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1 2 3 4 5 Freedom From Fear Magazine Not in our name The lost generation of violent extremists

freedomfromfearmagazine.org [email protected] unicri.it

6 It is easier to lead men to combat, stirring up their passions, than to restrain them and direct them toward the patient labors of peace

André Gide

7 Editorial Board UNICRI Cindy J. Smith Marina Mazzini Leif Villadsen

Max-Planck Institute Hans-Jörg Albrecht Ulrike Auerbach Michael Kilchling

Editorial Team Alberto Mallardo Marina Mazzini Annelies Pauwels

Graphic and layout Beniamino Garrone

Website designer Davide Dal Farra

Social Media Fabrizio De Rosa

Disclaimer The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and positions of the United Nations. Authors are not responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication. Contents of the publication may be quoted or reproduced, provided that the source of information is acknowledged. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations and UNICRI, concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific institutions, companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the Secretariat of the United Nations or UNICRI in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

Photographers

UN Photo Botts, Rick Bajornas, Devra Berkowitz , Teddy Chen, DB, Marco Dormino, Bikem Ekberzade, Loey Felipe, Paulo Filgueiras, Mark Garten, Milton Grant, John Isaac, Tobin Jones, Michael Keats, Anne-Laure Lechat, Ramadaan Mohamed, Stuart Price, J. Robaton, Evan Schneider, Philip Teuscher, ZAK.

Flickr 2ndeye, Asian Development Bank, Clément Brunneval, Can-, Stefano Corso, Rawle C. Jackman, Gisella Klein, Pro Juventute, Jake Stimpson, Taichiro Ueki, United States Forces Iraq, West Midlands Police.

Other: Ernest Harsch.

8 Why

Cindy J. Smith Director

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

A call for real heroes

Today the sound of the unsheathed scimitar gives rhythm to the videos produced by ISIS. Watching the videos’ merciless acts we ask ourselves “How is it possible a human being can generate such level of horror? How is it possible a person with a family, with dreams and skills has come to the point that the life of another human being is worth nothing?

The nexus of desensitization, dehumanization, and disengaged youth is a lethal combination. The desensitization to violence through repeated exposure via sight (e.g., videos, computer games, television) and sound, (e.g., music) has been a topic of research for several decades, with the majority of findings indicating that there is a reduced reaction to the stimuli – thus desensitization. When this is combined with the dehumanizing process, which also is found in the same media, it appears logical that those who are less sensitive to violence would be easier and more quickly moved through the process of dehumanizing another group of people. Dehumanization is the process of demonizing the perceived enemy or systematically reducing one group of people to a level of subhuman or animal, which allows the humans to treat the subhumans as dangerous game animals to be hunted and exterminated. The dehumanizing process has been used for centuries to legitimize unspeakable acts of violence on one group of people by another group (e.g., Nazi’s against the Jews and the Roma; Khmer Rouge against the “enemies” of the revolution; Hutus’s against Tutsis during Rwandan Civil War). But who does these acts? Who is most likely to join in the hunt? Each person has a “pile of empathy” in their mind, which helps them react appropriately when violent acts are observed or heard. Those whose “pile” is already eroded would be the easiest to persuade to join in the hunt. In other words, those who are already disengaged from their family and greater society are more likely to grasp at the promises of belonging and contributing to a group. When the desensitization process joined with dehumanizing rhetoric meets the disengaged and searching youth, and significant protective factors are not available, a lethal result may be looming.

Recruiters use various methods to pass their message. For example, they may use beheadings and cru- cifixions in the media to demonstrate power. These shocking images serve multiple purposes, including the step by step desensitization where horror becomes acceptable. A toxic mix of medieval and video games imaginary is building an army. The individual dehumanization process is conducted through a series of incremental steps: the call of duty videos are followed by training and participation in collective acts of brutality. This is the initiation package offered to these searching youth.

