share of coal in their energy supply; energy supply (current installed capacity: 9 GW) and has never the United Kingdom, Italy, France, the European been a major producer of coal . It mostly relies on imports . Coal Union, the United States and Canada show a strong imports, however, decreased between 2005 and 2016 due to decrease in energy supply from coal energy efficiency measures, the expansion of renewables and the 2008 economic and financial crisis, which heavily affected About 30% of the primary energy supply of the G20 countries electricity demand and steel production . Italy was struggling is derived from coal. In 2017, South Africa (68%), China (64%), with a dramatic overcapacity of electricity generation, putting India (44%) and Australia (32%) had the highest share of coal in pressure on electricity prices and the profitability of fossil the energy mix, above the G20 average .7 The share is even higher fuel power stations . In 2015, the energy market leader ENEL in terms of their electricity generation: in South Africa, 89% of announced its intention to become carbon neutral by 2050 electricity is generated from coal, in India 74%, in China 68% and and to accelerate investments in renewable energy . In 2017, in Australia 62% . Decarbonising the power sector is especially the Italian government announced a coal phase-out by 2025 .10 important as there is an increasing use of electricity in lighting, RR In France, EU legislation on air pollution regulations led to the cooling, transport and production . closure of seven coal-fired units in 2015 totalling 1,758 MW of In absolute terms, China has the biggest energy supply from capacity . The country invested early in nuclear power 11. coal . The country accounts for nearly half of the world’s coal RR In the United States, despite the support from the federal consumption and developments in the coal sector in China have government, the coal industry is declining in the face of lower- the potential to influence coal, gas and electricity prices around cost and abundant natural gas and renewable energy, as well the world 8. as regulations designed to reduce emissions and protect Absolute energy supply from coal in the G20 as a whole has public health (e .g . requirements to install pollution controls) . This has led several coal companies to declare bankruptcy, been more or less constant between 2012 and 2017, with including four industry giants between 2015 and 2018 12. only a negligible decrease of 0.9%. In nine G20 countries, the absolute energy supply from coal increased between 2012 RR In Canada, a planned phase-out of coal-fired power plants, and 2017, mostly mirroring rising economic development in particularly in the state of Ontario, has led to decreasing coal these countries and an overall increase in energy consumption: consumption . Ontario committed in 2003 to phase out coal by Indonesia (+61%), India (+26%), Turkey (+28%), Brazil (+8%), 2014 . Civil society campaigns on the negative health impacts Mexico (+7%), South Korea (+6%), Japan (+6%), Argentina (+3%) of coal made it a key issue in the 2003 provincial elections . and Russia (+3%) . The new government absorbed the cost of the phase-out and combined it with an overall reform of the electricity sector Eleven G20 members including the European Union (EU) and with promoting renewable energy . In 2018, the federal reduced absolute energy supply from coal. The highest government of Canada amended its regulations to accelerate reductions between 2012 and 2017 are observed in the United a coal phase-out by 2030 for the whole country . This followed Kingdom (-76%), Italy (-41%), France (-23%), the EU (-22%), the the Canadian government’s leadership in establishing the United States (-18%) and Canada (-13%) . This partly reflects Powering Past Coal Alliance in November 2017, together with a declining local energy demand, but also more stringent the UK government . regulation and market mechanisms in places where coal is no longer competitive . RR Pollution laws, carbon taxes and a commitment in 2015 to phase out coal by 2025 led to the closure of ageing coal plants in the United Kingdom, with three major plants shut down in 2016 alone . Energy efficiency reduced demand and the gap left by the coal plants is now met by nuclear, gas and renewables . The government incentivised the growth of wind, solar and biomass, which now generate a quarter of the United Kingdom’s power .9 In 2017, the United Kingdom, together with the Canadian government, established the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) – a global alliance of national and sub-national governments, businesses and organisations working together to end unabated coal use and financing for it .

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ii. Declining global coal demand will hit the largest decrease, as the government of India released several policies G20 coal exporters hardest – Australia, Indonesia, to reduce the dependence on imports 19. Both China and India, Russia, the United States and South Africa despite still having large planned coal pipelines, have both seen a reduction in coal fleet load factorsiii in recent years . At In 2017, the G20 countries accounted for 85% of global coal the beginning of 2019, Japanese banks and trading houses exports and 72% of global coal imports . The biggest coal were backing away from plans to build power plants and were exporters in the G20 were Australia (37% of global coal exports), divesting from Australian mines (Japan is Australia’s largest Indonesia (16%), Russia (12%), the United States (9%) and export customer) . Meanwhile major Japanese investors are South Africa (5%) . They supply, among others, the biggest coal seeking to back large-scale renewables projects across Asia 20. importers in the G20 – Japan which accounts for 18% of global If countries are continuously increasing the ambition of their coal imports, China (14%), India (12%) and South Korea (12%) 13. nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Russia’s main coal market continues to be Europe but might Agreement, coal demand will fall even faster 21. soon be surpassed by the Asian economies 14. Decreasing demand and the likely decreasing trade will affect However, these major exporters face a declining global coal exporting economies . Export revenues and related taxes – demand . The International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy often used currently to subsidise domestic coal power prices, Outlook stated in 2018 that global coal use peaked in 2014 . It establish infrastructure in coal regions and employ workers – is likely to remain stable until 202315 and the IEA forecasts that will fall . Coal exporters thus need to anticipate and manage the it will start declining afterwards 16,17. Indeed, there are signs of transition away from coal . reduced demand from the G20 biggest coal importers . Coal demand in China is forecasted to decline from the early 2020s, as result of saturated heavy industry growth, the country’s clean air measures and commitment to investments in renewables 18. The IEA also forecasted that India’s thermal coal importii will

ii Also known as steam coal which is burnt to generate electricity via steam iii If the load factor is 100%, a coal plant operates at its maximum capacity for every hour of the year . Due to routine maintenance, fuel availability problems and variations in demand, actual load factors are lower than 100% .

