1 Chapter 12 1 2 2 3 A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 3 4 4 5 Image Politics in the West during the 5 6 6 7 Cold War 7 8 8 9 Carl Marklund 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 Introduction 14 15 15 16 Today, the Nordic countries – known as Norden in the Scandinavian languages 16 17 and Pohjola in Finnish – are sometimes described as an ‘elite club’ among the 17 18 countries of the world.1 In international comparisons of competitiveness and 18 19 productivity, as well as global indices of quality of life and social equality, the 19 20 Nordic countries are often placed in the top percentile. While a 2007 Finnish 20 21 report on the ‘Nordic model’ warned that one should be careful when interpreting 21 22 these rankings, it concluded that the abundance of ‘similar evidence’ proves that 22 23 the Nordic model is consistent with ‘a good business climate’.2 23 24 Given that the Nordic countries are prosperous, high-performing and socially 24 25 stable, it is perhaps no wonder that they attract renewed international interest in 25 26 the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–8 and the subsequent Great Recession. 26 27 But ‘the success of the Nordic countries is a mystery’, according to a group of 27 28 Norwegian researchers based at the research institute ESOP, the centre for the 28 29 study of equality, social organization and performance in Oslo. Traditional 29 30 economic theories – often developed and tested in economic models based on 30 31 the premises of the American free-market system – cannot accurately explain 31 32 how the Nordic countries can combine high growth with social equality and 32 33 high taxes, the ESOP researchers asserted, arguing that ‘the Nordic experience 33 34 constitutes a social laboratory of general interest’.3 34 35 35 1 Proof Copy 36 martti Ahtisaari cited in Kimmo Sasi, ‘Nordiska rådets relevans’, Hufvudstadsbladet, 36 37 11 November 2011. Available at: http://hbl.fi/i-dag/2011-11-10/nordiska-radets-relevans, 37 accessed 15 November 2011. For an early reference, see H. Tingsten, 38 Från idéer till idyll. Den 38 lyckliga demokratien, 2nd edn (Stockholm, 1967). 39 39 2 torben M. Andersen et al., The Nordic Model: Embracing Globalization and Sharing 40 40 Risks (Helsinki, 2007). 41 3 equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP), ‘Confronting Theory41 42 with Nordic Lessons: An Application to Establish ESOP as a New Research Centre at the 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 263 8/1/2013 10:18:00 AM 264 Communicating the North

1 The Nordic countries’ reputation as social laboratories is not new. They have 1 2 attracted international attention as model societies since the interwar years for 2 3 a number of different reasons and in a variety of ways.4 Today, globalization, 3 4 neoliberalism and the recession may, of course, challenge the Nordic reputation 4 5 for exemplary success and its status as an elite club. Iceland’s 2008–11 financial 5 6 crisis may be a case in point. 6 7 Yet, it is precisely the Nordic countries that are often said to have adapted to 7 8 globalization quickly and to have handled the financial instability of the post- 8 9 Cold War years relatively well. They seem capable of fast recovery, as indicated 9 10 by Finland and Sweden in the mid-1990s and Iceland in the early 2010s. Also, 10 11 American political scientist Christine Ingebritsen has argued that ‘the small 11 12 European states provide an appropriate social laboratory to study these changes 12 13 [that is, globalization] precisely because of their economic openness and long- 13 14 held strategies of coping with the world around them.’ According to Ingebritsen, 14 15 the Nordic countries have not merely adapted to globalization; they have also 15 16 sought to actively shape globalization by playing the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’,5 16 17 using the ‘diversity in the strategies of small states’ as a means to ‘influence the 17 18 agenda in world politics’.6 18 19 Three main reasons, then, seem to explain the renewed interest in the Nordic 19 20 countries in the early 2000s. First, the Nordic countries appear exemplary simply 20 21 because they are achieving a better-than-average economic performance while 21 22 simultaneously topping the ‘beauty contests’ of the emerging global ‘audit 22 23 society’.7 Second, in combining economic growth with social equality, despite 23 24 high taxes and generous public expenditure, the Nordic countries provide a 24 25 model because they may function as a social laboratory of progressive social 25 26 policies. Third, the Nordic countries have consciously marketed themselves as 26 27 27 28 28 Department of Economics, University of Oslo’, 30 August 2006 at: http://www.esop.uio.no/ 29 about/about.html, accessed 8 March, 2010. 29 30 4 See, for example, Kazimierz Musiał, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of 30 31 Progress in the Era of Modernisation (Baden-Baden, 2002); Jenny Andersson and Mary 31 32 Hilson, ‘Images of Sweden and the Nordic Countries’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 34/3 32 33 (2009): 219–228; Carl Marklund and Peter Stadius, ‘Acceptance and Conformity: Merging 33 34 Modernity with Nationalism in the Stockholm Exhibition in 1930’, Culture Unbound, 34 35 2 (2010): 609–634.Proof See also Lindholm Narváez’s, CopyStadius’s, and Musiał’s and Chacinska’s 35 36 contributions to this volume (Chapters 9, 11 and 13 respectively). 36 5 37 For the concept of ‘norm entrepreneurs’, see Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore, 37 ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, , 52/4 38 International Organization 38 (1998): 887–-917. 39 39 6 Christine Ingebritsen, ‘Learning from Lilliput: Small States and EU Expansion’, 40 40 Scandinavian Studies, 76/3 (2004): 369–382 at 369–370 and 381. 41 7 ‘Beauty contests’ is an expression used by Finnish political scientist Olli Kangas. See 41 42 also Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford, 1997). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 264 8/1/2013 10:18:00 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 265

1 innovators and providers of solutions to global challenges. As such, the concept 1 2 of the ‘Nordic model’ involves not only the results of Nordic economic, political 2 3 and social development, but also the methods by which this development has 3 4 been brought about.8 The Nordic success is, in other words, usually not seen as 4 5 automatic, coincidental or predetermined, but as the result of conscious business 5 6 innovation and progressive social policy experiments. 6 7 This chapter will discuss the shifting reasons for interest in the Nordic 7 8 countries abroad, how the ‘image’ of the Nordic countries has developed since 8 9 the interwar years, and how it has been promoted by the Nordics themselves, 9 10 not least by the Swedes. Due to the importance of American public opinion 10 11 in shaping Western views during the Cold War, as well as global outlooks in its 11 12 aftermath, the chapter asks how the ‘Swedish model’ gained pre-eminence over 12 13 the other Nordic countries during the Cold War years. Finally, it analyses how 13 14 the Nordic identity served as a common resource for the smaller democracies of 14 15 northern Europe, including Sweden, during the interwar and immediate post- 15 16 war years, tracking its increasing ‘Swedification’ in the 1960s and the 1970s, 16 17 and highlighting the substitution of the ‘Swedish model’ for the Nordic model 17 18 since the 1990s. But, first, it is important to track the origins of this outside 18 19 interest in these admittedly minor powers as models for others to learn from or 19 20 be warned by. 20 21 21 22 22 23 Norden in the News 23 24 24 25 Except for certain jubilees, state visits and commemorations, the Nordic 25 26 countries did not generate much more press than comparable smaller nations, 26 27 either in terms of newsworthy events or in terms of more long-term socio- 27 28 economic development, before the 1930s. The 1930s marked a sharp contrast, 28 29 as the Great Depression generated a wave of publications on Denmark and 29 30 Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Finland and Norway, throughout the world’s 30 31 industrialized societies.9 31 32 This interest reached a peak in the United States, as American public 32 33 intellectuals, journalists, and politicians began to question American capitalism, 33 34 turning to other parts of the world for comparison and contrast, as well as 34 35 inspirationProof and concrete policy alternatives. Copy While many Americans looked 35 36 to how the other leading powers, notably France and Great Britain, dealt with 36 37 the economic and social crisis, intellectuals and progressives took a greater 37 38 interest in the Nazi, fascist, and Soviet experiments, usually without turning 38 39 39 40 40 8 For a recent study of the Nordic model, see Mary Hilson, The Nordic Model (London, 41 2008). 41 42 9 Musiał, Roots of the Scandinavian Model. See also Stadius, Chapter 11 in this volume. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 265 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 266 Communicating the North