9 © UN Photo/Rick Bajornas © UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz

The best candidates to join an army are those who have not yet discovered their path in life, those who need to belong to something, those who feel anxiety and stress about the future and those who feel angry and powerless because of injustice and suffering in many countries of the world. There are those who think they need to do something truly meaningful and unique: becoming a hero. Often they feel compelled to embrace together both a cause and a gun. Who are those best candidates? Certainly young people meet the profile. “So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight (…) raise your ambitions, O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue...” the words of the self-appointed caliph of the self proclaimed Islamic state attempt to appeal to this lack of belonging and desire to make a mark. Similarities can be seen with the thoughts of other brutal dictators: “To avoid parents being a retrograde force in the home, we must arm the child with an inner light so that he can repel this influence. Some fathers have escaped our hold for various reasons, but a young boy is still in our hands... The family unit must comply with centralised customs, ruled by revolutionary positions and traditions.” Saddam Hussain

“He alone, who owns the youth, gains the future (…). The weak must be chiselled away. I want young men and women who can suffer pain. A young German must be as swift as a greyhound, as tough as leather, and as hard as Krupp’s steel.” Adolf Hitler

Listening to the words of some of the indoctrinated youth of today also provides a chilling reminder of the success of the rhetoric. “All my brothers, come to jihad,” says a fighter, who has been identified as British. “Feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness that we are feeling.” They come from different places and background they speak different languages, they have different 10 Why

reasons to fight but finally find their answer and mission in an ideology that reminds us the one of Heart of Darkness “Exterminate all the brutes”! Suppress who is not part of the group of enlightened, those who have a different ideology, a different religion, or simply do not want to join!

There is a striking contrast in some of the images which are posted by ISIS, portraying the victim and the executioner. The victim is often a humanitarian aid worker or a journalist and often the executioner is a violent extremist. The similarities are many: both of them young, both devoted to their cause, both recruited over the internet and travelling from afar to assist in the cause and both believing that they are doing something to make the world a better place. After this, the contrast could not be clearer: the victim will be remembered for devoting their life to protect and shed light on the situation of the most vulnerable, while the executioner will be remembered for having murdered an innocent person in cold-blood. What if we start accepting some of the responsibility for the horror we are witnessing in many parts of the world with different extremists groups marching against civilians? If so, we, as a society, must address the root causes of the problem. We must work even harder against the rituals perpetuated on the internet. Unfortunately, until now while the global community engaged in discussion on human rights, development and peace, weapons and financial resources continued to flood into the hands of militants.

Those who use these weapons and resources and violate human rights are as guilty as those who collaborate in business with them. Both groups should face tangible sanctions, investigations and criminal trials.

Let us follow the example of the young people who are putting their life at stake to bring food and water to vulnerable populations. As a community, let us engage our youth to ensure they are seeking a sense of belonging or answering a call to “honor” that is peaceful. 11 Index Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists

{ Main Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and 14 what should we do? Clark McCauley and Sofia Moskalenko

Talking to terrorists: What drives young people to become foreign fighters for 24 ISIS and other terrorist groups and what can be done in response Anne Speckhard

The semiotics of violent jihadist propaganda: The message and the channel 29 Massimo Leone

Jihad as a lifestyle 34 Rik Coolsaet

The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence 40 Mia Bloom

Highlights

55 Children and armed conflict

F3 - Young

ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: Funding terrorism through art 64 Annelies Pauwels

The governance of Roma people in Italy: A shifting paradigm 72 Alberto Mallardo

Main

The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering? 80 Svenja Berg and Killian J. McCarthy

Dossier

Interview with the Mayor of Aarhus Jacob Bundsgaard 86 Marina Mazzini

12 Main } Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: Challenges and 90 opportunities, connectors and the transtheoretical model of change Basia Spalek

Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror’ 95 Ernest Harsch

Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges 100 Christophe Paulussen

Highlights

106 Football for peace

InFocus

Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: 111 Ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach Andrea Cerase, Elena D’Angelo, Claudia Santoro

Green corruption - More than “victimless” crimes 120 Vittoria Luda Di Cortemiglia and Annelies Pauwels

China strengthens the judiciary not the rule of law 126 Giovanni Nicotera

Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned 130 Bryan Lee

And more... 136 International events 140 UNICRI's Library selection

13 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do? by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko

