Writing the Rules for Europe Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations

Writing the Rules for Europe

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Series editors: Johan Schot (SPRU – Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, United Kingdom) and Phil Scranton (Rutgers University, USA)

Book series overview: Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The People Who Shaped Europe by Ruth Oldenziel (Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands) and Mikael Hård (Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany) Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers by Martin Kohlrausch (KU Leuven, Belgium) and Helmuth Trischler (Deutsches Museum, Germany) Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature by Per Høgselius (Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Sweden), Arne Kaijser (Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Sweden) and Erik van der Vleuten (Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands) Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations by Wolfram Kaiser (University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom) and Johan Schot (SPRU – Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, United Kingdom) Communicating Europe: Technologies, Information, Events by Andreas Fickers (University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg) and Pascal Griset (Paris-Sorbonne University, France) Europeans Globalizing: Mapping, Exploiting, Exchanging by Maria Paula Diogo (New University of Lisbon, Portugal) and Dirk van Laak (University of Giessen, Germany)

Initiator: Foundation for the History of Technology (Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands) The Foundation for the History of Technology (SHT) seeks to develop and communicate knowledge that increases our understanding of the critical role that technology plays in the history of the modern world. Established in 1988 in the Netherlands, SHT initiates and supports scholarly research in the history of technology. This includes large-scale national and international research programs, as well as numerous individual projects, many of which are in collaboration with Eindhoven University of Technology. SHT also coordinates Tensions of Europe (TOE), an international research network of more than 250 scholars from across Europe and beyond who are studying the role of technology as an agent of change in European history. For more information visit www.histech.nl.

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Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot

9780230308077_01_prexx.indd iii 10/10/2014 12:47:47 PM © Wolfram Kaiser, Johan Schot and Foundation for the History of Technology 2014 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identiﬁ ed as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN: 978–0–230–30807–7 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

9780230308077_01_prexx.indd iv 10/10/2014 12:47:47 PM Contents

Making Europe: An Introduction to the Series ix Acknowledgements xvii

Introduction 1 1 Origins of Technocratic Internationalism 21 Trading Goods for Prosperity & Peace 23 Reshaping Relations through Communication 27 Transforming the World through Association 31 Regulating Europe through Organization 37 Fragility of the International Machinery 44 2 The Power & Fragility of Experts 49 Reconciling the Worlds of Diplomats & Experts 50 Towards Postwar Reconstruction 58 Commissariat or Foreign Offi ce Domination? 62 Transit: Model for the League? 67 Technocratic Methods for Totalitarian Dictatorships 74 3 From Divided Europe to “Core Europe” 79 Myrdal’s Postwar pan-Europe 81 From Marshall Plan to OEEC 88

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Planning in Eastern Europe 93 Talking Supranational in Western Europe 103 Shaping a Legal Community 108 4 Europe of the Standard Gauge 113 Local Lines & European Choices 115 Mediating Tensions 121 Standardizing Technological Zones 128 Transnational Collaboration under Pressure 135 5 Tensions in Railway Europe 141 Transnational Organizations Competing 144 Returning Railway Wagons 151 Overcoming Old Divisions 158 Collaborating in East-Central Europe 161 Working Together in the West 165 Building Global Connections 173 6 Cannons & Cartels 179 Travel, Technology, Transfers 180 From National to Transnational Cartels 189 Cartels, Reconciliation, Peace 191 World Economic Conference & Beyond 196 Anti-Trust Law & Cartel Culture 204 Continuities in “Core Europe” Organization 212 7 Technology Cooperation in Steel Europe 219 Rebuilding East–West Trade Links 220 Expanding International Organization 223 Negotiating Investment Plans 225 Diffusing Technological Innovation 232 International Organizations, Technology, Transfers 243 Collaborating in Research 247 Competition and Cooperation 252 8 Towards European Union Hegemony 259 Hothouse for Supranationalism? 262 Deepening & Widening the Community 268 Market Integration in a Customs Union 275 Towards One Technological Zone 278 Regulating the Internal Market 284 Forward to the Past 287

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Conclusion 293 Institutions & Experts 295 Zones & Notions of Europe 300 Forward to the Past 304 Technocracy & Democracy 308

Endnotes 315 List of Archives 345 Bibliography 347 List of Abbreviations 373 Illustration Credits 377 Making Europe: Series Acknowledgements 383 Index 385

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In a typical conversation about twentieth-century European history, the subject of war will almost certainly arise—whether it is the Great War, the Second World War, or the Cold War. Similarly, historians who write about contemporary European history often view war as the twentieth century’s iconic event. In fact, many scholars rely on Europe’s political history, rife as it is with military confl ict, to set the timeframe for their work. The infl uential historian Eric Hobsbawn, for example, defi ned the twentieth century as beginning with the First World War and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union; Hobsbawn named this period—1914 to 1991—The Short Twentieth Century. Indeed, the topic of war and rupture has dominated the discourse on Europe in the twentieth century—and understandably so. We, the editors and authors of the Making Europe series, however, have taken an alternative approach to our subject. We offer a Euro- pean history viewed through the lens of technology rather than war. We believe that a European history with technology at its core can help to understand the continuities that have endured despite the rupture of wars. Making Europe places continuities—from the rise of institutions like CERN to the evolution of hacker networks—in a longer-term perspective. The Making Europe narrative suggests

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that recent European history is as much about building connections across national borders as it is about playing out confl icts between nation states. This view of technology from a transnational perspective has proven to be felicitous. As a phenomenon, technology has always been particularly mobile; this mobility has allowed new technologies to help shape international relations between countries, companies, organizations, and people. To understand the role of technology in this history, we required ourselves to rethink the very meaning of technology: referencing far more than machines alone, technology also embraces people and values; ideas, skills, and knowledge. Technological change, in our view, is a deeply human process. Technology was—and still is—central to the creation of Europe. And given its centrality, technology has been hotly contested—politically, economically, and culturally—in the making of Europe. Technology’s role in shaping Europe coalesced around 1850, when a new era began, an era from 1850 to 2000 that we refer to as The Long Twentieth Century. It was during the mid-nineteenth century that a newly globalizing world began to emerge. This was a world in which the many new transportation and communication technologies played a decisive part. At this time, technology became a reference point for European superiority—both within and beyond Europe. Cross-border connections and institutions thrived; the knowledge-sharing practices that fostered these connections were widely circulated and adopted. This circulation of knowledge led to a worldwide imagining, negotiating, and experiencing of Europe that exists today. This was also the foundation for the formal process of European integration that gained traction in the 1950s. Our perspective simultaneously decenters the European Union and its direct predecessors—which, after all, comprised only one force of Europeanization—and places the process of European integration in long-term historical context. Acknowledging that this dynamic of integration continues today, Making Europe presents and interprets a history that is still in the making. That said, it is clear to us as historians that the decade 1990–2000 marks another watershed: it was in this period that the digital revolution gained new momentum, as did shifting power relationships at the global level. This spurred the European Union to become a hegemonic force of Europeanization, and it helped globalization to enter a new phase. Simultaneously, however, the processes of

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integration and globalization in this apparent new phase have proven to be fragile: in light of the global economic crisis, Europe’s future, called into doubt, has become a pressing issue, and one with a sharp political edge. Accordingly, Europe’s past has also come under fresh scrutiny. We contend that technology will continue to play a central role in defi ning Europe; that the politics of Europe is the politics of technology as much as anything else; and that now is the opportune time to explore technology’s historical role in the creation of Europe. Making Europe provides a perspective on European history that transcends borders. The volumes in the series examine the linking—and, in some cases, the disruption—of infrastructures and knowledge networks that operate beyond nations and states. Also mapped here is the transnational circulation—and appropriation—of people, products, and ideas. The people and organizations featured in this series employed particular notions of Europe in building their cross-border connections. Indeed, they imagined and invented new Europes, often making clear distinctions between which people and places belonged and which were alien to the concept and the reality of Europe. Making Europe asks: Who projected their ideas of Europe? When did these projections take place—how, and why? The series looks at the people and the organizations that perceived themselves as central—and peripheral—to Europe, its colonies, and the transatlantic crossings that were part of the European imagination. Examined here are migrants and experts, foods and inventions, markets and regulations—virtually everything that was identifi ed, experienced, and communicated as “European.” This Europeanization, we fi nd, had signifi cant—and sometimes unintended—consequences: some connections between people and institutions were lasting, others broken, these continuities and ruptures shaping Europe as both an imagined place and a living community. Making Europe explores the stability and fragility of these European connections, communities, and institutions.

The majority of existing studies of Europe have been based on either of two approaches. First is the, often massive, single-author narrative. Second is the essay collection, which presents many voices, in some cases edited to align the authors’ themes. In the fi eld of European history, single-author volumes have tended to be broad-ranging and to address different timeframes and regions.

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Often, single-author volumes are a compilation of national stories; at their best, compilations transcend their individual stories to posit a complete European picture. Essay collections, for their part, have generally assumed a sharper focus—on particular communities, ethnicities, and empires, for example. These usual approaches point to a distinctive feature of Making Europe: in this series, fi ve of the six volumes have two authors; one book has three writers. These voices, thirteen in all, create multiple narratives. The six sets of Making Europe’s co-authors have worked as a team to draft a series of volumes with coordinated yet individual themes (see www.makingeurope.eu). These six volumes contain six distinct points of view; as editors, we have imposed neither uniformity nor the pressure to harmonize narratives. In our opinion, the most informative new contributions to European history embrace diverse actors and diverse meanings, a range of purposes and understandings. Making Europe captures this diversity, refl ecting a dynamic European history that continues to unfold.

All of the authors in the series have drawn on the European Science Foundation’s “Inventing Europe” collaborative research initiatives as well as the Foundation for the History of Technology’s “Tensions of Europe” project, begun in 1998 (see www.tensionsofeurope.eu). They have profi ted from an intensive period of discussion and joint research and writing at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Wassenaar dunes in 2010–11. The fruits of these initiatives include the Making Europe book series as well as a web-based exhibit “Inventing Europe, European Digital Museum for Science and Technology” that encompasses a dozen of Europe’s technology and science museums (see www.inventingeurope.eu) and scores of scholarly publications. All aim to promote creativity in fostering a more inclusive understanding of technology’s role in refashioning Europe—an ongoing process that is as fascinating as it is contentious. The authors of Making Europe have asked themselves what shape an open-ended European history of technology would take. They provide their answers in the form of this book series.

The fi rst volume in the Making Europe series, entitled Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The People who Shaped Europe, is written by Ruth Oldenziel and Mikael Hård. This volume spotlights the people

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who “made” Europe by appropriating and consuming a wide range of technologies—from the sewing machine to the bicycle, the Barbie doll to the personal computer. What emerges is a fascinating portrait of how Europeans lived during The Long Twentieth Century. Explored here are the questions of who, exactly, decided how Europeans dressed and dwelled? Traveled and dined? Worked and played? Who, in fact, can be credited with shaping the daily lives of Europeans? The authors argue that, while inventors, engineers, and politicians played their parts, it was consumers, tinkerers, and rebels who have been the unrecognized force in the making of Europe. The second volume in the series, entitled Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers, is written by Martin Kohlrausch and Helmuth Trischler. Here the focus shifts from consumers of technology to a new breed of professionals: the technical and scientifi c experts whose infl uence soared from around 1850 onward. The authors show how these experts created, organized, and spread knowledge—enabling them to shape societies, create cross-border connections, and set political agendas. During Europe’s Long Twentieth Century, technoscientifi c experts became a strategic resource for serving national, international, and transnational interests, the authors argue. They revisit experts’ visions of Europe, showing how these visions manifested in the dictatorships of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia—as well as helping to build Europe’s vast research networks during the Cold War. Building Europe on Expertise ends with today’s efforts to reinvent the Euro- pean Union—as a knowledge-based society defi ned by experts. The third volume in the series, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature, is written by Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten. This book elaborates on the fi rst two volumes by introducing a new cast of historical actors: system- builders. These individuals and organizations helped to transform Europe by envisioning, constructing, and manipulating large-scale transport, communications, and energy systems. Their efforts reshaped Europe as a geographical entity by forming massive new material interconnections—and divisions—between places. This had far-reaching implications for European integration; for peaceful economic exchange; for military planning and logistics. System- builders challenged Europe’s natural barriers, from the Alps to northern Europe’s forests and the vast marshlands to the east. But

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Europe’s water, air, and land were not only connected, they were transformed radically, sometimes destroyed. In response, system- builders eventually turned much of Europe’s environment itself into infrastructure, interlinking isolated ecosystems via human- made corridors and networks. The fourth volume, Making the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations is written by Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot. Here, the focus becomes the norms and standards of technological innovation—discussed in depth for transport and heavy industry. Featured are the people and organizations that debated, negotiated, and regulated the cross-border issues raised by innovation. Presented here are individuals with special—and often interdisciplinary—expertise in technology, business, and law. Often, these experts sought to de-politicize issues by deeming them technical; this yielded workable solutions to shared problems. It also paved experts’ way in rule-making for multiple, distinct yet overlapping, and frequently competing “Europes.” In the pursuit of fi nding technological solutions, many institutions’ transnational practices survived ruptures, including the two World Wars. After the Second World War, the European Union was obliged to accommodate—and to compete with—other institutions’ established practices in order for the EU to gain greater infl uence in shaping Europe. The fi fth volume, Communicating Europe: Technologies, Information, Events, analyzes Europe’s information and communication systems from roughly 1850 onward. Authors Andreas Fickers and Pascal Griset place these technologies at the very heart of European society. Presented here is a global vision of media, telecommunications, and computers that reveals the tensions inherent in designing and appropriating electrical and electronic devices. The authors argue that the control in the material realm by research and entrepreneur- ship and the emergence of new forms of creativity and new ways of life are two sides of the same coin, mostly driven by political and cultural forces. Examined in this volume are the political, economic, and cultural realities and meanings of information and communication technologies on a European level. This perspective, which extends over the long term, provides the tools for a new critical understanding of the digital revolution. How did today’s globalized, thoroughly mapped-out world emerge? What part did technology play in Europe’s international

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encounters, colonial and otherwise? Europeans Globalizing, written by Maria Paula Diogo and Dirk van Laak, concludes the Making Europe series with a study of how Europe interacted with the rest of the world from 1850 until the close of the twentieth century. The volume details how technologies were applied and creatively adopted—from India to Argentina, South Africa to the Arctic. From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, we witness assumptions about Europe’s technologically-based superiority being continuously challenged. And we discover that globalized Europe in its present form looks quite different from what Europeans once imagined.

Consumers and tinkerers; engineers and scientists; system-builders and inventors. Experts in technology, law, and business; commu- nicators and entrepreneurs; politicians and ambassadors. This is a cross-section of the actors represented on Making Europe’s pages. These actors, through the institutions and organizations they cultivated, the connections they created, the rules and practices they fostered, co-created Europe. Narrated from contrasting as well as complementary viewpoints, the six volumes in the series create a collage of co-existent portraits that depict Europe’s Long Twentieth Century; its technologies; and its meanings. Together, these histo- ries form the view of modern Europe that we and the authors wish to contribute to the historical record at this time. Johan Schot & Philip Scranton Making Europe Series Editors Amsterdam, the Netherlands & Camden, New Jersey, USA July 2013

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This book is the result of coordinated research by the two authors and of their collaborative writing. Crucially, however, our research and writing has been infl uenced by continuous intellectual exchange and cooperation for the Making Europe series. In the fi rst instance, this exchange has been with the authors of the other fi ve books, Maria Paula Diogo, Andreas Fickers, Pascal Griset, Mikael Hård, Per Høgselius, Martin Kohlrausch, Dirk van Laak, Ruth Oldenziel, Helmuth Trischler, and Erik van der Vleuten, and with Phil Scran- ton, one of the two series editors. The cooperation with them has tacitly infl uenced this book’s conceptual approach, structure and ideas. In addition to these colleagues we would like to thank the participants of numerous workshops and conferences at which we have presented our ideas and draft chapters including those of the Tensions of Europe international network of historians of technology. In particular we would like to thank Alec Badenoch, Matthias Middell, and Emanuela Scarpellini who shared with us and with the other authors considerable time in the dunes of Wassenaar during our stay at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies, and Pierre Yves Saunier whose unfl agging support for the Making Europe series including our book has been important throughout the process. This book covers much ground – chronologically, thematically, and geographically. For the research we have benefi tted from

xvii

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research assistance. This ranged from checking contemporary journals and selecting articles of relevance to our research, sharing archival sources and summarizing key information, to exploring archives and retrieving relevant material. This was especially important concerning sources in Slavic languages that we do not read ourselves. For this valuable assistance we would like to thank Irene Anastasiadou, Ana Bara, Hans Buiter, Maria Paula Diogo, Stephanie Gallic, Giel van Hooff, Ildiko Ivan, Frida de Jong, Vincent Lagendijk, Gijs Mom, Slawomir Lotysz, Frank Schippers and Peter Svik. In particular we are grateful to Suzanne Lommers and Jíra Janáč who contributed over a longer period of time, located, read and summarized extensive sets of sources, and shared their ideas and interpretations with us. Originally, we hoped to write the book with Dagmara Jajeśniak- Quast as a third co-author. Unfortunately, she had to drop out to give priority to fi nalizing her German Habilitation thesis and to her new commitments as professor of Interdisciplinary Polish Studies at the University of Frankfurt/Oder. We are grateful to her for her friendship, enthusiasm for our joint project, input in our research and discussions, comments on various chapters in the early stages of our writing, and her constant reminders that our book should fully integrate the East-Central and Eastern European experience. Whereas Philip Scranton and two anonymous reviewers commented on the fi rst book outline and two draft chapters and, in a second round, on the entire manuscript, we would like to thank the following colleagues for reading and criticizing individual chapters: Carine Germond, Brigitte Leucht, Jan-Henrik Meyer, Ruth Oldenziel, Kiran Patel, Ed Stoddard, Hans de Wit – and Philip Scranton for his support and superb advice throughout the process of writing, revising and fi nishing a manuscript. We thank Phil for his language editing, too, which also involved James Morrison and Philip Hillyer at various stages. In addition, the book’s design has profi ted enormously from the collaboration of the picture editors Katherine Kay-Mouat and Jan Korsten. We also wish to express our gratitude to the organizations that contributed fi nancially to making this book possible: the Founda- tion for the History of Technology and the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies. Our thanks also go to our publisher Jenny McCall and her editorial assistant Holly Tyler. Their enthusiastic support for our book has been important.

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Regarding citation conventions, we have used the original language for sources in the endnotes except in the case of sources in Russian where for easier comprehension we have given the title of the source in an English translation. Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot Portsmouth and Brighton, May 2014

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Writing rules for Europe in the early twenty-fi rst century appears to be the job of politicians and policy makers in the European Union (EU). Alongside the management of the Eurozone or the coordination of foreign policies, their manifold governing tasks include decisions on production and transport technologies, communication and energy infrastructures and the technical appliances we use, the food we eat, and the clothes we wear. The resulting technologies, systems, and standards provide a material, institutional, and cultural foundation for Europe.1 They ensure that Europe will not suddenly fall apart, even if the Euro as a currency were to collapse, for example. The Europe we discuss in our book should not be confl ated with the EU, however, no matter how important the latter may be. In fact, we explicitly aim to decenter the EU.2 The Europe of this volume has been constituted during the last 150 years or so through the creation of a set of rules by a variety of organizations, committees, and experts operating inside them—and this is the transnational focus of this book. The planning and construction of a European network of motorways illustrates the book’s long-term historical perspective. Engineers dreamed about them and conducted experiments before the First World War, mainly in the U.S. They drafted

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blueprints and implemented some plans after 1918, before a pan- European network emerged after 1945. In 1921, the Italian engineer Piero Puricelli fi rst advocated constructing an automobile-only road network in Northern Italy. When the fascists came to power in 1922, Benito Mussolini embraced the idea.3 In September 1924, he opened the fi rst dual motorway in the world, between Milan and Varese.4 Puricelli’s vision was not limited to Italy, however. He wanted to create a European network. In 1926, he promoted his ideas at a conference in Milan organized by the Permanent International Association of Road Congresses, a platform for a growing network of road engineers in Europe. They envisioned a much larger role for cars at a time when motorists made up less than three percent of the total traffi c. Puricelli’s 1927 European plan then integrated various initiatives of road engineers from Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain.5 For motorway visionaries, the Great Depression created new political opportunities. In 1931 Albert Thomas, director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), proposed a public works program for Europe including a motorway network.6 Thomas, who advocated a technical approach to European integration driven by experts,7 submitted his program to the League of Nations’ Commission of Enquiry for European Union (CEEU). The CEEU agreed to consider it, but Pietro Stoppani, a leading offi cial in the League Secretariat, told Thomas straight away that he considered his public works “luxury projects”—a technological promise with little contemporary economic relevance.8 Thomas and Puricelli’s own network subsequently organized an international road conference hosted by the ILO in Geneva from August 31 to September 2, 1931. A newly-created technical committee drafted a plan that extended Puricelli’s map into East-Central and South-Eastern Europe. The plan consisted of 14,000 km of motorways and a projected 750,000 new jobs.9 At the same time, the Verein zur Vorbereitung der Autostraße Hanse-städte-Frankfurt-Basel (Hafraba), created in 1926 with Puricelli on its board, advocated building German motorways.10 But despite their planning and lobbying efforts, motorway enthu- siasts made little progress in Germany until the National Socialists usurped power in 1933 and Adolf Hitler put Fritz Todt in charge of building a national network.11 By 1941, two years into the Second World War, 3,625 km had been built. In 1936, Todt asked Kurt

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Fig. 0.1 Building Europe on Motorways: The E3 was part of the European motorway network designed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe shortly after the Second World War. An active lobby of cities created a federation in 1957 to encourage the use of the motorway. This illustrated map provided many details about the road and the participating cities, such as their number of hotel beds and principal tourist attractions. It projected an imagined European community of tourists and other travelers.

Kaftan to draft a European plan for motorways. Due to his role in Hafraba, Kaftan was well known internationally among road engineers. In the same year Kaftan presented his proposal as an attempt “to enlist the active forces of all European peoples in a work ... wholly un-political, yet furthering the establishment of deeply-rooted economic relations among all European nations, a work of labor glorifi ed by the hope of our age: peace for Europe.”12 Kaftan reviewed earlier designs, including Puricelli’s, before arguing that the new plan for a European network should take the advanced German motorways as its center.13 Elsewhere, however, road engineers sought to follow the German example, but they did so to promote national projects.14 Backed by American foreign policy-makers and lobby groups, the construction of new motorways became a priority for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) shortly after 1945. Building on the American highway tradition and ignoring the fact that Nazi Germany had instrumentalized motorways and automobiles for its racist ideology and expansionary aims, American

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groups now argued that cars would stimulate individual liberty and democracy. As the chairman of the International Road Federa- tion, created in 1948, put it: “The values and spiritual character of the individual are free to express and develop themselves on the open road.”15 In 1947, the UNECE, using American terminology, created a Working Party on Highways staffed with road engineers who reviewed interwar plans and activities, including the Puricelli plan, which was already circulating in American policy circles.16 In 1950, this group’s work led to the “Declaration on the Construc- tion of Main European International Traffi c Arteries.” It confi gured the creation of a network with main routes called E-roads, which encompassed 66,320 km by 1985. As this example of the European motorway network shows, the EU and its predecessors, the European Coal and Steel Commu- nity (ECSC), created in 1951/52, and the European Economic Community (EEC), established in 1957/58, had to compete with and share responsibility for governing Europe with other organizations like the UNECE. In fact, some of these had been established in the nineteenth century, such as the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, created at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and the International Telegraph Union, set up in 1865. Such organizations created common standards for Rhine traffi c and abolished tolls; they decided on European train schedules and arranged trans-European express trains; they organized telegraph and telephone communication and cross-border electricity fl ows; and they formed steel cartels. As a result, distinct governing structures emerged which were geared towards making rules for Europe.17 Writing the Rules for Europe decenters the EU by discussing the activities of multiple organizations in making policies and deciding rules, procedures, and standards aimed at managing the cross- border fl ow of people, goods, information, and even pollution.18 We also take a long-term historical perspective, reaching back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Through what we call a transnational perspective on European integration, we show how Euro- pean rules and regulations were functionally highly fragmented, as many different organizations dealt with a variety of issues, often for specifi c sectors and activities.19 We call the development of distinct European governing structures the hidden integration of Europe—that is, forms of integration,

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which were (and are) not obvious to ordinary citizens of Europe.20 We concentrate on the making of rules for technology-related cross-border issues. We do so because experts frequently focused on such issues when they sought to create rules for transport, communication, industry, and agriculture. Moreover, the regulatory and technocratic nature of today’s hotly-debated EU policy making in many respects derives from earlier technology-related governing structures we analyze in this volume. Both institutions and individual experts matter a great deal for understanding the hidden integration of Europe. Thus, we combine an institutional with a biographical approach by integrating stories of key organizations with those of infl uential individuals. In fact, each chapter starts with such a story; and we use more of them throughout the book to support and illustrate general observa- tions. After all, Europe’s hidden integration was largely conceived and actually shaped by experts (chiefl y engineers and scientists, but also lawyers, economists, and others) who preferred to work behind closed doors, hidden from the public eye. These experts in the fi rst instance responded to what they considered the need for practical coordination resulting from the rapidly-growing transnational fl ows of people, goods, and information in the nineteenth century. They believed that established diplomatic channels were too cumbersome and that diplomats lacked technical expertise. Experts sought to fi ll the emerging regulatory gap with their own know-how and agendas. During the twentieth century they made increasingly self-confi dent claims about writing rules for Europe. They often saw their technocratic approach as a superior form of conducting international relations. The technocratic solutions they propagated were also part and parcel of a larger agenda promoted by other actors like companies, politicians, and social groups in addition to experts. They all sought to modernize industrializing economies and rapidly-changing societies. They fi rst promoted facilitating circulation, increasing effi ciency, and controlling competition to prevent “waste.” Later on, they increasingly advocated new methods of planning and social engineering, both to improve socio-economic development and to arrive at a form of organized, tamed capitalism, which has also been characterized as “embedded liberalism.”21 For the purpose of this book we adopt a situated understanding of these experts and their expertise. They were experts because their

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peers considered them to be experts and because they often worked together for long periods of time in organizations and committees, forming stable expert networks.22 They defi ned problems, singled out salient points for discussion, and identifi ed specifi c policy solutions.23 We demonstrate that these experts developed a specifi c technocratic framing and practice of managing transnational and international relations—something that we call technocratic internationalism.24 Experts fi rmly believed that the choice of technology-related issues should be “wholly un-political,” as Kaftan called it, as heated public debates resulted in irrational decision-making. Instead, they advanced the notion that such issues should be de-politicized, or Fig. 0.2 Informal Expert Culture: The working committees of many international and transnational organizations consisted of experts who often crafted long-lasting relations and friendships with each other. They developed a specifi c culture of how to negotiate international relations based on consensus seeking and voluntary agreements, making it easier to negotiate contested technological solutions and political ideas. This photo shows Raymond Braillard, the director of the Technical Committee of the International Broadcasting Union, with colleagues at Ouchy in Switzerland in 1941.

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“technifi ed,” with the aim of identifying and forming a consensus around what the experts considered the best technical and scientifi c solutions to common challenges. Identifying and agreeing to these solutions would be best for national societies and more generally, for mankind. Technocratic internationalism often proved fragile. For experts, delineating and maintaining the boundary with the political world was not always easy. In the twentieth century, experts also worked for and in dictatorial regimes. Many of them also strongly supported these regimes. This is true, for example, of the railway engineers Puricelli, Kaftan, and Todt, active in planning and building motorways. In fact, Todt was in charge of the Organisation Todt from 1938 onwards, a military-type construction agency of the Nazi regime. From 1940 until his death in a 1942 plane crash, he coordinated the German war effort as armaments minister. At the same time, other experts were cajoled or terrorized by the dictatorships, as happened in the persecutions after the Slánský show trial in early 1950s Czechoslovakia. However, the technocratic idea that expert work should be done in a politics-free zone clearly made it easy for many experts to align themselves with various political regimes, including fascist and communist ones. Both promised alternatives to unbridled capitalism and social disorder, which also broadly fi tted the technocratic inclinations of many. Experts originally shaped and helped institutionalize technocratic internationalist practices in the nineteenth century. These practices became known as the “international machinery”: a new set of institutions for coordinating not only relationships among states, but also the cross-border (or transnational) activities of organizations, businesses, and people.25 It entailed a new vision of how to conduct and shape international relations. It sought to overcome the European idea at the end of the Napoleonic wars of a concert of great powers, in which the largest states would coordinate and dominate European and world politics. The technological metaphor, international machinery, fuelled the founding and working patterns of the new institutions. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, many advocates of the emerging organizations and structures—among them engineers, economists, social reformers, and politicians—referred to this vision as internationalism. In their view this was a practical mechanism, based on “positive

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and concrete” concepts resting “upon an immovable and massive foundation.”26 It refl ected a widespread belief, in the words of the English journalist William T. Stead, that “the nineteenth century was the century of nationalism. The twentieth century is the century of internationalism.”27 Representatives of the emerging social science of international relations also embraced the notion of internationalism as extending beyond the diplomatic interactions among states. In one of the fi rst infl uential studies of international relations, published in 1911, the American diplomat Paul S. Reinsch argued that rapid technological change and growth in trade and travel was unifying the world.28 From his perspective, internationalism was not just or mainly rooted in idealistic beliefs about international peace. Rather, the phenomenon resulted from material technological and economic developments. It required the creation of new international institutions for their regulation.29 This is also how many experts in organizations and committees justifi ed the importance of their collaboration. They expected that increased transnational exchanges and interdependencies would change the attitudes of individuals, breed a new way of thinking about the world, and, as a result, foster peace. Thinkers like Reinsch became known as liberal internationalists. After the horrid experiences on the killing fi elds of the First World War they elevated to a more abstract theoretical level arguments for the creation of new organizations and committees as an extension of the proliferating international machinery.30 Their ideas about international collaboration did not come out of the blue, however. Instead, they studied the early history of many organizations created in the second half of the nineteenth century. These agencies, and the experts cooperating within them, not only established new patterns of cross-border cooperation; they also stood for a powerful way of knowing, envisaging, and talking about international relations to support and legitimize their new practice and knowledge domain. The new organizations and committees therefore were more than sites for building material connections, infrastructures, and technical norms. They also shaped new ways of thinking about transnational cooperation, established new institutional patterns and forms of decision- making, and infl uenced emerging behavioral norms in the international machinery. Within these new organizational settings, experts developed new routines and habitual ways of thinking

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and acting. That habitus they often continued to take for granted after the Second World War. With this in mind, focusing on organizations, committees, and experts making rules for Europe allows us to write a transnational history of how this continent has to some extent been governed jointly even in the hey-day of the nation-state and in times of national or ideological confl icts. This approach is a fresh and exciting way of looking at the modern history of Europe as shared history. It helps us, fi rst of all, to explore the nature of these organizations and committees and the working practices that experts devised. We distinguish between “transnational voluntary” and “international” organizations. Transnational voluntary organizations characterize platforms that are dominated by companies, experts, and social groups, with governments either associated with or sometimes even participating in their work. International organizations in contrast are based on treaties between states and are run by offi cial government representatives. They, too, can have expert knowledge or involve experts in their work, however. Indeed, as we show, even this distinction may be meaning- ful mainly from a formal legal-institutional perspective. In practice, the organizations focused on connecting the spheres of experts, companies, and governments. As a result, many organizations were actually hybrid institutional creatures in their working practices. The

Fig. 0.3 De- politicizing Europe: Despite Cold War tensions, East and West continued to collaborate on technical issues. The pan-European United Nations Economic Commission for Europe became one crucial bridging institution. Their strategy was to technify issues and provide expert-driven solutions. This photo shows Swiss, British, and Soviet UNECE experts studying a map related to the organization’s 1955 Road Traffi c Census.

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dichotomy between “supranational” which suggests hierarchical relations between organizations “above” the state and (member) state, and “intergovernmental structures” dominated by member state governments cannot capture this institutional hybridity.31 Writing the Rules for Europe also analyzes organizations and committees as fascinating sites for contesting and negotiating new technological solutions and political ideas. Alongside national governments, experts, businesses, and civil society, organizations sought to steer debates to infl uence emerging agendas and facilitate the transfer of ideas, solutions, and models across organizations and committees, from them into and among member states. The various actors invested time and energy because the efforts mattered. Commonly-agreed rules and regulations could buttress the economic and political power of one state, or a group of states. They could privilege one technological solution over another, with benefi ts for one corporation and adverse effects on another. More- over, the work of these organizations and committees strongly impacted the everyday lives of Europeans as “consumers, tinkerers and rebels,” even though the machinery behind that integration remained largely invisible to them. Thus, to offer one example among many, the rules for cross-border traffi c could greatly facilitate or impede long-distance train and shipping journeys of Europe’s streams of migrants crossing the Continent and the Atlan- tic. At the same time, the rules that Puricelli and his colleagues sought to implement also excluded millions of pedestrians and cyclists from their car-only roads.32 Europeans as consumers, tinkerers, and rebels could to some extent engage with and shape the use of technology, and even the technologies themselves; as citizens in democratic states they could also challenge the mandate given to experts, reject- ing its technocratic nature as profoundly undemocratic. This tension has become clear more recently in the debate about the so-called democratic defi cit of the EU—an issue to which we return in the Conclusion. The origins of this debate lie precisely in early postwar neo-functionalist notions of governing Europe through committees and experts. Advocates of this notion, like the French businessman and leading civil servant Jean Monnet, the fi rst president of the High Authority of the ECSC, had an exaggerated belief in the ability of experts to shed their national

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or ideological allegiances and to produce the best policies for the member states of new European organizations—an approach that they hoped could also diffuse potentially explosive issues of class, gender, and ethnicity. Moreover, these advocates cared little about the legitimacy of expert-led policy- and decision-making, which they largely took for granted. Their preferred way of making and implementing policies on cross-border issues was not transparent to ordinary citizens, however. Our transnational history of organizations, committees, and experts also allows us to explore the spatial dimension of European integration and the relationship between centers and peripheries. We do not take the notion of Europe for granted. It was, and is, a Continent with fuzzy economic, political, and cultural borders. Rather, we are interested in how experts in organizations and committees contested the notion of Europe and fi lled it with different and often competing meanings. In the cases we discuss, Europe is often present in different shapes: as an ambition, a problem, a necessity, a stepping stone, a last resort, a natural geographical space, a colonial space, a response to America, a background factor, or an unintended consequence. In fact, experts in the nineteenth century usually discussed cross-border issues without making explicit references to any particular kind of Europe. Many issues they addressed were also important for, and sometimes driven by, perceived exigencies of colonial expansion such as the creation of imperial infrastructures and trade links. During this period the experts we study usually used universalistic language, while predominantly dealing with cross-borders issues within Europe as a geographical space. Within Europe the work of organizations, committees, and experts was spatially fragmented. Each organization covered a specifi c zone governed by members (whether private businesses or states) willing to collaborate. In fact, not all zones of circulation, exchange, and regulation among companies necessarily even coincided with national boundaries. Their borders could be fuzzy, as rules often applied informally to activities of non-members within and beyond Europe.33 Since the functional and spatial reach of different organizations often overlapped, competition among them was rampant.34 Different centers formed, such as a Central European rail traffi c regime organized by the Verein Deutscher

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Fig. 0.4 a-b-c European Technological Zones: These are maps of proposed European motorway networks. They represent European technological zones of varying scope. The fi rst [left] was drawn by Piero Puricelli in 1927; the second [below] redrawn and extended in 1932 by him and a wider transnational network of transport experts; and the last one [right] by a group of transport experts in 1948, after the end of the Second World War. The maps highlight both continuities and discontinuities in terms of what and who is included and excluded. They also suggest how technological zones could cut across political borders.

Fig. 0.4b

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Fig. 0.4c

Eisenbahnverwaltungen and a continental Western European core of steel cartels which evolved into the ECSC after the Second World War. We also explore the impact of these emerging centers and their rule-making on those parts of Europe which were excluded, or excluded themselves, from integration. At the same time, as the new organizations and committees created new sites for exercising infl uence beyond the state, many small and medium-sized countries like Belgium and Switzerland invested heavily into establishing

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them and hosting their secretariats, so as to counterbalance the Great Power diplomacy from which they were largely excluded.35 While we focus on how organizations, committees, and experts made rules for Europe as a geographical space, we also explore and discuss linkages and interdependencies with other states beyond Europe and world regions. Thus, transatlantic exchanges with the U.S., as well as resistance to looming U.S. technological and regulatory hegemony, feature prominently. Moreover, Euro- pean colonial empires played a key role in what contemporaries called the process of internationalization in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, since the 1960s the more recent phase of globalization has greatly impacted Europe and the EU, which face the increasingly tough challenge of how to infl uence making rules for the world in global organizations and committees. For a long time though, even those organizations and committees which formally had a global reach were organized in a Euro-centric fashion. Moreover, experts operating inside them often shared such a perspective on their work—a form of pervasive Euro-centrism that we seek to contextualize and historicize. Finally, focusing on organizations, committees, and experts also allows us to investigate long-term continuities in modern European history across major political ruptures such as regime changes and the two World Wars. Their work created an alternative vision of, and discourse on, international relations, which was available after both World Wars for rebuilding the international machinery. They also shaped rules which in many cases persisted and were revised during the nearly 80 years of nationalist and ideological confrontation, economic depression and hot and cold wars—in that period roughly between 1911 when Reinsch published his book and 1989 when communist rule in East-Central Europe collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved soon after. During these 80 years, moreover, new European organizations and committees made more rules, thus deepening transnational relations in the midst of protectionism, ideological confl ict and power struggles among states. Many postwar organizations were heavily infl uenced by work conducted between the wars and during the Second World War. Exploring these continuities fatally undermines the implicit assumption, in much writing about integration in the present-day EU, that 1945

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marked a kind of “zero hour” when a new supranational Europe emerged like a phoenix from the ashes of two world wars. This is a myth that EU institutions have also cultivated while creating their own federalist “founding fathers” narrative to legitimize further steps towards an “ever closer union,” as it was phrased in the EEC treaty. To explore how organizations, committees, and experts have made rules for Europe we take a two-pronged approach. The fi rst three chapters tell the story of the foundation, growth, and crises of organizations and committees and accompanying technocratic visions and practices for managing cross-border relationships from the middle of the nineteenth century through postwar Europe. In chapter 1, “Origins of Technocratic Internationalism,” we argue that technocratic internationalism fed on several crucial developments around the middle of the nineteenth century. They include the growth of European varieties of liberalism, their drive for rational decision-making and their promotion of freer trade. Crucially, they also encompass Saint Simonian and other ideas for the regulation of capitalism through what technocratic internationalist thinkers and activists like Michel Chevalier called association. These different sources fed into the establishment of organizations and committees where experts developed new technocratic practices for managing transnational and international relations in Europe. In chapter 2, “The Power & Fragility of Experts,” we discuss the rising tensions between states, who increasingly sought to infl u- ence or even dominate old and new organizations, and experts, who were keen to retain the greatest possible degree of autonomy. We narrate the origins of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) created in Rome in 1905. Its formation, and the confl ict over its institutional design and working practices, exemplifi es how experts in new organizations and committees could never take their infl uence for granted. After the First World War the IIA, in line with several other existing organizations, contested the League of Nations’ attempt to expand its policy scope to include sectors like agriculture. A product of the Versailles Peace Conference, the League was the fi rst comprehensive horizontal organization created to meet transnational challenges in many different sectors and policy areas. Its work was divided into political tasks, such as

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dealing with border issues, population exchange, disarmament, Fig. 0.5 Working and other consequences of the war and the postwar settlement; towards Peace: By the end of the nineteenth and work perceived as technical, which sought to integrate or century the belief became even absorb the activities of many existing smaller organizations. widespread that Europe Although the League did not manage to displace these organiza- had built a technological foundation for peace. Many tions, it did offer an important platform where many of these experts were convinced single-issue organizations met and coordinated their efforts. Unlike that the newly-created most of the League’s political initiatives, contemporary commenta- international organizations for setting standards were tors actually regarded this technical work as quite successful. Here a harbinger for a whole the League not only built on the technocratic internationalist work- set of new international ing practices of many of these nineteenth-century organizations. It arrangements. This photo shows the participants also drew explicit lessons from international cooperation during of the 1899 The Hague the war. Peace Conference—one At the same time, as chapter 3, “From Divided Europe to ‘Core conference among several based on the idea that war Europe’,” shows, the League’s perceived political failures also was no longer a rational provided important lessons for the organizations and committees option for states to pursue. making rules for Europe which emerged after the Second World After the Second World War this idea of a material War. This concerns, in particular, prioritizing socio-economic and foundation for peace became technical issues broadly speaking, which led to the formation of infl uential once more in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Along- the establishment of the European Coal and Steel side the EU and its predecessors, the newly-created horizontal Community.

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organizations included the UNECE and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Western Europe and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the emerging Eastern bloc. These new organizations, which spanned different sectors, technologies, and tasks, had to compete with and accommodate to the existing international machinery with its many specialized organizations. Arguably, in trying to maintain and expand relations across the emerging Cold War East–West divide, the UNECE used technocratic internationalist methods of depoliticization most rigorously. In contrast, in both Western and Eastern Europe different political notions of integration were grafted on to new organizations such as the OEEC, the EEC, and CMEA which led to an uneasy, ambiguous relationship with persisting technocratic internationalist practices. Thus, the fi rst three chapters set the scene by narrating the growth and activities of transnational voluntary and international organizations and committees (and experts’ roles within them) since the middle of the nineteenth century. We then move on to studying two sectors more in-depth, each again in a chronological manner. We will discuss transport, especially railways in chapters 4 and 5, and heavy industry, especially steel in chapters 6 and 7. Both sectors were new and central to the economies of European states in the nineteenth century and they have remained relevant to making rules for Europe to the present day. Both sectors faced similar cross-border governance challenges; they came up with different solutions, however: agreed standards in railways versus agreed market shares (cartels) in steel. The steel sector allows us to trace the origins of technocratic internationalism in, and its persistent infl uence on, European integration, in particular on the ECSC, which started “core Europe” integration after the Second World War, and on the EEC. This form of integration proved successful in institutional terms, although the sector was plagued by recurring economic problems, culminating in a huge structural crisis after 1974. In contrast, integration in the transport sector made no headway for the fi rst twenty-fi ve years or so, not least because a number of other specialized organizations were already active in a very crowded fi eld. Analyzing these two sectors demonstrates how technocratic internationalism worked and what impact it had on the ground.

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Together, they bring out long-term continuities in making rules for Europe. How technocratic internationalism and the working practices developed by organizations, committees, and experts in different sectors and in the League of Nations infl uenced the present-day EU is the subject of chapter 8, “Towards European Union Hege- mony.” Here, we show how technocratic internationalism shaped the working methods of the newly-created institutions, especially the High Authority of the ECSC and the European Commission of the EEC. At the same time, we show that the EU’s progressive constitutionalization and its creation of a customs union and full internal market made it distinctive compared with other organizations, which helped it become more hegemonic over time in making rules for Europe. However, the EU has actually developed a form of associative regulation based on intense cooperation with transnational voluntary organizations which have set rules and standards since the nineteenth century. In fact, and surprisingly perhaps, globalization and the domestic European policies of privatization and market liberalization have fostered the renewed rise of technocratic internationalism and contributed to a greater role of experts in making rules for Europe—at a time when many transnational organizations were struggling to stay relevant in a globalizing world. European companies and social groups can only infl uence the setting of norms and standards if they ally themselves with the EU as a powerful international actor. At the same time, the EU and its member states, used as they were for centuries to European dominance in world affairs, can only infl uence this global competition if they associate themselves closely with transnational voluntary organizations and the experts who draft rules—not just for Europe, but increasingly for the global community. In the “Conclusion,” fi nally, we summarize our arguments. We show that the EU may have been quite effi cient in coordinating the making of rules for Europe and globally. Yet, the success of its associative regulation may also have contributed to the much debated and much maligned democratic defi cit—the widespread belief among citizens that their lives are shaped by unelected bureaucrats

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and experts infl uenced by well-organized interest groups in non- transparent committees. This volume will hopefully help us understand in historical perspective the benefi ts and downsides of the role of organizations, committees, and experts in writing rules for Europe, and some of the challenges lying ahead.

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After his successful political campaign in Britain for free trade, Richard Cobden went on a 14-month tour of continental Europe during 1846–7. He sought to combine sight-seeing with converting more continental Europeans to the free trade doctrine. As he was exploring the remains of Pompeii during his stop-over in Naples, meeting British archaeologists on the excavation site, he began to wonder: “Will the tourist from ... Michigan be some day amusing himself with digging up antique steam engines at Manchester?”1 After all, the British were leaders in technologies like iron and railways, which were crucial to the ongoing process of industrialization, just as the Romans had been hugely successful in developing and managing infrastructure and military technologies. British fi rms’ technological innovations dominated emerging new markets. Hence, freer trade in Europe and beyond would surely benefi t the dominant industrial power, but why would states or fi rms outside Britain agree to compete on these terms? During his European tour Cobden did not often have time for musing about Manchester’s future as an industrial excavation site, however. After his departure by train from London to Brighton and the boat passage to Dieppe on August 4, 1846, he quickly fi lled his diary, documenting countless meetings with royals, aristocrats,

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professors of political economy, liberal patriots, middle-class industrial entrepreneurs and merchants in port cities. Cobden fi rst traveled from Paris to Bordeaux and Pau, then on to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, and Malaga before stopping at Rome, Naples, Flor- ence, Turin, Milan, and Venice on his way to Vienna. From there he continued to Berlin via Prague and Dresden, and the Prussian cities in the Baltic, Danzig, and Königsberg, to St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Nizhni-Novgorod, before returning through the north German port cities of Lübeck and Hamburg to London, fi nally arriving on October 9, 1847. During this trip Cobden met with the Orléanist king Louis-Philippe and the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In Vienna Count Klemens von Metternich received him as did the Baltic-German Russian foreign minister Count Karl Nesselrode in St. Petersburg. His principal contacts were with bourgeois liberals of one hue or another, however. Cobden lectured at public meetings and attended numerous social gatherings organized in his honor—events widely reported in the regional and national press. Before his departure for London, for example, 700 guests attended a dinner featuring numerous speeches in Hamburg. Few could match Cobden’s enthusiasm in advocating free trade throughout Europe.

Fig. 1.1 Agitating across Europe: During 1846–7 Richard Cobden toured Europe to propagate free trade to foster trade and peace. The leading British Radical politician met with continental monarchs and liberals and gave many public speeches. On his return he promoted the organization of the fi rst world exhibition in London in 1851 as a platform for his political ideas. This engraving shows Cobden at a public meeting held in his honor at Rochdale in England in 1859.

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Cobden was easily one of the best known transnational celebrities of European liberalism.2 By the mid-1840s he had become the most prominent representative of the British Anti-Corn Law League and was widely recognized as the free trade ideology’s most infl uential proponent. In 1846, the British parliament fi nally repealed the Corn Laws of 1815, which had been designed to protect British agriculture from more competitive imports and thus refl ected the landed aristocracy’s economic and political interests. The repeal seemed to pave the way for more investment in industry, more rapid technological progress, and greater socio-economic and political infl u- ence of the industrial middle class. It also heralded a new era of lower food prices and increased living standards for the working class and a further extension of the franchise, fostering democratic participation by adult men. Cobden’s popularity among the industrial middle class, which already had the vote, was so great that he was returned for his parliamentary seat while touring Europe. One year later, moreover, the start of the revolutions in continental Europe coincided with the end of the politically more radical and economically protectionist Chartist working-class movement in Britain. To advocates of free trade this appeared to inaugurate a new era of social harmony in Britain. The term “liberalism” itself had many different culturally- embedded connotations across Europe.3 Many of Cobden’s Span- ish political friends were more enthusiastic about free traders’ anti-aristocratic agitation than about reducing tariff barriers. Italian liberals frequently appeared more driven by their desire to create an Italian nation state than by Cobden’s objectives of free trade and broader political participation. Moreover, when Cobden met John Prince Smith in Berlin in July 1847, the English-born co-founder of the fi rst German free trade association, recently created, he realized how support for this policy in the German lands was strongest by far among merchants in trading cities like Hamburg.4 In contrast, most western and southern German industrialists clung to the ideas of Friedrich List. This political economist had advocated free trade among the German states in the Zollverein (customs union) inspired by the American example and set up in 1834. From List’s perspective, however, high external tariff walls would allow

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technological progress and economic expansion within the Zoll- verein until it would be safe to open it up to more competition.5 Moreover, very few continental European liberals shared the anti- statist thrust of the so-called “Manchester liberalism,” a term that continental Europeans would increasingly use in derogatory terms to describe a form of capitalism that they regarded as concerned only with maximizing profi t.6 Despite these strong regional variations, middle-class liberals across Europe sought to respond to similar mid-century challenges to which British Radicalism was but one answer.7 In continental Europe, one diffi culty was how to break Britain’s dominance as the fi rst industrialized country. This necessitated identifying the best strategy for emerging industries’ development and competitiveness—through a greater or lesser role for the state, through private initiative, for example, or with the help of a more liberal or more protectionist trade policy. All European countries faced two other challenges. The fi rst was to manage the upheaval resulting from rapid industrialization and urbanization and to prevent social unrest and political revolution, without taking (excessive) recourse to older, oppressive methods like censorship and restricting freedom of association. Free trade was one answer. In theory, it would create jobs, and make it possible for everyone to profi t from lower prices, and hence keep the working class content. The second challenge was to defi ne the state’s role in managing industrialization at a time of rapid technological innovation. Liberals mostly argued for a small role for the state. However, local and national governments actually expanded their activities in response to new demands, such as building communication and transport infrastructures and developing public health and housing policies. This expansion of government, and the accompanying uncertain- ties about how to shape this process, created space for a new actor: the expert. His task became to identify and implement policies for stimulating industrialization and to explore, monitor, and fi nd solutions for the problems it caused. Complementing and sometimes competing with other forms of expertise, graduates of traditional and newly-established technical schools captured this space. They made, assessed, and articulated proposals for infrastructure projects and economic, industrial and town planning policies. They often advocated new laws and lobbied for the further expansion of the state bureaucracy. At the same time, private companies became

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interested in their capabilities and hired them for new jobs in industry. In the end, these knowledgeable specialists often worked for state institutions and private companies.8 Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards experts began to add a new layer to the existing international political and economic order—a set of ideas, practices, and institutions which formed the patterns of technocratic internationalism. They collectively created and expanded the knowledge base for their ideas and proposals. From the start experts traveled abroad and read books and articles reporting on experiences with solving technical, economic, and social problems elsewhere. Later on they also sought to enhance their own status and professional identities by developing new disciplines, creating professional organizations, and major Euro- pean and global conferences. Several features of contemporary liberal discourses fed into what we call technocratic internationalism. Thus, liberals broadly agreed on nation- and state-building, the rule of law, and the need for responsive and effective government to legitimize constitutional orders, regulate domestic socio-economic developments, and facilitate international cooperation and peace. They did not see any fundamental opposition between nation state building on the one hand and international cooperation and freer trade on the other. Liberals also shared a general belief in the benefi ts of competition, although not necessarily unchecked economic competition. According to many liberals, this could actually lead to “waste” and adverse economic effects, so that it might have to be regulated to some extent. However, liberals from different backgrounds certainly believed in the free circulation of ideas and open competition for the best modes of governing societies locally, nationally, and transnationally. Moreover, liberals judged that economic activity and political relations within and across borders could and should be governed by rational communication and decision-making. Individuals having relevant knowledge would be able to identify and agree upon solutions to new technological and economic challenges. These solutions would benefi t not just a few, but many, facilitating socio-economic progress, another liberal mantra. Finally, although liberals were divided over the timing and benefi ts of tariff reductions, let alone free trade, they largely

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shared a belief, already advocated during the Enlightenment Fig. 1.2 The World in and most radically espoused by British free traders like Cobden, a Village: The fi rst world exhibition in London in that commerce yielded more than economic benefi ts. Economic 1851 sought to represent exchange had the potential to facilitate mutual understanding the world in the village of and cordial relations not just among individuals, but also among the Crystal Palace. Made nations, contributing to peace and prosperity. entirely of iron and glass, it symbolized modern Alongside these guiding principles of economic and political technology and building liberalism, other ideas and practices also fed into technocratic styles. The European internationalism. This is true of European colonialism, which colonial powers dominated the exhibition. The United required experts to draft and implement strategies for developing Kingdom alone fi lled half and exploiting new colonial territories. Within Europe, it concerned the exhibition space. France (proto-) socialist concepts for modernizing industrialized societies, responded by organizing which would mark different variants of planning in the twentieth the next world exhibition in 1855, creating the century. Furthermore, the evolution of new transnational and most important global partly global communicative spaces (as in the case of the world communication forum of exhibitions in the nineteenth century) greatly facilitated the circu- the nineteenth century. lation of these ideas and practices, along with their infl uence on technocratic internationalism.

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Only four years after Cobden’s return from continental Europe, the guiding principles of free trade, as well as the economic, political, and social challenges associated with industrialization, became temporarily enshrined and debated at the Crystal Palace in London’s Hyde Park during the six months of the fi rst world exhibition.9 In the mid-1840s, the Royal Society of Arts had fi rst considered holding a national exhibition geared towards improving British industrial design. In fact, France and some German states had already organized such industrial exhibitions. But moderate economic modernizers and radical free traders hijacked the idea when the Corn Laws were abolished in 1846. They pushed for an international exposition to represent the entire world on one spectacular site. French parliamentarians discussed the possibility of organizing the fi rst international exhibition during the revolution in 1848. However, domestic protectionist economic interests proved to be extremely well organized and politically effective, so the idea came to nothing. This French failure only strengthened British resolve to hold an international exhibition not least to propagate free trade. When a Royal Commission of 24 members started preparations in 1850, moderate liberal Whigs and free trade Radicals like Cobden almost entirely dominated it. The Commission also included several experts who did not hold political offi ce, such as Philip Pusey, an agricultural expert and cofounder of the Royal Agricultural Society, who had converted to free trade in 1847.10 The international character of the Crystal Palace exhibition marked a paradigm shift. It fostered competition, comparison, and cross-border learning and transfers of technologies and policies (albeit adjusted to domestic traditions and needs). It also had the potential to change the way in which exhibition visitors and those who read about it viewed their countries in contrast, perceived the world outside of Europe and defi ned Europe’s role in it. The 6 million visitors who saw the exhibition were stunned by the unparalleled collection and dense assembly of so much of industrialization’s material culture under one roof. The two sectors discussed more in depth hereafter—railways and steel—took up much space. They were crucial to the exhibition’s huge success

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among businessmen and lay visitors. The Crystal Palace and its Fig. 1.3 Rat Race for successors were not only sites for representing the material culture Progress: The British satirical journal Punch of industrialization; they also created spaces for intense transna- ridiculed the Crystal Palace tional communication. One theme of this communication in the exhibition as the “Great exhibition grounds and via media like (illustrated) newspapers, Derby Race” in an analogy brochures, and books was technological and artistic competition with the famous British horse race. It shows John among companies and nations. This was brilliantly encapsulated in Bull in the lead for England the cartoon published in the satirical magazine Punch, “The Great followed by the French Derby Race for Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-One,” which showed Emperor Napoleon III on John Bull in the lead followed closely by the French Emperor Napo- a stylish horse, and also- rans from the rest of the 11 leon III on a racing horse and also-rans from the rest of the world. world. Such competition The debate exhibitions generated concerning the relative prog- at the world exhibitions ress of nations at least had the potential to destroy old myths and fostered a culture of comparison. This in turn to redirect transnational learning about innovation in technolo- facilitated international gies, production, regulation, and laws. In 1851, for example, due cooperation and transfers of to its weak central government and highly protectionist policies, technologies and rules. the U.S. contribution was not impressive. As a result, many Euro- pean and American observers alike called into question Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1840s prediction about America’s future world

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domination, together with Russia.12 During the exhibition it seemed that Americans excelled only at building guns (the Colt revolver), nearly unbreakable safes to deter bank robbers in the so-called Wild West, and fast yachts that actually outperformed British sail- ing boats in a race across the Atlantic.13 Transnational communication at the Crystal Palace also concerned information exchange and mutual learning about technological innovations. All contemporary accounts of visitors’ behavior in the exhibition demonstrate very clearly that company directors, engineers, and skilled workers spent many hours and sometimes many days in the sections most relevant to their professional expertise and work environments. They frequently talked to, and exchanged ideas with, attendants who worked for the fi rms exhibiting machines and who explained and demonstrated their functioning. Most businessmen combined travel to the Crystal Palace exhibition with visits to companies elsewhere in Britain, to procure information about new technologies, establish business contacts and, at times, hire qualifi ed engineers and workers to manage technology transfer.14 Later on, the transfer of technology was greatly facilitated by nationally- and transnationally-organized associations of engineers, scientists, political economists, and other professionals and by their journals. Even then, however, these organizations often held their international congresses in conjunction with world exhibitions, as this made it easier to attract high-caliber participants who could combine their attendance with one or more visits to the exhibition grounds. In Paris in 1878 the congresses fi rst became integrated into the offi cial exhibition program. The phenomenal rise in the quantity and thematic breadth of the associated or of offi cially recognized congresses becomes clear when comparing the exhibitions that took place in Paris between 1855 and 1900. In 1855, only one congress was held, on statistics. In 1867 there were 14 and in 1878, 32, including international meetings on agriculture, transport modes, and civil engineering including machinery and railways pertaining to both sectors discussed in this book. From 1878 to 1889 the number of congresses more than doubled to 69, and from 1889 to 1900 it almost doubled again to 127. With more than 50 million visitors, Paris in 1900 was also the largest world exhibition ever held. Its congress program included meetings on themes ranging from agriculture, railways, automobiles, and applied mechanics to

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sectors of the second industrial revolution like electricity, chemistry, and pharmaceuticals.15 In this way, the world exhibitions initiated, then regularized, transnational meeting spaces for experts who had previously depended much more on individual study tours and reading.16 The world exhibitions, fi nally, also created a space for the transnational debate over socio-economic and political reforms best suited to accommodate technological innovation and accelerating industrialization. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, many exhibition congresses, especially those on political economy and education, debated related themes.17 The 1851 London exhibition was still heavily dominated by the free trade paradigm. Many engineers, political economists, and others from Britain and abroad contributed to this debate. Those advocating freer trade, if not necessarily free trade, frequently used the Crystal Palace exhibition and British technological superiority as powerful arguments in domestic political confl icts over trade liberalization as in France.18 Thus, infl uential political economists like Adolphe-Jérôme Blanqui and engineers like Michel Chevalier went to London for several weeks during the summer of 1851. Then and afterward they published articles and books about the lessons that the French state and companies should learn from the world exhibitions. They also became heavily involved in the French campaign for the abolition of import prohibitions and for the lowering of tariffs.19 In these different ways, the Crystal Palace and later exhibitions refl ected the core ideas outlined above, which united most liberals. To some extent their appeal reached beyond liberalism as a fragmented political movement. They emphasized support for competition, at least for the best ideas and innovations; the belief in rationality as guiding technological and socio-economic progress and facilitating transnational learning and transfers; and the hope that commerce, as trade in goods and ideas, could foster prosperity and guarantee peaceful relations among people, nations, and states. These propositions became crucial for technocratic internationalism, too, but it was attached less to free trade than to international cooperation. After all, the Crystal Palace exhibition also embodied and promoted the power of association—as a means to organize capitalism and promote socio-economic development as much more than the growth of the gross domestic product. The 1851 exhibition was the fi rst major intercultural meeting place dedicated

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to industry and technology. It greatly facilitated the formation of cross-border networks and personal links, including those between Cobden and Chevalier, who had fi rst met in the 1840s.

Transforming the World through Association

Whereas Cobden was a British Radical who experienced business failure personally in 1846, Chevalier was the archetypical proponent and activist of technocratic internationalism. He expressed and formulated ideas that became the bread and butter for experts working in voluntary transnational and international organizations created in the second half of the nineteenth century. Experts in these organizations developed a collective ethos that valued particular technocratic ways of doing things. Many expressed ideas similar to Chevalier’s and, in some important cases, even directly inspired by him. Chevalier was educated in the French elite system of the Grandes Écoles. Especially early in his career his preferences were largely shaped by Saint-Simonism, a French tradition which also had substantial appeal among engineers and other experts beyond France. Even where technocratic internationalist practices had other origins, many of Chevalier’s ideas and preferences were nevertheless typical of the responses by engineers and others to the challenges of industrialization and political upheaval in the mid- nineteenth century. Chevalier entered the École Polytechnique in 1823, graduated top of his class, and then moved to the École des Mines in 1826.20 At the end of the 1820s, fi ve years after Saint-Simon’s death in 1825, Chevalier increasingly became engaged in the Saint-Simonian movement. It shaped the world views of many young men like Chevalier, who would become infl uential as builders of railways, canals and other public works, editors of newspapers, and founders of banks.21 They were not only active in France, but also across borders. Their thinking and actions were fueled by their belief in the power of material bonds among people and in desiring that experts play crucial roles in decision-making. Saint-Simonism was an eclectic movement. Economic and practical concerns co-existed with more religious and proto-socialist ideas.22 Saint-Simonists advocated what they called industrialism.

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They shared with the varieties of liberalism an opposition to the old order and a belief in the importance of liberty and freedom of self-expression. For this reason they were sometimes categorized as liberals at the time.23 Yet, they criticized the British Radical liberal laissez-faire approach which they believed would ultimately harm workers. Saint-Simonists argued that competition needed to be regulated to prevent egoism and waste, especially of resources and energy. They preferred what they called association over competition. Association referred to companies and organizations of industry and workers as well as infrastructures, networks among people, and trading relationships. Saint-Simonists not only pushed for such forms as a way to boost industrialization, production, and productivity. They also perceived association as a method that could foster peace among social classes. Association created interdependencies, nurturing a new social morality less geared towards individual gain. Liberty without association would only create anarchy and revolution, liberty with association would yield stability and order. For Chevalier and other Saint-Simonists, economic growth was not an end in itself. They believed that it should improve the lot of the workers and the poor, and they held that workers and capitalists had a shared interest in industrial development. Both belonged to the industrial class (les industrieux). They were the people in society who were productive, unlike the idle clergy, soldiers, and aristocrats who did not produce anything useful and lived off the work of others. Although Saint-Simonists often stressed workers’ rights, their tone was paternalistic as they preached the importance of order and authority. Like British Radicals, Saint-Simonists did not see a need for big government let alone government ownership of industry. Yet they were more positive about the role of the state. They argued that it could act as a catalyst for association and industrial development, but only if it was run by industrialists and their scientifi c policy advisors like the elite polytechniciens. In fact, they invented the notion of the technocrat whose calling was to apply objective expert knowledge to social problems. Prosper Enfantin, a leading Saint-Simonist, argued that “the École Polytechnique [is] to be the channel through which our ideas will fl ow.”24 Based on their view of the benefi cial role of experts in decision-making, Saint-Simonists defi ned politics as the science of production. For Chevalier the

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state’s role was crucial for improving a nation’s economic performance. In consequence, he campaigned vigorously for the French state to take a leading role in railway development. From the start, many Saint-Simonian projects were internationally oriented. Even smaller local projects were often seen as elements within larger designs. In 1844, for example, when a group of

Fig. 1.4 Railways fostering Sociability: Michel Chevalier and many other experts promoted material networks as a tool for overcoming tensions among social classes and nations. As early as 1832 Chevalier proposed the creation of a Mediterranean railway system. His ambition was embraced by French politicians and experts who continued to discuss it during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1906, the opening of the Simplon tunnel connecting Switzerland and Italy, which until 1982 was the longest railway tunnel in the world, appeared to make such a Mediterranean zone a reality. This poster hides the background to the Simplon tunnel’s construction: severe French competition with Germany for traffi c and infl uence.

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investors dominated by Saint-Simonists were planning the Paris– Lyon railway, they contacted Enfantin, who had just returned from a failed attempt to build a canal at Suez, Egypt. They asked him to serve as company director of this French line, which they promoted as a crucial link between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterra- nean.25 In fact, Chevalier had proposed such a plan in 1832 already, in his Système de la Méditérranée, which fi rst had appeared in the journal Le Globe and afterwards in a compilation of articles.26 In Système de la Méditérranée Chevalier discussed the connection between the individual and society in a way that would become an important tenet of technocratic internationalism. In this view, large-scale network projects fostered social organization and individual sociability. The lack of both caused confl icts among classes and nations. In this view, human progress required a physical transformation of the world which would change the psychology and behavior of individuals.27 Chevalier frequently used metaphors comparing infrastructure networks to the human body and its system of veins and arteries.28 The circulation of people, capital, and goods would contribute to the health of the social body. In the early 1830s Chevalier sailed to the U.S. to discover the secret of its apparent economic dynamism. He believed that America embodied the future. Hence, Europe should learn from it, in particular regarding infrastructure projects such as railways. However, Europe should not simply imitate the U.S., but remain true to its own traditions. Individual countries like France should use their established institutions for developing and implementing new projects.29 While Tocqueville, in his book published in the previous year, failed to pay much attention to the material dimensions of American society, Chevalier put them at the center, focusing especially on the role of infrastructures, industry, and banking.30 After his return, Chevalier continued to publish and to promote railway construction and public works. In 1840 he was appointed to the Chair of Political Economy at the Collège de France. He also traveled widely across Europe and acted as an advisor, for example, for the south-western German state of Württemberg, on whether to promote railway or canal building.31 During the Revolution of 1848 he warned against the danger—as he saw it—of popular radicalism creating an opposition between workers and capitalists, when both should collaborate for the common good. Tocqueville saw the election of Louis-Napoleon to the presidency as a choice

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for tyranny and concluded that liberty was lost. In contrast, Cheva- lier supported the new president, who would soon crown himself Emperor of France. In fact, he became his main economic advisor as conseiller d’état. In this position he promoted plans for a railway line connecting Calais to Marseille, the Simplon tunnel through the Alps to Italy, the Suez and Panama canals, a rail connection under the Channel between France and England, for which he created a company, and a trans-Saharan railway. Together with Cobden, he also negotiated the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1860.32 Chevalier and the Saint-Simonists developed a very specifi c technocratic way of thinking. They propagandized a key role for experts in the development of large-scale infrastructure projects and close collaboration with state institutions that expanded their remit and developed public utilities.33 Moreover, their ideas for modernizing, industrializing societies also infl uenced debates about transforming existing education systems away from traditional classical instruction towards greater emphasis on technical knowledge and skills at every level. All three fi elds— infrastructure, public utilities, and education—were of course crucial to the processes of nation state formation and national integration in post-1850 Europe. Moreover, infrastructure projects like Chevalier’s Mediterranean railway system were often drawn up and implemented to integrate Europe’s emerging colonial empires. The technocratic approach to modernization, therefore, was closely connected to both national integration and colonial expansion. However, advocates of technocratic internationalism like Chevalier saw no contradiction between national integration and transnational cooperation on a continental scale, which appeared to be mutually reinforcing processes. We will discuss the transnational voluntary Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Verein), its origins, expansion and working patterns, in chapter 4. Many organizations followed in industry, transport, communication, agriculture, public health, and improving social conditions. Transnational organizations such as the Verein grew at a much faster pace than international ones. By 1914, 466 transnational organizations existed against 37 international ones.34 All became homes for a new breed of experts who never formulated an explicit and coherent ideology about how to build international relations, but did develop a specifi c working method and quite stable practices for making rules for Europe

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Fig. 1.5 Building in the Underworld: Saint- Simonists like Michel Chevalier advocated large partly publicly fi nanced building works from railway networks to city infrastructures. In a period of rapid urbanization one key challenge was to improve the sanitary and health situation in the growing cities across Europe. This woodcut illustrates the sewage system in subterranean Berlin. The capital of the newly- formed German Reich grew from 172,000 inhabitants at the start of the nineteenth century to roughly 2 million by 1900.

and the world. By 1900 experts frequently referred to two global international organizations as models of effective cross-border cooperation and regulation: the International Telegraph Union (Telegraph Union) and the Universal Postal Union (Postal Union). Both showed that it was possible to create strong organizations with real powers and effective technocratic internationalist working practices in sectors characterized by strong national rivalries.35

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By the 1850s, networks of telegraph wires were beginning to cover England, France, the German lands, and the eastern part of the U.S., and they soon expanded all over Europe and the world. Within fi fty years, the globe was largely wired up. Back in the 1850s, tele- grams could not yet cross borders by wire, however. Clerks liter- ally carried them from one country to another. This process was cumbersome and often also required the message’s translation—a serious potential source of misunderstandings and friction. All such border crossings had to be arranged by bilateral diplomatic treaties, moreover. These problems were most tedious in the fragmented German lands. In 1850, Austria and several German states therefore created an organization, the Austro-German Tele- graph Union, which required its members to link their wires into a network. Soon there were calls to expand this organization. In 1855, Belgium, France, Sardinia, Spain, and Switzerland created the West European Telegraph Union. These two unions organized joint conferences in order to develop common rules. In 1864, the French government sent invitations to attend a conference in Paris designed to achieve more complete uniformity in the international telegraph system. Twenty states sent delegates to the gathering, which started on March 1, 1865.36 The meeting served at the same time as a diplomatic congress and a conference of experts. After the opening ceremonies, the experts convened sixteen meetings during six weeks. Their work resulted in the agreement which established the Telegraph Union. The convention was signed by the diplomats and its two annexes by the experts. These supplements were a technical rule book consisting of a table for uniform rates and a set of regulations, the Règlement de service international, for standardizing the sending, receiving, and signaling technology, telegram forms, codes, language, and services provided to customers.37 Diplomatic oversight still remained strong at the founding conference, but during the following decade, experts gained much independence. For the fourth conference in St. Petersburg in the early summer of 1875, the Telegraph Union’s Bureau prepared a new simplifi ed convention to replace the existing one and to avoid the need for frequent revisions. The new convention contained only 23 articles. From then

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on, the vast majority of issues could be managed through changing Fig. 1.6 Family the rate table and the telegraph regulations in the two annexes—a Photograph: New cross-border challenges of process managed entirely by experts. Diplomats were not called organizing standards and upon at all except for revising the simplifi ed convention, but even rules for communication this did not actually happen until 1932. led to the creation of the International Telegraph The Telegraph Union functioned well despite the fact that Union in Paris in governments saw telegraphy as a vital instrument of power almost 1865. Legally it was an immediately after its invention. They thought that telegraph international convention networks would help connect and integrate people and institutions among states. However, communication experts within their state and provide information about developments actually discussed and elsewhere. Telegraphy also promised to create substantial revenue, decided changes in the because businesses were so eager to use it. Moreover, govern- rate table and telegraph ments soon realized that timely access to crucial information could regulations defi ned in annexes to the convention. greatly contribute to victory or defeat in war. As a result, they were In 1865, the organizers took keen to control communication fl ows within their states and across this photo of the telegraph borders. experts, a practice that became part and parcel of the Whereas private companies built and operated the fi rst rail- rituals of other transnational ways almost everywhere, telegraphy was different. In continental and international Europe the telegraph service became a national competence early organizations, too. on. The government in London nationalized the British networks

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in 1868 and it tightly controlled the few private companies that managed its very large transnational colonial network. While the U.S. government never actually nationalized telegraphy, it did keep the telegraph companies under strict supervision. As colonial competition increased towards the end of the nineteenth century, telegraphy became intertwined with growing global rivalries and tensions proved more diffi cult to diffuse.38 At fi rst sight, therefore, it seems surprising that the Telegraph Union could become a model for technocratic internationalist practices. Its establishment and subsequent operation served the interests of its member states, which largely depended on each other for the cross-border connectivity of the emerging network—an important factor in any such cooperation, whether in an international organization or among companies in transnational voluntary organizations.39 While such mutual interests were a necessary precondition for cooperation, they alone did not (and do not) account for the success of any particular organization and the broad mandate that many of them acquired. In the nineteenth century, governments wanted to connect their networks, but they disagreed and competed over how best to do this. Setting specifi c rules and standards could easily prove a constant bone of contention. Moreover, the governments’ general preferences do not explain the comprehensive and long-term delegation of transnational management to experts—here in the telegraphy network. How then can we understand the far-reaching delegation of power to experts? Experts’ strong position actually resulted from the formation, evolution, and institutionalization of their technocratic internationalist working practices, which continued to shape many transnational and international organizations during the twentieth century. These practices operated through a set of formal and informal rules that guided the experts’ behavior and defi ned normative expectations about their relations with diplomats and politicians. These rules generated a certain degree of autonomy and created meaning, values, and a specifi c language that legitimized experts’ strong role. How then were these rules implemented in practice? The Telegraph Union was an international organization based on a convention signed by the member states. Experts offi cially represented the member state governments and always came from the national telegraph administrations. They did not meet between conferences. As a result they could only do their work with the

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help of the Telegraph Union’s Bureau, which was headed by a permanent director who participated in the expert deliberations without having a right to vote. The Swiss government offered to host this bureau. It collected statistics, undertook special studies as directed by the experts at the conferences, produced reports, prepared conferences, informed members and non-members of the results of various activities, and it published a journal. The bureau sometimes also infl uenced policy issues more directly. For example, it drew up the draft convention for the St. Petersburg conference in 1875, which gave experts a much larger mandate.40 The Telegraph Union’s formal intergovernmental institutional set-up tells us very little about its informal practices, however. It actually functioned like a transnational organization led by experts. It allowed the involvement of experts from companies and of observers from non-participating countries. For example, the conference in London in 1879 comprised 24 countries and 16 private companies, and the conference in Lisbon in 1908, 52 countries and 20 private companies including two from the U.S. While private companies had no voting power, they applied the Telegraph Union’s rule book—voluntarily or on the insistence of the Telegraph Union’s members, who demanded such compliance 41 when private companies wanted to use their networks. Fig. 1.7 Technology Conference procedures rapidly became ritualized: a solemn Uniting People: In 1908, opening was followed by a response from conference participants the International Telegraph Union approved a project and an agreement on the internal procedures. Then the real work to erect a monument in started in expert committees and sub-committees and in the corri- Berne, Switzerland, in dors, salons, and smoking rooms. The closing ceremony provided 1915 to commemorate an occasion for participants to congratulate each other on their the fi ftieth anniversary of its foundation. cooperation and agreements. While new participants attended each The Italian sculptor conference, a core set of experts who had known each other for a Giuseppe Romagnoli long time effectively directed the discussions and decision-making, won the international competition with a and socialized the newcomers into the informal rules. These experts monument that expresses often participated in the organization for ten or fi fteen years, and a central technocratic in some cases even longer. French became the organization’s offi - internationalist idea: cial language, but experts typically spoke several languages. Like “the souls of the peoples are united through the other such groups, telegraph experts formed a transnational expert International Telegraph community. They got to know each other well, developed friendly Union.” The statue’s relations, and often brought their families to the conferences. These central fi gure represents conferences lasted between one and two months. The transna- the ITU whose arms unite surrounding fi gures tional expert community was typically captured in the conference representing broader photograph, another core aspect of the conference rituals.42 themes.