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iii. China, India, Turkey and Indonesia have highest the G20 countries instead align their infrastructure planning and planned coal capacities their long-term strategies with 1 .5°C pathways . Most G20 countries are currently building more coal power plants Many of the plants have been planned based on old regulations or are planning to do so . The exceptions are: Canada, France, the and outdated energy demand projections . This creates a risk of United Kingdom and Italy, which have all decided to abandon stranded assets,iv especially if countries tighten climate policies . coal before 2030; Australia and the United States, where coal is For example, in India, 40 GW of coal-fired power capacity that has not competitive in their markets; and Saudi Arabia, which has been commissioned or is under construction is already “stressed”,v not used coal and is also not planning to build any coal plants . with potential systemic financial risks for the government and the According to the Global Coal Plant Tracker, Mexico also belongs financial system 25. Similarly, China is struggling with overcapacity to this group of countries . However, its National Electricity Plan in electricity generation and low utilisation rates of coal-fired 2018–2032 includes 129 MW of additional capacity planned until plants . If China implements its national climate targets (NDCs), 2020,22 despite the fact that Mexico joined the Powering Past there could be stranded assets of US$90 .4 billion from coal Coal Alliance at COP23 . Mexico’s newly elected president also power plants by 2030 .26 Finally, particularly in exporting countries, announced the purchase of 400,000 tons of coal from producers continued investment in export-related infrastructure risks in the Carbonífera Carboniferous Region in early 2019 23. creating costly stranded assets, for example Australia’s Carmichael mine, or plans in South Africa to expand rail capacity for exports . The biggest additions in coal capacity are planned (including announced, pre-permitted and permitted capacities) or are already In the best-case scenario, some plants may never be built if under construction in China (199 GW), India (94 GW), Turkey (37 governments tighten regulation and revise energy demand GW) and Indonesia (27 GW) . Turkey is due to roughly triple its projections . Indeed, the pipeline of new projects globally has existing coal capacity and Indonesia to double its capacity 24. fallen substantially in recent years . India’s pipeline has fallen the most, with 490 GW of planned coal capacity having been Due to the long lifetime of coal plants, decisions taken today will cancelled between 2010 and 2018 (while currently around 94 GW lock countries into a high-carbon energy pathway . It is critical that is planned or under construction) .

iv The loss of value, revenue or return on investment in coal production assets . v Stressed assets result from overdue principal/interest payments (whether in part or whole) of between 1 and 90 days (Reserve Bank of India, 2018) .

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iv. G20 governments continue to provide at least In addition to subsidies through fiscal support measures, US$39 billion of government support per year for G20 countries also support coal mining and coal-fired power the production of coal, including coal-fired power projects, both at home and abroad, through their public finance institutions . Some of these institutions continue to finance coal G20 governments subsidise the production of coal and coal- abroad, in spite of pledges to end coal domestically . fired power through fiscal support measures (via governments’ budgetary contributions and tax breaks), public finance and The biggest former (up to 2018) and future G20 overseas financiers investments of state-owned enterprises, to the value of at are China, Japan and South Korea viii. China’s public finance least US$39 billion per year (2013/14 average) vi,27. However, it is institutions have financed 27 GW of coal plants overseas (and in important to note that this is an underestimate, due to the lack of future will finance 24 GW), Japan’s have financed 20 GW (future transparency . Many support measures are unable to be identified finance: 3 GW) and South Korea’s 10 GW (future finance: 4 GW) 28. or even when they are identified, the resulting support cannot be Finally, numerous G20 countries have majority state-owned coal quantified . Similarly, there is limited transparency around public mining and utility companies . Even though many of these are finance institutions’ projects and investments by SOEs . run commercially, where these companies invest will inevitably The fiscal support measures captured include tax breaks for coal influence the future and direction of policy on coal in their mining (including for use of equipment and resources), tax breaks countries (and vice versa) . Therefore, it is crucial to the phase- for use of coal-fired power in industry and budgetary support for out of coal to challenge the activities of these companies, and coal-fired power production including for capacity mechanismsvii the role they could play in a just transition . and research and development (R&D) in coal-fired power production . Measures also include support for the transition away from coal mining, such as for the rehabilitation of mining sites or support of workers and communities .

vi This data will be updated in Overseas Development Institute (ODI) et al . (forthcoming), ‘G20 government subsidies to coal’ to be published in June 2019 . vii Capacity mechanism: A mechanism that rewards market participants for available capacity, on top of revenues generated by selling electricity in the wholesale market . These payments are meant to ensure security of supply by incentivising sufficient investment in new capacity or preventing the retirement of existing capacity . But in their current design, many of these risk undermining parallel energy and climate objectives by locking in dependence on high-carbon power generation assets (van der Burg and Whitley, 2016) . viii The data includes only foreign flows of financing for coal that come from public finance institutions such as export credit agencies and development banks .