In this paper we first put ISIS volunteers in context by considering other examples of Americans citizens fighting in someone else’s war. Next we consider poll results indicating that many U.S. Muslims perceive a war on Islam and prejudice against Muslims; at least ten percent of younger U.S. Muslims justify suicide attacks in defense of Islam. Against this background it is perhaps surprising that only a few hundred U.S. Muslims have volunteered to fight in Syria. In the absence of accurate data about U.S. volunteers, we review what has been learned about the thousands of European volunteers for ISIS, many of whom seem 14 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

to be pushed to action by individ- outrage over ISIS’s atrocities, War I and II long before the ual-level mechanisms described boredom with civilian life back United States officially declared by McCauley and Moskalenko home, dismay that an enemy war. In the Spanish Civil War in in 2011. Finally, we raise doubt they tried to neutralize is stron- the 1930s, Americans formed a about current efforts to crimi- ger than ever - they have offered contingent of more than 2,500 nalize and block would-be vol- themselves as pro bono advisers troops.” unteers. and riflemen in local militias.” In a more recent example, U.S. The article cites a Kurdish mi- citizens numbered about 2000 Precedents for volunteering in litia spokesman who estimated in the Israeli Defense Force at a foreign war that over 100 American citizens the time of the I.D.F. incursion A front page article in the New are fighting against ISIS in Syria. into Gaza Strip in 2014.2 In short York Times provides a useful The first thing to notice about there is history and precedent starting point for understanding this article is the blend of mo- for U.S. citizens volunteering to Western volunteers for combat tives described, in which emo- fight in someone else’s war. in the Middle East.1 “Unsettled tion and personal circumstanc- at Home, Veterans volunteer es are as important as political Many U.S. Muslims see a war to fight ISIS” describes a small opinion in moving individuals to on Islam and discrimination number of Americans, many of volunteer against ISIS. against Muslims them former military, who vol- In addition, this article about There have been two national polls unteered to fight against Islamic volunteers against ISIS differs of U.S. Muslims, the first in State in Iraq and Syria. “Driv- from articles about volunteers en by a blend of motivations— for ISIS by recognizing several 2 Eric McClam, “Americans fight for previous examples of American Israel as ‘lone soldiers’ in Gaza 1 Dave Phillips and Thomas James volunteers who joined armed Strip,” NBC News, July 22, 2014, Brennan, “Unsettled at home, http://www.nbcnews.com/sto- veterans volunteer to fight ISIS,” groups in another country. “Pi- ryline/middle-east-unrest/ameri- New York Times, March 12, 2015, pp. lots flew for the Allies in World cans-fight-israel-lone-soldiers-ga- A1, A12. za-strip-n161441. 15 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

2007 and the second in 2011; centage is small, the number of as justified often or sometimes both were conducted by the Pew U.S. Muslims with this extreme (11%, 16% vs. 8% for all U.S. Research Center. Each poll in- opinion is not negligible. Muslims in 2011). cluded over 1000 respondents The same two polls show that Of course 2007 and 2011 were in a representative sampling many U.S. Muslims do not feel years earlier than the rise of of U.S. Muslims that cost more accepted in the U.S. Most re- ISIS in 2014, and opinions of than a million dollars.3 Results spondents (53%, 55%) report U.S. Muslims may have changed. in 2007 and 2011 were broadly that being a Muslim in the U.S. is But the best polling data avail- similar. When asked about the more difficult since 9/11. About able indicate that antipathy to U.S. war on terrorism, about half a quarter (26%, 28%) say that the war on terrorism is not un- (55%, 41%) saw the war as “in- people have acted suspiciously common among U.S. Muslims, sincere.” When asked whether toward them, and about a fifth and justification for suicide suicide bombing or other vio- (15%, 22%) report being called bombing in defense of Islam is lence against civilians is justi- offensive names. In a land of not negligible, especially among fied to defend Islam from its immigrants, U.S. Muslims do not younger U.S. Muslims. Given enemies, a small minority (8% always feel welcome. this distribution of opinion, it is both times) said often or some- Muslims who do not feel wel- not surprising that some young times justified. This small mi- come in the U.S. are likely to U.S. Muslims might be ready to nority projects to 80,000 of the identify more as Muslims and take up arms in defense of Islam. approximately one million adult less as Americans. Especially But in fact, only a few turn to vi- U.S. Muslims. Although the per- younger Muslims, born in the olence. Only 100-150 U.S. Mus- U.S., are likely to be more open lims have joined or tried to join 3 The Pew Research Center, “Muslim to extreme opinions. Thus U.S.- ISIS.4 What distinguishes the Americans: No signs of growth in born Muslims and U.S.-born alienation or support for extremism,” August 30, 2011, http:// Black Muslims tend to be more 4 The White House Office of the people-press.org/files/2011/08/ open to seeing suicide bombing Press Secretary, “Press briefing by muslim-american-report.pdf. the Press Secretary Josh Earnest,