1 totalitarian themselves.10 Here, the Nordic countries could attract a broader 1 2 American audience as they seemed to combine capitalism with democracy, 2 3 unlike Germany, Italy and Russia, and were apparently better at doing so than 3 4 either France or Great Britain, or the United States itself for that matter.11 4 5 While the broader interest in the Nordic countries had already emerged in 5 6 1932−33, Sweden moved to the fore as a result of the publication of American 6 7 journalist Marquis Childs’s book Sweden: The Middle Way in 1936, as is widely 7 8 known.12 On the one hand, the popularity of Sweden, as well as of the other 8 9 Nordic countries, hinged upon the way in which they could provide concrete 9 10 examples for limited policy reforms and specific measures that could be used 10 11 by the experimentalist New Deal. On the other hand, they represented a 11 12 more general image, holding out the hope that others, too, could escape 12 13 uncompromising conflict between capitalism and socialism, between freedom 13 14 and security. The concept of the ‘Middle Way’ as employed by Childs to analyse 14 15 the Nordic countries, had already been activated as a byword for Franklin D. 15 16 Roosevelt’s so-called Second New Deal in 1935.13 Roosevelt referred to Childs’s 16 17 book and sent a commission to study the cooperative movement in the Nordic 17 18 countries.14 18 19 19 20 10 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, 20 21 MA., 1998); Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social 21 22 Thought in the Depression Years (New York, 1973); and Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Three New 22 23 Deals: Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy, Hitler’s Germany, and the Rise of State Power in 23 24 the 1930s (New York, 2006). 24 11 25 See Carl Marklund, ‘Sharing Values and Shaping Values: Sweden, Nordic Democracy 25 26 and the American Crisis of Democracy’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics 26 (Helsinki, 2010), pp. 114–140. 27 of Nordic Democracy 27 12 marquis W. Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT, 1936). See 28 28 also Sten Ottosson, ‘’Sverige som förebild: en diskussion om svenska självbilder med 29 29 utgångspunkt från tre reseberättelser/reportage från andra hälften av 1930-talet’,Scandia , 30 68/1 (2002): 109–120; Sten Ottosson, Svensk självbild under kalla kriget: en studie av 30 31 stats- och utrikesministrarnas bild av Sverige 1950–1989 (Stockholm, 2003); Sten Ottosson, 31 32 Sverige mellan öst och väst: svensk självbild under kalla kriget (Gothenberg, 2001); John 32 33 Logue, ‘The Swedish Model: Visions of Sweden in American Politics and Political Science’, 33 34 Swedish-American Historical Quarterly, 50/3 (1999): 162–172; Allan Kastrup, Med Sverige 34 35 i Amerika: Proofopinioner, stämningar och upplysningsarbete: Copy en rapport av Allan Kastrup (Malmö, 35 36 1985); Musiał, Roots of the Scandinavian Model; Per T. Ohlsson, Gudarnas ö: om det 36 37 extremt svenska (Stockholm, 1993); and Per T. Ohlsson, Over There: banden över Atlanten 37 (Stockholm, 1992). 38 38 13 The Second New Deal relied more on Keynesian economics and aimed at a longer- 39 39 range recovery programme than the ‘First’ New Deal had done. 40 14 Carl Marklund, ‘The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way, and the Swedish Model: 40 41 Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 34/3 (2009): 41 42 264–285. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 266 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 267

1 The Second World War affected the American impression of all the Nordic 1 2 countries in fundamental ways. Primarily, these impressions were determined 2 3 by the American perception of the relationships between the Nordic countries 3 4 and the two great totalitarian powers in their vicinity: Nazi Germany and the 4 5 Soviet Union. At the end of the war, Danish and Norwegian representatives in 5 6 the United States noted how Sweden had emerged in the forefront of American 6 7 interest in the Nordic countries. A crucial factor for explaining this shift seems 7 8 to have been the existence since 1921–22 of a Swedish news service – called 8 9 the Svensk-amerikanska nyhetsbyrån in Stockholm and the American-Swedish 9 10 News Exchange (ASNE) in New York – and its energetic efforts to provide the 10 11 American press with information about Sweden and the Swedish press with 11 12 information about the United States.15 12 13 ASNE had been set up in the aftermath of the First World War when a 13 14 Swedish delegation sent to the United States to negotiate food imports was met 14 15 with suspicion due to the perceived close ties between Sweden and Germany. 15 16 In response, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newly established 16 17 Sweden–America Foundation, founded in 1919, proposed jointly that a 17 18 permanent institution should be formed to facilitate news exchange between 18 19 Sweden and the United States. The information service was to be privately 19 20 funded, but was instructed to steer clear of all propaganda, as wartime experience 20 21 had shown that the American press held strong antipathies towards any overt or 21 22 covert attempts at influencing it.16 22 23 ASNE began its activity by distributing articles and telegrams to much of 23 24 the American daily press, reaching about 2,700 newspapers and concentrating 24 25 primarily on topics such as design, culture and the arts in conjunction with the 25 26 exhibitions in Gothenburg in 1923 and Stockholm in 1930. But ASNE also 26 27 took a more active role in cooperating with the organizers of the Stockholm 27 28 Exhibition in inviting a score of American journalists – including Marquis W. 28 29 Childs – which resulted in some 100 largely positive articles in the American 29 30 press on ‘Swedish Modern’ architecture and design.17 30 31 Through ASNE, Sweden thus already possessed a network and a channel 31 32 of information dissemination before the outbreak of the Second World War. 32 33 For example, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed in 1938 that 33 34 while all the Nordic countries enjoyed widespread admiration in the United 34 35 States, theProof Swedes had spent considerable resourcesCopy on ‘enlightenment work’ 35 36 (oplysningsarbeide) and had channelled it through a single, dedicated bureau 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 15 Kastrup, Med Sverige i Amerika, pp. 30–34. 41 16 ibid., p. 31. 41 42 17 ibid., p. 47. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 267 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 268 Communicating the North

1 of information, ASNE, which the other Nordic countries either had a lesser 1 2 version of or lacked entirely.18 2 3 During the Second World War ASNE joined the score of national 3 4 information agencies circulating a wealth of information in the United States 4 5 on various aspects of life in their respective homelands, as part of the war effort. 5 6 Across the entire United States, newspapers, large and small, in need of easily 6 7 readable material and stories from around the world would often reprint the 7 8 articles spread by ASNE without editing or comment, thus contributing to the 8 9 proliferation of information about Sweden. 9 10 The war also necessitated increased Danish and Norwegian information 10 11 activity in the United States, headed by Caspar Hasselriis and Torolv Kandahl, 11 12 respectively. Despite some suspicion towards the Swedes during the war years, 12 13 especially on the part of the Norwegians, these activities were to some extent 13 14 coordinated with ASNE from 1943 onwards. Through his establishment of14 15 the American Friends of Danish Freedom and Democracy in 1940, Hasselriis 15 16 is considered to have been instrumental in maintaining a positive American 16 17 opinion about Denmark even after the German invasion of Denmark and 17 18 Norway in April 1940. Like the Norwegian information services in the United 18 19 States, Hasselriis and his associates coordinated their efforts with the Office of 19 20 War Information and the press section of the US State Department. In 1945, the 20 21 Danish newspaper Politiken reported that Denmark was widely perceived in the 21 22 United States as an ally rather than a collaborator, thanks largely to Hasselriis’s 22 23 wartime activities.19 23 24 24 25 25 26 The Marketing of Sweden 26 27 27 28 The Swedes, on the other hand, experienced considerable difficulties in preserving 28 29 a positive image of Sweden in the American press during the war. The American 29 30 press quite regularly criticized the treatment of German-Jewish refugees in Sweden 30 31 and the insufficient Swedish support to Finland in the Winter War of 1939−40, 31 32 as well as Swedish iron ore exports to Germany, despite the country’s declared 32 33 neutrality. Largely as a consequence of these American perceptions, Swedish 33 34 export industries that were active in the American market united to establish the 34 35 Swedish IProofndustries Fund in order to support ACopySNE from 1941 onwards.20 35 36 As noted by Swedish historian Nikolas Glover, Swedish observers became 36 37 increasingly concerned with the Sweden’s reputation abroad immediately after 37 38 38 39 39 18 From 1937 onwards, ASNE was reorganized and became less dependent on Swedish 40 business interests for its financing. Ibid., p. 64. 40 41 19 ibid., p. 97. 41 42 20 ibid., p. 91. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 268 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 269