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In the nineteenth century most expert networks included only men. This is especially true of those dominated by engineers. In contrast, as the twentieth century progressed, women found it somewhat easier to break into such transnational expert circles in some sectors of the second industrial revolution like chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and when making rules for Europe in public health and other social domains. Arguably, technocratic internationalism was a male concept in the fi rst place. The heavy emphasis on seeking ideal technical solutions to joint cross-border issues resulting from an enlightened discourse among educated rational experts strongly refl ected dominant gendered concepts of modern society. Expert networks shared prevalent ideas about a division of modern society into the public sphere controlled by men as rational individuals, and the private sphere where emotional women could look after children and family matters. During the twentieth century, however, some women reformers also advocated the use of technocratic and professional expertise and language as a way to be taken seriously and to overcome the prevailing gender bias.43 The collective identity of the male experts in transnational networks was very different from that of diplomats.44 Experts perceived diplomats as people who had no interest in or knowledge of technical issues. They believed that diplomats played political games that produced irrelevant political noise. At base, diplomats were petty nationalists who only sought advantages for the states they represented, with no recognition of other states and their legitimate interests. In contrast, the experts regarded themselves as generous, able to overcome prejudices and capable of seeking consensus through rational communication. For this reason, experts usually preferred a transnational institutional setting and the inclusion of all relevant expertise. They believed that they had a natural inclination and ability to bring people together through building material links. These links would bring not only economic prosperity, but also peace to the nations of the world. In the case of telegraphy, the free circulation of information, with a right for each individual to use international telegraphy (as stipulated in the Telegraph Union’s convention), would complement free trade.45 The Telegraph Union could use simple majority voting. Colonial powers had more votes than other states as they controlled those

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of their colonial administrations. This was not diffi cult for experts to accept, however, because in their view the discussions should be based on arguments and lead to a consensus without the actual use of voting. Moreover, their decisions did not formally bind the member states. Each country could reject a decision even if it was signed by the national expert delegation, but it had to make a formal statement to that effect. The use of such an opt-out was very limited, however.46 The experts who came to the meetings agreed to arrange compliance themselves, as they were actually responsible for implementing their own rules and standards at the national level. The member state governments perceived the Telegraph Union’s work as a success that was refl ected in the huge increase in cross-border telegraph traffi c with ensuing sizeable revenue growth.47 This made it easy for governments to accept that the experts effectively devised the standards for international telegraphy networking and traffi c. The Telegraph Union also inspired the establishment of the Postal Union in 1874. Its member states formed a single large postal territory with guaranteed freedom of postal transit. The rates were fi xed and could not be changed by individual states on their own. In the case of the loss of a letter or parcel, legal responsibilities were clearly defi ned, as were standards for the weight and size of letters and parcels, services, and express deliveries. The Postal Union also settled accounts through a central clearing house. Finally, it organized arbitration in the case of disputes between national postal administrations. As in telegraphy, the Postal Union was based on a convention and had a separate set of postal regulations negotiated by experts. It organized expert conferences assisted by its Bureau in Berne. In the Postal Union, however, each expert had one vote, whether he represented a larger or smaller country. Decisions could be taken by majority vote. They were only de facto binding, not de jure. Much of the work was done by committees created at the fi rst meeting of delegates, and it was customary to allow the experts from larger countries to sit on the most important committees. In each committee, seeking compromise was the norm, embedded in the same consensus culture that also characterized other international and transnational voluntary organizations. The Postal Union grew rapidly to represent almost all the countries in the world, including the U.S. Like their counterparts in the Telegraph

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Union, the postal experts felt that they were custodians of a new international order.48 They did not perceive this new order as a political project, but rather as a “bond between the peoples of the world.”49 The experts in the Telegraph Union and the Postal Union, as in other organizations, found it unproblematic that the international machinery was functionally highly fragmented and consisted of many different organizations dealing with different sectors and issues. Each organization had its own spatial scope, too. This scope was not simply determined by the set of signatories. Companies and countries which did not join, or could not join, nevertheless applied some or all of the rules. This meant that the spatial reach was often fl uid and lacked sharp geographical boundaries.50 The resulting technological zone could be pan-continental European, extending from the Netherlands to Russia, as in the case of the nineteenth-century railways covered in chapter 4, or continental West European, as in the case of steel cartels discussed in chapter 6. But the zone could also extend outside Europe and be more global, as was the case for telegraphy and post. In particular, telegraphy became an important tool for empire building. The U.S. Fig. 1.8 a-b Hidden Integration of Europe: and Canada did not participate formally in the Telegraph Union, The International although they often sent observers. But even in global organiza- Telegraph Union produced tions such as the Telegraph Union and the Postal Union, European many maps of the experts dominated the working practices and decision-making. telegraphy cable system. This one dates from Whatever the organization’s spatial scope, therefore, the experts’ 1906. These maps refl ect Eurocentric experiences and defi nitions of cross-border problems the ITU’s hierarchical largely framed its work. understanding of the technological divisions of the world. Their main distinction was between a European regime and an Fragility of the International Machinery extra-European regime. During the nineteenth century experts did not Transnational and international organizations created in the nine- explicitly use networks teenth century were to some extent a function of the rise of the for integrating Europe. Implicitly, however, they modern state. They helped to fi nd responses to the challenges of saw Europe as the key industrialization and what might be called a fi rst phase of global- reference point for the rest ization during which international trade grew faster than gross of the world.

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domestic production. Their conferences and meetings allowed governments to explore and articulate interests that they usually defi ned as “national.” At the same time, they provided platforms for negotiating cross-border issues outside regular diplomatic channels—negotiations that were often left to experts in the respective sectors, who could come from companies, academia, or governments and their agencies. The infl uence of most organizations ultimately did not reside in their formal competences or any ability to overrule the policies and preferences of companies or governments. Moreover, the fi nancial resources of these organizations were small. Ultimately, their recommendations could be wholly dismissed. Peer pressure was one factor which enhanced the organizations’ cohesion, stability, and effectiveness. Nonetheless, their main asset was the voluntary work of experts. They not only invested much time and energy in developing recommendations and regulations, but they were also able to negotiate at national, transnational, and international levels, and to mediate between these levels. The new international machinery that experts had helped to create and run to seek functionally-adequate solutions for cross-border, technology-related issues in individual sectors inspired many liberals, socialists, and pacifi sts. For them, this nascent internationalism was proof that a new transnational and international society was emerging. In their different world views with varying political objectives, they believed that governance of this new transnational and international society had started in specifi c sectors, but that it would soon have to be expanded to create a more comprehensive institutional settlement for cross-border relations. Not only was the international machinery fragile, however, as it ultimately depended on the peaceful cooperation of states and governments; the role of experts was equally fragile and had to be negotiated from scratch for every new organization. The race for colonies and the growing great power frictions in Europe and beyond around the turn of the century made it increasingly diffi - cult for experts to carve out large spaces for themselves, however. Especially where the economic interests of politically infl uential social groups in national societies were affected, national governments increasingly sought to impose greater control over such

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organizations. At the start of the next chapter, this becomes clear in the case of the International Institute of Agriculture created in Rome in 1905. Nevertheless, as we demonstrate, its technocratic internationalist practices largely persisted after the First World War, when they also became embedded in the new technical work of the League of Nations, the fi rst international organization with a far broader political and economic scope crossing the boundaries of many different technological and economic sectors and issues.

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On a Sunday morning in October 1904, David Lubin, a fruit and wheat farmer from California, had a conversation with Italy’s King Vittorio Emanuele III at his summer residence near Pisa.1 Lubin spoke to the King for forty-fi ve minutes, setting out his idea to create a global chamber of agriculture. Five months later, in June 1905, a convention creating the International Institute of Agricul- ture (IIA) was signed in Rome, for which the Italian king provided a royal villa and the revenues of two of his estates. Lubin believed that establishing this organization was the best answer to recurring agricultural crises. He argued in a paper he left with the King that “the present efforts of agriculture are inadequate to meet the infl u- ences of the concentrated capital and energy of the cities. The cities with their syndicates, corporations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce, unions, and federations, are solidarity personifi ed; whereas the heterogeneous agricultural associations are feeble, inadequate, and ineffi cient.”2 Although he was also a successful industrial businessman, Lubin was unable to make his own farms durably profi table.3 He began to search for solutions not just for his farms, but for the entire agricultural sector, which had experienced a deep crisis in the late nineteenth century. Lubin decided to abandon

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his business life and to focus on solving the agricultural sector’s problems. Although lacking formal training, he became an expert on international agricultural issues. From 1896 he toured Europe to discuss agricultural issues with government offi cials, farmers, and experts. Lubin found that the Europeans blamed American competition for overproduction and falling prices. They called for protectionism, just as many American farmers did. Lubin did not believe in protectionism, but he argued against what he called excessive competition. In his view, transnationally-operating industries and transport companies were reaping the benefi ts of agricultural production without leaving enough profi t for the farmers who often had to sell below the cost of production. Market prices in turn were often the result of speculation by a few dealers who had information about world crop yields and livestock conditions and used it to become rich. European and American farmers faced the same problem, namely lack of access to reliable information, which an organization like the IIA might well address.

Reconciling the Worlds of Diplomats & Experts

Lubin had arrived in Rome after failed attempts to get the U.S., Brit- ish, and French governments to promote his ideas. Vienna, Buda- pest, and Berlin were also on his list if the Italians failed to react positively. Lubin’s interlocutors perceived him as a stereotypical American, in his habits and his use of direct and simple language. He also only spoke English. As a result, his visit to France had been a complete disaster.4 Arranged through the American Embassy, his fi rst contact in Italy with the Italian minister of agriculture did not go well either. The minister dismissed him as an American crank. Hence he desperately needed an interpreter and local supporter with the right kind of connections. He found an excellent colleague in Olivia Rossetti Agresti.5 She was born in London, where she became a noted anarchist and organized a salon. Her marriage to an Italian journalist had brought her to Rome. Agresti became Lubin’s personal assistant, arranged all his appointments, and also fi ercely supported his ideas.6 Without her Lubin would never have succeeded.

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A number of Italian experts and government offi cials now ne-fi tuned Lubin’s ideas to the Italian and European contexts, and created a network for him. He met Luigi Luzzatti, a well-known economist and banker and at that time, treasury minister, who had a keen interest in agriculture. Infl uenced by Saint-Simonian ideas, Luzzatti had founded Italy’s system of cooperative credit banks. He wanted to create a transnational institution to organize credit. Luzzatti arranged the meeting with the King and afterwards put together a team of people who helped Lubin elaborate his ideas. They included Maffeo Pantaleoni, a professor of political economy in Rome, and Giovanni Montemartini, a leading economist and social reformer deeply interested in statistics. This small group of experts, which Lubin called his “Committee of Pioneers,” elaborated and extended his agenda.7 They argued that the farmers formed the backbone of the nation and state. Yet they were politically and economically oppressed and exploited by other classes. In line with Lubin, the “pioneers” did not favor state intervention in general, but argued that in this case its involvement was justifi ed: the task of protecting agriculture had a public welfare character. They also moved beyond Lubin’s original idea. The “pioneers” wanted to turn the future chamber into a recognized global center for studying and advising on agricultural and economic questions. It should collect reliable data on acreages sown, crop conditions, harvest yields, livestock, and prices of agricultural products in order to achieve what the “pioneers” called a rational distribution of agricultural production. In addition, the organization should promote joint transnational and international action for controlling diseases of plants and animals, for international re-insurance of agricultural risks, for regulating border crossing forests and watersheds and the migration of farm labor, and for diffusing new inventions that could boost land fertility and cut production costs. Finally, they suggested that the chamber might even supervise and regulate trade in order to prevent speculation. Italy was actually well positioned to lead in creating such an international body. While agriculture was vitally important for Italy, governments and farm organizations from other countries did not perceive it as a country with vested interests, since it was neither a major agricultural importer nor a prominent exporter.8 More- over, the King was also the best person to support the proposal.

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Other monarchs had already acted as benefactors of international Fig. 2.1 Power of initiatives. Thus, the Tsar of Russia had supported the Peace confer- Information: The International Institute ences in The Hague, the German emperor had promoted conferences of Agriculture was based on labor and social insurance issues, and Belgium’s King Leopold II on the idea that lack of had supported conferences on standardizing trade statistics.9 comprehensive and timely In fact, Lubin had adopted his idea to create an international information made farmers vulnerable to speculation chamber from other advocates, and it had an appeal far beyond by traders. They had access Italy. The German agricultural expert Max Seering, professor of to such information about political economy at the University of Berlin, had fi rst suggested world crop yields, prices, 10 and livestock conditions, the idea to him during Lubin’s 1896 tour of Europe. In the same and allegedly used it to year, the Hungarian minister of agriculture invited Lubin to attend become rich at the expense the International Agricultural Congress organized in Budapest, to of farmers. With the help of talk about the causes of and remedies for the agricultural crisis. the statistical information collated in the institute’s In his lecture he argued for what he called cooperation, a prefer- calculation rooms shown ence which for him was also rooted in his religious convictions.11 in this photo, farmers As became clear at the conference, his speech fi tted into a wider would be able to outwit discussion among farmers and agricultural experts on how to speculators. Many expert- led organizations have 12 address the crisis. been based on the idea that Rural producers and analysts had exchanged information on the information and knowledge latest technological developments and discussed socio-economic translates into power, so that they have often become and political issues as early as 1848 when they had met in Brussels, reliable sources for statistics. and at several world exhibitions thereafter. In 1899, during a Paris

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conference, the delegates established the Commission Internationale d’Agriculture (CIA), not only for organizing conferences on a regular basis, but also to infl uence government policies.13 Its conferences attracted agricultural scientists, economists, independent farmers, and government offi cials. The CIA’s work fueled a rich debate and knowledge exchange on agricultural issues, including those touched upon in the Luzzatti report. As a result, several experts and farmers’ organizations had already argued for the creation of a new organization when the Italian government decided to issue an invitation for a conference with a set of diplomatic instructions in 1905.14 The Italian invitation used a well-established technocratic internationalist language which was widespread in other transnational and international organizations. It stressed in particular that the future institute would be “absolutely a-political in its aims.”15 Lubin could not take part in the conference as an offi cial U.S. representative because the American administration had not supported his original proposal.16 Luzzatti, Pantaleoni, and Montemartini participated as members of the Italian delegation, however. The conference opened on May 28 and ended on June 7, 1905. It brought together 113 delegates from forty-one countries. Most delegations were headed by a diplomat from the embassy in Rome, but several also included representatives of national farmers’ organizations, university-based agricultural experts, and individual farmers who served as experts.17 As the organizers had expected, two issues proved controversial: fi rst, the mandate of the new international organization; and second, the role of governments and farmers’ organizations in running it. The Italian government proposed four functions: fi rst, collecting and publishing data on agricultural production, labor conditions, and plant and animal diseases; second, facilitating the international organization of rural cooperatives, insurance, and credit; third, developing proposals either on its own initiative or by invitation of member state governments, for international measures to protect agricultural production (taking into consideration work done by the CIA); and fourth, assuming other international functions that were at the time undertaken by agricultural associations independent of governments.18 The French and British did not agree with this broad defi nition of functions. The French came up with their own proposal which

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basically limited the organization’s functions to the collection of data, the comparative study of economic and technical questions, and resolutions of an “undisputable general character.” The Brit- ish representative also advocated an information gathering role only and no decision-making functions.19 Neither nation wanted to support creating an international institute that would pressure them to adopt particular policies at the national level.20 In the discussion all parties quickly agreed that the organization should not touch upon politically-sensitive issues such as tariffs and the migration of farm labor. The delegates translated this agreement into article 9 of the draft treaty, which stated that: “All questions concerning economic interests, the legislation, and the administration of a particular nation shall be excluded from the consideration of the institute.”21 Even if these issues were off the table, there was still a gap between the Italian and French proposals. Luzzatti argued that the institute should go beyond information gathering and take practical actions. The institute should also serve as an international federation of agricultural cooperatives, and organize insurance, credit, and collaboration among farmers across borders. Due to French and British resistance, however, the IIA could gather information on these topics, but not undertake any activities.22 After considering functions, the conference delegates discussed who should control the institute. During their preparations, the “pioneers” had suggested shared control by governments and agricultural organizations—a concept refl ected in the instructions sent to diplomats who had to prepare the conference for their governments.23 The Italian delegation argued that such collaboration was highly desirable. But governments, not the farmers’ organizations, should decide who would represent member states.24 The Ital- ians tabled this proposal to avoid French opposition, as they had discovered beforehand that the French were keen on government control.25 In contrast, the Austrian, Belgian, German, Hungarian, and Spanish delegations had planned to create an effective farmer- controlled body in which governments would be consulted but would not have any decision-making powers.26 When it became clear that government control was the lowest common denomina- tor, several representatives of farmers’ organizations threatened to withdraw from the conference, but diplomats from their countries stopped them.27 As the Italian organizers were mainly interested

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in getting the institute off the ground, the French delegation essentially got its way over the institutional set-up as well as in fashioning the functions of the new organization, which was now formally baptized the IIA.28 The Italian “pioneers” and the farmers’ organizations were disappointed by the outcome. According to Pantaleoni, the result was a “wretched creature with one eye, a lack of features, one ear, minus a hand, etc.” It was not what they had hoped for. “France swayed England and the rest, leaving Germany, Austria and Hungary alone.” If he were to be invited to attend the Assembly, he would decline since “I will not again be overruled by a majority such as was the case in the Conference.”29 The farmers now saw the IIA as a lost cause and considered creating their own transnational organization. According to Giovanni Raineri, who became the president of the Federation of Italian Agrarian Cooperatives and was elected to the Italian parliament in 1905, the cause of “International Green is not a mere idea or dream of sociologists and poets.” It would proceed, but not through an institution controlled by governments.30 Lubin, however, disagreed strongly with this view. What he considered the IIA’s main function was now in place: providing information that would help farmers and their organizations to plan their sowing and breeding, and thus would stabilize prices. The information would be published by “an organization representing all nations, which would be received as authoritative by all the world.”31 His hope and expectation was that the IIA would become a deliberative consultative body in permanent session, representing the voice of farmers.32 He lobbied governments and leaders of farmers’ organizations alike to convince them of the IIA’s importance. Thus, in a letter to a Hungarian farmers’ association he argued: It is true that the Conference narrowed the outline of the work of the Institute, but it is not true that the Institute must, therefore, work on those narrow lines for all time to come! The farmers of the world; the changing conditions the International Institute of Agriculture will bring about; all these will tend toward necessary modifi cations of the original outline, and to much better advantage than if more radical lines had been agreed upon at the outset.33 By 1908 the convention setting up the IIA was ratifi ed by forty states and by 1915, fi fty-fi ve, including almost all of Europe,

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Fig. 2.2 Celebrating International Cooperation: When the American David Lubin arrived in Rome to sell his idea of creating a global chamber of agriculture he was fi rst seen as a crook. Soon, however, his conviction that farmers needed to unite and work with experts to boost their power in the market-place received wide support. Crucially important was the help of the journalist Olivia Rossetti Agresti. She established contacts with the Italian King and a group of high-level politicians and experts. They managed to establish the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome. During the interwar years the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini backed the institute’s work and decided in 1936 to commemorate Lubin. This photo shows the vice- governor of Rome giving the memorial address for the dedication to Lubin of one alley in the Villa Borghese, where the institute had its seat.

the U.S., almost all of South America, Egypt, Persia, Japan, and Australia.34 In 1905 the Italian government had created a Royal Commission to secure these ratifi cations, provide a suitable building, and prepare a working program for the institute, including defi ning procedures for the two IIA bodies, the General Assembly and its executive, the Permanent Committee.35 To Lubin’s chagrin, it took the Royal Commission a very long time to conclude its mission. By 1907, it felt forced to explain the delay.36 In an article

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in the Corriere della Sera, the Royal Commission argued that it had to invent a completely-new diplomatic procedure which combined diplomatic and technical administrative functions. None of the existing organizations had a Permanent Commit- tee consisting (mainly) of diplomats who actually resided at the seat of the organization and, at the same time, had to work on technical issues. The Royal Commission fi nally fi nished its work and submitted the results to a fi rst preliminary session of the Permanent Commit- tee, held on May 23, 1908. This committee dismissed the proposal for its procedures, and developed a new one. One major criticism was that the Royal Commission’s proposal did not actually contain a procedure for collecting statistical information, which was, after all, the key task of the institute.37 Thus, the IIA’s origins and early years illustrate two important points that also proved relevant to other transnational and international organizations, especially after the First World War. On the one hand, the story of the IIA refl ects the growing hopes among experts and interest groups—in this case farmers’ associations— that new organizations like the IIA could help address major socio-economic, as well as technological, cross-border challenges. Here for the fi rst time the focus shifted towards larger socio- economic development issues. The activists pushing to create the IIA regarded farmers’ welfare as crucial, not just for the political stability of states, but also for the international order. This rationale created a trajectory for the League of Nations, where technical and socio-economic issues increasingly became merged in the work of some of its specialized agencies. On the other hand the IIA’s origins also demonstrate the fragility of experts’ positions within the new international machinery at the start of the twentieth century. In the IIA attempts by farm interest groups to capture the new organization and use it as an instrument to lobby national governments for greater support and protectionism induced some governments to impose greater state control than in other organizations like the Telegraph Union and the Postal Union. In fact, the French and British governments initially did not see any need for a new organization and only agreed to the IIA’s formation on the strict condition that its institutions would be state- controlled and its functions narrowly confi ned to the gathering and sharing of information.

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At the same time, however, many governments did not want to exclude themselves or the farmers in their countries from the new organization. Hence, as the Royal Commission recognized, the IIA somehow had to reconcile the world of diplomats and the world of experts. This tension was especially pronounced in an organization like the IIA which was not limited to technology regulation with a shared interest among participating governments in facilitating information fl ows and increasing revenue, as with the Telegraph and Postal Unions; but which instead touched upon very politically-sensitive issues of trade policy and domestic redistribution among different socio-economic groups—in this case industry and consumers on one side and agriculture, independent farmers and farm workers on the other.

Towards Postwar Reconstruction

Despite growing international tensions among the Great Powers and their confl icts over colonial expansion in the early twentieth century, the continued growth of the international machinery appeared to herald a new age of cooperation, prosperity, and peace for Europe. This is what the English journalist William T. Stead sought, as he strongly supported the pacifi st cause and advocated adoption of the artifi cially-created language Esperanto as a unifying world language. In the autumn of 1898, Stead undertook a journey across Europe to learn whether the upcoming Peace Conference in The Hague stood any chance of success. In rapid succession he visited London, Brussels, Berlin, Moscow, Yalta, Constantinople, Sofi a, Budapest, Vienna, Rome, and Berne.38 He traveled on the Orient Express run by the international railway company Wagons- Lits, and testifi ed to the ease, comfort, and speed of travel. In his articles, Stead expressed the hope that the European states would be ready to unite in a kind of union comparable to the U.S. in order to escape the “blighting curse of the armed peace.” Stead was optimistic because the countries he passed through were not at war, and permission to cross borders was easy to obtain. He noted with satisfaction that “for travelling purposes Europe is already a commonwealth.”39 He also referred to several international organizations that embodied and worked towards

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some form of unifi cation including the Telegraph and Postal Unions and the Berne Convention on International Traffi c of Goods by Rail. That Stead understood Europe as more than a geographical space is especially remarkable for the time. After all, many of the organizations he listed had global ambitions and in several cases only de facto concentrated their work on Europe. They were not yet perceived more widely as vehicles for European unifi cation. Promoters of internationalism like Stead hoped that the continued evolution and expansion of the international machinery would help manage tensions and channel the energies of nations and the resources of states into enhancing cross-border cooperation for their mutual benefi t. This approach was frequently shaped by a latently-determinist technological way of thinking. Its main tenet was that the creation of material and economic links and of networks among people and countries would transform them and their relationships across borders. For one, as Chevalier had argued, the experience of traveling and trading changed the perception of distance and allowed individuals to feel more at ease in intercultural encounters. At the same time, networks created economic interdependencies, rationalized production, and trade, and thus facilitated economic growth, prosperity, and social well- being. A typical expression of such thinking was Norman Angell’s book The Great Illusion, published in 1909. It immediately ran through several editions and was translated into many languages. Angell attempted to demonstrate that the economic and fi nancial interdependence among nations would make war unprofi table and hence less likely.40 This type of determinism drew on the idea of the benefi cial effects of connections via all kinds of infrastructures. Businessmen and experts from agriculture and the steel sector, for example, also believed that cross-border agreements on price levels or the formation of cartels to divide markets could have similarly benefi cial effects on relations among people and states.41 When the First World War started in August 1914, the international machinery was disturbed, but the technocratic internationalist discourse on the integrative effects and peace-creating functions of transnational networks continued to thrive during and after the war. In one sense the war did mark a watershed, however. It radically called into question the future of European civilization, encouraging a new discourse on how to restore its economic and

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political power. This in turn allowed technocratic internationalists to acquire for the fi rst time an explicitly-European agenda.42 During the Versailles Treaty negotiations many experts like as Louis Loucheur, Osborne Mance, Arthur Salter, and Albert Thomas, who became infl uential during the interwar period, served as members of national delegations. They were disappointed by the outcome, and complained about the prevalence of hate and revenge, embodied in the desire for reparations at the expense of future prosperity and peace in Europe. They considered the negotiations a missed opportunity, as experts were not granted the autonomy they sought in the creation of international agreements—not even in sectors and on issues which they had regulated on the Allied side during the First World War.43 The technocratic belief in the power of transnational and international organizations for creating peace was strikingly apparent among experts from the newly-formed states in East-Central Europe after the First World War. Many of them, especially from Czechoslovakia and Poland, were vigorous members in various organizations. Naturally, their activism often aimed to legitimize the new states and to facilitate the transfer of knowledge needed to build their institutions and infrastructures. Their efforts were also grounded in technocratic internationalism, however.44 In 1921, for example, the Czech civil engineer Stanislav Špaček, together with some colleagues, started lobbying to establish a world federation of engineers. Such an organization would facilitate sharing technological knowledge and put engineers in a position to govern international economic relations to secure the peace. Špaček argued that “the engineers of the world should take a leading role in the world’s reconstruction, which cannot be accomplished solely by the men in political life. To be effective, the engineers of the various countries should be brought into relationships through an international association of engineers.”45 When the plan for a world federation broke down, Špaček succeeded in bringing the First International Scientifi c Manage- ment Conference to Prague instead. This conference inspired an international scientifi c management movement which would have a major presence at the 1927 World Economic Conference organized by the League.

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In 1919, when John Maynard Keynes, the British economist and fi nancial representative for the Treasury at the Versailles Peace Conference, published his infl uential book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, his views were still fi rmly embedded in the liberal belief that more international commerce resulted in less international confl ict.46 For Keynes, a stable peace depended on the reconstruction of the European economic system in which Germany had to play a key role. His book attacked the Versailles Peace Treaty for focusing excessively on political objectives, when the real issues were of a fi nancial and economic nature. He wanted to recreate an international environment in which trade could fl ourish. Yet Keynes also concluded that markets and trade had to be embedded in organized international cooperation—a judgement that marked a paradigm shift in thinking about European and global economic issues.47 Keynes favored using the new League of Nations for this purpose. The Allies created the new organization after the First World War on the initiative of the American President Woodrow Wilson. As Congress never ratifi ed the treaty, however, the U.S. did not become a member, which limited the League’s global scope and made it de facto more European in its organization, outlook, and working practices. For the fi rst time, a new international organization was no longer designed to address a set of specifi c issues or to coordinate cross-border cooperation in one sector only. Instead, it had a far larger charge: to address the political as well as the economic issues of postwar reconstruction. Initially, it also had the ambition to integrate many of the existing specialized organizations and their activities into its remit. This, however, provoked fi erce resistance on the part of some of them (like the IIA) which argued that they were already dealing effectively with relevant issues in their areas. Thus, the creation of the League as a horizontal organization covering many different sectors and problems, together with emergent tensions with the existing specialized organizations, created a pattern of cooperation and confl ict in the international machinery which actually persisted through and after the Second World War. Alongside internationalist beliefs and a strengthened pacifi sm as a result of the war experience, the League had two other main origins. One was the development of international law, especially

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the institutionalization and practice of arbitration. The other was the search for a more regularized form of cooperation among states. Thus cooperation with conferences on political, security, and economic issues would no longer effectively be limited to the great powers, like the informal concert of powers had been in the nineteenth century, but also would give a voice to small and medium-sized countries in Europe and beyond.

Commissariat or Foreign Offi ce Domination?

Towards the end of the First World War, various schemes for a global organization derived from the widespread feeling of “never again.” Politicians, civil servants, and intellectuals in France, England and the U.S., in particular, developed concrete plans for a League of Nations. One of the most infl uential British plans was largely based on ideas put forward by Leonard Woolf, one of the founders of the League of Nations Society in Britain.48 In his report International Government, Woolf discussed the settlement of disputes through regular conferences among the major powers, and arbitration. He promoted joint action on the model of the Postal Union.49 The basic idea was to extend its working method, and that of other technocratic internationalist organizations, to new sectors and issues. Woolf argued that governments, companies, scientists, and others had already created an international machinery that constituted the beginnings of international government.50 The League should build on these nineteenth-century foundations. A plan drafted by General Jan Smuts, the South African member of the British War Cabinet from 1917 and delegate to the Peace Conference, integrated several elements from different plans for a global organization.51 Just like Woolf, Smuts argued that the future League should be entrusted with the management of transnational commercial, industrial, and labor relations.52 He envisaged that the promotion of international cooperation, peace, and security through conferences and arbitration would be at the heart of the future League. In his view, the new organization should not only build on existing sector organizations, but also on the Allied experience of jointly managing war supply, which he was very familiar with from his War Cabinet work.

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Fig. 2.3 Technical Cooperation in War: During the First World War Allied forces develop new and direct forms of collaboration among experts to manage supplies of grain, coal, and many other products both for military and civilian purposes. This photo shows food supplies being unloaded for subsequent delivery to the Western Front in 1916. Allocating shipping space became one of the key tasks of the so-called Shipping Commissariat created in 1917. Participating in its work turned out to be an important experience for young policy entrepreneurs like Arthur Salter and Jean Monnet who became architects of new forms of international The complex logistics of war supply had induced close inter- collaboration after 1918. national cooperation among the U.S., Britain, France, and Italy.53 The lessons they drew During the war, the Allies developed a number of joint commit- from Allied war-time tees for particular commodities. By November 1918, 20 commit- cooperation became a 54 major plank of the League tees, or boards, were in place. The combination of the need of Nations’ program for to transport troops and military equipment and the effects of international cooperation. German submarine warfare meant that the main bottleneck was shipping space. Hence, the key controlling body was the Allied Maritime Transport Council which brought together national ministers. It had the power to provide or withhold shipping space. The main work was not done by the Council, however, but by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. It consisted of four national expert delegations welded into one body through daily contact in London. These experts worked in the same building, Lancaster House, where Arthur Salter coordinated their work. Other members included Jean Monnet and Bernardo Attolico. All three became infl uential League offi cials. Towards the end of the war, the Shipping Commissariat, as it became known informally, controlled 90 percent of the world’s sea-going tonnage.55 Its nickname was an ironic wordplay conjuring up parallels with the

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new Soviet commissariats, but it also refl ected the organization’s strong planning powers. The British War Cabinet discussed possibly using this war supply machinery for economic reconstruction. In fact, the British Foreign Offi ce proposed to its Allies that the entire Allied organization should be maintained after the war, and national controls strengthened. The Foreign Offi ce argued that this extension of war-time cooperation was “the inevitable corollary of the whole idea of a League of Nations as it is beginning to take form both in the United States and in this country.”56 The proposal was discussed with the governments of France, Italy, and the U.S. The fi rst two agreed, but the Americans fl atly refused. In fact, the State Department interpreted the proposal as an attempt by the British and French to control American resources after the war.57 Although the war-time international machinery was dismantled as a consequence, it had a major impact. Salter wrote an extensive report on how to organize an international government, which was translated into a concrete proposal for the League’s operating methods.58 The experience of war supply management became one of the central planks of the League’s international cooperation. League offi cials and promoters referred to this type of work as technical cooperation. It included issues such as cross-border economic and fi nancial matters, transport and communications, and social and health problems. By the late 1930s, more than one half of the League’s budget went to such technical efforts.59 Salter later claimed in his memoirs that the Shipping Commis- sariat’s working methods had been unprecedented; that they had a profound infl uence upon the League, and that they were eventually also adopted by the Allies during the Second World War. In his words, “a new instrument of Allied administration was created, tested and proved effective in operation.”60 So what made the Shipping Commissariat’s working methods so special? Salter argued that by bringing together offi cials from ministries with responsibility for a particular policy area or sector instead of diplomats from the foreign ministries, the Commissariat enabled effective international action without calling into question the formal authority of national governments.61 Ministry offi cials had expert knowledge combined with executive authority and credibility in their own countries. This in turn allowed them to implement international agreements via their national ministries.

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In Salter’s experience, that the Shipping Commissariat formally only had advisory functions was irrelevant. The nature of its work, and its working methods, blurred the boundaries between advisory and executive roles. Crucially, experts worked closely together, got to know each other well, and developed mutual trust. This made it possible to discuss policy issues openly at an early stage and to arrive at common solutions before diverging interests became fi xed and embedded at the national level and impossible to reconcile. According to Salter, “the new Allied principle did not override or replace the national organizations—it penetrated them.”62 Salter believed that the Shipping Commissariat’s methods diverged signifi cantly from those of nineteenth-century international organizations. The states provided those organizations with authority, but only over a limited set of issues. Moreover, their authority was fragile and could be withdrawn by the member- states at any time. As a result, in Salter’s view, they were either limited to coordinating scientifi c research and statistics (like the IIA) or focused (like the Danube Commission or the Postal Union) on specifi c issues in one economic sector only. In contrast, the Shipping Commissariat changed the scale and the character of international cooperation. As Salter put it, “It extended to the most vital interests of several countries [and] it involved the most drastic executive action through national departments coordinated by international bodies.”63 Salter certainly overstated the novelty of the Shipping Commis- sariat’s working methods. As we have shown, expert committees in many nineteenth-century organizations operated in similar ways by creating lasting informal networks among individuals— including experts from national ministries—who could act at both national and international levels; and some, like the Postal Union, could produce effectively-binding decisions. The main difference was that these experts did not meet on a daily basis, working in the same building in the extraordinary conditions of a major war. Thus, the Shipping Commissariat should really be seen as a variant of technocratic internationalism, one with more explicit emphasis on involving top civil servants from national ministries, with responsibility for particular sectors or policy fi elds rather than diplomats; an approach that would also inform “core Europe” integration after the Second World War. Salter’s approach, too, was based on

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the idea that experts would mediate and overcome tensions among states, come up with workable solutions and hence, establish de facto international government. The various plans and wartime experiences (including Salter’s) fed into the Peace Conference, which began in January 1919, when a committee was established to draft the treaty and to defi ne the functions of the future League of Nations. Following proposals by Smuts and others, the promotion of international cooperation became a central plank in its mission. Article 23 of the Covenant, the League’s charter, proclaimed the member states’ intention to manage international labor relations, address social problems such as the illegal traffi cking of women, children, and drugs, prevent the spread of diseases, and to secure freedom of communication and transit. Article 24 demanded the integration of existing agencies with responsibilities in these policy fi elds into the League.64 As soon as the Covenant was drafted, the Allies began a search for a secretary-general, eventually settling on the British career diplomat Eric Drummond.65 He immediately commenced organizing the secretariat with the aim of creating “a truly international secretariat, whose members ... must divest themselves of national preconceptions and devote themselves wholeheartedly to the service of the League.”66 He consulted Salter, Monnet, and others.67 Salter argued against the tentative Covenant structure which provided for the chan- neling of information via the foreign ministries rather than direct contacts with other national ministries with expert competence. He agreed with Drummond’s proposal to set up an international League secretariat and civil service, but pleaded that it be staffed with offi cials and experts having close contacts to national governments and an in-depth understanding of national politics. Monnet, who later became the League’s deputy secretary-general, sided with Salter. Based on these deliberations, Drummond eventually submitted a proposal to the Organization Committee, composed of representatives of the future member states, which incorporated many elements of the Shipping Commissariat model. The Organization Committee rejected it, however, arguing that it would undermine control by national foreign ministries. The controversial debate subsequently led to a compromise formula which allowed direct

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contact between the League secretariat and offi cials in national ministries, but under overall national government control. Drum- mond, Monnet, Salter, and others in the League secretariat believed that this provisional compromise solution was workable. It was discussed again by the British and French governments in the autumn, however, and rejected. They insisted that direct contact would be barred and all communication would have to be chan- neled via the League offi ces to be created in national cabinet offi ces. In practice, however, this rigid structure was not actually applied to much of the technical work of the League.68

Transit: Model for the League?

Once set up, the League of Nations was initially able to address several highly-contentious issues quite successfully, such as the economic stabilization of Austria. Regrettably, its political arbitration work satisfi ed nationalists nowhere, from the partition of Upper Silesia to the future of Trieste and the Dalmatian coast. The vanquished were not represented in the League until Germany was permitted to join in 1925. Still, the victors’ war aims were also not fully realized by the settlement and the League’s arbitration work. In Italy this fueled the rise of nationalism and helped pave the way for the fascist usurpation and consolidation of power between 1922 and 1925. The League’s ambitions to contribute to economic reconstruction and a lasting fi nancial settlement, too, were only partly successful. During the period of détente from 1925 to 1929 some progress was made. Thus, the League organized the fi rst World Economic Conference in May 1927 to enhance international cooperation on economic and fi nancial issues, with a view to improving the international management of markets and trade. At the conference delegates advocated rationalization, scientifi c management, and planning, which included the idea of an organized distribution of work among states. Scientifi c management was seen no longer only as a means to optimize fi rm-level behavior; rather, it became a strategy to organize relationships among economic sectors and states through means such as cartels.69 Indeed, the Young Plan of 1929 temporarily appeared to provide a long-term solution to the

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issue of German reparations. Soon, however, the rise of fascism, Fig. 2.4 Technocratic National Socialism, and totalitarian regimes in Europe fatally Working Method: undermined the League’s initiatives geared towards political The League of Nations established several technical reconciliation and the economic coordination of reconstruction. agencies. One of them In the shadow of these highly-controversial issues, however, the was the Organization League also sought to advance technical cooperation in Europe for Communication and Transit which the League and beyond. During the summer and autumn of 1919, its newly- Secretariat saw as a model established Secretariat worked to create technical agencies that for other technical agencies. would deal with the issues noted in Article 23. The Secretariat’s It was run by experts ambition was to make these agencies autonomous from the Coun- who were leading offi cials from transport ministries, cil and model them on Salter’s principles. Each agency would have railway companies, and its own conference, executive council, secretariat, and director. The other transport-related League would in fact become a web of smaller Leagues. In addition agencies. They saw to the newly-created International Labour Organisation the Secre- themselves as technicians able to synchronize national tariat made concrete plans for communication, transit and health. decision-making with In contrast, deployment of agencies to deal with fi nancial and agreements they themselves economic issues lagged behind because the Allied powers initially had negotiated at the international level. This did not want the League to meddle in reparations and war debt. photo shows one of their The Secretariat’s efforts eventually led to the establishment of a meetings.

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number of permanent advisory committees, such as the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the Committee for the Protection of Children and Young Persons, and agencies such as the Organiza- tion for Communications and Transit, the Economic and Financial Organization, and the Health Organization under the League’s roof.70 Salter headed the League Secretariat’s Economic and Finan- cial Section from 1920 to 1931, which also coordinated the World Economic Conference. Analyzing the Organization for Communication and Transit— also referred to as the Transit Organization—can help to explore the role of experts in these technical agencies and their working practices. The League Secretariat saw this unit as a model for other functional agencies.71 It argued that the Transit Organization worked smoothly as a kind of small League.72 What kind of model was it, and was it as successful as the Secretariat claimed? The Peace Conference had already established a separate committee on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways (also called the Paris Commission), which included not only technical experts, but also a few diplomats and international lawyers. This Commission wanted not only to prepare the treaty clauses on transport and communication, but also to develop general principles for free transit and the internationalization of transport in the service of a new world order. After the treaty was signed, the Paris Commission decided to continue its work on general principles and to prepare a proposal for a permanent organization for communication and transit which would supervise their implementation. In their eyes, this process should lead to a revision of the Versailles Treaty which appeared incomplete and unjust to Germany, which had been compelled to give up control over its transport tariffs. The Paris Commission members preferred to negotiate a general regime which would be free from what they perceived as power politics and economic bargaining.73 From the start, the nature of the future Transit Organization was discussed between the Paris Commission and the League Council and Secretariat. In this process, Robert Haas acted as a mediator. Although a French philosopher, not a transport expert, Haas had served as assistant secretary-general to the Paris Commission at the Peace Conference, which had given him an intimate knowledge of the issues at stake. He had also made a positive impression on experts in the Paris Commission. Haas joined the League Secretariat

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in November 1919, working as its lead offi cial with responsibility for the coordination of transport policy until his death in 1935.74 Trusted by transport experts and League offi cials alike, he had to dissipate tensions between them. One bone of contention was the Shipping Commissariat model Haas embraced.75 The members of the Paris Commission were cautious about it, fearing the “central- izing tendencies and the political infi ltration which began to manifest themselves in the reactions of the Council to the work of the Paris Commission.”76 They wanted their negotiations to be separated from the bargaining inherent in trade ... as well as from the intrigues and unprincipled compromise of diplomacy; they should be kept immune from political agitation. ... Communications should be viewed as “outside the game” ... and should therefore be dealt with only on the technical merits of the case and in conformity with a growing body of international rules.77 Due to its emphasis on contacts and negotiations among high-level national government offi cials, the Shipping Commissariat model could lead to what transport experts perceived as politicization. Thus, while the League Secretariat wanted to privilege Council members in the workings of the Transit Organization, the Paris Commission preferred to involve individuals with expert knowledge as well as countries from outside the League (like Germany). The Commission also felt that large and small states should have an equal say on transport issues.78 Nonetheless, there was a broad basis for agreement between the League Secretariat and the Paris Commission. After all, both institutions emphasized the importance of relying on experts, and preferred informal discussions not controlled by national foreign ministries. Thus, the League Secretariat eventually accepted the Paris Commission’s argument heralding the proposed Permanent Transit Committee “as an independent instrument of conciliation of undoubted competence which ... would ... in most cases succeed in quickly settling technical disputes in their early stages, before they had time to develop or react on political differences capable of disturbing the peace of the world.”79 In the end, and despite diverging preferences, the structure and working methods of the Transit Organization broadly fi tted the nineteenth-century technocratic internationalist perspective of

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transport experts and the views on functional agencies that the League Secretariat developed in the autumn of 1919.80 Each side downplayed the tensions between both variants to foster their shared interest in establishing an autonomous transit organization. The transport experts and the Secretariat offi cials thus could present the Transit Organization as the perfect embodiment of their vision of how to collaborate internationally. The experts had to accept that their work formally came under the control of the Council and the Assembly. However, they felt comfortable with this solution since this control was limited to verifying whether the proposals were compatible with the principles and the spirit of the Covenant. Moreover, the Transit Organization would be run by its own Advi- sory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. The majority of this committee’s members were leading offi cials from national transport ministries, representatives of state railways, river commissioners, transport engineers, railway inspectors, and directors of railways and of port authorities.81 The Committee saw itself as a “council of enlightened personalities, capable of taking the initiative and responsibility for any measures.”82 They viewed themselves as technical, non-political delegates who did not represent the interests of their governments, but at the same time were in a position to infl uence national decision-making.83 The Transit Committee did not want to restrict its membership to national representatives only. It wanted input from other international organizations and private experts. Therefore, it mainly worked through its temporary and permanent sub-committees (for railways, waterways, roads, etc.). These sub-committees were even less dominated by government experts, since they could invite anyone with relevant expertise from private businesses and international organizations to their meetings.84 Within the League, the Transit Organization enjoyed a very positive press in its fi rst years.85 It was praised for the creation of a set of general conventions that stated the principles for free transit and the international use of railways, rivers, and ports; electricity and hydropower, and for border crossing of motor vehicles.86 These were negotiated at conferences held in Barcelona in 1921 and in Geneva in 1923, with forty-four states participating, including Germany in a consultative capacity. The Transit Organization also convened two conferences on passports, in 1920 and 1926.87 Their

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Fig. 2.5 Signposting Europe: The development of new European signs for road transport was one successful initiative of the League of Nations’ Organization for Communication and Transit. On the left is the adopted standard prohibition sign, in the middle a Dutch proposal, and on the right a German proposal with a giant arrow to attract the drivers’ attention.

recommendations contributed signifi cantly to a greater ease and freedom of travel in the 1920s by introducing a standard passport, through railway tickets, and the reduction of fees for passports and visas. The Transit Organization also handled various disputes between countries about travel on rivers such as the Danube. It mediated the break-up of railways in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it supported the postwar reconstruction in the newly- established or re-established countries of East-Central Europe through technical assistance missions, such as one to Poland on the regularization of the river Vistula. Yet some of the transport experts, in particular in the railway sector, soon became less positive about the opportunities for collaboration in the League. They felt that the continental European railways had already reached a perfect system of internationalism before the First World War through the work of several international organizations such as the Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Verein), the Unité Technique, and the Central Offi ce for International Railway Transport. In their view, the key task was to make further progress on this basis, something they proposed at the 1921 Barcelona conference. Other participants, for example from India, Brazil, and South Africa, did not want to be forced into adopting a European set of standards that did not fi t their own transport situations. They

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criticized the proposals for their European focus and called the Tran- sit Organization a “European Committee.” The European members, in turn, did not want to give up their standards for what they saw as diluted global ones. They spoke of a “rigid universalism” pursued by the League as a formally-global organization. For this reason, it was not possible to achieve an agreement in 1921. The League had to call a second conference for 1923. The outcome was a set of fairly general rules. According to the European railway companies and government offi cials, these rules were neither harmful nor helpful. As a result, they no longer worked through the League for the development of new standards and regulations. Instead, they used their nineteenth-century institutions and created a new organization to coordinate their work.88 In the spring of 1922 the Allies and representatives of Germany and the Soviet Union met at the Genoa conference to discuss implementation of the Versailles Treaty and to identify ways to boost economic reconstruction. Initially, the League was not invited to participate. The conference created a separate transport commission which adopted a proposal submitted by the German delegation to re-establish a European railway system such as the one that had existed before the war. The purpose was not only to prevent the League from assuming control over railway traffi c, but also to revive the former railway regime dominated by the German- anchored Verein. To ensure French collaboration the German delegation suggested Paris as the new organization’s administrative center, as Berlin seemed to be out of the question so soon after the war. Another practical reason for proposing Paris was that the new organization should be of a non-political character, which would be easier to accomplish in France where the railways were still private. At Genoa, the French Railway Administration was asked to organize a later meeting of all European railways to discuss the restoration of European railway traffi c. The conference took place in summer 1922 and led to the foundation of the Union International des Chemins de fer (UIC). From then on, the League was no longer a signifi cant player in developing European railways and railway policies. The UIC only asked it to examine the progress made in the restoration of cross-border railway traffi c. Haas noted sarcastically that, in reality, this meant that the League was “not expected to do anything.”89 Thus, the League’s Transit Organization never actually became the central platform for negotiating a transport regime for

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Europe.90 The League Secretariat concluded that it should not try to formally absorb existing organizations, but instead should work with them. In sectors without existing organizations, the Transit Organization could have greater impact, however. This was the case for road transport, where the League’s Road Committee actually became a focal point for fashioning a new international regime.91

Technocratic Methods for Totalitarian Dictatorships

Thus, in the 1920s the League played a signifi cant role in establishing new cross-border regimes in Europe. In the 1930s, however, the combined effects of the Depression, the failures of its conferences on disarmament and economic and monetary issues in 1932–3, and the withdrawal of Japan and Germany in 1933 threw the League into a deep crisis. The rise of clerical, fascist, and National Social- ist regimes throughout continental Europe also highlighted the ambivalence and pitfalls of the experts’ preference for de-politicizing policy-making. Few of them joined the political movement for technocracy, which was most developed in the U.S. but failed dismally in elections. Many more were attracted to the new right- wing dictatorships for broader ideological reasons; or because they expected them to overcome what they saw as cumbersome decision-making by multiple political parties, parliaments, and state institutions in apparently ineffi cient parliamentary democracies. Thus, many German engineers, for example, shared strong anti-capitalist and nationalist prejudices.92 The initial modernist technocratic streak of several of the new right-wing dictatorships appeared to them to create suitable conditions for implementing technocratic programs and solutions. Moreover, these dictatorships’ frequently grandiose plans for the development of new technologies and domestic civilian and military infrastructures (like the German motorways) or for imperial expansion, created many projects for opportunistic experts. The majority was not interested in exercising power directly; rather, as previously in monarchies or parliamentary democracies, they were keen to secure the largest possible mandate for themselves for implementing their own ideas

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Fig. 2.6 Experts Serving Dictatorships: Many experts collaborated closely with left-wing and right- wing dictatorships. Their technocratic preferences made them believe that they could work on grandiose plans for new technologies and infrastructures without making any political commitment. Other experts served dictatorships with great enthusiasm, however. One of them was Albert Speer, the architect and subsequent organizer of the German war effort. In this photo he discusses his plans with Adolf Hitler.

and plans. Thus, slowly, but surely, “technocratic methods were decoupled from technocratic goals.”93 Technocrats began to serve the new regimes, and in many cases did so with great enthusiasm. After the Second World War many of these experts would claim that they had just done their duty by contributing their specifi c technical expertise, without having had any stake in the political regimes, let alone having facilitated their crimes.94 One of the most

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infamous of these apparently apolitical experts was the architect Albert Speer. He made elaborate plans before and during the war for transforming Berlin into a modern Rome before succeeding Todt, who had been responsible for the German motorway network, as German armaments minister for the last three years of the war. Like many others, he effectively played a key role in war crimes, for example by organizing the use of slave labor in armaments production.95 At the same time, the Soviet Union also accorded engineers and economists a key role in a brutally-implemented forced industrialization. Stalin’s preference for micro-economic forecasting in the centrally-planned economy generated a new type of communist expert.96 Interwar Europe outside of the Soviet Union also saw the origins of macro-economic planning, notably the Polish four year plan for 1936–40—an approach that became more widespread in postwar Western Europe, as was the case with the French modernization program and its so-called indicative planning. The 1930s collapse of the Versailles Treaty system and of the League resulted from the rise of right-wing movements and dictatorships and from intensifi ed ideological and nationalist confronta- tions. They were also the main cause behind the League’s failure to realize any of its larger political ambitions for European unifi cation. This is particularly true of Aristide Briand’s plan for European unifi cation and its study by League committees in the early 1930s.97 Whereas the French foreign minister’s initiative might have had a greater chance of succeeding before the outbreak of the world economic crisis and the rise of the National Socialists in Germany, it was doomed to fail when actually launched in rapidly deteriorating circumstances. Despite the momentous structural changes in the international system, however, debates within the League about its lack of effectiveness concentrated on institutional issues and, in addition, socio- economic challenges.98 While the League proved powerless in the face of ideological and nationalist radicalization, perhaps it could have done more, or could do more in the future, to address such cross-border socio-economic issues and confl icts which may have fueled political radicalization. As the League became relegated to a footnote to the Second World War, the reform debate nevertheless fed into the creation of the United Nations, its Economic and Social Council and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

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As we will next see, through its organization and working methods, the UNECE provided a high degree of continuity from the League’s technical work into the postwar period, embodying the technocratic internationalist approach during the Cold War. In addition, though, more horizontal organizations were formed after 1945, especially the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and the predecessors of the EU in Western Europe and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Eastern Europe. In different ways, these organizations were designed to serve larger political objectives, which resulted in ambiguities in their structures and working patterns that created new tensions in making rules for Europe.

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By the end of 1933, the League of Nations appeared all but doomed. Its World Disarmament Conference, convened in 1932, effectively collapsed with Hitler’s decision to withdraw from the League in October 1933—only six months after the Japanese walkout over the League’s mildly critical discussion of its creation of a puppet state in Manchuria. Even before Hitler came to power in January 1933, however, ever-more-nationalist German governments were no longer prepared to accept French military superiority, enshrined in the Versailles Treaty. The World Financial and Economic Confer- ence, held in London from June 12 to July 27, 1933, also ended in gridlock when the new U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed a possible scheme for global currency stabilization involving the U.S. dollar.1 Leading offi cials in the League’s Economic and Finan- cial Organization (EFO), who had helped prepare the conference, were powerless in the face of the wrangling between governments. Thus, from 1934 onwards, offi cials in the League Secretariat and the EFO began to push for returning to, or applying more strictly, the Shipping Commissariat model.2 In 1935, the League Council appointed a Special Committee under the chairmanship of Bernardo Attolico, with signifi cant input from Arthur Salter, to study the constitution, procedures, and practice of, the technical committees.

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They blamed the failure of the international conferences on the missing direct connection between the League Council and Secre- tariat and national ministries responsible for particular policy areas. The Committee recommended using the Shipping Commissariat model and creating a clearer separation of the League’s political and security-related work from its technical activities. The mounting international crisis during 1938–9 seemed to make these reforms even more urgent.3 Only days before Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, fi ve years of discussion on the reform of the League culminated in the publication of the Bruce Report, named after the Australian High Commissioner in London, Stanley M. Bruce, who had presided over the League Council in 1936.4 Joseph Avenol, the League’s Secretary-General, had decided to support the EFO’s efforts in January 1938, requesting that the Council create an EFO reform committee, which Bruce would chair. In its report, the Committee on the Structure and Functions of the Economic and Financial Organization, as it was offi cially called, proposed the establishment of a Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions to supervise and direct all technical committees. The Bruce Report’s institutional proposal became linked to a new notion of “positive security.” The Committee members were keen to shift the focus away from the traditional and highly-controversial issues of monetary and trade policy, let alone disarmament and military security, and toward transnational socio-economic issues such as nutrition, consumption, and health. From the perspective of Frank Lidgett McDougall from the Australian Commission in London, the new approach to positive security would “assist nations in the solution of national problems by means of an international inquiry followed by a report to Governments containing suggestions and recommendations.” The EFO would act as “a clearing house of information and as a focal point for discussion.”5 The Bruce Report acknowledged, fi rst of all, that as the world was on the brink of another global war, the League could not pretend to coordinate international trade and security. For infl uential League offi cials like Alexander Loveday and Pietro Stoppani, who informally steered the work of the committee, the Bruce Report also pitched the League to the public in democratic states as an organization that could still be useful and deserved to continue. The report constituted a plea to the U.S. administration to support the League as a possible vehicle for globalizing Roosevelt’s New Deal

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Fig. 3.1 The failure and success of the League of Nations: During the 1930s the League was perceived as a failure since it had not been able to prevent war. It became a rewarding target for cartonists. The failure view was shared among League offi cials who began pushing for focusing more on the technical arm of the League and separate it from its political activities. This view infl uenced the debate about the best institutional form for global and European postwar reconstruction. It should be a combination of freer trade and international economic and technical regulation. In short embedded liberalism.

economic and Open Door trade policies. The League, stuttering as it was on the eve of the Second World War, could facilitate the global institutionalization of what much later was termed “embedded liberalism”—the combination of freer trade with international economic regulation and cooperation to enhance social welfare, which shaped future American policy on international organization within the emerging Western world.6

Myrdal’s Postwar pan-Europe

Just like the First World War, the Second did not cause a complete rupture in transnational cooperation among experts or in their

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preferred working methods and patterns. Thus, many experts served governments in exile in coordinating the war effort, preparing national economic reconstruction, and planning postwar reforms of the international machinery. Monnet, for example, who had worked for the Allied Shipping Commissariat during the First World War and for the League of Nations from 1920 to 1923, once more became engaged in synchronizing the Allied war effort. In 1940 he headed the bilateral Franco-British Allied Coordination Committee; and from 1940 to 1943 he was in Washington working for the British government, where he elaborated the Victory Program for converting the American economy to war production.7 Transnational cooperation among experts in particular sectors also continued in occupied continental Europe during the Second World War, however. Railways and steel, for example, were crucial to the Axis powers’ war effort. Hence, unsurprisingly, experts played a key role in the planning, building, and maintenance of infrastructures, in armaments production and in the procurement of food supplies. Most experts came out of the war with the strengthened conviction that the best road to transnational collaboration and peace was once more to focus on specifi c sectors and technical cooperation in rebuilding the international machinery. Those who had played a key role in clerical, fascist, and National Socialist regimes at least used this rhetorical strategy to secure a place for themselves once more in the work of transnational and international organizations. The experts, like the Allied governments, looked to tried solutions and past reform proposals when they designed a new global, postwar organization, the United Nations (UN), created in 1945 with its General Assembly fi rst meeting in London in 1946. Actually, the UN member states adopted the Bruce Report’s recommendation and constructed the Economic and Social Council within the UN framework. It, in turn, oversaw new regional organizations for economic and technical cooperation, including the United Nations Economic Committee for Europe (UNECE).8 This new structure created a kind of multi-level system within the UN. Unlike the interwar League, the UN had a fuller global reach from the beginning, and as the process of decolonization progressed, gradually expanded its membership.9 At the same time, although the Economic and Social Council encouraged cooperation among the regional organizations, each of them had

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exclusive responsibility for a clearly-delineated geographical space. The League had experienced severe tensions in its economic and technical work resulting from its formally-global scope, but de facto European domination. In contrast, with the exception of one U.S. delegate, the UNECE had an exclusive membership from, and competence for, Europe, including the Soviet Union and Turkey. In fact, in February 1946, Jan Stańczyk, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare acting for the Polish government, fi rst proposed in the General Assembly an organization for the “reconstruction of [UN] countries devastated by war.”10 Polish infrastructure and industry had been heavily destroyed by the war. The nation’s borders had effectively moved westward. Moreover, the country was also economically interdependent with Central and Western Europe. As a result, the government in Warsaw was especially keen on such an all-European solution.11 Thus, Jacek Rudziński, the head of the Polish delegation, had clear instructions from his government to push for the creation of a UNECE-type organization. He had spent the war in exile in London and continued to cultivate his contacts in Western Europe, once he became Vice Chairman of the Central Plan- ning Board with responsibility for international economic matters in 1946.12 In 1950, Rudziński began advising Hilary Minc, the President of the revamped State Planning Commission, who played an important role in initiating the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), called Comecon in the West. By the time of the formal Polish proposal, the U.S. administration, drawing on the ideas of embedded liberalism for the international organization of markets and trade, had for some time been debating the best institutional form for the economic reconstruction of Europe. As Walt Rostow, Assistant Chief of the State Department’s German-Austrian Economic Division recalled later, he had concluded at this stage that “the way we were going would result in a split of Germany and Europe rather than unity.”13 Within the State Department, the political section, like the British Foreign Offi ce, began to see such a split as the increasingly-inevitable result of the rising tensions with the Soviet Union. In contrast, those concerned with economic and technical issues of reconstruction believed that due to the strong prewar economic interdependence, the severing of ties along what Winston Churchill fi rst called the “Iron Curtain” in a 1946 speech would complicate economic reconstruction further. As in interwar Europe, this would again lead to

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greater political tensions. Such a split should therefore be avoided, if at all possible. Rostow discussed his support for a pan-European organization under the auspices of the UN with his brother Eugene, a law professor at Yale University, who later joined the UNECE Secretariat, and Monnet, among others, and successfully promoted it within the State Department and the American administration.14 The ensuing intergovernmental negotiations concluded at the end of March 1947, when the UN General Assembly passed resolution 36 IV to create the UNECE. Several factors account for their success. The residual strong support by countries like the U.S., France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for some form of pan- European reconstruction provided a push for the UNECE despite mounting East–West tensions. In fact, Poland and Czechoslovakia already participated in two of three early postwar emergency economic organizations, the European Coal Organization (ECO) and the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO). They also intermittently sent observers to meetings of the third, the

Fig. 3.2 Overcoming Cold War Tensions: Gunnar Myrdal, the man in the picture, led the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe for ten years. He sought to run the place according to technocratic internationalist practices, bypassing diplomatic negotiations as much as possible. He shaped it into an expert-led organization that managed to become an important bridge between East and West during the Cold War. His focus was on building economic and material connections, such as shown on the map that hangs on the wall behind him, in order to overcome political divisions.

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Emergency Economic Committee for Europe. In contrast, the Soviet Union did join ECITO, but not the other two. These emergency organizations, derived from the Allies’ wartime collaboration, were temporary, moreover.15 Thus, ECITO convened in Paris in September 1945 for a period of two years only. It coordinated the exchange of rolling stock which had become dispersed across Europe during the war. By the end of 1946 it was clear, however, that it could hardly accomplish even this task in two years, let alone address other pressing issues of cross-border inland transport.16 Similarly, ECO formally commenced work in January 1946. It developed out of the Solid Fuels Division in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force. After the summer 1944 Normandy invasion, this Division coordinated the distribution of coal supplies in liberated parts of Western Europe. Coal remained a scarce resource for several years, however. At the beginning of January 1948, the newly-created UNECE took over from ECO and proved quite successful in the next two years at coordinating coal distribution, with a view to stabilizing and stimulating European industrial production, especially of steel. The last factor in the successful launch of the UNECE was the December 1946 termination of the United Nations Relief and Reha- bilitation Administration (UNRRA), created in 1943. Its primary task was to deal with displaced persons. However, the U.S. had provided 70 percent of UNRRA’s funding; hence its shut-down left a gap in external aid, providing an additional incentive for closer pan-European collaboration.17 The UNECE consisted of an intergovernmental Commission, which supervised numerous technical committees. Alongside those focused on coal and inland transport, they included committees for steel and agriculture and, among others, statistics.18 Between July 1947 and early 1949, some 650 meetings of these committees and their working groups took place, with some 4,000 experts participating. In January 1948, the Industry and Materials Committee established a sub-group on steel (it later became a separate full committee). The steel experts played an important role in the next eighteen months, facilitating the effi cient allocation of coal, coke, scrap, and iron ore to increase continental production and foster the reconstruction of infrastructures dependent on steel.19 With this structure and its emerging working patterns, the UNECE evolved into a hybrid institutional creature. Led by Gunnar

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Myrdal for the fi rst ten years, the UNECE Secretariat developed a high degree of autonomy. For one thing, Myrdal had a strong positive international reputation and could draw upon an extensive network of contacts developed in the interwar period—both as an economist and a Swedish social democratic politician. He cultivated direct links to national governments, ministries, and individual experts, frequently bypassing diplomatic representations in Geneva, the seat of the UNECE.20 In this way Myrdal sought to run the UNECE’s day-to-day work in line with the Shipping Commissariat model. Moreover, in staffi ng the Secretariat, Myrdal paid little attention to informal national quotas or other typical criteria used by more strictly international organizations run by diplomats. For the UNECE he recruited employees with legal, economic, or technical expertise from a variety of UN member states. They included Eugene Rostow from Yale, and, in the steel division, an expert from the Indian company Tata Steel, which has become a global player more recently. This strategy ensured that the secretariat could develop its own research capacities, strengthening its relative institutional autonomy. At the same time, however, the national governments appointed the members of the UNECE’s technical committees. They could be offi cials from ministries with relevant expertise, but they could (and very often did) come from state-owned or private companies. Crucially, the technical committees met in private, did not produce lengthy documentation, and shunned procedural issues, emphasizing throughout the technocratic character of their work. Of all the horizontal organizations formed after 1945, the UNECE, with its many technical committees with mixed membership, continued long-established working practices of technocratic internationalism. In 1977, looking back upon the UNECE’s fi rst decades, Myrdal captured the working practices in this way: This could be accomplished by stressing the technical, non-political nature and by avoiding all publicity around them. ... The greatest secrecy was kept up: the committees met in private, had no formal rules of procedure, no records were kept except an account of agreements reached between all or a number of states, and no votes were ever taken. The state offi cials acted together with the Secretariat as restricted “clubs”, keeping much independence towards their home governments and anyhow avoiding public interest and debate ...

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All this activity was secret diplomacy, the history of which has not as yet been written.21 In the light of the growing East–West political tensions, the policy of “technifi cation” seemed to be the only way to keep the UNECE going until Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War in 1953. In fact, with the partial exception of Poland (especially concerning the coal issue), Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Soviet Union and the by-now Stalinist satellite governments hardly engaged in the technical committees after 1948. In mid-1950, they temporarily withdrew from them altogether.22 Instead, the Soviet Union utilized the intergovernmental Commission, which met on an annual basis, for launching political attacks on the U.S., starting with its 1947–8 condemnations of the Marshall Plan and of the Western trade embargo policy which commenced on March 1, 1948. Subsequently, the Soviet delegation repeatedly attacked the UNECE’s close informal links with emerging Western organizations for economic integration and its refusal to go beyond informally coopting individual experts from East Germany. While the Soviet Union succeeded in extracting some concessions, such as the use of Russian alongside English and French and the creation of a trade committee, the Western European countries retained a fragile majority in the Commis- sion. Thus, as Myrdal speculated in retrospect, when the UN Economic and Social Council reached unanimous agreement on the establishment of the UNECE and its terms of reference in March 1947, “this may have been the last moment when such a decision could have been taken.”23 In the next ten years, more horizontal organizations formed, but none had the same pan-European spatial reach. This is true of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) created in 1948 and the European Economic Community (EEC) inaugurated in 1957–8, which built on the earlier experience in continental Western Europe of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), created in 1951–2. While the OEEC had a pan-Western European membership, the ECSC/EEC was limited to the continental “core Europe” of six countries: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The CMEA (or Comecon) surfaced in the Soviet bloc in 1949, but was only formalized under international law ten years later. In different ways all these new horizontal organizations pursued political objectives. This resulted in ambiguous institutional

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solutions and mixed working patterns, which incorporated and accommodated some traditions of technocratic internationalism, but also added a new, more political layer to their work.

From Marshall Plan to OEEC

On March 12, 1947 the American President Harry S. Truman asked for funds to provide technical aid, economic support, and weapons to the pro-Western governments in Greece and Turkey. The “Truman doctrine” was amplifi ed by Secretary of State George W. Marshall, who proposed a European Recovery Program (ERP) in a press conference on June 12, 1947.24 This led to the creation of the OEEC in April 1948, headquartered in Paris. Though Marshall’s offer formally addressed all of Europe, the U.S. administration by mid-1947 instead aimed to use its aid to support reconstruction in areas beyond the Soviet Union’s infl uence. It wanted to immunize these countries against communism, both domestically, where communist parties were strong as in France and Italy, and exter- nally, in relation to the Soviet Union and any carrots it might dangle in front of Europeans, such as the prospect of German reunifi cation. The governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia initially expressed an interest. Denouncing the American proposal as imperialistic and claiming that it was dividing Europe into two camps, Stalin however forced them to decline the American invitation.25 The Soviet Union sought to consolidate its control over East- ern Europe, ranging from the non-recognition of the Polish government in exile in 1944 to the imprisonment of Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty in February 1948. While this policy also had a defensive side to it, which needs to be understood against the background of Nazi Germany’s 1941 attack on the Soviet Union, it nevertheless paved the way for the division of Europe. The U.S. administration was not then exclusively preoccupied with containing communism, but aimed to enhance European economic productivity and effi ciency, facilitating economic reconstruction and limiting any long-term fi nancial burden on the U.S. Thus, Soviet and American policies reinforced each other to create pro-Soviet communist-dominated regimes in Eastern Europe and to strengthen Western preferences for the reconstruction of market

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Fig. 3.3 Rebuilding Europe: The Marshall Plan aimed to rebuild the economy in a wide range of European countries. It would strengthen Western preferences for market integration and would even promote some form of federation. Its spatial reach included not only Western European countries but also a range of Southern ones, including Turkey and Greece. Its work should act as a barrier against communism, and therefore it was unacceptable for the Soviet Union that countries which were part of what would become the Soviet bloc would join.

economies within multilateral cooperation structures, or even a federation, in Western Europe.26 Once in operation, the OEECs main responsibility was to distrib- ute about 12.5 billion US dollars in ERP funds in grants, loans, and conditional aid, from 1948 to 1952.27 The ERP funds were to help close the dollar gap in Europe (the lack of hard currency to buy

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essential American goods), which had severely impeded European trade and reconstruction. In fact, the OEEC’s only other substantial policy competence was quantitative restrictions to trade. While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, created in 1946, dealt with tariffs, the OEEC developed a scheme for the progressive reduction and eventual abolition of quotas. By February 1951 OEEC states achieved 75 percent liberalization and abolished all remaining quotas by 1958. Moreover, linked to the OEEC liberalization program was the installation of the European Payments Union in September 1950, a successful scheme for establishing a sustainable multilateral payments system. But how important were the ERP funds for the economic recovery of Western Europe after 1949–50? Arguably, Western European economies had suffi cient capital for reconstruction and mainly needed a stable political and institutional environment for investing it, already created by the 1948 currency reform in Germany’s Western occupation zones.28 The Marshall Plan’s impact on kick- starting the Western European economy was probably as much psychological as it was economic.29 According to some estimates, it did add two percentage points in total to Western European growth in the period from 1948 to 1952.30 In any case, compared to the UNECE, the OEEC’s scope was more narrowly focused on economic and trade issues—something that was also refl ected in the dominant role of the trade committee. Of the two sectors we will discuss in more depth, the OEEC became particularly active in transport policy, convening its own Inland Transport Committee in 1948 and establishing the Conference of European Ministers of Transport in 1953. However, its activities only added to the institutional competition in the fi eld, as the interwar Union International des Chemins de fer (UIC) continued to operate and the UNECE claimed particular competence for cooperation on inland transport across the emerging Cold War divide. The OEEC’s core technology-related work was actually conducted by the European Productivity Agency (EPA), begun in 1953 and operating until 1961.31 The EPA developed out of the Committee for Productivity created in 1949, which soon divided into a Committee for Scientifi c and Technical Matters and a Tech- nical Assistance Group. As a semi-autonomous institution within the OEEC, the EPA actually employed 45 percent of its total staff in 1955. It used limited U.S. funds to foster research and research

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collaboration in Europe, with a view to reducing the productivity gap with the U.S., widely regarded as the most important reason for Western Europe’s high balance of trade defi cit with the U.S. Soon, however, the EPA refocused its activities on facilitating the transfer of American management techniques, which appeared to be an even more important factor behind much higher U.S. productivity at the time. Although the OEEC’s impact beyond the distribution of ERP funds and the liberalization of quotas initially remained limited, the debates over its creation, institutional structures, and larger policy objectives refl ected new tensions surrounding rationales underlying making rules for Europe, which also affected technocratic internationalism. First, the U.S., based on its own experience with a large internal market and with some support within Europe, initially aimed to create a Western European industrial customs union with no internal, and with common external, tariffs. This association would, in theory, generate additional growth and lead to welfare gains for its citizens. Creating such a large internal market would have marked a huge leap. The OEEC and its member states would have become responsible for issues such as tariffs, which had been highly politicized and contentious in the past. At the same time, such horizontal integration of all industrial sectors would have brought with it the need for greater regulation by one overarch- ing organization, something at odds with the established patterns of technocratic internationalism with its many sector-specifi c organizations, which persisted after the Second World War. The U.S. administration, drawing on its federal constitutional structure, also projected hopes for political unity onto its plans for European organization. Articulating such political objectives raised strong opposition, however. Britain and the Scandinavian countries in particular strictly opposed new organizations with independent powers and majority voting, which could curtail national sovereignty traditionally understood as political autonomy from external forces. Ultimately, the British government’s views, which were unchanged from the debate over the creation of the IIA before the First World War, largely prevailed. The OEEC structure with its Council and Executive Committee would be run by ministers and foreign ministry offi cials with strictly consensual decision-making. In fact, the U.S. ambition to impose some kind of federal structure on Western Europe only strengthened British opposition to being

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lumped together with continental Western Europe states, which Fig. 3.4 Reconstructing had succumbed to dictatorships, lost the war or collaborated with and Dividing Europe: In November 1948, a Nazi Germany. As Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin put it during a locomotive crosses the June 24, 1947 meeting with the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for railway over the Corinth Economic Affairs William Clayton, Britain certainly did not want Canal, cleared out, widened 32 and rebuilt thanks to to be treated like “just another European country.” the Marshall Plan and At the committee and working group level, technocratic coopera- its technical assistance tion among experts also took place in the OEEC. The same experts program. This picture not only represents Greek and often worked in committees of various other organizations and European reconstruction, agreed among themselves where to deal with which issues. For but also the newly-created transport, for example, they decided that the OEEC would not be border with Central-Eastern European countries that the main place for negotiation. Similarly, for steel, the OEEC would were incorporated into the never become a key platform. The new divisive debate over the Soviet bloc, while Greece, long-term fi nalité politique, or political objectives of European inte- after a civil war between pro-communist and pro- gration, as it was called, impacted on technocratic internationalism Western parties, joined the in organizations like the OEEC. Before, experts were expected to Western bloc. From the sort out cross-border issues of a technical kind to facilitate the start the Marshall Plan was meant to be an investment movement of goods, people, and technological know-how. Their against communist take- work was to contribute to harmonious international relations in a over.

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general way. Now, however, some governments and social groups began to push for this work to foster some kind of deeper integration, with the long-term prospect of a European federation. As in the League context, many experts did not support using their technical work for such larger political objectives.

Planning in Eastern Europe

At fi rst sight the creation of the OEEC in 1948 also appears to have provoked the formation of the CMEA, which Stalin initiated in 1949 to counter economic cooperation in the Western world. However, in organizing Eastern European cooperation, the Soviet Union began to exclude Western European countries already in 1948, when it revamped the Danube Convention for regulating river traffi c, excluding Austria and the American Occupation Zone in Germany (as well as the Federal Republic after its creation in 1949).33 Moreover, just as elements of the structures and working methods of the UNECE and the OEEC were based on nineteenth century, interwar, and recent Allied wartime experiences in cooperation, those of the CMEA partly had their roots in traditions of economic planning and technocratic policy-making before 1939. In the 1930s, many large-scale industrial and infrastructural projects in East-Central Europe sought to promote economic planning, such as the Central Industrial Region (COP) in Poland. In the Soviet Union, this trend was strongly reinforced by the wartime experiences of the large-scale relocation of industry. For Nikolaj Alek- seevich Voznesensky, who played a key role preparing to launch the CMEA, the war experience was of crucial importance. First having been appointed Head of the State Planning Commission aged 34, in January 1938, he helped organize relocating industrial plants after the German attack in 1941. However, unlike in Western Europe, technocratic internationalist experts in the emerging Soviet bloc usually combined sector and planning expertise with socialist and communist ideological and political party training, plus experiences at national or international levels. Indeed, many East-Central European experts preparing the ground for the CMEA shared a similar background in their education and

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their experiences of planning, of the Soviet Union, and of international cooperation, providing signifi cant continuities from the interwar to the postwar period. Having been born around 1900, these experts belonged to the same generation.34 Most studied abroad in the interwar period—very often in France or in the Soviet Union. The Pole Hilary Minc, for example, studied law and economics in Poland and France. After three years in France, the Hungarian Ernő Gerő went to Moscow in 1928, where he attended the International Lenin School. Moreover, many of the experts had worked in national planning offi ces before the Second World War. Thus, Minc organized a census in Gdynia in 1935 while employed by the central offi ce for statistics. The expansion of the new Baltic seaport and city of Gdynia was part of the four-year plan developed by the economist, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasury Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski. Shortly before the war, Minc became a leading offi cial working for Kwiatkowski. The four-year plan, interrupted by occupation, was continued and expanded in Poland after 1944–5. Most early CMEA participants had experience with international cooperation, chiefl y through socialist and communist movements and parties. Thus, Minc was already a member of the Federation of the Polish Socialist Youth in the interwar period. In 1931, Gerő joined the Executive Committee of the Communist International, or Comintern, the organization founded in 1919 to fi ght to achieve an “international Soviet republic.” Stalin dissolved it in 1943 and replaced it with the Communist Information Bureau, or Comin- form, which existed from 1947 to 1956, the end of the Stalinist period. The Hungarian Gerő also did party work in France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal before taking part in the Spanish Civil War as a Comintern instructor in 1937–8. From 1939 to 1941, he represented the Hungarian Communist Party in the Comintern. In 1938, Rudolf Slánský went into exile in Moscow, where he was joined by many other Central and Eastern European communists. He became a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership. Dobryj Terpieszew served on the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1938. Subsequently, he played a leading role in the communist resistance and 1944 usurpation of power. In another example, Vasile Luca left Romania for the Soviet Union in the 1930s and took up Soviet citizenship. After the war, many of the experts involved in setting up the CMEA published books or articles about economic planning and

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international economic cooperation,35 or were involved in discussions about economic cooperation, as in the case of Voznesensky, Minc, and Slánský and the Bretton Woods negotiations. Several planning experts held key posts at the national level. Thus, Minc was minister for industry during 1944–7 and, from 1947 to 1949, minister for trade and industry. From 1949 to 1954 he chaired the Polish Central Planning Board. Gerő returned to Hungary at the end of the war, where in May 1945 he became minister for trade and transport. He was also a member of the joint Political Committee of the communist and social democratic parties in 1948. At the fi rst congress of the merged Hungarian Workers’ Party, Gerő became a member of its secretariat, and later, at a Central Committee meeting in November 1948, its assistant secretary general. One month later he was appointed fi nance minister and in June 1949, president of the National Economic Council. After his return from Moscow Slánský became secretary general of the Czechoslovak Commu- nist Party and later Deputy Prime Minister. Terpieszew was fi rst appointed to a ministerial post in 1944 and in 1949, became Deputy Prime Minster of Bulgaria. From 1945 to 1950 he headed the State Planning Commission and participated in the fi rst CMEA meeting in this function. Luca, fi nally, returned to Romania with the Soviet troops and became secretary of the Communist Party there, before acting as fi nance minister and deputy prime minister. Towards the end of the war, the Soviet Union and the countries of East-Central Europe were in a far worse position for economic reconstruction than Western Europe. For them late industrialization (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) combined with heavy wartime destruction formed key motives for seeking to participate in programs of mutual economic aid, including those with Western states. Germany as East-Central Europe’s traditional main partner in terms of foreign direct investment and trade would be occupied and its economic and political future was uncertain. Britain and France would be unable to fi ll this void. The Soviet Union would be preoccupied with its own reconstruction. Moreover, pro-Western forces in the governments in exile and in coalition governments, as in Czechoslovakia after 1945, opposed close association with the USSR on political grounds.36 This initially left only the U.S. as a potential provider of assistance for postwar reconstruction. Thus, representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, alongside those from the Soviet Union, were among the 44 national

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Fig. 3.5 Experts put on Trial: The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or Comecon) was not only a response to the Marshall Plan but also based on an interwar tradition of economic planning. Many of the experts involved shared a similar background, belonged to the same generation, and were communists. The goal became to advance the Soviet bloc economic integration and coordinating technological developments. Stalin was not interested, however, in multilateral relationships, he preferred bilateral ones and full Soviet control. Many of these experts governments meeting in Bretton Woods in July 1944 to discuss later became victims of the new international monetary system. At this stage, a battle was the Stalinist show trials. raging within the Soviet Communist Party between the advocates One of them was Rudolf Slánský, here visible at and opponents of Soviet participation. Voznesensky supported center in the picture. Soviet accession to facilitate economic reconstruction, as did Anastas Mikoyan, the trade minister, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the foreign minister.37 In the end, however, Stalin decided against membership in a new monetary system dominated by the U.S. Once Stalin had forced Poland and Czechoslovakia to decline Marshall Plan aid in 1947, the countries of East-Central Europe had to adopt socialist policies of industrialization and collectivization. They also had to replace their Western trade with trade within the emerging Soviet bloc.38 In countries like Czechoslovakia, where the communists gained 31 percent of the vote in the last free elections in 1946, they could also draw on substantial domestic support for changes in the political and economic system.39 The Soviet Union sought to make this switch more attractive with what became known as the Molotov Plan. This scheme led to several bilateral trade treaties between the Soviet Union and the countries of East- Central Europe, which gave them access to Soviet raw materials at preferential rates, for example. However, this form of economic

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integration was also fueled by a widespread fascination with economic planning. In his government role Voznesensky favored the use of macro-economic planning in place of the micro-economic planning of detailed production goals, which had been the norm in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. He allowed market forces to operate in the household sector, for example, alongside minimum rationing at controlled prices.40 Voznesensky sought to apply his economic policy preferences to the integration of the emerging Soviet bloc. The creation of Soviet-owned corporations in East Germany to manufacture goods for Soviet needs was also his idea. His perspective on the future role of German economic production was surprisingly similar to French policy in the early postwar period. The French sought forms of European integration that would allow the political control of Germany and saw its raw materials and industrial production primarily as a potential source of French economic reconstruction and economic dominance.41 Voznesensky’s main goal was to advance the Soviet bloc’s economic integration by coordinating technological developments, defi ning joint technical standards, and integrating CMEA members’ economic plans. Several other key experts who played a crucial role in initiating the CMEA shared his preoccupation with macro-economic planning. Even before the communist coup in Prague in February 1948 these experts intensifi ed their discussions about future cooperation in Eastern Europe.42 Stalin clearly saw this kind of international economic organization as a foreign policy instrument to strengthen Soviet control over East-Central Europe. In contrast, the planning experts were more concerned with technical cooperation and its contribution to reconstruction and industrialization. They wanted to concentrate on two sectors, energy and transport, alongside constructing shared credit and investment facilities. Many of these experts, who in some cases sought to model economic cooperation in East-Central Europe on the examples of the UN or even the OEEC,43 later became victims of Stalinist show-trials. Voznesensky was barred from a January 5, 1949 Moscow meeting which brought together representatives from the planning offi ces or economic and trade ministries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union to discuss the future international economic organization of communist states. Molotov, who led the

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Fig. 3.6 Integrating the Soviet Bloc: Due to their technocratic internationalist beliefs that technology developments promote economic growth and peace, experts could easily relate to the Comecon rhetoric of peaceful work, fraternal mutual aid, and socialist solidarity which is the message of this poster made for the international exhibition of 40 Victorious Years organized in 1985. However, Comecon was controlled by Communist Party leaders, and experts were never able to acquire a large mandate to realize their beliefs. By 1985, it had become very clear that the Comecon had not been able to fulfi ll its coordinating promise.