16 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do? few volunteers and would-be countries represent the largest wooed from crime and drugs to volunteers from the hundreds of contingent among the foreign- the promises of jihad. thousands of U.S. Muslims who ers. It is important to note that see the war on terrorism as a Western volunteers are at most war on Islam but do not volun- twenty percent of ISIS foreign Many young teer? fighters and U.S volunteers less people feel than one percent of ISIS fight- depressed and Only 100-150 U.S. ers. hopeless about Muslims have Coolsaet divides his analysis into push factors (situational pres- the future, and joined or tried to sures to leave home) and pull young Muslims join ISIS factors (the attractions exerted by ISIS). Cultural push factors in Europe are begin with the economic weak- Unfortunately there is currently particularly likely no report available that details ness and lack of job opportuni- the characteristics of the 150 U.S. ties that have afflicted Europe to drop out of volunteers. In the next section since 2010. we look instead at the character- school and fail to istics of European volunteers for It is important to find work. Right- ISIS. Study of European volunteers has profited by the fact that note that Western wing movements they are relatively numerous volunteers are in many European and that much more information about them is available. at most twenty countries make

Characteristics of European percent of ISIS many Muslims volunteers for ISIS foreign fighters feel unwelcome, The most recent and penetrat- ing report on Euro volunteers to and U.S volunteers even those born in ISIS estimates that nearly 4000 less than one Europe European youth, predominantly male, have gone to fight in Syria percent of ISIS 5 Then there are personal push since 2012. Coolsaet cites CIA fighters factors. As described by Cool- estimates according to which saet, these can be categorized ISIS has 20-30,000 fighters, in terms of the mechanisms of foreign fighters appear to ac- Many young people feel depressed and hopeless about the radicalization suggested by Mc- count for over half of these, and Cauley and Moskalenko.6 Po- fighters from Middle Eastern future, and young Muslims in Europe are particularly likely to litical grievance: some are out- raged by Western indifference 2/26/15,” February 26, 2015, https:// drop out of school and fail to find www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- work. Right-wing movements in to the plight of Sunni Muslims office/2015/02/26/press-briefing- many European countries make suffering from Shi’a in Iraq and press-secretary-josh-earnest-22615. many Muslims feel unwelcome, from Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite 5 Rik Coolsaet, “What drives Europe- minority government in Syria. ans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from even those born in Europe. The the Belgian case,” Egmont Royal result is a kind of jihad-cool Institute for International Rela- pop-culture: Young Muslim men 6 Clark McCauley and Sophia tions: Academia Press, March 2015, who feel hopeless, helpless, and Moskalenko, “Friction: How radi- http://www.egmontinstitute.be/ calization happens to them and us,” wp-content/uploads/2015/03/aca- discriminated against can be Oxford: Oxford University Press, demia-egmont.papers.75_16x24.pdf. 2011. 17 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do? Personal grievance: Even edu- tial volunteers carry with ISIS seemingly cated young Muslims with a job them. ISIS seemingly offers can feel the weight of white Eu- meaning, belonging, frater- offers ropean discrimination against nity, respect, status, adventure, Muslims. Love: some go to Syria heroism and martyrdom. It pro- meaning, because a friend or relative has vides an alternative to drugs and belonging, gone, or is going. Unfreezing: petty crime, and an alternative some have lost family, friends society with clear and straight- fraternity, respect, or job and seek new connections forward rules. It also offers status, adventure, in the brotherhood of men at material improvement: a salary war. Escape: some go to ISIS to and perhaps a villa with a pool. heroism and get away from debts or prison or It offers, for those who join in, family problems. Status and risk power over others, and, for those martyrdom seeking: some seek thrill and ad- who would never admit it, the Against a background of poverty, venture, and status as warriors. pleasure of sadism in the name pessimism, and perceived dis- Coolsaet tellingly describes this of a higher goal. Moral absolutes crimination in Europe, personal factor as the chance to go “from are part and parcel of the ISIS push factors move some young zero to hero.” attraction, and all the more so Muslims to action and ISIS of- After noting that Western hyper- to the extent that these can be fers the strongest promise of bole has given ISIS the cachet of applied immediately in large ar- personal success in a “success- “winner,” Coolsaet identifies the eas of Iraq and Syria. Osama bin ful” cause. In Coolsaet’s view, pull factors that bring volunteers Laden’s Al-Qaeda was never in Western volunteers for ISIS will to ISIS. a position to offer so much.7 diminish as its military successes diminish and the internal stress- Most important, it has a cat- 7 Rik Coolsaet, “What drives Euro- alogue of solutions on of- peans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case,” Egmont fer for every one of the Royal Institute for International be/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ personal motives the poten- Relations: Academia Press, March academia-egmont.papers.75_16x24. 2015, http://www.egmontinstitute. pdf. p.18.