1 the First World War, not least in the United States. Likewise, Swedish business 1 2 interests understood during the 1940s that Sweden’s image abroad must be 2 3 improved in order to secure new contracts for Swedish industry in the fierce 3 4 competition of the expected post-war slump, promoting the creation of the 4 5 private-cum-public Swedish Institute.21 5 6 Unscathed by war, Sweden was, in many ways, better equipped than the other 6 7 Nordic countries to meet the challenges of post-war reconstruction. In addition, 7 8 and as noted during the war by the Swedish social scientists and social reformers 8 9 Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, Sweden still had a capital of goodwill in the United 9 10 States which hinged upon the image of Sweden as a politically democratic and 10 11 socially progressive country that had evolved during the 1930s. While Sweden 11 12 certainly shared this capital with the other Nordic countries, it could also be 12 13 regarded as a national resource in forging a stronger link with American post- 13 14 war public opinion.22 14 15 Sometime later, high-level Swedish politicians did seek to connect what 15 16 can be called the inner middle way (that is, the welfare state) with the outer 16 17 middle way (that is, neutrality) in the expectation that the international respect 17 18 afforded to the former could be utilized for improving the international image 18 19 of the latter. At a strategic moment, on the occasion when Sweden became a 19 20 member state of the United Nations on 19 November 1946, Sweden’s Social 20 21 Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén gave a speech in the 21 22 General Assembly in New York which drew precisely upon the parallel identified 22 23 by the Myrdals.23 In his speech, Undén referred to Sweden’s reputation in the 23 24 United States as ‘the country of the Middle Way’, due to Swedish methods of 24 25 solving ‘inner social problems’. The Swedes, Undén stated, have readily accepted 25 26 this characterization, but would also like to see it applied to the Swedish attitude 26 27 towards international problems – that is, to its neutrality.24 27 28 Historians have noted how Undén thereby conceptually reconnected 28 29 Swedish domestic policy with Swedish foreign policy, emphasizing Sweden’s 29 30 peaceful labour relations over the progressive social policies of its nascent 30 31 welfare state.25 For example, Undén’s formulations – repeated in March 1950 – 31 32 32 33 21 nikolas Glover, National Relations: Public Diplomacy, National Identity and the 33 34 Swedish Institute, 1945–1970 (Lund, 2011). See also Glover, Chapter 10 in this volume. 34 35 22 alvaProof Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal, Kontakt medCopy Amerika (Stockholm, 1941); and 35 36 Gunnar Myrdal, Amerika mitt i världen (Stockholm, 1943). 36 23 37 ottosson, ‘Sverige som förebild’. 37 24 Östen Undén cited in 38 Förenta nationernas generalförsamlings första ordinarie mötes 38 andra del, New York 1946, m.m. (Stockholm, 1947), p. 9. 39 39 25 nils Andrén and Yngve Möller, Från Undén till Palme: Svensk utrikespolitik efter 40 40 andra världskriget (Stockholm, 1990); Ottosson, ‘Sverige som förebild’; Hans Lödén, ‘För 41 säkerhets skull’: ideologi och säkerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik 1950–1975 (Stockholm, 41 42 1999). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 269 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 270 Communicating the North

1 have been interpreted by Nils Andrén and Yngve Möller in 1990 as an attempt 1 2 at ‘ideologically motivating Sweden’s choice of role between the two blocks, 2 3 launching the Swedish model [although Undén spoke only of the Middle Way] 3 4 as an alternative of a particular value as an image to copy’, although Undén did 4 5 not explicitly suggest Sweden as a model or an example, but merely stated that it 5 6 has earned the reputation of providing a middle way.26 Again, the interest in the 6 7 cooperative movement and various concrete social policies, which had motivated 7 8 American interest in the Nordic countries during the ideological tension of the 8 9 1930s, could be associated with the wider problem of labour relations in an 9 10 industrialized society, namely Sweden, as a kind of domestic reflection of the 10 11 larger geopolitical tension between the superpowers in the 1940s.27 11 12 It has not been possible here to determine how the General Assembly and the 12 13 international press reacted to Undén’s alignment of the inner middle way with 13 14 the outer middle way, if at all. At home, though, the Foreign Minister’s speech 14 15 was criticized by some Swedish conservatives as a sign of hubris on the part of the 15 16 Social Democrats, who apparently imagined that ‘little Sweden’ would be able 16 17 to act as a ‘bridge-builder’ between the emerging superpowers. Yet, the Minister 17 18 was certainly right in that there was a broad reputation to build upon, exactly 18 19 as the Myrdals had suggested. The number of publications on Sweden and the 19 20 Nordic countries had fallen off during the war years, but a second wave emerged 20 21 at the end of the 1940s, among which David Hinshaw’s Sweden: Champion of 21 22 Peace (1949) and Hudson Strode’s Sweden: Model for a World (1949) deserve 22 23 special mention as they point to two main themes in the image of Sweden as 23 24 representative of Norden, namely peacefulness and exemplarity.28 24 25 In the latter, the author – a professor of English Literature at the University 25 26 of Alabama – became one of the first to explicitly speak of Swedish society in 26 27 general as model for others. Earlier observers had instead seen specific aspects of 27 28 Swedish politics and social life, most notably the cooperative movement and the 28 29 wage-bargaining system, as examples worthy of following or study.29 29 30 30 31 31 32 26 andrén and Möller, Från Undén till Palme, pp. 69–70. See also Arne Nilsson, 32 33 Sweden’s Way to a Balanced Economy (Stockholm, 1950). 33 34 27 aSNE actively supported this drive; see, for example, Naboth Hedin, ‘What Can 34 35 the UnitedProof States Learn from Sweden’s Past LaborCopy Pains?’, Commercial and Financial 35 36 Chronicle, 23 May 1946, p. 1ff (reprint); and Tage Lindblom, Sweden’s Labor Program 36 37 (New York, 1948). ASNE also organized a study and information trip for Swedish labour 37 leaders to the United States in April 1950, co-sponsored by the LO, Folket i bild, and the 38 38 labour movement’s own press (A-pressen), where they met with American trade union 39 39 representatives of the AFL–CIO. 40 40 28 David Hinshaw, Sweden: Champion of Peace (New York, 1949); Hudson Strode, 41 Sweden: Model for a World (New York, 1949). 41 42 29 marklund, ‘The Social Laboratory’. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 270 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 271

1 ASNE, for its part, was closely involved in the production of Strode’s book, 1 2 and its director, Naboth Hedin, was a close friend of Strode’s. But the Swedes 2 3 working at the news exchange in New York were sceptical of the title suggested 3 4 for the volume. They tried to convince Strode to change it toSweden Makes 4 5 Sense, but his publisher Harcourt Brace stuck with Sweden: Model for a World. 5 6 Under this title, the volume would eventually become a key reference for notions 6 7 of the ‘Swedish model’ in the English language. 7 8 In a somewhat dry understatement, Allan Kastrup (a co-worker of Hedin’s 8 9 and later Hedin’s successor as ASNE’s director) noted in his 1985 report on 9 10 Swedish information in the United States that the title suggested by ASNE 10 11 would hardly have had the same long-lasting impact as the title insisted on by 11 12 the publisher.30 12 13 13 14 14 15 From a Nordic Sweden to a Swedish Norden? 15 16 16 17 At the time of publishing Sweden: Model for a World, ASNE was deeply involved 17 18 in commissioning other books on Sweden. However, these texts failed to attract 18 19 the interest of commercial American publishers, as they detected a growing 19 20 ‘boredom’ with the flood of enthusiastic accounts presenting Sweden as the 20 21 perfect paradise.31 21 22 While Sweden as an individual Nordic country may then have begun to 22 23 suffer from overexposure in a genre that seemed to be on the wane,32 the Nordic 23 24 or Scandinavian countries as a group apparently remained fairly popular and 24 25 were widely reported as ‘model democracies’ by the late 1940s.33 The Swedes, at 25 26 least, were determined to use this reputation. 26 27 In 1949, for example, a group of American newspapermen visited Scandinavia 27 28 shortly after the breakdown of negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union 28 29 between Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Funded by the Economic Cooperation 29 30 Administration in Washington, an organization within the Marshall Plan 30 31 framework, the American journalists focused strongly on the Scandinavian 31 32 32 33 30 Kastrup’s 1985 report must be treated with some caution, as he is keen to depict 33 34 American interest in Swedish matters as largely spontaneous, but it nevertheless gives a very 34 35 valuable insightProof into the Swedish attempts to shape Copy that interest. Kastrup, Med Sverige i 35 36 Amerika, p. 154. 36 31 37 Ibid. 37 32 in the mind of some Swedish observers, by the late 1940s Sweden enjoyed ‘publicity 38 38 in America comparable to that of a great power’, as the chief editor of liberal daily, Dagens 39 39 Nyheter, Sten Dehlgren, himself an ASNE promoter, is said to have claimed in 1947. 40 40 Dehlgren, cited in Kastrup, Med Sverige i Amerika, p. 183. 41 33 See, for example, C.E.M. Joad, ‘Model Democracies and Why’, The New Statesman 41 42 and Nation, 31/800 (22 June 1946): 444–445. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 271 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 272 Communicating the North