Soviet delegation, submitted a joint proposal with Romania for such an organization. The participants debated it for two days. The Czechoslovak delegates suggested many changes. Due to the technological leadership role of their industry in East-Central Europe, they were especially opposed to the suggested obligatory sharing

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of patented technologies.44 During January 7–8 a smaller committee consisting of Mikoyan, Minc, and Slánský drafted a resolution to which all participants eventually agreed. Stalin did not participate in person, but he was, of course, consulted. In fact, it appears that he suggested the term CMEA to oppose the OEEC with a communist organization which would provide “mutual” aid.45 Moreover, whereas the East-Central European experts envisioned a more multilateral organization of economic relations, Stalin continued to prefer the bilateral approach, not least because it appeared to promise more Soviet leverage over individual countries in the region.46 On February 10, 1950 the CMEA secretariat began work in the building of Gosplan, the Soviet planning organization in Moscow, drawing upon the CMEA’s technical and administrative services. The secretariat was headed by the Russian Alexander Andreyevich Levrishchev, one of Gosplan’s deputy directors, and initially included one expert for every member state. The set-up was entirely informal, however. At their January 8 meeting the participants had agreed that if no government voiced any concerns in writing within two weeks, their resolution would be published in Pravda, the offi cial organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, marking the birth of the new organization, which duly happened on January 25, 1950.47 At this point, the CMEA’s focus was no longer on expert-led macro-economic planning aiming to reconcile market forces with policies of nationalization and of socialist planning. As a result of Stalin’s preferences and the purges in the East-Central European communist parties, the CMEA comprised a set of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union instead of “the co-ordination of trade and ... of plans of production between all countries of the socialist camp” as Oskar Lange, another economist and later chairman of the Polish Economic Council, had suggested.48 However, Stalin’s death in 1953 and the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 allowed a partial and conditional return to Voznesensky’s model of expert-led cooperation and integration in the CMEA. Rigorously-applied micro-economic planning was evidently one key source of the failure of the new centrally planned East-Central European economies to deliver the goods: reasonably-paid jobs combined with access to essential consumer products. Increasing stipulated work rates to compensate for these failures was one important reason, alongside political oppression,

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for the uprising in Eastern Germany in June 1953, for example. The formal denunciation of Stalinism in 1956 authorized a limited degree of economic liberalization in countries like Poland and Hungary, designed to strengthen private initiative and to facilitate reconstructing foreign trade, especially with Western Europe. Economic liberalization after 1956 in turn created more space again for national-level experts, whose capability was now valued once more as a resource in surmounting the problems of the centrally-planned economies, supplanting concerns for ideological reliability.49 These transformations allowed the CMEA’s institutional structure to expand rapidly, although the member states only formalized the organization under international law in 1959.50 The CMEA now also began to develop practical technical cooperation, to be coordinated by twelve technical standing commissions set up in 1956.51 While the CMEA secretariat continued its work in Moscow, managing the commissions was dispersed among different national capitals, as in transport (Warsaw), black/ferrous metallurgy (Moscow), and agriculture (Sofi a). Each dealt with technology development, standardization, and legal matters concerning its sector. Unlike the CMEA Council, which was heavily dominated by the Soviet Union, experts drove the technical commissions’ work, which involved a somewhat more bottom-up form of deliberating about and taking decisions on issues and problems. In the early postwar period it was customary in many sectors and for many issues to ask Soviet advisors for their opinion. Subsequently, many high-level experts were trained in Moscow or elsewhere in the Soviet Union. When the communist regimes became more consolidated and the Cold War entered a calmer phase in the second half of the 1950s, multilateral discussion among experts within the various standing committees and their CMEA working parties replaced the system of bilateral advisers. Moreover, East-Central Europe even partially revisited nineteenth-century technocratic internationalism after the end of Stalinism, with the attempt to bypass the more bureaucratic CMEA in newly-created sector organizations such as the Organi- sation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) established in Warsaw in 1957, Agromash for cooperation in agriculture and Intermetall for heavy industry, both initiated in 1964. They concentrated on technology cooperation, setting standards, and organizing trade fairs, circumventing rigid micro-economic planning and the control exerted by state trade monopolies. During the 1960s, study

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trips to the West became more frequent and experts again became Fig. 3.7 Training in Moscow: When it more active in international organizations such as the UNECE. By had become clear that the 1970s, they also began to work more closely with experts from East-Central European Western Europe. Thus, over time, the East-Central European experts countries had to integrate in the Soviet bloc, experts managed to extend their mandate somewhat. They still had far less 52 had to explore what this room to maneuver than their Western colleagues, however. meant. In many sectors Both the OEEC and the CMEA initially had a European scope, it was customary to ask but they developed into global organizations in the early 1960s. For Soviet advisors for their advice and their opinions, those in Western Europe who favored a more politically-meaning- and high-level experts were ful integration akin to a United States of Europe, the OEEC utterly often trained in Moscow. failed to provide a springboard for broader economic and political The Soviet Union created integration in Western Europe. Instead, they invested their hopes in several sectorial training centers. Here students the Council of Europe, created in 1949, and especially, the ECSC and examining a gas generator the EEC. The OEEC focus on trade, technical aid, and development at the International issues subsequently allowed the American administration to push Center for Joint Training of Civil Aviation Flying, for its transformation into a worldwide Western organization when 53 Maintenance and Control the U.S., Canada, and Japan became full members in 1961. From Personnel. the American perspective, the renamed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was to encourage a greater

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role for Western Europe in the economic and fi nancial support of developing countries—this both to alleviate the fi nancial burden on the U.S., which was experiencing growing balance of payments problems, and to strengthen the Western position in the newly- independent countries of Africa and Asia in competition with the Soviet Union. Since its reform the OECD has expanded its membership to the point where it is now a much more fully global, not a European organization. At about the same time as the OECD reform, the CMEA also began to expand its membership beyond Eastern Europe in line with Soviet leaders’ ideological ambitions. Thus, in 1962, Mongolia joined, followed by other communist countries such as Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978). Despite their original focus on reconstruction and economic and technology cooperation in Europe, both the OEEC and the CMEA thus developed a global reach and competed with each other as the economic wings of the rival Cold War political and military organizations. Despite this intense competition and the many wars in developing countries,54 cooperation across the Cold War divide also continued to a surprising extent. At the height of the Cold War, the UNECE was “one of the few remaining bridges between east and west.”55 Stalin’s death and the subsequent phase of early détente until the Soviet suppression of the Hungar- ian Revolution in autumn 1956, again permitted East-Central Euro- pean countries a more active role in the UNECE. In 1953 Czecho- slovakia was elected to chair the Commission, with the Soviet Union announcing its intention one year later to collaborate fully for the fi rst time with the technical committees.56 Subsequently, the East-Central European member states developed a strong interest in using the UNECE as a forum for access to technological developments and for technology transfer. In 1971 the UNECE strengthened scientifi c and technological cooperation through the creation of the Senior Advisors to UNECE Governments on Science and Technology, followed in 1976 by the offi cial recognition of science and technology cooperation as one of the key UNECE objectives. In fact, the Soviet Union became so keen on UNECE cooperation that it relocated the fi erce debate over the legal recognition of East Germany to other forums. In the UNECE, East German experts occasionally participated in technical committees, but formally in a strictly private capacity.57 Remarkably, the Soviet Union also no longer complained about the UNECE’s multiple links at expert level

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with the OEEC and the ECSC/EEC. At the same time, several East- Central European countries—especially Hungary and Poland—saw the UNECE as a means to increase their relative autonomy from the Soviet Union in the 1960s, when they implemented more economic reforms domestically. They sought to develop stronger technology and trade links with Western Europe.58

Talking Supranational in Western Europe

Meanwhile, British and Scandinavian insistence on the strictly intergovernmental character of the OEEC, Britain’s refusal to expand the OEEC’s remit beyond Marshall aid and quotas, as well as British and American demands for lifting all production limits on the industry of the newly-created Federal Republic of Germany, had spurred the search for a suitable design for a more highly integrated “core Europe.” On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, presented the plan for a common market for coal and steel under a supranational High Authority with independent decision-making powers, which had been drafted by Monnet. Schuman had consulted German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in advance, but not the British government, which was faced with a fait accompli at the meeting of Allied foreign ministers in London the next day. After complex negotiations, especially over its institutional and anti-cartel provisions, six continental nations signed the treaty in April 1951 and it came into force on July 24, 1952. Five years later, the six ECSC member states signed the Rome treaties creating the EEC as a customs union for all industrial sectors and agriculture, and Euratom for nuclear collaboration. The formation of “core Europe” added a new layer to making rules for Europe by organizations and experts. In his thinking Monnet, who had drafted the Schuman Plan and became the fi rst President of the ECSC’s High Authority, had been strongly infl uenced by his experience of Allied cooperation during the First World War.59 At the time, Monnet had an excellent working relationship with the French Minister for the War Economy, Étienne Clémentel, which ensured the smooth integration of his expert work with national war planning and policy-making. Salter’s ideas for the League

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of Nations and his own experience of working for it until 1923 reinforced Monnet’s preferences for governing cross-border issues. In 1950 Monnet aimed at combining a strong and independent secretariat—the ECSC High Authority—and close cooperation with competent experts in national ministries. This arrangement, which resembled the Shipping Commissariat model, was designed to de-politicize issues and keep interest groups at bay. Monnet now linked these objectives to framing policy- and decision-making around the explicit notion of common European interests. In the light of the nationalist and ideological confl icts in interwar Europe, which had hampered the efforts of the League, Monnet sought to strengthen the High Authority and transform it into a supranational institution with independent decision-making powers. His vision for the ECSC was also informed by his knowledge of the American experience with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), created by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration in May 1933 as part of the New Deal. As a public institution, the TVA, which was mainly responsible for water management and electricity production, nevertheless enjoyed a great degree of independence from the central government and developed expert-led policy-making in its attempt to help overcome the severe economic crisis.60 The set-up of the ECSC was not entirely new, however. Most important, due to the insistence of the Benelux countries, it included a Council of Ministers as the organ of the member state governments. As we will see for the case of the ECSC, moreover, institutional practice in “core Europe” was actually characterized by a high degree of continuity. Still, the formation of “core Europe” introduced two new dimensions to the way in which a growing part of Europe was governed, as the present-day EU enlarged over time from six to twenty-eight member states. The fi rst new dimension was the EU’s explicit federalist normative thrust, and the second its new legal design which was to foster this federalist agenda. As a result, with the creation of the ECSC and the EEC, making rules for Europe became intimately linked to the idea of European political integration. During the early twentieth century some intellectuals and politicians started advocating a higher authority than national governments which could, if necessary, impose solutions in the interest of all.61 Crucially, however, tentative ideas for some kind of feder- alized Europe had limited appeal and little organized support in

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European societies until the Second World War. Yet after the war, federalists began to organize and forcefully propagate a supranational organization of Europe and later, of non-communist Western Europe. This added a crucial and politically more infl uential vision of European integration to Monnet’s preference for a supranational Europe which lacked a stronger societal and political foundation. Federalists advocated forms of government reminiscent of the parliamentary systems of the member states, only at the European level. Accordingly, for them a directly elected European parliament or, at the very least, a European parliamentary assembly of national parliamentarians anchored their plans for European integration. The European Movement was internally fragmented and its federalist zeal varied from country to country. It came closest to being a popular mass movement in Italy. There, activist thinkers developed federalism into more than a constitutional technique: a cohesive ideology for outlining a path to a better future for Europe.62 They could build on what became known as the Manifesto di Ventotene drafted by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi during their internment for opposing fascism. Federalism in this form promised salvation for European civilization after the experience of National Socialism and fascism and, now, Stalinism in Eastern Europe. Replacing aggressive racist, nationalist, and class-based ideologies with a set of transnationally unifying ideas for future economic, societal and political organization, federalist concepts and organizations to some degree succeeded in mobilizing young Europeans, especially students, to debate European reconstruction in cross-border forums and to engage in common symbolic acts like tearing down border posts. U.S. organizations like the Ford Foundation also fostered such enthusiasm, as they mistook it for an emulation of the American model or simply believed that it would strengthen Western Europe against communism.63 The European Movement also intersected with other societal groups and actors in continental Western Europe after the Second World War, especially political parties that promoted European integration. It attracted many leading politicians to its May 1948 congress in The Hague, which passed a number of federalist resolutions on Europe’s political, economic, and cultural integration.64 Support for federalist ideas was especially strong in the French, Belgian and Italian socialist parties. Arguably, however, the Chris- tian Democrats, who temporarily formed single party or coalition

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Fig. 3.8 Combining technical and political integration: The discussions on the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community were fully informed by interwar experiences of technical cooperation in many sectors, for example between steel producers and between railway companies. Yet, the European Coal and Steel Community added a new layer to the making of rules for Europe. It combined the technocratic internationalists’ focus on decision-making by independent experts with the explicit political aim of promoting European integration. This combination of backgrounds is represented in the ritual crossing of the French–Luxembourg border of a coal train on February 2, 1953 celebrating the coming into being of the new Community.

governments in all six states when the ECSC treaty was being negotiated and who remained the dominant political force in continental Western Europe well into the 1960s, most strongly supported “core Europe” integration with long-term federalist objectives. These parties built effective networks, closely collaborating in transnational party forums, international organizations, through

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bilateral and multilateral government contacts, and personally, as in the case of the direct cooperation between German chancellor Adenauer and French foreign minister Robert Schuman.65 This broadly-federalist vision was refl ected in the ECSC treaty’s inclusion of a Parliamentary Assembly. It also guided several draft constitutions for an integrated Europe, including the one written by François de Menthon from the centrist French Mouvement Répub- licain Populaire for the European Movement in 1948 on to the draft treaty for a European Political Community with a bicameral parliamentary system worked out and agreed by the ECSC Ad hoc Assembly during 1952–3. This proposed constitutional order for “core Europe” was designed to complement the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty signed in 1952 to facilitate West German rearmament through the creation of a European army of sorts. Both failed, however, when the French parliament rejected the continued debate over ratifying the EDC treaty in August 1954, paving the way for Germany’s 1955 integration into NATO. It is easy to dismiss such federalist objectives and draft constitutions for a united Europe as fanciful rhetoric for public consumption to hide “national interests” that actually guided the actions of these political parties and politicians.66 However, a fairly-broad consensus existed at the political level that continental Western Europe needed new institutional solutions that would create greater legitimacy for an integrated Europe than either the continuous quarrelling among governments over their material and security interests, in which everyone retained a veto; or in-transparent action by little-known bureaucrats and experts over cross-border regulatory issues, the benefi cial effects of which were not always obvious to citizens. The extent to which individual politicians and political parties or, for that matter, business groups, trade unions or transnationally organized actors supported a more federal or supranational Europe obviously varied. Even as politicians routinely inserted demands for more supranational integration in their driveling speeches, the broadly federalist objectives became deeply engrained in the political and institutional cultures of the Community. The overwhelming majority of the European Parliament, as it called itself from 1962, saw itself in the vanguard of European federalism and tirelessly worked for turning the Community into a parliamentary system. Especially during the presidency of Walter Hallstein from 1958

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to 1967, moreover, the Commission at times behaved like a Euro- pean government in the making.67 While it received only limited support for its ambitions in the so-called “Empty Chair” crisis during 1965–6, when President Charles de Gaulle had the French government boycott the Council of Ministers,68 the European Parliament and several political parties, party groups, and national governments remained committed, well into the 1990s, to making the Commission directly responsible to the Parliament. Although the member states did not endorse such a transformation, they took another important step in the direction of federal organization when they introduced the Parliament’s co-decision powers in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992–3. Thus, federalist rhetoric and politics did have a concrete long- term impact on treaty revisions. These have transformed the EU over time into an entity with its own constitutional character, which is now quite distinct from more expert-led transnational and international organizations. But long before this happened, especially with the 1987 Single European Act and then the Maastricht Treaty, the federalist supranational discourse had laid the foundation for the Community’s greater legal integration—the second core dimension that distinguished it markedly from other international organizations.

Shaping a Legal Community

From the early activities of European international organizations, lawyers and legal expertise were crucial to framing and precisely defi ning any obligations resulting from treaties between governments or agreements among companies. But until the creation of the “core Europe” organizations, no international body had claimed that its competences superseded those of its contracting parties nor that it had any legal or actual enforcement powers. If a national government was no longer prepared to comply with the organization’s rules and regulations, it could withdraw, as Nazi Germany and Japan did from the League of Nations in 1933. If a company no longer wished to stick to its apportioned market share, a cartel, which was in any case only concluded for a limited, renewable time period, simply collapsed.

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The ECSC’s and the EEC’s institutional structure differed markedly from these traditions in two main respects. First, the ECSC treaty would be in force for a period of 50 years, so that it had to be integrated into the EU, when it came to its statutory end in 2002. The EEC treaty was temporally unlimited. Crucially, neither treaty had a provision for leaving the organization. Such a provision would not have stopped Hitler from getting out, but it did refl ect signatories’ strong political commitment to its long-term prospects. Moreover, both the High Authority in the ECSC and the European Commission in the EEC/EU had (and have) some independent judicial powers which allowed them to impose fi nes on companies for anti-trust behavior or on member states for failure to implement treaty provisions, which remained a national responsibility. In addition, the Community also had a Court of Justice from the start. It was not a traditional court of arbitration, as was the League’s Permanent Court of International Justice, which issued judgments and advisory opinions on international treaty disputes and international legal questions only. Instead, the Community judges could take binding decisions concerning the correct application of law inside the member states. The Community had no institutions or powers to enforce European law and its decisions, such as its own police force. Yet it clearly did have from the beginning the legal infrastructure for possible constitutionalization and evolution into an entity with state-like features going far beyond those of existing international organizations. Just as the institutional culture in the ECSC continued many cartel practices from interwar Europe, however, the Community did not suddenly acquire its own distinctive constitutional nature once the treaty came into force or, for that matter, after the European Court of Justice’s two landmark decisions in 1963–4. In 1963, in the case of Van Gend en Loos, the Court established the principle of direct effect, deciding that Community law was directly applicable in the member states. One year later, in Costa v. Enel, it stipulated that European law took precedence over member state law. Taken together, both decisions initiated a strongly federalist supranational interpretation of European law, which to some extent built on European legal networks and the Court’s preparatory work.69 Paradoxically, French President Charles de Gaulle, who preferred an international organization controlled by governments, involun- tarily contributed to the supranational legal dynamic by appointing

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Fig. 3.9 A New Dimension of International Collaboration: The creation of international organizations for promoting peace and economic development and even European unifi cation was not entirely new. Still, the postwar period introduced a new emphasis on an explicit federalist agenda, which in the beginning also had popular appeal. The various European movements shared an ideal to replace nationalist ideology with a new political agenda for European integration. They mobilized students in common symbolic acts like tearing down border posts. In the picture, German students driving with the green-white European fl ag to Strasbourg in 1950, in order to join students from other countries to demonstrate against the sluggish negotiations of the Council of Europe.

the Christian democratic legal expert and politician Robert Lecourt to the Court in 1962 as part of a domestic election deal. Lecourt then became rapporteur and cast the decisive vote in a 4:3 split in the Van Gend en Loos case. But Lecourt was only one of several important nodal persons and translators between different transnationally constituted networks of political parties, federalists, and lawyers. In the early 1960s, the European Commission’s Legal Service and its director Michel Gaudet strongly supported the European consolidation of such networks.70 The Legal Service initiated conferences on

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important current topics and subsidized the networks’ activities to help the Commission infl uence the Court’s legal culture and reason- ing, garner wide academic support, and gain political legitimacy for the process of European constitutionalization. These ventures gained strong support at the top of the institution from President Hallstein, who was, like Lecourt, a Christian democrat, as well as an international and public law professor with strongly federalist beliefs. Constitutionalizing the Community remained highly contested by national institutions and networks, however.71 Despite these confl icts, the Court of Justice made an especially crucial contribution to shaping the Community’s economic integration dynamic. Its activism in this fi eld culminated in its decision in the Cassis de Dijon case in 1979 which stipulated the need for the mutual recognition by the member states of their rules—in this case concerning the percentage alcohol content for a drink to qualify for sale as alcoholic. This decision gave added impetus for the creation of a proper internal market eliminating non-tariff barriers.72 The federalist thrust and legal integration of “core Europe” organizations were geared towards facilitating an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,” as the EEC treaty’s preamble stipulated. These dynamics turned negotiating the boundaries between the multiple and often confl icting political integration objectives and more technical cross-border issues into a core challenge for EU institutions and experts working within them or in advisory functions in its committees, and for societal actors and their interests represented in Brussels and in national capitals.73 In a long-term historical perspective, the EU’s present-day hegemony in making rules for Europe not only refl ects, but was perhaps to some extent induced by, the second phase of globalization from the 1960s. In many sectors production and trade became much more globalized. Arguably, in such a fast-changing world where cross-border issues such as new technological standards are frequently deliberated, negotiated, and decided globally, Europe can only exert infl uence if it speaks with one voice. Back in the mid-nineteenth century, by contrast, Europe largely set the pace of technological innovation and economic development. Despite the potential to learn from the westward expansion of the U.S. and its infrastructures, including railways, this was also true for European rail transport and its transnational regulation, as we will see next.

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Convened to reconstruct Europe after the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna, hosted by Austrian Emperor Franz I, lasted from September 1814 to June 1815. Alongside many other points on the agenda, the negotiators wanted to establish a general principle that international rivers should be free “with a view to facilitate the communication between nations and continually to render them less strangers to one another.”1 This idea was so revolutionary that Count Ernst zu Münster, representing the Kingdom of Hanover, complained that the interests of his kingdom to collect taxes were being sacrifi ced for “some vague ideas about the liberty of commerce.”2 Vague as these ideas may have been, they nevertheless signaled a new interest in stimulating trade for the sake of progress and peace. They not only found expression in a new regime for river Rhine shipping, but also in plans for connecting the main European rivers. Thus, in 1822 the Austrian emperor’s Imperial and Royal Trade Commission initiated a project to link the Danube with the Moldau (Vltava).3 It centered on a canal, but also contained a small railway link through the Šumava Mountains between Linz and Budweis (České Budějovice). The Imperial and Royal Trade Commission invited a young professor of practical geometry trained at the newly-founded

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Polytechnic Institute of Vienna, Franz Anton von Gerstner, to build this Linz–Budweis railway line. To gain experience, von Gerstner traveled to Britain several times. He was impressed by the plans for the fi rst English railway line using steam power, which opened between Stockton and Darlington in 1825. He decided to devote his career entirely to steam-powered railways, which became his new passion. Together with others he established the fi rst Austrian Railway Company and became its director of construction. The Austrian emperor did not share von Gerstner’s passion, however. He preferred horse-drawn cars on an iron-strap, wooden rail road. Von Gerstner had to accept this solution but decided to build according to more expensive steam power standards. As a result, he overran his budget. Worse still, several of his assistant engineers criticized him openly for his design choices. On June 28, 1828, when only the northern part of his line was complete, he was sacked. He had lost the backing of his fi nanciers. One of his assistants subsequently constructed the second part of the line, but as a much cheaper and lighter horse-powered line. It opened in 1832.4 Not giving up on his passion, however, von Gerstner embarked on his second railway building adventure. On January 6, 1835 he proposed to the Russian Tsar Nicholas I a railway from St. Petersburg to Moscow, alluding to a future vast network with extensions to Odessa on the Black Sea, Taganrog on the Sea of Azov, and other destinations.5 Under the infl uence of Chevalier, the idea of a network, instead of an individual line, had been debated in Russia and in Europe, for some time. In 1810 the Institute of Transportation Engineers had been established in Russia. Several French engineers heavily infl uenced by Saint-Simonism became its main teaching staff. In the 1830s Chevalier’s work was widely disseminated there, including his proposal for state-led building of networks across borders, fed by major trunk lines.6 Von Gerstner could also draw on the Belgian example. After the outbreak of the revolution and its secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, Belgian politicians and engineers considered building a state- owned railway network as a material foundation for the new nation. They, too, were inspired by Saint Simonian ideas, arguing that the railway would unite Belgium and result in mutual understanding among its people.7 Finally, Friedrich List and others introduced similar ideas into the Germans lands. In his plans material integration and nation building preceded political integration. In the early 1830s he campaigned vigorously for an integrated German railway network crossing state

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Fig. 4.1 Local Lines borders to complement the Zollverein (customs union).8 Although and Transnational Debates: The Linz–- railway promoters widely circulated and discussed networks, only Budweis railway opened the Belgian state acted. For Russia, this was too large a step. On in 1832 was a 129 km February 7, 1836, after many deliberations between von Gerstner horse-drawn line but already built according to and a special committee set up by the Tsar, he only secured permis- steam power standards sion to build a short pilot line between St. Petersburg and Tsarskoe by its designer Franz Selo and Pavlovsk, the Tsar’s residence and park. The formal open- Anton von Gerstner. It was commissioned by the ing of this line took place on October 30, 1837 with celebrations that Austrian emperor who lasted fi ve days. preferred horse-drawn cars on an iron-strap wooden rail road, as he feared that steam power would generate revolutions. Local Lines & European Choices While von Gerstner could draw on various examples from his visits to England, common standards had yet To construct his railway von Gerstner recruited engineers in Bohe- to emerge. The experience mia, mainly from the Prague Polytechnic. To obtain rails and equip- with projects such as ment, he made trips to England and Belgium, where he ordered the Linz–-Budweis line circulated widely through locomotives, wagons, rails, and other apparatus. It was clear that, personal contacts, visits, although this was just a local line mainly to be used for passen- and publications, provoking transnational debates on ger transport, its realization depended on a set of transnational how best to build railways. connections concerning both ideas and technology. This was also

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true for the required capital. To raise it, von Gerstner published a pamphlet setting out the advantages of building a railway from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoe Selo and Pavlovsk. Twelve thousand copies were printed and distributed in Russian, French, and German, with an English version published in newspapers such as The Times in London.9 The original stock of 15,000 shares with a value of 200 rubles each was quickly subscribed. By January 1836 the line had 700 stockholders: 641 resident in Russia and 59 abroad. The foreign shareholders held larger blocks of stock, however, making up nearly 50 percent of the capital.10 This capital fund later proved to be insuffi cient, however. The costs were three times higher than anticipated. Since the stockholders were not willing to pay more, the company had to ask the Russian government for a loan, which was granted because the adventure now at least looked likely to succeed. Overrunning the budget was not only due to delays in material deliveries and the low initial estimates, but also due to what von Gerstner’s critics called extravagant engineering. He himself preferred to speak of the need to give the structure “grandeur.”11 During the work on the St. Petersburg–Tsarskoe Selo line it already became obvious that von Gerstner would not get permission to build other parts of the proposed network. Neither his stockholders nor the Russian government were prepared to work with him any longer. He had antagonized them through rising costs and his constant insistence on what he believed were the best, but very expensive, technological approaches. Although he promised to build the entire connection to Moscow for less money than he had needed for his pilot line, using the latest techniques from Europe and America, his former collaborators no longer regarded his estimates and promises as credible. To prove the feasibility of his Russian plans, von Gerstner decided to travel to the U.S. and study railroad development there.12 He thought that after England, the U.S. was now setting the example to follow. Von Gerstner now completely reconsidered his engineering preferences. Based on an extensive study of all individual American railroads, he argued that the Moscow line (and other lines) should be constructed in accordance with what he called the American system.13 Von Gerstner now advocated not only a lighter overall construction, steeper grades, sharper curves, wooden trestles, and strap-iron-covered wooden rails, but also the American operating

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practice of slow train speeds and effi cient management systems. According to him, this would reduce costs substantially. When von Gerstner advocated the American system, he was following other European railway promoters and engineers. Thus, List wrote about the American system: It is, in the simplest terms, the system of having no system. It is the system of common sense which is not befuddled by the haughtiness of theory or false ambitions, by the arrogance of scientifi c mystery- mongering and boasting, by the supercilious know-it-alls and those who only seek originality, or by a presumptuous concern for the far-too-distant future ... [The American system is] the simplest, most prudent, most expedient, most advantageous system in the world.14 In contrast, early railways built by British engineers required a straight and level roadbed and easy curves, which in turn meant a great deal of excavation and broad embankments. They also specifi ed heavy tracks, constructed with all-iron rails and using iron chairs to hold the rails to their foundations, which in Britain were stone blocks. In the 1830s American engineers experimented with other practices following the natural terrain as much as possible, using wood for chairs, and avoiding iron as much as feasible, which led to wooden rails covered by thin iron straps. The initial capital investment was lower, so that Americans could build railroads much faster than Europeans. European engineers began experimenting with the American system. However, early results in Prussia showed that the sharp curves and light structures actually increased the operating costs and limited the speed at which trains could run. Engineers projected that in the long term such a system would be less durable and actually more expensive. Hence, Prussian railway builders agreed that it was better to use a heavier mode of construction to minimize maintenance budgets. Other engineers constructing lines in Europe argued similarly that economy should not be confused with the least expenditure at the outset; and they convinced the railway companies and their stockholders.15 In this way engineers rejected the American system and a European technological style emerged instead, as the outcome of a debate within the emerging transnational network of railway engineers and promoters. The story of von Gerstner and the debate about the American and European practices show that with the partial exception of Britain,

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building local lines was initially a transnational affair, since capital, expertise, and material had to be imported. This work was done by engineers and railway managers, or railway experts, trained on the job or in the newly established engineering schools. These railway experts engaged in the politics of comparison.16 They traveled, published reports, evaluated experiences, and defi ned best practices. The emerging European style of railway construction still contained many variants; but it was perceived to be different, and it was different, from the American system. One of the pivotal variations within Europe was the width of the gauge—the distance between a railway’s two tracks. In the 1830s and 1840s what gauge to choose was a hot topic.17 Many companies implemented George Stephenson’s English gauge of four feet, eight-and-a-half inches (1435 mm), but others argued for the use of broader gauges up to six feet (1829 mm). One of them was von Gerstner. His main argument was that a broad gauge was superior for a number of mechanical reasons. It would, for example, allow the use of more suitable wagons for goods such as hay and wool and of more powerful locomotives running at higher speeds. Subsequently, Russian engineers responsible for constructing other lines, such as St. Petersburg–Moscow, also advocated von Gerstner’s contested choice for a broader gauge. One consultant, the American engineer George Washington Whistler, argued for a narrower gauge than von Gerstner’s, but still broader than the Stephenson gauge being adopted in many other European countries. Whistler considered his gauge a good comprise between cost and speed. The Russian engineers did not consider departing from the Stephenson gauge to be a problem as the Moscow line would not connect to other networks outside Russia any time soon. Indeed, at the time all cargo had to be unloaded and reloaded when crossing borders.18 Both the early dominance of the Stephenson gauge and the subsequent discussion on broader gauges throughout Europe resulted from different preferences among British engineers. From the start, the British government had left the decision to the individual railway companies. Most British fi rms constructed lines on Stephenson’s 1435 mm gauge—not because they necessarily considered this the best option, but mainly because his company provided railway-building materials. Stephenson also delivered tracks, wagons, and locomotives to many projects on the Continent.

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As part of the package, he advised the Belgian government in 1834 to establish a standard of 1435 mm for all main railway lines on its territory. Similarly, Austria’s fi rst longer railway line, the Kaiser Ferdinand Northern Railway, was built to his specifi cations, as were the fi rst railways opened in Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These adoptions created a domino effect. Thus, the Belgian decision in 1834 infl uenced the Prussian government to prescribe the same gauge three years later. Some offi cials opposed this choice, arguing that such a common gauge might facilitate foreign invasions. But for many states, commercial arguments in favor of a common gauge prevailed.19 Even so, the Netherlands, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, and a few other German principalities chose broader gauges of different widths. They regarded them as technically superior, the standard for the future. In 1844 the Spanish government established a commission to study the gauge issue. Three civil engineers led the inquiry: Juan Subercase, a military engineer and dean of the Escuela de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, José Suber- case and Calixto de Santa Cruz. Their report advocated a broader gauge. They considered it safer and more effi cient in a country with mountainous territory. They also believed that the broad gauge was the international trend among the richest and most powerful countries, a group that Spain wished to join.20 Portugal, which traditionally had close relations with Britain, already had railways with the 1435 mm gauge. However, there the engineer João Crisóstomo de Abreu e Sousa, who was responsible for railway development, applied the conclusions of the Subercase Report to the Portuguese railway system and effected a change to a broader gauge. Soon the Spanish and Portuguese gauges converged to the so-called Iberian gauge of 1668 mm.21 They followed Isambard Kingdom Brunel, an engineer with the British Great Western Rail- way company, who had campaigned for a broader gauge from the mid-1830s onwards. These transnational debates were fueled by technical information circulating widely through travel, personal contact, and informal trading of know-how, but also via publications in several languages. Summaries were printed in newspapers and professional journals.22 By the end of the 1840s, however, the cost of diversity became clearer to railway managers and engineers. Companies had to make arrangements to reload goods and passengers onto

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each other’s wagons and carriages at points where different gauges Fig. 4.2 Voluntary Adoption of Standards: met. Railway managers, engineers of railway companies, and offi - In the mid-nineteenth cials in several countries with a broader gauge concluded that they century private companies would eventually have to convert, and that it was better to do so built railways with different early on when routes were still short. In continental Europe, lines gauge widths—the distance between the two tracks. with a broader gauge persisted only in Russia, Spain, and Portugal The resulting gauge breaks and for some secondary lines elsewhere. Traffi c across these gauge resulted in diffi cult and breaks was limited, however, reducing the economic pressure to often chaotic transfer of make the costly conversion. passengers and goods from the broad to the narrow The gauge issue showed the railway community the risks of gauge carriages, as this relying on informal voluntary and/or professional transnational unattributed engraving relations, supplemented by ad hoc exchanges among companies from the Illustrated London News of 1846 and engineers. They also realized that a uniform gauge was not shows. The costs of diversity suffi cient to permit easy travel on the lines of different companies. led many companies Instead, this demanded the harmonization of timetables, tariffs, to agree voluntarily tickets, bumpers, signals, wagons, liability rules, insurance cover- to conversion to the Stephenson gauge, which age, and transport policies. Moreover, nothing was stable in the had the most early adopters. railway business; innovation was dynamic and new technologies

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and systems could make older standards obsolete. Frequently, standards needed revision, and hence interaction among the companies and engineers to coordinate such changes was fundamental. Against this background, the Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnver- waltungen (Association of German Railway Companies—Verein) became a permanent transnational platform for discussing, testing, agreeing, and upgrading standards. In 1850, the Verein decided to adopt the 1435 mm gauge as the standard for all member companies.23 In this matter, they took action after the convergence had taken place. Yet on many other railway technical, operational and administrative issues the Verein became the most important expert-led, standard-setting, transnational voluntary organization in nineteenth-century Europe. Its origins lay in the ongoing tensions between railway companies and states, however, which were generated by the growth of railway networks and border crossings. These tensions were especially felt in the politically highly-fragmented German lands.

Mediating Tensions

Governments initially accepted private ownership of railways despite a long tradition of state ownership of transport infrastructures such as canals, and state responsibility for constructing main roads.24 Private ownership fi tted the emerging doctrine of economic liberalism. Perhaps more important, states saved money at a time when many governments faced severe budgetary constraints and did not want to raise taxes, as this could lead to even greater demands for participation and democracy. Yet, it is clear from contemporary discussions that governments and the public never perceived railways as just private businesses. On the contrary, offi cials and citizens alike saw railways as public responsibilities. Private companies should not enjoy monopolistic profi ts at the expense of industry and passengers. Therefore, governments regulated railway companies by issuing special charters for individual lines. They often also created national, generic railway laws in order to standardize the charters, create and implement basic safety measures, and allow specifi c interventions such as the regulation

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of rates or dividends. These laws created tensions between railway companies and governments. Amidst these tensions, the Verein emerged in Prussia. The 1838 Prussian national railway law had already given the state wide-ranging powers over private railway companies, including the option to set rates and tax their profi ts. This legislation generated a good deal of protest, but because private capital was crucial for constructing railways, it was hardly enforced. In August 1846, however, the Minister of Finance responsible for railway matters ordered all companies operating railways in Prussia to submit annual reports as required by the 1838 law. Ten companies which had their headquarters in Prussia took this as a sign of the potential enforcement of the unpopular law and quickly moved to defend their interests. They called a meeting to formulate new principles for a railway law, and founded a new organization. Soon the Prussian minister invited the companies to a meeting. To defuse agitation for changes in the Prussian law, railway companies from other German states were also invited. This would keep the meeting more focused on general issues. The Prussian railways responded immediately, however, by opening up their newly-established organization to all railway companies in the German lands.25 The conference called by Prussia was scheduled for March 1848, a year in which socio-economic and political tensions fueled multiple, linked revolutions throughout Europe. Although twenty- eight companies sent representatives to Berlin for the conference, the meeting never took place. When the visitors arrived, barricades were just going up. Several years passed before Prussian ministers again contemplated state intervention. In the meantime, right after the cancelled 1848 conference, the Verein members decided that they should use the opportunity to harmonize the entire German railway system, avoiding the direct interference of states and negotiations among diplomats. The railway company directors thus formed a united front against attempts by the Prussian state to intervene in their businesses. The Verein quickly became a genuine transnational organization aimed at building a uniform railway network across borders, harmonizing a large number of individual lines run by private companies and states. By 1871 its membership had increased to eighty-two companies of which fi fty were German, twenty-six

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Austro-Hungarian, three Dutch, two Belgian, and one Russian— the Warsaw–St. Petersburg line.26 Railway engineers managed to introduce, without diplomatic interference, an extensive set of rules enforced across companies operating in several different states. These rules applied to the transport of goods and passengers and their luggage, regulating the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the railway companies towards their customers and each other. Moreover, experts developed regulations for the mutual use and

Fig. 4.3 Engineers Mediating Tensions: These portraits of railway engineers featured in a Festschrift for the Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen published in 1896. Over the fi fty years of its existence, it had become a genuinely transnational organization with membership from railways operating in many German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Russia. It managed to introduce, without diplomatic interference, many rules to ensure harmonization across borders. The engineers fostered a specifi c culture of discussing different options and seeking consensus in order to mediate tensions between both companies and states.

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exchange of wagons so that loading and unloading of goods would be unnecessary when trains passed borders. Finally, the Verein developed and implemented many technical standards to ensure the uniformity of wagons, roadbeds, stations, loading and unloading, signaling systems, and schedules across borders. Thus, although the Prussian railway companies created the Verein to defend themselves against the Prussian state’s attempts to regulate their businesses, they quickly transformed it into an expert-led organization, which also aimed at mediating tensions among its members and various states in which members operated.27 Although, offi cially, company directors represented the Verein members, from the start experts played a decisive role in its operations.28 In fact, they often combined both roles when they also held a seat on a company’s board. At an 1849 Vienna meeting of the Verein, the company directors decided that railway engineers should prepare a set of standards for a uniform railway system. In their fi rst meeting in Berlin in 1850, however, the railway engineers agreed that they would not act as representatives of their companies, but in personal capacities. To mark this step they actually established their own Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn-Techniker (Association of German Railway Engineers) which organized its own sessions and admitted only individuals, not companies. Membership was open to all engineers employed by Verein companies. The divide between engineers employed by companies and others working for the state was not clear-cut. Many companies recruited engineers from the state sector. A common pattern was for a state-employed engineer to take leave for a limited period of time, supervise the construction of a railway and even become member of a company board of directors. Some subsequently returned to the state service, where they often specialized in railways, retaining their business contacts and being included in the Verein expert network.29 When the railway engineers celebrated their association’s fi ftieth anniversary in 1896, they argued that one of their greatest achievements was to have fostered the development of independent and purposeful engineers working on large-scale projects servicing a broader community.30 Formally, the Association of German Rail- way Engineers could only make recommendations to the Verein. But the company directors almost always followed the engineers’ advice, when determining the Verein’s procedures and standards for handling transit traffi c and building a uniform network. How

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then did railway experts from different companies and states come up with and promote this technical advice? The engineers developed a culture of collecting all available information, discussing at length the advantages and disadvantages of several options, and even testing new ones. After all, railway engineering was a rapidly-developing fi eld, for which new technological options became available, which had to be assessed. In the process all member companies were invited to respond to questionnaires through which they shared their experiences. When the engineers reached conclusions, they published them in separate reports, distributed to all companies. As an outcome of the 1865 meeting, for example, the engineers produced 71 of these reports, in 1868, 54, in 1871, 26, and in 1884, 157.31 Their deliberations and conclusions were also printed in the Association’s journal. Consensus was thus achieved by creating a shared pool of knowledge. Subsequently the experts evaluated the different technical options before making recommendations. The whole process facilitated mutual learning, reduced uncertainty and allowed collective decision-making. Involving experts in this way allowed the Verein to create a scholarly culture. As well, the experts used the Verein as an opportunity to develop their discipline. They explored different technical options and conducted research and experiments. The Verein nurtured the existing informal networks among railway experts, creating a tightly-knit community of railway engineers united by their professional norms. The experts shared a faith in science and rational discussion in which all available evidence was presented, eventually leading to a consensus. Of course, the experts also represented specifi c private business or state interests which could create tensions that they had to deal with. Crucially, however, experts with their strong ethos could use the Verein as an institutional platform for mediating tensions. But how did the Verein assure compliance when engineers had reached a conclusion? After all, the annual decision-making conferences only produced non-binding resolutions using majority voting. In 1852 some members proposed to make resolutions binding for all when passed by a three-fourths majority. This was not accepted however, as other members argued that the Verein had been created to foster cooperation, not coercion. From 1875 onwards decisions taken by majority vote did become binding, but members representing a minimum of 10 percent of the vote could

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reverse the decision within four weeks after the meeting. These binding decisions could also be taken by the various committees established in the same year. Yet despite these formal changes, decision-making in the Verein actually continued to be characterized by consensus seeking.32 The Verein did develop strategies to ensure compliance, nonetheless. To begin with, company representatives employed peer pressure. The Verein’s central offi ce kept a record of companies that had accepted and implemented particular resolutions. This list was also read out during the annual general meeting. Engineers and company directors also lobbied their own governments to shape railway laws and company charters in accordance with Verein rules. They almost always had close ties with their governments, and in many instances were even part of the state administration. Hence, they were in an excellent position to synchronize national regulations and Verein standards. Finally, the Verein discursively stressed the technical, non-political character of its work which was refl ected in its decision-making patterns. Members defi ned many issues as technical and hence, to be delegated to experts. They had the mandate to make decisions which they could then implement within their companies.33 Although the Verein delegated decision-making to experts and relied on a process of consensus- seeking and voluntary compliance, tensions could still persist. Crucially, the issue of the organization’s spatial scope led to a long internal struggle. Already during the Verein’s second Assembly meeting, delegates discussed how open the Verein should be to new, non-German members. In 1849, a test case concerned the Hungarian railway. The statutes stipulated that railway companies could only participate when they had their headquarters (Domizil) in one of the states of the German Confederation. Hence the annual general assembly had to decline the request, as Hungary was part of the Habsburg Empire, but not of the Confed- eration. The issue was speedily resolved, however when in 1850 the Hungarian railways pro forma moved their headquarters to Vienna in Austria, which was part of the Confederation. One of the reasons Verein members wanted to limit membership to the German Confederation was that they sought assurance that their rules would be implemented by the companies and enforced by states which had licensed them. Enlargement could come at the expense of reduced compliance and could make the greater

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alignment of rules more diffi cult.34 This concern also led to a discussion about who was actually a member of the Verein: the railway’s management or its shareholders. The latter could be foreign and have less interest in building an enlarged German network. The companies could not solve this tricky problem. As a result, the assembly ruled that as long as the implementation of the rules was secured, defi ning membership criteria would not be an issue.35 The membership question remained on the table, though. Propo- nents of enlargement beyond the German lands argued that this was a logical step, not only for practical reasons of growth of commerce and transport networks, but also because the railways had a larger mission to fulfi l. Echoing the Saint-Simonian myth of the network, several delegates voiced the sentiment that railways encouraged closer international relations and “thereby contribute to the great goal of humankind, the accommodation of hostile nationalities.”36 The opponents of enlargement argued that it would undermine the full implementation of rules and that the Verein would no longer be German—an argument that refl ected the persistence of German patriotism or nationalism among some private companies and their managers, despite the internal culture which prescribed a focus on technical work. In 1858 these discussions led to a compromise. Any company with headquarters in a “German” state would qualify. This meant that Dutch companies would be able to join since the Dutch king as grand duke of Luxembourg was a member of the German Confed- eration. On the other hand, railway tracks owned by Verein companies, but outside of the Verein area, were no longer taken to be part of the Verein and automatically ruled by its decisions. This was the case, for example, for tracks in parts of the Italian peninsula run by Austrian railway companies.37 The confl ict lingered on, however. In 1860, railway companies operating the Liège–Maastricht and the Warsaw–Vienna lines fi led their applications. They were rejected, as they lay (only partly in the case of Warsaw–Vienna) outside of “German” states. However, the annual General Assembly decided that exceptions could be made to the statutes on a case-by-case basis, but only if all members agreed.38 The editors of the newly-established Verein journal, who supported extending the Verein, added, in a footnote to a report on the assembly meeting, that this new rule meant that in future Belgian and French companies could also become members.39

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Earlier they had reminded their readers that they might not realize that the borders of the Verein were in fact already Amsterdam, Venice, and Warsaw.40 After the meeting they tried to educate their members by publishing an article on railways and the cosmo- politan zeitgeist. Referring to Chevalier, the editors argued that railways had linked neighboring countries more organically and had created a shared interest in commerce. This was incompatible with an inward-looking attitude and necessitated the Verein’s enlargement. Eventually the journal editors foresaw the emergence of a Continental Railway Association. Such an association would pose no threat to the fatherland (Vaterland).41 These arguments in turn fueled resistance. At the 1863 General Assembly in Salzburg, opponents expressed the fear that if non-German members joined, the Verein would develop into a Central European or even pan- European association. This would destroy the current community of interest (vorhandene Interessengemeinschaft). An 1864 compromise ended the discussion for good. In future any company could enter, but only after a unanimous vote. The delegates introduced a distinction between the inner (enger) and outer (weiter) Verein area. The fi rst referred to railway companies that had their main seat in the German Confederation, Hungary, and the Neth- erlands (but could run railway lines into areas beyond), while the latter included all companies who had their headquarters in other states. The assembly also decided to accept the pending applications for membership of companies with their main seats in Belgium and Russia. More Belgian companies and a Romanian enterprise joined later on. In 1871, however, the Verein rejected the application of the British Great Eastern Railway Company. Members could not see the practical relevance of extending the network beyond the Continent.42 In contrast, it was clear to leading railway company managers that the Verein and the railways operating in France and the Mediterranean area needed to be become linked, especially to facilitate expansion of goods transport.

Standardizing Technological Zones

From 1860, the Bavarian railways organized meetings with those of Austria, Württemberg, and France to agree on timetables for

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passenger transport. From 1871 onwards the Verein organized these conferences, and in 1891 named them the European Time- Table Conferences. Railway companies and the Verein nevertheless considered regulating goods traffi c a greater priority. Rail- way experts believed that passenger traffi c could be managed more lightly. After all, passengers could adapt while traveling. In contrast, goods moved without their owners and railway companies held legal responsibility for their safe transport and arrival.43 One additional reason why the Verein did not prioritize passenger transport was that the most powerful and infl uential elite travelers who could have put pressure on the companies were well served. They often used special express trains organized by the International Sleeping Car Company established by the Belgian engineer George Nagelmackers in 1876, which was better known by its French name Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits, or just Wagons-Lits. The company negotiated contracts with various railways which allowed its clients to cross borders with one through ticket, without transfers and interruptions. This led to the establishment of famous long-distance trains such as the Orient Express, which connected London to Istanbul in 80 hours with daily departures after 1885, and later also trains from Paris to Madrid and Lisbon, from Calais to Nice and Rome, and from Paris to Vladivostok.44 Passengers from other social classes did not have such smooth travel options. On the contrary, they experienced many problems when crossing borders using the services of different railway companies.45 In the 1860s railway network construction and traffi c increased steeply, and the prospect of new Alpine and trans-border lines stirred the imagination of railway managers and experts, as well as industrialists, politicians, and the general public.46 Only one had been realized in the 1850s: the line crossing the Semmering pass, connecting Vienna to Trieste, which opened in 1854. The Brenner passage through Tyrol, a second, much longer line between Vienna and Trieste through North and South Tyrol, was completed in 1867. During the 1860s the French were building the St. Cenis tunnel, which was eventually fi nished in 1871, linking France with the Italian Peninsula.47 However, the construction of these lines was overshadowed by the plan for the St. Gotthard tunnel in Switzer- land.48 In 1869, during a month-long conference in Berne, yet-to-be

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Fig. 4.4 Competition for Dominance: The opening of the Gotthard tunnel haunted French railway companies. They rightly feared losing a lot of traffi c to German railway companies as the tunnel connected Belgian, Dutch, and German harbors with Italy. This key function also became an essential element in this poster’s presentation of the tunnel used from 1902 onwards. As a result, French politicians, engineers, and political commentators began to push for a tunnel via the Simplon, connecting Switzerland with Italy, which they hoped would once more tip the balance in favor of French ports and railways.

united German states worked out all the details with Italy and Switzerland, and signed a tripartite treaty on June 20, 1870, only a few weeks before the Franco-Prussian/German war began. The French were haunted by the specter of the planned tunnel. Many believed that it would increase Germany’s advantage in

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terms of railway connections, and hence augment its economic as well as its political power. Many commentators expected that this new link would become vital for European and international trade. The French ports of Le Havre, Calais, Boulogne, Bordeaux, and Marseille could lose their transatlantic business to harbors in the Low Countries and Germany.49 In 1882 the St. Gotthard line opened and a new transnational company began running it. The French fears came true: much less freight was transported on their tracks than on the German ones. As a result, French politicians, engineers, and commentators discussed plans for a new tunnel via the Simplon through Switzerland which might tip the balance back in favor of France and its ports. While the Gotthard tunnel was still under construction, the Swiss government organized talks with France, Italy, and Germany over new railway standards and agreements. It needed such agreements in order to exploit its favorable position at the heart of the emerging European railway transit system.50 Swiss authorities knew of the complaints from various national chambers of commerce, transport companies, and travel agencies about the incompatibility of the Verein’s railway practices for goods transport with those of France and Italy.51 The anticipated growth in goods traffi c would compound these problems. How then to achieve collaboration and compatibility? A proposal coming from either France or Germany would surely be rejected by the other. They needed a neutral mediator, the Swiss state, although rumours circulated in France that the Swiss initiative was designed to cover up the Verein’s expansionist ambitions.52 As a result, the chances for success initially seemed slim. Memories of the 1870–1 war were still vivid, and relations between France and Germany tense, both on the level of the railway companies and the governments. Nevertheless, these transnational and international tensions turned out not to be the most diffi cult challenge to overcome. Tensions at the domestic level, between the private railway companies and the respective states, proved to be a greater barrier. The Swiss initiative to bring together governments and railway companies to discuss new agreements for goods transport came at a time when the nationalization of railways was beginning to gain momentum in both France and Germany. Otto von Bismarck, the Reich chancellor, wanted one national railway system under

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central control in order to bind the nation together economically, politically, and militarily. To this end, the new imperial constitution stipulated that the Empire should have supervisory powers over railways in the interest of national defense and general transportation. Bismarck established the Imperial Railway Offi ce in 1873, hoping that this would allow the German Reich to wrest control over the railways from the component states. His goals and this initiative received a cool reception from the Verein and from other German states, which were not prepared to cede authority to the central government. The Imperial Railway Offi ce argued that the Verein included too many companies and was too internationally oriented. Thus it proposed establishing an entirely-new association for strictly German matters and perhaps another one to deal with international affairs, including relations with Italy, Switzerland, and France.53 The Imperial Railway Offi ce effectively wanted to replace the Verein and take over its coordinating functions. But it did not succeed, due to resistance from the railway companies and several German states.54 The Verein continued to be a viable alternative for arranging cross-border traffi c. Its members (some of whom were by now state-owned entities while others remained private) strongly believed that their organization had to avoid favoring any particular state.55 The French government, in a very highly centralized state, also made renewed attempts in the 1870s to gain leverage over the railways. This was induced by the perception that Germany’s victory in the war of 1870–1 had at least in part been the result of its better-organized railway system. Politicians engaged in a fi erce debate whether, given this, nationalization of or stringent controls over private companies were more desirable.56 When the Swiss government called upon France, Germany, Austria- Hungary, and Italy to discuss unifying laws, standards, and rates for the cross-border rail transport of goods, the French and German responses diverged. French private companies feared that the government in Paris would seize this opportunity and use international negotiations to impose new regulations domestically. They eventually issued a joint declaration stating that international conventions should not modify the contracts that already existed between the French companies and the French state.57 At the fi rst two preparatory meetings in 1878 and 1881, they only participated as observers

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and refused to negotiate. German railway companies and the Verein took the opposite approach. They wanted to use the negotiations to strengthen their domestic position, and proposed agreements which amounted to the adoption of the existing Verein standards. The preparatory meetings did not lead to an agreement, which was only concluded after a change of the domestic situation in France. There in 1883 the railways and the government signed a new convention which regulated their mutual relations. This made it possible for the French railway companies to be more active on an international level.58 At the 1886 conference, Swiss diplomats ensured that the German experts could not outmaneuver either the French railway experts or Third Republic diplomats. The French state’s delegates in turn argued that agreements among companies must not compromise national sovereignty, and hence railway companies could not conclude an international agreement. The delegates accepted a solution to this problem which bypassed the issue of national sovereignty. They introduced the distinction between international and national traffi c with new rules only applying to the former and not the latter. Moreover, they would only be binding if and when also transposed into national law. In 1890 Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem- bourg, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland eventually signed the resulting Convention on the International Traffi c of Goods by Rail, which became known by its French title Convention Interna- tionale concernant le Transport des Merchandises par chemins de fer (C.I.M.), also called the Berne Convention, which was kept up to date by a Union of Railway Administrators (the Berne Union). Denmark followed in 1897, Romania in 1904, Sweden in 1907, Serbia in 1910, and Bulgaria in 1911.59 In this way the Berne Convention both succeeded in alleviating the tensions between Germany and France and united the Verein territory and the Mediterranean area into one European transnational railway space. This unifi cation was symbolized by the through wagon bill lettre( de voiture directe). According to the agreement, goods had to be accompanied by this letter, a derivative of a similar document used within the Verein’s territory since the 1850s. Prior to the agreement, goods being transported from one country to another could not be sent directly to destinations outside the Verein area. Instead,

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Fig. 4.5 European Interface Technology: Up until the invention of the so-called Berne key shown in this photo, several keys were used for opening international goods wagons. This led to much delay at borders. Engineers negotiated one key to be used on all wagons, but as a typical European compromise the key consisted of two parts, one French and one German. It could open wagons used in the western Mediterranean technological zone dominated by French companies and engineers as well as wagons used in the standards zone of the Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen. Fig. 4.6 Informal Expert Culture: When engineers met in 1910, tensions in Europe were running high. Yet their culture of networking and seeking consensus often enabled experts to fi nd common ground. Their conferences could take several weeks, and sometimes entire families traveled to them and befriended each other. Conferences became major highlights in the professional and personal lives of the mainly male experts. This photo shows the women accompanying the experts, sitting on the balcony, where they participated in the their journey had to be interrupted at the Verein frontier, where a opening ceremony of the commissioned agent received the goods. After passing the shipment Berne Union responsible for the Conventions on through customs, this agent could then send the goods on. After International Traffi c Goods 1893, when the Berne Convention came into force, goods could be and Passenger by Rail.

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sent without requiring successive re-expediting. Shipments were also now subject to a new international transport law—national laws no longer applied. All expenses associated with the transport were calculated as a total sum, paid by the recipient upon delivery of the goods and subsequently distributed among railway companies through the Berne offi ce.60 Finally, as in the Verein, uniform rates were not established because companies wanted to retain their freedom and fl exibility. They had to publish their tariff (price) schedules, however. The Swiss government not only initiated the Berne Convention but also assisted in building a new organization responsible for developing technical standards for rolling stock: the International Conference for Promoting Uniformity on Railways, better known as the Unité Technique. At two conferences, in 1882 and 1886, experts negotiated the Technical Unity of Railways Protocol. Its original signers were Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, but soon all railway companies on the Continent using the standard gauge joined the protocol.61 This intergovernmental organization also had its seat in Berne. It promoted industry standards that were negotiated compromises between France and Germany, but were closer to the Verein rules.62 The mediation as well as the outcome was beautifully expressed in one artefact: the so-called Berne key. Before 1893 several keys were in use for opening international train wagons. After 1893 these keys were integrated into one key with two sides: one that would open Verein wagons and one that would fi t on wagons used within the Western Mediterranean area.63 After the establishment of these new organizations, the Verein adjusted its own internal rules to fi t those of both the Berne Convention and the Unité Technique. This was not a diffi cult exercise, and seemed a small sacrifi ce in return for the establishment of a Europe-wide railway regulation, modeled after what the Verein had begun creating in 1847.64

Transnational Collaboration under Pressure

The main reason for the success and stability of the Verein was its ability to mediate multiple tensions: between states, among member companies, and between companies and states. It could

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do this because it developed a working method specifi c to technocratic internationalism. It consisted of three elements. To start with, railway managers and engineers promoted the belief that railways would naturally unify people and facilitate commerce. They sought to live up to this rhetoric, although they often failed to do so, as the struggles over the Verein enlargements and the establishment of the Berne Convention show. Next, Verein members developed a culture of de-politicization and technifi cation based on the ideology that the technical united people, while politics created artifi cial divisions. In 1896 when the Verein celebrated its fi ftieth anniversary, one expert argued: “Technical science recognizes but one language—that of Nature—and but one law—that of mathematics—which neither regards bridges as German nor rolling-stock as Austrian or Hungarian. ... [Techni- cal science] does not set up divisions between men, but unites them within a single sphere of useful activity.”65 This culture of separating the technical and political rested as much on a technocratic view about the allegedly-neutral nature of technology as on the perceived political need to remain as independent as

Fig. 4.7 Tools for Peace and War: Railway experts liked to represent railways as tools for peace. They believed that they could connect people and contribute to more communication and mutual understanding. But railways were also instruments for war. Right after the First World War French railways supported by Czechoslovakian and Romanian foreign policy- makers pushed for what they defi ned as an anti- German barrier in the form of a direct railway link among these allied states which would not cross Germany. This idea built on a range of proposals already developed before the war by French railways and politicians.

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possible of direct state interference. Yet railways also needed the state, and therefore they added a third element to their working method. This was a specifi c decision-making procedure geared towards the synchronization of national and transnational rules and relying on scientifi c expertise, peer pressure, and voluntary compliance. These technocratic working methods were also important for managing the relationships between various organizations. From the 1850s onward, not only the Verein but a host of different transnational railway organizations had institutionalized and supplemented earlier, voluntary relations based on professional contacts. Their work resulted in a functionally and spatially fragmented space. The organizations dealt partly with different issues, and their rules and standards covered different spaces. These spaces were also not exactly congruent with political borders. Moreover, railway experts considered them as open- ended, since expansion was anticipated and rules might be applied by railway companies that had not yet formally signed up for them. In 1885 one other new organization joined the existing group. In that year, the Belgian railways organized a major conference to celebrate their fi ftieth anniversary. Its success led to formalizing the International Railway Congress Association. Its main aim was to pursue the study of railway engineering and to facilitate the exchange of technical information. At fi rst, the Verein refused to collaborate, as it perceived the Railway Congress as a direct threat to its own hegemonic role and a scheme by French railway companies aiming to infl uence ongoing negotiations about the Berne Convention. In the 1890s the Verein developed a more positive attitude, welcoming the results of the Congress, and relations between both organizations slowly normalized.66 Despite the continuing cooperation by transnational and international organizations, competition among the railways from the major European powers intensifi ed due to growing political strains among the United Kingdom, France and Germany, in particular. The railways played a role in this, not only because they were at the core of war planning, but also because Germany and France began more forcefully to compete for railway connections to underpin their great power ambitions. Railways proved to be as much an instrument of war as of peace.67 Thus, around the turn

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of the century, by signing several agreements with the Ottoman Empire, Germany gained exclusive railway access from Europe to the Middle East, thus preventing Britain and France from securing continuous railway lines to colonial territories in the Far East and Africa. The German Reich began constructing the Berlin–Baghdad railway, which would be a bone of contention for many years to come. Pamphlets circulating in France and Britain demanded that these countries “show their determination to oppose the Germani- sation of Asia Minor” and “forestall the success of an aggressive and exclusive policy which would be a standing menace to the peace of the world.”68 The Berlin–Baghdad railway was not the only source of friction. Following the opening of the Simplon tunnel in 1906, itself an attempt to draw traffi c away from the Gotthard, French companies tried to create an alternative southern line to the East through Italy and the Balkans. It would break the monopoly of the Orient Express which used the Danube basin. Austria- Hungary denied them a concession, however. During the First World War, businessmen, politicians, and railway managers continued to discuss the need to break the German and Austrian railway hegemony. They felt that the Verein had been an important instrument for establishing a powerful Germany. They expected that after the war military battles would continue in the economic fi eld, and hence they proposed plans for a new railway line that would avoid Germany and create what they called an anti-German barrier. After the Armistice, the French government organized an international inter-parliamentary conference on the topic. It became clear that representatives from the newly- formed states in East-Central Europe including, for example, the Czech foreign minister Edvard Beneš, supported the project. He suggested that his country would connect to the new line to the East. This would create links with Russia and Poland, bypassing Germany.69 Already at the start of the twentieth century, due to growing political confl icts and localized wars as in the Balkans, international negotiations on railway matters were becoming more delicate. The spirit of relatively-strong railway unity in Europe during

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the nineteenth century seemed lost. Despite the experience of the First World War as a civilizational catastrophe, however, experts from the Verein, the Berne Union, and other railway organizations believed they would be able to rebuild a European technological railway zone of the standard gauge—reconstruction efforts that will next be discussed.

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In 1922 Osborne Mance, a renowned transport expert, published his views on the role of transport in international relations.1 He argued that there could be no civilization without transportation. Following in the footsteps of Chevalier, Mance expressed a fi rm belief in the myth of the network. Building railway networks would also lead to enhanced political security. Mance argued that the creation of transnational railway networks might in the fi rst instance provoke hostile reactions and even contribute to the origins of wars. Such bitter experience only served as a reminder that “there are common interests which are essential to the existence and development of all other interest.”2 In his view, the League of Nations should become the main voice for these common interests. It could do its job best by focusing on technical issues. This language clearly shows the infl uence of prominent League offi cial Arthur Salter. Mance promoted “informal non-binding discussion between experts before national policies are decided on, ... carried out in private.” He also argued that the good results of the League’s Transit Committee work during its fi rst years could largely be attributed to personal contacts among the experts and abandoning the “old method of corresponding through Foreign

141

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Offi ces and Embassies.” Furthermore, Mance warned of “being stampeded back to the ‘Old Diplomacy’ over some political issue.”3 Mance could draw on his rich experience in railway management. He had served in South Africa as an army offi cer administering railways. He then became transport advisor to the British delegation during the Versailles negotiations and participated in its Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways. Subsequently, he was involved in initiating the League of Nations’ Transit Commit- tee and in discussions on solving railway problems in East-Central Europe and the Balkans which had resulted from the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. Mance would retire and leave the League in 1924, but continued to work on railway issues.4 Osborne Mance experienced what he termed “old diplomacy” in dealing with the Habsburg Empire’s disintegrated railway system.5 With the creation of new states Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), the line from Lviv via Cracow to Vienna was cut into three sections (Polish, Czechoslovak, and Austrian), while the line from Vienna south to the port of Trieste was divided among Austria, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Each section now had different prices, which were quoted in different languages and in different currencies. Freight had to be paid for in advance. Through tickets were no longer available. The now independent states faced the challenge of having to constitute a national railway system and a host of new border stations. For example, the truncated state of Hungary, which had lost large territory to Romania and Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of Trianon, had to establish forty-nine border stations, and Austria fi fteen. A major problem was the uneven distribution of rolling-stock. Newly- created countries claimed all wagons that happened to be on their tracks as war booty. Wagons could only be exchanged on a one-for- one basis.6 The railways from Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia sought to establish a new organization to replace the Verein, which appeared to have buttressed German hegemony in East-Central Europe. They took a fi rst step in May 1921 when the Italian State Railways hosted a conference at Stresa, attended by representatives from the railways of fi fteen European countries. They formed the International Union of Railway Wagons usually referred to as RIV for freight wagons and RIC for passenger wagons.7 The Wagon regulations allowed freight wagons to

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continue their journey across borders, with the help of a system of clearing accounts for their use. The receiving railway company had to pay a rent that was calculated on a daily basis and on a sliding scale in order to prevent a delay in their return. The railways also accepted paying fi nes for breaches of rules. The Union’s decisions were binding when taken by a two-thirds majority.8 Although designed to replace the Verein, the wording of the new rules was almost exactly the same as the earlier Verein regulations.9 The establishment of the RIV/RIC did not speed up cross- border traffi c in the Habsburg Empire’s successor states, however. Crucially, the RIV/RIC rules implied that the ownership of wagons was clear, whereas the newly-created states actually contested who owned what. Therefore, special measures were needed and the Italian State Railways called another conference in Portorose in November 1921. The delegates aimed to discuss a wider range of practical problems that had resulted from the Empire’s break-up. It was the fi rst conference which the Western European states did not dominate.10 Among other things, participants agreed to create a common wagon pool and provisionally to mark the wagons, which would not prejudice their fi nal allocation, but in the meantime allow their free circulation. In a report written for the League in 1923, Mance concluded that this agreement was a success.11 Yet the fi nal allocation of wagons was never resolved; and the resulting uncertainty impacted adversely on repairs in the common wagon pool. Throughout the 1920s, despite laborious negotiations in almost two hundred meetings, a dedicated League Distribution Commission could not achieve a breakthrough. In August 1931, the Commission stopped its work without having resolved the outstanding issues. A later report written under Mance’s auspices concluded that such technical issues should not have been dealt with through diplomatic channels: “It is diffi cult not to feel that with reasonable foresight and goodwill the matter could have been more speedily and very much more satisfactorily settled.”12 The key question was, however, which institutional platform to use? The Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Verein) was no longer recognized as a legitimate organization as widely as before the First World War. Moreover, its technological zone (Verein territory) was reduced from 101,500 km of railway track in 1913 to 73,093 km in 1926 as a result of the various peace treaties concluded at the end of the

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war.13 It remained transnational as it continued to comprise the German, Dutch, Austrian, and Hungarian railways, but had much less authority.

Transnational Organizations Competing

The Portorose delegates not only agreed on a common wagon pool, but they also saw the need for a new pan-European organization to replace the Verein. Their recommendation to establish such an organization was taken up in spring 1922 by the organizers of the intergovernmental World Economic Conference held in Genoa. At this conference, for the fi rst time since the War, Germany and the newly-created bolshevist Soviet Union were invited to participate as equals. This meant that the issue of replacing the Verein was negotiated in the presence of German railway representatives. Although staged as an economic conference, it was largely a political gathering which sought to reshape the postwar order, including relations with Germany and Russia. This turned out to be very diffi cult.14 Nevertheless, the separate meeting of transport experts was a success.15 The German representatives agreed that a new railway organization should be created. They insisted however that it should not become part of the League. They saw the League as a politicized organization of the Allied powers. The Germans actually invited the French railways to organize the new institutional framework. Railway experts, including the Germans, felt that it was necessary to de-politicize international railway relations once again. From their perspective, inviting the French railways that were still in private ownership was the best way forward.16 Thus in December 1922, the expert-led Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC) was established by forty-six railway administrations from twenty seven countries in Europe including Germany, and two from Asia (Japan and China, six companies). By the end of 1924 fi fty-three companies from thirty countries including Russia had signed up.17 Interestingly, however, the UIC never gained a prominent role among the various railway organizations during the interwar years. The existing railway organizations such as the Berne Union

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Fig. 5.1 A Technical Code for Doing Politics: After the Great War Allied railway experts wanted to create one new central railway organization, which would not be dominated by the German. In 1922 they established the Union Internationale des Chemins de fer. The Union created what became known as the UIC Code for the railways, which consisted of hundreds of leafl ets on railway standards developed by railway experts. They dealt with rolling stock, train traction, safety, signaling systems, platforms, and after the Second World War also with pictograms which were standardized. This work on standards was never purely technical since political confl ict about dominance was never far away and experts sought technifi cation in order to overcome political confl ict and create conditions for peace.

for the development and implementation of international transport law, RIV/RIC for mutual wagon use, and the European Timetable Conference, did not want to grant the UIC a coordinating role. Only the Unité Technique (for technical standardization) worked closely with the various UIC technical committees.18 The Verein also began to reassert itself.19 It started to compete with the UIC for infl uence. The struggle for dominance in East-Central Europe

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between the Verein and the UIC became very obvious at the Mitteleuropäische Verkehrstagung conference in 1926, organized by a newly-created foundation which aimed to promote regional economic integration.20 At this meeting the economist and former Hungarian minister of trade, Elemér Hantos, argued that the East-Central European railways should be organized separately and follow Verein principles. The UIC rules were too general, while the East-Central European railways had been united in the Verein before the war. In a later publication he elaborated his view, arguing that chaos now ruled whereas thanks to the Verein regulations the region had enjoyed railway unity before the First World War. In those days people did not speak about “foreign wagons” and did not have to deal with what Hantos saw as artifi cial borders.21 His plea naturally reso- nated well with Hungarian policy aimed at either the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy or the territorial expansion of a Greater Hungary. Otakar Lankáš, a high-level offi cial from the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Railways, opposed the German-dominated Verein and what he saw as attempts by Hungarian politicians to restore Hungarian power in the region. He emphasized the need to develop a new international regime for railways. Referring to various conferences and organizations, he believed that this regime was under construction. Lankáš wanted to overcome the remaining problems through a specifi c focus on East-Central Europe. He perceived such a regional group as a stepping stone towards a broader European regime, however. He also stressed that the main precondition for any further reform was a complete de-politicization of all transport relations. The UIC secretary-general, Gaston Leverve, who was also present, suggested that his organization could be a suitable home for such a regional group. It was clear that Lankáš preferred the UIC option above an association of some sort with the Verein.22 In contrast, Hantos saw no benefi ts in the UIC option, as it could not take binding decisions, whereas its rules were copied from the Verein.23 A League observer wrote in his report after the meeting that railway discussions usually led to such controversies between supporters of the Verein and those of the UIC.24 Not surprisingly the conference had no clear result. It decided not to use either the Verein or the UIC, but instead stressed the need for direct

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collaboration among the various East-Central European railway administrations, and to create an expert committee to facilitate such cooperation.25 Afterward, Hantos recommended that the Verein change its name. It should fl ag a Central and East-Central European ambition, although it was clear that German companies would have a dominant position. With such a name change, several East-Central European countries would be interested in joining it.26 The concept of Central Europe—the term used by Hantos—was highly contested during this period.27 During the First World War, the German national liberal Friedrich Naumann had popularized the idea of Mitteleuropa (Central Europe) to promote the region’s economic and political reorganization under German hegemony.28 At the time Naumann proposed a list of areas for which transnational common policies should be formulated, including railways.29 Responding to such German ambitions, the Czech politician Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk promoted a union of nations that lay between the great powers of Germany and Russia/Soviet Union, but completely independent of German infl uence—an approach also refl ected in France’s support for the Little Entente alliance formed in 1920–1 between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania to counter German, Austrian, and Hungarian revisionism. In 1929 the Verein changed its statutes to enable the accession of associate members. Immediately, the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish railways joined. In 1932, to signal its ambition for the integration of East-Central European countries more explicitly, the Verein changed its name to Verein Mitteleuropäischer Eisen- bahnverwaltungen.30 But the railway administrations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia did not respond. On the contrary, they had formed a regional group within UIC in 1930.31 In fact, the relations between these different organizations and groups remained strained until the Second World War. The war then provided a new opportunity to rethink the position of the various organizations. Between 1940 and 1945 London became a center for discussing postwar transport developments. Already in September 1940, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) became a platform for debating transport. The institute was an infl uential think tank, created in 1920 to study international problems with a view to preventing future wars. It commissioned a large study of international transport and communication coordinated by Mance, who drew on both the available

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Fig. 5.2 Gauges and Technological Zones: The Soviet Union was never part of the European Railway technological zone. It kept its own gauge and set of standards. In this sense the Soviet Union was not part of Europe. When the Soviets conquered part of Poland, they converted the tracks to their gauge, and the Germans converted them back when they crossed Polish territory in their quest to make the Soviet Union a colony of their European order.

expertise in transnational organizations and League of Nations materials.32 In the fi nal report published in 1946, Mance stressed the need for more coordination among the various transport organizations for creating one pan-European regime. To achieve this, the Verein had to be dissolved, since its continued existence after the First World War had caused too many problems. Mance reminded his readers that: “it must be remembered that while the common danger had led allies to pool resources during both wars, this spirit of collaboration evaporated rapidly after the last war as soon as the immediate danger ceased to exist.” He argued that this time around states should accept that international relations could only be improved via the delegation of decision-making powers to international bodies run by “objectively minded” personalities who “without any sacrifi ce of national patriotism have developed an international outlook.” Mance promoted transport and communications as promising fi elds for tighter cooperation since transport experts of different

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countries were used to working closely together. As he put it: “They are apt to forget politics in the pursuit of their respective technical problems.”33 In fact, Mance was thinking of the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO), which the Allied Forces had established as the war drew to a close, under the leadership of Englebert Roger Hondelink, a Dutch transport expert.34 Hondelink was the obvious candidate to head the ECITO secretariat. He was trained as a civil engineer at the Technical University Delft in the Netherlands before the First World War. Subsequently, after a short time spent with the Dutch railways he participated in a wide range of international transport projects during the interwar years, mainly in the Far East. In 1936, Delft appointed him as part-time professor of transport engineering. Hondelink happened to be in Brussels when the Second World War started and fl ed to England, where he became involved in discussions on postwar reconstruction. There he headed the Technical Advisory Committee on Inland Transport (TACIT) created in October 1942, often called the Hondelink Committee.35 In October 1945 Hondelink published his views on transport problems in Europe.36 He opened his article by portraying transport as “a primary problem in the restoration of Europe to sanity and order ... For the last twelve months the cry from the national authorities of each of the liberated areas has been for transport, as a fi rst essential for the re-establishment of the economic life of their countries.”37 ECITO reports between 1945 and 1947 underlined the importance of transport. They were fi lled with descriptions of the lamentable state of postwar railways, frustrating border formali- ties, and the diffi culties involved in making payments in different non-convertible currencies in the midst of urgent calls for transport of vital products such as coal, fi sh, and potatoes for freezing and starving people. Immediately after the war, ECITO estimated that at least 15 percent of the wagon stock had been destroyed and 40 percent damaged. Moreover, a staggering 600,000 wagons were outside of their countries of origin.38 In this article, Hondelink revisited one of the cornerstones of the technocratic internationalist belief: the distinction between the political and technical. ECITO should deal with technical issues only and not with political ones. Political issues included the treatment of wagons as reparations, the uncertain ownership of railway stock due to de facto border changes (as between Poland and Germany), and the control over the German railway system by Allied military authorities.