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Summary: Role of coal in main G20 coal users and exporters

■■ Coal capacity installed: 24 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 0 GW ■■ 4th largest coal share in energy supply, above G20 average, with decreasing trend in absolute Australia energy supply from coal (-11%, 2012–2017) ■■ Biggest global coal exporter (37% of global coal exports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 973 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 199 GW ■■ 2nd largest coal share in energy supply, above G20 average, with decreasing trend in absolute energy supply from coal (-1%, 2012–2017) China ■■ 2nd biggest coal importer in G20 (14% of global coal imports) ■■ Biggest international funder: China’s public finance institutions have financed at least 27 GW of coal plants overseas, and may finance at least 24 GW in the future

■■ Coal capacity installed: 47 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 3 GW ■■ Share of coal in electricity generation (39%), slightly below G20 average, with a decreasing trend in Germany absolute numbers (-12%, 2012–2017) ■■ Biggest producer of lignite coal and biggest importer of hard coal in EU (5% of global coal imports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 221 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 94 GW ■■ 2nd largest coal share in electricity generation (74%), above G20 average, with increasing trend in India absolute electricity supply from coal (+44%, 2012–2017), although the share has decreased due to expansion of renewable energies ■■ 3rd biggest coal importer in G20 (12% of global coal imports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 29 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 27 GW ■■ 5th largest share of coal in electricity generation, above G20 average, with strong increase of 45% of Indonesia total electricity supply from coal (2012–2017) ■■ 2nd biggest global coal exporter (16% of global coal exports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 46 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 15 GW ■■ 6th largest share of coal in energy supply, below G20 average, but with increasing trend in absolute numbers (+6%, 2012–2017) Japan ■■ Biggest global coal importer (18% of global coal imports) ■■ 2nd biggest international funder: Japan’s public financial institutions have financed at least 20 GW of coal plants overseas, and may finance at least 3 GW in the future

■■ Coal capacity installed: 48 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 5 GW ■■ Share of coal in energy supply and electricity generation below G20 average, slight increase in Russia absolute energy supply from coal (+3%, 2012–2017) and increase in electricity generation (2%, 2012–2017) ■■ 3rd biggest coal exporter in G20 (12% of global coal exports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 42 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 14 GW ■■ Largest share of coal in both energy supply and electricity generation (89%) in the G20, although South Africa with slightly decreasing trend (-6%, 2012–2017) ■■ 5th biggest coal exporter in the G20 (5% of global coal exports)

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■■ Coal capacity installed: 37 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 8 GW ■■ 6th largest share of coal in electricity generation (46%), above G20 average, with increasing trend South Korea (+10%, 2012–2017) ■■ 3rd biggest international funder: South Korea’s public finance institutions have financed at least 10 GW of coal plants overseas, and may finance at least 4 GW more in the future

■■ Coal capacity installed: 19 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 37 GW (highest increase: Turkey triples its capacity) Turkey ■■ 5th largest share of coal in energy supply (30%), slightly below G20 average, but with increasing trend in absolute numbers (+28%, 2012–2017) ■■ Coal importer (3% of global coal imports)

■■ Coal capacity installed: 12 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 0 GW United ■■ First country to mainly use fossil fuels, large decline in absolute energy supply from coal (-76%, Kingdom 2012–2017) due to pollution laws, carbon taxes and a commitment to phase out coal by 2025 ■■ Neither a significant coal exporter nor importer

■■ Coal capacity installed: 259 GW; coal capacity planned and under construction: 0 GW ■■ Large decline in absolute energy supply from coal (-18%, 2012–2017) due to lower-cost and United States abundant natural gas and renewable energy as well as regulations designed to reduce emissions and protect public health ■■ 4th biggest coal exporter in G20 (9% of global coal exports)

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3. POLICIES: CANADA, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM LEAD THE G20 COAL PHASE-OUT PLANS. BIGGEST COAL USERS AND EXPORTERS LACK SUFFICIENT ACTION. This section compares G20 climate action to phase out coal . It are lacking either any action to reduce coal (Australia, Indonesia, draws on the policy ratings from the Brown to Green Report on: Japan, South Korea, Turkey) and/or a long-term vision to phase 1) decisions to reduce coal use or plans to phase out coal; and 2) out coal (India, China and South Africa) 30. advancing renewable energies . It looks further at 3) approaches ii. Advancing renewable energies for a socially and economically just transition and 4) governments’ commitments to end public spending for coal (for 15 categories The speed of the transition away from coal to a low-carbon, see detailed information per country in table on page 15) . environmentally friendly alternative in the power sector depends on the speed, costs and scale for advancing renewable energies . i. Decision to reduce or phase out coal use According to the rating of the Brown to Green Report 2018, based A government’s decision to phase out coal sends strong signals on the Allianz Climate & Energy Monitor31, governments can do to investors and thus prevents the lock-in of fossil fuel-based the following to promote renewable energies: infrastructure . According to the IPCC Special Report, a near-total 1) Define ambitious renewable energy targets: In order to reduction in the use of coal and other fossil fuels for electricity provide planning stability for investors, countries require long- generation by 2050 is necessary to limit global warming to term renewable energy targets compatible with the Paris 1 .5°C, with reductions of approximately two-thirds by 2030 . Agreement goals . The Allianz Monitor 2018 rates countries’ The Powering Past Coal Alliance recognises that the EU and existing renewable energy generation targets against a path OECD countries must phase out unabated coal-fired electricity towards full decarbonisation by 2050 (Allianz Monitor 2018, generation no later than 2030, with the rest of the world no later Category 1 .2) In order to achieve a large-scale decarbonisation than 2050 29. by 2050 to limit global warming below 1 .5°C, countries need Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom lead the G20 with to become 100% renewable – low-carbon alternatives such Paris-compatible plans for phasing out coal for power by or even as nuclear, hydro and carbon capture and storage (CCS) have before 2030 . Germany is currently discussing phasing out coal by negative social and environmental impacts . 2038, which would be a crucial achievement, but is not aligned 2) Support renewable energy targets through effective with a 1 5°C. pathway . The G20 countries with the highest use of policy environments: To advance renewable energies coal, highest coal exports or most coal capacity in the pipeline and create enabling conditions for investors, an adequate