18 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

© UN Photo/Michael Keats es of administering a would-be ing their Western country, some Also, blocking state increase. are caught after returning from Syria and Iraq. They are charged ISIS volunteers with something like support for ISIS offers the a terrorist organization and sent but not volunteers strongest promise to prison when convicted. joining other There are several downsides to of personal punishing ISIS volunteers. Dis- armed groups can success in a enchanted ISIS dropouts would alienate Muslims make credible spokespeople “successful” cause against setting out for Syria. But in Western effective persuasion is difficult What is to be done? to advance from a prison cell. countries With the notable exception of Also, blocking ISIS volunteers A case in point is Michael Ze- Denmark,8 Western govern- but not volunteers joining other haf-Bibeau, a Libyan-Canadian ments have begun to criminal- armed groups can alienate Mus- convert to Islam. In October ize volunteering for ISIS. Some lims in Western countries, who 2014 he went to Ottawa to apply Muslims are caught before leav- may see this distinction as anoth- for a Canadian passport but was er example of Western discrimi- held up as Canadian authorities 8 Simon Hooper, “Denmark introduc- nation against Muslims. Perhaps es rehab for Syrian fighters: An in- weighed concerns about wheth- most important, blocking their novative rehabilitation programme er he might go to Syria to join departure leaves would-be ISIS offers Danish fighters in Syria ISIS. He also applied for a Lib- an escape route and help without volunteers with a choice: forget yan passport renewal, and his prosecution,” Al Jazeera, Septem- about fighting for Islam, or stay ber 7, 2014, http://www.aljazeera. application was refused. Days home and attack fellow citizens com/indepth/features/2014/09/ later, on October 22, 2014, Ze- with whatever bomb, firearm, or denmark-introduces-rehab-syri- haf-Bibeau shot and fatally an-fighters-201496125229948625. automobile may be available. html. wounded a sentry at Ottawa’s 19 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; a short time later Zehaf-Bibeau was himself killed in an attempted attack on the Parliament Building.

Is it worth keeping individuals like Zehaf-Bibeau from going to join ISIS? As already noted, Western volunteers are a minority of ISIS fighters. If all Western volunteers were blocked, ISIS would persevere. Western governments are concerned about the threat of returned jihadists, but many volunteers will die and others will not be interested to return. It might be easier to keep track of returnees - even helping return- © UN Photo/Ramadaan Mohamed ees as the Danes do - than to pay the cost of domestic attacks by those blocked from joining ISIS. The authors It might be easier Clark McCauley is Professor of Psychology and Co-director of to keep track of the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at returnees - even Bryn Mawr College. He is Founding Editor Emeritus of the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. helping returnees Sophia Moskalenko is a Research Fellow at the National Con- as the Danes do sortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responces to Terrorism - than to pay the (NC-START) and a Research Associate at the Solomon Asch Cen- ter for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College cost of domestic (Bryn Mawr, PA). With Clark McCauley she has authored Fric- attacks by those tion, How radicalization changes them and us, as well as a number of research articles on political radicalization and terrorism. blocked from Communication relating to this paper to Clark McCauley, Psy- joining ISIS chology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, 19010, U.S.A. [email protected]

Acknowledgment. The preparation of this paper was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grant number N00140510629. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