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Hondelink distinguished between technical problems of a long- Fig. 5.3 Railways Implicated in Holocaust: term and short-term character and divided the latter into three Right after the war the categories: engineering, movement, and coordination. Engineering railways presented themselves again as the harbingers of involved repairing damage, replacing losses, and restoring transport peace in Europe. Railway equipment to its original owner. Movement referred to the necessary experts and managers did not micro-planning of all railway traffi c across borders, and coordination assess the role of the railways in deporting Jews and others to the necessary liaison and cooperation between different transport to the concentration camps organizations whose regulations had to be reinstated in order to and if discussed presented it return to normalcy. Apart from solving such short-term problems, as a technical job they had to do. They felt that they were ECITO had to lay the groundwork for a solution to long-term issues. not responsible for what they These included more structural coordination among the large variety carried and even praised the effective cooperation across of railway and other transport organizations, the standardization and borders despite the political modernization of equipment, and the international pooling of railway tensions. This was even rolling stock, in order to prevent empty returns. How Hondelink and argued by railway experts who had been active in the ECITO implemented these ideas becomes clear in their approach to resistance movement. The two related problems, which had also plagued the interwar settlement, picture shows the arrival of a train containing Jews particularly in East-Central Europe: the return of railway wagons to deported to Auschwitz death their identifi ed owner and the establishment of a wagon pool. camp in Poland.

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Fig. 5.4 Overcoming Political Tensions: After Returning Railway Wagons the war railway wagons were scattered all over Europe. Transport experts ECITO decided early on that a return of wagons should be based built an infrastructure to on a complete overview of all available wagons. When ECITO return wagons. The process provoked heated debates and started work, reliable data on the number and location of rolling political tensions. Wagons stock did not exist. Railway wagons and locomotives were scat- were seen as war booty, and tered across Europe as a result of German occupation policies an element of reparations. Nevertheless, the transport and the use of railways for transporting weapons and troops and exports managed to taking Jews and others to the concentration and death camps. For organize a massive amount example, a large number of Polish wagons were left in France, of wagon movements. The the Western Occupied zones and the Netherlands, while Belgian, map pictures the balance sheet of movement of French, and Dutch wagons were in Poland (including former railway wagons arranged German territory). Nearly 45 percent of the locomotives in Poland by ECITO in a specifi c were of German, Belgian, French, and Hungarian origin.39 In week in 1946. addition, many marks of ownership had been repainted to claim

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wagons for the country where they were now found. Diffi cult questions also arose regarding the rightful owners of wagons built for Germany in other countries during the war, and those on the new western Polish territory that had belonged to divisions of the Deutsche Reichsbahn in Breslau, Oppeln, Stettin, and Königsberg. Hondelink and his ECITO offi cials sought to resolve these issues by technifying them. Trying to avoid having to determine the rightful owners of the wagons, ECITO proposed a technical defi nition of identifi cation. It focused on determining the origin of a vehicle—that is, the country in whose books it was entered before the war. Accord- ing to ECITO: “The determination thus made is entirely technical and in no way prejudices the fi nal allocation of the vehicle according to decisions made at a higher [i.e., political] level, but is a necessary prelude to the restitution of vehicles and to the establishment of order in European vehicle stocks.”40 ECITO created elaborate procedures and an infrastructure to achieve its objectives. Thus, identifi cation involved fi lling in a dedicated ECITO form and took place in specifi c workshops with the help of an identifi cation handbook. When the responsible offi cer in an identifi cation workshop was unable to reach a decision, the vehicle was sent to a regional Identifi cation Centre that had extensive documentation about all European rolling stock. When identifi cation was completed, the wagon was marked.41 Then restitution (or redistribution in the case of unidentifi ed wagons) commenced. Again, ECITO developed a technical formula that translated political stakes into seemingly-neutral fi gures. It included the notion of priority and non-priority countries (i.e. the occupied Germany and Austria), the minimum level of stock to be maintained in non-priority countries, and the determination of vital needs and equal distribution among Allied countries.42 This technifi cation strategy did not guarantee a smooth process. The neat distinction between the political and technical, which ECITO offi cials tried to uphold, often broke down in higher-level Council meetings, as well as on the ground. An American observer of the August 1946 Council meeting remarked that “on a great many questions even of a technical nature the Council was split into west–east groupings familiar in political gatherings.”43 Thus, the process of returning railway wagons provoked heated debates.

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All parties perceived them as war booty and reparations, which were urgently needed to stimulate national economies and were sometimes even a matter of life and death for starving people who needed to be fed and kept warm. This becomes especially clear in the issue of Polish wagons, which dragged on for a long time. On February 2, 1946, Hondelink met with Polish offi cials in Warsaw. The Polish delegation stressed that they had more railway track and more industry than before the war (due to the border changes) but fewer wagons, which made reconstruction very diffi cult. Hondelink replied that other countries devastated by the war had needs too and he requested that the Poles quickly compile a list of rolling-stock in the possession of the Polish railways.44 However, Poland delayed delivering this data until the autumn of 1947, even though it was actually prepared on ECITO forms and packed in ten boxes by July 31, 1946.45 The Polish offi cials probably assumed that reporting the data speedily might lead to a loss of wagons. More than 80,000 wagons were categorized as “foreign,” that is, they were owned by other countries and bore their marks. In contrast, the fi rst reports from Western countries participating in the identifi cation procedure revealed only 1,408 wagons of Polish origin in their possession.46 Although the Polish offi cials did not want to disclose their fi gures, they also realized that only full participation in the ECITO process would make it possible to settle mutual claims and identify more Polish wagons in foreign possession.47 Instead of providing numbers, at ECITO meetings Polish experts pushed for their particular, preferred defi nition of what constituted a Polish wagon. This defi nition included wagons of the German railways on former German territory that was now de facto part of Poland. According to ECITO offi cials, however, these wagons were German because “identifi cation is a purely technical matter, not prejudging the ownership of the stock.”48 The Polish tactics were also motivated by a second consideration. They also had to deal with the Soviets and their claims on German wagons as reparation, especially those in the former German territory of Poland. Hence they were uncertain how many wagons they really had, but did not want to disclose this uncertainty to ECITO. From 1945 onwards Soviet troops had repainted any rolling stock bearing German labels including originally Polish ones (repainted by the Germans) with a “T” (Tрофейный –

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“captured”). The Poles now claimed these wagons from the Russians as part of their share in the reparations, and sometimes repainted them again—a veritable “wagon war” according to the former high-level Polish railway offi cial Henryk Różański, who was involved in this confl ict.49 The wagon war continued until early 1947. On February 26, it was settled in a meeting attended by Stalin. The Poles suggested that they retain 45,000 captured German wagons as part of their share in the German reparations. The Soviets accepted this demand eventually, since they also had an interest in reliable transit from their occupation zone in Germany to the Soviet Union on a railway network once more fully under the control of the Polish railways.50 In contrast, the Polish–Western European issue lingered on, while wagon pools were already operational. From the start, it was clear for ECITO experts that the identifi - cation and the process of returning wagons needed time and that border-crossing transport on a wagon-by-wagon basis would slow down activities tremendously. In response the ECITO Council established a Wagon Exchange Commission during the autumn of 1945. This Commission organized a pool that included wagons not yet identifi ed. The Commission’s task was to keep track of all movements and maintain a proper balance sheet between countries by organizing compensatory movements. The Commission met in Paris every week. Its task entailed collecting detailed information and record keeping, in which it was assisted by French railway offi cials. The Commission supervised 900,000 wagon movements across borders by January 1946. Within two years, the Commis- sion managed to facilitate the exchange of between 7 and 8 million wagons. During 1947, this number included 1.5 million compensatory movements, which were also used to return already-identifi ed wagons to their home countries.51 Thus, when a country received a wagon that it had originally owned, it could keep it, but had to return a foreign wagon. In this way 140,000 wagons were returned to their countries of origin by 1947.52 The fi rst Wagon Commission, headquartered in Paris, covered Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the American, British, and French Occu- pied Zones in Germany. Hence, many East-Central European countries and the Soviet Occupation Zone did not participate, probably because they did not want to engage in pooling wagons

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with Western European countries while wagon ownership issues remained unresolved. Instead, these countries exchanged wagons on a one-by-one basis, organized through bilateral contacts and ad hoc meetings, not only with Western European countries, but also among themselves.53 In early 1947, during an ECITO meeting, Russian representatives of the Soviet Occupation Zone and experts from Czechoslovakia came to the conclusion that they needed a Wagon Exchange Commission similar to the one in Paris. They called a conference to be held in Prague on April 10–11, 1947. The Soviet state railways were not invited since, as Czechoslovak experts explained in a note to them, “it is exclusively a technical issue ... of railways of standard gauge in central Europe.”54 The new Wagon Exchange Commission for East-Central and South-Eastern Europe with its seat in Prague began to operate on June 14, 1947. Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany, and Yugoslavia took part in the conference in addition to Czechoslova- kia.55 The participation of Italy in particular indicated that wagon pooling was not yet a simple East–West issue of the emergent Cold War. Although both Wagon commissions collaborated and sent observers to their respective meetings, Hondelink contested the East-Central European Wagon Commission. He interpreted it as a sign of regionalism and particularism, whereas the ultimate aim of all European railways should be creating a pan-European order.56 The Wagon exchange principle itself also drew criticism. Some railway offi cials thought that it allowed countries to keep wagons, that it made the identifi cation process more complex, and that countries returned damaged wagons without compensation.57 These offi cials were opposed to any pooling, even if it made effi cient wagon use possible. They preferred a fast return to the interwar RIV regime, which had forced railways to return foreign wagons as fast as possible and made them pay for using them. The Wagon Exchange proponents argued that this was impossible since the RIV regime assumed that the owners of wagons were known. The Paris and Prague Wagon Exchange Commissions eventually continued until the spring of 1948, when the RIV regime for returning wagons was put into place again. One year earlier, during spring 1947, the Allied powers had decided to break up ECITO, the mother organization of the Wagon Exchange

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Commissions. Although the experts believed that their work was far from fi nished, the governments argued that ECITO was an emergency organization whose mandate had been limited to two years from the start. In a fi nal overview of its activities, ECITO concluded that its results were mixed. On the wagon issue, it noted that a large number had not been identifi ed and restituted. It warned that while “immense progress has been made in the restoration of European transport ... the situation is in delicate balance which the coming winter may rudely upset ... An international crisis [in Germany and Austria] ... would quickly develop into a general crisis with unfore- seeable consequences.”58 They called, therefore, for the establishment of a new, expert-led transport organization to be coordinated by the recently created United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Its task would be to fi nish the job that ECITO had started and realize a new pan-European transport order. The UNECE in fact convened a meeting of transport experts to discuss how to proceed.59 This conference was held in Geneva from May 26 to June 6, 1947, just after the fi rst UNECE session at ministerial level.60 It brought together a new generation of transport experts.61 Among the seventy who attended the meeting, only four had been active in the prewar period. They were Georges Harrand and Georges Pader from the UIC, Joseph Fahm from the Berne Convention and Ernesto Ballinari, the RIV/RIC president. Of the 328 experts who had participated in prewar activities of the UIC and the League of Nations’ Transit Committee, only ten were also involved in ECITO and early UNECE railway activities after the Second World War. Within this group, only two occupied infl uential positions: Mance and Branko Lukač, who became Director of the UN Transport and Communications Division in New York and helped to transfer prewar experience, knowledge, and documents to the postwar period. The UNECE in Geneva established an expert-led Inland Trans- port Committee that would operate within the agency but retain its autonomy.62 It held its fi rst session on October 20, 1947, involving delegates from sixteen countries.63 Several had participated in ECITO activities and had been present at the conference of transport experts earlier that year. Experts from Western and Eastern Europe joined in, but not Soviet experts. However, the Soviet Union did send a message that its absence should not be interpreted as a political decision, since it continued to support the UNECE.64

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One of the main topics on the meeting’s agenda was the restitution and redistribution of railway wagons. Here, the Transport Committee had to fi nalize the work started by ECITO. The Polish delegate, Stanislaw Sobieszczański, took the fl oor with a lengthy explanation of his nation’s specifi c problems. He was not satisfi ed with the way ECITO had assigned nationality to wagons. The defi - nition of Polish wagons should include the original Polish wagons of Polish construction on a German pattern, wagons of German origin assigned to Poland after the First World War, and all wagons belonging to the Western (formerly German) Polish provinces. Sobieszczański also argued that Allied countries should not be forced to return any wagons to Germany. They should instead be seen as reparations. He disagreed with ECITO’s technical model for redistribution, which allocated Germany a minimum level of wagons to serve its vital needs. The British delegate responded that this was a political position which could not be considered by the Inland Transport Commit- tee. The Dutch chairman Jan Oyevaar proposed leaving this issue open for the time being since the process of identifi cation was incomplete. At this point, not just Poland, but also the American and British administrations from the Bi-zone (the now combined American–British occupation zone in Germany) had not yet undertaken identifi cation work and remained unwilling to disclose their wagons’ origins. At the end of the session, the ITC formed a new working party. Its task was to look at the identifi cation results and to study possible changes to the prevailing methods. The Inland Transport Committee’s next session convened at the beginning of February 1948 with the same countries and many of the same delegates.65 At this session, it became clear that the American and British occupation authorities were refusing to return wagons. The Czechoslovak delegate called for action on restitution and redistribution instead of the massive collection of statistical data. The Polish representative claimed that he had lost trust in the process. At a third session in October 1948, fi nally, not only Eastern but also some Western European delegates began to support Poland.66 The French delegate argued that Poland had been robbed of its rolling stock and therefore had the right to get it back. He added that other countries had also lost rolling stock to Germany. The French experts’ approach was of course in tune with the general French foreign policy, which still aimed to secure

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reparations for its economic losses and sought to keep Germany weak.67 The refusal of the Bi-zone authorities to collaborate was based on the argument that restitution and redistribution was part of reparations and therefore a political decision. The British representative argued that his country could not accept redistribution based on a technical calculation. At the end of the meeting, the British and American representatives, who had contacted their governments, gave in on the issue of identifi cation, however. They would, fi nally, provide information on foreign rolling stock in the Bi-zone. In 1949, the Inland Transport Committee asked its newly-established Railway Sub-Committee to handle the issue.68 Eventually, the experts were able to resolve it. In 1950, they agreed that the fi nal wagon restitution and redistribution batch would involve sending 11,800 wagons from Poland to Western Europe and 14,800 wagons back to Poland. Thus, at the height of the Cold War, experts were able to bring the wagon issue to a conclusion. ECITO and its successor, the UNECE’s Inland Transport Committee, were more successful than the interwar Distribution Committee, which had to arrange for wagon identifi cation and redistribution in the former Habsburg Empire. People like Hondelink and Mance had studied the interwar legacy. They knew what they were up to and what to avoid. The challenge was not the same, of course, but in both cases political tensions were very apparent. The real difference was that ECITO and the Inland Transport Committee crafted a political strategy of technifi cation which helped them to overcome political divisions. Although the technical parameters were constantly debated and challenged, they at least kept the process going. They created a cognitive space for discussion and a mandate for action. The experts’ ambitions went beyond resolving the wagon issue, however. They wanted to return to the prewar, pan-European railway regime controlled by railway managers and experts.

Overcoming Old Divisions

In October 1949, the UNECE’s Inland Transport Railway Sub- Committee organized a special session to discuss the structural reform of international transport organizations.69 Representatives

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of transport ministries from Western and Eastern Europe and from railway organizations participated. In particular, the relationship between these railway organizations and the newly-created Inland Transport Committee led to heated debate. Government delegates argued that railways should respond to government needs and their organizations should become adjuncts of the Inland Transport Committee. As the Dutch representative pointed out, railways had a signifi cant impact on public fi nances, on a country’s economic position, and on international relations. During the debate, the director of the UNECE’s Transport Division warned railways and government representatives that business as usual would not work. He stressed that “the necessity of planning in a new Europe, in the interest of both Western and Eastern Europe ... [requires] the relinquishment of certain national, and even professional, habits of exclusiveness, the age of ivory tower [is] over and done with and activities should be rationalized on the international, as well as on the professional, plan.”70 But railway managers and experts were suspicious that the United Nations, and with it the Inland Transport Committee, “was vulnerable to political infl uences.”71 The existing transnational and international organizations resisted, just as they had done during the interwar years, when the newly-established League of Nations Transit Committee had tried to subordinate them. On September 28, 1949, shortly before the UNECE meeting, railway managers of all the major companies in Western Europe had already met in Brussels to discuss this issue. They advised the UNECE Inland Transport Committee that they strongly opposed any subordination of existing railway bodies to this governmental international body. They felt that railways should be free to organize themselves internationally without being directed by a political organ. Several government delegates at the Committee meeting hastened to add that they respected this call for independence and acknowledged the existence of a separate international technical sphere, yet they felt that railways should respond to the need for more international coordination. Those present eventually agreed to invite the UIC to assume a coordinating role that would make it responsible for unifying the activities of various railway organizations on a pan-European level, including the RIV/RIC, the organizations responsible for wagon exchange.

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Fig. 5.5 Europeaniza- tion of Railway Wag- ons: The French and German railways developed a new wagon pool system which would not force railways to return wagons as fast as possible when they crossed borders. Each railway company would contribute wagons to the pool and these then could be used for international transport. This meant that the use (but not the ownership) of wagons was de-nationalized. The pool was coined EUROP symbolizing the anticipated Europeanization of railways.

After the UNECE meeting, the UIC negotiated a formal agreement with various transnational railway organizations and with the Inland Transport Committee towards this end.72 This agreement gave the UIC a new coordinating role and led to its close collaboration with the Inland Transport Committee in the early 1950s. Formally, the UIC would function as the technical arm of the Inland Transport Committee. In reality, from 1950 onwards, the UIC acted

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quite independently. Thus, the outcome of the confl ict was another resounding success for the transport experts. They had sought and got an extensive mandate to operate on their own as long as they dealt with technical questions. The UIC became the main owner of this mandate and a central platform for collaboration across borders. Just as during the interwar years, the UIC had pan-European membership and pan-European ambitions, although East-Central European countries were not very active before 1954. There, railway companies and experts had to deal with a new set of pressures from the communist regimes established in the Soviet bloc.

Collaborating in East-Central Europe

After the war the Soviet Union pushed East-Central European countries to reorganize their international railway system. Already at a conference in Belgrade in October 1947, the Soviet Union proposed that East-Central Europe should leave the Western Euro- pean railway regime and join the Soviet regime, including adopting its standards.73 The representatives of Czechoslovakia, which at the time was still governed by a coalition which had emerged out of democratic elections, were responsible for the ECITO Wagon Exchange Commission. They argued against such subordination to the Soviet regime. They preferred to apply the Berne Convention and RIV/RIC regulations upholding the prewar pan-European regime. Although they embraced closer economic relations with the Soviet Union, and pushed for a better connection to the Soviet network, they also wanted to stimulate traffi c with the West.74 They realized that accepting the new Soviet rules would result in many ineffi ciencies, extra costs, and greater political dependence. It would mean that they would have to implement two transnational regimes simultaneously.75 Yet, at the next conference in Warsaw on December 6–12, 1948 following the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, an agreement for goods and passenger transport was signed. It became known under its Russian abbreviations SMPS/SMGS.76 Each year transport ministers and experts met to discuss international transport issues and to propose improvements of the SMPS/

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SMGS system. A clear difference from the West was that transport ministries were more fully in control of the railway organizations. Although railways in both Eastern and Western Europe had become nationalized by the late 1940s, those in Western Europe retained a quasi-independent status and railway experts negotiated standards on the international level without direct inference by policy-makers from transport ministries. By the end of 1948, in all East-Central European countries the process of Sovietization was in full swing. This included not only the political seizure of power by communist parties, but also the adoption of a specifi c socialist modernization model.77 Many railway experts embraced this model, which emphasized planning and the crucial role of railways at the expense of road transport. In the case of railways, therefore, Sovietization did not simply amount to the creation of an empire by coercion. Instead, it was also based on the domestic appropriation of the Soviet modernization style by national railway experts.78 To a certain extent they were guided by Soviet railway advisors, yet they also had to improvise and make the system work in their specifi c situations, in particular concerning the fact that their railways operated on the normal gauge and that they needed to mediate between two rule systems, as in the case of wagon exchange. The railways in the Soviet bloc had to develop their own system for wagon exchange. Soviet advisors pushed for mutual wagon use, and some kind of pooling system. The East-Central Euro- pean countries did not want to lose control over their wagons, however. Thus, they developed a system for returning wagons, known as PPV, which contained many rules similar to the RIV/ RIC.79 The main difference was that it used much lower fees for the use of wagons. Calculations based on actual costs incurred were regarded as a capitalist practice. Socialist cooperation on the other hand should be about mutual help and satisfying real needs.80 This principle soon became a bone of contention, however. Countries like Poland and East Germany owned higher- quality wagons and had problems with getting enough of them back. Consequently, the Polish railways proposed several times to raise the fee. When the issue could not be resolved in negotiations at either expert or government level, on April 19, 1958 the Polish Ministry of Transport unilaterally terminated the PPV and announced that it would henceforth apply Western RIC/RIV rules for socialist countries.81 At the next conference of transport

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Fig. 5.6 A Multi- layered Technological Zone: After the Second ministries, however, Poland was forced to give in under pressure World War the East- from all other countries, but especially from the Soviet Union. Central European 82 countries had to mediate Polish representatives continued to raise the issue of fees, but it between two railway was never resolved. systems: the Soviet system The example of the wagon exchange issue shows how railway (called SMGS on the map) and the system that had experts sought to implement a Sovietized railway system in a fl exi- been used in the remaining ble manner seeking to harmonize the SMPS/SMGS system with the part of Europe (called CIM existing Western European regime, especially after Stalin’s death on the map). They sought to harmonize both systems, in 1953 increased their room for maneuver. Although the Soviet but this often proved Union and East-Central European countries and railways never left diffi cult. They ended up the UNECE’s Inland Transport Committee or the UIC, they did not with using a double system which led to the formation participate in any meetings at the height of the Cold War, during the of a separate technological Korean War from 1950 to 1953. With the beginning of a three-year zone with a layered set period of early détente, they returned. At the fi rst UIC meeting of of regulations. This is a typical technocratic railway directors early in 1954, Richard Urx, the Czechoslovakian internationalist solution deputy minister of transport, reminded his colleagues that the which avoids political Czechoslovakian railways had fully participated in the UIC from negotiations and focuses on technical solutions. the start. He argued that railways did not only bridge the capitalist

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and socialist systems, they also shared a similar wartime experience. They were, therefore, in a pivotal position to make peaceful co-existence—the new Soviet foreign policy slogan—possible. This new Soviet approach was steeped in the belief that state control and planning would eventually produce a socialist type of economic development which would out-compete the capitalist market economies.83 In fact, Urx expressed this belief when he talked about the different challenges that railways faced in the East and West. While in the East the main problem was how to build up enough transport capacity and increase effi ciency in order to fulfi l production goals, in the West railways had to face rampant competition from cars, trucks and airplanes, which led to ineffi ciencies. His speech struck a chord with the Western Euro- pean railway directors from state-owned companies. On the one hand they felt that railways could become a means to overcome East–West divisions. On the other hand they agreed that they had to face what they saw as wasteful competition with the road and air sectors.84 At several SMPS/SMGS transport conferences during the 1950s, representatives of transport ministries and state-owned railway companies continued discussing how to further international collaboration within the Soviet bloc and with the West. In 1956, at a Sofi a conference, the transport ministries decided to establish an Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) which began operating in 1957.85 Its statues gave broad competences to this new organization and created eleven expert committees. One of the main aims was to improve the circulation of wagons and to establish scientifi c and technical cooperation within the Soviet bloc. Yet the OSJD also aimed for more collaboration with other international railway organizations such as the UIC. The central idea was that East-Central European countries would be in a better position to negotiate if they could coordinate their actions though a joint organization. Before the OSJD was implemented, leading SMGS/SMPS experts initiated a debate on the topic of international collaboration.86 Jan Kalina, Urx’s successor as Czechoslovak deputy minister of transport, argued that, in addition to exchanging information and documentation, the OSJD should also engage in more direct forms of cooperation, such as coordinated action in areas of shared interest. Kalina referred to all important railway organizations and mentioned explicitly the

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option of harmonizing railway regulations between the “East and West.”87 Once the OSJD began operations, one of its experts raised two diffi cult questions with the national ministries: fi rst, whether the OSJD should be seen as an organization of railway administrators or as an intergovernmental body, or in other words, as a transnational or an international organization; and what kind of mandate experts would get for negotiating standards and regulations. Second, how did the OSJD’s spatial reach into Asia affect the relationship with other European railway organizations? These questions were left unanswered. De facto, however, it became clear that high-level experts from national transport ministries, and not experts from the state railways, tended to dominate the OSJD. But they also sought to minimize technical differences between East and West.88 Thus, in the 1957 meeting in Beijing the delegates confi rmed that offi cial policy was to harmonize as much as possible OSJD transport documents with the Berne Convention. In the 1950s it became clear that the Sovietization of railways in East-Central Europe meant the formation of a technological zone for railways with a layered set of rules and regulations. The zone was governed by shared Sovietized railway regulations (referred to as SMPS/SMGS), and a set of rules set by organizations such as the UIC, the Berne Union, and the RIV/RIC which traditionally aimed at establishing a pan-European regime. These rules only pertained to transnational traffi c. National transport which constituted by far the largest amount of railway traffi c, continued to be governed by national rules. Experts in the OSJD were to ensure that these different layers would be better linked. When the OSJD began its operation in 1957, however, the UIC had already embarked on a wide range of new initiatives. As a result, it would prove even more diffi cult for East-Central European countries to bridge the widening gap.

Working Together in the West

The driving force behind new initiatives in Western Europe at this time was Louis Armand, the energetic new UIC chairman appointed in 1951. He was a technocratic internationalist par excellence who had

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fi nished fi rst and second in his classes at the French elite institutions, the École Polytechnique and the École des Mines. Before and during the Second World War he had worked for the French railways. In 1946, Armand became adjunct director of the French railways and, in 1949, their director-general. From the start, he was a leading proponent of new transnational initiatives, such as the creation of a European Wagon Pool, the establishment of a new European Research Laboratory, and a European investment fi rm (Eurofi ma) for railways which allowed the nationalized railways to purchase equipment collectively at lower prices.89 All these initiatives involved West German participation. Armand did not want to dwell on the interwar struggle for dominance between the Verein and the UIC or, for that matter, the subsequent war. Instead he pointed out that railway experts had always been able to overcome differences, as during the interwar years and even during the German occupation.90 The German railways had, of course, played a crucial role not only in the Nazi war effort, but also in organizing the Holocaust. Back in August 1932, before the National Socialists came to power in Germany, Carl Stieler, then one of the Reichsbahn directors, who had played a leading role in the Verein, had expressed his fear that Adolf Hitler would end the Reichbahn’s autonomy and limit the experts’ ability to manage the railways. To retain this formal autonomy subsequently became the Reichsbahn’s main objective. Its Board of Directors therefore sought a gentlemen’s agreement with Hitler which was concluded in September 1934. According to this pact, the Reichsbahn retained its formal autonomy in return for full cooperation with the new regime. As a result, it made its services freely available to the SS and other party and regime institutions. It handled the transport of Jews and other victims to the concentration and death camps in a routine fashion, fi tting them into its operating plans as additional freight. Train traffi c to the camps went smoothly. In fact, the Nazi dictatorship had chosen Auschwitz, Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka as death camps precisely because they had access to main railway lines. Many Reichsbahn managers and experts realized that they were transporting millions of people to their deaths, but they did not care much. Although they could do so without negative consequences, few railway offi cials asked to be transferred away from these transports.91 Armand had actively resisted the German occupation and was decorated for it after the war. Nevertheless, he believed that the

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war had strengthened the spirit of collaboration between French and German railway experts. Under diffi cult circumstances they had been able to work together. In his view this had been possible because many German railway offi cials had resisted the “Nazi infection.”92 After the war neither Armand not the German offi - cials were keen to dwell on the trains that had delivered millions of people to their deaths in the German camps. For them this was the work of Nazi Germany, not of railway experts. German railway offi cials also propagated the postwar myth that the National Socialists had exercised little infl uence on the Reichsbahn, which had concentrated on its technical responsibilities and had stayed clear of politics. When asked, after 1945, about their wartime roles, many claimed to have stayed with the Reichsbahn because they had hoped to “do some good.”93 Crucially, this view was not merely an argument used to cover up the effective participation of the German railways, managers, experts, and workers in war crimes; it was actually an expression of deeply-held convictions, and of a collective memory which was at least in part shared across borders by Armand and many other railway experts in formerly occupied territories. Even Richard Urx from Czechoslovakia reminded his audience of the successful wartime collaboration.94 With the past safely ignored and the immediate postwar reconstruction complete, Western European railways increasingly confronted the new competition from road and air transport. The UIC sought to develop a new strategy for dealing with this competition. In February 1951, it circulated a report that provides insights into its vision of the future.95 According to the report, although railway traffi c had reached on average 150 percent of its prewar volume, the railway companies nevertheless faced huge defi cits and competition from roads, which were attracting a far larger portion of the postwar traffi c boom. While the public and many policy-makers perceived railways as an outdated transport mode, the railway experts continued to believe that they were a rational, effi cient, and modern transport system that had defi ni- tive advantages over roads in terms of speed, cost, and capacity, particularly for long-distance movement of bulky goods and for passengers. But it would be necessary for governments to coordinate road and rail transport to avoid an unfair advantage for roads, which did not have to bear the cost of their infrastructure,

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Fig. 5.7 Railways as Harbinger of a New Europe: After the war the railways embarked on a number of projects they experienced and communicated as European. They not only sought to Europeanize the railways in order to be able to compete with trucks, automobiles, and airplanes, but also because they believed railways had a mission to build peace in Europe across borders.

nor comply with public service obligations, such as keeping remote regions connected and serving unprofi table lines. The railway experts also considered competition from road transport dreadful because it created ineffi ciencies, duplication, and waste and because it could ultimately destroy railways. As the authors of the report dryly pointed out, this was only a problem for Western Europe and not for East-Central Europe, where governments privileged railways and protected them against unfair and ruinous competition.

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The UIC also acknowledged, however, that the railways had to make drastic changes themselves. The strategy report called for a radical modernization of the railways’ own technologies and operations. It highlighted the need to create a European industry that could mass-produce standardized new rolling stock to replace the great variety of aging wagons, thus reducing costs substantially. Furthermore, the report argued that railways needed a research and development capability and had to ratio- nalize the operation of wagon loads to prevent empty returns and facilitate faster transit. The railway companies should pursue a European integration strategy, particularly to reap scale benefi ts that would rescue the national railways. According to Armand, the postwar era called for the creation of a “Europe of railways.”96 The fi rst project Armand proposed to modernize railways was the European Wagon Pool. Armand argued that the RIV regulations for goods wagons refl ected, as he saw it, the wishes of states (and the military) to control their wagons in times of the interwar rivalry. He wanted to return to the pool principle, so effectively managed by the Paris Wagon Exchange Commission, but abandoned in 1948. In 1950 under Armand’s leadership, the French and German railways began to explore the possibility of a new wagon pool.97 The core idea was that each railway company would contribute a substantial number of wagons to be used for international transport. These wagons could be used even to bring loads to third countries that did not participate in the pool. Each railway company was obliged to ensure that it did not use more wagons from the pool than it contributed. If the balance was disturbed, they could return a wagon situated close to the border. An offi ce would keep track of all wagon movements and order returns if necessary. The country using the wagon would also make repairs, but not conduct major overhauls. While the use of wagons was to be de-nationalized, they would still be owned by one of the national companies. The great advantage of this solution would be that railways did not have to return each wagon as soon as possible.98 The resulting bilateral Franco-German agreement came into force on May 1, 1951, and replaced the RIV regulations for the pooled wagons. The French railways contributed 30,000 closed wagons and 20,000 open wagons, while the German railways provided 10,000 closed wagons and 40,000 open wagons. The wagons in the

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pool would be used alongside wagons operating under RIV rules and therefore needed clear signs. Upon Armand’s proposal the agreement specifi ed the use of EUROP as the name for the pool, symbolizing the de-nationalization of wagon use and the future progressive Europeanization of the agreement. It was an open project. Other railways had a standing invitation to join the club.99 The initial results of the Franco-German agreement showed 90 percent fewer empty runs and a signifi cant reduction of costs compared to the RIV regime.100 Thus, more railways were eager to join. The UIC, in collaboration with the Inland Transport Commit- tee, created a special committee to propose a format for extending the system. On March 2, 1952, eight other railways approved a fi nal text and decided to join the pool, which now consisted of 152,679 wagons. In addition to the French and German wagons, the railways of the Saarland, which still formed an economic union with France at this time, contributed 4,100 wagons, Austria 4,500, Belgium 19,500, Denmark 600, Italy 15,000, Luxembourg 1,235, the Netherlands 3,750, and Switzerland 4,000.101 The UIC’s journal introduced the pool as a European manifestation of solidarity and trust.102 Initial evaluations of the enlarged pool again demonstrated its success in signifi cantly reducing empty returns and costs.103 The railway companies could not contribute all of their wagons to the pool, however. The limiting factor for expansion was the quality of wagon stock. A wagon could only enter the pool if it met specifi ed standards.104 During their discussions, the participants agreed to focus on quality above quantity. One of their aims was to prevent the moral hazard that would appear if companies contributed low-quality wagons while using higher-quality wagons in return. Another goal was to boost the quality of wagons. Compa- nies joining the pool agreed that when they ordered new rolling stock, they would use the new specifi cations under development by the UIC. The ultimate goal was confi rmation of one European standardized wagon for each type (open, covered, and later, fl at wagons). Since 1947 the Inland Transport Committee and the UIC had been working on standardizing spare parts and various wagon types. However this had turned out to be a complex problem due to a large variety of wagons and differences between countries. To speed up the process, the Inland Transport Committee suggested that the UIC set up an international study bureau. Thus, the UIC created the Offi ce for Research and Testing and mandated it to

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develop and test seven types of wagons to reduce what its director F.Q. Den Hollander called the “chaos of different types.”105 The results of the Offi ce for Research and Testing’s work were integrated into the wagon pool requirements.106 The new research center not only tried to standardize existing types but also initiated technological innovation. It successfully embarked on a program for the development of what it called the wagon of tomorrow.107 Eventually this work led to the introduction of a cluster of standardized European wagon types. As of 1958 only these wagons could be used in the pool which was limited to 150,000 wagons. By 1975 this total was doubled and covered almost half of the wagons used internationally by pool members. The remaining wagons continued to be subject to RIV regulations.108 From the start, Armand wanted to complement the Wagon Pool and the development of standardized European wagons with a European fi nancing system. He urged companies to place orders jointly, in order to reduce costs by exploiting economies of scale. In 1955 the European Company for the Financing of Railway Rolling Stock (Eurofi ma), a European investment fund to attract capital, became another success story of Western European transnational collaboration.109 Eurofi ma used the acquired capital to buy wagons which were then leased to the railway companies. In addition, railways also developed specialized wagons jointly, for example for the transport of perishable food. In 1949, a number of companies, in collaboration with the Inland Transport Commit- tee, formed the International Railway Company for Refrigerated Transport (Interfrigo).110 It began as a study group, but its founding members, the railways of Belgium, France, Italy, the Nether- lands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom soon transformed it into an international enterprise that developed a European pool of specialized wagons. The UIC led by Armand not only Europeanized goods transport in this way. It also worked on passenger transport, establishing the Trans Europ Express network and the Europabus initiative. Hollander proposed the fi rst in 1953. It was operated by a transnational committee and used dedicated newly-designed passenger wagons. It commenced running in 1955 and served seventy cities in Western Europe between Hamburg, Amsterdam, Paris, Marseilles, Milan, and Zurich during the 1960s.111 The second, Europabus, was a European bus network organized by eleven Western European

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Fig. 5.8 The Harmonization of National Difference: When railway wagons crossed borders they had to be marked, depending on which regime applied to their use. It could be the OPW regime created by the East-Central European countries after the Second World War, or RIV/RIC system developed after the First World War, or fi nally the EUROP system. Each system had specifi c requirements for wagons to comply with. The wagons would, however, keep their national identity too, which meant that the name of the railways who wanted to capture a share of road transport. As national company also Europabus they began intercity services, competing with lines stayed on the wagon. The signs signifi ed a typical opened by private companies such as Viking Continentbus and working method which Linjebuss. Europabus also offered to organize sections of their trips accepts national borders by rail. The French and German governments awarded privileges and develops standard to the new railway-sponsored road travel service, which led to stag- for harmonizing national differences. nation for the private undertakings. In 1952, the private companies complained to the Inland Transport Committee. It tried in vain to mediate and help create a Europe-wide network. However, thanks to lobbying by the railways and the UIC, Europabus managed to out-compete the private lines and became the dominant provider in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s.112 In the 1950s Western European railways embarked on a series of collaborative projects that they experienced and communicated as European. Although East-Central European railways did not participate, they did try to copy them. For example, in 1959, at the fourth OSJD conference in Sofi a, the Hungarian government raised the issue whether socialist countries should not establish a pool similar to EUROP. For the initial period such a pool should only comprise 6,000 covered wagons which would not leave the railway networks of the countries participating in the pool. The East German government rejected such a solution and argued that it preferred the better implementation

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of the existing PPV arrangement.113 The issue dragged on, and the wagon circulation problems got worse. The transport of perishable foodstuffs from Bulgaria and Romania became a particularly big problem. Eventually, a wagon exchange agreement (called OPW) was concluded in 1963.114 It included the Soviet Union which had a seat on the OPW Council.115 Its fi rst evaluation claimed immediate success in terms of a reduction of empty returns and the speeding up of international circulation. By 1964 92,700 wagons were in the OPW pool.116 However, in contrast to EUROP-pool, the early history of OPW was troubled by complaints about problems with the return of wagons, the low quality of wagons, and necessary repairs not being made. The situation only improved somewhat in the 1970s. Yet steel experts in the organization Intermetall, among others, claimed that the system remained defi cient and continued to impede cooperation and trade in East-Central Europe.117 Although the pools in Western and East-Central Europe resembled each other, they were not merged. Rather, the interwar RIV/RIC rule continued to apply between West and East. This result was emblem- atic for postwar developments. Indeed railway organizations had developed new initiatives, but the dream of Mance and Hondelink to create a single pan-European governing structure without any divisions could not be realized. Instead a fragmented multi-layered structure emerged. It consisted of a series of overlapping technological zones: national ones, a European one which in part included traffi c between East and West, and a Sovietized one. Railway experts mediated the tensions between these rules by drawing on a long- established technocratic internationalist practice of harmonizing different systems and building interfaces between them. During the entire twentieth century, railway experts kept returning to this technocratic practice that had emerged during the nineteenth century, always hoping that it would contribute to peace in Europe.

Building Global Connections

Despite the technocratic internationalist belief that transnational infrastructures and networks would foster cooperation and peace, the history of building European railway networks was one of

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Fig. 5.9 Rescuing the Future of Railways: High-speed trains became a major plank for building a new future for the railways, not only in Europe but also elsewhere in the world, in particular in Japan and China. No longer were railways connected with a technology of the past, instead traveling high speed became fashionable. Once again railways were perceived as connectors for the world.

confl ict and rivalry—not only, as we have seen, between governments and railway companies and among a wide range of transnational and international organizations, some of which were established to compete with others. A case in point is the UIC, created in 1922 with French private companies in the lead, as an alternative to the Verein dominated by German private and state-owned companies and then, from 1920 onward, the nationalized Reichsbahn.

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German railway managers and experts accepted this, as it allowed them to come back to the negotiation table where they previously had been excluded by the Allies after the First World War. But they had a shared interest with the French and other railway companies to keep the League of Nations at arm’s length. Railway leaders regarded the League as an organization too much dominated by national foreign offi ces and hence prone to the infl uence of power politics. Criticizing such national rivalries, prominent railway experts such as Hondelink and Mance, who during the Second World War evaluated the results of one hundred years of railway collaboration, expressed their continued belief in the peace-making benefi ts of the established technocratic internationalist practice. Experts in both Western and Eastern Europe worked with and towards this ideal and struggled to maintain their autonomy with the aim of boosting the values of effi ciency, connectivity, innovation, modernization, and the neutrality of technology. Railways in Western Europe were a business in relative decline, however. They did not profi t much from the fast-growing traffi c. On the contrary, they could not compete against cars, trucks, and airplanes. During the 1950s and 1960s many railway companies faced growing defi cits and further decline. The general public and many politicians equated railways more and more with a technology of the past. Despite these negative trends, Armand remained optimistic about their future. In a 1964 interview, he insisted that railways were not obsolete, as trucks could not compete with them on long distances and airlines lost their competitive edge on distances below 500 kilometers.118 In 1964, Japan inaugurated its new high-speed train, the Shink- ansen, which in Europe became known as the “bullet train.” From then on railways in Europe, especially in France and Germany, began to devise their own high-speed trains (the TGV and ICE) as a major plank for a railway future. German companies also developed the revolutionary magnetic levitation train technology, which was later adopted in China with its less effi cient existing railway infrastructure and greater capital to invest in large-scale implementation. The UIC became involved early on in the promotion of high-speed railways. In 1968 it created a new expert group on fast intercity connections. In a 1971 report, this group developed the idea of a European master plan for high-speed rail transport. High- speed trains thus became a catalyst for a new European confi dence

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in railways. At the same time, the Japanese Shinkansen trains made it abundantly clear to the UIC that European railway technology was no longer necessarily superior.119 The UIC was never a purely-European organization, as Chinese and Japanese railways had been members from the start. In fact, they had asked the UIC to drop the use of the word European for the work of some of its sub-committees.120 More companies entered during the interwar years, in particular from the Near East and Middle East. By the time the UIC resumed its activities after the Second World War many private railways had merged and become nationalized. The Cold War resulted in Russia and China leaving, but the East-Central European railways remained in the UIC. It, not the UNECE, became the main organization for bridging the political divide, and experts from both sides continued to work together, including on joint standards. The ongoing East–West collaboration was demonstrated by the fact that the UIC chairman was appointed alternately from the West and the East. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc during 1989–91, these UIC connections proved to be a solid basis for the further harmonization of regulatory, technical and administrative standards in railway Europe.121 In the 1990s the UIC also began to develop a more global presence. The railways had gained new confi dence boosted by the success of the high-speed trains in Europe and Japan, and the UIC felt strengthened due to its major role in the process of European harmonization. Railways now believed that they could and should play a key role in meeting twenty-fi rst-century challenges: facilitating fast growing global traffi c and making this growth in traffi c compatible with sustainable development. The UIC now had an expanding membership from outside Europe and began to build closer connections with other regional associations such as the Association of American Railroads in the U.S., the African Union of Railways, and the Arab Union of Railways. In 1995 the urge to go global led to the establishment of a high-level decision-making board, bringing together chairmen of railways from around the globe which convened for the fi rst time in Nairobi in 1996. The task was to overcome the UIC’s European bias, and draft a world action plan. In 1997 the UIC General Assembly was held outside of Europe for the fi rst time. In 2009, after a long internal struggle, the UIC members accepted new statutes which formally ended the dichotomy between Europe and the rest of the world. The UIC’s

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new global ambitions were coupled to three values: unity, solidarity, and universality, which once more sought to express and reaffi rm the traditional Saint Simonist ideal of building unity through technical organization. This technocratic ideal and the associated working practices not only infl uenced railways, but also other sectors including steel, as we will now see.122

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One of the most attractive exhibits at the Crystal Palace exhibition in London in 1851 was a 6 pounder cannon made of cast steel, a solid fl awless ingot weighing 2,000 kilograms, more than twice as much as any previously cast.1 Admired by, among others, the ageing Lord Wellington, who had defeated Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo in 1815, it promised enhanced reach and much greater reliability. The cannon was produced by the fi rm Friedrich Krupp AG from the Ruhr Area in Prussian Westphalia, which was to become synonymous with the rise of Prussia and then, the German Reich as a military power before the First World War. In fact, like many other steel and armaments companies, such as the French Schneider Creusot, Krupp regularly exhibited its ever larger and more deadly weapons in national pavilions or its own company pavilions at later world exhibitions. While Krupp invented and started the production of cannons made of cast steel, the vast majority of technological innovations in iron and steel production until the late nineteenth century originated in Britain and were transferred from there.2 This is also why, like many other company owners, directors, and engineers, Alfred Krupp, one of the sons of founder Friedrich Krupp, combined his visit to the world exhibition in 1851 with a tour of British companies

179

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Fig. 6.1 On Show: Iron and steel were not only crucial to European industrialization, but also to warfare. At the world exhibition in London in 1851 the Prussian fi rm Friedrich Krupp AG from the Ruhr Area exhibited this innovative and powerful 6 pounder cannon made of cast steel. It attracted a great deal of interest, not least from Lord Wellington, who had commanded the British troops at the battle of Waterloo in 1815.

and steel works—not only to renew existing and to initiate new business contacts and to seal export deals, but also to get an update on technological innovations.

Travel, Technology, Transfers

By the time his fi rm almost instantaneously became a household name all over Europe with the public presentation of its new cannon, Alfred Krupp had already traveled to Britain on several occasions to learn about technological innovations and industrial practices there. Thus, before his 1838–9 journey to London, Birmingham, Sheffi eld, and Liverpool, he contacted a British engineer working in Aachen for advice on where to go, what to see, and whom to contact. He made a detailed list of what he wished to explore. His top priority was to gain insights into the construction of crucible melting furnaces for the production of fl awless raw casts. At times Krupp traveled incognito using different names to disguise the purpose of his visit. However, he found most owners of steel works and their employees accessible and prepared to divulge valuable information. Writing to his brother Hermann in January 1839, he

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reported on a visit to a rolling mill whose owner “felt fl attered” by the interest Alfred Krupp took in his company and technical knowledge. Krupp was astounded “how so far in England heaven is dropping pots of gold in my lap”: businessmen, engineers, and specialist workers at British plants made easy what would now be

Fig. 6.2 Stirring Molten Iron: The early production of steel was not fully mechanized. Well-trained and experienced puddlers had to stir the molten iron continuously with a paddle to achieve optimal results. British puddlers were in high demand in continental Europe where they helped establish and improve steel production in Belgium and the Rhineland, for example. Léon Benett produced this sketch of a puddler for Jules Verne’s novel Les cinq cents millions de la Bégum (1879).

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called industrial espionage.3 Occasionally, as in the case of a British engineer working in France who went to Britain to obtain valuable technical information, such espionage was penalized with short prison terms and fi nes.4 But mild sentences like these did not stop the lively trade in technological ideas and innovations. In nineteenth-century Europe, technological innovations in iron and steel production transferred across borders in a number of different ways. The puddling process illustrates such processes very well. It was fi rst used by Henry Cort in Britain in 1784 for refi ning pig iron using pit-coal. Refi ning pig iron made in blast- furnaces served to “decarburize” it to create what was then called steel, that is, iron or iron alloy produced by smelting, with carbon content of around 1 percent, which can be wrought or rolled.5 The puddling furnace allowed the separation of the fuel from the iron by means of fi re bricks, so that the iron was exposed to the heat, but not to the fuel. This process avoided impurities resulting from direct contact between the pig iron and coke or coal. To expose all of the pig iron to the oxidizing effect of the fl ames, the puddler had to stir the molten iron continuously with a paddle. Although puddling marked a technical innovation in the form of the new structure of the furnace and the heating process, it proved to be a “transitory technology.”6 Puddling required a very experienced worker for producing relatively-homogeneous material of consistent quality. This process was transferred fi rst of all by entrepreneurs who migrated from Britain to continental Europe. Thus, in 1799 the blacksmith and mechanical engineer William Cockerill created a textile machinery factory at Verviers, in what later became Belgium in 1830. His family having joined him from England, his sons Charles James and John set up an iron foundry and a machine building factory at Seraing in 1817. This is where they introduced the puddling process.7 Subsequently, the company and the site at Seraing became a preferred destination for visitors from other fi rms and later, for organized technical missions like the Japanese Iwakura mission to Europe and North America during 1871–3.8 In 1824 Friedrich Remy was the fi rst to transfer the puddling process to Neuwied on the Rhine, after a visit to the Cockerill plant at Seraing. For obtain- ing valuable technical information, Remy handed out bottles of French wine to English puddlers—alcohol that he found was “well invested” in his company’s future.9

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Fig. 6.3 Celebrating Founding Fathers: Steel production required skilled workers, but also entrepreneurs prepared to take risks in a sector that depended heavily on the general business cycle. Some, like the Cockerill family from England, ventured abroad, spreading technological knowledge in the process. William Cockerill started textile production in Seraing in what later became Belgium in 1830. One of his sons, John Cockerill, expanded the family’s business interests into iron and steel. In 1871 the town erected this statue to commemorate him.

However, continental European iron and steel companies also hired British engineers and puddlers. Their expertise and experience was crucial to the successful introduction of the process. Until 1824 British law actually forbade specialist workers like puddlers to leave the country to work for foreign companies. But borders were

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Fig. 6.4 Technology Transferred: With the spread of industrialization, European (and North American) steel technology and production methods increasingly became transferred to other parts of the world. This illustration shows Japan’s fi rst foreign mission headed by Prince Iwakura, leaving Yokohama for the U.S. and Europe on December 23, 1871. After the Meiji restoration in 1868 Japanese reformers imported not just legal, political, and educational institutions adjusting them to their domestic needs, but also foreign technology to advance the country’s economic and social development.

porous, and the continental European entrepreneurs and the mobile British engineers and puddlers frequently committed what they saw as legitimate and trivial offences in their mutual interest. Despite their reputation for high levels of alcohol consumption, not just of French wine, well-trained British puddlers used fewer primary resources, succeeded in producing more and better-quality steel per day and thus, achieved a much higher productivity than less- experienced local staff. As a result, they were often paid wages that exceeded the prevalent local pay levels by 50 percent and more.10 The new mechanized production processes also became easily transferred across Europe. They included, fi rst of all, the Bessemer process developed in the 1850s in which molten pig iron was refi ned in a pear-shaped converter by blowing air through it. This new

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process fi rst allowed the much faster batch production of steel.11 Fig. 6.5 Technological Leaders: British Although only a minor modifi cation to the Bessemer technique, the companies initially Thomas-Gilchrist process (discovered by Sidney Thomas in 1878) continued their made it possible to use phosphoric iron ore for steel production. This technological leadership and dominance of steel innovation made a crucial difference to German steel companies markets. From the middle after the new German Reich’s 1871 annexation of the Lorraine region, of the nineteenth century where this type of iron ore was found. Finally, the Siemens-Martin Sheffi eld became the process (or open-hearth furnace) resembled the puddling process, world’s leading center of steel production. One but used such great heat from a mixture of gas and air that the whole of the leading companies pig iron charge could be refi ned without outside interference. was John Martin. This When the technological leadership in the iron and steel industry lithograph produced 12 by John Henry Bufford passed to the U.S. in the late nineteenth century, new processes for the company’s U.S. and more effi cient forms of organization of production developed agents shows conically- there also fl owed quite easily across the Atlantic. They included shaped blast furnaces on the Taylor-White process for making high-speed steel, which the left where iron and steel are smelted from revolutionized machine tool production, continuous rolling mills, ores. and the large-scale electrifi cation of engines used in steel plants. Other innovations concerned the integration, rationalization, and standardization of production processes. They are closely associated with the ideas and works of Frederick W. Taylor, summarized in his most infl uential work, Principles of Scientifi c Management, fi rst published in English in 1911 and rapidly translated into other European languages.13 Taylor actually developed most of his ideas about rationalizing production processes while he was chief

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engineer at the Midvale Steel Company and then advisor to Bethlehem Steel between 1884 and 1901.14 Subsequently, his ideas informed the 1920s debate in Europe about rationalization, especially in heavy industry, which in turn infl uenced the controversy over the advantages and dangers of cartels. Why, then, did technological innovations and new forms of production become widely available with relative ease in the iron and steel sector; and why did the iron and steel sector initially lack any cross-border regulation of technical norms and standards, either by private companies in transnational voluntary organizations or by governments in international organizations? To begin with, unlike sectors of the second industrial revolution such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the steel industry was not “based on an administered or secret technical knowledge.”15 New production processes were large scale and impossible to hide. Knowledge about them was widely diffused within the companies. It could easily be transferred to other companies and across borders by businessmen, engineers, and specialist workers as well as through new specialized journals like the British Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, published since 1871, and the German journal Stahl und Eisen, founded in 1881. The new processes were patented, and the patents were sold and thereafter licensed to commercial users. The production of steel used raw material like iron ore, coke, and coal, but steel also was a raw material, for example for the production of rails, locomotives, and machines. Steel was crucial to infrastructures like railways and bridges, but it raised no issues of compatibility across borders. What mattered was the type of steel, its purity and hardness. These issues were clarifi ed directly between buyers and producers in relationships based on experience and mutual trust. Moreover, the different production processes had only relatively-marginal effects on product prices. In contrast, transport costs were a crucial factor, as was the fuel expense. Around 1850, fuel costs made up 22 percent of product value at furnaces in Scotland, 30 percent at Cockerill in Belgium and at some French plants, up to 60 percent.16 The result: the crucial strategic importance of access to cheap coke and coal, which created regional interdependencies across borders.17 It also motivated the drive towards vertical integration in the steel and coal industries to reduce costs: combining in one company the extraction of raw materials from mines with the production of iron and steel.18

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One additional factor helps explain why technological innovations and new production processes circulated with relative ease: the close transnational ties among experts. In the steel sector, they often integrated technical and engineering knowledge with managerial experience. When engineers’ training became more structured and professionalized with the proliferation of university-level degree programs in the late nineteenth century, the roles of engineers and business managers still did not (and still have not) become clearly delineated in steel.19 Technical experts also acquired business experience, and managers came from families with mining or steel backgrounds or had prior technical training or an engineering degree. Collectively, these experts took pride in their sector’s pioneering role for industrialization and in their shared technical knowledge. They also feared the often immediate cross-border impact of economic depressions on their businesses, as between 1873 and 1879. Excessive secrecy appeared incompatible with the unwritten rules of their informal networks. Thus, Viscount Greenwood, the British politician and President of the British Iron and Steel Federation from 1938 to 1939, insisted at a Düsseldorf meeting with German steel industrialists in March 1939: “Our industry is more than national, it is supremely international. No industry in the world pools its knowledge and its friendships more regularly than the steel industry.”20 And at the same meeting, Ernst Poensgen, Chairman of the German national steel cartel, explained: We have visited each others’ works, and been shown their progress, and if at any time there was in our family a naughty boy who would prefer to keep something in the dark because he believed himself to be cleverer than his brothers, the latter have soon shown him that they could do it, and make it still better than he.21 These close transnational ties were not institutionalized until after the Second World War. In fact, just like the sector’s business associations, national organizations of technicians and engineers founded after 1850 supported nationalist and imperialist agendas. This is true of the British Iron and Steel Institute, created in 1869, as it is of the German Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute (as it called itself from 1938) created in 1860.22 Patriotism and economic self-interest went hand in hand. The steel sector developed almost symbiotic relations with nation states that sought in different ways to speed up their industrialization, become strong military

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Fig. 6.6 New Process Technology: From the 1850s new mechanized processes changed steel production. In the Bessemer process molten pig was refi ned in a pear-shaped converter by blowing air through it. It allowed the much faster batch production of steel. This historical artwork published in Harper’s Weekly Magazine in 1889 shows men at a forge using the Bessemer process to make steel.

Fig. 6.7 Bessemer in Operation: Henry Bessemer used this picture for his autobiography published in 1905. The engraving shows the operation of the Bessemer converter as it was designed in 1860. The illustration in the top right-hand corner shows the converter being charged with molten iron. Air is then blown through the furnace from the tuyeres in the base (bottom left) before the resulting steel is poured into a ladle (bottom right).

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powers, and expand their colonial infrastructures. Instead of defi n- ing technical norms, as in railways, transnational voluntary organizations in the steel sector concentrated on containing adverse consequences of economic and political competition by regulating markets through cartels. For the reasons outlined above, however, unlike in the chemical industry, steel cartels never regulated the sharing of information about newly-developed technologies or their joint use.

From National to Transnational Cartels

Cartels were arrangements of limited duration among private companies to coordinate plant expansion, divide up markets or agree on export prices. By the 1880s, they already had a long tradition at the national level, particularly in Germany.23 They were also well established in Belgium. In contrast, French companies had a tradition of forming sales syndicates only.24 From the 1880s onwards, however, more and more cartels also spanned national borders. At the time, they were called international because of their reach beyond the state. Sometimes encouraged, but not controlled by governments, they were really transnational voluntary organizations of companies. Just before the First World War there were more than 100 such cartels.25 Some were only bilateral and very few had a global reach. Most cartels concentrated on European markets and overseas export markets, for example in Latin America.26 They ordinarily exempted colonial markets, which were treated as reserved for national producers from the colonial powers. In this way, the transnational European cartel arrangements amounted to a kind of cooperative colonialism. National steel cartels fi rst formed to control the domestic market for rails and to coordinate dumping them in export markets, that is, selling excess rails below their price of production to destroy or prevent local competition in such markets.27 Companies from the German Zollverein created a fi rst rails cartel in 1864.28 By 1876, its national agreement covered all domestic sales of rails. This in turn meant that three-quarters of the entire domestic sales of German steelworks were managed collectively, amounting to a syndicate- like industrial organization. The great importance of rails highlights

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the pronounced interdependence of different sectors in the Euro- pean economy. With the expansion of national and cross-border rail networks slowing down in Europe and America from the 1870s and suddenly coming to a complete halt in Argentina in 1890 as a result of a banking crisis, steel companies fi ercely competed in shrinking export markets. In these diffi cult circumstances, German, French, Belgian, and British companies formed the fi rst broader transnational rails cartel in 1884. It reserved national markets for domestic producers and their cartels and set quotas and prices for exported rails.29 The parties reconstituted it as the European Rail Makers’ Association (ERMA) in 1904, extending it through agreements with smaller producers from the Habsburg Empire, Spain, and Russia, before American fi rms joined in 1905. ERMA was renewed in 1926 with a pan-European scope and, with US participation, became the International Rail Makers’ Association in 1928.30 The rails agreements set the pace for similar transnational cartels managing other steel products, which in many cases formed before the First World War. They also provide initial insights into why cartels became the preferred instrument for making rules for steel nationally and across borders via regulating markets. To start with, the steel sector—like railways—was very capital intensive, and investments in new plants were risky. Cartels involving agreements on market shares and price levels promised to create much greater stability for such investments. The steel sector was also (and still is) highly sensitive to the general business cycle and to surges or crises in particular closely-related sectors such as railway construction, which repeatedly disrupted stability. Moreover, the health of many European steel producers, especially those from Britain, Germany, and Belgium, already depended to a signifi cant extent on exports. However, dividing up domestic markets only induced dumping of excess inventory in export markets, often at considerable loss. Transnational cartels like the ERMA provided a means to reduce such competition in export markets, at least temporarily, and to increase profi tability. Lastly, forming steel cartels proved to be relatively easy, not least because the steel consuming industries were very diverse and not well organized. The example of ERMA also illustrates why European companies and national cartels dominated transnational cartels, even when they involved producers from overseas. Their greater export dependence led them to seek multilateral agreements more vigorously

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than did American producers, who operated within a much larger domestic market. Their domestic cartels usually also created institutional structures and policy solutions, such as quotas and common export prices, which served as templates for transnational cartels, as in the case of the German rails cartel and the ERMA. This in turn built long-term institutional continuities even when transnational cartels temporarily became defunct as a result of new technologies, changes in markets, or wars. And fi nally, the informal networks among European entrepreneurs, managers, and experts in the steel industry were much closer than were any transatlantic ties. These close links actually persisted across the Second World War and to a large degree explain the continuation of cartels and cartel-type behavior in postwar Western Europe, despite strong pressures from the American government for anti-cartel legislation and policies.

Cartels, Reconciliation, Peace

Before the First World War, transnational steel cartels were exclusively motivated by business concerns. After 1918, however, many European entrepreneurs and politicians believed that transnational business cooperation in cartels could also foster reconciliation and peace. Thus, Arthur Salter, who had played a crucial role in designing the League of Nations’ secretariat, and who headed its Economic and Financial Section from 1920 to 1931, claimed in a 1932 book that cartels “cut across national frontiers and help to eliminate them as factors in the world’s economic life and competitive struggle. They thus create interests and forces which will tend to counteract the competitive nationalism which is the world’s chief danger.”31 Among others, one German author categorically stated that only transnational cartels could “pave the way for durable peace.”32 In other words, participants in the debate about cartels saw them as an organic form of making rules for Europe that could potentially lock companies, employees, and governments into durable and mutually- benefi cial cross-border arrangements. Moreover, cartels could utilize an informal international machinery that did not require elaborate treaties between states and avoided intrusion by diplomats. In fact, the origins of the fi rst comprehensive transnational steel cartel, the continental Western European Entente Internationale de

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Fig. 6.8 Source of Destruction: Until the Franco-German war of 1870–1 the French writer Jules Verne pictured Germans as likeable people. In contrast, in his novel Les cinq cents millions de la Bégum published in 1879, they feature as nationalist scientists with ambitions to rule the world. In this illustration by Alphonse de Neuville for the book, the Stahlstadt, or city of steel, appears as a potential source of power and destruction, foreshadowing the European experience of two World Wars in the twentieth century.

l’Acier (EIA) created in 1926, which formed the core of the Interna- tional Steel Cartel (ISC), seems to have borne Salter out. It partly grew out of an initiative by Emile Mayrisch, director of ARBED steel, the largest in Luxembourg,33 who helped create the Franco-German Infor- mation and Documentation Committee in 1925. This committee with

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offi ces in Paris and Berlin intended to foster closer Franco-German cooperation following that year’s Locarno Treaty.34 Known as the Mayrisch Committee, it served as a platform for steel industrialists from France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg for assembling the Western continental European core of the ISC, with Mayrisch as its fi rst president. The Committee also developed other initiatives for reconciliation.35 In this case, transnational business cooperation and European integration indeed appeared to go hand in hand. The main motives for constructing the EIA/ISC were entirely economic, however.36 As a result of the re-annexation of Alsace- Lorraine by France, German steel companies no longer had easy access to the region’s iron ore. Luxembourg, on the other hand, had been part of the German customs union until 1918. The transitional period of tariff-free access to the German market laid down in the Versailles Treaty was about to expire when Mayrisch began talks with Fritz Thyssen to devise a long-term quota solution. Despite attempts to develop new export markets through the sales company Columeta, launched in 1920, ARBED largely remained dependent on its German sales. Against this background, the EIA, signed on September 30, 1926 and initially planned to last for four-and-a-half years, sought to stabilize the stagnant steel market by determining the total amount of crude steel to be produced by each country. Accordingly, Germany had a quota of 40.45 percent, France 31.89 percent, Belgium 12.57 percent, Luxembourg 8.55 percent, and the Saar region, occupied by France until a referendum about its future, 6.54 percent. The Management Committee, operating from Luxem- bourg, had one representative from each participating group, with France and Germany representing the Saar region together. Each group in turn allocated the national quota to its members. In February 1927, producers from Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary joined the ISC as one Central European group leading to a reallocation of existing quotas. Production over and above the agreed national quotas triggered penalties.37 Dissatisfi ed with its national quota, the German group renounced the ISC agreement in May 1929, and it expired at the end of Janu- ary 1930. Only three-and-a-half years later, however, on June 1, 1933, a new transnational export cartel agreement came into force, which lasted until Nazi Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. This second compact was much more ambitious. Unlike its predecessor, it divided export markets, devised marketing schemes

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for particular steel commodities, created uniform pricing systems, coordinated price policies among the controlled steel products, and brought under its roof special agreements for particular steel commodities. Thus, to give only a few examples, the commodity agreements for thick plates and medium plates were managed from Düsseldorf, the administrative center of the German steel industry, and those for wire rods and hot rolled brands and strips from Ougrée and Liège in Belgium.38 Moreover, beyond France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the cartel eventually embraced all East-Central European producers. In fact, the First World War had disrupted traditional raw material and production links, given the Habsburg Empire’s breakup and the creation of a new Polish state encompassing formerly German, Russian, and Austrian territories. When the region of Upper Silesia was fi nally divided between Germany and Poland in 1922, after a referendum organized by the League of Nations, some foundries and rolling mills became separated. The transnational trusts and cartels facilitated their economic reintegration across the new borders.39 In 1935, fi nally, British steel producers became associated with the cartel, and when American fi rms acceded to the agreement in 1938, the ISC controlled some 90 percent of global trade in iron and steel, effectively transforming it into a world steel cartel.40 Unlike cooperation in rail transport discussed earlier, these transnational cartels did not focus on technical specifi cations at all. In the nineteenth century, the broader economic and societal implications of national and transnational cartels had already been subject to public debate in countries like Germany. There, economic and legal experts on the whole tended to emphasize their potentially- positive contributions in avoiding “ruinous” competition, overproduction, and dumping, for example.41 National governments tolerated or encouraged them due to their intimate relationship with major steel enterprises that provided the foundation of armaments production, military power, and colonial expansion. In the 1920s, however, the cartel question became one of the most topical issues in increasingly-heated transnational debates over postwar reconstruction, economic and trade policy and, after 1929, the best strategy for overcoming the deepening world economic crisis. Supporters of transnational cartels opposed free competition and free trade. In their view cartels allowed a coordinated approach to rationalizing industrial production. This in turn could facilitate

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technological progress and create more stable conditions for investment and employment in different economic sectors. Like Mayrisch and Salter, most advocates of transnational cartels also believed that they strengthened the relative autonomy of business from nationalist political forces and generated cross-border interdependencies. These in turn could contribute to universal peace. These hopes were not linked to any specifi c plans for institutionalized European integration, however. Instead, they either had a diffuse global scope or a bilateral focus, as in the case of Mayrisch’s 1920s efforts to foster Franco-German cooperation and in British policy towards Germany in the 1930s. In spite of Hitler’s rise to power, the belief in the pacifying function of transnational cartels persisted after 1933. In fact, the British government strongly pushed for the Iron and Steel Federation’s rapprochement with the ISC as a cornerstone of its new economic policy agenda and as an integral part of its appeasement policy.42 It hoped that transnational cartels like the ISC would strengthen the autonomy of private companies in Germany. These in turn would seek to moderate the dictatorship’s foreign policy ambitions and try to avoid war. At the bilateral level, the close cooperation among companies in heavy industry culminated in the broader Düsseldorf Agreement of March 1939, which the Federation of British Industries and the German Reichsgruppe Industrie concluded with government backing. In it they emphasized their shared interest in avoiding “destructive competition” through the creation of an “ordered system of world trade” with a view to completing the cartelization of the world economy.43 In the mid-1920s cartels also became a topic for non-governmental institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which started in Paris soon after the Armistice. In November 1925 the ICC created three committees to improve policy coordination. The main Trade Barriers Committee boasted seven sub-committees, including one on international industrial ententes.44 When the ISC formed in 1926, the cartel issue moved up the agenda and became a crucial item for discussion at the May 1927 World Economic Conference organized by the League of Nations, alongside the enduring question of tariff barriers. Subsequently, it continued to play an important role in the deliberations of the League’s committees until 1931.45 From being seen exclusively as a means to regulate and limit economic competition before 1914, cartels had turned

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Fig. 6.9 Taming Steel: Their advocates hoped that cartels would foster peace as well as organize markets. After all, alongside Germany other European powers also pursued expansionist foreign policies and participated in the European arms race before 1914. In Paris in 1889, for example, the French fi rm Schneider Creusot built its own company pavilion (pictured here) featuring a gun for one of the modern battleships in planning and under construction at the time. The experience of the First World War strengthened the search for durable transnational connections in the 1920s.

into a widely-advocated strategy for overcoming political as well as economic confl icts.

World Economic Conference & Beyond

The League’s Assembly fi rst contemplated convening an international economic conference in the autumn of 1920. During the

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Locarno process, which led to Germany’s accession to the League, the French government resuscitated the proposal, resulting in an Assembly resolution passed on September 24, 1925 and a Council decision on December 15, 1925 to hold such a conference. Crucially, as Daniel Serruys, the French chair of the Economic Committee, explained to its members at a meeting on December 3, 1925, the purpose was not to organize another diplomatic conference, but to bring together “technical experts in industrial, commercial and banking matters.”46 Their task would be to identify topical issues of economic cooperation in Europe and beyond and to make recommendations to member states. In fact, the conference design largely refl ected Salter’s idea of close cooperation between League experts and national policy-makers to ensure practical results. In the end, national governments nominated 194 delegates to the World Economic Conference, including many politicians and civil servants. In addition, other international organizations like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and non-governmental organizations such as the ICC, trade unions and consumer organizations sent another 157 experts. The participants came not only from member states of the League, but also from the U.S. and the Soviet Union.47 The League charged a Preparatory Commission of experts including representatives of the ILO, the ICC, and the International Insti- tute of Agriculture with organizing the conference, in cooperation with the Secretariat. At this stage, informal consultations conducted by Serruys had already clarifi ed that “limitation of competition” and “groupings of industries” should be put on the agenda.48 The German Clemens Lammers was charged with coordinating the preparation of reports that would inform discussions about cartels and trusts in the conference’s Industry Committee. The choice of Lammers illustrates the working patterns of expert committees. He came from the European country with the longest cartel tradition, a national cartel law of 1923 and a cartel court that never once indicted a national cartel. Moreover, Lammers had studied law and economics, combining the two most relevant fi elds of expertise for the cartel issue. He also had experience and wide networks in the European business world. Before the First World War he worked for industrial associations with headquarters in Düsseldorf. Afterwards he became self-employed advisor to industrial fi rms and organizations on legal and economic questions and was an elected board

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member of the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie. He already headed the ICC’s sub-committee on cartels when he was asked to coordinate the Preparatory Commission’s work on the same issue. Finally, he was politically active for the Catholic Centre Party and a member of the Reichstag parliament from 1924 to 1929. Not only did the Centre Party support the Weimar Republic and reconciliation with France; as a (Catholic) people’s party it also represented a wide cross-section of German society. As a result, Lammers was used to working with Left-Catholic trade unionists who held more critical views on cartels than his own. In other words, he combined extensive technical expertise with the ability to mediate between different views in a transnational committee context, something he in fact did so successfully that he played a leading role in all subsequent discussions about the cartel issue in every committee of the League and the ICC. Through his close cooperation with the League Secretariat and with Ernst Trendelenburg, the long-serving State Secretary in the German Economics Ministry (1923–32) and deputy chair of the League’s Economic Committee,49 Lammers secured a combination of reports including two more from other German experts: Julius Hirsch, a professor of trade economics in Berlin who was later sacked by the National Socialists in 1933 and forced to emigrate, and Kurt Wiedenfeld, a professor of economics at the University of Leipzig. The reports partly overlapped in their attempts to provide factual information on national and international cartels past and present. They discussed in a relatively-detached manner arguments for and against cartels used in national debates. They emphasized that their actual economic effects, for example on price formation, were diffi cult to gauge due to a lack of empirical economic studies and of detailed data on cartel agreements. Such information was only partially and indirectly accessible via publications of industry associations and companies. Most important, as Lammers stressed in his own documentation of existing legislation on cartels and trusts across the world, the reports deliberately made “no attempt to express an opinion on such important questions as ... the creation of a uniform international system of legislation to control international cartels or other combines”—questions that he argued should be left entirely to the World Economic Conference itself.50 At the conference the Industry Committee was essentially split between members close to industry emphasizing the potential

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advantages of cartels, and those from the ILO, trade unions, and consumer organizations, who highlighted their dangers and advocated various degrees of national or international regulation. Henri de Peyerimhoff, long-time secretary-general, vice-president and president of the Comité central des houllières, the association of French mining companies, and Louis Loucheur, an engineer and an infl uential French businessman, Republican Left politician and recurrent government minister, were especially outspoken in favor of cartels and rejected any international regulation.51 They eventually supported a draft compromise resolution that Lammers advocated during the committee deliberations.52 In the light of the controversial committee discussions, this resolution, which was later adopted in a revised form, refrained from arguing for or against cartels. Rather, it stipulated that cartels were “either good or bad according to the spirit in which they are formed and operated.” Among their potential benefi ts were listed the “more logical group- ing of enterprises,” reduced “industrial instability” and as a result, also “more stable employment for labour,” an argument clearly geared towards the trade union representatives in the committee. At the same time, the resolution conceded that cartels could also “encourage monopolistic tendencies and unsound business methods,” even arresting “all technical progress in production.” Crucially, the resolution rejected outright the possibility of international jurisdiction on cartels “owing to the heterogeneous nature of the measures which the various countries have decided to adopt.” Moreover, some committee members like Arthur Balfour, the former British Prime Minister, made it plain that their governments would in any case never agree to cede their “own sovereignty” to any new international organs.53 However, the draft resolution did advocate strengthening existing mechanisms for voluntary arbitration of cartel confl icts by the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration set up in 1923, which assessed commercial disputes between businesses. It also suggested a greater role for the League in keeping “a close watch on these forms of industrial co-operation and their effects on technical progress, on the development of production, on the conditions of labour ... and on the movement of prices.”54 This compromise resolution actually moderated much more far-reaching demands for controlling cartels by trade unions and consumer representatives. Thus, P.J.S. Serrarens, the

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secretary-general of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, pleaded for the potential usefulness of cartels, but demanded an international agreement on the representation of workers on their management boards.55 In contrast, the Austrian socialist Emma Freundlich representing the International Co-operative Alliance suggested the creation of national commissions for scrutinizing the formation and operation of cartels and of any negative effects like price hikes, and their coordination by an international commission including representatives of workers, consumers and farmers.56 The most vociferous advocate of the international control of transnational cartels was Léon Jouhaux, however, the French socialist trade unionist and ILO representative on the Industry Committee. At the very least, the League should become a center for scrutinizing cartels “to arm public opinion against abuses.”57 However, in his own draft resolution Jouhaux initially argued in favor of a “system of guarantees” combining “national bodies for the purpose of discovering, inves- tigating, judging and suppressing secret and unlawful combines,” in which workers and consumers would have to be represented, with an “international body” and “suitable national and international procedures and sanctions.”58 Although the industry representatives on the committee averted a strongly-worded resolution that could have been highly critical of the trend towards transnational cartels like the ISC, it is clear that despite ICC deliberations on the same issue, they were not well prepared for the broader debate in the League. Although not illegal anywhere in interwar Europe, effective cartels largely operated informally, if not secretly; and they certainly avoided public scrutiny. As a result, most steel entrepreneurs, managers, and experts were overwhelmed by this new international attention. In this respect, Lammers was an exception to the rule, which also explains his infl uence on the League and ICC cartel discussions. Straddling the spheres of cartel-related legal and economic expertise, business, and politics at the national and European levels, he basically supported cartels as a tool for the rationalization and integration of the European economy. However, as he put it in the deliberations in the Industry Committee, no cartel arrangement should allow what he called “an excessive private profi t at the expense of other industries or of the general public.”59 To avoid such abuses, Lammers accepted the need for improved scrutiny. He

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also believed that the League as an international body had to play a leading role in enhancing oversight of increasingly transnational, not purely national, cartels. The cartel debate carried over into the temporary Consultative Committee formed to follow-up recommendations from the 1927 conference. Headed by former Belgian Prime Minister Georges Theunis, it passed the buck via the Council to the Economic Committee, where Serruys and Trendelenburg now had to deal with this “very delicate” and politically-explosive matter.60 On Salter’s proposal, the Economic Committee eventually initiated a legal report on transnational cartels and their possible regulation to be prepared by three external experts from Germany, France, and the U.S.61 Although at this time the cartel issue was subject to domestic controversy in the U.S. as well as Europe,62 the League Secretariat’s Economic and Financial Section nevertheless saw two fundamentally confl icting points of view. The American conception ... is an uncompromising maintenance of the principle of competition in the interest of the consumer and of the smaller producer and trader. On the other hand, in the interest of what is styled the “national economy”, the competitive system has been seriously compromised and invaded on the continent of Europe by the cartel movement, supported in varying degrees by governmental cooperation. It was clear that “their respective sponsors have at the present time no common ground to stand upon.”63 When the legal experts began sharing drafts of their report, the industry members on the Economic Committee were shocked. The legal experts did not merely plan to outline, in more detail than Lammers had done in 1926–7, the national legal situation in comparative perspective. Rather, it became clear that they would emphasize in surprisingly-stark terms the potential negative effects of unregulated cartels. Introducing their preliminary fi ndings to the members of the Economic Committee on October 26, 1929, the French expert Henri Decugis, referring in particular to the ISC, claimed that cartels “often had negative objectives” such as dividing up markets and regulating prices. At the Economic Commit- tee’s next meeting in late January 1930, the industry representatives frontally attacked the draft legal report. Cartels were “an essential factor in modern economic life.” One “should take no measures

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to hinder their free play, only preventing any abuses.” The jurists’ view that their main objective was to increase prices was errone- ous and should be “corrected.” Under no circumstances could the report be offi cially approved by the committee. Instead, if it were published under the auspices of the League at all, it would have to be characterized as a “more or less personal study by its authors”64 – something that the League Secretariat in fact highlighted in its introductory note when the study eventually came out in late April 1930.65 Moreover, it would urgently have to be complemented by the already-envisaged economic expert reports that could discuss the wider economic and societal benefi ts of national and transnational cartels. The publication of the critical legal report severely complicated Lammers’ political balancing act. In a letter to the League Secre- tariat, Lammers’ collaborator on the cartel issue in his Berlin offi ce complained that this report had unnecessarily antagonized industrialists and their associations, especially in Germany: “The prepared- ness of German industry to cooperate with the League of Nations is close to zero. They regard the publication of the legal report ... as a terrible mistake.” From this perspective, it was Lammers, “together with his infl uential friends in industry circles,” who had succeeded against all odds, at inducing industry associations and cartel managements to cooperate over the economic experts’ reports.66 Reassuringly for the industrialists, all four economic reports were prepared by experts who were close to industry interests and favored cartels. Alongside Lammers, who was also a board member of the giant chemical company IG Farben, they included the Luxembourger Aloyse Meyer. Meyer, who worked for ARBED, had succeeded Mayrisch as president of the ISC. Like Meyer, who had studied at the Technical University of Aachen in Germany, the Frenchman Louis Marlio also had an engineering degree, from the École Polytechnique, and a doctorate in law. After the First World War he had a business career in the heavily-cartelized aluminum industry and in hydroelectric power companies. Finally, Antonio Stefano Benni, the president of Confi ndustria, the association of Italian industry from 1923 to 1934, was used to fascist corporatism and also advocated cartel solutions. To enhance the impact of the four economic reports published in 1930,67 Lammers initiated a general report that would integrate the main fi ndings of all cartel studies conducted by the League and

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develop a larger argument in favor of cartels, which was discussed by the Economic Committee at its meetings during 1931. Based on the four economic reports, the general report’s outline asserted that cartels tended “to foster technical progress, i.e. the rationalization of industry in general”—something that was even truer of what was variously referred to in different national contexts as trusts, combines, or concerns—conglomerates of fi rms locked into long- term relationships via often complex capital ties. Cartels, his report alleged, could also facilitate private agreements on standardization which could reduce prices. Moreover, by fi xing uniform prices, they redirected competition to product quality. The report also advanced a strong claim that cartels as well as trusts could enhance technological progress. The close cooperation among cartel members would lead them to exchange information and to develop joint research programs. In future, such joint research could also potentially be organized and funded by “international research institutes” no longer focused on fostering national, but instead, transnationally organized, collaborative basic and applied research.68 With their enthusiastic advocacy of cartels, the economic experts countered the criticisms voiced at the World Economic Conference and in the legal report. Time appeared to be on their side. Their positive evaluation at the same time refl ected and strengthened the broader trend towards cartel formation after the Wall Street crash in late October 1929. In fact, when the issue next came up in the Economic Expert Committee of the Commission of Enquiry on European Union in 1931,69 following the Briand Plan of 1929–30, the sub-committee on cartels quickly reached conclusions that were broadly in line with the economic expert reports. It became clear that, by that time, Lammers and his collaborators had largely succeeded in forging a consensus within the League’s committee structure on the potentially-positive contribution of transnational cartels to overcoming the economic crisis.70 But the cartel issue was now totally overshadowed by confl icts over protectionist tariffs imposed everywhere. It also became sidelined as a result of the severe diplomatic tensions following the abortive plans for a customs union between Germany and Austria—something that both countries explored during 1930–1, as a contribution to tackling the economic crisis, but which the Allied powers and France in particular thwarted in 1931 for fear

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that it might turn out to be a precursor to political integration. Even in Lammers’ view, however, cartels—as he had put it in a report about the 1927 World Economic Conference—could “never constitute the only, or even the decisive factor for the union of nations.”71 Nonetheless, until the Düsseldorf Agreement of March 1939, transnational cartels continued to expand and the widespread belief in their pacifying force persisted. With the discarding of the free trade tradition by successive British governments and their growing support for cartels,72 Europe seemed headed for a cartelized future—a trend initiated by the steel sector with the rails cartel of 1884 and pushed further through the ISC agreements of 1926 and 1933.