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policy environment is required . The Allianz Monitor 2018 iii. Developing just transition approaches rates countries based on: a) their level of direct support Often, a coal phase-out requires broad political and societal policies and financial incentives to promote renewable support . It is important that it is considered just for those energy deployment, for example, feed-in tariffs, auctions potentially adversely affected by it: workers, communities, and renewable energy portfolio standards; as well as b) the enterprises, and lower-income households . What is therefore factors ensuring renewable energy projects are realised, needed is a just transition of the workforce through compensation such as mid-term certainty of policy signals, streamlined and retraining for those people who lose their jobs, and national administrative procedures for permitting, factors ensuring policies to support the development of green and decent jobs 32. renewable energy plants are set up on time (e .g . pre- Moreover, phasing out subsidies to coal and coal-fired power and defined realization period, pre-qualification requirements establishing carbon pricing can lead to higher energy prices . To and effective penalties if timelines are not met) and factors prevent social repercussions, subsidy reforms and carbon pricing ensuring that electricity produced is used (e .g . presence of can be complemented by compensation for lower-income priority dispatch for renewables and compensation in case households . Revenues generated from carbon pricing and from of curtailment) (Allianz Monitor 2018, Category 2) . phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can support public goods such as Several of the G20’s big coal consumers or exporters – Australia, energy access, health, education and sustainable infrastructure 33. China, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey – are rated only low In various G20 countries, the debate on just transition has or medium in terms of advancing renewable energies . They lack started with the engagement of trade unions and the regions ambitious renewable energy targets and an adequate policy affected . There are national or regional government initiatives to environment . Germany and India are the only G20 countries that learn from in Australia, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, rely heavily on coal whose renewable energy targets are rated Indonesia, South Africa and the United States . For example, ambitious and policy environments adequate . However, both Germany’s multi-stakeholder Commission on Growth, Structural still face challenges to integrate renewables into their power Change and Employment recommended in January 2019 that systems and need to extend the grid and increase storage €40 billion be provided to coal-intensive states until 2038, to capacities . No G20 country is aiming for 100% renewables in the compensate and retrain coal workers and reduce the financial power sector by 2050 . burden on electricity consumers, industry and utility companies . Similarly, Canada’s Just Transition Task Force published its report in March 2019 with recommendations for a just transition plan for coal workers and communities .

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iv. Committing to restrict public spending for coal 3 . National/domestic export credit agencies (ECAs): ECAs, usually an official or quasi-official branch of government, Phasing out coal also requires public finance institutions in G20 provide government-backed loans, credits and guarantees countries to end finance for coal mining and coal-fired power . for the international operations of corporations from their A shift from fossil fuel-based to low-carbon, climate-resilient home country . They back public finance for risky projects, spending by these institutions is also an important signal for including coal mines and power plants . private financiers to align their investments . In a policy in 2015 covering 35 export credit agencies in An encouraging development in recent years has been the OECD countries, the OECD determined categories of coal commitments from some multilateral development banks and plants ineligible for export credits . As of January 2019, these nationally owned development banks to mainstream climate guidelines were extended to allow only financing for large considerations into their operations and lending decisions 34. coal-fired power plants with “ultra-supercritical technology”,xi Pressure from civil society organisations, including the Big Shift or with an emissions intensity of below 750g of carbon campaign which targets public finance institutions and builds dioxide per kilowatt hour (CO /kWh), which excludes for on wider campaigns such as End Coal which aims to end coal in 2 example every operating coal-fired power plant in Australia Europe, has played a big role in this development 35. and India . The G20 OECD countries whose export credit The commitments of public finance institutions in G20 countries agencies are currently participants in this arrangement are to end or restrict public spending for coal can be tracked Australia, Canada, certain European Union countries (France, through three categories:36 Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), Japan, Korea, Turkey and the United States . Mexico is the only G20 OECD 1 . Multilateral development banks (MDBs): MDBs have a country that is not involved 39. development mandate and are backed by large sums of public money from member governments . This allows them ECAs in Canada, France and the United States have their to provide finance to governments and the private sector at own export policies that go beyond the OECD regulations . lower interest rates and better terms than commercial lenders . For example, Export Development Canada stated in its new climate change policy: “No new financing for coal-fired power Germany and the United Kingdom (and formerly the United plants, thermal coal mines or dedicated thermal coal-related States) are the only two G20 countries that announced infrastructure – regardless of geographic location” 40. restrictions on coal financing in their role as shareholders of MDBs (over and above the 2013 commitments of the World Despite these restrictions the highest levels of ECA coal Bank Group, European Investment Bank and European Bank financing comes from Japan, China, South Korea, Germany, for Reconstruction and Development to restrict coal-fired France and India . power finance) 37. 2 . National development agencies (NDAs) and development banks (NDBs): These development finance institutions (DFIs) have development in their mandate, often providing support to the private sector to encourage investment . They can finance coal domestically and abroad . In 2013, the United States developed a policy to end public financing by DFIs for new coal-fired power plants overseas, except in rare circumstances; the United Kingdom and some non-G20 European countries joined in this . Germany’s Development Bank (KfW), the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and France’s Development Agency (AFD) have guidelines restricting coal finance with the most ambitious being the AFD which aligned its entire lending with the Paris Agreement in 2017 38.

ix Very efficient technologies

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 14/27 RR Policies MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict to coal No commitments financing restrict to coal No commitments - -

. . the . the - The The . . g . Therefore, despite the participation despite Therefore, . Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government implementation of just transition Effective a lack of is impeded by policies in Argentina as assessment of social and job vulnerabilities, inclusion of unions in climate as proper well change policy making development, it difficult include just transition in government to agendas of civil society (including labour organisa by tions) on panel discussions promoted agencies within the framework government of adaptation and mitigation policies (e the concept of Cabinet), expanded Climate or is distortedjust transition loses strength Neither specific decisions nor methodologies been discussed have action Some government and unions (the CFMEU Major Australian a comprehensive ACTU) negotiate to agreed agreement Transfer Worker (the Valley Latrobe government Victoria state Scheme) with the stations power privately owned and three job losses, and preventing aimed at managing rather than simply mitigating their effects placing Hazelwood for provides agreement and commits partworkers jobs, in alternative retrain minimise job losses, ner companies to sche workers and implement early retirement opportunities younger more allowing for mes, in the industryworkers remain who want to . In

. Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: high increase aims to government The in the of renewables the share electricity 20% by 2% to mix from 2025 . It of projects has awarded half the 5,000 MW, approximately the 2025 reach to required power for initial although finance target, poses a challenge investment published a 2017, the government Change and Climate 2030 Energy action plan . Rating: low A combination of global trends and support electricity from market participants helping to are of drive the cost competitiveness . However, in Australia renewables virtually are there no policies apart target, energy the renewable from in 2020 and, which will expire not be plans, current to according replaced . This . . Nine coal

. Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: not applicable mix is energy of coal in Argentina’s share The negligible Rating: low no policy is currently the accelerate to There phase-out . of coal in Australia the same time a number of older coal-fired At and there been shut down plants have power stations as they come close more plans to are the end of their planned lifetimes to in the past been retired stations have power a 1,600-MW including Hazelwood, years, five plant . In coal-fired addition, new coallignite generation capacity widely is now power the private sector by seen as unviable the economic challenges that coalillustrates against continuously plants face in Australia and storage costs of renewables decreasing Policies supporting phase-out coal Policies in G20 countries low medium high frontrunner Argentina Australia Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 15/27 RR Policies . National development agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict coal to Somecommitment Brazilian Development Bank BNDES has The announced it will no longer support coal plants financing restrict coal to Somecommitment In the OECD Arrangement, addition to Canada’s export agency credit EDC will not finance coal countries designated Principle plants in Equator . unless equipped with CCS - - - . . In early . The task force recommends recommends task force The . CUT, a prominent trade union a prominent . CUT, Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government on just transition in Brazil has so debate Public in a de its relevance despite far been limited, countryveloping leads the just transition deba currently in Brazil, and is part perspective, of the workers’ from te (led by the COP the trade union delegation to to Plan National Adaptation the ITUC) . Brazil’s published in 2016, recognises Change, Climate a just transition, albeit achieve the need to do this to on how without a clear strategy action government Substantial long- Canada’s Framework, Pan-Canadian The commitment to “a plan, calls for term climate workers Canadian skills provide and training to opportunitieswith a just and fair transition to economy” clean growth in Canada’s published recommen taskforce 2019, a federal coal workers a just transition for dations for and communities implement and develop, that the government a just transition plan; adapt national monitor fund; establish a long-term research legislation; create transition centres; establish locally driven workers, a for programme a pension bridging workers in the staying for funding programme labour market and an inventory with labour market establish a just transition information; workers; affected and meeting for programme communities directly with affected - . Responsibility for renewable . Responsibility renewable for Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: high of has a high share Brazil already in the electricity mix . hydropower of It the share increase aims to 2030, 23% by to other renewables than 13 more to and solar power GW capacity 2026, compared by The MW in 2017 . only a few to set a has not yet government 2050 . for target renewable Rating: low of hydro has a high share Canada in its electricitypower mix but has not set itself a 100% renewable of other and the share target, is still very sources renewable low support schemes lies at provincial level Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: medium Brazilian Development Bank announced The that it will no longer finance coal-based plans but the government plants, power 3 . 5 GW installed to coal power increase to capacity in 2026 . Rating: frontrunner has announced the phase-outCanada of 2030 coal by

low medium high frontrunner Brazil Canada Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 16/27 RR Policies ? . A . However, it must be . However, National development agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict coal to Somecommitment policy Credit and associated Green China’s pushed all Chinese public and private regulations to highly polluting financing reduce banks to including coal industries, not rigid that these restrictionsnoted were US-China included a restatement joint statement strengthen that China would of this principle, strictly with a view to controlling “regulations projects with high into flowing public investment pollution and carbon emissions…” not available Information - - . . It is not known how . Just transition has also been The Chinese government has Chinese government The . . In December 2017, the Commission Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action Some government . Reducing employment coal could affect nearly 3 . 5 million workers are there Currently in coal mining 30 billion yuan (US$4 . 56 billion) over allocated support to the next years three the closure redeploy inefficient coal mines and of small, 1 million workersaround the fund will help these workers action Some government (EC) Commission included the European The “Communication concept of just transition in its which a to according Union”, on the Energy or “retraining transition will require just energy up-skilling in certain of employees sectors and, at the approp social measures needed, where riate level” in Regions Coal for established the Platform and re assist EU member states to Transition transition in structuralgions and technological in coal regions this directive; Governance in the EU’s referenced taking its aspectsrequires consideration in into of decarbonisation . the process - . suggesting the use . . g . Support policies for Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: medium tar China has no 2050 renewables 680 GW reach get but is aiming to capacity of installed renewable by surpass2020 . China is expected to thanks target, its 2020 solar energy tariff system a successful feed-in to decided to but the government for 2018 . tariff rates feed-in reduce Rating: not available 20% of source EU aims to The sources renewable from energy 2020, and has set individual by each member state; for targets of 32% is currently a 2030 target the legislative going through process member states’ are renewables but the EC has competence support guidance for adopted e schemes, of auctions - - . . . . In will launch trial 2019, the government Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: medium has no phase-out government The plans for in the the share reduce but aims to coal yet 58% by 64% to currently mix from energy strict introduced government re The 2020 . the construction of new coal for quirements construction stop plants in 2016, to power of electricity with over-supply in provinces strengt recently air pollution policies, China’s the 2018–2020 Air Pollution hened through coal in reduced resulted already have Plan, use a new emissions trading scheme periods for sector the power for Rating: medium 26% representing EU member states Ten already of the installed coal capacity have plants closing their power to committed of the EU’s reform The . 2030 at the latest by in early Scheme adopted Trading Emissions in much higher prices resulting 2018, already this accelerate may of emissions allowances, on economic grounds process

low medium high frontrunner China European Union Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 17/27 RR Policies .

