Investigation of the capsize and sinking of the fishing vessel Solway Harvester BA794 11 miles east of the Isle of Man on 11 January 2000 with the loss of 7 lives Marine Accident Investigation Branch Carlton House Carlton Place Southampton SO15 2DZ Report No 1/2006 20 January 2006 Extract from The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 – Regulation 5: “The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.” NOTE This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 13(9) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purpose is to attribute or apportion liability or blame. CONTENTS Page GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOREWORD SYNOPSIS 1 SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 4 1.1 Vessel and accident particulars 4 1.2 Vessel description and layout 6 1.3 Fishing gear and operations 9 1.4 Background to the final voyage 10 1.5 Narrative 15 1.6 Post-loss activity 18 1.7 Vessel history 19 1.8 Ownership and operational management 22 1.9 Health and safety management 22 1.10 The crew 23 1.11 Weather and sea conditions 24 1.12 Underwater survey 24 1.13 Recovery of the crew’s bodies 29 1.14 Safety Bulletin 31 1.15 The casualties 32 1.16 Recovery of the wreck 32 1.17 Wreck examination 35 1.18 Stability test 50 1.19 Liferafts 50 1.20 Pump examination and tests 53 1.21 Scale model tests and numerical simulations 55 1.22 Full-scale tests 59 SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 65 2.1 General 65 2.2 The collision theory 65 2.3 Further evidence for a capsize 66 2.4 Hull and mast damage 66 2.5 Capsizing 71 2.6 Stability 73 2.7 Flooding of the fish room 78 2.8 Bilge alarms 84 Contents page continued Page 2.9 Bilge pumping system 85 2.10 Previous flooding incidents 89 2.11 Effects of weather 89 2.12 A reconstruction of the likely events leading up to the accident 90 2.13 Safety issues – general 92 2.14 Design issues 92 2.15 The missing ice scuttle 96 2.16 Maintenance of the fish room slush well 98 2.17 Qualifications and competency 98 2.18 Liferafts 99 2.19 Basic safety training 100 2.20 Health and safety on board Solway Harvester 100 2.21 Survey issues 102 SECTION 3 - ADDITIONAL REPORTS, WORK AND INFORMATION 107 3.1 Reports 107 3.2 Other sources 107 3.3 Discussion of new material 107 3.4 Overview of new information 111 SECTION 4 - CONCLUSIONS 112 4.1 Likely loss scenario 112 4.2s Safety issues 112 SECTION 5 - ACTION TAKEN 114 5.1 Safety Bulletin 114 5.2 Summary report 115 5.3 General recommendation to industry 123 5.4 Stability awareness training 124 SECTION 6 - RECOMMENDATIONS 125 Annex 1 MAIB Safety Bulletin 1/2000 Annex 2 Safety recommendations from the MAIB Summary Report 1/2003 Annex 3 Wreck examination Annex 4 Solway Harvester model experiments in waves Annex 5 Solway Harvester computer numerical simulations Annex 6 MGN 49(F) Losses of fishing vessels through flooding Annex 7 Syllabus for Fishing Vessel Class 2 (Deck) Certificate of Competency Annex 8 MGN 20(M+F) Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessels (Health and Safety at Work) Regulations 1997 Annex 9 MGN 104(M+F) Stowage and Float Free Arrangements for Inflatable Liferafts GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ALB All weather lifeboat BCP Burness Corlett & Partners BMT British Maritime Technology SeaTech Limited CCTV Closed circuit television CSO Coflexip Stena Offshore DGPS Differential Global Positioning System DSV Diving Support Vessel EPIRB Emergency Positioning Indicating Radio Beacon FA Fishermen’s Associations FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance FTAG Fishing Training Advisory Group FV Fishing Vessel GPS Global Positioning System HMS Her Majesty’s Ship HRU Hydrostatic Release Unit HS Significant wave height JONSWAP Joint North Sea Wave Project (M+F) Merchant Ships and Fishing Vessels MAFF Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre MRSC Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre MSA Maritime Safety Agency OPCON Operational Control RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle RSS Registry of Ships and Seafarers SFIA Sea Fish Industry Authority SFPA Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency SSRC Ship Stability Research Centre TP Modal (or peak) period UKFVC United Kingdom Fishing Vessel Certificate UTC Universal Co-ordinated Time VHF Very High Frequency GLOSSARY OF TERMS Angle of vanishing Angle at which the GZ curve crosses the base line stability. stability Bellies The netting on the underside of the scallop dredge. Detain MCA will not permit the vessel to proceed to sea until serious deficiencies have been rectified and the vessel re-surveyed for compliance. Dodging Hove to. When inclement weather halts the