1 countries’ participation in the Marshall Plan, as well as their defence and foreign 1 2 policies. 2 3 Only two months after the trip ended, ASNE published a richly illustrated 3 4 booklet – Report on Sweden by American Newspapermen, 1949 – containing 4 5 some sixty articles from the visit that dealt with Sweden, thus ignoring visits 5 6 to the other Scandinavian countries, which led to some consternation in the 6 7 Danish information services. According to Kastrup, who had been instrumental 7 8 in bringing about the ‘Report’, the Swedes defended their enterprising initiative 8 9 to the other Scandinavians by referring to Sweden’s more ‘exposed’ position, 9 10 which ‘forced’ them to use any positive publicity for ‘continued information 10 11 services’ more actively than the other Nordic countries.34 11 12 The determination of the Scandinavian countries to defend themselves12 13 impressed the American audience of the McCarthy years, making it an obvious 13 14 focal point for Nordic marketing in the United States. At the same time, 14 15 McCarthyism turned against the social welfare provisions and public health 15 16 programmes of the New Deal. Nevertheless, when the Nordic countries sought 16 17 again to capitalize on the trust they had accumulated just before the First 17 18 World War in conjunction with the establishment of the Nordic Council at the 18 19 beginning of the 1950s,35 they chose to focus on the social policies of the Nordic 19 20 welfare states. The resultant book, Freedom and Welfare (1953), authoritatively 20 21 restated the relevance of the Middle Way as the most appropriate metaphor 21 22 for understanding how the Nordics sought to combine democracy and market 22 23 freedom, on the one hand, with social planning and social welfare on the other. 23 24 The key to this unlikely combination was ‘a common background and ideology’ 24 25 in the ‘Northern countries’, leaning towards ‘tolerance and compromise’. This 25 26 set-up has caused the Nordics in recent times to attempt ‘to build a new social 26 27 structure, providing more equal opportunities for all and better utilization of 27 28 available resources, with an improved standard of living and a wider scope of 28 29 social security as the main goals’.36 29 30 By pointing at these features of Nordic social policy, Freedom and Welfare 30 31 emphasized that cooperation in ‘Northern community life’ does not amount to 31 32 any ideological or totalitarian planning of the socialist kind. Rather, ‘the peculiar 32 33 combination of individualism and social solidarity which would appear to be 33 34 an outstanding feature of Northern mentality’ is reflected in the way in which 34 35 ‘the NorthernProof peoples’ are realists: ‘In their “socialCopy engineering” they have never 35 36 followed any one general formula. Planning has been carried out on a strictly 36 37 37 38 38 34 Kastrup, Med Sverige i Amerika, pp. 180–181. 39 39 35 The Nordic Council was established in 1953 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and 40 Sweden, while Finland joined in 1956. 40 41 36 george R. Nelson (ed.), Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern 41 42 Countries of Europe (Copenhagen, 1953), pp. 38–39. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 272 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 273

1 pragmatic basis, drawing upon past experience but freely adapting it to changing 1 2 circumstances,’ the book continued.37 2 3 The political struggles that can be assumed to have preceded the establishment 3 4 of this vision of a ‘common goal’ were conspicuously absent in Freedom and 4 5 Welfare: except for a four-page sub-chapter called ‘Government’ (notably 5 6 followed by four pages on ‘Popular Movements’) political conflict was obscured 6 7 in favour of continuous references to the efficient implementation of consensual 7 8 popular will. Accordingly, in Freedom and Welfare, the Nordic countries are 8 9 presented as if they have managed to bypass another central dichotomy of 9 10 modern democracy, alongside the tensions between capital and labour, tradition 10 11 and modernity: namely, the divide between popular will and individual interest. 11 12 12 13 13 14 The Making of Sweden 14 15 15 16 The Swedish ‘hijacking’ of the trip made by American newspapermen in 1949 16 17 was repeated in conjunction with the publication of Freedom and Welfare, in 17 18 what appears to be another Swedish attempt at bandwagoning the coordinated 18 19 Nordic or Scandinavian information efforts: ASNE’s publication in April 19 20 1953, of a 128-page booklet entitled The Making of Sweden, written mostly by 20 21 Kastrup.38 This sleek booklet effectively accompanied the massive and more 21 22 academically inclined Freedom and Welfare, competing for its readership and, to 22 23 some extent, capitalizing on the general interest in Nordic affairs to the benefit 23 24 of Swedish marketing.39 24 25 This little booklet took the same tack as the volume on the Nordic countries. 25 26 Indeed, navigating between capitalism and socialism guaranteed the Swedes 26 27 both freedom and welfare. Again, it was emphasized that Sweden by no means 27 28 represented socialism and should neither stir up utopian aspirations nor arouse 28 29 dystopian fears. While noting that ‘American observers have often paid tribute to 29 30 Swedish progress in social welfare’, the booklet also stated that ‘some undoubtedly 30 31 have gone too far. Critics have also been heard, and sometimes they, too, have 31 32 seemed to overshoot the mark.’ Continuing, the booklet drove home a point well 32 33 suited to clear up any American confusion with regard to Sweden and socialism: 33 34 34 35 SwedishProof social reforms have never aimed at eliminatingCopy a sound individualism 35 36 or robust self-reliance, and, on the whole, there have been no such effects. The 36 37 37 37 Ibid. 38 38 38 allan Kastrup, The Making of Sweden (Stockholm, 1953). 39 39 39 aSNE managed to distribute 20,000 copies of the little volume – partly through 40 commercial sales and partly through distribution to journalists and editors – which 40 41 effectively meant that Sweden would become the archetypical ‘Northern country’ among 41 42 American journalists in the 1950s. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 273 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 274 Communicating the North

1 reforms are based on the conviction that all citizens are entitled to a certain 1 2 basic protection, and that society itself will gain by providing such aid. Poverty 2 3 and distress, unemployment and slums have never been democracy’s friends. By 3 4 concerted efforts to solve those and similar problems, the productive capacity of 4 5 the nation should also be improved. Immense benefits to the national economy 5 6 will result particularly from better protection of the people’s health and the 6 7 common battle against disease.40 7 8 8 9 In this representation, the social welfare of neutral Sweden was no more socialist 9 10 than the social welfare of the United States’ Nordic allies, Denmark and Norway. 10 11 In fact, Sweden resembled the United States more than the rest of Scandinavia, 11 12 in being more industrialized and slightly more prosperous. Swedish social 12 13 welfare also sought to promote some core American values, guaranteeing the 13 14 independence, self-reliance and democratic participation of citizens, not unlike 14 15 the well-known American policy proposals of the late 1940s.41 15 16 In the Swedish information provided to the United States, then, freedom 16 17 was described as welfare and welfare as freedom. Yet, this combination could 17 18 not be expected to come about automatically, either in Sweden or anywhere else. 18 19 It had to be built on the basis of conscious and planned effort on the part of 19 20 society, as indicated by the title The Making of Sweden. 20 21 This emphasis on economic prosperity, rational planning and consensual21 22 politics in the making of a modern society would play a key role in the shift 22 23 from a general interest in the Nordic countries towards a stronger focus on the 23 24 Swedish experience from the late 1950s and onwards. Despite the very close 24 25 contacts between Norwegian and American social science scholarship – as well 25 26 as American reports on the subject, such as that the Norwegian welfare system 26 27 was just as generous and progressive as the Swedish one – Sweden gradually 27 28 evolved into the archetypical welfare state in American social science during the 28 29 1950s and 1960s.42 29 30 In the early 1960s the American press reported that concrete examples 30 31 of Swedish social policy, especially the 1959 pension reform, interested the 31 32 Kennedy administration and the Johnson administration, not the least because 32 33 the pension funds could be used for supporting a more active investment policy 33 34 on the part of the government.43 This high tide of American interest in Sweden 34 35 Proof Copy 35 40 36 Kastrup, The Making of Sweden, p. 62. 36 41 37 For example, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights in 1944 or Harry S. 37 Truman’s Point Four Program of 1949. 38 38 42 For contacts between American and Norwegian social scientists, see Fredrik W. 39 39 Thue, In Quest of a Democratic Social Order: The Americanization of Norwegian Social 40 40 Scholarship 1918–1970 (Oslo, 2006). 41 43 See Carl Marklund, ‘Nordic Models, American Mirrors, and Swedish Self-Portraits’, 41 42 in Louis Clerc, Nikolas Glover and Paul Jordan (eds), Public Diplomacy in Context: The 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 274 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 275

1 peaked in the early 1960s, coinciding with a Swedish information campaign 1 2 in the United States that included the Face of Sweden television series aired in 2 3 1962, as well as visits by prominent Swedish politicians and representatives of 3 4 trade unions and employers’ organizations.44 The growing interest in Sweden 4 5 and the increasing availability of information about it caused some alarm 5 6 among American conservatives, who feared that socialism could be introduced 6 7 by stealth into the free-market United States by using Swedish precedents. To 7 8 some extent, these fears were exacerbated by the so-called convergence theory, 8 9 which held that the differences between the blocs were diminishing as scientific 9 10 rationality and welfare provision evolved into common goals of both Soviet and 10 11 American development.45 The proponents of the convergence theory sometimes 11 12 referred to Sweden – or perhaps, rather, to what British historian Stewart Oakley 12 13 in 1966 called the ‘Swedish Image’46 – as a showcase of both the technologically 13 14 advanced welfare state and the possibly exotic behaviour patterns of the future.47 14 15 Gradually, Sweden evolved into the prototypical modern society of the 1970s – 15 16 that is, a potentially universal, yet exotic, image of a modern society bypassing 16 17 the dichotomies of Cold War rivalry.48 17 18 Soon this image of Swedish modernity morphed into a distinct policy 18 19 alternative for industrialized countries. As such, it needed a descriptive label, 19 20 and the ‘Swedish model’ emerged in the late 1960s as an alternative to either the 20 21 American or the Soviet way.49 In part, this shift corresponded to a more activist 21 22 Swedish foreign policy with regard to both Cold War tensions and the rise of 22 23 the Third World. In part also, it reflected the increasingly schematized pattern 23 24 of Swedish domestic policy, in particular the so-called Rehn–Meidner model 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 Past and Present of National Image Management in the Small States and Nations of Northern 28 28 Europe, 1900–2010 (Leiden, forthcoming 2014). 29 44 29 See Glover, National Relations, p. 96, n. 390. 30 45 For discussions on the convergence theory, see, for example, John Kenneth Galbraith 30 31 and Stanislav Menshikov, Capitalism, Communism, and Coexistence: From the Bitter Past 31 32 to a Better Prospect (Boston, MA, 1988); Clark Kerr, Industrialism and Industrial Man: 32 33 The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA, 1960); 33 34 and Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International 34 35 Implications (New Haven, CT, 1963). 35 46 Proof Copy 36 Stewart Oakley, The Story of Sweden (London, 1966), p. 257. 36 47 37 See, for example, Jenny Andersson, När framtiden redan hänt: socialdemokratin och 37 (Stockholm, 2009). 38 folkhemsnostalgin 38 48 richard F. Tomasson, Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society (New York, 1970). See 39 39 also Nikolas Glover and Carl Marklund, ‘Arabian Nights in the Midnight Sun: Exploring 40 40 the Temporal Structure of Sexual Geographies’, Historisk tidskrift, 129/3 (2009): 487–510. 41 49 Bo Stråth, Folkhemmet mot Europa: ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet (Stockholm, 41 42 1993). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 275 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 276 Communicating the North