Anti-Trust Law & Cartel Culture

In Western Europe the Second World War put an abrupt end to the steel companies’ preferred world of cartels and concentrations in the name of rationalization. At least, this is how it seemed when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) appeared in 1951–2. After all, Article 65 of the ECSC treaty prohibited “all agreements among enterprises, all decisions of enterprises, and all concerted practices, tending directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict or distort the normal operation of competition within the common market.” In the future no co-determination of prices, restriction or control of production, technical development or investments and no agreements on quotas or sources of supplies would be allowed. In addition, Article 66 required ECSC-based steel companies to seek its permission for any mergers and acquisitions. The High Authority had the power to determine whether a merged company could acquire a dominant market share that might inhibit competition, and it could forbid the merger—a legal weapon that the U.S. administration hoped would prevent the re-concentration of German heavy industry after the transfer of full sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany. Unlike in subsequent negotiations over Western European integration treaties or treaty revisions, the U.S. actually co-shaped

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the ECSC. The American administration was convinced that the support by many German steel industrialists for right-wing nationalist political parties had facilitated Hitler’s rise to power and the destruction of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, they now saw cartels as a barrier to the desired creation of a Western European customs union and freer world trade, an American preference from the intensifi ed Open Door policy of the second half of the 1930s through “embedded liberalism” derived from the creation of the Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) immediately after the Second World War. Through transatlantic expert networks, American institutions and individuals exercised informal infl uence on drafting the ECSC treaty provisions, especially those concerning competition policy.73 These various and partly overlapping networks centered on the emergency postwar European Coal Organization (ECO), the US High Commission for Germany, and the French Planning Commissariat headed by Monnet. On the Western European side, they mostly involved individuals whose academic and professional socialization had partly taken place in the U.S. Crucially they were not businessmen or experts from the steel sector. Instead, they often had an academic background in law or economics. In the latter case, they frequently held “ordo-liberal” beliefs, a German- European tradition of economic thought extending back to the 1930s. Ordo-liberals were keen to foster market forces, but they also allocated the state an important role in the institutional guarantee of free competition, with parallels with the American anti-trust concepts having their roots in the 1890s.74 Monnet fostered these transatlantic links and infl uences on framing and negotiating the ECSC treaty, not least because he wanted to keep the steel industry with its cartel preference at bay. But how far did the “Americanization” of the continental West- ern European steel sector really go?75 Its limits soon became clear in the formulation of key treaty provisions. Thus, Articles 59 and 61 allowed for direct interventions in the market by the High Author- ity in the case of insuffi cient production or a severe crisis in heavy industry—a key objective of all previous transnational cartels. In fact, after the institutional merger of the three Communities in 1967, the European Commission imposed minimum prices for steel in 1977–8, at the height of the steel crisis, as proposed by industry.76 This decision was fully in line with older transnational cartel

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practices, although in the new institutional setting of Western European integration, it was now taken by a Community institution. Moreover, Article 65 only prohibited domestic cartels within the future customs union for coal and steel, not agreements regarding exports to third countries,77 another standard practice of transnational cartels. In fact, Western European steel producers used this loophole in the ECSC treaty even before the common market opened, when they created the so-called Convention de Bruxelles in spring 1953. The origins of this export cartel can be traced back to the December 1948 bilateral export agreement among producers from Belgium and Luxembourg.78 Their plan covered certain export markets, where trade was conducted in convertible currencies, with export sales at agreed minimum prices to be coordinated by the Belgian cartel, Syndicat Belge de l’Acier, with 56 percent allocated to Belgian producers and 44 percent to Luxembourg fi rms.79 When prices for steel in these export markets began to decline in 1952–3, steel makers from these two countries, as well as from France and Germany, began to hold talks. After negotiations lasting less than two weeks in March 1953, the steel associations signed a protocol, which covered exports of almost all steel products to all markets outside the ECSC and its members’ colonial territories. The producers created a Commission in Brussels responsible for setting minimum prices. Although the cartel’s objective was to stabilize prices, members discussed from the start other options such as export quotas—again, a well-established practice before the Second World War. The cartel quickly encountered serious diffi culties when it became clear that independent steel export companies undercut the agreed minimum prices. At the beginning of September 1953, producers from the four countries signed a new agreement to prevent such distor- tions. When individual producers and exporters occasionally continued to sell steel at lower than the agreed minimum prices, the cartel fi nally transferred the supervision of its agreement and the imposition of penalties to a Swiss company in Basle, which had exercised this function for the steel cartel EIA in interwar Europe.80 Not only did steel producers themselves continue their cartel practices wherever possible under the ECSC treaty’s new legal conditions; far from implementing a more forceful competition

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policy, the High Authority actually adopted a very lenient stance towards these traditional practices. In the coal sector, for example, where the Americans had imposed the dissolution of the German sales cartel,81 the High Authority tolerated the renewed formation of three sales organizations that clearly coordinated their pricing policies.82 Moreover, the High Authority actually fostered the re-concentration of the German and European steel industry.83 In the fi rst test case, Lorraine-Escaut in France, the High Author- ity confi rmed the merger despite the fact that the new company would control 80 percent of the French market for steel tubes. By 1958 the High Authority had dealt with 104 cases, forty-six from Germany, and it prohibited not one of the proposed mergers and acquisitions.84 Despite the fact that, due to high transport costs in particular, most coal and steel was sold within a relatively- small radius from the point of production, the High Authority treated the ECSC as one integrated market so that concentrations appeared small in relation to overall Community output. Moreover, the High Authority also argued, as the trusts and transnational cartels had done before, that these concentrations were actually healthy, because they facilitated rationalization and modernization, thus making the European steel industry globally more competitive.85 Fifteen years after the ECSC’s formation, the steelmakers constructed yet another cartel in 1965–6, this time combining a domestic with an export compact, in response to a new crisis of overproduction and dwindling prices that had started in 1961–2. At a meeting with the High Authority on December 14, 1965, they pressed for the proclamation of a “manifest crisis” in line with Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty. This would have allowed the High Authority to come up with a plan for the coordinated support and reorganization of the ECSC steel industry. However, in the middle of the so-called “Empty Chair” crisis, when French President Charles de Gaulle boycotted the EEC Council of Ministers, the High Authority had no appetite for triggering more controversy by initiating an EC-level policy response. As a result, the steelmakers went ahead with their one-year-cartel plan, in clear breach of the treaty. It almost seemed as if “fi fteen years of European [integration] experience had left no noticeable mark.”86 Why did these strong continuities in institutional practices persist, despite a new treaty framework with great formal powers

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for the High Authority and rules for competition policy, which were to some extent infl uenced by the American model? Researchers have traced them back to Franco-German cooperation at government levels and to the close coordination between Monnet and Franz Etzel, the German Vice-President of the High Authority.87 Arguably, the High Authority had an “implicit mandate” to foster Franco-German reconciliation—a political objective that necessitated a European interpretation of superfi cially-American legal norms.88 But this view fails, fi rst of all, to fl esh out the domestic infl uence of heavy industry on government preferences, both directly and indirectly via the industry associations that they still largely dominated. Thus, the connections between heavy industry circles and associations and West German government policy were very close.89 In fact, heavy industry and business more generally provided much of the funding for the ruling Christian Democrats there.90 In contrast to the steel producers, the steel consuming industries, which were interested in a more rigorous competition policy and lower prices, remained more weakly organized after 1945. Moreover, unlike in the case of railways, steel policy had no obvious direct impact on the everyday lives of citizens as consumers, reducing its potential for public controversy. However, steel’s European networks constituted a powerful force behind the tradi- tionalist High Authority approach, in line with transnational cartel practices. Its experts provided specialized knowledge and exercised infl uence at two levels: the staff in key divisions of the Authority in Brussels, and through the Consultative Committee. At the political level of the High Authority, Monnet managed to avoid the member states’ appointment of senior managers or administrators recruited directly from coal and steel companies and their associations.91 To fulfi ll their tasks, High Authority decision- makers desperately needed technical expertise at an offi cial level, and this was where the steel companies and their associations targeted their lobbying for personnel closely linked to them and socialized in their ways of doing things.92 As a result, staff from heavy industry dominated the Authority’s civil service, especially its Market Division, which was responsible for competition policy. In fact, fourteen offi cials in this division had degrees in engineering and mining and only four in other subjects (two had none).93 A survey of their professional experience immediately prior to

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entering the High Authority also shows eleven of them having worked in or for the coal and steel industry. Two came from sectoral interest groups, another two from international organizations, and eight had backgrounds in national ministries.94 Like Tony Rollman, Director for Steel in the Market Division, several from the latter categories had professional experience in heavy industry, too. Rollman’s case illustrates very well the continuities in steel industry self-governance, even after imposition of the ECSC’s new legal framework. Like many former offi cials, Rollman has retrospectively styled himself as a convinced supranational federalist,95 but he was nothing of the sort. From 1921 to 1944 he worked for Columeta, ARBED’s international sales organization. In between a stay in Japan and his later position as Colufl andres’ sales director in Gent, Belgium, Rollman worked for the ISC in ARBED’s Luxembourg headquarters during 1935–6. His steel industry and cartel expertise, combined with his experience as Economic Councilor in the Luxembourg embassy to Belgium after the liberation, qualifi ed him for subsequent roles in the Luxem- bourg delegation to the Marshall Plan conference in 1947 and in the steel committees of the OEEC and the UNECE, where he became Steel Division Director from 1948 to mid-1950.96 Monnet noticed Rollman for the fi rst time in 1949, when UNECE put out a report on the Western European steel industry which issued a stark (and misguided, as it turned out) warning against an imminent overproduction crisis.97 The two men subsequently met in Paris in June 1950.98 After the conclusion of the ECSC negotiations, Monnet enticed Rollman to join the High Authority, given his technical expertise and, most important, his experience of working in other and partly-competing international organizations, but not for his views on European integration generally or on how the steel sector should be run. In fact, Rollman had little sympathy for the Americans’ and Monnet’s original concept of a separate supranational authority with independent decision-making powers. When the future institutional provisions were fi rst discussed in informal networks during the summer of 1950, he advocated initiating a Steel Board. This Board would either include 40 percent representatives from the member state governments and 20 percent each from the producers, trade unions, and steel consumers or alternatively,

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one-third producers, one-third trade unions, and only one-sixth each from governments and steel consumers.99 In Rollman’s concept, what later became the ECSC’s Consultative Committee, enriched with government representatives, would have been responsible for decision-making. Compared to interwar Europe, his project recognized the increased need to co-opt trade unions and steel consumers and to gain support from member state governments under pressure from the U.S. to make a decisive break with the cartel tradition. Similarly, there was no question for Rollman, who had been fully socialized into the cartel mentality and even worked for the ISC, that the new organizations would have to defi ne minimum prices “to avoid destructive competition in which even an effi - cient producer would not be able to make a fair profi t.”100 It is not surprising, therefore, that Rollman was at the forefront of embed- ding traditional, transnational, cartel objectives and practices in the new organizational structures. Within the Market Division, he had a congenial collaborator in the Director for Coal, the German Hermann Dehnen, who had worked for the German coal cartel from 1933 to 1945 and had continued his career in the German coal industry after the war. After his move to the High Authority, Rollman remained highly skeptical about Monnet’s linked visions of more supranational decision-making and ECSC-level indicative planning. Max Kohnstamm, Secretary of the High Authority, confi ded to Monnet in August 1953: “The diffi culty with Rollman, to take an example ... is that at the end of the day he does not believe in the possibility of a revolution in the European economy. ... He is afraid of these enticing prophecies which he considers discon- nected from reality.”101 The steel industry strongly supported the efforts of Rollman, Dehnen, and others within the High Authority to cultivate what they regarded as sound European traditions of voluntary collaboration among private companies, reinforced through their corporatist links to governments. Alongside their lobbying of member state governments, the new Consultative Committee provided steel associations a suitable platform for exercising infl uence. Shortly after the war, steel companies remained united in their support for transnational cartels. They “could not imagine an economic system without cartels.”102 From 1948 onwards, West European steel corporations and their general business associations were

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once more looking towards working with their German counterparts.103 The American anti-cartel thrust at the time of the Schuman Plan only strengthened this incipient cooperation,104 which yielded the Club des Sidérurgistes, formed at a May 1952 meeting in the ARBED headquarters,105 an organization later transformed into the European Steel Association (Eurofer) in 1976. With its monthly meetings it allowed steel managers and experts to coordinate their policy advice to the High Authority directly and indirectly, via the Consultative Committee. In that committee, infl uential individuals who combined great technical expertise with excellent political links regularly represented the steel industry. Moreover, their average time in the Consultative Committee was 7.7 years,106 more than those representing trade unions and steel consumers. More signifi cantly, the steel industry specialists’ tenures also exceeded the average terms in offi ce of members of the High Authority or, for that matter, government ministers with responsibility for coal and steel policy, thus guaranteeing a great degree of continuity in policy discourse and advice. Eric Conrot, another Luxembourger, best exemplifi es the type of expertise and network links which these steel industry agents brought to the Consultative Committee.107 Whereas Rollman only briefl y worked for the ISC between two ARBED posts, Conrot was the ISC’s secretary until its dissolution in 1939–40. From 1944 to 1975 he was fi rst secretary-general, then director of the Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques, the association of steel companies in the Grand-Duchy. He represented Luxembourg at the Marshall Plan conference, in the OEEC’s and the UNECE’s steel committees, and then in the ECSC negotiations. He became one of the leading steel representatives in the ECSC Consultative Committee. As with Rollman, it was no question for Conrot after the Second World War and at the start of the ECSC negotiations that producers should continue to organize their transnational relations autonomously. He initially expected that the High Authority would oversee time-limited cartels. When it turned out that the steel industry could not avoid the legal prohibition of domestic cartels in the future common market, Conrot, together with his colleagues from the Club des Sidérurgistes and allies within the High Authority like Rollman, successfully invested substantial resources into inserting traditional cartel objectives and practices into ECSC policy-making.

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Carrying these traditions over from late-nineteenth-century transnational cartels to the ECSC was greatly facilitated by the very pronounced transnational esprit de corps in the steel industry, something which survived the Second World War. During the war, the steel industries of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France formed an integral part of the Nazi Grossraumwirtschaft, or greater economic space. In 1937 Hitler had created the state-owned Reichswerke Hermann Göring A.G. to exploit domestic iron ores around Salzgitter which the private Ruhr companies deemed uneconomical.108 This company’s appetite for expansion before and during the war in annexed or occupied territories created severe frictions with the private steel corporations. This, in turn, strengthened traditional networks in Western Europe. Thus, when the Reichswerke sought to gain control over ARBED, Hermann Josef Abs from the Deutsche Bank, who had close links with the private steel companies, took over shares from the Belgian bank Société Générale to protect the Luxembourg fi rm.109 In the long run the Ruhr steel industry was keen to regain its privileged access to iron ores from Lorraine. For the duration of the war, however, the so-called Kleine Kreis of several Ruhr steel fi rms explicitly denounced such ambitions.110 Moreover, the German trustees, who managed French foundries during the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, cultivated traditional relationships which they hoped would pay off economically and politically whatever the war’s outcome. In fact, it did so after 1945, in the form of “a bulg- ing briefcase of Persilscheine” for representatives of the German steel industry—certifi cates from local entrepreneurs and managers in Belgium, Luxembourg and France, testifying to their anti- Nazi credentials.111 Even the rabid nationalist steel industrialist Hermann Röchling escaped severe censure at a tribunal in Rastatt. Unquestionably, “confl icts of interest, management breakdowns and different national loyalties” had not destroyed “the tradition of co-operation ... in the West European heavy industry.”112

Continuities in “Core Europe” Organization

In the steel sector, as we have seen, technological cooperation and transfer across borders took place at the company level. Standards

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for producing different types of iron and steel and steel products were defi ned between producers and steel consumers. The steel industry did not create transnational voluntary organizations to defi ne technical norms as happened in railways or in other infrastructures like electricity networks. Instead, steel makers regulated markets and agreed on common price levels by using cartels. The rules and practices of transnational cartels varied widely across sectors and even within the steel sector. However, most steel cartels, as in other sectors like aluminum, aimed to carve up export markets in third countries, exempting colonial territories. Technocratic internationalism used cartels as one organizational form to foster voluntary cross-border cooperation. Cartels did not build infrastructures like railways did, but concretized business connections instead. Advocates of cartels claimed that these business linkages and their consequent rules and arbitration methods were geared towards fostering public goods such as peace and stable conditions for investment and employment. Moreover, cartels also constituted another means (alongside “technifi cation” in the railway sector) of de-politicizing issues that could, and often did, become highly-charged issues of trade policy. Although governments sometimes fostered cartel formation and kept in close touch with the resulting organizations, enterprises’ transnational voluntary organizations allowed companies to keep state institutions at bay. Finally, cartels had highly-consensual decision-making structures, including arbitration, which in essence relied on voluntary compliance or, as an alternative, the voluntary exit of a non-complying member or ending the entire agreement and possibly replacing it with a new one. Starting with the rails cartel, this tradition of transnational self- organization, for an entire industrial sector and its sub-sectors, was greatly facilitated by several factors. First, we must appreci- ate the strong esprit de corps among entrepreneurs, managers, and engineers, who frequently shared a common higher education and training background, as in the Market Division of the ECSC, and a pronounced pride in their sector’s leading role in industrialization and in Europe’s temporary ascendancy to global economic, military, and political dominance. Second, truly important were steel’s capital intensity and high transport costs, which generated enterprises’ strong shared preference for long-term stability for investments and cooperation to control “wasteful” competition

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and guarantee stable prices. Third, in contrast to the increasingly- Fig. 6.10 Debating nationalized rail transport, the predominantly-private nature of Cartels: Steel companies formed transnational steel companies continued, until the fi rst state-owned companies cartels in Europe from surfaced in East-Central Europe during the 1930s, before a larger the 1880s onward. At nationalization trend set in after the Second World War. These its World Economic private companies cultivated close political links, especially with Conference in 1927 the League of Nations and anti-communist center-right democratic and right-wing nationalist experts from governments, political parties and with economic ministries, but they also fi ercely industry, and societal defended their independence from the state, whether the National organizations discussed the Socialist dictatorship in Germany or after the Second World War, technological, economic, and political opportunities the High Authority in the ECSC. and dangers of such cartels. The steel companies’ transnational voluntary organization also This photo published by raised concerns and stimulated public debate in Europe about the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung shows Georges the economic effects of cartels and their political infl uence. These Theunis, the former concerns led the League of Nations to take up the issue of cartels Belgian Prime Minister and their possible regulation at the national or international level. and chair of the World In 1927 the World Economic Conference temporarily created a Economic Conference, addressing the delegates.

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transnational public sphere, which allowed trade unions and consumer groups for the fi rst time to articulate their dramatically more critical views on cartels and their economic effects. These organizations, which defended the general interests of social groups at national and international levels, temporarily succeeded in inserting alternative expertise into the policy-making process, which challenged prevailing industry views. For the steel companies and the ISC, this public attention beyond state boundaries created the need to justify their policies and to highlight cartels’ advantages by drawing attention to alleged positive effects of price stability for steel consumers, technology investments, and employment. After 1927, when the League’s committee structure, which was not in the public limelight, became absorbed in the cartel topic, steel and other heavily- cartelized industries largely succeeded in shaping a pro-cartel consensus which lasted well beyond the Second World War. The steel industry’s economic and business expertise as presented in the 1930 reports Lammers coordinated very much strengthened the pro-cartel case. The strong tradition of transnational self-organization by private steel companies and their combined cultures of technological, business, and legal cartel-related expertise played a crucial role in carrying over many of their practices into a very different institutional and legal framework after the Second World War. Experts close to the coal and steel industry in the High Authority and industry leaders represented in the Consultative Committee dramatically limited Americanization, especially in the form of competition policies directed at preventing cartels or the re-concentration of the sector. The EEC’s Directorate General IV eventually developed a more competition-oriented policy, later strengthened by congruent decisions by the European Court of Justice.113 By then, however, the German-European ordo-liberal notions of competition were more infl uential for the evolution of a European competition policy than were American anti-trust traditions reaching back to the Sherman Act of 1890.114 As the ECSC treaty ran for 50 years until its integration into the present-day European Union in 2002, the coal and steel sector to some extent continued to lead a life of its own. In fact, when the Community’s institutions were merged in 1967, the Consultative Committee continued separately providing the steel

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industry, trade unions and steel consumers with a forum of their own for infl uencing policy in this sector. Until after the Second World War, the steel industry, its cartels, associations, and experts operating in transnational voluntary and new international organizations, never developed a clear notion of “Europe” beyond the alleged contribution of cartels to fostering cooperation across borders and encouraging peace—something that after the First World War, they generally took to mean peace in Europe as a geographical space. Crucially, however, the steel industry practiced a particular notion of Europe in their transnational business cooperation through cartels. From the 1880s, theirs was a notion of a continental central-western European “core Europe,” which comprised Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. These countries and their industries learned to compete with Brit- ain as steel’s industrial leader; they were especially interdependent in terms of raw materials like iron ore and coke and coal; and they shared similar business practices which included some domestic cartelization since the 1840s, which greatly facilitated the later formation of transnational cartels. The organization of the steel cartels after 1884 refl ected this “core Europe” focus. In all these cartels, producers from these four countries formed a separate, central organization. This center was enlarged through association agreements with enterprises from Central Europe, whose production was still comparatively marginal; and from Britain and the U.S., who joined the existing continental Western European structures after some delay. More- over, the informal networks among entrepreneurs, managers, and experts proved to be much stronger among these four countries than with producers elsewhere. Independent of the Cold War context, in terms of its spatial reach, the ECSC’s formation thus marked a natural continuity in the kind of “Europe” that the steel sector had already practiced for one hundred years—loosely associated with Central Europe, and with Britain and the U.S., despite their different competition and trade policy traditions, a vision which only temporarily and very partially converged with those of the four “core Europe” states—defi ning a regional space that Italy and the Netherlands subsequently enlarged as latecomers to steel production.

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After its institutionalization in the ECSC, this small “core Europe” steel world developed in a much broader European and global setting from the 1950s onwards. It did so under the infl u- ence of growing economic forces of globalization and the increased activities of diverse international organizations, which we will next encounter.

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At the height of the Cold War in November 1949, Zdeněk Rudinger, the Deputy Director of the nationalized Czechoslovak heavy engineering industry—the building of large machinery—traveled from Prague to Geneva to contribute to the work of an expert committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).1 Rudinger also met with the Luxembourger Tony Rollman, who was still Director of UNECE’s Steel Division. During the meeting Rudinger mentioned that he could probably double, if not actually treble the output of his nationalized company if only he had access to suffi cient amounts of steel. The purchase of 150,000 tons of steel from a Western European supplier would be a most helpful beginning. His fi rm lacked capital in a convertible currency necessary for an ordinary commercial deal, however. As a result, any purchase would have to be facilitated by a special credit scheme.2 Rudinger was an experienced manager with a background as an economist.3 Born and raised in the Habsburg Empire as a German- speaking Jew, also fl uent in Czech, he married Lisa, a non-Jewish German speaker. Rudinger became an enthusiastic Zionist; he and his wife went to Palestine where they fi rst worked in the Kibbutz Beit Alfa, created in 1922. He was subsequently employed as a manager in the Tel Aviv building industry before they returned to

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Czechoslovakia in 1927. There Rudinger held several managerial positions, fi rst in the plastics industry, then in porcelain and glass, as a cartel director. Before the First World War Lisa Rudinger had studied agriculture in England at what later became the Univer- sity of Reading, where she got in touch with Fabian circles and became converted to feminist socialism. In the 1930s she joined the Czechoslovak Communist Party secretly so as not to damage her husband’s career prospects. In 1939 the Rudingers fl ed to England. In the last year of the war, however, the Czechoslovak government in exile recruited Zdeněk Rudinger to work on reconstruction planning.

Rebuilding East–West Trade Links

When he returned to Czechoslovakia with his wife in 1945, Zdeněk Rudinger had exactly the qualifi cations, expertise, and experience needed for reconstruction. As a trained economist, he had vast practical experience as a manager in different sectors. Moreover, he was fl uent not only in Czech and German, but also in English, the new lingua franca in the emerging Atlantic world. Now, however, he was recruited as a manager in the heavy engineering industry. Having also become a member of the Communist Party and subsequently having supported the communist coup d’état of February 1948, Rudinger was in charge of foreign business relations. For the moment, the Communist Party desperately needed the business experience, foreign contacts, and language skills, which he and others with a similar background had acquired. Such talents were essential for reconstruction and for the effective implementation of nationalization—this at a time when Czechoslovak industry had at least partially been purged of collaborators with the Nazi German occupation regime and, after the coup, also of center-right supporters of the short-lived parliamentary democracy.4 When he heard about Rudinger’s interest in purchasing steel from a Western European country, Rollman wrote an internal note for Gunnar Myrdal, the UNECE Executive Secretary: “Knowing what the situation was in Belgium and Luxembourg, I had the feeling that something more than a friendly talk could come out

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of this.”5 In fact, after successful reconstruction of their steel industries, these two countries were already suffering from overproduction and were keen to sell some of their steel in foreign markets. Shortly after his meeting with Rudinger, Rollman had traveled to Belgium where he found keen interest in a deal with the Czecho- slovak company. There, his main contact was with Paul Boland, the managing director of Sybelac, a Belgian cartel originally initiated by Nazi Germany in 1940 to fulfi ll German war-time orders and expanded after the war to include steel companies from Luxem- bourg. Rollman knew him well from the UNECE Steel Committee on which Boland had served as one of the Belgian representatives since 1947.6 Subsequently, at the start of December 1949, Rudinger traveled to Brussels to discuss the desired quantity, quality, and delivery schedule for the steel purchase. His Belgian and Luxembourg partners promised to make enquiries about the possibility of Belgian credits and export guarantees.7 However, the National Bank of Belgium was unwilling to guarantee any credits by Belgian private banks, as it feared that Czechoslovakia might be unable or unwilling to repay the loan with interest for economic or political reasons.8 The Offi ce National du Ducroire—a national agency for providing export guarantees—was only willing to cover purchases up to the value of 200 million Belgian francs.9 Thus, although the presidium of the Economic Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was going to approve the planned steel deal in principle at its meeting the following day,10 Rudinger wrote to Rollman on December 27, 1949: “I am afraid that the most pleas- ant conversations we can have will not change the fact that people in Brussels judge questions of European economic cooperation differently from you in Geneva.”11 Rudinger assumed that American pressure not to assist East- Central European communist countries had infl uenced the Belgian decisions. The real commercial reason was, rather, that with Euro- pean trade highly fragmented and access to convertible currencies limited, the sale to a Czechoslovak nationalized company appeared too risky. Also Rudinger’s request for a credit term of two years was excessive by prevalent Western European standards. As Eugene V. Rostow, Special Assistant to Myrdal, explained to Ludvík Frejka, chief economic advisor to Czechoslovak President, Klement Gottwald, at the start of February 1950: Tony Rollman “was able to

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satisfy himself entirely that the diffi culties in the transaction do not arise in the realm of trade policy, and do not refl ect either American pressure, or a discriminatory attitude.” Moreover, Rostow continued, “We are informally sounding out other institutions to see if a plan which would more nearly correspond to your needs could be devised.”12 Rostow, a trained lawyer, former professor of law at Yale University and assistant general counsel in the U.S. Lend-Lease Administration, now used his own contacts in the banking sector to facilitate fi nancing the steel deal. He fi rst approached bankers from the Crédit Suisse13 and the Banca Commerciale Italiana,14 who specialized in commercial loans to industry. They recommended that the Czechoslovak National Bank guarantee the repayment of the credit with gold or foreign currency reserves in one of its foreign accounts, for example in Switzerland. A few days later, on February 15, 1950, Rostow traveled to Basle to discuss this and other issues with banking experts from another international organization, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).15 The BIS had been created in 1930;16 it facilitated cooperation among national central banks also after the Second World War. Whereas the communist CMEA countries did not participate in GATT until Poland fi rst joined in 1967, the BIS continued as a pan-European organization. It also arranged credit operations for East-Central European central banks, especially those from Poland, Czechoslo- vakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.17 At Basle, Rostow met with the Belgian Marcel Van Zeeland, who had worked for the BIS since its creation. In 1949 he was Head of the Banking Department and First Manager. Van Zeeland was eager to help. During the six weeks following their meeting in mid- February, Rostow and Rollman from the UNECE, Van Zeeland and Danish manager Oluf Berntsen from the BIS, representatives from Sybelac as well as Rudinger, Frejka, and delegates of the Czechoslovak National Bank continued to discuss unresolved issues in writing and on the phone.18 Finally, from April 3 to April 5, 1950, they converged in Basle for a series of meetings to fl esh out the conditions for a complex combination of credits and guarantees involving the BIS, private Belgian banks, the Czechoslovak National Bank, and the Belgian Offi ce National du Ducroire.19 These discussions continued and new technical issues arose.20 Moreover, the National Bank and the Czechoslovak fi nance

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ministry were not fully content with the interest rates the BIS and the Belgian banks offered.21 As no trace remains of further contacts after June 1950, it is highly likely that the steel deal failed in the end. There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, the North Korean invasion of South Korea starting on June 25, 1950 and the American-led intervention in the war on behalf of the South led to a sudden surge in demand for steel. The Belgian and Luxembourg steel companies probably found alternative, less risky outlets for their tonnage. At the same time, a battle raged in the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government over the desirability and extent of continued economic ties with Western countries. It is quite possible that Prague decision-makers in the end opposed either the credit conditions offered or, as a matter of principle, the import of so much steel from the West. The long drawn out Czechoslovak– Belgian discussions and negotiations did set a precedent for similar deals, however, which were successfully concluded in the fi rst phase of early détente from 1954 onwards, with very similar credit and export guarantee arrangements as those provisionally arranged in 1950.22 They also fed into bilateral trade and payments treaties concluded between Belgium, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia in 1954–5.23

Expanding International Organization

This case effectively illustrates the liberty that experts in international organizations and their committees frequently enjoyed in interpreting treaty provisions and terms of reference in expanding their activities. Here, the UNECE’s Secretariat invested substantial resources in cooperating with several other international organizations, national institutions, and private and publicly-owned banks and steel companies to facilitate an East–West business deal. As UNECE Executive Secretary, Myrdal placed particular stress on keeping East-Central European countries like Czechoslovakia as well as the Soviet Union actively engaged in the only major pan- European organization for economic reconstruction and cooperation. As Myrdal insisted in a speech at Moscow’s Lomonosov State University in March 1956, shortly before the twentieth congress of

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the Soviet communists denounced Stalinism: “no political division of Europe will easily break the economic interdependence of the Continent, and none could do so without tremendous costs in terms of decreased welfare for all European countries.”24 Alongside Myrdal and the UNECE’s secretariat, the Steel Committee, too, facilitated trade links between East and West after Stalin’s death in 1953. At the fi rst meeting with full Eastern Euro- pean participation, late in March 1954, Soviet experts discussed with the British possibly importing wire rods, and Polish delegates explored with experts from Western European countries purchasing raw materials, like ferro-cobalt and acid-resisting stainless steel tubes for use in the chemical industry. The committee’s original terms of reference dating from November 1947 had focused on addressing the European steel shortage.25 Once this shortage was overcome by 1950, at least in Western Europe, the committee drafted new terms of reference for its work programme. These terms were so broad as to cover practically every conceivable activity. In future, it could inter alia “collect and transmit all useful information concerning steel production and consumption trends,” “pursue its statistical work,” “undertake ... any studies which the Committee may deem of importance,” and “draw any appropriate conclusions arising from its work.”26 As in the case of its UNECE counterpart, the de facto power of the Steel Committee of the OEEC to manage its own agenda and business without interference was never seriously disputed. Thus, when the Council of the reformed and enlarged OECD decided to prolong its existence for another fi ve-year period in 1965, there was—in contrast to several other sectors—“unanimous recognition by governments that problems in the iron and steel industry were of importance and did affect government policies and interests.”27 The example of this UNECE committee illustrates well how its scope changed and grew over time.28 To overcome the steel shortage in Europe, it fi rst concentrated on reallocating coal and iron ore supplies during 1947–9. As the Soviet Union was unwilling to disclose the amount of available scrap in its eastern German zone of occupation, discussions about this issue shifted to the Western Euro- pean OEEC.29 Evolving from its concern with the shortage, the Steel Committee, in cooperation with the Steel Division of the UNECE Secretariat, also surveyed sectoral developments in production and markets. In September 1949 the Secretariat’s Rollman report

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predicted overproduction of up to eight million tons of steel in Europe by 1953.30 These concerns subsequently provided an added economic justifi cation to the Schuman Plan for creating the ECSC in continental Western Europe.31 When the Steel Committee debated the report’s fi rst draft and the results of its own working party, however, it became clear that any overproduction on a continental level would be a problem mainly for Western Europe.32 At the same time, analyzing these topics also induced statistical work and debates about investments in the modernization of old or the construction of new steel plants. After the Second World War, national governments produced their own plans for investing in heavy industry, to support economic reconstruction, as in the case of the fi ve-year plan devised by Jean Monnet for France, or to foster industrialization, as in the case of OEEC peripherals like Greece, Turkey, and Portugal or CMEA countries like Bulgaria, which had not had steel production before. Such efforts formed one part of national welfare policies to support the development of particular regions with high unemployment or predominantly-agricultural production. At the same time, in the light of growing raw material interdependence and the globalization of steel production and trade, purely-national planning for the sector appeared to be anachronistic. As a result, discussing investments in the steel sector became a key concern for international organizations, especially for the OEEC in the early postwar period.

Negotiating Investment Plans

From the beginning the U.S. planned to make Marshall Plan aid conditional upon a concerted European plan for economic reconstruction. The Truman administration entertained high hopes that such cooperation would ultimately lead to the creation of a common market and some form of political federation in Western Europe.33 While it became clear almost immediately that several Western European countries (Britain in particular) were unwilling to fi t into such an economic and political straightjacket,34 OEEC committees nevertheless devoted much time to discussing national investment plans. In early 1949 the OEEC Council stipulated that, above all in the steel sector, “investment and modernization projects

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should be developed rationally and in concert.” Member states were to “avoid erecting a production capacity in excess of Europe’s needs and export possibilities.” Their projects should adopt the latest technology and help to reduce the dollar gap by enabling European industry to earn hard currency through exports—thus improving Western Europe’s balance of payments and facilitating further trade liberalization.35 Subsequently, the Executive Commit- tee instructed the Steel Committee “to provide an estimate of what would be the appropriate level of steel production in the participating countries to meet the probable export demand and to provide adequate supplies of steel to support the processing industries at the level which viability demands.” The member states would submit their investment plans over the next two to three years. The Steel Committee in turn would evaluate them against its assessment of future steel consumption and on their technological merit, then judge whether they seemed “justifi ed.”36 All OEEC member states complied and submitted fairly-detailed investment plans to the Steel Committee. National economic ministries drafted them, in cooperation with nationalized or private companies. Unlike in the UNECE’s Steel Committee, which had a very mixed membership, including representatives of individual companies and business associations, offi cials from these national ministries also set out and defended their own plans in the OEEC’s Steel Committee. They were aware of the general American pressure to coordinate national investment planning, but they were under much greater domestic political pressure to defend maximized national-level objectives. From the beginning, the committee found it diffi cult to conduct evaluations without reliable fi gures about consumption trends.37 Moreover, when the UNECE’s Rollman report ventured to predict future consumption and market developments later in 1949, its warnings were quickly confounded once steel demand increased sharply after the outbreak of the Korean War. In a situation of rapidly-rising demand, it became more diffi cult to criticize technologically- or economically-ineffi cient national investments. But the Steel Committee’s deliberations also highlight other issues. When members discussed the Portuguese submission in August 1949, for example, it became clear that desirable investments into domestic pig iron production could not be made for some time until the Douro River was made navigable to allow the transportation of

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raw materials and pig iron. Instead, the Lisbon government had scheduled construction of a new tin plate factory, with a planned annual output of 30,000 tons for welded tube production. The other committee members argued strongly that these investments were premature and not economically viable as long as Portugal had to import practically all the raw materials.38 Undeterred by this criticism, the Portuguese continued to advocate for electronically- welded tube production, which the committee discussed in July 1950. In this case, the delegate from France, among others, argued that the submission underestimated the production capacity, as it ignored the possibility of two or three shifts instead of one in such a plant. Other committee members called into question the Portuguese claims about the future cost differential, if any, between imported and domestically-made tubes. In the end, only the Austrian delegate supported the plan and the Swiss abstained. As the Dutch member pointed out, however, Switzerland always abstained in votes due to its neutrality status and the Austrian delegate only substituted for the permanent member and was without instructions to oppose the Portuguese plans.39 In fact, the Dutch had run into similar problems in the Steel Committee during the previous year over their scheme to extend the Koninklijke Nederlandse Hoogovens blast furnaces and steel works at Ijmuiden, north-west of Amsterdam. The projected extension was to increase steel output from 340,000 to 570,000 tons annu- ally and involved the erection of a slabbing mill, a semi-continuous hot strip mill, and a cold rolling mill to make cold rolled sheets and tin plate. The Dutch member claimed the investment would help reduce imports and improve the balance of payments. Moreover, the Netherlands had a growing population and the government needed to create jobs. The output increment had already been scaled down from 800,000 to 570,000 tons. Given this, and as the Steel Committee had already approved similar plans by other member states, refusing the Dutch proposal would clearly amount to “discrimination.”40 Nonetheless, the plans proved to be nearly as controversial as those later submitted by Portugal. The Brit- ish member argued that the emerging Benelux customs union required that investments in the Netherlands should be seen in conjunction with those in Belgium and Luxembourg. However, these three countries together already had “rather more” than their “full share ... of the total increase in fl at product output” compared

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to the prewar period. Among others, the Danish and Norwegian members agreed. They regretted that “it had not been possible to co-ordinate the different projects thoroughly as there had been no opportunity to consider them all at the same time.”41 The general objectives formulated by the OEEC Council and the subsequent discussions in the Steel Committee were part and parcel of a short-lived transnational dynamism in the process of economic reconstruction with Marshall Plan aid. This dynamism fostered new forms of informal cross-border indicative planning—in this case of investments in the steel sector. For a short period it seemed as if new international organizations like the OEEC would be able to develop the transnational coordination of investments into one of their major activities. However, the OEEC Steel Committee discussions showed clearly that “the piecemeal approach” to discussing national plans did not work. The committee members were able to consider the “technical merits” of each case in isolation.42 As offi - cials from economic ministries they were more interested in plans’ economic rather than technological merits. However, the piecemeal approach made it impossible to evaluate individual investment projects together and thus allow for pan-OEEC indicative planning and decision-making on the basis of up-to-date predictions of steel consumption trends. The problems were not limited to the structure of the submission of plans, their evaluation, and the decision-making. The Steel Commit- tee could not implement formal sanctions. Unlike Europe’s interwar steel cartels, moreover, the infl uence of Committee members’ expertise was severely constrained by their formal government roles and their instructions to defend the submitted national plans at all cost. Thus, they failed to develop a stronger esprit de corps and consensus orientation which could have involved give-and-take on all sides and ready compliance with informal behavioral norms. In fact, despite almost universal damning criticism of the technical merits of Lisbon’s plan, the Portuguese government simply took the Austrian chance vote and the Swiss abstention as conveying suffi cient international support. Indeed, as the Steel Committee concluded by October 1949, the member states treated the submission of a national investment plan “merely as a formality after the country concerned has made a fi rm decision to go forward with it.” Instead, for the committee to have worked more effectively, it would have been necessary to discuss plans at an early stage, when they

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could still be adjusted.43 Nevertheless it took the OEEC Executive Committee until 1952 to decide that the Steel Committee’s reports would in future automatically be submitted to the member states, and also to the U.S. Mutual Security Agency when they concerned projects to be co-funded with dollar aid.44 This at least opened up the temporary possibility of American sanctions, if the U.S. agency decided to factor the reports into their own decision-making. In contrast, the UNECE’s Steel Committee could not even exercise limited moral pressure. When reviewing their discussions about investments in the steel sector in November 1956, members reaffi rmed their conviction that “with the need for the most effi cient utilization of resources, ideally, international coordination of investment according to the principles of international specialization and division of labor is desirable.” However, they also concluded that this would “be Utopian but some degree of coordination can be achieved, and at the very minimum the undertaking of investment decisions in one country in the light of full knowledge of what another is doing.”45 Thus, in coordinating investment plans for the steel sector, the international organizations quickly reached an impasse. Their activism was severely restricted by the determination of member governments to prioritize their objectives for domestic reconstruction. In the case of large steel producers like Britain, for example, this surfaced in the defense of traditional export markets. By contrast, OEEC peripherals like Greece, Turkey, and Portugal were anxious to build up domestic production and replace foreign imports. They frequently still followed policies of autonomous industrialization and autarky. In cases like Portugal, the combination of an underde- veloped rural economy with a clerical dictatorship at home and an empire abroad required a high degree of autarky to foster industrialization, stabilize the political system, and run the colonies in Africa. Over-reliance on imports of steel products, which were needed for industrialization and fi ghting colonial wars, even from traditional allies like Britain, had to be avoided at all cost. More generally, as the Dutch investment plan illustrates, governments were concerned with protecting and increasing the welfare of their citizens, especially before the 1950s economic boom in Western Europe arrived, or at least became tangible for citizens. Whether as direct government aid for state-owned industries or as subsidies for private steel companies, investments in domestic

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steel production almost amounted to a public works program. The social policy objectives of job creation, reduced unemployment, and higher income and consumption levels easily outweighed technocratic concerns about modernizing the entire European steel industry and achieving a rational division of labor among nations. More surprisingly perhaps, the CMEA did not even attempt to coordinate investments in the Soviet sphere of infl uence. In the steel sector it remained inactive until the mid-1950s, by which time most major investment decisions had already been taken. Cooperation was limited to bilateral agreements such as one between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which dated back to 1948. A joint committee exchanged information about production planning, costs and prices, norms and pay, but it made no plans for common investment.46 Instead, each CMEA country sought to develop a miniature version of the Soviet Union’s iron and steel industry. At the same time, they became more reliant on the Soviet Union not just for general political reasons. The Western embargo policy, formalized with the creation of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) in 1949–50, sought to limit the transfer of technological innovations to communist countries.47

Fig. 7.1 Following the Soviet Model: Communist countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also failed to coordinate their national investments to extend steel production after the Second World War. However, the Polish government copied the Soviet models of Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk in building the new Nowa Huta plant using Soviet production technology and iron ore from Krivoi Rog. The photo shows the entrance to the then V. Lenin Metallurgical Combine in Nowa Huta in 1969.

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Moreover, the East-Central European countries also became more and more dependent on Ukrainian iron ore supplies. Thus, in the immediate postwar period, the Polish government initially planned to utilize Western technology and Swedish iron ore for its projected new steel plant, which could have been located in Upper Silesia close to the Polish coal reserves. Instead, it constructed the huge integrated steel works at Nowa Huta based on the Soviet models of Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk—using Soviet production technology at a site which was more convenient for iron ore supplies from Krivoi Rog, and without any advance calculation by the Soviet experts of the costs involved.48 At one point, the CMEA did come up with a tentative project of greater concentration of iron and steel production in and around Krivoi Rog, but the East- Central European member states insisted on developing their own industries further.49 In fact, after this and similar experiences, one of the core objectives of East-Central European CMEA countries became to retain a larger measure of independence from the Soviet Union. Above all, this concerned technological innovations. For the postwar period two of these innovations stand out: oxygen steel-making and continuous casting.

Fig. 7.2 Slow Death of Open Hearth: After the Second World War the basic oxygen furnace and the electric arc furnace increasingly replaced the open-hearth furnaces in Western Europe. This artwork from the fi rst half of the twentieth century shows men at the steel forges in Oberhausen, Germany, using the Siemens-Martin process to make steel which still involved using open- hearth furnaces.

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Among the major technological innovations in steel-making processes after the Second World War was oxygen steel-making. A pneumatic technique in which pure oxygen refi nes a charge of molten iron and recycled scrap, this process signifi cantly shortened production times. The most common version is the Linz-Donawitz (LD) or basic-oxygen process which introduces a top-mounted lance through the mouth of the vessel to inject oxygen downward onto the charge. In fact, this process succeeded in yielding up to 300 tons of steel in forty-fi ve minute cycles, compared to six hours in the open hearth process. After its commercial introduction in Austria in the early 1950s, oxygen steel-making fast turned into the standard process for bulk steel, as it reduced capital costs and energy consumption as well as being less labor-intensive. In fact, by 1986 roughly 70 percent of steel in the twelve-member European Community (EC) was produced using the oxygen and nearly 30 percent using the electric steel-making process. While the fi gures

Fig. 7.3 Basic-oxygen from Austria: The Linz-Donawitz (LD) or basic-oxygen process increasingly replaced the open-hearth process from its invention in 1952 onwards. It was developed by the state- owned company Vöest in Linz, where Nazi Germany had created a steel works in 1938, after the annexation of Austria. The Soviet Union bought a complete LD steel mill from the Austrians for Novo Lipetsk and a license for themselves, but not for the other CMEA countries. This photo shows the LD Steelworks 1 in Linz, the fi rst plant of its kind.

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for Japan were much the same, companies based in the U.S. still used the outmoded open hearth process for some 4 percent of their steel production.50 In contrast, producers from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were much slower in adopting the oxygen process. The time-lag in the diffusion of the oxygen process to the CMEA countries illustrates well why the established nineteenth-century pattern of licensing steel technology no longer operated as smoothly on a pan-European level as before. The CoCom list generally complicated CMEA industries’ access to Western technology. As in several other cases, CMEA countries could circumvent the CoCom rules for the LD process by importing the new technology from neutral Austria. However, the hard-nosed managers of the state- owned Austrian Iron and Steel Works Vöest insisted that the Soviet Union purchase a license for itself or alternatively, a block license for the entire CMEA area. Eventually, the Soviets bought a complete LD steel mill from the Austrians for Novo Lipetsk and a license for themselves, but not for the other CMEA countries. Despite the option of cooperating with a producer from neutral Austria, the license fee, which had to be paid in hard currency, constituted a serious obstacle to timely technology transfer, as did the high capital costs. Moreover, to gain access to Western technology, even from neutral states like Austria, the CMEA countries, when entering into obligations under a license agreement, in essence had to accept Western legal standards, something that became more formalized in the Helsinki process in the mid-1970s. Moreover, the parallel independent attempts by Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to get access to the LD process also highlight the absence of a coordinated strategic approach to manage technology transfer more effi ciently.51 In fact, this lack of cooperation among East-Central European countries in upgrading steel technologies was also one important motivation for the 1964 formation of Intermetall. Some CMEA member states took the initiative in the 1960s to create sector organizations, which included the international Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) created in 1956–7; and Agromash for agriculture, with headquarters in Sofi a. In the case of Intermetall, headquartered in Budapest, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland signed the treaty on June 5, 1964. The Soviet Union and East Germany expressed their interest in joining the new organization on August 24 and September 4

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respectively, and acceded in conjunction with its fi rst Council Fig. 7.4 Electric Steel meeting in the Hungarian capital during November 23–26, 1964, Making: This photo with Bulgaria following in 1965.52 shows an early electric arc furnace, a furnace to melt Constructing Intermetall and other sector organizations in the manganese ore in order to Soviet bloc during the 1960s had a two-pronged motivation. At the make special steel grades. political level it was one outcome of what was often dubbed East- One can distinguish three electrodes as well as the Central European “Gaullism”: the attempt by countries from the shell of the furnace. By region to develop their own socialist models and to become less the mid-1970s, roughly dependent on the Soviet Union, just as one of the French President’s 30 percent of Western key objectives was to enhance independence from the U.S. and European steel production used electric arc furnaces, conduct his own Eastern policy. Under the leadership of Josep Broz while Eastern European Tito, Yugoslavia had adopted a more independent nationalist policy countries only began to early on, which led to the 1948 expulsion of its communist party from introduce them when the communist regimes the Cominform and the country’s leading role in forming the non- collapsed fi fteen years later. aligned movement created in Belgrade thirteen years later. Romania began a more careful process of disengagement from mid-1952 onwards, which eventually led to a quite independent foreign policy in the 1970s. Poland and Hungary, fi nally, emphasized economic

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reform to differentiate their road to socialism from the Soviet model of comprehensive state ownership and micro-economic planning. Their approach included more private enterprise and some market incentives—a strategy that, using the name for a famous Hungarian dish, became known as “goulash communism.” At the level of technical cooperation, the East-Central European “Gaullism” strongly infl uenced the new sector organizations. Both the CMEA itself and, in the case of steel, the CMEA Stand- ing Committee for Black Metallurgy, had their headquarters in Moscow and were heavily dominated by the Soviet Union and Russian experts. While the new sector organizations could not exclude the Soviet Union, they had their headquarters elsewhere and created alternative institutional platforms for cooperation. At the same time, for economic and sector ministries (not foreign ministries and communist parties), as for state-owned companies and sector experts, Intermetall (like the other sector organizations) promised new opportunities for more fl exible cross-border work to facilitate technological innovation and transfer and to develop joint projects. The organization’s fi rst director was a Hungarian, József Kocsis. He had two deputy directors, one for production and one for technology, plus a budget including a small amount in hard currency (Swiss francs), and an initial staff of fi fty-nine, including thirty experts appointed by the Council for three-year periods.53 Thus, Intermetall, which signed a cooperation agreement with the CMEA in July 1970,54 was designed to be more expert-driven, facilitating cooperation (not just in the CMEA but also with West- ern European countries and producers) over issues of trade and technology transfer. This was refl ected, for example, in Yugoslavia’s relations with the new organization. Due to its tensions with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, although communist, was the only country with an associate member status in the CMEA, which allowed it to participate in twenty-one of thirty-two of its key institutions as if it were a full member. In contrast, Intermetall moved the relationship to a different and less complicated level. In fact, it devolved to the company level when the Association of Yugoslavian Metal- lurgical Factories, not the Yugoslavian foreign ministry or another ministry, signed an open-ended association agreement with Inter- metall. This arrangement allowed Yugoslavian steel producers to participate regularly in the organization’s activities upon payment of a fi xed fee in Hungarian forint.55

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Fig. 7.5 Meeting of Minds? Professional organizations of engineers and international organizations like the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe fostered exchange among steel experts after 1945. In Eastern Europe, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the specialized Intermetall organization sought to facilitate transnational cooperation. This photo shows Soviet and Czech experts in steel works in the town of Kladno near Prague in Czechoslovakia in 1975.

But, like much other cross-border cooperation in the CMEA region, Intermetall promised far more than it actually achieved. Thus, in 1965, only one year after its creation, a secret internal report compiled by a permanent Intermetall working party dedicated to steel production and trade issues analyzed the CMEA’s continued dependence on imports from Western countries. While these imports had decreased between 1962 and 1964, East-Central

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European countries actually had to import greater quantities of innovative products such as stainless steel and cold rolled sheets, which were not widely produced in CMEA member states; or, even more worryingly, could not be produced, because state-owned steel companies suffered from a growing technology gap in specialized steel products. As a result, the experts concluded that increased exchange of such products and the development and acquisition of new production technologies ought to be given high priority by Intermetall and its member states.56 The ensuing attempts by Intermetall to foster the so-called socialist division of labor in steel had few productive results beyond its already existing bilateral links and CMEA cooperation. At a 1967 Budapest meeting, experts concentrated on cooperation in the production of, and trade in, smaller specialized steel products for industrial machinery, crucially important for increasing productivity and reducing costs for idle plants lacking spare parts—an endemic problem in the centrally-planned economies. But not least to avoid control by the Soviet Union, the agenda was organized as a chain of bilateral negotiations, which never created a larger picture for the CMEA region as a whole. These bilateral talks were totally driven by the sometimes grotesque ineffectiveness of national plans and the resulting gaps in production. The experts from each country sought to fi ll these shortfalls with imports, but they had only limited interest in selling their own products. Due to the enormous insecurities of national planning, demand, and production, they were all afraid that such sales would merely create new gaps in their national output of these parts and tools, which in turn could have terrible downstream effects on industrial production more generally. The long-drawn-out negotiations between the Hungar- ian and Polish experts came to very little, for example, as Hungary was not actually producing most of the products the Polish experts desired, but was instead importing them from the West. Similarly, the Polish and Russian experts concluded that both countries suffered from similar defi cits in the production of the same crucial products and thus, were unable to assist each other.57 After similar experiences the Intermetall Council actually held an extraordinary meeting in October 1974 to discuss the near total failure of the envisaged socialist division of labor in steel technology development and production.58 Representatives from national ministries were joined by the members of the Intermetall bureau

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and steel experts. In contrast to the offi cial CMEA reports, which (like those of national ministries in the Soviet bloc) regularly produced beautiful statistics to impress domestic publics, other international organizations, and Western countries, the Intermetall meeting concluded that the results of the specialization drive were wholly inadequate in relation to the time and energy invested. In ten years Intermetall had accepted just fi fty proposals for possible cross-border cooperation. In fewer than ten of these proposals were the most problematic issues actually resolved, and only two contracts were fi nally signed. The entire process in other words proved to be far too slow and tedious to engage actual technological developments, which even in Eastern Europe were taking place at a much faster pace. Although couched in communist economic terminology, the Council and Bureau members and experts stated quite bluntly the key reasons for the failure of the system’s division of labor. They were anxieties about the changing demands of national plans and production; the absence of market prices; and the refusal of member states and state-owned companies to take legal responsibility for supplying a particular product to an agreed standard in a timely manner or face fi nancial penalties. The last two reasons were surprisingly-harsh judgments about the inadequacies of the communist economic model and practice in Eastern Europe, compared to Western market economies where demand and supply formed prices; and companies, transnational voluntary organizations, and international treaties created a fairly-stable legal framework for technological cooperation and transfer as well as trade. As the Polish Intermetall delegate pointed out, even where specialization and cooperation in East-Central Europe was agreed and trade could potentially increase, it was severely disrupted by the inadequacies of cross-border railway transport, with heavy delays at border crossings and a severe lack of wagons for shipping steel products. Intermetall meetings routinely featured these complaints, which clearly showed the inadequacies of the OSJD’s work and its specialized committee for wagon exchange. In Intermetall, as in the CMEA, therefore, the actual results of expert-driven cooperation were far more meager than they appeared on paper. Successful large projects like the Hungarian Ikarus bus production were the exception to the rule. This company had existed since 1895 and profi ted from being confi rmed as the CMEA’s bus

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Fig. 7.6 Model of Cooperation: The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was committed to a “socialist division of labor.” In practice, however, few collaborative technology projects saw the day of light and were successful. One such model for socialist cooperation was the Ikarus bus produced in Hungary which was sold throughout Eastern Europe and even to West Germany and Latin America. These Ikarus buses were lined up outside their factory in 1974 before being transported to export markets.

production specialist, especially for its series 200 models. At one point, with an annual delivery of 15,000 buses, it even became the largest producer in the world, with assembly kits distributed to communist developing countries like Cuba, Angola, and Mozam- bique and some exports to countries like West Germany as well. Generally, cooperation efforts yielded better results where one nation’s technological, scientifi c, and fi nancial resources were hope- lessly inadequate for the task, as in the case of the new Eastern Euro- pean energy infrastructure and its gas and oil pipelines. In Intermetal, the development and production of new types of extremely-hard non-corrosive steel pipes suitable for use in nuclear power stations is another case in point, where safety and security concerns over- rode the wide-spread hesitancy—also among experts—to share technological knowledge.59 This reluctance resulted at least in part from the so-called Sofi a Principle: the formal commitment in the CMEA to “fraternal assistance” in scientifi c and technological cooperation, which committed member states to circulate all new scientifi c-technological knowledge at an absurdly-small charge for

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the reproduction of the documentation.60 This policy resulted in nominally-high fi gures for the exchange of sets of scientifi c and technical documents in the CMEA at large, some 38,000 between 1960 and 1962, for example.61 But most of this information was outdated and no longer useful, as the member states withheld the most relevant new knowledge until the technology was fully amortized. After all, no one put any trust in the formal CMEA rule that the actual use of the knowledge had to be preceded by the donor’s agreement, which was practically impossible to police in the absence of intellectual property rights protection in the Soviet bloc.62 Thus, despite attempts by Intermetall (and the CMEA) to enhance cooperation among member states, the technology gap with Western Europe and other steel producers world-wide actually widened, including the lag in continuous casting, the second most important technological innovation after 1945. Continuous casting cut four steps from the conventional steel-making process. It was no longer necessary to pour steel into ingots, and thus the new process saved a lot of time and energy. In 1970, only 9.6 percent of steel produced globally was continuously cast. By 1975, this fi gure had already risen to 21.5 percent.63 However, CMEA countries were just beginning to introduce continuous casting when the communist dictatorships collapsed. Unsurprisingly, comparative research on steel technology transfer conducted at the time concluded that state ownership combined with central planning heavily bureaucratized diffusion processes and made them highly ineffi cient.64 Regarding steel technologies like continuous casting, poor communication within and among CMEA countries clearly aggravated other problems, such as the severe lack of capital during the accelerating economic crisis from the mid-1970s onwards.65 Together with other incremental technological innovations, oxygen steel-making and continuous casting contributed signifi - cantly to reduced energy consumption per ton of iron or steel. According to a 1989 UNECE report, the average fuel rates fell from more than 800 kilograms per ton of pig-iron in the 1950s to approximately 500 kilograms by the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, the requirements of steel-consuming industries also shifted, leading in particular to the development of a much greater variety of specialized steels, such as stainless steel, and harder and lighter steel plates for automobiles, to help reduce fuel consumption, especially after the fi rst oil crisis (1973). Product innovation of this kind was

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Fig. 7.7 Quest for Alternative Materials: After thirty years of growth, steel production in Western Europe sank for the fi rst time in 1974, starting a prolonged structural crisis in the sector which eventually led to cross-border mergers. Demand for steel fell not least because many industries began to use alternative materials such as aluminum or plastics like PET for cans and bottles. At the same time, car producers sought to build lighter automobiles in order to reduce fuel consumption. This photo shows the Peugeot Vroomster, a concept car exhibited at the motor show in Essen in Belgium in 2002.

also driven by the greater availability of alternative materials such as aluminum or plastics like PET for cans, bottles, and other pack- ages. Naturally, competition from alternative materials was much greater in market economies where it could fuel technological innovation in the steel sector.

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Studies of the evolution of the world steel market after the Second World War emphasize the relatively-limited benefi ts of technological leadership. The market remained highly transparent. The purchasing departments of steel-consuming industries had an excellent overview of steel companies, their products, and quality on a global scale.66 Specialized steel products initially remained the domain of steel companies located in highly-industrialized countries placed close to often export-oriented steel-consuming industries. However, mass-produced steel had more or less the same quality everywhere. Indeed, a 1989 OECD study of the role of technology in shaping the world steel market concluded that new technological developments in iron- and steel-making “may work to the advantage of the newly-industrialized economies in that they offer them an opportunity to incorporate straightaway the latest processing routes and processes in plants built at new sites.”67 The faster growth rates of economies like Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s, and others like China since then, also tended to increase steel production for domestic consumption in the ship-building or car industries. Some countries actually had signifi cant competitive advantages over established European producers, especially the domestic availability of raw materials such as coking coal or iron ore. Alternatively, they could build up their steel industry in coastal areas to reduce transport costs for importing cheaper raw materials—a strategy also used by Dutch producers on the North Sea coast to import tariff-free North American coal.68 Nevertheless, the activities of steel sector international organizations increasingly extended to facilitating technological innovation and knowledge transfer and fostering research cooperation. In steel, research only slowly became somewhat de-coupled from production and more structured and scientifi c, with an increased role of state-funded institutes and of professional bodies and academic journals in disseminating results. In postwar Europe, however, technological innovation gradually became a concern for governments, for international organizations, and for societies at large, due to several reasons. Thus, CMEA countries like Bulgaria and OEEC peripherals like Portugal saw steel as a key technology for their more rapid industrialization. Moreover, as the costs of research and development and capital investments rose further, cost-sharing became a crucial incentive for transnational technology collaboration. It also became ever more necessary to diversify

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Fig. 7.8 Cruising the and reduce energy consumption, initially to allow the use of nearby Seas: Whereas demand raw materials and to reduce production costs. Especially from for steel has stagnated in Europe, it has risen the mid-1960s onwards, however, much lower levels of energy sharply in industrializing consumption also promised to reduce pollution and later, to prevent countries, especially in more rapid climate change. Finally, a further key objective was to the Far East. Because of high transport costs, steel guarantee the future of steel production and linked employment is normally produced in Europe, after the peak in production reached in 1974, in times of close to where it is rapid globalization of the sector. This proved to be a huge challenge consumed. Much of the steel production for ship- for East-Central Europe when its steel producers suddenly became building, for example, exposed to the world market in 1989–90. has moved to the Far East together with the industry. This picture was taken at the DSME shipyard in Okpo in International Organizations, Technology, Transfers South Korea in 2013. It shows the fi rst vessel in the Triple E class Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller under Access to technological know-how was probably the single most construction, the largest important motive for the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries container ship of its time. to re-engage with the UNECE in 1954. This time round the Soviet

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Union sent “actual steel experts, untutored in international work and visibly surprised at the warmth of the welcome accorded to them by Western delegations and the secretariat.”69 During his trip to Prague in October 1955, H.W.A. Waring, Director of the UNECE’s Industry Division, was advised that in future Czechoslovakia, too, would once more be represented on the Steel Committee by a technical expert instead of a diplomat trained in Cold War rhetoric, the standard practice in the late Stalinist period.70 By the time the CMEA countries started to participate again in the Steel Committee, it had already initiated various technology and knowledge transfer activities. In February 1954, as part of a series of comparative studies of different materials, the UNECE published a report on competition between steel and aluminum—a good conductor of electricity and heat, light and strong and resis- tant to corrosion.71 The report was widely disseminated and had an impact on material substitution decisions in companies and among planners, as Waring learned during his visit to Moscow in October 1955, prior to going to Prague. It also became clear, however, that more than in Western European countries, technological consider- ations were often overshadowed in the centralized state economy by issues of “general planning,” which could decide whether it was “better to increase steel production or, for example, aluminium.”72 At the same time, Waring realized that despite the willingness of the new Moscow leadership, the fragmentation, competition, and outright chaos in the Soviet central planning system impeded actual cooperation with the UNECE. Thus, Gosplan, not the economic ministries, was responsible for collecting statistical information, which the UNECE Secretariat desired to obtain. However, Gosplan did not have fi gures for production and trade in steel products within the CMEA, which would have been technically compatible with Western statistics; nor was the agency prepared to divulge the statistics it did have, which were of course manipulated to create the illusion of an economy regularly exceeding its planning targets.73 Alongside its studies of steel and other competing materials, the UNECE published an annual report from 1952 onwards about advances in steel technology. The fi rst issue was compiled for the UNECE Secretariat by a Swiss professor. Subsequently, the Secre- tariat collected papers by national experts which it edited to minimize overlaps among them. For the fourth report (1956), however,

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the Steel Committee decided upon the topics to be discussed and divided up gathering documentation among its members.74 The report came in two volumes and contained articles on raw materials, iron production, steel production, and semi-fi nished and fi nished steel products. The second section contained a contribution by an expert from East Germany on the development of low- shaft pig-iron furnaces, which could be run on coke made from brown coal which existed in abundance there. Initial tests at the state-owned Maxhütte plant had not been satisfactory as the brown coal coke reacted too slowly in the low-shaft furnace. Subsequent trials had shown, however, that mixing two-thirds brown coke, produced at a lower temperature, with ordinary coke worked and generated suffi cient pig iron production.75 Interestingly, this and other research into technological solutions for the effective use of brown coal, both in East Germany and in the Federal Republic’s North Rhine-Westphalia, where it was also available, had origins before 1945. During the National Socialist era, it had formed the backbone of the dictatorship’s autarky policy for becoming independent from raw materials imports.76 The annual UNECE reports showed the limits of what international organizations could do to facilitate knowledge transfer through compiling and disseminating information. In November 1956 the Secretariat noted that the reports gave “a serious but essentially popular account of the main technological advances.” By the time of publication, the majority of the articles had already come out “in one form or another in the existing scientifi c and technical journals.”77 Thus, in October 1957 an internal memorandum to Myrdal stated that compiling the reports put a great burden on the institution’s translation services, and that it was doubtful whether they served “any very useful purpose.” In fact, the report’s bibliography was by now “much inferior to what is being produced by the technical institutes, particularly in the United Kingdom, Western Germany and the USSR.”78 As a result, the annual technology reviews were dropped. Instead, the UNECE concentrated on new domains where it could contribute to setting technological trends and addressing larger societal agendas. In the 1960s, this was the case especially for the advance of automation, or the control of production processes using newly-developed computers.79 The reformed and enlarged OECD followed a similar strategy. It produced a fi rst, agenda- setting report on steel industry pollution and how to minimize it

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as early as 196380—a decade before the broader public debate about environmental protection really took off. Additionally, the UNECE concentrated on fostering relationships among companies and steel experts by organizing transnational visits to individual member states and some of their steel plants and mines. Such collective tours were completely new in postwar Europe. In the West, the Rockefeller Foundation organized visits by European steel experts to U.S. steel plants and the exchange of trainees and interns, for example.81 Like several other national organizations, the German Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute (VDEh), the professional organization of steel experts, developed links with CMEA countries like the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary. Their activities included joint workshops on technology issues. Never- theless, the UNECE’s role in facilitating such connections across the East–West divide was crucial, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, in 1955 steel experts from several Western European countries went on a two-week trip to the Soviet Union which included, alongside Moscow meetings with offi cials and steel experts in ministries, touring plants at Dniepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, Nicopol, and Rustavi. The group included Pierre van der Rest, the president of the Comité de la Sidérurgie belge, who also played a leading role in the ECSC’s Consultative Committee.82 These visits became a much more regular feature from 1966 onwards.83 The UNECE organized steel experts’ tours to the Soviet Union in 1966, Italy in 1967, Poland in 1968, the U.S. and Canada in 1969, Japan in 1970, and Czechoslovakia in 1971.84 By this time, despite the UNECE’s European scope, the groups sometimes traveled to overseas destinations and included representatives of countries and companies from outside Europe, which refl ected the increasing globalization of steel production, trade, and networks. To give but one example, the study tour to Poland in 1968 included fi ve Japanese steel experts who chiefl y represented Japanese rmsfi in Europe. Moreover, the mixed groups always comprised offi cials from ministries and steel experts from state-owned or private steel companies as, in this case, from Vöest in Austria and Fuji Iron and Steel in Japan.85 The study tours were kept informal. Until 1971 the UNECE did not even compile reports on them. The emphasis was on establishing and deepening direct personal contact among experts to foster sustainable networks and facilitate knowledge transfer.86

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Participants mostly conformed to the industry’s strong tradition of mixed expertise in technology and business. Until the Second World War their contacts had been direct at the personal or company level or had taken place within the cartel networks. Now the more narrowly research-focused cooperation was also fostered by engineers’ professional organizations in the steel sector and by the steel research institutes, which formed transnational links for the fi rst time. This was much later than in railways, where they had played an important role in setting transnational standards in the nineteenth century. Thus, in 1951, the fi rst world metallurgical congress took place in Detroit.87 In Europe national organizations like the Société Française de Métallurgie, and the VDEh organized joint conferences or workshops focused on specifi c technological issues, with transnational committees for specifi c research topics forming in the 1970s.88 Professional bodies frequently cooperated with state-funded research institutes, which developed a much greater international orientation after the Second World War. Eventually, these institutes, including the German Max Planck Institute für Eisenforschung, the Benelux Centre National de Recherches Métallurgique, the French Institut de Recherche de la Sidérurgie and the Spanish Centro Naçional de Investigaciones Metalurgicas, formed the Directors of Steel Societies Conference in 1982, later reorganized as the Euro- pean Steel Institutes Confederation in 1990. International organizations, not just the ECSC, fostered this growing transnationalization of professional bodies and national research institutes, however, and they also supported actual collaborative research.