20 21 © Flickr/ Scott Cresswell PREVENTING CRIME TO BUILD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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@CrimeCongress13 https://twitter.com/CrimeCongress13 23 facebook.com/UNCrimeCongress2015 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to become Foreign Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What can be Done in Response

Talking to terrorists: What drives young people to become foreign fighters for ISIS and other terrorist groups and what can be done in response by Anne Speckhard

24 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to become Foreign Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What can be Done in Response

The draw for young people to group’s ideology argues that the a desire for adventure, romance, join a terrorist group has never group’s political aim and pur- sex, purpose and personal signif- been as strong as it is today. I pose is so important to justify icance, a desire to be heroic or know because I have spent over the use of terrorist violence - even to live up to stereotypical a decade interviewing over four this is always argued wrongly gender roles. hundred terrorists around the because there is no cause ever world and, in the case of suicide that justifies intentionally at- bombers who are already dead, tacking civilians. Third is some There are interviewing their family mem- level of social support within numerous other bers, close associates and even the individual’s community for the hostages they held. My ques- choosing this path. And fourth motivators but tions always centered on what are the individual vulnerabili- trauma and put these (mostly young) people ties and motivations exposed to on the terrorist trajectory. Could the group, its ideology and its so- revenge are their movement along this tra- cial support. jectory have been prevented? primary Once on the trajectory, could I found that in conflict zones they have been moved back off individuals primarily resonate Recruiters in non-conflict zones it by some sort of intervention? to terrorist ideologies out of are also adept at bringing what is revenge and trauma that arises happening in the conflict zones From my research I learned first- out of violence they have en- into the discussion via raw video hand what makes up the prime dured or witnessed. There are footage and images of violence. ingredients of the terrorist cock- numerous other motivators but These can induce a secondary tail. First, there is a group with a trauma and revenge are prima- trauma if the individual relates political aim that has framed a ry. In non-conflict zones the to those in the conflict zones as problem and its solution in vio- motivators are more likely to “fictive kin” – that is like in the lent terms - a group that is will- include discrimination, margin- case of the Muslim ummah for ing to use terrorism. Second, the alization, frustrated aspirations, instance where downtrodden

25 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to become Foreign Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What can be Done in Response