1 of the early 1950s, with its aim of ensuring full employment through an active 1 2 labour policy.50 2 3 But the Swedish model could only serve this role if it actually proved to be 3 4 distinct from other alternatives. As an explicit hybrid of capitalism and socialism, 4 5 difficult to pin down in the geopolitical contests of the Cold War years, Sweden 5 6 puzzled contemporaries, attracting both praise and criticism. Combining in 6 7 complex ways the Swedish image of neutral non-ideological modernity and 7 8 the Swedish model of highly ideological and presumably leftist, yet corporatist, 8 9 progressivism proved provocative to foreign observers, on both the left and the 9 10 right.51 To the American right, Sweden could also be appropriated as a scarecrow 10 11 as the international reputation for ‘Swedish sin’ began to proliferate from the 11 12 late 1950s onwards.52 12 13 Here, it is also interesting to see how the Swedish model parted company 13 14 with its Nordic setting, reflected in the introduction of the ‘Scandinavian model’ 14 15 as a new concept during the 1960s. While the Swedish model evolved during the 15 16 1960s into a more politicized concept, indicative of a left-leaning welfare state, 16 17 the Scandinavian model emerged in American academia as an analytical concept 17 18 to denote the social policy providing for this welfare, quite irrespective of its 18 19 ideological characteristics.53 19 20 While these conceptualizations seem to have reinforced one another over 20 21 the next decades, they also split in important ways, as socialism became pinned 21 22 to Sweden while welfare became associated with Scandinavia. As a consequence, 22 23 ‘Sweden’ could be used to decry the welfare state as socialist, while ‘Scandinavia’ 23 24 could not. In effect, the Swedish model earned much of its international24 25 reputation among both friends and foes from being the only prosperous ‘socialist’ 25 26 state. But this fame would also prove to be one of its liabilities, as we will see. 26 27 27 28 28 29 From the Swedish Model via the Danish Model to the Nordic Model 29 30 30 31 This understanding quickly became part not only of Swedish self-identity, but 31 32 also of intra-Nordic self-perceptions. While other Scandinavians and Finns 32 33 33 34 50 See Carl Marklund, ‘The Social Laboratory’ and Marklund, ‘Nordic Models’. 34 35 51 CarlProof Marklund, ‘Hot Love and Cold People: Copy Sexual Liberalism as Political Escapism 35 36 in Radical Sweden’, Nordeuropaforum – Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur, 19/2 36 37 (2009): 83–101. 37 52 The myth of the Swedish sin – especially manifested in the production of 38 38 pornography for export – appears to be another Nordic feature that has become more closely 39 39 associated with Sweden than with any other individual Nordic country. See Klara Arnberg, 40 40 ’Synd på export: 1960-talets pornografiska press och den svenska synden’, Historisk tidskrift, 41 129/3 (2009): 467–486. 41 42 53 See Marklund, ‘Nordic Models’. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 276 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 277

1 may regard the international exemplarity of Sweden as somewhat overstated, 1 2 few Nordic observers would deny that the Swedes themselves have taken their 2 3 perceived exemplarity very seriously. Interestingly, the Swedes themselves seem 3 4 to have become victims of a kind of ‘utopian trap’: whenever utopian Sweden 4 5 appeared less than perfect, social problems which Sweden shared with other 5 6 modern societies were easily exaggerated. 6 7 For example, as the 1979 energy crisis generated labour conflicts across 7 8 the industrialized countries, including a big strike in Sweden in 1980, one of 8 9 Sweden’s leading dailies, the liberal Expressen, ran a series of articles on the 9 10 ‘failure’ of the Swedish model. Prominent Social Democrats warned that the 10 11 reputation of Sweden as a model society was in danger due to the inability of the 11 12 then bourgeois government to handle the crisis.54 12 13 But the problems persisted even after the Social Democrats came back into 13 14 power in 1982, despite the attempt at relabelling the Swedish model as the 14 15 ‘Third Way’. The ominous warnings of the early 1980s were followed by a long 15 16 series of research reports, as well as several titles by Swedish academics, on the 16 17 impending fall of the Swedish model, primarily intended for the international 17 18 scholarly community.55 These reports culminated in 1985, incidentally the same 18 19 year the Swedish model was celebrated in an ambitious exhibition at Nordiska 19 20 museet (the Nordic Museum) in Stockholm, entitled ‘Modell Sverige’ (‘Model 20 21 Sweden’).56 By the mid-1980s the international reputation of the Swedish model 21 22 had apparently not only evolved into a strong source of self-identification on 22 23 the part of the Swedes, but had also become a central concern of the Swedish 23 24 economic and political elite, as indicated by the December 1986 commissioning 24 25 of a government study on the task of providing information on Sweden abroad.57 25 26 However, Swedish reporting on the death of the Swedish model in the early 26 27 1980s appeared slightly exaggerated, at least to foreign observers. To American 27 28 28 29 54 See, for example, Leonard Downie, Jr, ‘Sweden’s “Biological Problem”: Facing Facts 29 30 of Life in a Mature Welfare State’, Washington Post, 17 May 1981, K1 and Walter Korpi, 30 31 Sverige: arbetsfredens land (Stockholm, 1981). 31 32 55 incidentally, the Conservative Party embraced the idea of ‘systemic shift’32 33 (systemskifte) as the goal for its election campaign in the same year as the exhibition was 33 34 held, in 1985. 34 35 56 SeeProof Elisabet Stavenow-Hidemark (ed.), Modell Copy Sverige: en utställning om det moderna 35 36 Sveriges framväxt (Stockholm, 1985); Erik Lundberg, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Swedish 36 37 Model’, Journal of Economic Literature, 23/1 (1985): 1–36; Walter Korpi, ‘Economic Growth 37 and the Welfare State: Leaky Bucket or Irrigation System?’, , 1/2 38 European Sociological Review 38 (1985): 97–118. 39 39 57 utredningen om de statliga insatserna inom Sverigeinformationen och kulturutbytet 40 40 med utlandet, Sverigebilder: 17 svenskar ser på Sverige: betänkande avgivet av Utredningen 41 om de statliga insatserna inom Sverigeinformationen och kulturutbytet med utlandet, SOU 41 42 1987:57 (Stockholm, 1987). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 277 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 278 Communicating the North

1 journalists and academics, for example, the Swedish crisis was not very different 1 2 from, or much worse than, the crisis suffered by other industrialized societies 2 3 when Keynesianism failed to control stagflation. But American sociologists, 3 4 long interested in Sweden as the prototypical modern society and archetypical 4 5 welfare state, noted the increased sense of self-doubt and bewilderment on the 5 6 part of the Swedes. By the 1980s Sweden, long a destination for American social 6 7 scientists looking for political solutions, had become a place where international 7 8 academics went to study social problems.58 8 9 American economists also noted a shift in perceptions of Sweden: from 9 10 having symbolized a pragmatic and vigorous hybrid of capitalism and socialism, 10 11 the Swedish model had, by the end of the 1980s, fossilized into either a 11 12 corporatist or a socialist welfare state, depending on a critic’s point of view. In 12 13 either case, it was seen as paralysed by its own structural set-up, and was widely 13 14 diagnosed with a particularly virulent bout of ‘Eurosclerosis’. 14 15 Regardless of the actual severity and the real causes of social problems, 15 16 Sweden had developed into a byword for stagnation and socialism, both at home 16 17 and abroad. While the information about Sweden provided in the United States 17 18 had sought to disprove the association between Sweden and socialism since 18 19 the early 1950s, as we have seen above, it also embraced the socialist epithet 19 20 elsewhere, especially in information relayed to the Third World. This made the 20 21 association difficult to do away with once it had become a liability.59 21 22 Indeed, the bourgeois victory in the 1991 elections signalled to the Wall 22 23 Street Journal – which had been rather positive towards Sweden throughout the 23 24 1980s – that ‘Swedish voters are finally tiring of something the world’s left has 24 25 long praised, the ‘Swedish model’ of socialism’.60 As the fall of the Swedish model 25 26 made the international news in the early 1990s, the Swedes seemed to abandon 26 27 their earlier model in favour of EU harmonization, confirming that Sweden27 28 was becoming a ‘normal’ country – neither a scarecrow nor a peace dove. In any 28 29 case, the end of Cold War tension also suspended the need for any middle way 29 30 between capitalism and socialism. Now, all that mattered was efficiency. 30 31 Internationally, however, the demise of Sweden spelt the rise of Denmark, 31 32 as evidenced in the following report, also found in the Wall Street Journal, 32 33 from November 1991: ‘Talk of the “Danish model” of economic recovery has 33 34 34 35 58 toProof be fair, this shift cannot be directly assumed Copy to reflect an actual increase in social 35 36 problems, but rather a more inclusive definition of social problems, among both Swedish and 36 37 international scholars. Furthermore, by the 1980s Sweden and the other Nordic countries 37 had become some of the world’s most well-researched societies, with scores of reliable social 38 38 statistics available for time-series studies. 39 39 59 See the discussion in Marklund, ‘Nordic Models’. 40 40 60 ‘The “Swedish Model” Rejected’, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 1991, p. A14. 41 In particular, Assar Lindbeck, at a seminar in December 1993 at the Brookings Institution, 41 42 emphasized that Swedish economists had also abandoned the model by then. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 278 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 279