Collaborating in Research

The AIRBO international experimental blast furnace in Ougrée- Marihaye in Belgium well exemplifi es the intimate links between international organizations and steel experts and their networks in developing postwar collaborative steel research. The cooperation, which concentrated on the use of tonnage oxygen and lower quality raw materials for pig iron production, originated in the OEEC.89 The British government fi rst proposed to devise a system

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Fig. 7.9 Science Meeting Technology: Transnational cooperation in steel was shaped by experts with mixed expertise in engineering, business, and law. Increasingly, however, scientifi c expertise became more important, for example for limiting air pollution. Here an expert closely examines a sample of steel from a 30-ton electric arc furnace at the English Steel Corporation Works (Vickers) in Sheffi eld, which specialized in the induction method. Samples were then analyzed by a qualifi ed chemist in a laboratory attached to the smelting department.

for disseminating scientifi c and technical information among the member states, which became operational in 1950. Cooperation should not be limited to sharing information, however. Instead, as the joint American–British research efforts during the Second World War had shown, “the scientifi c approach need not be restricted too narrowly to its application to the immediate physical problems of production.” Rather, in times of “strictly limited” national resources, “collaboration in the generation and application of new industrial knowledge and ‘know-how’ ” could prove benefi cial to all OEEC member states.90 Following up on this British initiative, the Council convened Working Party Number 3 on Matters of Co-operation in Scientifi c and Technical Information. The member states relied entirely on Working Party scientifi c and technical experts to come up with ideas

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and plans for collaboration. Its terms of reference stipulated that “a very free hand was to be left to the Working Party in the choice of its program and in the proposals which it might wish to formulate as to its own future within the framework of the Organisation.”91 Nominated by the British delegation, the Belgian Jacques Errera became its Chairman. He was a professor of chemistry and applied physics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles since 1930 and Advisor to the UN Atomic Energy Commission since 1947. In 1938 he had been awarded the prestigious Francqui Prize in Exact Sciences. Only a year after its creation, in October 1950, the members of Working Party Number 3 concluded in an intermediate report to the Council that they wanted their institutional status to be upgraded to that of a full OEEC committee—a request the Council granted by initiating the permanent Committee for Scientifi c and Technical Matters.92 During this time the experts had sprouted several sub-groups and panels which focused on specifi c options for technological collaboration. The Co-operative Research and Development Group Number 3 devoted itself to studying possibilities for cooperation in fostering the use of “tonnage oxygen” in the chemical and metallurgical industries. According to a defi nition initially proposed by the British delegation and adopted by the experts in April 1950,93 such tonnage oxygen was oxygen-enriched air with an oxygen content of only between 40 and 95 percent compared to 99.5 percent in pure oxygen. It could be produced in large quantities for industrial purposes in facilities that could be built adjacent to iron and steel plants. Air would be compressed at pressures of a few atmospheres only, instead of tens and hundreds of atmospheres. As a result, the unit costs of such tonnage oxygen for use in steel production were considerably below those of high-purity oxygen. As the experts reported to the Council via Working Party Number 3, tonnage oxygen could in particular permit the use of low-grade fuels and ores in pig iron production.94 In fact, at their April 1950 session, the tonnage oxygen experts had already identifi ed research on the production of pig iron in low-shaft blast furnaces as “a subject particularly well suited for co-operative treatment on an international basis, as it is of wide interest, but diffi cult and extremely costly.”95 The OEEC member states could only build on limited experimental research, such as at several small-sized units at Oberhausen in the Ruhr Area and several smaller national projects including East–West cooperation

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between Belgium and Poland on coal gasifi cation, especially of brown coal, for heating purposes. The next month the same group spun off a more specialized panel on low-shaft blast furnaces, which held three meetings, combined with an interchange of visits to existing plants in OEEC member states, until the submission of its report to the Council in October 1950.96 By July 1950, the tonnage oxygen experts already could confi rm that in their view oxygen-fed low-shaft blast furnaces offered “interesting possibilities ... for using low grade coal and ores.” It was also evident, however, that several member states would “not be greatly interested” in technological cooperation in this fi eld. Countries like Norway and Switzerland had hydroelectric power resources and others like Sweden, access to better-quality iron ores. In contrast, the continental Western European core steel-producing countries that had emerged in the nineteenth century shared similar problems of energy use and low- quality raw materials.97 By July 1950 the Belgian delegate confi rmed that steel companies based in and around Liège, especially Cockerill and Ougrée Marihaye, which would merge in 1955, had agreed to the use of their premises to build an experimental low-shaft blast furnace for collaborative research.98 Subsequently, in October 1950 Work- ing Party Number 3, based on preparatory work by the low-shaft blast furnaces panel and the larger group on tonnage oxygen, recommended the construction of one low-shaft blast furnace at Ougrée-Marihaye and a second at Oberhausen. Their primary objective would be “perfecting the use of oxygen” in pig iron production “from low-grade or powder ores and ores with high sulphur content, using small brittle coke, coal in the natural state or lignite.” This would compensate for the inferiority especially of continental European raw materials, reduce the need for imports from overseas, and make European production more competitive. At this stage, alongside all six future ECSC-founding member states, Austria and Greece still expressed an interest in participating in the planned collaboration. After further consultations with national governments over their fi nancial contribution and legal issues, the Working Party Number 3 submitted a draft agreement to the Council on February 14, 1951.99 Finally, on April 2, 1951, only a year after the fi rst session of Working Party Number 3, the OEEC Council took the formal decision to recommend “a programme of research and of trials in the

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production of pig iron in low-shaft blast furnaces, with the help of appropriate fi nancial, technical and administrative assistance from interested Member countries.” The slightly-revised draft agreement set out the OEEC panel’s collaborative research objectives. It provided for a Governing Board with one representative from each participating member state. These representatives would be “selected on grounds of their personal qualifi cations” and technical experts could accompany them to meetings. The draft agreement also stipulated that the Governing Board would take its decisions by a majority of three-quarters of the votes cast, with the number of votes proportional to each member state’s fi nancial contributions to the joint research programs.100 Although AIRBO thus had its origins in the OEEC’s technical committee structure, after its 1953 startup, it quickly developed into a collaborative project among the ECSC member states with fi nancial support from the High Authority. The ECSC Treaty’s Article 55 charged the High Authority with promoting technical and economic research and suitable forms of collaboration among research institutes in the Community. Moreover, unlike the OEEC, the ECSC actually had its own funding for collaborative research. The core of its budget consisted of a levy on ECSC coal and steel products, paid by the companies. In March 1953 the Belgian Albert Coppé, the High Authority vice-president with responsibility for research policy, initiated the institution’s activities in this fi eld. The fi rst projects with 60 percent ECSC co-funding started in 1955.101 The High Authority also fi nancially supported the AIRBO experimental blast furnace, which was operated by an international team of engineers, as “one of the most outstanding examples of European collaboration in research.”102 Despite its fi scal competences and autonomous budget, the High Authority not only depended in part on the initiatives of other international organizations like the OEEC in the case of the AIRBO project, but also effectively delegated funding decisions to the tight networks of steel experts with a mixed engineering and business background. These individuals came from the High Authority itself, the Consultative Committee, and the industrial and professional sector associations in the ECSC. The ECSC’s Commission de la Recherche Technique Acier (CRT), set up in April 1953, began to advise the High Authority on its funding decisions. The CRT included directors of the national research organizations and

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institutes and professional associations like the VDEh, as well as outside technical experts. It was in turn lobbied by the highly- informal Club des Amis, an association of steel research organizations and institutes. In 1970 it transformed into the Association Européenne pour la Promotion de la Recherche Technique en Siderurgie and became institutionally linked to the board of the business association Eurofer. This structure guaranteed that experts close to industry much more tightly controlled the evaluation of proposals and the disbur- sal of ECSC research funds than in other, more heterogeneous sectors covered by the EEC treaty, with its present-day framework programs for fostering transnational research collaboration.103 Despite their intensifi ed postwar cross-border cooperation, these industry experts initially used transnational cooperation to promote national research projects. Thus, the fi rst three projects co-funded by the ECSC were a German VDEh study of the characteristics of silica blocks for oven structures, the internationalization of the journal Acier, Stahl, Steel by the Centre for Steel Information in Brussels, and research on the technical conditions for the rolling process by the French Centre National des Recherches Métallurgiques.104 In fact, until the 1980s some 70 percent of all ECSC co-funded projects were still run nationally. However, the increasing cross-border mergers and acquisitions, combined with the new Community rules for research funding, eventually reversed the situation. When the coal and steel sector became integrated into the EU at the ECSC treaty’s expiration in 2002, more than 90 percent of all co-funded projects were transnationally collaborative with, on average, four to fi ve partners, often from as many member states.105

Competition & Cooperation

Clearly, the international organizations that emerged after the Second World War developed multiple initiatives in the steel sector. Whereas the League of Nation’s work was entirely dominated by the cartel question, the UNECE, the OEEC, the ECSC, and the CMEA started work on steel statistics, forecasting future consumption, coordinating investment in the sector, exchanging and disseminating information on technological innovation,

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creating business ties (including between East and West and beyond Europe), and initiating and—in the case of the ECSC—co-funding joint research projects. To some extent, facilitating networking and business contacts replaced the transnational cartels that were suppressed within the ECSC customs union and in the CMEA’s planned economies. But these organizations also responded to new functional needs, such as the growing desirability of collaboration in research and development to manage ever-rising costs. At the same time, the steel sector also illustrates the limits to cooperation in the CMEA, especially its failure to enhance transnational technology projects. Their initiatives sometimes overlapped, creating competition as well as cooperation. Thus, when the newly-created OEEC, instead of the existing UNECE, was charged with administering the Marshall Plan, the latter had to carve out a new role for itself. After the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries decided to re-engage with it in 1953–4, UNECE did so by serving as the only signifi cant institutional bridge between East and West for networking initiatives across the not-so-Iron Curtain. Similarly, experts in the OEEC developed the steel sector’s fi rst major transnational collaborative research project in 1952–3, but the ECSC soon assumed control. The effort comprised the six member states who were mainly interested in the AIRBO project. Unlike the OEEC, the ECSC was actually able to provide substantial co-funding. Later, the international organizations expanded their activities, especially by taking up topical issues and trying to set transnational policy agendas, as with the implications of air and water pollution and environmental protection for the steel sector. Moreover, it has also become evident how closely international organizations cooperated with industry and professional organizations and national research organizations and institutes. This link between state and steel became intimate in postwar Europe. This happened not just in Eastern Europe, where all steel companies were nationalized, but also in Western Europe, where many governments nationalized steelmaking (partly or wholly) or where they at least intervened to regulate access to raw materials, encourage restructuring, and facilitate cross-border cooperation and, eventually, mergers and acquisitions following the 1974 steel crisis. In fact, the globalization of the sector and the resulting distress in the Euro- pean steel industry energized not only states, but also international

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organizations toward conceptualizing and facilitating structural change. Eventually, major restructuring involved the closure of many plants, privatization and deregulation, and takeovers from outside of Europe, as in the case of Arcelor Mittal or Tata Steel’s purchase of the British-Dutch Corus group in 2007. The composition of these organizations’ committees also refl ected the close relationship between member states, industry, and experts with a typical mixed engineering and business background. This was most obvious at UNECE, which placed the greatest emphasis on expertise and tried especially hard to de-politicize its work to facilitate East–West contacts. Taking a random meeting of the UNECE’s Steel Committee, on November 10, 1967, to illustrate the point, Domenico Taccone was in the chair.106 He was director of steel at the private Italian company FIAT. Alongside offi cials from national ministries, others present included representatives of private and nationalized steel companies like Werner P. Naumann from US Steel, Matthew Hafner from the Iron and Steel Works in Jesenice, Yugoslavia and Stefan Gheorghita from a Romanian steel works. Another cluster represented national industry associations: Ernst Lueg from the German Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie in Düsseldorf, Pierre Clerget from the Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française, and Hans von Delwig from the Swedish Jernkontoret. East–West cooperation also continued at the level of industry and professional organizations and national research organizations and institutes. Unlike late nineteenth-century transnational cartels or those in interwar Europe, these experts’ room for maneuver was tightly circumscribed when government bureaucracies defended presumed national interests. The OEEC discussions about national investment plans in Western Europe and, in different circumstances, the inability of the CMEA to coordinate investments in any way illustrate these limits. Investment in steel was highly politicized. It fulfi lled a variety of politically-crucial functions: creating employment after the war, facilitating top-down industrialization strategies, sustaining empires as in Portugal, and last but not least, legitimizing political systems—the new but still fragile parliamentary democracies in countries like West Germany and Italy and even more so, in right-wing and communist dictatorships. Thus, in the case of the OEEC, government offi cials functioning as steel experts had to defend their own nations’ plans, which clearly constrained their

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objectivity and professionalism where national plans submitted by their colleagues were concerned. Indeed, governments overruled expert criticism, even when it was practically unanimous, as was the case for the Portuguese welded tube production plan. On less politicized issues, by contrast, experts enjoyed great freedom of maneuver in defi ning and interpreting their own tasks, notably when considering technology transfer and collaborative research. Moreover, experts often transgressed boundaries and also engaged in business activities to facilitate trade and mergers and acquisitions. The story of the Czechoslovak–Belgian steel deal outlined at the start of this chapter is exemplary. The backgrounds of those involved in the discussions and negotiations highlight some of the key resources they could mobilize and invest in transnational cooperation. These resources included their technical knowledge of different, but similarly crucial, dimensions of the prospective deal. Naturally, this knowledge concerned the technologies at the heart of heavy engineering and steel production. Their engineering training and their experience in the heavy engineering and steel industries allowed Rudinger, Rollman, and Boland to determine and clarify the quantity and quality of the required steel and to arrange a suitable delivery schedule to fi t the nationalized Czecho- slovak fi rm’s production processes. However, the purchase was severely complicated by the lack of capital in convertible currency, so that experts with contacts in the banking sector like Rostow and with professional banking experience like Van Zeeland had to be brought into the discussions to address related fi nancial and legal issues. Their expertise not only extended to the deal’s content, but also covered the formal regulations and the informal operational codes of the international organizations that they represented. Crucially, these experts could also draw upon diverse networked contacts acquired over many years. Those who worked for international organizations or attended meetings of their expert committees readily expanded their existing networks. Thus, Rudinger exploited his contacts from the UNECE committees to discuss the steel issue with Rollman. The Director of the UNECE Steel Divi- sion in turn utilized his links with Belgian and Luxembourg steel companies. He had partly built these up during his employment in the steel industry and partly through his role in organizing and steering the UNECE Steel Committee. Marcel Van Zeeland was of course extremely-well networked in Belgium where his brother

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Paul, who had a similar background, was a leading member of the Catholic Party, Belgian Prime Minister from 1935 to 1937 and foreign minister at the time of the steel deal discussions in 1949–50. Marcel also had excellent networks in Britain and the U.S. which resulted both from his studies at Princeton University and from both countries’ infl uential roles in the BIS.107 These experts had, of course, different upbringings, education, experience, and memories, all of which to some extent formed their contrasting attitudes and worldviews. Thus, Rudinger was a perse- cuted Jew who had survived the Holocaust, exiled in England. In contrast, Rollman in his role at Colufl andres in Gent had invol- untarily collaborated in Nazi Germany’s Grossraumwirtschaft, or continental European war economy, after the 1940 occupation of Belgium. Rudinger was also a convinced communist, who favored the nationalization of industry and a centrally-planned economy. Conversely, Van Zeeland as an economist had strongly liberal preferences. In fact, he was one of only 25 people alongside Raymond Aron, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, and others who attended the August 1938 Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris. At this meeting the term “neoliberalism” was coined and an intellectual movement founded whose ideas were to become very infl uential from the 1970s onward.108 Similarly, these experts’ visions of Europe’s future could differ signifi cantly. Thus, Myrdal had strong pan-European preferences, in part informed by his background as a social democrat from neutral Sweden. In contrast, Rollman supported “core Europe” integration and swiftly became Director of the ECSC High Authority’s Steel Division based in his native Luxembourg in 1952. Van Zeeland had a peculiar interest in, and affection for, the territory of the former medieval Kingdom of Burgundy which linked his native Belgium, France, and Germany with Switzerland, where he had lived since 1930. For this reason this region was frequently represented as a kind of cultural “core” for an integrated Western Europe.109 However, these fundamentally-different experiences, ideological differences, and varying concepts of Europe did not hamper technical cooperation at expert level. Rather, the experts involved in the prospective steel deal themselves sought to externalize their differences and to de-politicize their working relationships as much as possible. Unlike in rail transport, however, de-politicization in steel did not involve a focus on creating technological standards.

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Instead of technifi cation, as in so many other transnational and international organizations before, deliberate politicization actually shaped the ECSC and the EEC to a large degree. Thus, coal and steel integration became a vehicle for Franco-German reconciliation and rapprochement, and the EEC had the long-term ambition to strive for “ever closer union.” As we will next discover, technocratic internationalist practices persisted into the present-day EU. This was especially the case in the European Commission, with its hybrid identity as the EU’s administration paired with strong ambitions for political leadership. In time, the EU’s market integration strengthened its appeal to third countries, leading toward its hegemonic expansion across the Continent. This in turn paved the way for its assumption of far greater regulatory powers than initially imagined and the evolution of what has been termed “associative regulation”—with a return to practices of making rules for Europe which strongly resemble nineteenth-century technocratic internationalism.

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When Jean Monnet arrived in the provincial city of Luxembourg to head the newly-created High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), his vision for the new institution was strongly infl uenced by his prior work in international organizations. One feature of technocratic internationalism, which had characterized the aspirations and to some extent the practice of many organizations and agencies before the ECSC, was especially dear to Monnet. This was the notion of policy deliberation and decision-making by experts guided, not by bureaucratic hierarchies or national allegiances and prejudices, but by rational argument and transnationally-shared objectives. This he had experienced in the Allied Maritime Transport Commission during the latter stages of the First World War, in discussions with Arthur Salter and others at the League of Nations, and again during Allied cooperation on logistics during the Second World War. To create an open atmosphere for such rational policy deliberation in a multinational organization, Monnet sought to keep the High Authority’s day-to-day work as informal as possible. As a result, its institutional practice initially resembled that of other specialized international organizations or agencies, having expert committees operating with minimal guidance and with

259

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Fig. 8.1 Mastermind- ing “core Europe”? Jean Monnet wrote the so-called Schuman Plan that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. This photo shows him as the fi rst President of the organization’s High Au- thority during a visit to a steel mill in Velval (Esch) in Luxembourg in April 1953. Monnet aimed at “supranational” policy- making by experts shed- ding their national alle- giance. But he quickly ran into diffi culties as experts in the High Authority and from companies continued established technocratic internationalist working methods and member states sought to secure their particular interests in fi lling positions and deciding policy.

administrative support from small secretariats. Unlike these operations, however, the High Authority, like the European Commission later on, was designed as a far larger and knowledgeable bureaucracy, which integrated many functions of expert committees in the other transnational voluntary and international organizations. In addition, the High Authority could maintain direct links to the national ministries responsible for the coal and

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Fig. 8.2 Supporting steel sector, and experts in these ministries—a set-up markedly Experts: The vast different from the League’s continued domination by foreign majority of experts ministries. While the League’s technical arm worked quite inde- working for the European Coal and Steel pendently, its secretariat had offi cially been forced to go through Community after 1952–3, the national foreign ministries to communicate with other minis- as for other transnational tries responsible for certain sectors or policy issues. In addition, and international the High Authority received additional input from a Consulta- organizations before, were men. But as the High tive Committee that included representatives of the producers, Authority grew into a consumers, and trade unions. sizeable bureaucracy, In line with Monnet’s preferences, according to Edmond female support staff Wellenstein, the High Authority’s work during the fi rst two years played a crucial role in running its operations on amounted to “creative chaos. All opinions were allowed. Every- a daily basis. This photo body in the rather large circle around Monnet could suggest things, shows the secretaries and they were even taken up.”1 This informal and non-hierarchical working for Jean Monnet, the fi rst president of the working pattern was very much in line with technocratic interna- High Authority, at its tionalist traditions. Recalling the early days of the High Authority, seat in Luxembourg. many of Monnet’s collaborators have also praised his extraordinary stamina. His American friend George Ball recalled that “he was

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oblivious to the need for allocating time to other requirements, such as sleeping or even eating. ... That he seemed always able to fi nd men willing to submit to his stimulating but exasperating methods of work testifi ed to his extraordinary charisma.”2 And Michel Gaudet, who headed the Legal Service fi rst of the High Authority and later of the European Commission, remembered Monnet’s great ability to bring people together in such circumstances to create a shared sense of purpose.3 At the same time, Monnet, as deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations until 1923, had also experienced how fragile the position of offi cials and experts could be when national governments limited their space and freedom and used organizations as sites for pursuing narrowly-nationalistic interests. From this Monnet had deduced that experts in international organizations needed independent decision-making powers that would not just be delegated to them temporarily, as the responsible ministers had largely done in the Allied Maritime Transport Council. Instead, they would be legally enshrined, creating what Monnet (alongside many politicians and academics) henceforth called a supranational institution that could act above member states. When Monnet arrived in Luxembourg, he certainly had great hopes to turn the High Authority into the nucleus of a new kind of integrated Europe; a Europe in which the member states would pool their sovereignty and surrender decision-making powers to experts deliberating policy and acting in the interests of all. To him, integration in coal and steel only marked the beginning. He hoped that if successful, a functional logic would lead to spill-overs into more integration in other sectors including, for example, transport, energy, or agriculture, all of which experienced discussions or negotiations in the early 1950s about enhanced sector integration in Western Europe.

Hothouse for Supranationalism?

But to what extent did Monnet actually succeed in turning the High Authority into a “ ‘hothouse” for supranationalism, which would initiate and drive a process of sector integration?4 Some

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of his closest collaborators like Max Kohnstamm certainly felt inspired by Monnet’s vision for European integration, combined with his informal technocratic internationalist working methods. But many others were not so certain. They began to work for the High Authority for a host of other reasons.5 Several were placed in Luxembourg as a result of national and interest group pressures. In the German case this included Vice-President Franz Etzel, from the Christian Democratic Union headed by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. During the Weimar Republic Etzel had been active in the predominantly-Protestant right-wing, anti-Semitic, and anti-French völkische Bewegung, although he never became a member of the National Socialist Party.6 In contrast, Fritz Hellwig, who became the second German member of the High Authority in 1959, had actually joined the Party in 1933. While they shed their fi erce nationalism after the war, they remained to be convinced of Monnet’s new supranational European integration agenda. At the same time, many offi cials were strongly attached to the cartel tradition. They included Tony Rollman from Luxembourg and Wilhelm Salewski, director of the West German Wirtschafts- vereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, who headed the High Authority’s Investment Division. These experts, who were crucial to the institution’s day-to-day operation, had largely been socialized in the technocratic internationalist tradition—either directly by working for a transnational voluntary organization, like Rollman, or through their experiences in national companies or cartels which participated in such organizations. In contrast, very few offi cials had any serious links to the Resistance in Western Europe or other circles where ideas for a postwar supranational organization of Europe had been discussed.7 In short, given that the members of the High Authority and its offi cials were not united in a new supranational “Church,” familiar technocratic internationalist attitudes and working methods persisted in the ECSC. More generally, launching the ECSC did not mark a sudden, fundamental breakthrough towards a supranational Europe. During the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Paris, the Nether- lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg insisted on including a Council of Ministers to represent the member states. At the time, they believed that this would protect the interests of smaller members against domination of the High Authority by one or more larger

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states, especially France and Germany. In fact, as an additional Fig. 8.3 Interpreting safeguard, the three Benelux countries together had one vote more Europe: Offi cials in the than either France, Germany, or Italy, when it came to decisions High Authority were normally multilingual. In taken by majority vote. Compared to the original French proposal the beginning their daily in the Schuman Plan, the role of national governments and their communication was mostly interests was thus formally strengthened at the expense both of in French and German. the High Authority as an institution and of experts everywhere. Offi cial documents had to be translated into all Once the ECSC was up and running, moreover, many decisions Community languages, were prepared informally by governments in Paris and Bonn. Even however. Moreover, when the High Authority’s policy-making was characterized by close national government cooperation between the French and German members, especially ministers, offi cials, and experts came to Monnet and Etzel, and a strong consensus orientation. This suited Luxembourg for meetings the experts’ technocratic internationalist working method, but the and negotiations they often strong Franco-German bilateralism at the political level, including required interpretation. This photo shows two members of the High Authority, did not. interpreters at work in the Besides, it was not even clear at the start that the ECSC mid-1960s. would succeed in its more limited objective of creating a proper common market for coal and steel. Monnet had private business

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experience in his family’s cognac enterprise, in addition to having worked for international organizations and in national ministries. Given his strong connections to American policy-makers, he desired to limit the infl uence of nationalized or private coal and steel companies to create such a proper common market. However, continuities in staff, interest group infl uences, and coal and steel policy-making strongly embedded the cartel approach in the ECSC, which fi tted technocratic internationalist thinking, but ran counter to Monnet’s own preferences. This practice varied signifi cantly from its rhetoric, especially in transatlantic relations. There, ECSC policy-makers aimed to convince their American counterparts, who were more strongly infl uenced by the anti-trust tradition, that the ECSC would not form a cartelized protectionist bloc and deserved continued strong support on political grounds.8 Such American support was not just crucial because of the Cold War, but also for domestic European reasons. Thus, in Germany the opposition Social Democrats did not come out strongly in favor of Western European integration until 1956–7, arguing that it could make any form of German reunifi cation impossible. In France, the Fourth Republic’s party system became more and more fragmented, with strong opposition to the ECSC and even more so, to the plan for a European Defence Community launched in October 1950. Dissent from the communists on the Left and the Gaullists on the Right contributed to heated controversies over the future of France and the incipient “core Europe” integration. In the beginning, therefore, ECSC working patterns were much more similar to the established technocratic internationalist practices than the customary narrative about the “founding fathers,” especially Monnet, and their role in constructing an entirely new Europe would suggest. The ECSC departed from technocratic internationalist practices in two main respects, however. The fi rst concerned its explicit primary objective of fostering Franco- German reconciliation and cooperation, which Monnet and Schuman, among many others, shared. It was this political motive and not any functional logic, which motivated political leaders in Paris and Bonn to sign the ECSC treaty in the fi rst place. In contrast, experts in transnational voluntary and international organizations traditionally emphasized functional logics for integration, with political benefi ts as a welcome consequence. From the beginning, working

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to foster Franco-German cooperation as well as attempting to create a “supranational” Europe politicized “core Europe” integration beyond the functional goals of earlier specialized transnational or international organizations. This created a paradoxical situation for the ECSC. In the technocratic internationalist tradition, experts in the High Authority without any direct democratic legitimation were supposed to work independently to fi nd the best technical solutions for policy issues. But this process, as well as all possible solutions, had profoundly-political implications, not just for the industry or technology concerned but for the relations among the member states and for larger political objectives as well. Far more than in established specialized organizations, the need to comply with these objectives overshadowed the work of experts, even if political goals clashed with what experts took to be functionally- appropriate solutions to cross-border issues. Integration in the ECSC differed from earlier specialized international organizations in a second way, too. Those organizations had normally been driven by the interests of producers, businesses, or states in creating effective norms, standards, and markets, which experts at different levels then negotiated and implemented. In some sectors like transport these experts enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. The interests of workers and consumers were at best marginally considered.9 In railways companies and governments mainly cared for the socially- and politically-infl uential fi rst-class passengers. After 1945 state ownership of railoads did not foster any greater sensitivity to the interests of rail users and their organizations. In interwar Europe the League of Nations and its associated International Labour Organisation, which had responsibility for employment and social issues, began to involve representatives from trade unions and consumer organizations in their work.10 Broader transnational welfare concerns became more central to debates during the Great Depression. However, they did not actually generate common policies with potential redistributive effects, which the unsuccessful proposal for European motorways as a joint transnational public works project demonstrated. While a few trade unionists became offi cials in the High Author- ity, the ECSC nonetheless had a second, larger, political objective.11 This was to contribute to transnational social integration through

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European-level investments funded from a common budget and neo-corporatist forms of interaction, which characterized its Consultative Committee with mixed membership. This created an institutional precedent for the equally-consultative Economic and Social Committee of the European Economic Community (EEC) created in 1957–8. These structures of cooperative decision-making had also been implemented at the national level, either in nationalized industries or in legislation, as was the case for the German Mitbestimmungsgesetz, or co-decision law, for heavy industry passed in 1951, one year before the ECSC’s emergence. Technocratic internationalists traditionally disapproved of turning larger political objectives, such as creating social harmony, into primary goals of international organizations. But the continued sector integration, propagated by Monnet and others sharing his functionalist approach to “core Europe” integration, promised to do exactly this. Thus, integration in nuclear energy, which eventually led to the formation of Euratom in 1957–8, was not just concerned with securing Western European independence in energy, especially from the increasingly-unstable Middle East. It was also geared towards deepening Franco-German cooperation in a sector where the U.S. and Britain led scientifi c development. Similarly, integrating agriculture, a goal eventually incorporated into the EEC treaty, was not concerned with technology cooperation. Instead, it was intended to create a fair overall Franco-German economic arrangement and a durable transnational solution to harmonizing, at taxpayers’ expense, the interests of farmers with those of the rapidly expanding industry and service sectors.12 In April 1955, existing ideas for further sector integration became merged in a proposal by the Benelux countries promoting horizontal market integration.13 After the 1954 failure of the EDC in the French parliament, this initiative eventually led to the creation of Euratom and the EEC. Euratom, led by Louis Armand, embodied technocratic internationalist traditions far more than did the EEC. While Euratom’s technical work did produce some results in fostering transnational nuclear research and engineering, it was not nearly as effective in advancing European political integration as Monnet and others had hoped.14 Instead, creating a horizontal customs union for all industrial products in the EEC formed a far more powerful trajectory for Western European integration in the

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long run, which via the administrative merger of all three communities in 1967, eventually developed into the present-day European Union (EU).

Deepening & Widening the Community

Both the High Authority and the EEC’s European Commission built far larger bureaucracies than the smaller secretariats of established transnational and international organizations. Both institutions ended up with their own staff statutes. Moreover, the Commission introduced a competitive concours, or entrance exam, for recruiting new A-level policy staff with higher education degrees. In practice, however, both the High Authority and the Commission tried hard to hire offi cials proportionately from the member states. For top- level positions, especially those of director-general and director in the different ministries, moreover, national governments exerted strong pressure to protect balance or get their citizens appointed to particular posts. The infl uence that political parties and interest groups tried to exert at European and national levels, aiming to have offi cials sympathetic to their worldviews or economic interests appointed, further complicated hiring and promotion processes. Finally, the Commission actually began to secure more national offi - cials or industry representatives as experts on temporary contracts concerning particular policy challenges. This was especially salient for completing the internal market and for the Community’s expansion into new policy areas, which usually brought new opportunities for national governments and interest groups to infl uence the Commission’s policy-making and preferences. In other words, the Commission, like the High Authority, did not become an intellectually-closed school of federalist zealots. In its fi rst decades, a signifi cant percentage of young offi cials were graduates from the College of Europe in Bruges, founded by the European Movement in 1949–50. This institution sought to imbue its students with the “spirit of Bruges,” which certainly included a strongly federalist vision for Europe.15 But when confronted with fi erce national bargaining and infl uence on hiring and promoting personnel in Community institutions, its former students often

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adopted a more pragmatic attitude. At the highest political level, too, the preferences of commissioners concerning the future of European integration varied. Moreover, just as in other international organizations or national governments, different directorate- generals developed diverging policy trajectories, especially on economic issues. The Commission’s daily working practices largely resembled those of other international organizations. But as the Community’s policy scope grew, so did its administration. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of the “outer Seven” countries never employed more than about a hundred offi cials in its Geneva secretariat, for instance. The organization of initially seven member states (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) had been formed after French President Charles de Gaulle’s 1958 veto against a large free trade area, which Britain had proposed to mitigate possible negative effects of the EEC customs union on its trade in Europe.16 Today, the secretariat of the OECD in Paris, now a thoroughly-global organization, only employs about 2,000 staff, 700 of whom are concerned with policy- making tasks. By contrast, the European Commission already had 1,051 by the end of 1958, 2,892 before the institutional merger in 1967 and 5,778 on the eve of the fi rst enlargement in 1973.17 As of 2014, the Commission in the enlarged 28 member EU employed more than 32,000 staff—roughly the number of employees of the Munich city administration, but far more than any other regional international organization. Clearly, Monnet’s open door policy of ad hoc meetings and access to high-level policy-making even for young offi cials was not (and is not) feasible for a bureaucracy of this size. These offi cials also needed something to do, and were eager to exert infl uence. Naturally, the Commission’s fi rst priority alongside creating a customs union for industrial goods was to develop those policy areas for which the EEC treaty had established a Community competence, in particular competition, agriculture, and transport. The Community experienced dynamic growth and even greater increases in intra-EEC trade until the fi rst oil crisis of 1973. This, together with integration across all sectors in the industrial customs union, greatly facilitated the more ordo-liberal design of EEC competition policy in the 1960s, with its long-term economic liberalization effects.18 The Common Agricultural Policy

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(CAP) in turn sought to balance economic gains from integration and to protect Community farmers from fi erce competition with third-country producers at world market prices.19 One other reason helps account for the Community’s success in developing both policies during the 1960s. Whatever their problematic long-term effects such as the CAP’s overproduction, milk lakes, and export subsidies, neither experts nor interest groups could rely on any existing international organization for securing their objectives. In fact, competition policy was an almost entirely- new fi eld in Western Europe during the early 1960s.20 As a result, the Commission found it comparatively easy to recruit legal and economic experts intrigued by developing new Community policies. In agriculture, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Orga- nization (FAO) took over the work of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome.21 The FAO was an expert-led organization that produced statistics and facilitated knowledge exchange. Moreover, as its scope was global, it hardly qualifi ed as an institutional site for creating a limited European market with a common protectionist policy. At the same time, when the French government initiated the so-called Green Pool in the early 1950s, hoping to include Britain as well as Germany as Western Europe’s two main importers of foodstuffs (not least from France), the talks failed, chiefl y because of Britain’s commitment to the free import of foodstuffs from the Commonwealth.22 For agricultural economists as key experts in this fi eld, just as for the farmers’ unions in the six founding member states, therefore, the EEC provided the only-suitable site for transnational market creation and rule-making. Inversely, the regulation of cross-border transport issues was a very crowded policy area with many well-established transnational and international organizations cooperating and competing. None- theless, on August 16, 1950, Edouard Bonnefous, a French politician, proposed in the Council of Europe yet another organization, a European transport authority. It should coordinate all transport modes and organizations and construct European infrastructures. Just like the future ECSC High Authority it would have supranational powers, would be led by independent experts, and would plan investments, tariffs, and traffi c movements.23 But the railway experts, who had been cooperating in the Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC) since 1922, saw

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Fig. 8.4 Fighting the proposed body as a threat to their professional independence Against “Brussels”: Unlike many standard- and a menace to their sector. Politicians, they believed, would use setting organizations, the the new organization to promote European integration, without European Community sharing a genuine interest in or having any substantial knowledge also developed welfare policies, most notably the of railways. In the Council of Europe debates, Maurice Lemaire, Common Agricultural the UIC chairman, argued that it was better to leave cooperation Policy. For more than two in the sector to international transport experts than to general- decades from the mid- 24 1960s it made up roughly ists without direct knowledge and experience. Several national 80 percent of its budget. transport ministries also opposed the Bonnefous proposal for Farmers organized and took similar reasons. In particular, they feared that the establishment recourse to direct action to protect their interests in the of a transport authority would give foreign offi ces and economic extensive subsidy system. ministries leverage over transport ministries, curtailing their abil- This photo shows German ity to negotiate critical issues internationally on behalf of their farmers pouring out 250 litres of milk in a collective governments. protest against new milk Thus, the combined lobby of transnational and international rail- quotas which took place way organizations and national transport ministries succeeded in in Munich, the capital of Bavaria, in 1987. amending the proposal for a European transport authority to suit

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their interests. It was transformed into a proposal to bring together expert-driven transport ministries at the highest political level. The new organization would not be formed in a supranational fashion, and it would work closely with existing organizations according to established technocratic internationalist working methods. On October 17, 1953, following three years of debate and negotiation, sixteen states signed the protocol founding the European Confer- ence of Ministers of Transport.25 Although the EEC treaty subsequently authorized a Community transport policy, for experts the functional logic alone required regulatory solutions beyond the EEC, most obviously in air transport. As a result, the Common Transport Policy made very little progress for its fi rst 25 years. The EEC created a market which led to sharply-increased trade and transport, but the existing transnational and international organizations continued to set norms and standards in an institutional division of labor.26

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Fig. 8.5 Common Beyond the EEC’s original competences, the Commission sought European Transport to expand its remit and infl uence. In the 1970s, it developed entire- Space: In 1949 several European countries agreed ly-new policy areas for the Community, often working closely with to facilitate international member state governments and social movement organizations road transport under the advocating European action. Both research and environmental auspices of the United 27 Nations Economic policy are excellent examples of this expansion. In such fi elds, Commission for Europe. where no specialized international organizations existed and the Truckers obtained UN or the OECD were unable to create funding instruments or an internationally- binding standards, the Commission worked closely with academ- harmonized customs document, referred to as a ics, research organizations, and environmental pressure groups to TIR Carnet, shown here. develop policy approaches. It allowed them to transit Characteristically, the Commission employed different rationales a country without paying for justifying a greater policy role both for the Community and for duties or taxes. It thus facilitated the formation itself. On the one hand, it argued functionally, in the technocratic of a common European internationalist tradition, that transnational challenges required transport space without transnational solutions. On the other hand, it also employed a feder- any direct involvement of the European Economic alist logic. It did so energetically until the “Empty Chair” crisis of Community, the 1965–6, when de Gaulle ordered the French government to boycott predecessor of the present- the EEC’s Council of Ministers. This led to the entirely informal day European Union. The and legally non-binding Luxembourg Compromise agreement on EEC tried to set up its own Common Transport Policy. using a national “veto” in areas of majority voting under certain For decades, however, it circumstances. The Commission used this federalist logic once again failed, in part because during the presidency of Jacques Delors from 1985 to 1995. other transnational From this perspective, the Commission, which saw itself as a and international organizations successfully European government-in-the-making, readily took responsibility dealt with many issues. for addressing and solving a wide range of problems member states or citizens faced—from the restructuring of agriculture and steel to creating work in rural regions, overcoming pollution and gender discrimination in the Community and addressing underdevelop- ment in the so-called Third World. Instead of limiting itself to seeking practical solutions to common cross-border regulatory issues, the Commission politicized its own role and that of the Community. This was clearly visible in transport policy, where federalist beliefs and agendas drove Commissioner Lambert Schaus’s policies.28 In this way, however, the Commission arguably created unrealistic expectations among European citizens in the longer term concerning what it, and the Community, could do for them. More recently, this has contributed strongly to public disenchantment not just with politics generally, but with EU politics in particular and with

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government by bureaucrats and technical experts lacking direct Fig. 8.6 Dollars and political legitimacy. Peace: “Understanding through Travel is the Institutionally, therefore, the Community was an oddly-hybrid Passport to Peace”—this creature. Technocratic internationalist traditions continued slogan of the European to shape its internal working practices, especially in the High Travel Commission, an expert working group of the Authority and the European Commission. But at the same time, Organisation for European the Community’s drive (as phrased in the EEC treaty) for “ever Economic Cooperation, closer union,” which was embedded in federalist rhetoric and promoted one of the basic fostered by its legal integration, raised expectations that it would ideas of technocratic internationalism: be able to play a much more overtly-political role in making traveling promotes peace. rules for Europe which would go far beyond technical norms, for The commission’s main example. Rather, the Community, with its own budget, would function was to stimulate shape policies (like the CAP) with strong redistributive effects North American tourism to Europe, not least to and expand into new policy areas, even those without an obvious help close the dollar gap in functional logic. Western Europe. Over time the present-day EU became a more powerful and hegemonic force in integrating Europe, especially after the end of the Cold War—not, in the fi rst instance, via the transfer, trade, or regulation of technology across borders. Instead, driven by political leadership, shaped by business and legal elites and expertise, and fostered by legal integration, the creation of a customs union and later, internal market, crucially allowed the EU to deepen its integration and to draw nearby countries into its orbit, extending both its functional and spatial scope. Market integration, which had its origins in the early postwar period, in turn led to the EU’s foray into technical regulation and standardization from the late 1980s, with a corresponding growing role in global technology regulation and a strong revival of technocratic internationalist practices.

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After the Second World War, a host of international organizations contributed to the liberalization of trade in the emerging Cold War West. To begin with, the Bretton Woods system installed an international monetary order in 1944, with the US dollar as its anchor currency, pegged to the price of gold—an attempt to combine the advantages of some fl exibility in exchange rates with long-term stability. While this system lasted until the beginning of the 1970s, the OEEC had responsibility for abolishing quantitative restrictions to trade within Europe, the key protectionist device used by states to direct trade fl ows and facilitate their own reconstruction. This “beggar your neighbor” policy was regarded as a major barrier to a more effective multilateral form of reconstruction and trading. Finally, the GATT formed in 1947–8 had responsibility for negotiations in the Western world about the reduction of tariffs. Its remit was only expanded for the fi rst time during the Kennedy Round in the mid-1960s, which also covered anti-dumping measures. Crucially, despite continuing competition and confl icts, this basic institutional set-up and division of competences and priorities among the different organizations soon became quite fi xed. International organizations had created the conditions for currency convertibility and trade liberalization, but they did not set up a transnational market. The U.S. government in particular felt that Western Europe needed more far-reaching economic integration to replicate the American model of a larger domestic market. Such integration would facilitate Western European reconstruction and sales of American products. Thus, in 1947–8 the U.S. administration inserted the idea of a Western European customs union into the preparatory talks about the use of Marshall Plan funds and the creation of the OEEC. However, protectionist traditions and anxieties in countries like France thwarted the plan, as did the British fear that participation in such a customs union would destroy the Commonwealth’s preferential trading system, devised in the early 1930s as a response to the Great Depression. Given that a Western European customs union would require a common external tariff and trade policy, the UK’s preference system would have been doomed.29

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Five years later, however, the six ECSC member states created such a customs union for coal and steel. The ECSC did away with well-established national protectionist measures such as dual pricing for raw materials or differentiated freight rates for domestic and foreign companies. But only the EEC’s creation in 1957–8 marked a major breakthrough towards transnational market integration, bringing a customs union for all industrial goods and the agricultural sector. EFTA in turn did away with internal tariffs, but as a free trade area, did not require common external tariffs. Not only had the six Western European EEC countries developed habits of cooperation through the ECSC; they had also enjoyed several years of high growth rates, leading to full employment except in southern Italy. The result was reduced fears, especially in France, concerning anticipated fi erce competition from German and other industrial producers, combined with the positive expectation that a common market for foodstuffs would bring signifi cant reciprocal gains. Although opposed to all federal ambitions for the EEC, de Gaulle actually supported this form of transnational market integration, which he saw as a key building block for modernizing the French economy.30 But the customs union only abolished tariffs. The Community also had to deal with non-tariff barriers if it wanted to create a true common market as the EEC treaty envisioned. Non-tariff barriers included technical standards, for example for electrical appliances, but also health and safety regulations or detailed rules for the recognition of educational degrees as a precondition for allowing individuals to work in a particular profession. These non-tariff barriers increasingly constituted a severe and growing barrier to elaborating a common market. They sometimes resulted from fast technological developments and national standard-setting, but were also used instrumentally by individual member states to impede imports and protect domestic producers. Importantly, it was far from clear how to eliminate them. Initially, the Commission, in the tradition of organizations that set transnational rules and norms, believed in the principle of positive harmonization, or adopting new Community-wide laws establishing new European rules and norms to override existing national ones. But the Commission made little headway throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. National authorities, along with specialized international organizations and agencies, resisted harmonization

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as an attempt to create a new powerful regulatory center—either for fear of losing their own competencies or because they disagreed with the limited reach of such new rules for only six (until 1973) or nine countries in Western Europe. Moreover, the member states, interest groups, and bureaucracies sought to defend national variation in rules and norms. Their arguments ranged from the alleged technical superiority of their existing standards to their intimate connection to cultural traditions and values. Realistically, the Commission still had limited resources, too few offi cials, and an insuffi cient set of advisory and expert committees to actually take a hegemonic role in harmonizing rules and norms as a way to abolish non-tariff barriers and create a proper common market. It always seemed to lag behind technological innovation, with more new rules and norms created at the member state level, thus raising new protectionist barriers. Thus, beginning in 1973, the Commission changed its approach, starting with the Low-Voltage Directive, which created Commu- nity standards for the free movement of electronic goods operating between 50 and 1,000 volts, including household items but excluding electricity systems with sockets, which continued to vary from one country to another. With this directive the Commission began to incorporate the work of transnational voluntary organizations involved in setting standards. In this case the European Committee for Standards and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) were able to draw upon protocols already developed by the International Electrotechnical Commis- sion and utilized in different forms by several member states.31 The directive introduced the notion of “harmonized standards.” What became known as the “presumption of conformity” meant that products designed and built in line with these standards met legal requirements, giving them a competitive advantage without making them mandatory within the member states. Finally, the directive de facto authorized the CENELEC to develop electrotechnical standards on behalf of the Community and its member states. The Commission now began to concentrate on framework regulation of key issues, leaving much of the detailed technical work to the existing array of transnational voluntary organizations run by industry. This new informal approach made it possible for the Commission to cope and encouraged greater cooperation with other organizations, and between them and the Community. At the same

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time, expert networks, as in transport, realized that the Commis- sion was becoming more pragmatic and willing to work with them. Moreover, transnational voluntary organizations also came to the conclusion that they might profi t from collaboration with the EU to implement their ideas and preferences at the European and global levels.32 The European Court of Justice’s 1979 Cassis de Dijon decision reinforced this new approach and inter-institutional cooperation, as it required member states under certain conditions to mutually recognize their norms and standards where no single European standard existed.33 Market integration in the customs union and the debate about non-tariff barriers and how to abolish them also provided the main incentive for adjacent countries to join the Community. In most of Western Europe, enthusiasm for the creation of a quasi-federation with strong state-like features was far more limited than it might have been in the “core Europe” of the six founding member states. In 1961, Britain did not apply for membership to adopt a new ordo-liberal competition policy. In 1973 Denmark did not join to contribute to the fi rst Environmental Action Programme. And in 1986 Spain did not accede to the Community to improve the lot of women through its gender mainstreaming policies.

Towards One Technological Zone

From the beginning, “core Europe” developed a strong, if implicit, imperial thrust. Thus, when the ECSC High Authority started work in Luxembourg, its external representation immediately became one of its top priorities. Monnet was well connected to his counterparts at the helm of the UNECE and the OEEC, Gunnar Myrdal and Robert Marjolin, who later became a member of the EEC Commission. Monnet succeeded in enticing some offi cials like Roll- man to move to Luxembourg, in this case from the UNECE, where he had briefl y headed the Steel Division. Clearly, from a Western European perspective, the six ECSC member states had the largest output of coal and steel, but also faced the greatest economic and political challenges in this sector. Politically, too, the High Author- ity’s ambition to utilize “core Europe” integration to overcome the Franco-German confl ict differed from UNECE and OEEC agendas.

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As a result of their greater spatial scope and internal fragmentation regarding any political integration objectives, both organizations focused more on technology and trade cooperation. As a result, the High Authority, hinting at its far greater formal legal powers, from the beginning insisted that the UNECE and the OEEC limit their activities to issues outside the ECSC’s competencies, or that they at least involve the High Authority as the representative of the ECSC in any deliberations. As the ECSC had no legal personality under international law, the High Authority could not formally replace the member states in these international organizations. It was coopted into their working patterns at the committee level, however. Moreover, delegations of High Authority offi cials visited Geneva and Paris, and those from the UNECE and the OEEC traveled to Luxembourg, too, to gain deeper insights into evolving ECSC policy agendas. When the European Commission started its work early in 1958, one of its top priorities was to ensure the Community’s internal cohesion. Hence, it immediately started to coordinate and align the position of the six member states behind protectionist French and Italian positions in OEEC negotiations about a larger Western European free trade area. Shortly afterwards the Community had to agree not just on its common external tariffs, but also on how it would negotiate in international organizations with third countries like the U.S., especially about tariffs in the GATT. This became an urgent issue with the mid-1960s Kennedy Round. In line with its broadly-federalist ambitions, the Commission initially wanted to negotiate for the Community and take fi nal decisions on changing its position or approving a particular outcome. This went too far, not just for France, but also for the other fi ve member states. According to the resulting compromise, the Commission negotiated “on behalf of” the member states. If it wanted to change a particular negotiating position, it had to go back to the member states to obtain a revision in its mandate.34 The Community’s imperial thrust was refl ected in the EEC treaty articles 237 and 238, which anticipated the accession and association of additional countries. In fact, the UK fi rst put the issue of enlargement on the EEC’s agenda. In the mid-1950s, the British government fi rst discussed the economic consequences of initiating a continental Western European customs union.35 The Economic Section of the Treasury and the Board of Trade warned that global trade was

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shifting more and more to trade among industrialized countries, away from colonial trade patterns. Soon Commonwealth preferences might be worth little for British exporters, while countries like Canada and Australia became interested in developing their industries and diversifying their exports, including to an enlarged Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Foreign Offi ce overruled such skepticism. It excluded British participation on the grounds that this would jeopardize the United Kingdom’s links with the Common- wealth and the U.S. and de-stabilize the so-called three circles that (according to Winston Churchill) guaranteed the country a continued great power role over and above countries like France. When Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government reconsidered its European options after the formation of EFTA and applied for EEC membership in 1961, the Community was up and running and its economic and trade growth were already impressive. The government was now eager to secure access to this larger market for British exporters, instead of relying on the steadily less-signif- icant Commonwealth markets. Even the key motivation to please the new Kennedy administration, which strongly pushed for Brit- ish EEC membership, had an economic rationale; this was that the EEC would accrue power and infl uence in transatlantic relations through its common trade policy. For economic reasons alone, Brit- ain had to join the EEC—an idea that particularly motivated the Labour government’s second British EEC application in 1967. The French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed both applications, but Britain fi nally joined the Community in 1973. To secure access to the customs union was also a central motive for the Danes and Irish when they joined the Community together with Britain. In their case, however, the overriding aim was to benefi t from the CAP through full market access and its benefi - cial budgetary effects on agricultural export countries. Although Greece, which entered in 1981 and Spain and Portugal (1986), wished to stabilize their democratic systems after emerging from right-wing dictatorships during 1974–5, all three countries also sought the economic benefi ts of membership—here through industrial development and the redistributive effects of the agricultural, social and regional policies. Lastly, the applications for membership by Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which fi nally joined in 1995, were largely although not exclusively, motivated by their interest in full access to the emerging internal market.36

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The Community’s progressive enlargement allowed it to play an increasingly-central role in European and transatlantic relations in the 1970s and 1980s. To begin with, as the Community began to cover larger areas in Western Europe and later, most of Europe, functional arguments for making rules for Europe by independent organizations with a larger spatial scope became less valid. This in turn facilitated greater cooperation between the Community and such organizations. The Community’s more central role was also refl ected in the policies of third countries like the U.S., and of other international organizations like the OECD, EFTA, and the CMEA. Having supported “core Europe” integration from the start, the U.S. became increasingly worried about the Commu- nity’s growing strength and independence. While both partners remained mutually dependent during the Cold War, bilateral trade relations became more confl ict-ridden, ranging from the 1960s “chicken wars” about U.S. food imports through to American fears of a “fortress Europe” internal market in the 1980s. At the same time, the U.S. increasingly demanded that the Community and its member states share the “burden” of funding and protecting the Western world—a key motive behind Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s declaration that 1973 should become the “Year of Europe.”37 But the Americans were nevertheless apprehensive that the Community might turn out to be a “superpower in the making,”38 with its own global policy priorities, which could lead to greater friction. The Community’s growing functional and spatial scope also impacted on other international organizations. In 1961 the OEEC reconfi gured itself as the OECD, on the initiative of the U.S. Henceforth it was a global organization with the U.S., Canada, and Japan as full members. At the same time, its functions increasingly shifted from administering the Marshall Plan and its legacy to economic and statistical analysis and policy deliberation. The OECD promoted the comparison of national public policies to facilitate policy learning and the transfer of tested models—a shift induced by the U.S. assumption that “core Europe” organizations would in the future look after Western Europe’s economic integration as fulfi lling the original rationale behind creating the OEEC in 1948. While the OEEC predated the EEC, EFTA was constructed in response to “core Europe” integration and the failure of plans for

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a larger Western European free trade area. But EFTA was highly fragmented, as it combined industrial free trade with a set of bilateral agricultural treaties between Denmark and Norway and the food importers Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The Swiss and Austrians actually traded far more with the EEC than with other EFTA countries and mainly excluded EEC membership due to their neutrality. Denmark in turn became very concerned that the emerging CAP would cut off Danish farmers from the large German market for foodstuffs, where its exports would be replaced by Dutch and other produce. EFTA’s heterogeneity was fi rst exposed when Britain applied for EEC membership in 1961, without paying much attention to its possible consequences for the other EFTA countries. This indifference became obvious in 1964–5 during the organization’s “surcharge crisis,” when the UK’s new Labour government blatantly violated the EFTA Convention by extending its new tariff surcharge to its partners, which led to fi erce attacks on British policy especially by the Swiss and Swedish governments. But competition with the EEC also resulted in demands for EFTA’s functional expansion. Thus, the Portuguese government successfully lobbied for technical and fi nancial assistance with the development of the country’s infant industries, which to some extent mirrored EEC policies. And in 1963, when de Gaulle vetoed British entry but welcomed Denmark to break up EFTA, the Danish government actually began to lobby for a common EFTA agricultural policy based on the emerging CAP model.39 The Community’s functional and spatial growth even infl uenced the Eastern European CMEA. When ECSC member states fi rst discussed a customs union in 1955–6, the Soviet Union unsuccess- fully launched counter-initiatives in the UNECE to undermine the plan. It subsequently propagandized against the EEC as a form of “imperialist integration” dependent on the U.S. and NATO.40 When the Soviet Union began to conclude bilateral treaties on technological and scientifi c cooperation with trade implications, starting with France in 1969, it sought to shut the Community out of this process, which the Commission accepted until 1975.41 Eventually, the Soviet leadership de facto accepted the Community as an international actor, when it consented to the Helsinki Accords in 1975 being signed by Prime Minister Aldo Moro for the Community, as well as for Italy, which held the rotating EC presidency.

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Fig. 8.7 Cooperation Alongside domestic economic problems, Soviet policy for the in the East: Experts CMEA was also infl uenced by the EEC’s development. Thus, continued to cooperate within the Council its 1971 initiative for a “Comprehensive Program for the Further for Mutual Economic Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Develop- Assistance, also called ment of Socialist Economic Integration” responded directly to Comecon in the West. the Community’s initiatives for foreign policy cooperation and a This photo shows Polish 42 and Soviet engineers common currency, launched at the 1969 summit in The Hague. In at the construction fact, the CMEA program, which was a compromise document with site of a sulfuric acid limited impact, foresaw the creation of an investment bank and factory in the late 1970s. even a single currency based on a convertible ruble. Uncoordinated national plans and severe lack of At the same time, protectionist Community policies in sectors like material and fi nancial agriculture and steel created problems for Eastern European coun- resources often impeded tries and producers, who sought to maintain or expand their trade such cooperation, until it collapsed completely with links with Western Europe. Thus, the governments of Poland and the end of the Cold War Hungary began to engage in bilateral talks with the Commission in 1989–90. about resolving the resulting issues. Just like the Community, they had no interest in strengthening the CMEA through formalized,

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high-level cooperation between the two organizations—something that they feared would only have strengthened Soviet control over the CMEA and over Eastern Europe more generally.43

Regulating the Internal Market

Despite the fundamental differences in their political systems, the CMEA and the Community, together with their member states, faced broadly-similar economic challenges during the 1970s, although varying in degree and in likely consequences. Both Western and Eastern Europe had to face structural crises in fi rst- generation industries. Producers in Western Europe confronted increasingly-global competition in steel and related sectors like ship-building. Shielded from such competition, those in the CMEA at least needed to start replacing steel with alternative materials, as was happening elsewhere, and to reduce energy consumption and production costs, which would require technological innovation and structural adjustments in the industry. Western and Eastern Europe also faced rapid technological development in fi elds such as computing and automation which were mostly led by the U.S. during the 1970s. For Western Euro- pean producers, lagging behind in technological development posed a direct threat to their global competitiveness. In Eastern Europe during the Cold War, the Soviet Union concentrated most of its engineering and scientifi c resources on military technology. But this in turn increased the yawning gap with the West in civil engineering technologies and the technology, design, reliability, and cost-effective production of consumer products. As a result, CMEA imports of machinery and equipment from OECD countries rose ten-fold between 1965 and 1975 alone—something that contributed to a rapidly-growing external debt in hard currency.44 At the same time, the CMEA member states’ inability to provide more and better consumer products impacted directly on communist central planning’s rapidly-diminishing legitimacy.45 Finally, Western and Eastern Europe also had to grapple with faster productivity growth in other world regions. For Western Europe this mainly concerned Japan during the 1970s, whose

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increased competitiveness in sectors like automobiles and electron- ics led to fast-rising imports. In Eastern Europe, the prevailing economic policies effectively limited productivity increases to delay the associated social costs of hidden unemployment. The Soviet Union actually supported other Eastern bloc countries with subsidized energy supplies to keep them more closely associated with the CMEA, but this policy reduced pressure to produce better products more effi ciently.46 Moreover, as the CMEA never actually devised or implemented the “socialist division of labor” which the Soviet Union had propagated in the early 1960s to strengthen its control over the organization, member states like Romania and Bulgaria continued to invest in technologically-backward plants instead of importing products from other countries in Eastern Europe, leading to trade destruction rather than creation.47 Rhetorically, the CMEA sought to address its problems in several initiatives during the 1980s, leading up to the “Collective Concept of the International Socialist Division of Labor for the Years 1991– 2005,” with the objective of a “unifi ed socialist market” confi rmed in July 1988.48 By this stage, however, the CMEA countries’ economic policies were diverging more than ever, with some like Hungary introducing more market incentives. The organization’s implosion was well on its way. During the momentous political transformation that followed in 1989, no Council meetings took place. CMEA trade collapsed during 1990 and the organization was formally dissolved in June 1991.49 By contrast in Western Europe, the Community reacted to the multiple economic challenges of the 1970s by reviving its ambition to create an internal market. Multinational companies, some member states, and the Commission coalesced in the early 1980s to advance this older agenda decisively. In 1983 several chief executive offi cers of European companies within and outside the Community created the European Round Table of Industrialists, which vigorously advocated completing the internal market by abolishing non- tariff barriers and creating new transnational infrastructures.50 The network behind this initiative had originally formed in the early 1970s as an effort by European automobile producers to prevent the adoption of tighter and expensive new U.S. safety standards.51 Throughout the decade, this network was concerned with allegedly “unfair” competition, inducing the Community to negotiate a voluntary export restraint agreement for cars with Japan, for

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example. By the early 1980s, however, it had expanded signifi cantly beyond the automobile makers to focus more on building a larger internal market that would reduce costs and create a better basis for exporting. Slowly but surely, private companies with strong export interests gained the upper hand and demanded a liberal Community trade policy to complement the expected abolition of internal non-tariff barriers. At the same time, some member states, starting with the United Kingdom, also pushed to complete the internal market. Here, it would reinforce Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s new domestic neo-liberal economic policies at the European level and could contribute to liberalize world trade. Other member states also adopted more moderate policies of privatization and liberalization, to remedy structural problems of low growth rates, high infl ation, rising unemployment, and growing budget and state defi cits, which had characterized the period since the fi rst oil crisis of 1973. They also saw constructing the internal market as a means to transform the Western European economy while delegating to the Community responsibility for the reforms’ possibly negative social consequences. Appointed in 1985, new Commission President Jacques Delors also supported this process, with its core feature of technical harmonization. He agreed with the need to transform the European as well as the French economy. At the same time, he saw the initiative as a chance to connect his federalist political reform agenda to the internal market objective in the Single European Act. This could overcome what had been widely perceived as the “Eurosclerosis” of the 1970s, or as Europe’s “dark ages,”52 with apparently-limited institutional and policy progress.53 In fact, even Thatcher, who opposed a federal evolution of the Community, supported majority voting for internal market legislation as only this would prevent individual member states from vetoing liberalization measures that they disliked. In addition, the Community acquired new competencies for policy fi elds like the environment. Moreover, the Court of Justice’s broadly federalist interpretation of the Single European Act actually expanded the scope of Community policies and majority voting, something that deeply upset Thatcher. Subsequently, the Maastricht Treaty strongly reinforced the Single European Act’s federalist thrust, especially through introducing both the European Parliament’s co-decision role for much of the EU’s legislation and

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the plan for a common monetary policy, traditionally one of the key attributes of national sovereignty.

Forward to the Past

How, then, did these changes affect the way in which European transnational and international organizations made rules for Europe? First of all, the internal market program required vast technical regulation not just for industry, but also for the service sector, which was now included in the EU’s economic integration. From a functional perspective, abolishing non-tariff barriers made the EU a perfectly-legitimate site for such technical regulation. After all, it could now demand much more forcefully than before the close cooperation of existing, specialized transnational and international organizations or their association with, and/or integration into, the EU’s regulatory framework. At the same time, the spatial argument against the EU as a hegemonic site for rule-making also lost traction. The EU’s enlargement by Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995 further reduced opposition to it being transformed into a regulatory hub. After two failed accession referendums, Norway joined the European Economic Area together with Liechtenstein, so that they also became part of the internal market and its regulations, which accounted for roughly 80 percent of all EU legislation. Switzerland as a neutral country at the geographical heart of Western Europe had once played an infl uential role in many specialized European organizations and agencies. Holding out, it negotiated a complex system of bilateral treaties with the EU, which also effectively brought it into its regulatory orbit. Even more important, after the collapse of communism, all the new democracies in Eastern and South- Eastern Europe enthusiastically embarked on the long and wind- ing road to full EU membership, which was often portrayed and experienced as a civilizational “return to Europe.” While NATO membership was crucial for these countries’ external security, only EU accession entailed this larger political promise. In other words, by the mid-1990s the EU was fi rmly on the way to becoming a pan- European organization, which fatally undermined the argument

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that organizations and agencies with a different spatial scope were more suitable for making rules for all of Europe. Finally, it quickly turned out that the end of the Cold War coincided with a new phase of globalization characterized by rapidly- growing international trade, a progressive shift of economic activity to Asia, and an increasing role of global international organizations in worldwide regulation. If, however, Europe wanted to retain a pivotal role in global trade and regulation, then it had to speak with one voice in these organizations. Clearly, in the light of its exclusive competences for market integration and trade policy and its high degree of political institutionalization, only the EU would be able to do so effectively. Not only did it seem clear that the EU would become a more hegemonic force in making rules for Europe; the internal market program and the Maastricht Treaty, combined with its progressive enlargement, also reinforced the peculiar way in which it was and is governed. At fi rst sight, the institutional transformation appeared to strengthen the supranational “Community method.” This involved a strong role by the Commission in designing policies and brokering among different institutional and societal actors; strategic bargaining by the member states; and the locking-in of interest groups through their careful cooptation into policy- making. But as became clear in heavy industry, and as was even true of agricultural policy-making, this Community method had to accommodate older traditions and patterns of technocratic internationalism, characterized by a strong role for experts, their demands for “rational” policy-making, and the search for consensus around “optimal” solutions. At closer inspection, the internal market’s regulatory program actually reinvigorated this technocratic internationalist tradition. It turned out that the EU was quite well adapted to the further evolution of such a traditional regulatory policy-making mode, which many specialized transnational and international organizations and agencies had used for a long time.54 First of all, with the partial exception of the CAP and social and regional policy, the EU had fewer competencies than its member states for implementing policies with strong redistributive implications, which tend to be highly politicized. Moreover, the Commission could enhance its own institutional role by working closely with expert communities

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Fig. 8.8 Low Voltage: Surrounded by labor- saving devices from an electric whisk to a washing machine, this British housewife is apparently enjoying an easy life, drinking tea, and picking at snacks from the hostess trolley—as imagined by the Daily Herald cartoonist in 1956. For a long time these new electrical devices were produced to different national standards. But in 1973, cooperating closely with existing industry standards bodies, the European Community started its foray into regulation and standardization with the Low-Voltage Directive. It created common standards for the free movement of electrical goods operating between 50 and 1,000 volts. Henceforth, Western European technological zones became more closely aligned with the European Community as a political space. in devising policies, norms, and standards. Its elaborate set-up of some 1,000 expert and advisory committees facilitated such consultation and cooperation.55 The Council in turn functioned as a forum for determining minimum standards for the internal market and the direction of harmonization. Finally, the Court of Justice had the means to ensure that the rules were applied relatively evenly. In fact, the Community formalized its new regulatory method (called the “New Approach to technical harmonization and standards”), developed since the Low-Voltage Directive as early as 1985, before the signing of the Single European Act and the implementation of the Internal Market program. The Council resolution confi rmed that legislative harmonization would in future be

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limited to meeting minimum requirements for products to be able to circulate freely in the Community. Laws had to specify objectives such as safety precisely, but not detailed design specifi cations. The laws would also require producers to undertake a risk analysis and to elaborate technical specifi cations that would satisfy the specifi ed objectives. The New Approach also introduced the CE marking which certifi es that the product in question conforms to the Directive. The New Approach did not only undergird the internal market program, however. It also increasingly dominated policy areas like biotechnology and food safety, which required a great degree of scientifi c expertise, just as the regulation of cross-border transport had been strongly infl uenced by engineering expertise during the nineteenth century. Crucially, the New Approach, although it turned out to be diffi cult to implement, transformed the EU into an attractive site for experts keen to exert infl uence in a larger European regulatory and political space, either working inside EU institutions or for standards bodies like the CENELEC, mentioned above, which cooperate closely with them. With its switch to associative regulation the EU has, in other words, moved forward into the past. After all, as we have seen in this book, multiple transnational voluntary and international organizations like the Verein in the railway sector already practiced what is now called associative regulation in the nineteenth century. At the time, states loosely supervised their activities and sometimes tried to intervene more strongly to enhance foreign ministry control or secure particular outcomes, especially around the turn of the century. But the organizations laid down rules, norms, and standards for cross-border infrastructures, communication and trade in Europe, and sometimes beyond Europe. They also gave experts with relevant knowledge large leeway to debate and defi ne such rules, norms, and standards just as organizations like the CENELEC are doing within the EU’s general legal framework nowadays. Nevertheless, this regulatory mode had, and still has, limits. Most important, far from making EU citizens happy through “rational” and effective policies, its non-transparent nature has arguably aggravated the disenchantment among many citizens

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more recently with EU politics and policy-making. But the EU’s hegemony in making rules for Europe has also turned out to be far more fragile than it might have appeared in the early 1990s, not least because of the relentless growth both of global rules and of international, private rule-making by companies and their standards organizations. The EU is not, after all, the only game in town.

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The European Union (EU) and its institutions have crafted their own narrative of the EU’s foundation and evolution since the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951–2 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957–8. This potent story centers on a number of “founding fathers” surrounding Jean Monnet, who sought to overcome ideological and national strife among peoples and states by creating an entirely new form of supranational Community, geared towards making policy in the common European interest. The EU has even produced a number of videos for classroom use, including “Jean Monnet: the Father of Europe,” all of which are designed to reinforce this narrative.1 In the meantime, it has become part and parcel of the EU’s institutionally promoted memory: in the folklore of resolutions, driveling speeches, and representations in museums.2 Enthralled by this vision, some historians have contributed to refi ning and legitimizing this teleological foundation narrative.3 Others have heavily criticized the focus on the “lives and teachings of the European saints.” They have argued that European integration merely expresses the socio-economic and foreign policy preferences of member states.4 Most of this literature, and much recent research on postwar European integration, take the year 1945 as

293

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the starting point, however. Everything that happened earlier has deserved no more than a footnote in the history of European integration.5 This foundation narrative and the literature on postwar European integration are reductionist and misleading in several important ways. While we agree that individuals matter, the standard narrative presents a simplistic view of the motivations and objectives of the few individuals like Monnet on which it is centered. Moreover, like almost all the recent literature on postwar European integration, it ignores crucial long-term continuities across the Second World War, confl ating Europe with the European Union in the process. The heavily state-centric literature does not capture the EU’s institutional hybridity either. It does not help us understand how transnational and international organizations, once set up, have frequently developed lives of their own, creating a multi- layered system for writing rules for Europe. Much of their work is at least apparently of a technical character and done by experts. In the EU this has often created severe tensions between technocratic internationalist patterns and practices and supranational or federalist political objectives. In this book we have sought to de-center the present-day EU through offering a long-term analysis of what we call the hidden integration of Europe since the middle of the nineteenth century. We emphasize forms of cross-border cooperation and integration that have involved multiple transnational voluntary and international organizations, experts, and cartels in making rules for Europe. Studying the evolution of this international machinery until the present day provides fresh insights into the nature of European integration—insights that are urgently needed in a political climate in which not just the Euro as a currency, but even the future of the EU itself sometimes appears to be at stake, and in which severe criticism is leveled at the technocratic nature of its decision-making. We have not set out to solve the EU’s chronic legitimacy problem, however. Rather, studying the emergence and transformation of technocratic internationalist working patterns and practices in a wide range of contexts, with a particular focus on railways and steel, has allowed us to reach some larger conclusions about the role of organizations, experts, and cartels in making rules for Europe—and about the origins and evolution of the EU’s powerful

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technocratic vector.6 These conclusions concern, in particular, the nature of policy-making in transnational and international organizations, especially the role of experts; the organizations’ spatial scope; and their evolution through to the present-day.

Institutions & Experts

Much of the existing social science literature about postwar European integration was informed by dichotomous ways of conceptualizing making rules for Europe as either supranational or intergovernmental.7 The fi rst suggests a hierarchical organization where institutions, using the so-called Community method, act above the member states, their actions being enforced by the EU’s Court of Justice and legal system. The second sees most or all policy-making in the EU as dominated by member states and their bargaining over interests. Instead, we have found another distinction more helpful for understanding the international machinery in historical perspective. We distinguish transnational voluntary organizations initiated by (sometimes state-owned) companies with a large mandate for experts, or created by experts themselves, from treaty-based international organizations with a greater formal role for governments. Governments’ increased formal roles in international organizations were sometimes forced upon experts. At other times experts also sought state participation, so as to help them secure the implementation of rules at the state level. For the experts it was more important to create a functioning structure and culture which accorded them a large mandate. As a result, whatever their legal forms, the most striking characteristic of most of the organizations featured in this book surely is the institutional hybridity that has characterized their working patterns and practices. Politicians, diplomats, experts, and social groups are continuously involved in negotiating boundaries: between states and companies; between experts on one side and states and companies on the other, which formally own the organization in question; and between cooperation and consensus and effective decision-making, if necessary by majority.

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In the nineteenth century many transnational and international organizations already had provisions for the use of majority voting. In the railway sector, the Verein deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Verein), a transnational organization, could decide by majority. Such a decision could also be undone within four weeks after the meeting by objections from 10 percent of the members. The Tele- graph Union, an international organization, also had this option; here, the colonial powers had more votes than other governments to represent their overseas territories. In practice, however, majority voting was seldom used. Seeking consensus was regarded as a superior form of policy-making to avoid tensions and facilitate compliance. Moreover, the experts in these various organizations were convinced that rational analysis and debate would allow them to identify the best technical solutions to the cross-border issues at hand. This in turn would enable them to arrive at such a consensus transnationally, and then to implement it at the national level. The pervasive role of experts in deliberation and policy-making was a key phenomenon which helps explain the similarities in the working patterns and practices across transnational and international organizations like the Verein and the Telegraph Union, whatever their legal form. Their preferred technocratic internationalist approach can be traced back to liberal beliefs in rationality, the rule of law, and greater international exchanges of people and goods, not least to foster peace. In addition, their methods derived from the perceived need to organize capitalism nationally and transnationally through forms of association and cooperative deliberation and decision-making—ways of thinking about economic transformation and increasing internationalization (as it was called) in the nineteenth century, which to some extent prefi gured the embedded liberalism in the Atlantic world after the Second World War. To address cross-border challenges effectively, experts in transnational and international organizations repeatedly and habitually drew on a strategy of technifi cation to de-politicize the issues at stake. In an era characterized by fi erce national rivalries, experts sought to create and expand their own spheres of infl uence and decision-making at the expense of foreign ministries and diplomats, who (according to the experts) were uninformed about technical problems and more interested in playing political games than resolving them. The experts’ distaste for what they regarded as power politics and their strong dislike of diplomats also explain

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Fig. 9.1 Explicit why experts had a clear preference for working directly with Europeanism: In competent member state ministries responsible for the sector or 1929, the French internationalist magazine policy issue concerned, not via embassies. The Shipping Commis- Notre temps started sariat model chimed in with this preference, which also impacted a weekly column La the organization of the EEC/EU Council of Ministers from 1958 jeune Europe. Its aim onwards. There, the General Affairs Council of foreign ministers was to trace the expected progress on European was largely limited to a supervisory role and to coordinating unifi cation to follow upon foreign policy. new initiatives by the Their preference for technifi cation became a core part of the belief League of Nations and other organizations and systems and ethos of experts working in transnational and inter- groups. The Notre temps national organizations. Assumptions that they knew best and that headers connected notions only they could come up with solutions that were in the interest of technology (in this case of all strongly infl uenced Monnet’s thinking and the institutional electricity) and European unifi cation. logic of the ECSC High Authority and the European Commission in the EEC. All the while, experts of course used technifi cation as a political strategy, both to create more decision space for themselves and to achieve concrete objectives. In their eyes this space should be free from what they saw as irrational political noise and jealousies nurtured by diplomats. But their discussions actually often centered on highly-political choices, albeit couched in technical language. In contrast to key assumptions in the literature about expert collaboration in so-called epistemic communities, experts often disagreed about fundamental issues. They did not limit themselves to preparing and implementing an agenda set by politicians and diplomats. Instead, they sought to get the largest possible mandate for making decisions themselves, without interference by outsiders.8 Once organizations agreed on a policy solution, they needed to ensure compliance at the national level. The experts involved in making rules for Europe—whether they were formally appointed by companies, governments, the secretariats of transnational or international organizations—normally transgressed boundaries between national, transnational, and international worlds. In

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many cases, the same experts who took decisions on cross-border railway standards, for example, then implemented them within their private or state-owned company or in the transport ministry. Several organizations developed arbitration mechanisms, as in the Berne Convention or in the interwar steel cartels. But arbitration was seldom used. The consensus culture and peer pressure normally guaranteed compliance. Legal contestation was seen as undermining the prevailing consensus culture and reducing the effectiveness of the organization concerned. In fact, when companies took recourse to arbitration, it often signaled the end of the cartel. Against this background, the EU’s legal integration does mark a conditional break with this past practice of transnational and international organizations. The European Court of Justice can (and does) take binding decisions, and the European Commission can (and does) impose fi nes on companies as well as governments for fl outing laws. De facto although not de jure, however, the EU still relies on voluntary compliance at the member state level as unlike states, it possesses no military or police force to coerce them into respecting European laws. Its legal integration has defi nitely helped the EU to become a more hegemonic force in making rules for Europe. In its early days, however, it had to compete with specialized organizations formed in the nineteenth century or the interwar period, and other horizontal organizations like the OEEC. This institutional competition, resulting in what social scientists have called “international regime complexity,”9 has been one of the most striking features of the international machinery since the mid-nineteenth century. A wide range of transnational or international organizations were established for particular functional needs. Sometimes organizations were also created to compete with existing ones, however. The Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC) formed in 1922, in order to bypass the much older Verein, is just one particularly pertinent example. In this case, great power rivalries between Germany and France impacted on the formation and evolution of organizations for cross-border cooperation. This particular case also shows that experts frequently succeeded in mediating the resulting tensions. They often served on committees of different organizations so that the rules and the experts making them remained more or less the same despite formal institutional changes.

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Fig. 9.2 Hybrid Technological Zone: In other words, it has become clear how diffi cult it is for new “Let us learn Russian. Let transnational or international organizations to change the game us learn from the Soviet fundamentally when multiple organizations and rules already people to work, think and exist and have created trajectories over many decades.10 The EEC’s live in a new way.” This 1951 poster illustrates great diffi culties with creating a common transport policy, one tele- the dominance of Soviet communication network, or one energy market are cases in point.11 technology in East-Central Durable organizations like the UIC and others already dominated Europe after the Second rail transport. They and the experts working in them effectively World War. Experts there largely had to follow boycotted the EEC’s planned incursion into their territory— the Soviet example, and something greatly facilitated by their claim that it was functionally many were also attracted inappropriate to organize railways for only six “core Europe” states by it. However, despite cooperation with Soviet when important transport arteries for Europe extended beyond advisors, they often had them, in particular in the case of lines that crossed the Alps which to improvise, creating had been facilitated to create a more-pan-European railway regime a hybrid technological in the fi rst place. zone between Soviet and Western European Functional requirements, such as through transit in rail- technologies and practices. ways or energy, sometimes allowed smaller countries to play a

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disproportionately infl uential mediating role in constructing and running transnational and international organizations. This was the case for Switzerland and Belgium in railways and for companies from Luxembourg in steel. Governments and fi rms from such smaller countries also actively sought to gain international infl u- ence through playing proactive roles, for example by hosting the secretariats of new organizations. Their particular emphasis on building and extending the international machinery refl ected both their greater economic interdependence and their pronounced interest, in times of national and ideological confl ict, in creating a resilient European international machinery which could help constrain powerful states.