Palestinians, Chechens, Kash- cepted (in some circles) narra- that keep him an active recruiter miris, Iraqis and Afghanis are tive that the West is attacking from beyond the grave. referred to as one’s brothers and and occupying Muslims, Islam sisters. itself and Islamic lands. Those ISIS is also peddling a vision of a who are facing perceived or real utopian state in which Muslims Belonging is also a big part of it. injustices and who are angered of all nationalities, ethnicities Youth often follow their peers over foreign policy decisions and races are brought together and some may simply want to be that don’t sit well with them, not to - according to their claim - part of what is becoming known surprisingly, may resonate to live under Islamic ideals. While as “jihadi cool” or “gansta” jihad. this message. the reality is a far cry from that, Likewise when young girls de- young women are called to come mand that their men be willing ISIS has taken it a full step fur- and marry “real men” - mujahi- to “martyr” themselves or join ther in claiming a Caliphate in deen - who are fighting to bring as mujahideen they may also the Middle East and capitalizing about this utopian ideal and the sign up - not for the promises on scriptures and beliefs about men are called to be the fighters of the virgins in paradise but for the end times. In their apoca- idealize this utopian vision and sex right now. lyptic vision they claim that ev- resonate to it. The women who ery Muslim has a duty to make go idealize their role to populate The current militant jihadi ac- “hijra” - that is moving to the the new Islamic State and sup- tors - namely al Qaeda and now place of jihad and fighting jihad. port their men, while the men ISIS have also become extreme- Anwar al-Awlaki, now killed by resonate to the idea of being ly adept at using ideology to mo- a U.S. drone strike in particular tough, strong and important. In tivate individuals both within lives on and continues to con- both cases frustrated individuals and outside of conflict zones to vince youth that militant jihad are being fed the hope of escap- join their cause. Both groups and joining groups like al Qaeda ing dull lives by stepping into an have mastered social media and or ISIS is their duty via his very adventure where they are prom- have hammered away on a now charismatic sermons still circu- ised the possibility of living up well-known and sadly well ac- lating on the Internet - messages to male and female ideals while 26 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to become Foreign Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What can be Done in Response living a pure and good Islamic teach youth how terrorist groups Disillusionment, existence. Of course, it never recruit and why intentional- materializes, but the young star ly attacking civilians is never a deradicalization struck recruits taking off for good answer. Nations may make Syria and Iraq can not know that mistakes and may cause collat- and disengagement - until he or she arrives. eral damage but a core value that in others can can be taught to inoculate youth serve as a learning Frustrated against the idea of terrorism is to teach that intentionally tar- example of why individuals are geting civilians is always wrong and then provide case examples not to engage being fed the hope that show clear ways to solve of escaping dull problems that do not include Since so much of today’s ter- violence and case examples of rorism in non-conflict zones is lives by stepping where terrorism failed terribly. motivated by a desire for signif- Similarly, we can work with for- icance, purpose, adventure, life into an adventure mer extremists and terrorists to meaning and to impress others tell their stories in compelling it is also wise to find tools to The fight against today’s terror- ways so other can learn why survey vulnerable persons and ist groups is necessarily multi- they entered the terrorist trajec- what they are posting on social pronged and needs to be contex- tory and how it did not work out media. Most of today’s extrem- tual, just as the call to terrorism as they hoped. Disillusionment, ists who join ISIS cannot resist is. What works well in one set- deradicalization and disengage- bragging about it on social me- ting might not work in another. ment in others can serve as a dia and many brag well before Firstly we must focus on pre- learning example of why not to they buy a plane ticket to Syria. vention. The ISIS and al Qaeda engage. The more creative ways Jon Cole of Liverpool Universi- narrative has been around for in which these stories are told ty developed the Inventory of some years now and needs to - by video, via the Internet, in Vulnerable Persons (IVP) a tool be addressed head on because short but emotionally convinc- similar to what we used to ac- those concerned with injustice ing ways, and so on - can make cess extremists when I designed will resonate to it in varying them more compelling and more the psychological component degrees. One way to approach likely to reach a wider audience of the Detainee Rehabilitation the narrative is to include it in with a profound teaching effect. Program in Iraq to be applied to middle school curriculums to 20,000 detainees and 800 juve-

27 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to become Foreign Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What can be Done in Response

niles. This program consisted of dressing the individual vulnera- are useful in monitoring the tra- the traditional Islamic challenge bilities that had made the ideol- jectory into terrorism we need carried out by imams who were ogy resonate for them. The IVP also keep in mind that they are to gain rapport with detainees can be used as guidance to iden- guidance for law enforcement and then point out to them reli- tify early on those who might be and not scientific tools to cate- able scriptures that contradict- taking it all the way to terrorism gorize people and predict their ed their militant jihadi views. and then intervention can occur behaviors with certainty. Alongside of this we also add- before they do. Jeff Weyers, a ed psychological interventions doctoral student and policeman There are so many good answers to address the trauma of living in Canada has already used it for to terrorism and many of them in a conflict zone, having been exactly that purpose and found involve fighting for social justice arrested and detained and re- that it led to actionable evidence and dignity for all people. While sponses of wanting to fight back, against would be and real ter- that is a tall order we need to revenge, etc. This combination rorists in three hundred cases start somewhere. was aimed at taking apart the in various countries around the terrorist ideology as well as ad- world. While tools of this sort

The author

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University in the School of Medicine and of Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service. She is author of Talking to Terrorists and coauthor of Undercover Jihadi. She was responsible for designing the psychological and Islamic challenge aspects of the Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to twenty thousand detainees and eight hundred juveniles. She also has interviewed over four hundred terrorists, their family members and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, the West Bank, Chechnya, Iraq, Jordan and many countries in Europe. Her forthcoming book is Bride of ISIS. Website: www.AnneSpeckhard.com Blog: https://annespeckhard.wordpress.com

28 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Semiotics of Violent Jihadist Propaganda: the Message and the Channel

The semiotics of violent jihadist propaganda: The message and the channel by Massimo Leone