. storage . 2 . National development agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict coal to Somecommitment Restrictions finance development on bilateral coal for Restrictions coal plants on export for credits and with no CO without CCS financing restrict coal to Somecommitment Restrictions institutions on coal finance at bilateral coal plants KfW-Ipex bank restrictions for still allow 500 MW if they meet a under 500 MW and over minimum efficiency standard - - - - - . It acknowledges that . . The plan calls for a “managed “managed a plan calls for The . Meanwhile, similar local support . Meanwhile, sche Subsequently, the draft finance bill for the draft finance bill . Subsequently, Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action Some government political the French entered transition” “Just election Macron’s President discourse following of the Ministryin 2017, with the formation of Cli . France’s Transition and Inclusive Ecological remaining prioritises Plan closing the four mate 2022; national coal and stations by coal power opposition expressed shipping unions have this deadline to support emphasising the need to transition”, workers affected in the short and medium terms compensation a ten-year create 2019 plans to local for the loss of revenue makefund to up for of coal power authorities the closure caused by stations with nine other been agreed already mes have which support local mitigation projects regions, start-ups, rather than wholesale indus or green trial restructuring action government Substantial if the 20,000 workers be affected Around would coal phase out lignite decides to government Agree of the Paris the targets reach to use, pledged €1 . 5 billion government The ment . the period 2017–2021 to (US$1 . 72 billion) for ease structural changes 2021, and funding will be needed beyond more structural “growth, has set up a commission on coal address to change and employment” in commission recommended phase-outThe . January to 2019 that €40 billion be provided compensate until 2038, to states coal-intensive coal workers the finan and retrain and reduce on electricitycial burden industry consumers, and utility companies . - Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: high 32% towards strives France in 2030 energy renewable 2050 are by (100% renewables 1 . 5°C compatible) In 2018, the a presented government French new accelerate plan to ten-point and double its wind wind projects years capacity within five power Rating: high 80% of produce Germany aims to electricity sources renewable from swit government The 2050 . by tariff system a feed-in ched from an auctioningto scheme in 2017 . - - - The The . . A multi-stakehol . Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: frontrunner In announ Macron January 2018, President all coal plants will shut down ced that France earlier 2021, two years than planned by plan covering multi-annual energy revised a provide 2018–2023 and 2024–2028 may detailed phase-out plan . Rating: medium Germany miss its 2020 GHG is expected to of 40% compared target emission reduction the remaining mainly due to 1990 levels, to mix and of coal in the energy share large rising transport emissions der commission tasked the government by in Januaryrecommended phase out 2019 to is government The 2038 . by coal at the latest workingnow and finan laws on respective cing frameworks

low medium high frontrunner France Germany Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 18/27 RR Policies MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict to coal No commitments financing restrict to coal No commitments - -

. In - .

. Before this . Before . India is “Just transition” transition” “Just . . In 2018, the go The price The cap is $70/ton . . The success of these macro-scale success of these macro-scale The . Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government is not prevalent “just transition” concept of The policy climate discourse in India’s transitions: urbanisation, massive undergoing and labour force industrialisation, formalisation about 32 million . India create needs to growth jobs per year main concern . transitions is policy-makers’ part is a significant Coal of the economies (Jharkhand, states some poorer Orissa and official employ to Chhattisgarh) . According workers employed 355,000 were ment figures, of about 450 out of a workforce in coal mines, about 1 . 8% fell mine employment million . Coal about 6% while productivity grew per year, . half the global average) (it remains per year is estimated value chain employment Coal 1 million jobs be just over to is dependent on the success of current macro-transitions action Some government fourth producer largest Indonesia is the world’s of natural producer largest of coal and the tenth on oil imports reliant and is increasingly gas, 2015, Indonesia a new fuel pricing introduced reduces subsidies mechanism that effectively on imported oil and gasoline domestic a price cap for vernment introduced electricitycoal use for coal that is of high calorific value for the state-ownedpolicy was introduced, utility PLN bought coal based on the market price to determine impactsWhile it is difficult on budget allocation to the reduced employment, on soci spending greater allowed subsidies fuel and boost growth to ally linked programmes including developing povertyreduce indirectly, programme health coverage a universal - . Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: high programme clean energy India’s capacityhas doubled renewable The between 2014 and 2017 . country 175 GW have aims to capacityof installed renewables NEP expectsThe the 2022 . by installed capacity of renewables 2027, which 265 GW by reach to place Indiawould ahead of its 2030 . for NDC target Rating: low the Indonesia increase plans to of new and renewable share in the primaryenergy mix energy government The 2050 . 31% by to for various feed-in tariffs offers but the technologies renewable gene is based on the average rate ration cost of electricity (including which subsidised coal power), unsubsidised renewable renders uneconomical in projects energy some regions - . No . Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: medium India dependent on coal power is heavily the 2017 National Electrici to according and, ty (NEP), net additions of 45 GW will be Plan that these 2027, although it notes added by peakingplant additions will be needed for rather than baseload power Rating: low expects government The that 56 GW of new capacity will be needed in the next decade, coal 26 . 8 GW of this by cover and plans to coal phase-out is under consideration .