Zones & Notions of Europe

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, cross-border cooperation in transnational and international organizations has created or formalized what we have called technological zones in Europe. Each of these zones has had a different spatial reach. Functional requirements to some extent account for the different geographies of integration. Thus, as the United Kingdom lacked a land connection with continental Europe, British railway companies were not as interested in discussions about gauges or other issues of cross-border rail traffi c as were those in Germany or France. Similarly, British steel companies were unaffected by continental European interdependencies in raw materials and as a result remained marginal to interwar European cartel arrangements. Crucially, however, the emerging, multiple, fractured, and only partly overlapping, technological zones had fuzzy borders. Together they did not form one smooth and well-connected Euro- pean area. Companies and experts sometimes took part in meetings although they were not members, or could not be members for formal reasons, as in the Verein. At the same time, the rules, norms, and standards of any one organization could extend beyond its territory, perhaps because a member company made the adoption of these rules by a third company a precondition for business relations. In fact, the fuzzy borders of technological

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zones did not even necessarily coincide with state borders, as the example of the Verein shows. Functional needs also changed with technological developments, which in turn required adjustments to the existing institutional set-up. The emergence of two German- and French-dominated technological railway zones created tensions at their interface (especially traffi c through the Alps). These were eventually mediated through the creation of the Berne Convention’s pan-European regime. Even where international organizations were formally global in terms of their membership, as in the cases of the Telegraph Union, the Postal Union, and the International Institute of Agri- culture, they initially remained heavily dominated by European companies, governments, and experts. The technological zones and linked transnational and international organizations also marked and often buttressed the spatial scope of centers and peripheries in writing rules for Europe (and mediated their relations). It is striking how Germany and France, plus companies, experts, and social groups from both, were at the heart of policy- and decision-making, not just in transport and steel, but in practically every other part of the European international machinery. Political tensions between the two countries, with their mutually constitutive narratives about each other as “arch-enemies,” sometimes spilled over into transnational and international organizations, as in rail transport after the First World War. More often than not, however, experts from both countries resisted such political spill-over and fostered renewed efforts at intensifying cooperation, such as after the Second World War. From this perspective, the formation of “core Europe” after 1945 cannot be suffi ciently explained by referencing three wars in three generations between France and Germany and enlightened politicians wisely putting an end to that bilateral confl ict. Rather, as we have shown, both countries had actually formed the core of the European international machinery and technocratic internationalism from its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century. Over time, their centrality created crucial trajectories in terms of networks, habits and rules, norms and standards. These technological trajectories prefi gured “core Europe,” with huge long-term consequences for the present-day EU’s operations. Some regions and countries consistently remained on the periphery of the European international machinery for a variety

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of reasons: because they took a different or slower path to industrialization; because their geographical location was not central to the emerging infrastructures; or because their higher education systems were not as developed and able to provide students with the necessary knowledge and expertise or to help them integrate into growing transnational networks, where they could infl uence technocratic internationalist thinking, planning, and decision-making. For the most part this has certainly been the case for countries like Ireland, Portugal, Greece, or Finland. The centrality of particular companies, governments, and experts also depended on (perceived) functional needs and sometimes political exigencies. Experts usually sought to minimize political pressures. In the most important single-country case, the United Kingdom, although running a global empire until the 1950s, was actually peripheral in both sectors studied in greater detail in this book, railways and steel. If we had made a different selection, then we would have shown different patterns. British companies and experts were much more central to making global rules for shipping, for example. After all, they owned half of the world’s ocean freight tonnage at the close of the nineteenth century and still a third in 1939.12 Similarly, a country like Sweden remained outside the continental European steel cartels largely because it had huge iron ore resources and did not depend on cross-border cooperation as much as did companies in France, Germany and Luxem- bourg. These technological trajectories and zones thus allow an alternative mapping of Europe. The centers of the international machinery could nevertheless have great impact on the peripheries by setting rules, norms, and standards which created path dependencies for latecomers in a particular sector; by agreeing to rules with direct adverse consequences for outsiders, as in the case of the ECSC export cartel which antagonized Sweden; and sometimes by effectively coercing companies or governments in third countries to adopt particular conventions as a precondition for cooperation. More- over, as a result of these and other pressures, centers for making rules for Europe frequently transferred their technical, institutional, or policy designs. The creation of an East-Central European Wagon Pool in the late 1940s and Danish demands for a common agricultural policy in the European Free Trade Association in the

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1960s illustrate this point. So do growing environmental concerns, which resulted in transfers among different horizontal international organizations in the 1970s to deal with pressing scientifi c and societal issues like air and water pollution.13 Finally, organizational centers also greatly facilitated the formation of denser social networks among experts, as well as politicians, diplomats, and social groups. As in France and Germany and “core Europe,” these networks could eventually play a key role in advancing new institutional designs or policy solutions. Being external to them in part accounted for, and still accounts for, the “semi-detached” position of the United Kingdom as an “awkward partner” in European integration and the EU.14 Whatever their spatial scope, notions of Europe largely remained implicit in the work of transnational and voluntary organizations throughout the nineteenth century. The First World War marked a watershed. Notions of Europe became attached for the fi rst time to cooperation in these organizations. The technical work of the League of Nations was also expected to contribute to reconstruction and political reconciliation. Notions of Europe also frequently became attached to the objective of sustaining empires and recreating European dominance in world affairs; a political motive that continued to play a strong role during the fi rst two decades after the Second World War, as in the case of mainly French concepts of “Eurafrique.” This scheme imagined that the economic integration of Western Europe with African colonies with their huge mineral resources would buttress France’s and Western Europe’s claim to a seat at the table of the new super- powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.15 New political notions of European integration were strengthened after 1945 by Europe’s continued relative economic, political, and military decline, the experience of totalitarian regimes and the Second World War, and American advocacy of its internal market and federal system as a model for “old Europe.” They became attached in particular to the “core Europe” of the ECSC and the EEC, which created an ambivalent mix of political objectives with technocratic internationalist working patterns and practices. In terms of the spatial scope of transnational and international organizations, the new political layer also defi ned new criteria for who could be, or would want to be, in or out. Thus, from a purely functional perspective it would have made just as much

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sense for countries like Sweden and Switzerland to be part of the emerging “core Europe” as for Belgium and the Netherlands. The governing elites in these countries chose to abstain from the more politicized project, however, which in turn marginalized them, and increasingly, their experts.16

Forward to the Past

Our long-term perspective on making rules for Europe has highlighted strong continuities. The year 1945 did not mark a “zero hour,” as much of the research on the history of the EU implies. The long-term continuities since the middle of the nineteenth century comprise, fi rst of all, the search for the best means to organize capitalism to combine dynamic technological and economic development with political freedom and social stability. Chevalier’s plea for association at the national and transnational level foreshadowed to some extent the embedded liberalism of the trente glorieuses—the thirty years of almost uninterrupted growth of the economy and welfare provisions in the Atlantic world including Western Europe after 1945.17 Harmonizing rules, norms, and standards through transnational and international organizations represented one building block for taming capitalism and creating harmonious relations among people, nations, and states. In interwar Europe in particular, cartels seemed to offer another option, where the main focus was on limiting competition to avoid “waste.” In sectors such as chemicals, supporters of cartels also argued that they would facilitate cross-border research collaboration, resulting in faster technological innovation and better economic development. Similarly, the transnational and international organizations themselves created a large degree of continuity across political breaks like the two World Wars. To begin with, they, and the experts working in them, developed and cultivated internationalist rhetoric and discourses which were available after the end of confl icts and could be adjusted to changed economic and political circumstances. Companies, states, and experts also created institutional forms which persisted and could be used as models to justify institutional innovation. At the most basic level, the set-up of many organizations in the nineteenth century, with a forum for companies or

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governments, a small secretariat, and a number of technical committees, has endured in the European international machinery. The European Commission has, it is true, expanded into a fairly large bureaucracy, which however is still small compared to those of national governments. It has sought to integrate experts and expertise more inside this European bureaucracy. It has continued to rely, and is now relying more than ever, on external capabilities in expert and advisory committees and agencies administering EU policies.18 Institutional continuities have also taken more concrete forms. Thus, the formation of the UN’s Economic and Social Council and of the Economic Commission for Europe in 1947 owed much to the reform debates in the League of Nations during the 1930s. Equally, Monnet, when advocating “core Europe” integration after 1945, was able to draw upon his experience of the Allied Maritime Transport Council at the end of the First World War, which Arthur Salter and others formed into the Shipping Commissariat model, and of the League of Nations and Allied cooperation during the Second World War. The Shipping Commissariat model provided

Fig. 9.3 Confl ated Identities: With its growth in spatial scope and powers, the European Union and Europe as a continent and civilizational notion have become more and more confl ated. EU institutions now routinely claim to speak on behalf of Europe, while other transnational and international organizations continue to co-shape this Europe. This advertisement for a European night train run by a private company contributes to this confl ation by associating its transport service with the European fl ag used by the EU and the Council of Europe which covers a much larger space.

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the template for direct cooperation between the High Authority and later the European Commission, and specialized national ministries. To some extent they came to sideline foreign ministries and diplomats. Moreover, nineteenth-century technocratic internationalist working patterns and practices also largely continued functioning during the twentieth century, and still exert a strong infl uence on the EU’s day-to-day work. For experts, their ways of doing things became habitual and embedded in informal institutional rules. These rules often remained in place, even when transnational expert groups were largely replaced, as in the case of rail transport after 1945. For steel the continuities in elites involved in transnational cooperation were more pronounced. Here, many experts steeped in the cartel tradition of interwar Europe actually ran the routine business of the High Authority, thwarting the hopes of the American administration and some Europeans like Monnet that the ECSC would end this tradition. Alongside the continuity in ideas, institutional models, and technocratic practices, moreover, the actual rules, norms, and standards evolved over time, creating forms of cross-border material integration which would continue to connect Europeans even if the Euro as a currency were to fail one day. Finally, technocratic planning, too, created long-term trajectories, as the story of the European motorway network made clear. Transnational and international organizations have also under- gone signifi cant change, however. In the heyday of their global empires before the First World War, Europeans initiated and largely controlled even those organizations that had a global scope, like the Telegraph Union and the Postal Union. In these and many other organizations, the world really did seem to revolve around Europe. In contrast, in the early twenty-fi rst century, the EU, despite its continued economic weight and its signifi cant infl uence on international trade negotiations or development aid, at times resembles at the global level, the Switzerland and Belgium of making rules for Europe before the First World War. Informed by its long history of successful regional integration and its limited ability and willingness to use coercive power, the EU, too, has a strong preference for what is now called global governance.19 Yet despite the widespread perception in the U.S. and especially in Asia that the EU may be on a slippery slope to global irrelevance,

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it is also astonishing to see in a long-term perspective how Europe- ans have continued to play infl uential roles in increasingly global transnational and international organizations concerned with technology-related questions. In the fi rst place, despite some postwar Americanization of Western European industry and society, superfi cial as it may have been, Europeans largely retained control over making rules for themselves.20 The ECSC’s practices ran directly counter to the American preference for a strong anti-trust policy, after all. The Telegraph Union was brought into the remit of the UN, but European experts continued to play leading roles.21 More recently, the EU has also succeeded in turning European standards into global standards, most notably for digital mobile phones. Although the technology was developed by Bell Labs in the U.S. in the early 1970s, mobile phone use grew much faster in Europe. As a result the Conference of European Posts and Telecommunications formed the Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) to develop solutions for issues such as enhanced voice quality and international roaming. Then, in 1989, the European Telecommunications Standards Insti- tute devised GSM specifi cations. Their commercial use began in 1991, and the standard was soon adopted around the globe.22 Several reasons account for Europe’s relative success in infl uencing making rules not just for Europe, but for the world. One is that institutional continuities favor European companies, governments, and experts. Thus, the UIC was initially a European organization with limited global extensions only to Japan and China. It only became fully global in 2009. Yet its headquarters remain in Paris where the organization was founded in 1922. The World Steel Association de facto evolved around the European organization Eurofer; and as a result, its main headquarters are still in Brussels with a second offi ce in Beijing in China. This dual structure continues despite the fact that the EU’s combined output of steel is totally dwarfed by that of China. At the same time, the very long European transnational and international tradition and experience of managing cross-border issues still gives Europeans an advantage when addressing similar issues in a global context. Moreover, with the EU, Europeans now have a highly institutionalized form of multi- level rule-making, which can to some extent be copied-and-pasted for imitation at the global level. Lastly, technocratic internationalism with its European roots and its preferred method of technifi cation could be particularly useful when framing shared rules, norms, and

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standards with (party) dictatorships like China, in situations where the partners’ prevailing political norms and objectives vary vastly. The international machinery is now more fully global and Euro- peans are forced to fi ght their corner in a multi-polar world. All the while, technocratic internationalism has revived inside the EU. Crucially, the retrenchment of the welfare state since the 1980s and the new policies of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation have brought about a new form of writing rules for Europe which has been called associative regulation. State institutions at EU and member state level cooperate much more closely again with agencies and transnational voluntary organizations and their experts in setting rules, norms, and standards, much like in the nineteenth century. The political context has changed, however. Then, most citizens were content to have experts build the material infrastructure for integrating their nation or state and to cooperate across borders for facilitating transport and trade. In contrast, at the start of the twenty-fi rst century, the specter of European technocracy is regarded with pronounced skepticism by many EU citizens and is met with outright hostility and opposition from populist movements and political parties.

Technocracy & Democracy

Technocratic working patterns and practices formed an organic part of governing Western political systems and societies after 1945, and across the different “varieties of capitalism.”23 The state increased the scope of its activities, including through varied nationalizations of companies or sectors. Governments and administrations rapidly built and expanded the modern welfare state. The underlying belief in scientifi c, technocratic approaches to policy-making was refl ected in the widespread enthusiasm for various forms of indicative planning in Western Europe, for example. This more-intrusive Keynesian state appeared to be successful and thus, legitimate. After all, the trente glorieuses after 1945 were characterized by full employment almost everywhere in Western Europe, combined with narrowing income and wealth gaps, indicating the emergence of socio-economically fairer societies. In an infl uential 1973 book, Daniel Bell claimed that on both sides of the Iron Curtain

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industrialized societies were moving towards post-industrialism. This new social order was defi ned by a shift from manufacturing to services, the growing importance of science and technology and the dominance of technical experts.24 The continued strong infl uence of the technocratic internationalist vector in the ECSC and the EEC was part and parcel of this larger postwar trend. Monnet and other entrepreneurs of “core Europe” integration were not overtly concerned about the legitimacy of their role in making rules for Europe. This legitimacy appeared to be suffi ciently grounded in their objective to overcome strife among European states and in their claim to policy-making in the “general interest” of all those in the “core Europe” organizations. The High

Fig. 9.4 Technocracy versus Democracy: During the 1990s the European Union developed a new infrastructure policy combining several large- scale projects selected by experts without any direct involvement of the public. This cartoon mocks this process’s undemocratic nature, allegedly geared towards making even more money for multinational companies running and exploiting these pan- European infrastructures. The EU is more and more criticized for its technocratic features. A powerful technocratic vector is especially deeply engrained in the European Commission’s working methods and consultative structures. The EU’s future may well depend on how it manages the obvious strong tensions between technocracy and democracy in the emerging European polity.

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Authority and the European Commission were concerned, in other words, with what social scientists have called “output legitimacy”: the quality of legislation and regulation in the eyes of the citizens.25 Indeed, such legitimacy appeared to be on the rise until the late 1970s, as the so-called “permissive consensus” grew throughout the enlarged Community including countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark. This consensus featured the widespread belief among citizens that European integration as such was a good thing, although they neither had much knowledge of nor showed great interest in its organization and decision-making.26 From experts’ technocratic internationalist perspective, this was the natural state of affairs. Rational decision-making on transnational issues produced good legislation and regulation, which in turn made citizens happy. Since the 1970s, however, several inter- connected trends have fundamentally undermined this apparently straightforward link between “output” and legitimacy.27 First, previously hierarchical government and decision-making has fragmented as a consequence of the welfare state’s decline since the 1970s.28 Policy deliberation and agenda-setting at the European as at the national level has increasingly taken place in informal networks involving—in the EU—multiple institutions and social groups in what is often called “multi-level governance.”29 This informality has led to decreased transparency and accountability: to citizens it is unclear where proposals come from and why they are made in any particular form. The informality of policy deliberation and agenda-setting thus adds to the formal complexity of EU decision-making rules and procedures. This in turn increases the widespread confusion among EU citizens about who is politically responsible and how to hold offi cials accountable. Second, until the 1973 oil crisis, the social effects of economic restructuring, such as the closure of coal mines starting in the 1960s, had been cushioned at the national and European level by other forms of employment. Then it was also far easier for industry and society to bear the costs of the economically wasteful, but politically expedient forms of Europeanized redistribution to farmers in the Common Agricultural Policy. From the 1970s onward the economic and social consequences of globalization, liberalization, and privatization began to lead to far greater redistributive confl icts at European and national level—culminating in the economic and fi nancial crisis since 2008. This latest crisis has highlighted the

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much more heavily politicized nature of EU politics and policy- making, compared to the early postwar period. This politicization has put new demands on EU institutions. They cannot ignore these demands, trapped as they are in the comfort zone of their own well-established supranational and federalist discourse. As a result, EU institutions have taken on more and more tasks which go well beyond regulating rules, norms, and standards as the core business of technocratic internationalist European integration. This political overload has fueled the EU’s particular legitimacy crisis, beyond the more generic structural problems it shares with representative democracy at the member state level; national institutions and political elites are also under attack from populist political forces, after all. At the same time, citizen groups have increasingly challenged the problem-solving promise of science and technology and their claims of neutrality. Such groups deeply distrust the credibility and legitimacy of the institutions in which experts operate, including the EU.30 The EU’s institutions have responded to the resulting democratic defi cit with a frantic search for new ways of legitimizing the European “project”—fi rst emphasizing the “input” of EU citizens into policy-making since the 1990s, and then increasingly highlighting the need to enhance the EU’s cultural cohesion and legitimacy through more closely aligned narratives and collective memories of the past.31 Encouraging popular participation in policy-making runs counter to the technocratic internationalist belief in rational and consensus- driven decision-making by experts, however. This belief is still deeply engrained in the European Commission and its consultative structures. Here, public interest groups can greatly enhance their infl uence if they are willing to abide by the rules of the game and provide relevant expertise without attaching a specifi c normative perspective to it. Not surprisingly, therefore, despite its rhetoric about citizen participation and “input legitimacy,” the European Commission has actually taken a thoroughly instrumental and symbolic approach to transforming its policy-making culture. Its aim is to encourage public participation, but to prevent what it sees as excessive politicization. It mainly perceives public participation as an instrument to improve decision-making and not to stimulate deeply political deliberations.32 In its e-democracy initiatives, for example, the Commission has outsourced the analysis of citizen input on issues such as animal welfare to private agencies. Their

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summaries have had little or no effect on legislation, which had already been largely shaped by the Commission’s internal expertise and preferences and those of relevant interest groups.33 At the same time, the bargaining among the member states, between them and the European Parliament, which now has wide- ranging co-decision powers, and the infl uence of powerful interest groups is largely and overtly shaped by normative preferences and material interests. This runs directly counter to the technocratic internationalist belief in optimal policy solutions resulting from what its advocates regard as rational debate, including seeking voluntary consensus behind closed doors; in other words, the hidden integration of Europe. Nonetheless, the European Commis- sion, as the EU institution with the strongest technocratic internationalist tradition, is habitually blamed for any adverse effects of politicized negotiations and decision-making processes, despite the fact that it can only draft legislation, but not vote it into law. Since the 1980s in particular, member state governments have often sought to distance themselves from their own roles in “Brussels” decision-making to defl ect domestic criticism of any adverse consequences of globalization, liberalization, and privatization. This, too, has contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions.34 Lastly, the character of expertise has changed, too. In the nineteenth century, experts with technological knowledge drove the construction of the international machinery. Cartels, as one approach to mediating transnational tensions, already required legal and business expertise. Moreover, the League of Nations steadily expanded its activities into policy fi elds like economic cooperation and fi nancial diplomacy, which mainly required legal and business expertise. Other domains of transnational regulation like animal health fostered the growth and combination of scientifi c knowledge with social science expertise, from statistics to sociological perspectives on the consequences of industrialization, urbanization, and poverty. More recently, scientifi c expertise has become far more relevant to EU policy-making—think of health scares like the 1990s outbreak of “mad cow” BSE disease in Britain or the fi rst avian infl uenza (bird fl u) scare in 2005. Making rules for technological issues allowed experts to work and take decisions shielded from the public limelight. In contemporary Europe many issues requiring scientifi c expertise, by contrast,

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are hotly debated in public, including crises like climate change. Experts become public fi gures through their presence on television or in the new social media, where they propagate their views and offer solutions to transnational challenges. Expertise thus becomes more and more politicized, and working behind closed doors has become far more diffi cult. Believing in the intrinsic value of expertise, determined by rational discourse in the private settings of transnational and international organizations, not in public, is a key pillar of technocratic internationalism. Its fragmentation and fi erce public contestation may herald the greater democratization of expertise, however. No one has an easy-to-administer recipe for how to manage these unresolved tensions between technocracy and democracy within organizations like the EU.35 As our book has demonstrated however, recognizing, debating, and wherever possible, resolving these tensions may have a great impact on the EU’s future. As we have shown, technocratic internationalism has had a huge infl u- ence on writing rules for Europe since the middle of the nineteenth century. In an age of greater pluralism and growing demands for more political participation, however, it may be necessary to break with some of its basic tenets.

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Introduction

1 Badenoch and Fickers, Materializing Europe, 4–5. 2 As is also advocated in Patel, “Provincialising the European Union.” 3 Here we use the British term “motorways.” For other usages see Mom, “Roads without Rails.” 4 On Italian developments and Puricelli, see Moraglio, Storia, 46–61. 5 Puricelli, L’Autostrada Bergamo-Milano. 6 Schipper, Driving Europe, 83–120. 7 See: Guérin, Albert Thomas au BIT, 90; Fine, “Albert Thomas,” 545. 8 “Questions économiques, monetaires et fi nanciers. Grand travaux publics nationaux et internationaux. Quelques plans de grands travaux publics— super réseaux électriques europeéns. November 1928 – Mai 1932,” letter from Thomas July 1, 1931, 6B-7-3, Cabinet Albert Thomas, International Labour Organisation Archives. 9 See: Heckmann-Strohkark, “Der Traum.” See also: Moraglio, Storia, 164–70. 10 Vahrenkamp, The German Autobahn 1920–1945, 31–54; Kornrumpf, Hafraba e.V. Deutsche Autobahn-Planung. 11 Seidler, Fritz Todt, 23–96. 12 Kaftan, Europa braucht Autobahnen, preface. 13 Ibid., 15. 14 Moraglio, Storia, 180–81. 15 As quoted in Blomkvist, “Roads for Flow,” 165. 16 Schipper, Driving Europe, 167–71. 17 Political scientists use the notion of governance to emphasize the idea of cooperation among multiple state and non-state actors in less hierarchical policy- making. See, for example, Kohler-Koch and Eising, Transformation. 18 See also: Saunier, “Learning by Doing.” For an introduction to the transnational perspective on European integration see: Kaiser et al., History. 19 Some historians use the notion of Europeanization, which traditionally focuses more on outcomes (such as convergence in law or practices) than processes, however. See, for example, Conway and Patel, Europeanization. 20 Misa and Schot, “Inventing Europe.” 21 Ruggie, “International Regimes.” 22 See, in more detail, Kohlrausch and Trischler, Building Europe. 23 As also stressed in the political science literature: Haas, “Epistemic Communities,” 3. 24 For this notion see: Schot and Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism.” 25 See: Lyons, Internationalism, 18. 26 See: Reinsch, Public International Unions, 2. The notion of practical internationalism was also present during the interwar period. See: Lommers, Europe-On Air, 290. 27 Quoted in Herren, “Governmental Internationalism,” 121. 28 Reinsch, Public International Unions. For an introduction to nineteenth-century internationalism and the infl uence of Reinsch see also: Herren, Hintertüren zur Macht, 13–39.

315

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29 Reinsch, Public International Unions, 7, 13. 30 For an introduction see: Long and Wilson, Thinkers. 31 As an introduction to the historiography of the present-day EU see: Kaiser and Varsori, European Union History. 32 This is explored in much more detail in Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels. 33 Based on Barry, Political Machines, 37–42, who uses the notion of technological zones. 34 See, for example, Patel and Schot, “Twisted Paths to European Integration.” 35 For this argument see: Herren, Hintertüren zur Macht, 221, 509–10.

1 Origins of Technocratic Internationalism

1 As quoted in Hinde, Richard Cobden, 175. 2 Kaiser, “Transnational Mobilization,” 410. 3 Leonhard, Liberalismus. 4 Taylor, The European Diaries, 164. 5 See: Davis, Britain and the German Zollverein; Tribe, Governing Economy; Raico, Die Partei der Freiheit. 6 Mares, “ ‘Not Entirely a Manchester Man’.” 7 For the particularities of the British free trade tradition see: Trentmann, Free Trade; Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England. 8 For the rise of the expert, see: Kohlrausch and Trischler, Building Europe on Expertise. For a case-study of this general process see: van Lente and Schot, “Technology as Politics.” 9 Davis, The Great Exhibition. 10 See also: Haltern, Die Londoner Weltausstellung. 11 “The Great Derby Race for Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-One,” Punch 20 (1851), 208. Analyzed and contextualized in Kaiser, “The Rat Race for Progress.” 12 De Tocqueville, Démocratie. 13 See, for example, Le Play, Voyages en Europe; Greeley, Glances at Europe. 14 See, for example, Kroker, Die Weltausstellungen. 15 See the statistical information in Schroeder-Gudehus and Rasmussen, Les fastes du progress. 16 See: Geyer and Paulmann, “Introduction,” 22. 17 Kaiser and Dittrich, “Political Communication.” 18 See: Kaiser, “Cultural Transfer.” 19 Blanqui, Lettres; Chevalier, L’Exposition. 20 The best available biography is still Walch, Michel Chevalier. 21 Picon, Les saint-simoniens, 226–34; see also: Carlisle, “Saint-Simonian Radical- ism.” 22 Picon, Les saint-simoniens; Carlisle, The Proffered Crown; see also: Carlisle, “The Birth of Technocracy”; Mason, “Saint-Simonism.” 23 Drolet, “Industry, Class, and Society.” 24 As quoted in Carlisle, The Proffered Crown, 137. 25 For this episode see: Carlisle, “Saint-Simonian Radicalism,” 441. 26 Chevalier, Politique industrielle. See also: Walch, Chevalier, 99–102; Picon, Les saint-simoniens, 226–39. 27 For this connection and its intellectual background see: Drolet, “Industry, Class and Society,” 1267–9.

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28 See, for example, Chevalier, Politique industrielle, 41. 29 Chevalier, Lettre sur l’Amérique. 30 On this trip to the U.S. and the comparison with Tocqueville see: Jennings, “Democracy before Tocqueville.” 31 See: Chevalier, Die Eisenbahnen. 32 On the role of Chevalier in this process see: Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty. 33 For the role of Chevalier in infrastructure development in Europe see the introduction in Högselius, Kaijser, and Van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition. 34 Based on Lyons, Internationalism, 13–14. His calculation is based on Speeckaert, The 1,978 International Organizations. Lyon considers his fi gures more reliable than those published in the Yearbooks of International Organization. We follow him here. For an analysis based on the yearbooks see: Boli and Thomas, “INGOs,” 22–23. 35 Murphy, International Organization, 86; Woolf, International Government, 186–205. 36 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 13–20. 37 Documents Diplomatiques. For the conference and history of ITU see: Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 21–22, 30, and Laborie, L’Europe mise en réseaux. 38 For the international history of telegraphy and its role in colonialism, war, and international rivalries, see: Headrick, Invisible Weapon; see also: Fickers and Griset, Communicating Europe. 39 See, for example, Zacker and Sutton, Governing Global Networks. 40 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 48–51. 41 For the conference and history of ITU, see: Codding, The International Telecom- munication Union, 13–37, and Laborie, L’Europe mise en réseaux, 63–86. 42 Based on Laborie, L’Europe mise en réseaux, 116–25. See also: Henrich-Franke, “Organisationskultur.” 43 See: Oldenziel, “Gender.” 44 As a result, it would be misleading to talk about their work as technical diplomacy. For this concept see: Schmidt and Werle, Coordinating Technology, 49; Fickers and Griset, Communicating Europe. 45 See: Laborie, L’Europe mise en réseaux, 157–58. See also: Mazower, Governing, 98–104. 46 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 46. 47 Murphy, International Organization, 87. Reinsch, Public International Unions, 18. 48 On the UPU see: Codding, The Universal Postal Union; Woolf, International Gov- ernment, 186–205; Murphy, International Organization, 87–89. 49 Words used at the 1909 Postal Union commemoration of its foundation; see: Reinsch, Public International Unions, 27. 50 Laborie, L’Europe mise en réseaux, 138–54; Schot, “Transnational Infrastructures.”

2 The Power & Fragility of Experts

1 On Lubin and his meeting with the King, see: Agresti, David Lubin, 185–205; and Hobson, International Institute of Agriculture, 3–33. Both books give a detailed introduction to the origins of the IIA. However, they are in part autobiographi- cal as both authors were involved in the organization. Agresti worked with Lubin, and Hobson was a member of the IIA executive committee after the First World War. 2 David Lubin, “The Welfare of the State and the International Chamber of Agri- culture,” paper presented to H.M. the King of Italy on October 23, 1904, pp.

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3–4, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol 1. Sect. 1. Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 3 The summary in this and the next section is based on his own presentation of the origins of his ideas in a paper (without title) presented in Vienna, March 19, 1905, pp. 111–64, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1. Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. In addition see: Agresti, David Lubin, 111–64, and Hobson, International Institute of Agriculture, 3–26. 4 For a description of Lubin’s early contacts and experiences in Rome see: Agresti, David Lubin, 173–74, and for his visit to France, 168–71. 5 See: ibid., 169. 6 See, for example, L’iniziativa reale e l’instituto internationale di agricultura, Conference tenuta dalla sig. Olivia Agresti, il Maggio 1905, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1. Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 7 Rapporto a A.S.E. Luigi Luzzatti, Ministro del Tesoro, dec. 1904, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1. Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agricul- ture Organization Library. For a summary see: Hobson, International Institute of Agriculture, 35–38. 8 Agresti, David Lubin, 186. 9 For the general argument about the importance of monarchs for the establishment of international organizations see: Murphy, International Organization, 76–81. 10 Agresti, David Lubin, 135. 11 Ibid., 135–8. 12 On this discussion see: Aldenhoff-Hübinger, Agrarpolitik und Protektionismus, 42–70. 13 On the work of this Commission see: ibid.; Lyons, Internationalism, 88–90. 14 See, for example, “Report of the meeting of representatives of Germany, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Austria in Vienna, Austria, March 19th 1905 at the K.K. Landwirtschaftgesellschaft for the consideration of the International Chamber of Agriculture as proposed on the initiative of H.M. the King of Italy,” Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol 1. Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 15 Reprinted in Pantaleoni, “A proposito,” here 38; formal invitation also in Hob- son, International Institute of Agriculture, 47. 16 Agresti, David Lubin, 202. 17 See: Conférence Internationale d’Agriculture, Procès-verbaux, xxv–xxxiii, 1–11, 81–87, 91–99, 103–9, Congresses, conferences and meetings, Box N1, Archives of the International Institute of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organiza- tion Archives. 18 Ibid., 19. 19 Ibid., 25–27, 46. 20 For additional information on the French position see: Lyons, Internationalism, 95; see also: Agresti, David Lubin, 209. 21 For discussion see: Conférence Internationale d’Agriculture, Procès-Verbaux, 157–63, and 177–80, here 162. 22 Ibid., 224–30.

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23 Istruzioni agli Agenti diplomatici, Création de l’IIA et Commission royale, Box A1-6, fi le A4, Archives of the International Institute of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization Archives. 24 Conférence Internationale d’Agriculture, Procès-Verbaux, 22–23. 25 Istituto Internationale di Agricoltura, Comitato Generale, Seduta del 6 aprile 1905, Création de l’IIA et Commission royale, Box A1-6, fi le A4, Archives of the International Institute of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization Archives. 26 Conférence Internationale d’Agriculture, Procès-Verbaux, 124, 143–47. 27 Hobson, International Institute of Agriculture, 49. 28 See: treaty text published in ibid., 328. Article 9 defi nes its functions. 29 Ibid. quotes at 69. For an extended argument why the proposed institute run by governments would not be successful see also: Pantaleoni, “A proposito.” 30 Dr. Raineri, “The defence of Agricultural Against the ‘Trust’,” paper without date (probably translation of Italian version) p. 5, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organi- zation Library. 31 Letter of David Lubin to Henry Cabot Lodge, Washington May 21, 1906, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library in Rome. 32 Agresti, David Lubin, 211, 215. 33 Letter of David Lubin to Doctor Bernat, p. 4, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 34 For list of countries see: Hudson, International Institute of Agriculture, 41–44. 35 This issue was raised at the conference, but not discussed further. See: Con- férence Internationale d’Agriculture, Procès-Verbaux, 70, 173. 36 See: “How the International Institute of Agriculture is Organizing,” Transla- tion of Il Corriere della Sera, Milan, April 1904, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 37 David Lubin, Report and Comments Relating to the First Session of the IIA, June 1908, Papers in relation to the founding of IIA, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Lubin’s Archive, Food and Agriculture Organization Library. 38 Stead contributed articles to the Daily News and the Review of Reviews and to the Associated Press of America. They were collected in his book, The United States of Europe. 39 Ibid., 9 and 12. 40 Angell, Great Illusion. On Angell and his success see also: Miller, “Normal Ang- ell and Rationality.” 41 On the interwar cartels and their ambitions see, for example, Gillingham, Coal, 14–28; Wurm, Internationale Kartelle; Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or Competition?. 42 Spiering and Wintle, Ideas of Europe. 43 See also: Van Meer, “Transatlantic Pursuit.” 44 See: Kohlrausch, Steffen, and Wiederkehr, Expert Cultures; Van Meer, “Engi- neering beyond Politics.” 45 Van Meer, “Transatlantic Pursuit,” 134.

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46 Keynes, Economic Consequences. 47 Markwell, John Maynard Keynes, 90–110. 48 For the different schemes see: Zimmern, League of Nations, 160–73. Regarding Woolf’s impact, see: Wilson, International Theory, 54–55. 49 Woolf, International Government. 50 Ibid., 345–67. 51 Smuts, League of Nations. 52 Ibid., 42–43. 53 Ibid., 71. 54 For wool; cotton; fl ax, hemp and Jute; hides and leather; tobacco; paper; tim- ber; petroleum: coal and coke; cereals; oil seeds; sugar; meat and fats; nitrates; aircraft; chemicals; explosives; non-ferrous metals; mechanical transport; and steel. See: Salter, Allied Shipping Control, 83. 55 Zimmern, League of Nations, 146. 56 Ibid., 154. 57 Ibid., 157–58; see also: Markwell, John Maynard Keynes, 35–36. 58 Salter, Allied Shipping Control. The proposal was later published in Salter, United States of Europe, 3–31. 59 Pedersen “Back to the League of Nations,” 1108. For an overview see: Greaves, League Committees. 60 Salter, Memoirs, 122. 61 Salter, Allied Shipping Control, 248–62; quotes at 251 and 259. 62 Ibid., 259. 63 Ibid., 264. 64 For the Covenant, see: Walters, A History, 40–65. 65 For Drummond and his appointment, see: Barros, Offi ce Without Power, 1–19. 66 From a press release by Drummond on May 29, 1919, cited in Dubin, “Trans- governmental Processes,” 472. See also: Walters, A History, 75–80. 67 Dubin, “Transgovernmental Processes,” 473–78. 68 Salter, Memoirs, 105. On the work of the technical committees see also: Greaves, League Committees. 69 For scientifi c management see: Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy.” 70 For a history of the Economic and Financial Organization, see: Clavin, Secur- ing the World Economy; Clavin and Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations”; for the Health Organization, see: Wendling, International Health Organizations; Borowy, Coming to Terms. 71 For a recent account see: Schipper, Lagendijk, and Anastasiadou, “New Con- nections for an Old Continent.” For contemporary literature see: Greaves, League Committees, 139–58; Le Marec, “L’Organisation”; Hostie, “Transport and Communications”; Hostie, “Communications and Transit.” In addition, a typewritten manuscript by Jean Hostie entitled “The Organization of Transit and Communications” (undated, but fi nished after the Second World War) is available in the United Nations Offi ce of Geneva Library. Although a lawyer, Hostie was well informed as he had been present at many Transit Organiza- tion meetings as an expert and the Belgian member of the Permanent Legal Committee of the Transit Organization. Finally we refer to Mance, Frontiers, 84–96. Mance used a report by J.E. Wheeler, “The League of Nations Transit

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Organisation,” attached to a letter from Wheeler to Lester, February 12, 1942, 9A/41447/39706, Box R-4264, League of Nations Archives. 72 Illustrated Album of the League of Nations, 61. 73 Commission on the International Régime, vi; Hostie, “The Organization of Transit and Communications,” 26–30. 74 Haas was praised by his superiors (fi rst Drummond, then Avenol) for his high technical and political competence. See: Lettre de Monsieur Robert Haas, 33/1746/X, Personal Files, League of Nations Archives. 75 See: Haas, “World Transit.” A published introduction to the results of the Bar- celona conference (probably written by Haas) heralded the implementation of the Allied Shipping model at the conference. See: League of Nations Barcelona Conference, 6. 76 Hostie, “The Organization of Transit and Communications,” 40. 77 Hostie, “Communication and Transit,” 160. See also: Le Marec, L’Organisation, 9–13. 78 Hostie, “The Organization of Transit and Communications,” 38. 79 Ibid., 36. 80 For a clear description, see: Mance, Frontiers, 60–62. 81 See also: ibid., 63; and Greaves, League Committees, 149. 82 Hostie, “The Organization of Transit and Communications,” 44. 83 Le Marec, “L’Organisation,” 60–61. 84 For examples, see: Schipper et al., “New Connections”; see also: Greaves, League Committees, 156. 85 Greaves, League Committees, 143. 86 See: Mance, Frontiers, for an overview of all conventions and their ratifi cation, 69–73. For an in-depth discussion of the work of the railway, electricity, and road subcommittees, see: Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe; Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe, 39–106; Schipper, Driving Europe, 121–58. 87 On the history of passports and border controls in Europe see: Torpey, Inven- tion. 88 For this criticism of universalism, see: Hostie, “Communications and Transit,” 158–64. For the discussion about the European nature of the proposals, see: Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 97–152. 89 Fink, Genoa Conference, 243–45. 90 For a similar conclusion about the League’s political work see: Steiner, Lights that Failed, 349. 91 Schipper, Driving Europe. 92 Kohlrausch and Trischler, Building Europe, 143–53; Herf, Reactionary Modern- ism, 152–88. 93 Renneberg and Walker, “Scientists, Engineers and National Socialism,” 6. 94 Similar to “functionaries” preoccupied with organizational matters, especially the organization of interest representation. See: Kössler and Stadtland, Vom Funktionieren der Funktionäre. See also: Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure. 95 Fest, Speer; Scherner and Streb, “Das Ende eines Mythos?”; Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit. 96 See: Schattenberg, Stalins Ingenieure; Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. 97 Fleury, Le Plan Briand. 98 See: Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 231–66.

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3 From Divided Europe to “Core Europe”

1 See: Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 84–123; Eichengreen, “The Origins and Nature of the Great Slump.” 2 For this history and discussions within the League, see: Dubin, “Towards the Bruce Report”; Hill, Economic and Financial Organization, 110–19; Henig, League of Nations, 164. 3 For the internal debate in the League see: Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 231–66. 4 On Bruce’s role see also: Hudson, Australia; Stirling, Lord Bruce. 5 Cited in Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 235. 6 See: Ruggie, “International Regimes.” 7 On Jean Monnet see: Wells, Jean Monnet; Duchêne, Jean Monnet. 8 On these continuities across the Second World War see also: Mazower, Govern- ing the World. 9 Berthelot, Unity and Diversity; Kostelecký, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 10 Kostelecký, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 16. 11 Skodlarski, Międzynarodowe stosunki, 25–28. 12 Roszkowski, Najnowsza historia Polski, 91; see also: Rudziński, Polityka. 13 Interview cited in Kostelecký, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 20–21. 14 Ibid., 22. See also: Rostow, Division of Europe. 15 On the question of continuity from these temporary emergency organizations to the UNECE see also: Wightman, “East–West Cooperation,” 2. 16 On the work of ECITO see: Memorandum on the European Central Inland Transport Organization, submitted by the Executive Board, April 29, 1947, E/ ECE/7, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. For more detail see chapter 5. 17 Rostow, “The Economic Commission for Europe,” 255. 18 On the particular contribution of the UNECE to social scientifi c work like the preparation of pan-European statistics see: Loveday, “Contribution of the Eco- nomic Commission for Europe.” 19 See also: Wightman, Economic Co-operation, 92–106. 20 On Myrdal’s preferences for social engineering in the domestic Swedish context, which partly informed his thinking about international collaboration, see also: Etzemüller, Die Romantik der Rationalität. 21 Myrdal, “Increasing Interdependence,” 199–200. 22 Wightman,”East–West Cooperation,” 4. 23 Myrdal, “Twenty Years,” 617–18. 24 Hogan, Marshall Plan. 25 On the Polish and Czechoslovak policies on the Marshall Plan see: Janus, Polska i Czechosłowacja; Kaplan, Československo v RVHP, 7–21; Pawlikiewicz, “Destrukcyjne skutki planu Marshalla,” 238. 26 Westad, “New International History.” 27 Barbezat, “The Marshall Plan,” 34. 28 Milward, Reconstruction. 29 Hogan, Marshall Plan; Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days. 30 Eichengreen and Uzan, The Marshall Plan. 31 See: Boel, “The European Productivity Agency.”

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32 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. III, 271. 33 See: Metcalf, Council, 18–26; Stone, Satellites and Commissars, 5–9. 34 For Ernő Gerő see: Markó, Új magyar életrajzi lexicon, II, 995–96; for Hilary Minc see: Nowy Leksykon PWN, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1998, 1079; Jez- ierski and Leszczyńska: Historia Gospodarcza Polski, 395. 35 See, for example, Martin, Minc, and Voznesensky, Rozpravy o plánování. 36 See: Günther and Jajeśniak-Quast, Willkommene Investoren. 37 Lipkin, The Soviet Union and European Integration, 13–25. 38 Jajeśniak-Quast, “The European Coal and Steel Community of the East,” 229. 39 See, for example, Schulze Wessel, “Vom Tabu zum Mythos?” 40 Kaser, “Voznesensky,” 830. 41 Lynch, A History of the French Economy. 42 Letter of Frejka to Slánský, February 21, 1948, Volume 43–44, Folder 306, Czechoslovak Communist Party–Central Committee, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 43 Proposal for a resolution on “economic cooperation,” December 31, 1948, Vol- ume 43–44, Folder 306, Czechoslovak Communist Party-Central Committee, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 44 Results of the consultation about the issues related to sending of the Czecho- slovak delegate to the Bureau, held at Dolanský’s offi ce, January 22, 1949, Vol- ume 43–44, Folder 306, Czechoslovak Communist Party-Central Committee, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 45 Różański, Spojrzenie na RWPG, 12. 46 Metcalf, Council, 33–34. 47 The German translation, entitled “Kommuniqué vom Januar 1949 über die Errichtung des Rates für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe,” is published in Uscha- kow, Der Rat, 86. This communication was published in Russian in Pravda on January 25, 1949 and translated into all languages of countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. 48 Kaser, Comecon, 51. 49 For more on the year 1956 in East-Central Europe as well for the de-Staliniza- tion process, see: Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956; Applebaum, Iron Curtain. 50 Brine, Comecon, xii. 51 Kaser, Comecon, 25. 52 See: Janáč, European Coasts, 131–80; Fava, “Between American Fordism”; Hris- tov, Communist Nuclear Era. 53 Griffi ths, “ ‘An Act of Creative Leadership,’ ” 235–56. 54 On this competition see: Westad, Global Cold War. 55 Wightman, “East–West Cooperation,” 2. 56 Ibid., 6. 57 Siotis, ECE, 49–53. 58 On the role of the UNECE alongside the International Labour Offi ce in fostering “circulations” between East and West during the Cold War see also: Kott, “Par-delà la guerre froide,” 143–54. 59 See: Piétri, “Jean Monnet,” 23–30. 60 On the American New Deal policy see, for example, Katznelson, Fear Itself. 61 Long and Wilson, Thinkers. 62 Levi, Il pensiero federalista, 140.

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63 Berghahn, America; Saunders, Cultural Cold War. 64 Lipgens and Loth, Documents. 65 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, 191–252. 66 As in Milward, European Rescue, 318–44. 67 On the Commission and its relationship with the member states see: Ludlow, European Community. 68 Bajon, Europapolitik. 69 From a sociological historical perspective see: Vauchez, L’Union par le droît. 70 The emerging historical literature focuses more on the contestation of legal concepts by different actors than the social cohesion of legal networks. See, for example, Davies and Rasmussen, “Towards a New History,” 305–18. 71 For the particularly important German case see: Davies, Resisting the European Court. 72 For two different views on the process of constitutionalizing see: Weiler, Con- stitution; Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy. 73 For the infl uence of experts and expertise through societal actors and networks see: several chapters in Kaiser and Meyer, Societal Actors; Kaiser, Leucht, and Gehler, Transnational Networks.

4 Europe of the Standard Gauge

1 See: Chamberlain, Regime, 172. 2 See: Nicolson, Congress of Vienna, 216–17. 3 See: Gamst, “Introduction,” 10. 4 For this story see: von Gerstner, Early American Railroads, 9–15. 5 For early Russian railway development and the role of von Gerstner see: Haywood, Beginnings. See also: von Gerstner, First Russian Railroad. 6 See: Riber, “Rise of Engineers in Russia,” 545, 555–57. 7 De Block, “Designing the Nation.” The railway promoters also aimed to enhance Belgium’s economic position in Europe, in particular in competition with the Dutch. 8 List, Über ein sächsisches Eisenbahn-System. See also: Henderson, Friedrich List, 124–42. 9 Haywood, Beginnings, 93. 10 Von Gerstner, First Russian Railroad, 22–23. 11 Gamst, “Introduction,” 20. 12 The results of his study were published in von Gerstner, Die innere Communi- cation der Vereinigten Staaten. Von Gerstner never returned to Europe. His poor health caused his death on April 12, 1840. 13 Quoted in Gamst, “Introduction,” 27–28. 14 Quoted in Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 216. 15 See: ibid., 215–26. 16 For this notion see: Kohlrausch and Trischler, Building Europe, 16. 17 For this history of the gauge see: Puffert, Tracks Across Continents, 45–83. 18 Gamst, “Introduction,” 19. 19 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, xvii. 20 Menéndez, “Características de la red ferroviária,” 185–90. 21 Pereira, “Caminhos-de-Ferro.”

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22 See: Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 202–8. 23 Ibid., 197. 24 For a European history of the role of national governments in various infrastructures including railways, see: Milward, Private and Public Enterprise, 59–75. See also: Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 69–97. 25 For the origins of the Verein and the confl ict with the Prussian state see: Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 169–73. See also: Roth, Das Jahrhundert der Eisenbahn, 89–107. For a general discussion of relations between railways and the state in Prussia see: Brophy, Capitalism, Politics and Railroads. For the history of the Verein this section draws on Schot, Buiter, and Anastasiadou, “Dynamics.” 26 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 23–39. 27 Two books provide in-depth information on all rules, regulations and standards which are considered the core of the work of the Verein: Festschrift über die Thätigkeit and Vereinshandbuch. 28 See, for example, the report by Weissenbruch, “Note sur la réunion.” 29 On railway engineers, see: Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 56–68. 30 Rückblick auf die Thätigkeit, 16. 31 Ibid., 15. 32 Kaessbohrer, “Der Verein,” 27–28. 33 See: Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 411–12 and 414. See also: Philippe, “Notice sur l’union”; Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband. 34 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 24. 35 Ibid., 4–5. 36 Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 164–65; Vereinshandbuch. 37 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 4–5, 27. See also: “Das deutsche Eisenbahn-Netz und das Gebiet des Vereins der deutschen Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen.” Zeitung des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen 1, no. 1 (1861): 5–6. 38 “Die General-Versammlung des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen, Cöln, 26–28 August 1861.” Zeitung des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen 1, no. 20 (1861): 257–60, here 259. 39 Ibid. 40 “Das deutsche Eisenbahn-Netz.” 41 “Eisenbahnen und der kosmopolitische Geist der Zeit.” Zeitung des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen 1, no. 34 (1861): 401–3. 42 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 28–30. The British railways had developed their own railway regime. See: Bagwell, Railway Clearing House. 43 Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 189–90. 44 Mühl and Klein, 125 Jahre; Behrend, History of Wagons-Lits. 45 Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels, 83–122. 46 Ville, Transport, 114–71; see also: Mitchell, Great Train Race, 142–44. 47 Schram, Railways, 34–35. 48 See: Schueler, Materialising Identity. 49 For these discussions see: Mitchell, Great Train Race, 106–8. 50 Ribeill, “Aux origines de l’utopie,” 45. 51 Tissot, “Les modèles ferroviares nationaux.” 52 Tissot, “Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire,” 294. 53 Mitchell, Great Train Race, 128 and 120–41.

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54 Ibid., 120–41. For the failed attempts see also: Henrich-Franke, Gescheiterte Integration im Vergleich, 186–218. 55 Mitchell, Great Train Race, 123. 56 Ibid., 85–90. 57 Tissot, “Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire”; Mitchell, Great Train Race, 108–109. 58 Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer en France, 499, 533. 59 Ribeill, “Aux origins de l’utopie,” 48. The updating work was delegated to a special committee known as the Comité International des Transports par Chemins de fer (CIT) run by railway experts. The CIT experts prepared supplements to the Berne Convention in 1898 and 1906, and a new convention for passenger transport in 1911 which corresponded to the C.I.M. but was only implemented during the interwar years. Its full title was Convention Internationale concernant des Voyageurs et des Bagages par Chemins de fer. 60 Tissot, “Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire,” 31. 61 Frauenlob, Technische Einheit im Eisenbahnwesen. See also: Ribeill, “L’Unité technique des chemins de fer en marche.” 62 Ribeill, “Aux origins de l’utopie,” 48–49. See also: L.W., “Geschäftsführende Verwaltung,” 1251. 63 Ribeill, “Aux origins de l’utopie,” 50–51; Ribeill, “L’Unité technique.” 64 See: Wedgewood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 14; Festschrift über die Thätigkeit, 211–12; Vereinshandbuch, 27. 65 Lochner, “Über den Einfl uss der Vereinsthätigkeit,” 544. 66 See: Dubois, “Note sur l’histoire.” On the relationship with the Verein see: especially 576–77. 67 On war and railways see: Högselius, Kaijser, and Van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition, chapter 6. 68 Sarolea, Bagdad Railway, 19, 31. 69 Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 33–98.

5 Tensions in Railway Europe

1 Mance, “The Infl uence of Communications.” 2 Ibid., 79. 3 Ibid., 88. 4 See: League of Nations, Restoration of the Means of Communication, 5–10. 5 See: his report for the League of Nations, published in ibid., 5–26. 6 For these problems see ibid.; see also: Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 68–79. 7 These are abbreviations of the Italian names Regolamento Internationale dei Veicoli and delle Carrozze. 8 Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 18–20. 9 Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband, 9. In 1936 the RIV Union comprised 103 railway administrations from twenty-one countries, representing the total of normal gauge networks in continental Europe. On its history see: “Activi- tés des Principaux Organismes Internationaux de Chemins de Fer autres que l’UIC.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 12, no. 6 (1936): 205–6.

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10 See: Shotwell, “The Portorose Conference” and League of Nations, Restoration of Means of Communication, 19–25. 11 League of Nations, Restoration of Means of Communication, 20. 12 Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 79. 13 Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband, 6. 14 The best account is Fink, Genoa Conference. 15 Ibid., 243–45; Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband, 11–15. 16 Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband, 23. 17 “Historique de la Constitution de l’UIC.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 1, no. 1 (1924): 38–39. 18 Ibid., 5–10. 19 On this relationship see: Armand, Propos Ferroviaires, 41–44. 20 On this episode and for interwar railway development and collaborations see: Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, in particular 97–152. 21 Hantos, L’Europe Centrale, 157–68. 22 See: the report of the meeting Zasedání středoevropské dopravní konference ve Vídni ve dnech 2. až 5. října 1926, October 10, 1926, Box 509, Ministry of Railways, National Archives of the Czech Republic; see also: “Réunion de la conférence des communications et du traffi c en Europe centrale, à Vienne, du 2 au 5 Octobre 1926.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 2, no. 11/12 (1926): 444. 23 Hantos, L’Europe Centrale, 168, 170–71. 24 Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 143–44. 25 Resolution der “Mitteleuropäischen Verkehrtagung,” Box 509, Ministry of Railways, National Archives of the Czech Republic; see also: Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 144. Based on League of Nations archival sources she contends that the meeting led to the creation of three permanent committees, one on railways with its seat in Prague. 26 Hantos, L’Europe Centrale, 171. 27 For a historiographical summary of this debate and how it framed waterway policies and developments in East-Central Europe, see: Janáč, European Coasts, 28–35. 28 Naumann, Central Europe, 1–5. 29 Ibid., 31. 30 “L’Union des Administrations de Chemins de Fer de L’Europe Centrale: Verein Mitteleuropaïscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen.” Bulletin de l’Union Inter- nationale des Chemins de Fer 9 (1933): 376–80. 31 “Demande d’admission dans l’Union du ‘Premier Groupement Régional des Chemins de fer Européens Membres de l’U.I.C.’ (G.R.E.M.).” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 6, no. 11/12 (1930): 406, 545–47. 32 The results were published in Mance, Frontiers. This was the fi nal volume of a series of various sector studies, including telecommunications, air, sea, river, rail, and road. The railway study was published as Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport. Another related wartime study was published as League of Nations, Transport Problems. 33 Mance, Frontiers, 136–39. 34 ECITO and Hondelink published several overlapping reports on the work of ECITO. See, for example, Hondelink, “The Organisation and Functions of

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ECITO.” This is the text of a lecture given by Hondelink to staff of ECITO on January 27, 1947, which is also included in the ECITO journal, The Transport Situation in Europe, no. 17 (February 1947), 3–8—a journal that contained reports and news. Finally, see also: Memorandum on the European Central Inland Transport Organization, submitted by the Executive Board, Economic and Social Council, April 29, 1947, E/ECE/7, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. The ECITO agreement itself was published in American Journal of International Law 40, no. 1 (1946), Supplement: Offi cial Documents, 31–45. 35 For a brief biography of Hondelink, see the compilation of some of his letters and papers in Hondelink, Switches & Crossings; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, art. 71296. 36 Hondelink, “Transport Problems.” 37 Ibid., 512. 38 Twenty collections of reports were published between October 1945 and May 1947. The railway fi gures mentioned here are published in The Transport Situa- tion in Europe no. 20, May 1947, 9. 39 The Transport Situation in Europe, no. 6, March 1946, 3. 40 The Transport Situation in Europe no. 17, February 1947, 9. 41 Ibid., 9–15. 42 On November 18, 1946, ECITO published a paper entitled “The Restitution of Railway Rolling Stock” that included the principal calculation techniques, see: The Transport Situation in Europe no. 20, May 1947, 34–35. For a calculation that uses some of these techniques, see: Main Activities of Inland Transport Committee in connection with Railways, p. 3, Committee on Connections with Railways, G.IX 10/1/1/27, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 43 Report on the Fifth Session of the Council of ECITO, held in Paris on Thurs- day, August 29 and Friday, August 30, 1946, p. 1, fi le ECITO Council sessions, G.IX 2/1. United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 44 Protokół z konferencji odbytej w dniu 30.2.1946 r. w gmachu Ministerstwa Komunikacji, ul. Chałubińskiego 4, w sprawie zagadnień transportu międzynarodowego, Ministerstwo Komunikacji w Warszawie, pp. 3–6, Unit 18, Ministry of Communication (315), Archives of Modern Records Warsaw. 45 Spis taboru kolejowego, August 5, 1946, pp. 1 and 101, Unit 18, Ministry of Communication (315), Archives of Modern Records Warsaw. 46 Spis taboru kolejowego, August 5, 1946, p. 120, Unit 18, Ministry of Commu- nication (315), Archives of Modern Records Warsaw. 47 R. Ceceniowski, Notatka w sprawie wymiany taboru kolejowego, Spis taboru kolejowego, August 5, 1946, pp. 15–16, Unit 18, Ministry of Communication (315), Archives of Modern Records Warsaw. 48 Statement by Mr. Glass, Delegate of the Ministry of Communication, Warsaw. Appendix 1 to Minutes of ECITO Fourteen and the last Meeting held at 19, Avenue Kleber, Paris, on the 22nd March 1947, p. 117, Unit 9, Ministry of Communication (315), Archives of Modern Records Warsaw. 49 Różański, Śladem wspomnień, 458. For the repainting see: 223. 50 Ibid., 490. 51 “A Summary of the Principal Accomplishments of the European Central Transport Organisation,” The Transport Situation in Europe no. 20, May 1947, 3–41, here 9, 12; See also: “Exchange of Rolling-stock between the Countries

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and Zones of Continental Europe,” The Transport Situation in Europe no. 4, 1946, 5–10. 52 “The Gradual Return to the Pre-War Arrangements for the Exchange of Goods Rolling Stock,” The Transport Situation in Europe no. 18, 1947, 14–16, here 14. 53 Vyrozumění cizích železničních správ o výměně transitujících vlaků, August 1946, Box 340, Ministry of Transport 1, National Archives of the Czech Repub- lic; Železniční konference v Bělehradě v prosinci 1946, Box 6, Department for International Organizations 1945–55, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 54 Informování ZAMINI o vzniku a účelu CEWEC za účelem vysvětlení věci sovětskému velvyslanectví, May 8, 1947, Box 340, Ministry of Transport 1, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 55 The Commission only gained full membership and became operational at its second meeting. See: Zápis ze zasedání komise konané 27 až 30. května 1947 na ministerstvu dopravy, May 8, 1947, Box 340, Ministry of Transport 1, National Archives of the Czech Republic. See also: “The Wagon Exchange Commission for Central Europe,” The Transport Situation in Europe no. 19, April 1947, 59. 56 Letter dated June 17, 1947, with code EX/702 annexed to minutes to the earlier second meeting of the Wagon Commission, in Zápis ze zasedání komise konané 27 až 30. května 1947 na ministerstvu dopravy, May 8, 1947, Box 340, Ministry of Transport 1, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 57 Cousin, “Études,” 228. 58 The Transport Situation in Europe no. 20, May 1947, 49. 59 Transport Expert Meeting, Preparatory Memorandum, May 20, 1947, E/ECE/ TR/3, Annex III and IV, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 60 See: Meeting of Transport Experts, 27 May 1947, Summary Record of the Plenary Meetings, G.IX 5.1.4. United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. The conference consisted of fourteen sessions. Various studies and the rationale of the meeting are briefl y summarized in Transport Expert Meeting, Preparatory Memorandum, May 20, 1947, E/ECE/TR/3, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 61 The following information and numbers are derived from a systematic comparison of postwar and interwar meetings based on the minutes of these meetings. 62 David Wightman said that the ITC was an empire in itself. See: his Economic Co-operation, 167. See also: Transport Export Meeting, Preparatory Memo- randum, May 20, 1947, E/ECE/TR-3, p. 9, Library of United Nations Offi ce Geneva. 63 See: Inland Transport Committee, Summary Record of First Meeting, Volume E/ECE/Trans/S.R.1/1–6, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 64 Inland Transport Committee, Summary Record of First Meeting, E/ECE/ Trans/S.R.1/1, pp. 6–7, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 65 Inland Transport Committee, Summary Record of Second Meeting, E/ECE/ Trans/SR.2/1–8, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 66 Inland Transport Committee, Third session, October 25–29, 1948, E/ECE/ Trans/SR.3./1–8, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 67 Hitchcock, France Restored, 72–98.

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68 Inland Transport Committee, Fifth session, December 19, 1949, pp. 4–5, Records of Meetings, G.IX/9/2/3/15, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 69 Summary of the proceedings of the special session of the sub-committee held at Geneva from October 17–19, 1947, G.IX/10/1/2/7, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 70 Ibid., p. 15. 71 Ibid., p. 5. 72 See: note by Mr. Lemaire, Inland Transport Committee Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, “Main activities in connexion with railways,” pp. 6–7, G.IX 10/1/1/27, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. The agreement with the ITC was operational as of January 1951. 73 Úmluva o vzájemném používání železničních vozů mezi železnicemi výcho- doevropských států, November 24,1947, Box 18, Department for International Organizations 1945–55, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 74 This was explicitly argued in a report of the Czechoslovak transport ministry, Právní podklad pro mezinárodní dopravu po železnicích, July 4 1945, Box 16, Department for International Organizations 1945–55, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 75 Letter of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Transport to Yugoslavian Ministry of Transport, January 20, 1948, Box 18, Department for International Organiza- tions 1945–55, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 76 Zpráva o průběhu konference o t.zv. bělehradských úmluvách o přepravě osob, cestovních zavazadel a zboží, Box 18, Department for International Organizations 1945–55, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At fi rst agreements were known as Settlement procedures applied to the Agree- ment on Direct International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Rail (MPS) and Agreement on Direct International Goods Transport by Rail (MGS). The abbreviations refer to original Russian names. The agreements were signed by the railways of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. At subsequent meetings the railways amended and renamed them Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS) and Agreement on International Passenger Trans- port by Rail (SMPS). In 1953 China, North Korea, and Mongolia signed up to the agreements, and in 1955 North Vietnam followed. For these rules and a brief history see: Kolloch, Abkommen. 77 For a discussion of this concept see: Janáč, European Coasts, 133–45. See also: Apor, Apor, and Rees, Sovietization, 2008. 78 For the notion of empire by coercion (as opposed to empire by invitation, the term used by Geir Lundestad for the creation of U.S.-dominated Western organizations) see: Bohri, “Empire by Coercion.” 79 See: Kolloch, Abkommen. The literal translation of PPV from Russian is Regu- lations of the Use of Wagons in International Transport of Passengers and Goods. Sometimes PPW is also used interchangeably. 80 Porada expertů ve Varšavě o zvýšení nájemného za vagony; October 18, 1957 and July 26, 1957, Box 125, International Department, Department of Inter- national Organizations 1955–65, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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81 Zápis ze zasedání conference ministrů v Pekinu, July 26, 1957, Box 124, Inter- national Department, Department of International Organizations 1955–65, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 82 Konference ministrů řídících železniční dopravu v soc. zemích konaná v Praze, August 21, 1958, Box 125, International Department, Department of International Organizations 1955–65, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 83 See: Rees, “The Sovietization of Eastern Europe,” 22–23. This change in policy and what it meant for consumption is also discussed in Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels, 197–234. For the belief in the Soviet promise see also: Spufford, Red Plenty. 84 Niederschrift über die 38. Tagung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Paris, am 6. und 7. Dezember 1954, 11 and annex II, Box DM 3609, Abteilung DDR, Federal Archives. 85 Konference ministrů řídících železniční dopravu v Sofi i, zpráva, August 10, 1956, Box 12, International Department, Department of International Organi- zations 1955–65, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sometimes the German abbreviation OSShD is used. 86 Zusammenarbeit der OSShD mit anderen internationalen Organisationen, die sich mit den Fragen Eisenbahnverkehrs beschäftigen, February 6, 1957, p. 8, Box 71, Ministry of Transport 2, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 87 Response letter signed by Kalina, March 11, 1957, Box 71, Ministry of Trans- port 2, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 88 Spolupráce OSŽ s mezinárodními dopravními organizacemi, February 22, 1957, Box 124, International Department, Department of International Orga- nizations 1955–65, Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also: Holdevici, “Gedanken über die Vereinheitlichung der Abkommen,” 9–15. 89 When Armand became the UIC Chairman, its journal published a brief biography that advertised Armand’s role in the establishment of the wagon pool. See: Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 22, no. 12 (1951): 533–34. For more information on Armand, see: Du Cros, Louis Armand and Josette Buzaré, Louis Armand. 90 Armand, Propos Ferroviaries, 41–46; 63–67. 91 Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset, 1–24, and 114–28. See also: Hilberg, “German Railroads/Jewish Souls.” 92 Armand, Propos Ferroviaries, 45. 93 Quoted in Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset, 125. 94 Niederschrift über die 38. Tagung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Paris, am 6. und 7. Dezember 1954, p 11 and annex II, Box DM 3609, Abteilung DDR, Federal Archives. 95 Internationaler Eisenbahnverband, Die Lage der Europäischen Eisenbahnen. Schwie- rigkeiten, Ursachen, Gesundungsmöglichkeiten, Februar 1951, Ministerium für Verkehrswesen 1945–1960, Box DM1/2713, Abteilung DDR, Federal Archives. 96 Armand, Propos Ferroviaires, 206–7. 97 For the early history of the wagon pool, see: documents Railways Exchange of Wagons, Constitution of Pools, G.IX 10/2/4. United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. See also: Friedrich, “Güterwagenprobleme in europäischer Sicht,” 142–43.

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98 Friedrich, “Die Europäische Güterwagengemeinschaft,” 606. See also: “Convention EUROP.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 24, no. 4 (1953): 125–27, here 126. 99 Friedrich, “Güterwagenprobleme in europäischer Sicht,” 146; see also: Martin, “Co-operation between French and German Railways.” 100 Friedrich, “Die Europäische Güterwagengemeinschaft,” 606. 101 Ibid., 610. 102 “Convention EUROP,” 125. 103 “La mise en route du régime ‘EUROP’.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 24, no. 11 (1953): 256. 104 “Convention EUROP.” 105 Mr. Lemaire, Inland Transport Committee Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe. Main activities in connexion with railways, pp. 4–5, G.IX 10/1/1/27, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives, and Den Hollander, “Modernisierung und Standardisierung,” 52. 106 Friedrich, “Die Europäische Güterwagengemeinschaft,” 611. 107 “Rapports des Offi ces et des Bureaux de l’UIC: Offi ce de Recherches et d’Essais (ORE).” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 23, no. 11 (1952): 243–46. 108 Henrich-Franke, “Europäische Verkehrsintegration,” 154–55. 109 On the history of Eurofi ma see: Heinrich-Franke, “Die Eurofi ma.” 110 Van der Vleuten, “Feeding the Peoples of Europe.” 111 Price, “Ten Years of Trans Europe Express.” 112 Schipper, Driving Europe, 232–40. 113 Protokol o zasedání pracovní skupiny pro koordinaci dopravních otázek RVHP; Box 1285, Prime Minister’s Offi ce-Classifi ed 1945–1959, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 114 This abbreviation refers to the Russian name that can be translated as Common Freight Wagon Fleet. 115 Abkommen über die Schaffung und gemeinsame Nutzung des Gemein- samen Güterwagenparkes, Prag, 1963, Anlage 3 zum Protokoll der zweiten Tagung der Serktion II für Eisenbahntransport, DM1/11643, Ministerium für Verkehrswesen 1945–1960, Abteilung DDR, Federal Archives. 116 Kábrt, Společný park, 11. 117 Protocol of 38th session of the Standing Committee for Transport, TP/38/70, Moscow 1970, Box 10, Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade, National Archives of the Czech Republic. In this session the CMEA Standing Committee for Transport wanted to interfere to settle tensions within the OPW Council. 118 Meunier, On the Fast Track, 30. 119 For an early history see: ibid. 120 “Historique de la Constitution de l’UIC.” Bulletin de l’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 1, no. 1 (1924): 38–39, here 24. 121 Lewin and Véron, UIC, 65–75. 122 Ibid., 113–17, 119–21.

6 Cannons & Cartels

1 Stenglein, Krupp, 36. 2 See also: Schwarz, Der Schlüssel zur modernen Welt, 71.

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3 On Alfred Krupp’s trip see: Schumacher, Auslandsreisen deutscher Unternehmer, 132, 165. 4 Ballot, L’introduction du machinisme, 507. 5 Nowadays any refi ned iron with a carbon content of between 0.2 and 2.1 percent, depending on the grade, is called steel. On the evolution of the technical process of steel production see: Wengenroth, Enterprise and Technology. 6 See: Fremdling, Technologischer Wandel, 177. 7 Halleux, Cockerill. 8 Nish, Iwakura Mission, 103–5. 9 Beck, “Die Einführung,” 120. 10 Fremdling, Technologischer Wandel, 197; Schumacher, Auslandsreisen deutscher Unternehmer, 229. 11 See: Kleinschmidt, Technik und Wirtschaft, 17. 12 On U.S. steel industry in this period see: Misa, A Nation of Steel. 13 Taylor, Principles. 14 Kanigel, One Best Way. 15 Hexner, International Steel Cartel, 15. 16 Fremdling, Technologischer Wandel, 363. 17 Fremdling, “Regionale Interdependenzen.” 18 Leboutte, Vie et mort, 191. 19 Maier, Zilt, and Rasch, “150 Jahre Stahlinstitut VDEh,” 10. 20 Quoted in Barbezat, “A Price for Every Product,” 68. 21 Hexner, International Steel Cartel, 15. 22 See: several chapters in Maier, Zilt, and Rasch, “150 Jahre Stahlinstitut VDEh.” 23 For a long-term perspective Schröter, “Kartellierung und Dekartellierung.” On the late nineteenth century see: Marin, “Zollverein, cartels ou coalitions?” 24 Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or Competition? 29. 25 Harms, Volkswirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft, 250–1. 26 See also: Ertel, Internationale Kartelle. 27 On dumping by cartels in export markets see also: Liefmann, “Internationale Kartelle,” 287. 28 Liefmann, Die Unternehmerverbände, 139; Blaich, Kartell- und Monopolkritik, 54. 29 On the origins and operation of the International Rail Makers’ Association see: in greater detail Wengenroth, Enterprise and Technology, 143–65. 30 Liefmann, “Internationale Kartelle,” 267. 31 Salter, Recovery, 207. 32 Michels, “Die internationalen Trusts und Kartelle,” 820. 33 For the history of the company see: Trausch, ARBED. 34 On Emile Mayrisch’s business concerns see: Barthel, “Emile Mayrisch.” On French policy see: Bariéty, “France and the Politics of Steel.” 35 On the Mayrisch Committee see: in greater detail Müller, Europäische Gesell- schaftsbeziehungen; Sonnabend, Pierre Viénot. 36 See: Nocken, “International Cartels and Foreign Policy.” 37 Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action, 182–87; Hexner, International Steel Cartel, 72–79. 38 Hexner, International Steel Cartel, 278. 39 On this issue see: Popkiewicz and Ryszka, Przemysł ciężki Górnego Śląska; Shannon, “Etatismus und Wirtschaftsnationalismus.”

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40 Kiersch, Internationale Eisen- und Stahlkartelle, 40–44. 41 Wurm, “Politik und Wirtschaft,” 3–4. 42 See also: Schmidt, England in der Krise, 261–75. 43 Quoted in Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action, 62. 44 See: Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace, 228–29. 45 For the context of the World Economic Conference see: Schirmann, Crise; Schulz, Deutschland; Bussière, La France. 46 Economic Committee, Seventh Meeting held in Geneva on Thursday, December 3, 1925, at 11 a.m., E/17th Session/P.V. 7 (1), League of Nations Archives. 47 Walters, A History, chap. 36; Hill, Economic and Financial Organization, 47–52. 48 Economic Committee, Seventh Meeting held in Geneva on Thursday, Decem- ber 3, 1925, at 11 a.m., E/17th Session/P.V. 7 (1), League of Nations Archives. 49 Ernst Trendelenburg to Pietro Stoppani, Generalsekretariat des Völkerbundes, July 23, 1926; E. Respondek (Offi ce Clemens Lammers) to P. Denis, League of Nations Secretariat, August 21, 1926, Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 463, League of Nations Archives. 50 Lammers, Review of Legislation, 6. 51 Bussière, “L’Organisation économique de la SDN,” 304. 52 Resolution, International Economic Conference, Industrial Agreements, May 19, 1927, S.C.E./II/C.R./2, Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 53 International Economic Conference, Industry Committee, Drafting Committee on Industrial Ententes, Minutes of the First Meeting held at Geneva on May 14, 1927 at 10 a.m., Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 54 Resolution, International Economic Conference, Industrial Agreements, May 19, 1927, S.C.E./II/C.R./2, Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 55 Respondek, Verlauf, 92. 56 Proposition sur l’organisation du Contrôle des Cartels, Mme. E. Freundlich et Y.K. Keto au nom de l’Alliance Coopérative internationale, May 11, 1927, Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 57 International Economic Conference, Industry Committee, Drafting Committee on Industrial Ententes, Minutes of the First Meeting held at Geneva on May 14, 1927 at 10 a.m., Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 58 International Economic Conference, Committee II – Industry, Proposal by M. Jouhaux on Industrial Combines, May 14, 1927, Section 10, 53332, 53332, Box R 465, League of Nations Archives. 59 Respondek, Verlauf, 192. 60 Economic Committee, Twenty-sixth Session, Minutes of the Ninth Meeting, held at Geneva on Saturday, October 27, 1928 at 10 a.m., E/26th Session/P.V. 9 (1), League of Nations Archives. 61 Economic Committee, 27th Session, Minutes of the Seventh Meeting, held Friday, January 18, 1929, at 10.30 a.m., E/27th Session/P.V. 7 (1), League of Nations Archives. 62 On the American debate after the start of the world economic crisis and in the early phase of the New Deal in the 1930s see also: Brinkley, End of Reform.

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63 Préparation d’un mémorandum par trois experts juristes, Draft, July 9, 1929, Section 10, 9989, 4274, Box R 2830, League of Nations Archives. 64 Economic Committee, Summary of the discussions of the Industrial Experts at their fi rst meeting (January 30–31, 1930) and outline of a Programme of Work, E/602, League of Nations Archives. 65 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, Review of the Legal Aspects of Industrial Agreements. 66 E. Respondek to Alfred Husslein, League of Nations Secretariat, August 23, 1930, Section 10, 20773, 4275, Box R 2830, League of Nations Archives. 67 Internationale Industrie-Kartelle, Eine wirtschaftspolitische Studie. 68 League of Nations, Economic Relations Section, Outline for a general report by the experts on economic problems arising in connection with international industrial agreements, May 7, 1931, Section 10, 24459, 4275, Box R 2830, League of Nations Archives. 69 By way of introduction see: Fleury, “Une evaluation des travaux.” 70 Société des Nations, Rapport et projet de résolutions présentés par la deux- ième Commission à l’Assemblée, Geneva, September 23, 1931, 4–5, Section 10, 31254, 4275, Box R 2830, League of Nations Archives. 71 Lammers and Scholz, “Cartel Question,” 148. 72 On the British debate see also: Mercer, Constructing a Competitive Order. 73 Leucht, “Transatlantic Policy Networks”; Leucht, Transatlantic Policy Networks. 74 Kovacic and Shapiro, “Antitrust Policy.” 75 For the broader argument about the (alleged) Americanization of West German industry see: Berghahn, Americanization. For an international history of the (failed) deconcentration of the West German steel industry see: Warner, Steel and Sovereignty. 76 Dichgans, Montanunion, 72. 77 Reuter, La Communauté Européenne, 211, 269–70. See also: Lister, Europe’s Coal and Steel Community, 177. 78 Barthel, “De l’Entente.” 79 Some Belgian producers accounting for 25 percent of Belgian steel production did not participate in the export cartel, however. See: ibid., 188–89. 80 Ibid., 199–200. 81 Gillingham, Coal, 279–80. 82 Swann, Competition and Industrial Policy, 119–29. 83 Witschke, Gefahr für den Wettbewerb? 84 European Coal and Steel Community, High Authority, Sixth General Report, Vol. II, 98–99. 85 Lister, Europe’s Coal and Steel Community, 171. 86 Barthel, “European Steel Cartel,” 350. 87 Spierenburg and Poidevin, History, 91. See also: Loth, “Plan Schuman.” 88 Witschke, Gefahr für den Wettbewerb?, 334–35. 89 Bührer, Ruhrstahl und Europa. 90 Bösch, Die Adenauer-CDU, 195–235. 91 See also: Carbonell, Des hommes à l’origine de l’Europe. 92 For the German case see, in greater detail, Bühlbäcker, Europa im Aufbruch. 93 Seidel, Process, 38. 94 Ibid., 39.

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95 Kiefer, Tony Rollman [fi lm about Rollman drawing upon Rollman’s private film material]; “Les origines du Plan Schuman. Le témoignage de Tony Rollman.” 96 See also: Brandt, “Der Stahleuropäer Tony Rollman.” 97 UNECE, European Steel Trends. 98 Report on the trip to Paris of Philippe de Selliers and myself, June 19, 1950, ARR 14/1360, Box 81, Folder II2/8, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 99 Schuman Authority. Proposed action on the Schuman Plan, no date, ARR 14/1360, Box 67, Folder 1/3/3, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 100 Ibid. 101 Max Kohnstamm to Jean Monnet, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe Lausanne, AMH 6/4/14, cited in Seidel, Process, 59. 102 Berghahn, “Montanunion und Wettbewerb,” 251. 103 Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, 135–38; Wilkens, “Verständigung von Wirtschaft zu Wirtschaft.” 104 Gillingham, Coal, 292. 105 Dichgans, Montanunion, 139. 106 Ibid., 115. 107 For Conrot’s attitude to the Schuman Plan and his fear of excessive planning see: Barthel, “Sturm im Wasserglas.” 108 Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 236. 109 Gillingham, Industry and Politics, 148. On the rivalry among the coal and steel companies and their diverse relationships with the regime see also: Mollin, Montankonzerne. 110 Volkmann, Luxemburg, 105. 111 Gillingham, Industry and Politics, 157. 112 Ibid., 159. 113 See: the contributions to Patel and Schweitzer, Historical Foundations. 114 As argued in long-term perspective in Gerber, Law and Competition.

7 Technology Cooperation in Steel Europe

1 Rollman, Note on Belgian–Czech steel deal. Visit to Bâle, Brussels, and Luxembourg from April 3rd to 8th, G.X 18/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 2 Steel transaction between Czechoslovakia and Belgium, Tony Rollman to Gunnar Myrdal, November 18, 1949, G.X 18/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 3 For the following biographical information see the account (with much information about the family history) of the life of Rudinger’s son, who became a well-known peptide scientist, in Jones, “Life and Work of Josef Rudinger,” and several references to Rudinger in the autobiography of one of his friends, an expert on Czechoslovak history and politics, Skilling, Education. 4 Pelikán et al., “Economics and System Change,” 215–17. 5 Steel transaction between Czechoslovakia and Belgium, Tony Rollman to Gunnar Myrdal, November 18, 1949, G.X 18/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 6 They had just met again at the fi fth session of the UNECE Steel Committee on September 26–28, 1949, E/ECE/Steel/37, October 4, 1949, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library.