1 replaced the “Swedish model” of a cradle-to-grave welfare state.’ The newspaper 1 2 continued: ‘To its northern neighbors Denmark long seemed a smaller sibling, 2 3 if not a weaker cousin. But now its neighbors can use Denmark’s advice. Norway, 3 4 Sweden and Finland are in recession, and are trying to find ways to solve domestic 4 5 economic problems and raise exports.’ While noting that Sweden – long a viable 5 6 alternative to eastern European dissidents on the quest for a ‘socialism with 6 7 a human face’ – could no longer provide guidance to others, the Wall Street 7 8 Journal predicted that ‘[t]he Danish experience also could set a precedent for 8 9 states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia looking for ways to develop their 9 10 small economies’.61 10 11 Since the 1990s Denmark has been praised for its ‘flexicurity’, as well as its high 11 12 levels of subjective well-being and quality of life.62 However, there are dangers in 12 13 being praised, as the Danes would learn, too: just as the Swedish model was 13 14 once called into question by accusations of socialism and paternalism, so Danish 14 15 exemplarity today is troubled by allusions to xenophobia and parochialism. 15 16 As the economic situation stabilized from 1995 onwards, and Finland and 16 17 Sweden settled into their new roles as small members of the European Union 17 18 (EU), the relative similarities between the Nordic countries – if compared with 18 19 the other member states – reappeared as an asset vis-à-vis the wider Union. 19 20 Significantly, the Swedish model has virtually disappeared from international 20 21 news reporting, having been effectively replaced by the concept of the Nordic 21 22 model, discussed at the beginning of this chapter. While the Swedish model 22 23 is today used mostly in defensive positioning – for example in the so-called 23 24 Vaxholm case63 – the Nordic model has taken over much of the positive and 24 25 promotional meaning once held by the Swedish model. 25 26 Most recently, the concept of the ‘Nordic way’ popped up at the World 26 27 Economic Forum in Davos in January 2011. In a brief text commissioned by 27 28 the Nordic Council of Ministers, Investor and the Norden Association, we 28 29 are told that while Norden may not possess a crisis-free model transferable to 29 30 other societies, ‘Nordic experiences’ – the Nordic way of crisis management, 30 31 social trust, and radical individualism – may prove inspiring to others. The 31 32 foreword explains that ‘[m]any people see the Nordic countries as some kind 32 33 of compromise between socialism and capitalism. This is not at all the case … 33 34 Instead, it is the combination of extreme individualism and a strong state that 34 35 Proof Copy 35 36 36 37 37 61 Craig Forman, ‘Denmark’s Miracle is Gaining Believers Reversal Makes it Europe’s 38 38 New Economic Model’, Wall Street Journal, 5 November 1991, A14. 39 39 62 See, for example, Bent Greve (ed.), Happiness and Social Policy in Europe 40 (Cheltenham, 2010). 40 41 63 TheVaxholm case concerned a conflict between Swedish labour law and European 41 42 free movement of services, where the latter was widely seen as threatening the Swedish model. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 279 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM 280 Communicating the North

1 has shaped the fertile ground for an efficient market economy.’64 Not only has 1 2 ‘socialism’ been stripped from the Swedish model; even the very ‘model’ has 2 3 been disassociated from the new, yet strangely familiar, Nordic way presented as 3 4 an alternative path to a world in crisis. 4 5 This liberal rebranding of the Nordic model has been politically appropriated 5 6 by Sweden’s governing bourgeois Alliance, most recently at the Northern 6 7 Future Forum which gathered the leaders of the nine countries of northern 7 8 Europe (excluding Ireland) in Stockholm in February 2012.65 Again, Sweden is 8 9 marketing itself as the leading proponent of the Nordic welfare model. But this 9 10 time it is a question of ‘liberalizing’ a model that has previously been ‘socialized’. 10 11 Nevertheless, Nordic social democracy has certainly not capitulated. In January 11 12 2012 SAMAK – the forum for Nordic cooperation between the Social 12 13 Democrats and the trade union movement – launched the research project 13 14 NordMod 2030, which is to identify future challenges to the social democratic 14 15 welfare model. In December 2011 the Swedish Patent and Registration Office 15 16 approved the joint application of SAMAK and the Swedish Social Democratic 16 17 Party to register ‘the Nordic model’ as a protected trademark for ten years.66 The 17 18 struggle continues. 18 19 19 20 20 21 Conclusion 21 22 22 23 This chapter has attempted to show how Nordic exemplarity – the image of 23 24 the Nordic countries as model societies – has grown out of a complex interplay 24 25 between national needs of the Nordic countries and domestic public debate 25 26 in other countries. In vying for positive reviews in the United States in the 26 27 early stages of the Cold War, the Nordic countries coordinated their efforts in 27 28 presenting themselves as welfare states, relying on the reputation of the Middle 28 29 Way of the 1930s in conceptually combining freedom and welfare in the 1950s. 29 30 Here, Sweden actively and successfully took on the role of the archetypical 30 31 welfare state. 31 32 Apparently, however, Sweden also suffered from its success as the only obvious 32 33 accusation which could be directed at a prosperous and egalitarian Sweden 33 34 would have to hone in on its ‘socialism’. The country’s supposedly unique, yet 34 35 potentiallyProof universal, combination of prosperity Copy and progressiveness – the very 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 64 Shared Norms for the New Reality: The Nordic Way / World Economic Forum, Davos 39 39 2011 (Stockholm, 2011). 40 40 65 göran Eriksson, ‘Slaget om Norden’, Svenska Dagbladet, 9 February 2012. 41 66 Jan Söderström, ‘Socialdemokraterna har fått den nordiska modellen 41 42 varumärkesskyddad’, Aktuellt i politiken, 12 February 2012. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 280 8/1/2013 10:18:01 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 281

1 same element that made Sweden a resource for American liberals – could be 1 2 turned into a liability if conservatives could succeed in branding it as socialism. 2 3 But why did Sweden and the Swedish model gain pre-eminence over the 3 4 other Nordic countries in these Cold War image politics? For much of this time, 4 5 Denmark and Norway also had social democratic governments successfully 5 6 combining elements of capitalism and socialism. Danish political scientist Hans 6 7 Mouritzen has suggested that Sweden’s relative hegemony as a model during the 7 8 Cold War resulted from being larger and more economically, technologically 8 9 and politically independent than the other Nordic countries. It consciously 9 10 marketed itself as a neutral state during the Cold War. As such, it served as a 10 11 bandwagon for the other Nordic countries during the period, according to 11 12 Mouritzen. As the Cold War ended and the Swedish economy faltered in the 12 13 early 1990s, the Swedish political elite abandoned the Swedish model in favour 13 14 of making Sweden ‘European’, leaving it up to the other Nordic countries to 14 15 construct alternative Baltic or Nordic identities.67 15 16 In a less rational actor-oriented and more culturally essentialist explanation, 16 17 Swedish historians Henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh – who contributed to 17 18 The Nordic Way – have sought the answer to Swedish hegemony in what they 18 19 call Swedish ‘statist individualism’.68 To Berggren and Trägårdh, Swedish statist 19 20 individualism presents a moral and political paradigm which goes beyond 20 21 political divisions, according to which true freedom, independence and self- 21 22 determination can only cohere if every individual is guaranteed not only a basic 22 23 level of welfare but also – as far as possible – the tools by which to independently 23 24 improve his or her standing. As a social investment, welfare spending is not 24 25 an obstacle to freedom or an onerous cost to business: instead, it becomes a 25 26 precondition for freedom. 26 27 Without generating the high social costs of American society, according to 27 28 Trägårdh and Berggren, the Swedes manage to produce most of the core values 28 29 – such as competitiveness, entrepreneurship, individualism, innovation and 29 30 prosperity –used by American conservatives to excuse the social exclusion and 30 31 inequalities of American society. This is why Sweden has been admired by critics 31 32 of America and loathed by its supporters. As such, it has played a certain role in 32 33 the ideological contest of the Cold War. 33 34 This argument happens to be exactly the basic theme for most Swedish, as 34 35 well as mostProof Nordic, self-promotion in the UCopynited States since the penning of 35 36 Freedom and Welfare in 1953. Hence, it can hardly explain why Sweden would 36 37 have gained precedence over the other Nordic societies. 37 38 38 39 39 67 hans Mouritzen, ‘The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and 40 40 Fa l l’, Journal of Peace Research, 32/1 (1995): 9–21. 41 68 henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh, Är svensken människa? Gemenskap och 41 42 oberoende i det moderna Sverige (Stockholm, 2006). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 281 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM 282 Communicating the North