low medium high frontrunner India Indonesia Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 19/27 RR Policies National development agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict coal to Somecommitment financing restrict coal to Somecommitment financing restrict to coal No commitments - - . Nevertheless, while not . In new June 2018, Italy’s Pri . . Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government coal supply is imported, 90% of Italy’s Around the coal phase-out less and therefore have may workers,of an impact compared on upstream with other G20 nations the explicit just transition policy, to referring (2017) does call for Strategy National Energy “timely workers actions retrain and create to new jobs and skills” “work pledged to Giuseppe Conte, me Minister, in progress, already speed up the process, to production of [Italy’s] ‘decarbonisation’ of the system” action No government published its Japanese government The draft on 23 April long-term strategy 2019 . a just transition without to refers strategy The specifying details action No government been no policies on just have Since 2018, there transition . Nevertheless, the next administration has an opportunity make distribu to policies to transition . the social benefits of energy te an intention it has expressed example, For and participation job creation increase of to energy communities and users in renewable emphasising medium, small-scale and projects, distributed generation . - - - - - . - 45 . So far, the government the government . So far, However, the newly elected . However, Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: medium exists target No 2050 renewable Inreduce energy an effortto 2017 National Italy’s dependency, an in envisages Strategy Energy in electricity of renewables crease to 39% currently demand from be is to strategy The 2030 . 55% by in 2019 . revised Rating: medium the share increase Japan aims to in the electricityof renewables between 22% and 24% by mix to 15% in 2016), which is 2030 (from likely with existing be achieved to policies a 2050 renewab has not adopted . les target Rating: medium has set a target government The of renewab the share increase to les in the electricity 35% by mix to 2050 (aspira 50% by 2024 and to tional only), and has introduced energy, an auctioning for system capacity certifi and clean energy cates cancel decided to government fourth long-term ener the nation’s renewables gy auction for - . - - . 44 Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: frontrunner which is Strategy, 2017 National Energy Italy’s phase out coal in po plans to under revision, 2025, but the government generation by wer has not taken implementing measures any Rating: low Energy 2030 Strategic Under the current of coal its share reduce Japan plans to Plan, in the electricity power 26% (from mix to Japan acti the same time, 32% in 2016) . At plants at build new coal power seeks to vely home and abroad Rating: low Alliance Coal Past Mexico joined the Power add new coal-fired it plans to yet at COP23, newly The elected govern capacity in 2020 . of 400 M tons ment announced the purchase in the Carbonífera producers of coal from . Region

low medium high frontrunner Italy Japan Mexico Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 20/27 RR Policies MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict to coal No commitments financing restrict to coal No commitments -

- . - - . It . . In the past, Russia respon Potential impacts on . Potential Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government depend and towns Several Russian provinces Ob such as Kemerovo fuel industries, on fossil coal sector which is vulnerable to last province, should the international coal marketjob losses, decline dramatically displaced workers for ded with social migration (particularly coal mining) after the collapse from Union and heavyof the Soviet industries will the government be seen how to remains act aid workers mitigation to displaced through restructuring system and/or energy measures action No government in 2016 . was unveiled 2030” Vision “Saudi The of non-oilIt raising the share exports called for 50% of export 16% to from 2030, value by of renewab as expanding the role as well and system in the Saudi energy le energy and industrial energy localising the renewable equipment sectors workers and communities in the oil gas evidence of with limited not clear, sector are public discourse on just transitions in Saudi cre had aimed to Vision the Arabia . However, 1 . 2 million private sector2020, and ate jobs by 9% . At 11 . 6% to from cut unemployment to 2018, Saudi the Bangkok Conference Climate to “central Arabia described a just transition as future” their ecological - - . . No The gover The . . Russia supports . Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: medium its 2009 Strategy to According Development of Renewable for increase Russia aims to Energy, in the of renewables the share electricity 1% around mix from The 2020 . 2 . 5% by to currently 2024 of 4 . 5% by target previous has been abandoned and there for targets no longer-term are energy renewable long-term through renewables continuing capacity agreements, the next decade at least for Rating: low 10% source Saudi Arabia aims to of electricity by renewables from an instal 2023, equivalent to led capacity of 9,500 MW plan exists longer-term nment uses auctioning schemes supportto of the development renewables . Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: low the share increase aims to government The of coal in electricity 16% to generation by 17% until 2035, which implies a 24% increase no are There 2035 . of coal consumption by phase-out coal power plans for Rating: not applicable power Saudi Arabia does not use coal for generation .

low medium high frontrunner Russia Saudi Arabia Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 21/27 RR Policies MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict to coal No commitments financing restrict coal to Somecommitment - - -

. Notably, . Notably, . South Africa has high levels . South Africa has high levels The 8th Basic Plan for Long-Term Long-Term for 8th Basic Plan The . Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action Some government is highly coal-depen economy South Africa’s dent, and the coal mining sector employs 80,000 workers of poverty ensuring and unemployment; a been explicitly just transition has therefore as a priorityrecognised in national policy South Africa is the only country to Moreover, and just transi inclusive “an to directly refer a social dialogue in its NDC . Currently tion” South has been launched by Africa’s process just develop to Commission National Planning pathways, transition sustainable development workers and but explicit transition policies for in place not yet communities are action No government go ahead with the Discussions on whether to planned construction of Kori 5 and 6 nuclear sparkedreactors on the much public debate on workersimpacts of plant closures transport energy, Korean unions representing and public sector workers announced a call for stating their support transition”, “just energy a the phase-out but that a for of coal and nuclear, pu transition that ensures energy for “roadmap democratic blic accountability and strengthens must also be industry” of the energy control developed Electricity Supply and Demand 2017–2031, include 2017, did not appear to late released a just transition . explicit planning for - - - . . A programme to support to . A programme Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: medium the 2019 updated to According Southdraft unadopted), IRP (as yet expand renewable Africa plans to to 3 . GW currently from energy 20 GW installed capacity above 2030; or about 29% of installed by capacity then . No 2050 rene by has been adopted wables target so far power through energy renewable inde for agreements purchase was producers pendent power put on ice in 2016 and while some in 2018, no signed projects were have rounds new procurement been instigated Rating: low increase South aims to Korea in the of renewables the share electricity 2030 . 20% by mix to its 2017 Electricity to According an increase require this would Plan 11 . 3 of installed capacity from 58 . 5 GW in 2030 GW in 2017 to the revised government The by Standard Renewable Portfolio prioritising and incen wind power plants power tivising renewable model with profit a shared have to communities - The . envisages the comple envisages 46 Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: medium on coal power heavily South Africa relies Plan draft Resource 2019 updated Integrated electricity(IRP) for tion of major plants and the construction of but also plants in the 2020s, new coal power of coal will be reduced assumes that the share 20% of the electricityto 2050 . supply by Rating: low in 2017, the new assuming power After temporarily shut decided to government plants older than 30 years coal power down shorter decommission for and to periods, plants will be these in 2022 . New coal power decided built until 2022, but the government change some of the planned units into to coal use liquefied natural gas (LNG) . Overall, 2022 and peak at 42 GW by is expected to 39 . 9 GW in 2030 to then decrease