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7 Rudinger to Rollman, December 27, 1949, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 8 Communication téléphonique de la Banque de la Société Générale de Belgique, Banque Nationale de Belgique, Département bancaire, internal note, Novem- ber 21, 1949, Discount HBB, Record A 578, File no. 07.04.04.00, Archives of the National Bank of Belgium. 9 Rudinger to Rollman, December 27, 1949, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 10 Zápis ze schůze presidia Hosporářské rady KSČ, konané dne 28.12.1949, Hospodářská rada ÚV KSČ 1948–1951, vol. 11, no. 138, National Archives of the Czech Republic. 11 Rudinger to Rollman, December 27, 1949, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 12 Rostow to Frejka, February 7, 1950, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 13 Rostow to Reinhardt (Crédit Suisse), February 7, 1950, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 14 Rostow to Rollman, February 11, 1950, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 15 Rostow to Van Zeeland (BIS), February 16, 1950; Rostow to Frejka, February 16, 1950, GX 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives; Berntsen, internal note, February 15, 1950, Proposals for Financing Belgian Steel Deliver- ies to Czechoslovakia, February 1950–June 1950, 2/148, Bank for International Settlements Archive. 16 Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation, 33. 17 Ibid., 347. 18 See, for example, Bengtsen to Rostow, March 6, 1950; Rostow to Frejka, March 10, 1950; Rollman to de Selliers, internal note, March 23, 1950; Boland to Rollman, March 25, 1950; Rostow to Myrdal, internal note, March 31, 1950, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives; Berntsen to Rostow, February 21, 1950; Van Zeeland/Berntsen to UNECE, March 6, 1950; Van Zeeland to Frère (National Bank of Belgium), March 6, 1950; Rostow to Van Zeeland, March 11, 1950; Rostow to Van Zeeland, March 25, 1950, 2/148, Bank for International Settlements Archive. 19 Memorandum I on discussions regarding the Bank of International Settle- ments credit fi nancing Belgian steel deliveries to Czechoslovakia, Meeting on April 3, 1950, at 3.30pm, April 3, 1950, P.H. Börsig, Memorandum sur discussions entre MM. Frère, Ansiaux et MM. Aubin, M. van Zeeland sur le fi nancement de l’opération belgo-tchèque, April 4, 1950; Memorandum II on discussions regarding the Bank of International Settlements credit fi nancing Belgian steel deliveries to Czechoslovakia, Meeting on April 5, 1950, at 9.30am, April 5, 1950; Memorandum III on discussions regarding the Bank of International Settlements credit fi nancing Belgian steel deliveries to Czecho- slovakia, Second meeting on April 5, 1950, at 4.15pm, April 5, 1950, 2/1948, Bank for International Settlements Archive. 20 Rollman to Boland, April 15, 1950, G.X 19/9/1/47, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives.

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21 Rudinger to Van Zeeland, April 14, 1950, 2/1948, Bank for International Settlements Archive. 22 As documented in Discount HBB, Record A 578, File no. 07.04.04.00, Archives of the National Bank of Belgium. 23 Accord concernant les échanges de marchandises entre l’Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise et la République Tchécoslovaque, Brussels: Offi ce Belge du Commerce Extérieure, Supplément aux Informations Commerciales, no. 62, March 29, 1955. 24 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe as an Organ for All- European Economic Co-operation, Lecture by Professor Gunnar Myrdal, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe given under the auspices of the Institute of Economic of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR at the Lomonosov State University of Moscow, Moscow, March 9, 1956, ARR 14/1360, Box 1, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 25 UNECE, Industry and Materials Committee, Resolution on the Establishment of a Sub-Committee on Steel, November 26, 1947, E/ECE/IM/9 Rev. I, ARR 14/1360, Box 9, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 26 Report on the Future Programme of Work of the Steel Committee, Note by the Secretariat, March 10, 1950, E/ECE/Steel/48, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 27 1st Session of the Special Committee for Iron and Steel, September 28–30, 1965, November 25, 1965, IS/M (65) 2, Organisation for Economic Coopera- tion and Development Archives. 28 See also UNECE, Three Decades. 29 Wightman, Economic Co-operation, 94. 30 UNECE, European Steel. 31 Wightman, Economic Co-operation, 95. 32 UNECE, Steel Committee, Note by the Secretariat, October 4, 1949, E/ECE/ STEEL/41, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 33 See Hogan, Marshall Plan. 34 Milward, United Kingdom, 10–47; Kaiser, Using Europe, 1–27. 35 C (49) 26 (Final), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 36 Executive Committee, Draft Directive to the Iron and Steel Committee— Approval of Despatch of Questionnaire, Note by the Secretary of the Execu- tive Committee, April 16, 1949, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 37 Iron and Steel Committee, Some Refl ections by the Steel Committee on Co-ordination of Investment in the Steel Industry, Report to the Executive Committee and the Council, October 7, 1949, IS (49) 21, CE (49) 76 (Final), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 38 Iron and Steel Committee, Minutes of the 55th to the 60th meetings, held at the Chateau de la Muette on August 1, 2, 3, 4, 1949, IS/M (49) 6, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 39 Iron and Steel Committee, Portuguese Project for the Installation of a Plant for the Production of Electronically Welded Steel Tubing, Memorandum draw up by the Secretariat on the instructions of the committee, August 10, 1950, IS (50) 8, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives.

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40 Executive Committee, Report by the Iron and Steel Committee on Projects submitted by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria for the 1949–50 Programme, CE (49) 129. See also IS/M (49) 6, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 41 Executive Committee, Report by the Iron and Steel Committee on Projects submitted by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria for the 1949–50 Programme, CE (49) 129, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 42 Iron and Steel Committee, Some Refl ections by the Steel Committee on Co-ordination of Investment in the Steel Industry, Report to the Executive Committee and the Council, October 7, 1949, IS (49) 21, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 43 Ibid. 44 Resolution of the Executive Committee concerning the Procedure for Inves- tigating Investment Projects in the Iron and Steel Industry, October 28, 1952, CE/M (52) 27 (Final), OEEC Decisions, 142, Organisation for Economic Coop- eration and Development Archives. 45 Note by the ECE Steel Committee, November 9, 1956, ARR 14/1360, Box 9, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 46 Jajeśniak-Quast, Stahlgiganten, 266–67. 47 Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare. 48 Jajeśniak-Quast, Stahlgiganten, 277–81. 49 Eckart and Kortus, Die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, 27; Jezierski and Leszczyńska, Historia Gospodarcza Polski, 495. 50 OECD, Role of Technology, 18. 51 On this issue see in greater detail Jajesniak-Quast, “Iron and Steel,” 277–82. 52 Record of the 1st meeting of the Council of Intermetall, Budapest, November 23–26, 1964, Fonds Intermetall, Box N1/1, National Archives of Hungary. 53 Record of the 1st meeting of the Council of Intermetall, Budapest, November 23–26, 1964, annexes 5–6, Fonds Intermetall, Box N1/1, National Archives of Hungary. 54 Protocol of the character and form of the cooperation between the Intermetall and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Moscow, July 9, 1970, Fonds Intermetall, Box N26, National Archives of Hungary. 55 Agreement between Intermetall and the Association of Yugoslavian Metallur- gical Factories about the Yugoslavian partner’s participation in some activities of Intermetall, Fonds Intermetall, Box 32/220, National Archives of Hungary. 56 Analysis of the quantity of rolled steel and steel tubes imported from capitalist countries, 1962–1965, Fonds Intermetall, Box 94/1, National Archives of Hungary. 57 Record of the fi rst meeting of delegates from the Intermetall member countries on the subject of the exchange of metallurgical products for industrial use, Budapest, February 15–17, 1967, Fonds Intermetall, Box 10, National Archives of Hungary. 58 Record of the Meeting of the Council of Intermetall on the subject of specialization, Budapest, October 9–10, 1974, Fonds Intermetall, Box 29, National Archives of Hungary. 59 Record of the 10th meeting about the specialization and cooperative production of rolled steel, pipes, and hardware, Budapest, June 13–16, 1978, Annex

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2: New production of pipes for nuclear power stations in the Czechoslova- kian Socialist Republic, Fonds Intermetall, Box N21, National Archives of Hungary. 60 Van Brabant, Economic Integration, 275. 61 Kaser, Comecon, 156. 62 Van Brabant, Economic Integration, 276. 63 UNECE, Structural Changes, 45. 64 Tarr, “Effi cient Diffusion”; Poznański, “Diffusion Performance.” 65 Poznański, “International Diffusion.” 66 Dieter, Die Krise der deutschen Stahlindustrie, 189. 67 OECD, Role of Technology, 61. 68 Warren, World Steel, 161. 69 Wightman, Economic Co-operation, 102. 70 H.W.A. Waring, Director, Industry Division, to Gunnar Myrdal, Execu- tive Secretary, Visit to Prague, October 9–12, 1955, October 26 1955, G.X/18/9/1/102, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 71 UNECE, Competition. 72 H.W.A. Waring, Director, Industry Division, to Gunnar Myrdal, Execu- tive Secretary, Visit to the Soviet Union, from September 23 to October 8, 1955, November 2, 1955, G.X 18/9/1/102, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 73 Ibid. 74 UNECE, Advances in Steel Technology. 75 G. Brückner, “The Use of Brown Coal High-Temperature Coke.” 76 Bähr et al., Der Flick-Konzern. 77 Note on the ECE Steel Committee, November 9, 1956, ARR 14/1360, Box 9, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 78 A.F. Ewing to Executive Secretary, October 2, 1957, ARR 14/1360, Box 9, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 79 UNECE, Automation [1965]. 80 OECD, Air Pollution. 81 Bührer, “Der Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute,” 228. 82 See the reports in G.X 18/9/1/102, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 83 UNECE, Three Decades. 84 V.I. Filippov, Director, Industry Division, to J. Stanovnik, Executive Secretary, July 17, 1970, G.X 18/9/1/127, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 85 List of Participants of the Study Tour in Poland, G.X 18/9/1/127, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives. 86 On East–West technology transfer in the Cold War see also more generally, Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy, Reassessing Cold War Europe; Autio-Sarasmo and Humphreys, Winter Kept Us Warm; Autio-Sarasmo, “Cooperation across the Iron Curtain,” 223–39. 87 See Baldwin, Proceedings of the fi rst World Metallurgical Congress. 88 Bührer, “Der Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute,” 225. 89 Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Report to the Council, October 6, 1950, C/WP3 (50) 38, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives.

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90 United Kingdom Memorandum, April 28, 1949, CE (49) 84, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 91 C (49) 63 (Final), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 92 Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Report to the Council, October 6, 1950, C/WP3 (50) 38, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 93 Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-Operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Co-operative Research Group No. 3 (Tonnage Oxygen), Note by the British Delegation, April 14, 1950, C/WP3/CR3 (50) 1 Annex III; Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Co-operative Research Group No. 3 (Tonnage Oxygen), Minutes of the 1st Session held in the Château de la Muette, April 12 and 13, 1950, C/WP3/CR3 (50) 2, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 94 Note by the Secretariat, C/WP3 (51) 6, January 31, 1951, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 95 Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Co-operative Research Group No. 3 (Tonnage Oxygen), Minutes of the 1st Session held in the Château de la Muette, April 12 and 13, 1950, C/WP3/CR3 (50) 2, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 96 Ibid. 97 Working Party No. 3 of the Council on Co-operation in Matters of Scientifi c and Technical Information, Group No. 3: Co-operation in Research and Tech- nical Development (Tonnage Oxygen), Minutes of the 2nd session held on July 24 and 25, 1950, at Château de la Muette, December 30, 1950, C/WP3/ CR3 (50) 11, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 98 Ibid. 99 Note by the Secretariat, January 31, 1951, C/WP3 (51) 6, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 100 Recommendation of the Council concerning Research on Pig Iron Production in Low-Shaft Blast Furnaces, April 2, 1951, C/M (51) 11 (Final), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives. 101 European Commission, Steel Research. 102 Ibid. See also Zegers, “Steel Research.” 103 Steffen, “Förderung.” 104 European Commission, Steel Research. 105 Steffen, “Förderung,” 117. 106 UNECE, Steel Committee, Thirty-fi fth session (October 18–20, 1967), E/ECE/ Steel/167, November 10, 1967, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library. 107 See also Van Zeeland, Les États-Unis d’Amérique. 108 “Die Mission des Liberalismus.” Die Zeit Online, Wirtschaft, October 8, 2008: http://www.zeit.de/2008/33/A-Neoliberalismus?page=all. Accessed Febru- ary 14, 2014. 109 Rencontres de Genève.

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8 Towards European Union Hegemony

1 Interview François Duchêne with Edmond Wellenstein, The Hague, May 16, 1989, Int 532, Historical Archives of the European Union. 2 Ball, Past, 73. 3 Interview François Duchêne with Michel Gaudet, Paris, April 12, 1988, Int 500, Historical Archives of the European Union. 4 Trondal, “European Commission,” 1112. 5 Seidel, Process, 9–62. 6 Bühlbäcker, Europa im Aufbruch, 149–88. 7 Carbonell, Des hommes à l’origine de l’Europe; Lipgens, Europa-Förderations- pläne. 8 See: Leucht, “Expertise.” 9 For an inversed perspective, which highlights their experiences and roles, see: in greater detail Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels. 10 For the ILO see: Kott and Droux, Globalizing Social Rights. 11 Seidel, Process, 35–62. 12 On the origins of the Common Agricultural Policy see: Knudsen, Farmers; see also: Patel, Fertile Ground. 13 On the negotiations leading up to the signing of the EEC treaty see: still Küsters, Fondements. 14 See: Kohlrausch and Trischler, Building Europe, 216–38. For a multilateral history of the negotiations leading up to the creation of Euratom see still: Weilemann, Die Anfänge; on Armand’s role, Du Cros, Louis Armand; and on American policy, Skogmar, United States. 15 On the College of Europe see: Poehls, Europa Backstage. 16 Kaiser, “Successes and Limits.” 17 Dumoulin, “The Administration,” 220. 18 On the tensions between American and German policy traditions and infl u- ences see: Leucht, “Transatlantic Policy Networks.” 19 Knudsen, Farmers. 20 See: Patel and Schweitzer, Historical Foundations. 21 On long-term continuities in this sector see: Hambridge, Story of FAO, 39–60. 22 Thiemeyer, Vom “Pool vert.” 23 Council of Europe, CA 24th OS, November 22, 1950, European Documenta- tion Centre, Library European University Institute Florence. 24 Council of Europe, CA, 4th OS, 24 September 24, 1952, Doc. 72, 853–56, Special Collections, European Documentation Centre, European University Institute Library, Florence. 25 For the origins of the Transport Ministry Conference, see: Henrich-Franke, “Mobility and European Integration.” 26 For a comparison between agriculture and transport see: Patel and Schot, “Twisted Paths to European Integration.” 27 Meyer, “L’européanisation”; Mitzner, Research for Growth? 28 Patel and Schot, “Twisted Paths to European Integration,” 391–95. 29 Kaiser, Using Europe, 1–27. 30 On French economic integration policy in the 1960s see: Warlouzet, Le choix. For German policy towards the creation of the CAP see: Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen.

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31 Dashwood, “Hastening Slowly,” 291–97. 32 For the switch to such a more pragmatic approach in transport policy see: Erdmenger, European Community Transport Policy. 33 For the role of the ECJ decision in fostering the internal market agenda see: Armstrong and Bulmer, Governance. 34 On the origins of the Community’s trade policy see: Coppolaro, Making of a World Trading Power. 35 Kaiser, Using Europe, 108–73; Milward, United Kingdom, 310–51. 36 In comparative perspective Kaiser and Elvert, European Union Enlargement. 37 On U.S. policy towards the Community in this period see: Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect. 38 The term fi rst used in the sub-title of Galtung, European Community. 39 Kaiser, “Successes and Limits,” 386. 40 Lipkin, “Evropeiskaya integratsia.” 41 For the Community’s relations with the CMEA see also: Document de travail du Conseil sur les relations de la CE avec les Pays de l’Est, 14 March 1974, EN 1986, Historical Archives of the European Union. 42 Ibid.; Brine, Comecon, xii. 43 On the Community’s policy towards Eastern Europe and the CMEA see also: Romano, “Untying Cold War Knot”; Yamamoto, “Détente or Integration?” 44 Dangerfi eld, “Turning Inwards.” 45 For the case of East Germany see: Zatlin, Currency. 46 Van Brabant, Economic Integration, 267. On the issue of specialization in the CMEA see also: Sobell, Red Market. 47 Lavigne, International Political Economy, 62. 48 Brine, Comecon, xiii. 49 Ibid., xiv. 50 Green-Cowles, “Setting the Agenda”; from a Neo-Gramscian perspective see: Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism. 51 See: Pérez and Sigfrido, “Transnational Business Networks.” 52 Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe,” 8. 53 For a different view of the 1970s as a dynamic period of the mobilization of new social groups and the evolution of new policy concerns and agendas see: Kaiser and Meyer, “Polity-Building and Policy-Making”; Awesti, “Myth of Eurosclerosis,” 45; in a global perspective see also: Ferguson et al., Shock. 54 Wallace et al., Policy-Making, 107. 55 Heard-Lauréote, European Union Governance.

Conclusion

1 See also: Shore, Building Europe, 40–65. 2 See also: Kaiser et al., Exhibiting Europe. 3 Most notably Duroselle, L’Europe. 4 See, in particular, Milward, European Rescue. Very few studies take a long-term approach to understanding continuity and change in European integration, but see, for example, Kaiser, Christian Democracy. 5 For the historiography of postwar European integration see: Kaiser and Varsori, European Union History.

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6 Our conclusions about the importance of scientifi c and technical networks are confi rmed by multiple other cases in fi elds like city planning, space exploration, energy, transport, communication, and environment protection discussed in other volumes of the Making Europe book series. 7 By way of introduction see: Rosamond, “European Integration.” 8 Haas, “Epistemic Communities.” For a discussion and criticism of the epistemic community concept see: Schot and Schipper, “Experts.” 9 Alter and Meunier, “The Politics.” 10 For a theoretical conceptualization of such “path-dependencies” see: Pierson, Politics in Time, 123–63. 11 For other cases see: Laborie, “Missing Link”; Lagendijk, “An Experience Forgotten Today.” 12 Mance, International Sea Transport, xi. 13 Kaiser and Meyer, International Organizations. 14 George, An Awkward Partner? 15 See: Bitsch and Bossuat, L’Europe unie et l’Afrique. 16 For such a comparative analysis see: Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans. 17 Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses. 18 For greater detail see: Heard-Lauréote, European Union Governance. 19 Wunderlich and Bailey, European Union and Global Governance. 20 For West Germany see: Berghahn, Americanization. 21 See: Laborie, “Fragile Links.” 22 Kammerer, “Off the Leash.” 23 Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism. 24 Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society. 25 Scharpf, Governing in Europe. 26 See: Down and Wilson, “From ‘Permissive Consensus’.” 27 On the 1970s as a transformative period see also: Ferguson et al., Shock; Jarausch, Das Ende der Zuversicht? 28 Kaiser, “Bringing History Back.” 29 Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, “Governance Turn.” 30 For a general analysis see: Giddens, Consequences. 31 See also: Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy.” 32 On the idea that citizens should acquire technological and scientifi c knowledge to allow informed participation see also: Barry, Political Machines. 33 Weller, “Democratic Legitimacy?” 34 For this argument see also: Bickerton, European Integration. 35 For these tensions and possible solutions see: Rip et al., Managing Technology; Callon et al., Acting; Fischer, Democracy & Expertise.

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Archive of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague Archives of the International Institute of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome Archives of Modern Records, Warsaw Archives of the National Bank of Belgium, Brussels Bank for International Settlements Archives, Basle European Commission Historical Archives, Brussels European Documentation Centre, European University Institute Library, Florence Federal Archives [Germany], Berlin Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence League of Nations Archives, United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library, Geneva Lubin’s Archives, Food and Agriculture Organization Library, Rome National Archives of the Czech Republic, Prague National Archives of Hungary, Budapest Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Archives, Paris United Nations Offi ce Geneva Archives, Geneva United Nations Offi ce Geneva Library, Geneva

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Berne Union Union of Railway Administrations BIS Bank for International Settlements CAP Common Agricultural Policy CEEU Commission of Enquiry for European Union CENELEC European Committee for Electrotech- nical Standardization CoCom Coordinating Committee on Multilat- eral Export Controls CIA Commission Internationale d’Agriculture C.I.M. (Berne Convention) Convention Internationale concernant le Transport des Merchandises par Chemins de fer CMEA (or Comecon) Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CRT Commission de la Recherche Tech- nique Acier (of the ECSC) Hafraba Verein zur Vorbereitung der Auto- straße Hansestädte-Frankfurt-Basel EC European Community ECITO European Central Inland Transport Organization ECO European Coal Organization ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EFO Economic and Financial Organization (of the League of Nations) EIA Entente Internationale de l’Acier EPA European Productivity Agency ERMA European Rail Makers’ Association (after 1928 International Rail Makers’ Association) ERP European Recovery Program

373

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EU European Union FAO (United Nations) Food and Agriculture Organization GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GSM Groupe Spacial Mobile ICC International Chamber of Commerce IIA International Institute of Agriculture ILO International Labour Organisation ISC International Steel Cartel NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation OPW Common Freight Wagon Fleet Agreement OSJD Organisation for Co-operation between Railways PIARC Permanent International Association of Road Congresses Postal Union Universal Postal Union PPV Regulations of the Use of Wagons in International Transport of Passengers and Goods RIC International Union for Passenger Wagons (Regolamento Internationale delle Carozze) RIV International Union for Freight Wagons (Rego- lamento Internationale dei Veicoli) SMGS Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail SMPS Agreement on International Passenger Trans- port by Rail TACIT Technical Advisory Committee on Inland Transport Telegraph Union International Telegraph Union TVA Tennessee Valley Authority UIC Union International des Chemins de fer UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

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UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration UN United Nations UK United Kingdom U.S. United States of America Verein Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen

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Permissions to reproduce the illustrations and photographs in this book have generously been granted by the institutions and collections named here, and are gratefully acknowledged by the editors, the authors, the Foundation for the History of Technology, and Palgrave Macmillan. The Foundation for the History of Technology has carefully tried to locate all rights holders. Parties who despite this feel that they are entitled to certain rights are requested to contact the Foundation for the History of Technology (www.histech.nl). Cover Original caption: “Le 2 mai 1956, un train orné des drapeaux des six États membres de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (CECA) et chargé de houille traverse la frontière franco-luxembourgeoise pour marquer l’ouverture du marché commun européen du charbon et de l’acier,” 1956. Photo by Théo Mey. Permission by Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. © Théo MEY / Photothèque Ville de Luxembourg. 0.1 Map of the E3, around 1970. Published in: Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 206. Courtesy of Frank Schipper. 3 0.2 Photo with (in the middle) Raymond Brailard, Director of the IBU Technical Committee and Brussels Checking Center with his colleagues at Ouchy, 1941. Permission by European Broadcasting Union, IBU archive box 58 Photographs, IBU. 6 0.3 Original caption: “Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), one of four UN regional economic commissions, provides the opportunity for European nations to work together to improve their economies and to maintain and strengthen economic relations among themselves and with other countries. At its headquarters in Geneva an international secretariat of some 150 members carries on the day-to-day tasks and research work of the Commission. From left to right Mr. W. Moser (Switzerland), Mr. A. Agafonov (USSR), and Mr. E.D. Brant (UK) of the Transport Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe studying a map on the 1955 Road Traffi c Census,” 1958. Permission by UNOG Library, League of Nations Archive. Ref. no. UN: 61977. 9 0.4a Map by Piero Puricelli (1883–1951) in Autostrada Bergamo-Milano (Bergamo, Instituto Italiano d’Arti Grafi che, 1927). Published in: Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 105. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 12 0.4b Map by Piero Puricelli (1883–1951), in: “La question des autoroutes,” L’Illustration 91, no. 4727 (1933), 19, fi gure 39. Published in: Frank Schipper, Driving Europe. Building Europe on Roads in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 109. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 12 0.4c Map published in Wegen 19 / 20 (October 1948), 204. Permission by Kennisplatform CROW. 13 0.5 Original caption: “First Hague Peace Conference, from 18 May – 29 July 1899. The delegation of the peace conference on the steps in front of the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague.” Photo taken May 18, 1899. Permission by AKG Images. Ref. no. AKG141016. 16 377

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1.1 Original caption: “Richard Cobden honored at a soiree at Rochdale, Manchester,” engraving by unknown artist in Illustrated Times, August 27, 1859. Permission by Mary Evans Picture Library. Ref. no. 10155363. 22 1.2 Original caption: “Queen Victoria arriving to open Great Exhibition, 1 May 1851.” Permission by AKG-images. Ref. no. 7EN-I1-0390002955. 26 1.3 Original caption: “The Great Derby Race for Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-One,” drawing published in Punch 20 (1851), 208. Courtesy Special Collections University of Exeter. 28 1.4 Affi che de tourisme pour les chemins de fer PLM: “Simplon, Venise, Milan.” Illustration by Hugo d’Alesi (1849–1906). Permission by KHARBINE-TAPABOR. 33 1.5 Original caption: “Das unterirdische Berlin,” woodcut published in: Franz Reuleaux, Das Buch der Erfi ndungen und Gewerbe, vol.1, 8th edition (Leipzig: Spamer, 1884). Permission by AKG-images. Ref. no. AKG-62249. 36 1.6 Participants Telegraph Conference in Paris, 1865. Courtesy International Telecommunication Union. 38 1.7 Cover Journal Télégraphique XLVI, no. 12 (December 25, 1922). Courtesy International Telecommunication Union. 41 1.8a Carte des communications télégraphiques du regime européen d’ après des documents offi ciels par le Bureau des Administrations Télé- graphiques, Berne 1891. Courtesy International Telecommunication Union. 45 1.8b Carte des communications télégraphiques du régime extra-européen dressée d’après des documents offi ciels par le Bureau International de l’Union Télégraphique, Berne 1909. Courtesy International Telecommunication Union. 45 2.1 Calculating room of the International Institute of Agriculture, photo 1915–24. Courtesy Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 52 2.2 Memorial address given by the Vice Governor of Rome at the Viale David Lubin, 1936. Permission by AKG-images. Ref. no. Bildarchiv Pisarek. 56 2.3 Unloading meat from a ship, destined for British soldiers on the Western Front during the First World War, photo ca. 1916. Permission by Rue des Archive. Ref. no. 00692173. 63 2.4 Original caption: “Commission des Communications du transit.” Photo of General Conference on Communications and Transit, Geneva 1923. Permission by United Nations Archives at Geneva. 68 2.5 Road signs published in: Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 145. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 72 2.6 Adolf Hitler and Albert Speer in discussion, Nuremberg, Germany, photo ca. 1933–7. Permission by Bundesarchiv Berlin, Bild 146-1971-016-29. 75 3.1 Original caption: “Some day your prince will come,” cartoon by Philip Zec. Published in Daily Mirror, April 17, 1943. Permission by Mirrorpix. Ref. no. 00461310. 81 3.2 Gunnar Myrdal, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1947–57), 1947. Permission by United Nations. Ref. no. 409950. 84 3.3 A ship formed from the word Europe bears many sails each made from the fl ag of a European nation as it crashes through the waves. Poster by Reyn Dirksen (1924–1999), published by European Recovery Program;

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Marshall Foundation. Poster found in Library of Congress. © Reyn Dirksen, c/o Pictoright Amsterdam 2014. 89 3.4 The Corinth Canal after its construction in 1948. Collection Gamma-Keystone. Permission by Getty Images. Ref. no. 105219605. 92 3.5 Trial of Rudolf Slánský, January 11, 1952. Permission by CTK Photobank Ref. no. FO 0056750. 96 3.6 Reproduction of “Comecon is Peaceful Work, Fraternal Mutual Aid, Socialist Solidarity,” poster by Yevgeny Kazhdan (1922–1984), 1978. Poster made for the international exhibition 40 Victorious Years’ at the Central Exhibition Hall, Comecon — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Permission by Ria Novosti. Ref. no. 434260. 98 3.7 Students examining an Il-86 gas generator at the International Center for Joint Training of Civil Aviation Flying, Maintenance and Control Personnel of Comecon Countries, January 2, 1983. Photo by Boris Ushmaykin (Oulyanousk Russia). Permission by Ria Novosti. Ref. no. 871960. 101 3.8 Original caption: “Le 2 mai 1956, un train orné des drapeaux des six États membres de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (CECA) et chargé de houille traverse la frontière franco-luxembourgeoise pour marquer l’ouverture du marché commun européen du charbon et de l’acier,” 1956. Photo by Théo Mey. Permission by Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. © Théo MEY / Photothèque Ville de Luxembourg. 106 3.9 German students drive under the green-white federalist European fl ag to Strasbourg, in order to demonstrate against the sluggish negotiations of the Council of Europe, November 25, 1950. Permission by Ullstein Bild. Ref. no. 00137323. 110 4.1 Original caption: “Pferdeeisenbahn Budweiss – Linz – Gmunden,” drawing by A. Kruzner, 1832. Permission by Ullstein Bild. Ref. no. 00080092. 115 4.2 The “break of gauge” from wide to narrow gauge at Gloucester. Cross-country passengers and their baggage have to change trains. Drawing by W.J. Linton in Illustrated London News, 1846. Permission by Science Museum / Science and Society Picture Library. Ref. no. 10411941. 120 4.3 Reproduction of Festschrift über die Thätigkeit des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen in den ersten 50 Jahren seines Bestehens 1946–1896 (Berlin 1896). Courtesy collection Foundation for the History of Technology, Eindhoven. 123 4.4 Poster Gotthard Bahn 1902. Permission by Swiss National Library, Berne. Ref. no. poster collection SNL_TOUR_1601. 130 4.5 Photo of Berne Key; photo taken by Pierre Yves Saunier; Berne Key from Société Nationale de Chemins de fer Francais. The photographed keys were used by Mr. Biez, a railway worker for the French public company Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF). Mr. Biez began to work for the company in 1973. One of these keys was the one he fi rst received when his work assignment entailed tasks connected with rolling stock. Courtesy Pierre Yves Saunier. 134 4.6 Original caption: “Casino Berne July 4 1910 (Vue de la Salle du Casino de Berne pendant la séance d’óuverture solennelle de la huitième session, le 4 juilet 1910),” 1910. Scan from Bulletin du Congrès de l’ Association Internationale des Chemins de Fer. Courtesy Didier Durandel. 134 4.7 Original caption: “La Barrière Antigermanique”, published in Gérald, Géo, et al., L’Atlantique Mer Noire, “Bordeaux Odessa”, ou ligne

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dite du 45e parallèle, métropolitain de l’Europe, barrière antigermanique, [Réunion interparlementaire du 24 Décembre 1918, Société d’études économiques de Paris et comité internationale du sud –européen. Comité international économique Suisse – Océan. – La couv. Porte La Nouvelle politique des transports interalliés] (Paris: Le Courrier Franco American, n.d.). In collection Bibliotheque national de France. Permission by Bibliotheque national de France (BnF). 136 5.1 UIC-code. Courtesy UIC, International Union of Railways. 145 5.2 Original caption: “Railroad Track is changed to standard European gauge from wide Russian gauge, which Red Army installed. Most of Poland’s available rolling stock runs on standard gauge.” Photo by John Philips. Permission by Getty Images, The Life Picture Collection. 148 5.3 Arrival of a train containing Jews deported to Auschwitz death camp in Poland. Permission by Ullstein bild – United Archives / World History Archive. Ref. no. 1302421131. 150 5.4 Bulletin de L’Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer. Bulletin d’information des Organisations ferroviaires non gouvermentales 1951, 241. Courtesy International Union of Railways, and Het Spoorwegmuseum Utrecht. 151 5.5 An employee of the French railway system (SNCF) putting onto the carriage of a goods train a paper saying “EUROP-SNCF,” information which will enable it to cross borders more easily, 1963. Photo by Keystone-France / Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images. Permission by Getty Images. Ref. no. 104406933. 160 5.6 Map from Zeitschrift der Organisation für die Zusammenarbeit der Eisenbahnen OSShD, no. 1 (1959), 12–13. Courtesy Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD). 163 5.7 Le train de l’Europe: les etats de l’O.C.D.E. Carte postale vers 1950, illustration anonyme. Collection IM / KHARBINE-TAPABOR. Permission by Kharbine-Tapabor. 168 5.8 Photo by Witold K. Prusinkiewicz. Permission by the photographer. 172 5.9 Thalys train, UIC. The Worldwide Association of Railways: Challenges Past, Present and Future (UIC 2010), 79. Courtesy International Union of Railways. 174 6.1 Krupp exhibit, 1851. Permission by Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stiftung, Historisches Archiv Krupp, Essen. 180 6.2 Original caption: “Le puddleur, du bout de son crochet.” Illustration by Leon Benett (1838–1917) for the novel Les cinq cents millions de la Begum by Jules Verne. Courtesy collection Foundation for the History of Technology, Eindhoven. 181 6.3 Statue of Mr. John Cockerill at Seraing Belgium, 1871. Permission by TopFoto via ANP. Ref. no. LC017371. 183 6.4 Japan’s fi rst foreign mission, headed by Prince Iwakura, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, leaving Yokohama for the United States and Europe on December 23, 1871. Permission by TopFoto via ANP. Ref. no. 0475153. 184 6.5 Nineteenth-century artwork of the Wentworth Works, a steel factory operated by the John Martin company in Sheffi eld, UK. This lithograph was produced by John Henry Bufford in Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., between 1856 and 1864, for the W. Bailey Lang company, the U.S. agents of the John Martin company. Permission by Science Photo Library via ANP. 185

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6.6 Nineteenth-Century Bessemer furnace. Historical artwork of men at a forge using the Bessemer process to make steel. Published in Harper’s Weekly Magazine, 1889. Permission by Science Photo Library via ANP. 188 6.7 Engraving showing the operation of a Bessemer converter. This picture fi rst appeared in An Autobiography by Sir Henry Bessemer in 1905. Permission by Science and Society Picture Library. Ref. no. 10320418. 188 6.8 Original caption: “Cette masse est Stahlstadt, la Cité de l’Acier.” Illustration by Leon Benett (1838–1917) for the novel Les cinq cents millions de la Begum by Jules Verne. Courtesy collection Foundation for the History of Technology, Eindhoven. 192 6.9 Pavillon du Creusot (par Louis Bonnier, usine Schneider) à l’exposition universelle de 1889 à Paris. Permission by Rue des Archives / PVDE. 196 6.10 Switzerland, World Economic Conference by the League of Nations in Geneva, Georges Theunis (Belgium) speaking. Photo by: Wide World Photos, published by Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung 20, 1927. Vintage property of Ullstein bild. Permission by Ullstein Bild. Ref. no. 01020545. 214 7.1 The entrance to the V. Lenin Metallurgical Combine in Nowa Huta, Poland, 1969. Permission by Ria Novosti. Ref. no. 669613. 230 7.2 Oberhausen steelworks. Early twentieth-century artwork of men at the steel forges in Oberhausen, Germany, using the Siemens-Martin process to make steel. Illustrated around 1930–40. Permission by TopFoto via ANP. 231 7.3 Linz-Donawitz steel mill. Courtesy Company Archives Voest Alpine. 232 7.4 Oven to melt manganese ore around 1920. Courtesy ArcelorMittal company archives. 234 7.5 Meeting of Soviet and Czech experts in a workshop of Union of Steel Mills, town of Kladno (Czechoslovakia), January 1975. Permission by RIA Novosti. Ref. no. 601495. 236 7.6 New Hungarian Ikarus buses lined up outside their factory, ready for export to the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Peru, April 1974. Photo by Istvan Bara for Keystone / Getty Images. Permission by Getty Images. Ref. no. 3359280. 239 7.7 Peugeot Vroomster at Essen Motor Show in Essen, Belgium, November 28, 2002. Photo by Patrick Piel. Permission by Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images. Ref. no. 113945709. 241 7.8 Container ship Maersk Butan, 2013. Courtesy Maersk company archives. 243 7.9 A worker holding his fi nished product, a drop-forged front axle, at the English Steel Corporation Works (Vickers) in Sheffi eld, which specializes in the electrical induction method. Every forging has a small surplus of metal, known as “fash” which is clipped off by the last die-press, as shown here. Permission by Mirrorpix. Ref. no. 00267158. 248 8.1 Jean Monnet presiding over a ceremony at the Belval factory in Luxembourg establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Holding a hammer, Monnet makes the fi rst gesture of the symbolic steel casting, May, 1 1953. Photo by Keystone-France / Gamma-Keystone. Permission by Getty Images, Keystone Collection. Ref. no. 104402386. 260 8.2 Théo Rey, Les secrétaires du présidents de la CECA. Permission by Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. Ref. no. 52299 / 11. © Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. 261

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8.3 Tony Krier, Interpretes et traducteurs. Permission by Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. Ref. no. 19651426 / 17. © Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. 264 8.4 Farmers protest in Munich, destruction of milk. Farmers protest against the limitation of the milk contingent and destroy 250 liters of milk, March 6, 1987. Picture Alliance, DB Hellmann Permission by Picture Alliance / Rue des Archives. Ref. no. 00750327. 271 8.5 TIR-carnet. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 272 8.6 Letterhead UNDERSTANDING ...THROUGH TRAVEL ...I S THE PASSPORT [image] TO PEACE. The slogan of the ETC, an organization trying to stimulate North American tourism to Europe (among other things to help mend the so-called “dollar gap”), explicitly links traveling and peace. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 274 8.7 Polish and Soviet engineers at the construction site of a sulfuric acid factory, 1978. Polish Press Agency. Ref. no. pap_19780131_002.jpg. 283 8.8 An ink and crayon drawing showing a woman in a fi tted kitchen surrounded by the latest appliances, drawn by an unknown artist for the Daily Herald newspaper, in about 1956. Permission by Daily Herald Archive / National Media Museum / Science & Society Picture Library. Ref. no. 10432135. 289 9.1 Column header that was used in the magazine Notre Temps, 1930s. Published in: Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 75. Courtesy Vincent Lagendijk. 297 9.2 Poster, Let us Learn Russian. Let us Learn from the Soviet People to Work, Think and Live in a New Way, 1951. Permission by Českomoravská konfederace odborových svazů, Prague. 299 9.3 Advertisement, Deutsche Bahn, 2005. Permission by Deutsche Bahn Museum Nuremberg. Ref. no. WIK 2005. 305 9.4 Cartoon, “Trans European Network,” artist unknown. Courtesy Frank Schipper. 309

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Making Europe is the result/product of an unusual collaboration among a host of individuals and organizations. The Making Europe authors and series editors feel extremely fortunate to be working with them. We list here individuals and organizations who contributed to the entire series. Each volume in the series also has its own separate acknowledgements.

Making Europe was initiated by: • Foundation for the History of Technology (www.histech.nl)

Making Europe is sponsored by: • Eindhoven University of Technology (www.tue.nl) • Fonds 21 (www.fonds21.nl) – formerly known as SNS REAAL Fonds • Next Generations Infrastructures (www.nextgenerationsinfrastructures.eu) • Foundation for the History of Technology Corporate Program (www.histech.nl) that includes: • DSM (www.dsm.com) • EBN (www.ebn.nl) • FrieslandCampina(www.frieslandcampina.com) • Philips (www.philips.nl) • SIDN (www.sidn.nl) • TNO (www.tno.nl)

Making Europe has been made possible thanks to: • Tensions of Europe Network (www.tensionsofeurope.eu) • European Science Foundation EUROCORES Programme Inventing Europe – Technology and the Making of Europe, 1850 to the Present (www.esf.org) • Research Theme Group Grant of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in 2010–11 (www.nias.nl) • European University Institute in Florence, Italy for providing the support in developing the series and for the founding workshop (3–6 July 2008) (www. eui.eu)

Making Europe benefi ted from the feedback of a community of scholars who have been involved in the series from the start: Håkon With Andersen, Alec Badenoch, Robert Bud, David Burigana, Cornelis Disco, Paul Edwards, Valentina Fava, Karen Johnson Freeze, Andrea Guintini, Gabrielle Hecht, Rüdiger Klein, Eda Kranakis, John Krige, Leonard Laborie, Vincent Lagendijk, Suzanne Lommers, Slawomir Lotysz, Dagmara Jajeśniak- Quast, Karl-Erik Michelsen, Matthias Middell, Thomas J. Misa, Dobrinka Parusheva, Kiran Patel, Pierre-Yves Saunier, Emanuela Scarpellini, Frank Schip- per, Michael Strang, Ivan Tchalakov, Frank Trentmann, Aristotle Tympas, Hans Weinberger

383

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Making Europe relied on the unfl agging support of: Picture editors • Katherine Kay-Mouat • Giel van Hooff • Jan Korsten (Management) • Camiel Lintsen – Kade 05 Eindhoven (graphs and maps)

Text editors • Lisa Friedman • James Morrison

PalgraveMacmillan • Jenny McCall (Publisher) • Holly Tyler (Editorial Assistant) • Philip Hillyer (Copy-Editor and Editorial Services Consultant) • Susan Boobis (Indexer)

Offi ce Foundation for the History of Technology: • Sonja Beekers (Secretarial Support) • Jan Korsten (Business Director) • Loek Stoks (Bookkeeping) • Henk Treur (Volunteer)

Board Foundation for the History of Technology: • Hans de Wit (chair) • Jacques Joosten (treasurer) • Saskia Blom • Dirk van Delft • Herman de Boon • Eric Fischer • Frans Greidanus • Emmo Meijer • Wim van Gelder • Michiel Westermann • Harry Lintsen (advisor) • Martin Schuurmans (advisor)

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Abreu e Sousa, João Crisóstomo Austria 54, 55, 113, 194, 203, 280, 282, de 119 287 Abs, Herman Josef 212 economic stabilization 67 Adenauer, Konrad 103, 263 Imperial and Royal Trade African Union of Railways 176 Commission 113–14 Agreement on Direct International railways 113–14, 115 Fig. 4.1, 119, Carriage of Passengers and 127, 133, 135, 138, 142 Luggage by Rail (MPS) 329–30 steel industry 232 Fig. 7.3, 233, 246, Agreement on Direct International 250 Goods Transport by Rail wagon pooling 154, 170 (MGS) 330 Austrian Iron and Steel Works Agreement on International Goods Voest 233 Transport by Rail (SMGS) 161–62, Austrian Railway Company 114 163 Fig. 5.6, 164–65, 330 Austro-German Telegraph Union 37 Agreement on International Passenger automation 245, 284 Transport by Rail (SMPS) 161–62, Avenol, Joseph 80 164–65, 330 Agresti, Olivia Rossetti 50–51, 56 Balfour, Arthur 199 Fig. 2.2 Ball, George 261–62 agriculture 49–50 Ballinari, Ernesto 156 see also International Institute of Bank for International Settlements Agriculture (BIS) 222 Agromash 100, 233 Belgium 54, 87, 216, 306 AIRBO international blast furnace Office national du Ducroire 221 project 247, 251, 253 railways 133, 137, 171 Allied Maritime Transport steel industry 193, 211, 219–20, Commission 259, 262 250–51, 255, 256 Allied Maritime Transport Council 63, wagon pooling 154, 170 305 Bell, Daniel 308 alternative materials 241 Fig. 7.7 Benelux countries 104, 227, 264, 267 aluminium 241 Fig. 7.7, 244 Centre National de la Sidérurgie 247 Americanization of European see also individual countries industry 205–6, 215, 306 Beneš, Edvard 138 Angell, Norman 59 Benni, Antonio Stefano 202 anti-trust law 204–12 Berlin–Baghdad railway 138 Sherman Act (1890) 215 Berne Convention 59, 133, 134 Arab Union of Railways 176 Fig. 4.6, 135, 161, 163 Fig. 5.6, ARBED Steel 192, 193, 202, 209, 212 165, 298, 301 Arcelor Mittal 254 Berne key 134 Fig. 4.5, 135 Armand, Louis 165–67, 169, 171, 267 Berne Union 133, 134 Fig. 4.6, 139, Aron, Raymond 256 144–45, 165 association 15, 31–36 Berntsen, Oluf 222 Association of American Railroads 176 Bessemer process 184–85, 188 Fig. 6.6, Association of Yugoslavian 6.7 Metallurgical Factories 235 Bevin, Ernest 92 associative regulation 18, 257, 290, 308 Bi-zone 157, 158 Attolico, Bernardo 63, 79 Bismarck, Otto von 131–32

385

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Blanqui, Adolphe-Jérôme 30 CMEA 16, 77, 83, 87, 93–103, 230 Boland, Paul 221, 255 Fig. 7.1, 231, 233, 236 Fig. 7.5, Bonnefous, Edouard 270, 271 238–40, 252–53, 282, 283 Fig. 8.7, Braillard, Raymond 6 Fig. 0.2 284–85 Bretton Woods 95, 96, 205, 275 Standing Committee for Black Briand, Aristide 76 Metallurgy 235 Briand Plan (1929–30) 203 Cobden, Richard 21, 22 Fig. 1.1, 23, Britain see UK 27, 31 British Anti-Corn Law League 23 Cockerill, John 183 Fig. 6.3 British Iron and Steel Federation 187, Cockerill, William 182, 183 Fig. 6.3 195 Cold War ix, 16, 77, 84 Fig. 3.2, 100, British Radicalism 24, 32 102, 158, 163, 176, 244, 275, 281, Bruce Report 80–81 284, 288 Bruce, Stanley M. 80 collaboration Brunel, Isambard Kingdom railways 135, 136 Fig. 4.7, 138 119 research 247–52 Bufford, John Henry 185 Fig. 6.5 see also transnational networks Bulgaria 94, 95, 133, 147, 155, 173, 225, colonialism 26, 189, 317 234, 242 Comecon see CMEA bullet train (Shinkansen) 175–76 Commission de la Recherche Technique Acier 251 cannons 179, 180 Fig. 6.1 Commission of Enquiry for European CAP see Common Agricultural Policy Union (CEEU) 2 cartels 17, 109, 189–96, 200–201, 294, Commission Internationale 304, 312 d’Agriculture (CIA) 52–53 anti-trust law 204–12 Committee on Intellectual railways 189–90 Cooperation 69 steel industry 189–96, 204–12, 214 Committee of Pioneers 51, 54 Fig. 6.10, 228, 298, 302 Committee for the Protection of transnational 189–91, 194, 254 Children and Young Persons 69 CENELEC 277, 290 Common Agricultural Policy Central Commission for Navigation on (CAP) 269–70, 271 Fig. 8.4, 280, the Rhine 4 288, 310 Central Industrial Region (COP) 93 Common Transport Policy 272 Central Office for International communication 27–31 Railway Transport 72 language 264 Fig. 8.3 CERN ix see also specific forms Chartism 23 communism 88, 89 Fig. 3.3, 105, 287 Chevalier, Michel 15, 30, 31–32, 33 goulash communism 235 Fig. 1.4, 34–35, 36 Fig. 1.5, 59, 114, Community method 295 128, 141, 304 competition 5, 11, 18, 24, 25, 27, 28, Système de la Méditérranée 34 30, 32, 39, 50, 90, 102, 130 Fig. 4.4, China 144, 174 Fig. 5.9, 175, 176, 242, 137, 164, 167–68, 189–90, 194–95, 307 197, 201, 203–8, 210, 213, 215, 241, Churchill, Winston 83, 280 244, 252–57, 284, 285 CIM see Berne Convention computing 284 Clayton, William 92 Conference of European Posts and Clémentel, Étienne 103 Telecommunications 307 Clerget, Pierre 254 Conrot, Eric 211 Club des Amis 252 consumers, tinkerers and rebels 10 Club des Sidérurgistes 211 Continental Railway Association 128

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Convention de Bruxelles (1953) 206 deregulation 254, 307 Conventional Internationale determinism 59 concernant le Transport des dictatorships 74–77 Merchandises par chemins de fer diplomats 50–58 (C.I.M.) see Berne Convention Drummond, Eric 66 cooperation 252–57 Düsseldorf Agreement (1939) 195, 204 Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls East Germany (CoCom) 230, 233 railways 162–63 Coppé, Albert 251 steel industry 245 core Europe 103, 104, 108, 111, 212–13, East-Central Europe 214 Fig. 6.10, 215–17, 260 Fig. 8.1, Gaullism 234, 235 265, 267, 278, 281, 299, 301, 303, railways 161–65, 168 Fig. 5.7 308 Wagon Pool 302 Corinth Canal 92 Fig. 3.4 East–West trade 220–23 Cort, Henry 182 Eastern Europe 93–103 Corus group 254 see also CMEA; and individual Council of Ministers 108 countries Council for Mutual Economic Economic and Financial Organization Assistance see CMEA (EFO) of League of Nations 69, 79 cross-border activities see transnational economic restructuring 310 networks economics 61, 97 Crystal Palace exhibition (1851) 26 ECSC 4, 10, 11, 16 Fig. I.5, 17, 87, 104, Fig. 1.2, 27, 28 Fig. 1.3, 29, 30–31, 106 Fig. 3.8, 109, 204, 251, 252, 179, 180 Fig. 6.1 259, 293, 303, 306–7, 308 currency convertibility 275 Commission de la Recherche customs union 275–78, 280 Technique Acier 251 Czechoslovakia 60, 87, 88, 96, 102 Consultative Committee 251, 261 Little Entente alliance 147 experts 261 Fig. 8.2 railways 161–62, 163–65 export cartel 302 steel cooperation with High Authority 104, 109, 205, Belgium 219–20, 255, 256 206–10, 251, 260, 262–63, 266, 278, wagon pooling 154 297, 309 Czechslovak Communist Party 95 integration 265–66 Parliamentary Assembly 107 Danube Commission 65 US support for 266 de Gaulle, Charles 108, 109–10, 207, EFTA see European Free Trade 273, 276, 280, 282 Association de-politicization 9 Fig. 0.3, 136, 146, electric steel-making 234 Fig. 7.4 256 embedded liberalism 5, 81, 83, 205, Declaration on the Construction of 296, 304 Main European International “Empty Chair” crisis 108, 207, 273 Traffic Arteries 4 Enfantin, Prosper 32, 34 Decugis, Henri 201 engineers 1, 2–5, 29–31, 42, 60, 71, Dehnen, Hermann 210 74–75, 114, 131, 179, 181, 213 Delors, Jacques 273, 286 professional organizations 236 Delwig, Hans von 254 Fig. 7.5, 247, 251 democracy 308, 309 Fig. 9.4, 310–13 railways 7, 115, 117–22, 123 Fig. 4.3, Den Hollander, F.Q. 171 124–25, 134 Fig. 4.5 Denmark 282, 302, 309 roads 2–5 wagon pooling 170 steel industry 183–84, 186, 187

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Enlightenment 25–26 European Parliament 107, 108, 311 Environmental Action Programmes of European Payments Union 90 European Community 278 European Productivity Agency environmental protection 245–46 (EPA) 90 Errera, Jacques 249 European Rail Makers’Association Esperanto 58 (ERMA) 190 esprit de corps 212, 213, 228 European Recovery Program (ERP) 87, Etzel, Franz 208, 263, 264 88, 89 Fig. 3.3, 90, 91, 92 Fig. 3.4 Eurafrique 303 European Round Table of Euratom 103, 267 Industrialists 285 Euro-centrism 14 European Steel Association Eurofer see European Steel Association (Eurofer) 211, 252, 307 Eurofima 166, 171 European Telecommunications EUROP wagon pool 160 Fig. 5.5, 168 Standards Institute 307 Fig. 5.7, 170, 173 European Time-Table Conferences 129 Europabus initiative 171–72 European Travel Commission 272 European Central Inland Transport Fig. 8.5, 274 Fig. 8.6 Organization (ECITO) 84–85, 149, European Union x, 1, 259–90, 293, 305 327–28 Fig. 9.3 breakup of 155–56 democratic deficit 10 postwar return of rail wagons 151 ECSC High Authority as model Fig. 5.4, 152–58 for 260, 262–63 Wagon Exchange internal market 284–87 Commission 154–55 market integration 275–78 European Coal Organization supranationalism 260 Fig. 8.1, (ECO) 84–85, 205 262–68 European Coal and Steel Community European Wagon Pool 166 see ECSC see also EUROP wagon pool European Commission 110, 205, Europeanism 297 Fig. 9.1 268–69, 279, 297, 304, 309, 311 Europeanization x, xi, 160 Fig. 5.5, Legal Service 110–11 170, 315 European Committee for Eurozone 1 Electrotechnical Standardization experts 6 Fig. 0.2, 24–25, 42–44, 46, see CENELEC 50–58, 295–300 European Company for the Financing and dictatorships 74–77 of Railway Rolling Stock see ECSC 261 Fig. 8.2 Eurofima gender bias 42, 261 Fig. 8.2 European Court of Justice 109, 111, postwar return of rail wagons 151 289, 295, 298 Fig. 5.4, 152–58 Cassis de Dijon case 111 see also individual experts and Van Gend en Loos case 109, 110 organizations European Defence Community export quotas 206 (EDC) 107, 265 European Economic Area 287 Fahm, Joseph 156 European Economic Community federalism 105, 107, 268 (EEC) 17, 87, 109, 267, 276, 293, Federation of Italian Agrarian 303, 308 Cooperatives 55 European Free Trade Association finalité politique 92 (EFTA) 269, 275, 280, 281–82, 302 Finland 280, 287, 302 European Movement 105, 110 Fig. 3.9, First International Scientific 268 Management Conference 60

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First World War ix, 1, 8, 15, 47, 59–60, Verein Deutscher 61, 62, 63 Fig. 2.3, 72, 82, 175, 189, Eisenbahnverwaltungen 11, 197–98, 301, 305, 306 35–36, 72, 74, 121, 122–29, 143–44, Food and Agriculture Organization 147, 296 (FAO) 270 Verein Deutscher Ford Foundation 105 Eisenhüttenleute 187, 246 France 37, 62, 64, 87, 94, 203, 216, 303 wagon pooling 154 communism 88 Gerö, Ernö 94 engineers 31 Gerstner, Franz Anton von 114, 115 industrial exhibitions 27 Fig. 4.1, 116–17 Planning Commissariat 205 Gheorghita, Stefan 254 Railway Administration 73 globalization x, 13–14, 18, 44–45, 288, railways 35, 73, 128, 129, 133, 135, 310 137, 171 Göring, Hermann 212 road transport 2 Gosplan 99, 244 steel industry 193, 211 Gottwald, Klement 221 trade liberalization 30 goulash communism 235 wagon pooling 154 governance 17, 46, 209, 306, 310, 315 Franco-British Allied Coordination Great Depression 2, 74, 266, 275 Committee 82 Great Eastern Railway Company Franco-German Information and 128 Documentation Committee 192 Great War see First World War free trade 22, 25–26, 42 Greece 88, 89 Fig. 3.3, 92 Fig. 3.4, 225, see also European Free Trade 229, 250, 280, 302 Association Green Pool 270 Frejka, Ludvík 221 Greenwood, Hamar (1st Viscount Freundlich, Emma 200 Greenwood) 187 Friedrich Krupp AG 179, 180 Fig. 6.1 Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) 307 Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia 22 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques 211 Gaudet, Michel 110, 262 gauge width on railways 118–19, 120 Haas, Robert 69–70, 73 Fig. 4.2, 121, 148 Fig. 5.2 Hafner, Matthew 254 General Agreement on Tariffs and Hafraba 2, 3 Trade (GATT) 90, 205, 222, 275, Hague Peace Conference (1899) 16 Fig. 279 I.5, 58 Germany 54, 55, 87, 216, 303 Hallstein, Walter 107–8, 111 anti-CAP protests 271 Fig. 8.4 Hantós, Elemér 146–47 Berlin sewage system 36 Fig. 1.5 harmonization 304 cartels 191, 192 Fig. 6.8 railways 168 Fig. 5.7, 172 Fig. 5.8, East see East Germany 176 Imperial Railway Office 132 standards 276–77 industrial exhibitions 27 technical 285–87, 289–90 Max Planck Institute für trade 276 Eisenforschung 247 Harrand, Georges 156 Nazi Party see Nazi Germany Health Organization of League of railways 133, 135, 138, 166 Nations 69 Reichsbahn 166, 174 health and sanitation 36 Fig. 1.5 steel industry 193–94, 212 Hellwig, Fritz 263 Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn- Helsinki Accords (1975) 282 Techniker 124 hidden integration 4–5, 45 Fig. 1.8

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high-speed trains 173, 174 Fig. 5.9, international machinery 7, 8, 59, 64 175–77 fragility of 44, 46–47 Hirsch, Julius 198 see also individual aspects Hitler, Adolf 2, 75 Fig. 2.6, 79, 109, international organizations 9, 223–25, 166, 195, 205 243–47 Hobsbawn, Eric ix see also specific organizations Holocaust 256 International Rail Makers’ railways’ role in 150 Fig. 5.3, 166 Association 190 Hondelink, Englebert Roger 149–50, International Railway Company 155, 158, 173, 175 for Refrigerated Transport see Hungarian Revolution 102 Interfrigo Hungary 54, 55, 87, 88, 100, 103, 283 International Railway Congress Ikarus bus 238, 239 Fig. 7.6 Association 137 railways 126, 133 international regime complexity 298 hybrid technological zones 299 Fig. 9.2 International Road Federation 4 International Sleeping Car IG Farben 202 Company 129 IIA see International Institute of International Steel Cartel (ISC) 192, Agriculture 195 Ikarus bus 238, 239 Fig. 7.6 International Telegraph Union see Imperial Railway Office 132 Telegraph Union industrial classes 32 international travel 272 Fig. 8.5, 274 industrial espionage 182 Fig. 8.6 industrialism 31, 308 International Union of Railway industrialization 21, 24, 27–28, 30, 31, Wagons (RIV/RIC) 142–43, 159, 32, 44, 76, 95–97, 180 Fig. 6.1, 184 162, 168 Fig. 5.7 Fig. 6.4, 187, 213, 225, 229, 242, internationalism 7–8, 59, 301, 307, 313 254, 301, 312 technocratic see technocratic Inland Transport Committee 156–58, internationalism 159, 160, 163, 170, 171, 172 internationalization 13–14 Inland Transport Railway interpreters 264 Fig. 8.3 Sub-Committee 158–59 investment 225–31 input legitimacy 311 Ireland 280, 302 institutions 295–300 Iron Curtain 83, 253, 308 Interfrigo 171 see also Cold War Intermetall 233, 235, 236 Fig. 7.5, iron industry 180 Fig. 6.1, 181 237–38, 240 Fig. 6.2, 182, 226–27 internal market 284–87 Bessemer process 184–85, 188 International Agricultural Congress 52 Fig. 6.6, 6.7 International Chamber of Commerce puddling 181 Fig. 6.2, 182–83 (ICC) 195 Siemens-Martin process 185 International Court of standardization 186 Arbitration 199 Thomas-Gilchrist process 185 International Cooperative Alliance 200 see also steel industry international cooperation 63 Fig. 2.3 Italy 2, 50, 87 International Federation of Christian agriculture 51–52 Trade Unions 200 communism 88 International Institute of Agriculture European Movement 105 (IIA) 15, 47, 49, 52 Fig. 2.1, 54–58, nationalism 67 65, 270, 301 railways 35, 119, 133, 135, 142, International Labour Organisation 171 (ILO) 2, 68, 197, 199, 266 wagon pooling 154–55, 170

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Japan 108, 284–85, 307 Linjebuss 172 Shinkansen (bullet train) 175–76 Linz–Budweis railway 115 Fig. 4.1 Jouhaux, Léon 200 Linz-Donawitz process 232 Fig. 7.3 List, Friedrich 23–24, 114–15, Kaftan, Kurt 2–3, 6, 7 117 Kaiser Ferdinand Northern Little Entente alliance 147 Railway 119 Locarno Treaty 193, 197 Kalina, Jan 164–65 Long Twentieth Century, The x Kennedy Round 275, 279 Loucheur, Louis 60, 199 Keynes, John Maynard 61 Louis-Philippe of France 22 Kissinger, Henry 281 Loveday, Alexander 80 knowledge transfer see technology Low-Voltage Directive 277, 289, 289 transfer Fig. 8.8 Kocsis, József 235 Lubin, David 49–52, 55, 56 Fig. 2.2, Kohnstamm, Max 210, 263 317 Korean War 163, 223, 226 Luca, Vasile 94 Krupp, Alfred 180–81 Lueg, Ernst 254 Kwiatkowski, Eugeniusz 94 Lukač, Branko 156 Luxembourg 87, 216 Lammers, Clemens 197–98, 200–202 railways 133 Lange, Oskar 99 steel industry 193, 211 language 264 Fig. 8.3 wagon pooling 154, 170 Lankáš, Otakar 146 luxury projects 2 League of Nations 15, 17, 47, 51, 61, Luzzatti, Luigi 51, 53, 54 62, 64, 66, 73–74, 77, 81 Fig. 3.1, 108, 141, 159, 175, 191, 194, 252, Maastricht Treaty 108, 286, 288 262, 266, 303, 312 McDougall, Frank Lidgett 80 Commission of Enquiry for Macmillan, Harold 280 European Union (CEEU) 2 macro-economics 97 Distribution Commission 143 Mance, Osborne 60, 141–42, 147–49, Economic and Financial 158, 173, 175 Organization (EFO) 69, 79 Manchester liberalism 24 Locarno Treaty 193, 197 Manifesto di Ventotene 105 Permanent Court of International Marjolin, Robert 278 Justice 109 market integration 275–78 technocratic working method 67–74 market liberalization 18 World Disarmament Conference 79 Marlio, Louis 202 World Economic Conferences 67, Marshall, George W. 88 144, 195, 196 Fig. 6.9, 197–204 Marshall Plan 87, 88, 89 Fig. 3.3, 90, League of Nations Society 62 96, 209, 211, 253, 281 Lecourt, Robert 110–11 Martin, John 185 Fig. 6.5 Lemaire, Maurice 271 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue 147 Leverve, Gaston 146 Max Planck Institute für Levrishchev, Alexander Eisenforschung 247 Andreyevich 99 Mayrisch Committee 193 liberal internationalists 8, 25 Mayrisch, Emile 192–93, 195 liberalism 23, 32 Metternich, Klemens von 22 embedded 5, 81, 83, 205, 296, 304 Meyer, Aloyse 202 Manchester 24 migration 10, 51, 54 liberalization 18, 307, 310 Mikoyan, Anastas 96, 99 trade 30, 275 Minc, Hilary 83, 94, 95, 99 Liechtenstein 287 Mitteleuropa 147

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Mitteleuropäische Verkehrstagung Orient Express 58, 129 conference (1926) 146 output legitimacy 309 Molotov Plan 96 oxygen steel-making 232 Fig. 7.3, Molotov, Vyacheslav 96, 97–98 233 Monnet, Jean 10, 63 Fig. 2.3, 66, 82, Oyevaar, Jan 157 84, 103–4, 105, 205, 208, 209, 225, 259, 260 Fig. 8.1, 261–65, 278, 293, pacifism 61–62 297, 306 Pader, Georges 156 Montemartini, Giovanni 51, 53 Pantaleoni, Maffeo 51, 53, 55 Moro, Aldo 282 Paris Commission 69–70 motorways 2, 3 Fig. 0.1 Paris exhibitions (1855–1900) multi-level governance 310 29–30 Münster, Ernst zu 113 Paris-Lyon railway 34 Mussolini, Benito 2, 56 Fig. 2.2 Permanent Court of International Myrdal, Gunnar 84 Fig. 3.2, 85–87, Justice 109 220, 221, 223–24, 245, 256, 278 Permanent International Association of Road Congresses 2 Nagelmackers, George 129 Permanent Transit Committee 70 Naumann, Friedrich 147 permissive consensus 309 Naumann, Werner P. 254 Peugeot Vroomster 241 Nazi Germany 76, 80, 88, 108, 166, Fig. 7.7 167, 212, 263 Peyerimhoff, Henri de 199 neoliberalism 256 plastics 241 Fig. 7.7 Nesselrode, Karl 22 Poensgen, Ernst 187 Netherlands 87 Poland 60, 76, 80, 82–83, 87, 88, 93, 96, railways 133, 171 100, 103, 283 steel industry 227–28 Nowa Huta steel works 230 wagon pooling 154, 170 Fig. 7.1, 231 non-tariff barriers 111, 276, 277, 286 postwar reconstruction 153 North Atlantic Treaty Organization railways 162–63 (NATO) 287 Polish Central Planning Board 95 Norway 282, 287 pollution 245–46 polytechniciens 32–33 OECD 101–2, 225–26, 228, 248–49, 281 popular participation 311 OEEC 16, 87, 88–93, 97, 99, 101–3, 209, Portugal 280, 302 211, 224–26, 228–29, 242, 248–51, iron industry 226–27 252, 281–82, 298 railways 119 Open Door Policy 205 steel industry 242 OPW wagon exchange system 168 Postal Union 36, 43–44, 57, 58, 62, 65, Fig. 5.7, 173 301, 306 ordo-liberals 205 postwar reconstruction 58–62 Organisation for Co-operation PPV wagon return system 162 between Railways (OSJD) 233–34 privatization 18, 285, 307, 310 Organization for Communication and productivity growth 284 Transit see Transit Organization protectionism 50, 275, Organisation for Economic 283–84 Cooperation and Development see Prussia see Germany OECD puddling 181 Fig. 6.2, 182 Organisation for European Economic Puricelli, Piero 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12–13 Cooperation see OEEC Fig. 0.4 Organisation Todt 7 Pusey, Philip 27

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railway engineers 123 Fig. 4.3, 124–25 St. Petersburg–Tsarskoe Selo railway wagons line 115, 116 East-Central European Wagon Settlement procedures 329–30 Pool 302 Simplon tunnel 33 Fig. 1.4, 35 EUROP wagon pool 160 Fig. 5.5, technological zones 128–33, 134 166, 168 Fig. 5.7, 170, 173 Fig. 4.5, 135 Europeanization of 160 Fig. 5.5 tension mediation 121–22, 123 OPW exchange system 168 Fig. 5.7, Fig. 4.3, 124–28 173 transnational collaboration 135, 136 postwar return 151 Fig. 5.4, 152–58 Fig. 4.7, 137–38 PPV return system 162 Wagons-Lit 129 RIV/RIC 142–43, 159, 162, 168 Western Europe 165–73 Fig. 5.7 Raineri, Giovanni 55 Soviet Bloc 162–63 Reisch, Paul S. 8, 14 standardization of 170–71 Remy, Friedrich 182 Wagon Exchange research collaboration 247–52 Commission 154–55, 169 RIV/RIC see International Union of railways 4, 7, 11, 33 Fig. 1.4, 34, 71–72, Railway Wagons 73, 82, 113–38, 141–77, 300 road transport 2, 3 Fig. 0.1, 4, 10, American system 116–18 12–13 Fig. 0.4 Berlin–Baghdad line 138 engineers 2–5 cartels 189–90 Ikarus bus 238, 239 Fig. 7.6 competing transnational motorways 2, 3 Fig. 0.1 organizations 144–51 signposting 72 Fig. 2.5 East-Central Europe 161–65 Röchling, Hermann 212 engineers 7, 115, 117–22, 123 Rockefeller Foundation 246 Fig. 4.3, 124–25, 134 Fig. 4.5 Rollman, Tony 208–10, 211, 219, gauge width 118–19, 120 Fig. 4.2, 220–22, 226, 255, 256, 263 121, 148 Fig. 5.2 Romagnoli, Giuseppe 41 Fig. 1.7 global connections 173–77 Romania 98 goods transport 161–62, 163 Little Entente alliance 147 Fig. 5.6, 164–65, 171, 330 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 79, 104 harmonization 168 Fig. 5.7, 172 New Deal 80–81, 104 Fig. 5.8, 176 Röpke, Wilhelm 256 high-speed trains 173, 174 Fig. 5.9, Rossi, Ernesto 105 175–77 Rostow, Eugene 86, 221–22 Holocaust transports 150 Fig. 5.3, Rostow, Walt 83–84 166 Royal Agricultural Society 27 Iberian gauge 119 Royal Society of Arts 27 Kaiser Ferdinand Northern Rózański, Henryk 154 Railway 119 Rudinger, Lisa 219–20 Linz–Budweis line 115 Fig. 4.1 Rudinger, Zdenek 219–20, 221, 255, local lines 115–21 256 old divisions 158–61 Rudziński, Jacek 83 Orient Express 58, 129 Russia see Soviet Union Paris–Lyon line 34 Rüstow, Alexander 256 passenger transport 161–62, 164–65, 171–72, 329–30 St. Gotthard tunnel 129, 130 Fig. 4.4, rolling stock see railway wagons 131 St. Gotthard tunnel 129, 130 St. Petersburg–Tsarskoe Selo Fig. 4.4, 131 railway 115, 116

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Saint-Simonism 31–34, 35, 36 Fig. 1.5, Spain 54, 280 51, 114, 127 Centro Naçional de Investigaciones Salewski, Wilhelm 263 Metalurgicas 247 Salter, Arthur 60, 63 Fig. 2.3, 64–65, railways 119 79, 103–4, 141, 191, 192, 195, 259, Speer, Albert 75 Fig. 2.6, 76 305 Spinelli, Altiero 105 Santa Cruz, Calixto de 119 Stalin, Josef 76, 87, 88, 96, 97, 99, 154, Schaus, Lambert 273 163, 224 Schneider Creusot 179, 196 Fig. 6.9 Stańczyk, Jan 83 Schuman Plan 211, 225, 264 Standing Committee for Black Schuman, Robert 103, 107, 265 Metallurgy 235 scientific expertise 312 Stead, William T. 7, 58–59 Second World War ix, 2, 8, 14, 61, 64, Steel Committee 221, 224, 225, 226, 75, 76, 105, 166, 175, 176, 206, 211, 227, 229, 244 215, 242, 247, 252, 274, 301 steel industry 82, 86, 180 Fig. 6.1, 182, postwar return of rail wagons 151 183 Fig. 6.3, 185 Fig. 6.5, 224, 300 Fig. 5.4, 152–58 AIRBO international blast furnace Seering, Max 52 project 247, 251, 253 Serrarens, P.J.S. 199–200 Americanization of 205–6, 215, 306 Serruys, Daniel 197, 201 cartels 189–96, 204–12, 214 Fig. 6.10, shared history 9 228, 298, 302 Sherman Act (1890) 215 competition 252–57 Shinkansen (bullet train) 175–76 electric steel-making 234 Fig. 7.4 shipbuilding 243 Fig. 7.8 engineers 183–84, 186, 187 Shipping Commissariat 63 Fig. 2.3, falling demand 240, 241 Fig. 7.7 64–65, 70, 80, 82, 86, 104, 297, 305 investment 225–31 Short Twentieth Century, The ix nationalization 253–54 Siemens-Martin process 185, 231 open-hearth furnaces 231 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.2 oxygen steel-making 232 Fig. 7.3, signposting 72 Fig. 2.5 233 Simplon tunnel 33 Fig. 1.4, 35 quotas 193 Single European Act 108, 286 shipbuilding 243 Fig. 7.8 Slánský, Rudolf 94, 95, 96 Fig. 3.5, 99 Siemens-Martin process 185, 231 SMGS see Agreement on International Fig. 7.2 Goods Transport by Rail socialist division of labour 237–38, Smith, John Prince 23 239 Fig. 7.6 SMPS see Agreement on International standardization 186 Passenger Transport by Rail Taylor-White process 185 Smuts, Jan 62, 66 technological cooperation 219–57 Sobieszczański, Stanislaw 157 transnational cartels 189–91 socialist division of labour 237–38, 239 Stephenson, George 118–19 Fig. 7.6, 285 Stieler, Carl 166 Société Française de Métallurgie 247 Stoppani, Pietro 2, 80 Sofia Principle 239 Subercase, José 119 South Korea 242 Subercase, Juan 119 Soviet Union 76, 87, 88, 95, 98 Fig. 3.6 supranationalism 260 Fig. 8.1, 262–68 railways 133, 161, 163 Fig. 5.6 surcharge crisis 282 steel industry 224, 246 Sweden 280, 282, 287, 302 training centres 101 Fig. 3.7 Switzerland 282, 287, 306 Sovietization 161–62 railways 133, 135, 171 Špaček, Stanislav 60 wagon pooling 170

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Sybelac 221, 222 Trans Europ Express network 171 Syndicat Belge de l’Acier 206 Transit Organization 68 Fig. 2.4, 69–73 Taccone, Domenico 254 transnational cartels 189–91, 194, 254 Taiwan 242 transnational circulation xi tariffs 25–26, 91, 276 transnational collaboration 135, 136 Tata Steel 86, 254 Fig. 4.7, 137–38, 247, 248 Fig. 7.9, Taylor, Frederick W. 185–86 249–52 Taylor-White process 185 transnational networks 7, 42, 60, Technical Advisory Committee on 300–303, 306 Inland Transport (TACIT) 149 transnational voluntary technical cooperation 63 Fig. 2.3 organizations 9, 295 technical harmonization 285–87, Treaty of Paris 263 289–90 Trendelenburg, Ernst 198 technification 6–7, 87, 152, 213, 257 trente glorieuses 304, 308 technocracy 5, 308, 309 Fig. C.4, Truman, Harry S. 88 310–13 Tsar Nicholas I of Russia 114 technocratic internationalism 7, 17, 60, Turkey 89 Fig. 3.3 165–66, 173, 213, 267 origins of 21–46 UIC see Union International des railways 163 Fig. 5.7 Chemins de fer technocratic working methods 67–74 UK 282, 302, 309 technological innovation 232–43, 284 as “awkward partner” 302, 303 technological zones 12–13 Fig. 0.4, Commonwealth 279 278–84, 299 Fig. 9.2, 300–303 Foreign Office 64, 279 technology transfer 29, 180–83, 184 Great Eastern Railway Fig. 6.4, 185–89, 243–47 Company 128 Telegraph Union 36, 37, 38 Fig. 1.6, railways 117, 171 39–40, 41 Fig. 1.7, 42–43, 44–45 War Cabinet 62, 64 Fig. 1.8, 57, 58, 296, 301, 306, 307 Ukraine 231 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 104 UNECE 3, 4, 9 Fig. 0.3, 16, 76, 82, Terpieszew, Dobryj 94 84–87, 156–58, 219, 224–25, 236 Thatcher, Margaret 286 Fig. 7.5, 240, 246, 252–53, 254, Theunis, George 201 255–56 Third World 273 annual reports 244–45 Thomas, Albert 2, 60 Steel Committee 221, 224, 225, 226, Thomas, Sidney 185 227, 229, 244 Thomas-Gilchrist process 185 Union International des Chemins TIR Carnet 274 Fig. 8.6 de fer (UIC) 73, 90, 144–47, 145 Tito, Josep Broz 234 Fig. 5.1, 156, 159, 160–61, 163–64, Tocqueville, Alexis de 28–29 165–67, 169, 174, 176, 270, 298 Todt, Fritz 2, 7, 76 Unité Technique 72, 135 totalitarianism 74–77 United Nations 76, 82 tourism 272 Fig. 8.5, 274 Fig. 8.6 Economic Commission for Europe trade, East–West 220–23 see UNECE trade barriers 276 Economic and Social Council 76, non-tariff 111, 276, 277, 286 82–83 tariffs 25–26, 91, 276 Food and Agriculture Organization Trade Barriers Committee 195 (FAO) 270 trade liberalization 30, 275 Relief and Rehabilitation trade unions 197, 199–200, 266–67 Administration (UNRRA) 85

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Universal Postal Union see Postal Voznesensky, Nikolaj Alekseevich 93, Union 95, 96, 97 urbanization 24 Urx, Richard 163–64, 167 Wagon Exchange Commission 154–55, USA 169 Americanization of European Wagons-Lit 129 industry 205–6, 215, 306 Wall Street Crash (1929) 203 Association of American war see individual wars Railroads 176 Waring, H.W.A. 244 fears of Europe as superpower 281 Wellenstein, Edmond 261 railways 116–18 Wellesley, Arthur (Lord Rockefeller Foundation 246 Wellington) 179 Sherman Act (1890) 215 West European Telegraph Union Tennessee Valley Authority 37 (TVA) 104 Western Europe 103–8 Wall Street Crash (1929) 203 railways 165–73 Western European Entente van der Rest, Pierre 246 Internationale de l’Acier Van Zeeland, Marcel 222, 255–56 (EIA) 191–92 Van Zeeland, Paul 256 Whistler, George Washington 118 Verein see Verein Deutscher Wiedenfeld, Kurt 198 Eisenbahnverwaltungen Wilson, Woodrow 61 Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn- Woolf, Leonard 62 Techniker 124 World Disarmament Conference Verein Deutscher 79 Eisenbahnverwaltungen 11, World Economic Conferences 67, 144, 35–36, 72, 74, 121, 122–29, 143–44, 195, 196 Fig. 6.9, 197–204 147, 296 world exhibitions 26 Fig. 1.2, 27, 28 Verein Deutscher Fig. 1.3, 29–31 Eisenhüttenleute 187, 246 World Financial and Economic Verein zur Vorbereitung der Conference (1933) 79 Autostrasse Hansestäde- World Steel Association 307 Frankfurt-Basel see Hafraba Versailles Peace Conference 15, 61, 69 Young Plan (1929) 67–68 Versailles Treaty 60, 73, 76, 79 Yugoslavia 234, 235–36 Vienna Congress (1814–1815) 113 Little Entente alliance 147 Viking Continentbus 172 railways 142 Vittorio Emanuele III of Italy 49, 51–52 voting 42–43 Zollverein 23–24, 189

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