1 Other observers, such as Swedish historian Hans Lödén, have sought an 1 2 explanation to Swedish pre-eminence in the ‘active’ foreign policy of Sweden 2 3 during the Cold War and its support of Third World interests.69 Lödén argues 3 4 that Sweden used the emerging North–South polarity, decolonization and 4 5 détente in the early 1960s to ‘activate’ a global role for itself as a ‘third power’. 5 6 In this context, the Swedes themselves began to market Sweden as a model for 6 7 others in explicit competition with the American way, particularly from 1971 7 8 onwards.70 8 9 However, other small and middle-sized states also attempted to adopt a more 9 10 activist global role in the shadow of the Cold War, notably Canada, Denmark, 10 11 the Netherlands, Norway and Yugoslavia, for example. Lödén argues that these 11 12 countries adopted only some specific policy areas, while ‘Sweden developed a 12 13 radical policy within all areas … offering itself as a model for the states of the 13 14 wo rl d’. 71 14 15 Judging from the American press reports and the American academic studies 15 16 that provide the mainstay of the material surveyed here, some very basic and 16 17 rather concrete conditions seem to have been more important for making 17 18 Sweden pivotal: Sweden was, at the time, more prosperous than the other Nordic 18 19 countries, its economy grew faster, and it was widely perceived as being more 19 20 unambiguously neutral – unlike Finland or Yugoslavia, for example – while its 20 21 ‘independent’ interpretation of this neutrality made it a key player in the so- 21 22 called ‘Nordic balance’ during the Cold War. 22 23 Combining this independent neutrality – which already worried the 23 24 Americans during the Undén era but could be made a valuable asset if tilted 24 25 more towards the West – with progressive economic and social policies, which 25 26 apparently generated fast growth, simply made Sweden marginally different26 27 from its Nordic neighbours. Like the others, it combined freedom and welfare, 27 28 capitalism and socialism. Unlike the others, however, it combined welfare and 28 29 neutrality. Sweden, in other words, was understood in America as being different 29 30 from the other Nordic countries in important ways, without being so different 30 31 that it could no longer represent the others in a general context. 31 32 Judging from the material surveyed here, this is not only the decisive element 32 33 for the Americans’ stronger interest in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries 33 34 in the past. It can also explain why Sweden spent more energy on shaping its 34 35 Proof Copy 35 69 36 Lödén, ‘För säkerhets skull’. 36 70 37 even more important, not being a member of NATO can possibly explain why 37 Sweden took a greater interest in actively changing world politics and pursuing radical 38 38 policies in ‘all areas’ to begin with, and why it sought to market itself as a model in so doing. 39 39 See Hans Lödén, ‘Anarki på svenska: nationellt intresse och nationell identitet mellan 40 40 Hobbes, Locke och Kant’, in Sven Eliaeson and Hans Lödén (eds), Nordisk säkerhetspolitik 41 inför nya utmaningar (Stockholm, 2002), pp. 254–255. 41 42 71 ibid., pp. 252–253. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 282 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 283

1 image abroad than the other Nordic countries did: the ‘Western’ understanding 1 2 of Swedish neutrality, with all its implications for Swedish business, hinged on 2 3 whether Sweden was seen as truly neutral and not too socialist, in an illustration 3 4 of how domestic policy and foreign policy coincided in the pressure chamber 4 5 that was the Cold War. 5 6 As such, it is worth asking whether the Swedish image and the Swedish model 6 7 simply mattered more to the Swedes themselves than to the world at large. It 7 8 is tempting to argue that the Swedish preoccupation with the Swedish image 8 9 abroad reflects a deep-seated national uneasiness about the identity and position 9 10 of Sweden in the world. The nervous and somewhat premature reporting of its 10 11 first demise in the early 1980s would seem to indicate this. But the sheer mass of 11 12 the reporting on the second fall of the Swedish model does seem to vouch for its 12 13 international function during the Cold War. 13 14 Even though all Nordic countries are not successful all the time, a given 14 15 Nordic country may be so at one point or another. The Nordic countries may 15 16 thus take turns in supporting and maintaining the international image of 16 17 Nordic exemplarity. During the Cold War, Sweden, for specific reasons, quite 17 18 consciously adopted this role. During the 1990s Denmark stepped in to become 18 19 the most exemplary Nordic country. Today, Finland and Norway are perhaps 19 20 the next most likely candidates. But they will probably draw upon the Nordic 20 21 model for their legitimacy rather than launch novel notions of a ‘Finnish model’ 21 22 or a ‘Norwegian model’, except for specific references to particular policy areas 22 23 in which these countries are said to do exceptionally well, such as education, 23 24 innovation and resource management. Taken together, the diversified, yet 24 25 distinct, brand of the combined Nordic countries appears stronger today 25 26 than the reputation of any individual Nordic country.72 As such, it also eases 26 27 the conscience of promoters of ‘Nordicity’, traditionally wary of nationalistic 27 28 chauvinism. 28 29 While marketing strategies, image politics and close attention to the needs of 29 30 the intended audience may have played an important role in telling and selling 30 31 the story about the success of the Nordic countries, the three central elements of 31 32 this story remain rather constant and commonsensical, perhaps even banal. Yet, 32 33 they are likely to remain important markers of Nordicity, at least as long as they 33 34 are not widely shared globally. They are equality, peacefulness and prosperity. 34 35 As longProof as the Nordic countries remain relativelyCopy good at providing these 35 36 three basic elements of the good life, international observers are likely to 36 37 continue to express an interest in Nordic experiences of freedom and welfare, 37 38 no matter whether they are primarily capitalist or socialist, unique or universal, 38 39 still running the risk of getting stuck in the ‘utopian trap’. But that may be a small 39 40 price to pay for the relative success of the Nordic countries. 40 41 41 42 72 Sasi, ‘Nordiska rådets relevans’. 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 283 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM 284 Communicating the North

1 Bibliography 1 2 2 3 Andersen, Torben M., Bengt Holmström, Seppo Honkapohja, Sixten Korkman, 3 4 Hans Tson Söderström and Juhana Vartiainen, The Nordic Model: Embracing 4 5 Globalization and Sharing Risks (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2007). 5 6 Andersson, Jenny, När framtiden redan hänt: socialdemokratin och folkhems- 6 7 nostalgin (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2009). 7 8 Andersson, Jenny and Mary Hilson, ‘Images of Sweden and the Nordic 8 9 Countries’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 34/3 (2009): 219–228.Andrén, 9 10 Nils and Yngve Möller, Från Undén till Palme: Svensk utrikespolitik efter10 11 andra världskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1990). 11 12 Arnberg, Klara, ‘Synd på export: 1960-talets pornografiska press och den12 13 svenska synden’, Historisk tidskrift, 129/3 (2009): 467–486. 13 14 Berggren, Henrik and Lars Trägårdh, Är svensken människa? Gemenskap och 14 15 oberoende i det moderna Sverige (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2006). 15 16 Childs, Marquis W., Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University 16 17 Press, 1936). 17 18 Downie, Jr, Leonard, ‘Sweden’s “Biological Problem”: Facing Facts of Life in a 18 19 Mature Welfare State’, Washington Post, 17 May 1981, K1.Equality, Social 19 20 Organization, and Performance (ESOP), ‘Confronting Theory with Nordic 20 21 Lessons: An Application to Establish ESOP as a New Research Centre at the 21 22 Department of Economics, University of Oslo’, 30 August 2006 at: http:// 22 23 www.esop.uio.no/about/about.html, accessed 8 March, 2010. 23 24 Eriksson, Göran, ‘Slaget om Norden’, Svenska Dagbladet, 9 February 2012. 24 25 Förenta nationernas generalförsamlings första ordinarie mötes andra del, New 25 26 York 1946, m.m. (Stockholm: Kungl. Boktryckeriet. P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 26 27 1947). 27 28 Forman, Craig, ‘Denmark’s Miracle is Gaining Believers: Reversal Makes it 28 29 Europe’s New Economic Model’, Wall Street Journal, 5 November 1991, A14. 29 30 Galbraith, John Kenneth and Stanislav Menshikov, Capitalism, Communism, 30 31 and Coexistence: From the Bitter Past to a Better Prospect (Boston, MA: 31 32 Houghton Mifflin, 1988). 32 33 Glover, Nikolas, National Relations: Public Diplomacy, National Identity and 33 34 the Swedish Institute, 1945–1970 (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011). 34 35 Glover, NProofikolas and Carl Marklund, ‘Arabian Copy Nights in the Midnight Sun: 35 36 Exploring the Temporal Structure of Sexual Geographies’, Historisk tidskrift, 36 37 129/3 (2009): 487–510. 37 38 Greve, Bent (ed.), Happiness and Social Policy in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward 38 39 Elgar, 2010). 39 40 Hedin, Naboth, ‘What Can the United States Learn from Sweden’s Past Labor 40 41 Pains?’, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 23 May 1946, p. 1ff (reprint). 41 42 Hilson, Mary, The Nordic Model (London: Reaktion Books, 2008). 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 284 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 285