voyage and the ship is manoeuvred so as to ride it out in the most comfortable position. Dredge Steel-framed basket which is dragged across the seabed to collect shellfish. Ejector A device which uses the Venturi effect to draw water from the bilge. Fishing Vessel Code The Code of Safe Working Practice For The Construction And Use of 15 Metre Length Overall to Less Than 24 Metre Registered Length Fishing Vessels. Gilson The mast from which the fishing gear is lifted. GZ Curve A diagram showing the righting lever at each angle of heel. (A stability curve) JONSWAP A representation of the regular wave frequencies present in the spectrum of a random seaway. Kort nozzle Duct surrounding the propeller to increase thrust. Painter Rope leading from the liferaft inflation trigger. Risk assessment A formal technique for assessing safety by identifying hazards, assessing the likelihood of each hazard occurring, and the potential consequences if it does. Running Moving in the same direction as the waves. Shaker A mechanical device which is shaken by an unbalanced rotor, driven by a hydraulic motor which agitates the catch causing debris to fall into rubbish chutes and the shellfish to move towards the picking trays. Significant wave The mean of the third highest waves. height Sword The rake-like bar fitted to the leading edge of the scallop dredge. Transmotor A well-known make of 24V direct current generator. FOREWORD At about 1745 on 11 January 2000, the Scottish Ballantrae registered scallop dredger Solway Harvester sank with the loss of her seven-man crew 11 miles south-east, and within the territorial waters, of the Isle of Man. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch started its investigation almost immediately. Its initial enquiries revealed evidence of several safety shortcomings which gave rise to serious concerns about the safety of fishing vessels. A Safety Bulletin outlining these concerns and making immediate recommendations was published on 23 February 2000. The original MAIB report of the investigation of the capsize and sinking of Solway Harvester was completed and, after the statutory consultation process, was ready for publication in February 2002. The Isle of Man Attorney General objected to publication on the grounds of possible prejudice to the pending criminal proceedings by the Isle of Man Government against the owner of Solway Harvester. Exceptionally, the MAIB decided to delay publication of the report. On 17 June 2002, the owner was charged with the manslaughter of the seven crew members on Solway Harvester when she sank. When, subsequently, it became apparent that the case would take considerably longer to come to court than had been anticipated, the MAIB became concerned that the lessons to be learned and the safety recommendations arising from its investigation would be seriously delayed in being brought to the public’s attention. Therefore, on 13 June 2003, the MAIB published a Summary Report of the investigation. This merely outlined a reconstruction of the events leading to the loss of Solway Harvester, based on information gleaned during the investigation, and also included additional safety recommendations to those published in the Safety Bulletin. The owner’s trial started on 11 April 2005 and ended on 18 May 2005 when Deemster Moran QC decided, as a matter of law, that he had a duty to stop the case from proceeding further, and directed the jury to return verdicts of “not guilty”. Subsequent to the trial, the MAIB has considered all the evidence presented, as well as a loss scenario developed for the defence. This has resulted in some minor textual amendments, but did not affect the MAIB’s conclusions or recommendations. This means that, some 6 years after the loss of Solway Harvester, and nearly 4 years after its original report had been prepared, only now can the MAIB publish its full investigation report. The report which follows contains virtually everything that was in the original, but with some additional material used during the trial, and a section on reports and related information which has come to the attention of the MAIB since the drafting of the original report. The section “Action Taken” gives information on the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the MAIB Summary Report. S R MEYER Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents January 2006 Location of accident Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 1121 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office SYNOPSIS On the evening of 11 January 2000, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) was informed that a fishing vessel was missing, feared lost, south-east of the Isle of Man.