low medium high frontrunner South Africa South Korea Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 22/27 RR Policies - . MDB level agencies and banks development National Domestic export agencies credit Export restriction in OECD credit agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict to coal No commitments financing restrict coal to Somecommitment Kingdom United The issued a policy statement res joint statement the US and Nordic similar to but it did not apply trictingoverseas, coal finance exportto credits . - - . - . In . SDG 8, . In both the 2017 Industrial terms of policy, Just transition approaches approaches Just transition action No government presidency duringTurkish the Labour 20 The ensuring to the Summit in 2015 committed countries of developing in G20 representation international leaders to and urged processes low-carbon towards economies through move G20 cooperation on just transition strategies efficiency on energy and a focus despite Yet, the past decade, roll-out over energy renewable a policies towards has not implemented Turkey socially oriented and inclusive comprehensive, transition . the energy for approach action No government Just transition discourse in the UK has been trade unions and civil society to mostly isolated Audit report the Environmental A recent by “UK Government that the noted Committee of the in raising the profile seems uninterested [Sustainable Development] Goals [incl undertakendecent work and jobs], having no them domestical promote work to substantive ly” and 2018 Clean Growth Paper White Strategy mention just transition and have fail to Strategy of trade unions the role to reference limited (TUC) Unions Congress Trades has contrast, the undertaken consider and produced research able work on just transition, including a Climate a Just that sets out demands for Change Policy TUC The . government from Strategy Transition via the Minis dialogue, push for continues to terial Advisory on Manufacturing, Group the Union Sustainable Development Advisory Trade . Forum and the Coal Committee, - The The . Feed-in tariffs tariffs . Feed-in Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: medium capacity tariff, has a feed-in Turkey pre-licensingauctions, auctions and other support schemes in renewable ener different place for include and plans to gy sources, installed in total 30% renewables capacity 2023 . by Rating: low sector emissions in 2017 Power than in 1990 but 65% lower were is no long-term plan after there energy renewable 2020 for supports Difference Contract for of large-scalethe deployment projects renewable end in to are smaller projects for 2019 . March The . . Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: low announced the opening of 30 GW Turkey by 2023, plants power of new coal-fired than 60 GW planned in total with more subsidies and purchase provides government coal power for guarantees Rating: frontrunner In early announced 2018, the government plants would coal power that all unabated . 2025 at the latest by be shut down

low medium high frontrunner Turkey United Kingdom Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 23/27 RR Policies . National development agencies and banks development National Export restriction in OECD credit MDB level Domestic export agencies credit Commitments to restrict public finance restrict to public finance Commitments power and coal-fired coal to financing restrict coal to Somecommitment countries: ending with Nordic Joint US statement plants power for new coal-fired public financing finance) except (at MDBs and in bilateral overseas circumstances in rare . . . g By contrast, California currently has currently . By contrast, California . Just transition approaches approaches Just transition level) action state (at Some government Activity and discourse varies level at state (e in the Appalachian coal region States established the Power Virginia) West Kentucky, support in 2015 to initiative Plus economic worker including retraining and diversification, benefits no official policy away to manage its transition oil from . In 2018 the Renewable energy policies energy Renewable Rating: low for US has no 2050 target The energy renewable on tariffs introduced government the import of solar panels that led companies to energy renewable of or cancel investments freeze US$2 . 5 billion around Coal phase-outCoal commitments Rating: low phase has no plans to US government The Trump The generation . out coal in power the coal revive to administration vowed and has started industry, in 2017 to processes of the previous Plan the Clean Power repeal . government

low medium high frontrunner United United States Rating:

MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 24/27 References

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MANAGING THE PHASE-OUT OF COAL A COMPARISON OF ACTIONS IN G20 COUNTRIES page 26/27 Authors and Acknowledgments

Authors This briefing paper was prepared by Hannah Schindler of the International Secretariat of Climate Transparency under the guidance of the Partners .

Contact: hschindler@governance-platform .org

May 2019

Acknowledgements This paper benefited significantly from contributions of and review by Ipek Gencsu (ODI); Lena Donat (Germanwatch); Gerd Leipold, Aleksandra Zebrowska and Sebastian Wegner (HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform); Paola Parra (Climate Analytics); Andrew Marquard, Jesse Burton and Bryce McCall (Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town); Thomas Spencer (The Energy and Resources Institute); Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute), Fabby Tumiwa (Institute for Essential Service Reform); Yuji Mizuno (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies); Mariana Gutierrez (Iniciativa Climática de México) .

Disclaimer This paper has been developed by the International Secretariat of Climate Transparency . The paper is part of Climate Transparency’s activities to enhance ambitious climate action in G20 countries . Responsibility for the content of this paper lies with the authors and does not necessarily represent the opinions of either their organisations or the Partners of Climate Transparency .

Suggested citation: Climate Transparency (2019): Managing the coal phase-out – a comparison of actions in G20 countries, Climate Transparency, c/o Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany www .climate-transparency .org info@climate-transparency .org

This project is part of the International Climate Initiative (IKI) . The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) supports this initiative on the basis of a decision adopted by the German Bundestag .

Supported by:

based on a decision of the German Bundestag

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