1 Hinshaw, David, Sweden: Champion of Peace (New York: Putnam, 1949). 1 2 Ingebritsen, Christine, ‘Learning from Lilliput: Small States and EU Expansion’, 2 3 Scandinavian Studies, 76/3 (2004): 369–382. 3 4 Joad, C.E.M., ‘Model Democracies and Why’, The New Statesman and Nation, 4 5 31/800 (22 June 1946): 444–445. 5 6 Kastrup, Allan, The Making of Sweden (Stockholm: Svensk-amerikanska 6 7 nyhetsbyrån, 1953). 7 8 Kastrup, Allan, Med Sverige i Amerika: opinioner, stämningar och upplysning- 8 9 sarbete: en rapport av Allan Kastrup (Malmö: Corona, 1985). 9 10 Kerr, Clark, Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and 10 11 Management in Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 11 12 Press, 1960). 12 13 Korpi, Walter, Sverige: arbetsfredens land (Stockholm: Institutet för social 13 14 forskning, 1981). 14 15 Korpi, Walter, ‘Economic Growth and the Welfare State: Leaky Bucket or 15 16 Irrigation System?’, European Sociological Review, 1/2 (1985): 97–118. 16 17 Lindblom, Tage, Sweden’s Labor Program (New York: League for Industrial 17 18 Democracy, 1948). 18 19 Lödén, Hans, ‘För säkerhets skull’: ideologi och säkerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik 19 20 1950–1975 (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1999). 20 21 Lödén, Hans, ‘Anarki på svenska: Nationellt intresse och nationell identitet 21 22 mellan Hobbes, Locke och Kant’, in Sven Eliaeson and Hans Lödén 22 23 (eds), Nordisk säkerhetspolitik inför nya utmaningar (Stockholm: Carlsson 23 24 Bokforlag, 2002). 24 25 Logue, John, ‘The Swedish Model: Visions of Sweden in American Politics 25 26 and Political Science’, Swedish-American Historical Quarterly, 50/3 (1999): 26 27 162–172. 27 28 Lundberg, Erik, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model’, Journal of Economic 28 29 Literature, 23/1 (1985): 1–36.Marklund, Carl, ‘Hot Love and Cold People: 29 30 Sexual Liberalism as Political Escapism in Radical Sweden’, Nordeuropaforum 30 31 – Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur, 19/2 (2009): 83–101. 31 32 Marklund, Carl, ‘The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way, and the Swedish 32 33 Model: Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of 33 34 History, 34/3 (2009): 264–285. 34 35 Marklund,Proof Carl, ‘Sharing Values and ShapingCopy Values: Sweden, Nordic 35 36 Democracy and the American Crisis of Democracy’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and 36 37 Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: SKS Finnish 37 38 Literature Society, 2010). 38 39 Marklund, Carl, ‘Nordic Models, American Mirrors, and Swedish Self-Portraits’, 39 40 in Louis Clerc, Nikolas Glover and Paul Jordan (eds), Public Diplomacy 40 41 in Context: The Past and Present of National Image Management in the 41 42 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 285 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM 286 Communicating the North

1 Small States and Nations of Northern Europe, 1900–2010 (Leiden: Brill, 1 2 forthcoming 2014). 2 3 Marklund, Carl and Peter Stadius, ‘Acceptance and Conformity: Merging 3 4 Modernity with Nationalism in the Stockholm Exhibition in 1930’, Culture 4 5 Unbound, 2 (2010): 609–634. 5 6 Mouritzen, Hans, ‘The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise 6 7 and Fall’, Journal of Peace Research, 32/1 (1995): 9–21. 7 8 Musiał, Kazimierz, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era 8 9 of Modernisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002).Myrdal, 9 10 Gunnar, Amerika mitt i världen (Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundets 10 11 bokförlag., 1943). 11 12 Myrdal, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, Kontakt med Amerika (Stockholm: Bonnier, 12 13 1941). 13 14 Myrdal, Gunnar, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its 14 15 International Implications, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963). 15 16 Nelson, George R. (ed.), Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern 16 17 Countries of Europe (Copenhagen, 1953). 17 18 Nilsson, Arne, Sweden’s Way to a Balanced Economy (Stockholm: The Swedish 18 19 Institute, 1950). 19 20 Oakley, Stewart, The Story of Sweden (London: Faber and Faber, 1966).Ohlsson, 20 21 Per T., Over There: banden över Atlanten (Stockholm: Timbro, 1992). 21 22 Ohlsson, Per T., Gudarnas ö: om det extremt svenska (Stockholm: Bromberg, 22 23 1993). 23 24 Ottosson, Sten, Sverige mellan öst och väst: svensk självbild under kalla kriget 24 25 (Gothenburg: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Gothenburg University, 25 26 2001). 26 27 Ottosson, Sten, ‘Sverige som förebild: en diskussion om svenska självbilder 27 28 med utgångspunkt från tre reseberättelser/reportage från andra hälften av 28 29 1930-talet’, Scandia, 68/1 (2002): 109–120. 29 30 Ottosson, Sten, Svensk självbild under kalla kriget: en studie av stats- och 30 31 utrikesministrarnas bild av Sverige 1950–1989 (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska 31 32 institutet, 2003). 32 33 Pells, Richard H., Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social 33 34 Thought in the Depression Years (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 34 35 Power, MProofichael, The Audit Society: Rituals Copy of Verification (Oxford: Oxford 35 36 University Press, 1997). 36 37 Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age 37 38 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 38 39 Sasi, Kimmo, ‘Nordiska rådets relevans’, Hufvudstadsbladet, 11 November 39 40 2011 at: http://hbl.fi/i-dag/2011-11-10/nordiska-radets-relevans, accessed 40 41 15 November 2011. 41 42 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 286 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM A Swedish Norden or a Nordic Sweden? 287

1 Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, Three New Deals: Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s 1 2 Italy, Hitler’s Germany, and the Rise of State Power in the 1930s (New York: 2 3 Metropolitan Books, 2006). 3 4 Shared Norms for the New Reality: The Nordic Way / World Economic Forum, 4 5 Davos 2011 (Stockholm: Global utmaning, 2011). 5 6 Sikkink, Kathryn and Martha Finnemore, ‘International Norm Dynamics and 6 7 Political Change’, International Organization, 52/4 (1998): 887–917. 7 8 Söderström, Jan, ‘Socialdemokraterna har fått den nordiska modellen 8 9 varumärkesskyddad’, Aktuellt i politiken, 12 February 2012. 9 10 Stavenow-Hidemark, Elisabeth (ed.), Modell Sverige: en utställning om det 10 11 moderna Sveriges framväxt (Stockholm: Nordiska museet, 1985). 11 12 Stråth, Bo, Folkhemmet mot Europa: ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet 12 13 (Stockholm: Tiden, 1993). 13 14 Strode, Hudson, Sweden: Model for a World (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949). 14 15 ‘The “Swedish Model” Rejected’, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 1991, 15 16 p. A14. 16 17 Thue, Fredrik W.,In Quest of a Democratic Social Order: The Americanization 17 18 of Norwegian Social Scholarship 1918–1970 (Oslo: Faculty of Humanities, 18 19 University of Oslo, 2006). 19 20 Tingsten, H., Från idéer till idyll: den lyckliga demokratien, 2nd edn (Stockholm: 20 21 Bokförlaget PAN/Norstedts, 1967). 21 22 Tomasson, Richard F., Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society (New York: Random 22 23 House, 1970). 23 24 Utredningen om de statliga insatserna inom Sverigeinformationen och 24 25 kulturutbytet med utlandet, Sverigebilder: 17 svenskar ser på Sverige: 25 26 betänkande avgivet av Utredningen om de statliga insatserna inom 26 27 Sverigeinformationen och kulturutbytet med utlandet, Statens Offentliga 27 28 Utredningar 1987:57 (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1987). 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 Proof Copy 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42

9781409449485_Harvard.indb 287 8/1/2013 10:18:02 AM