On the one hand, terrorism is the antithesis of communication. It does not aim at transmitting any message to its victims, but at annihilating them. On the other hand, yet, terrorism is extremely powerful communication for those who witness the tragedy, directly or through the media, and are either terrified or fascinated by it.1 Terrorist acts revolutionize the social attitudes of individuals and groups, pushing them to radically change their lifestyles. Those acts instill fear, but can also attract supporters’ admiration. From September 11 on, terrorist jihadist groups have resorted to increasingly sophisticat-

1 Christian Uva, ‘Il terrore corre sul video. Estetica della violenza dalle BR ad Al Qaeda,’ Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008; William Mitchell and John Thomas, ‘Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present,’ Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 29 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Semiotics of Violent Jihadist Propaganda: the Message and the Channel ed communication in order to the global audience, nowadays Western visual communica- accompany and influence the the gap has practically disap- tion (for instance, Hollywood reception of their violent deeds. peared. As some commentators narratives and visual effects).4 Obeying to a global tendency, have pointed out, whilst in the Made by Western affiliates for for jihadists it was not sufficient past war acts were accompanied other potential Western affili- to perpetrate violence and insti- by rolling of drums, today ter- ates, the current IS communi- gate terror. It was equally funda- rorist jihadist violence is simul- cation seems to more and more mental to let the world know that taneously ushered by drones of bridge the gap between state war violence had been committed, Tweets and YouTube videos.3 propaganda and terrorist commu- and what was the appropriate Timing and technique are not nication; social media have en- cognitive, emotional, and prag- the only elements that have abled terrorists to directly reach matic interpretation of it. marked the evolution of terror- a global audience as effectively, However, whereas in the first ist jihadist communication in and sometimes even more, than years after the 9/11 attacks ter- the last decade. Also the target traditional state broadcasting pro- rorist jihadist groups would cre- of such communication has paganda. ate messages to be transmitted changed. Osama Bin Laden’s by mainstream media (e.g., Osa- videos were primarily addressed ma Bin Laden’s videos broadcast to an Arabic-speaking and Mus- IS communication by Al Jazeera), from the sec- lim audience. Most Westerners increasingly ond half of the 2000s on, these could access their content only groups have increasingly aimed through the linguistic and cultur- resorts to at developing their own media. al mediation of translators and European The shift has been also a conse- interpreters. Moreover, these vid- quence of the world-wide dif- eos predominantly targeted West- languages, and fusion of social media. Through erners as addressees of threats. them, indeed, terrorist jihadist On the contrary, communication mainly to English groups can not only reach large developed by IS, especially from and French, but audiences, but also learn how the second half of 2014 on, has to become increasingly profi- had a different communicative also to Russian, cient at it. As several analysts agenda: it addresses Westerners German, Spanish, have already underlined, there not only as targets of terrorist is a technical abyss between threats, but also as potential af- and Italian the amateurish videotapes that filiates. That is why IS commu- Osama Bin Laden would broad- nication increasingly resorts to In particular, the purposes of IS cast through Al Jazeera and the European languages, and mainly communication toward Western sophisticated visual editing by to English and French, but also to citizens is manifold: which the so-called Islamic State Russian, German, Spanish, and (IS) flaunts its tragic accomplish- Italian, in order to communi- 1. Accompanying, describing, and ments to the world.2 Moreover, cate with its audience. In these interpreting terrorist acts in whereas in the past a tempo- messages, the visual dimension order to make their own geo- ral gap would occur between is becoming more and more pre- political narrative globally pre- perpetration of a terror act and ponderant, yet it too seems to dominant against the geopoliti- communication interpreting it for adopt the codes and styles of cal narrative diffused by western governments and mainstream 2 Davide Ferrario, ‘Le fiamme della 3 Anti-Defamation League 2012, media; guerra si misurano in gradi Fahr- ‘Tweeting for Terror: How Foreign enheit,’ Doppiozero, December 1, Terrorist Organizations Exploit 4 Francesco Zucconi, ‘Autoritratto 2014, http://www.doppiozero.com/ Twitter,’ December 14, http://www. canaglia,’ Doppiozero, December 1, materiali/commenti/le-fiamme- adl.org/combating-hate/interna- 2014; http://www.doppiozero.com/ della-guerra-si-misurano-gradi- tional-extremism-terrorism/c/ materiali/commenti/autoritrat- fahrenheit tweeting-for-terror.html to-canaglia 30 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Semiotics of Violent Jihadist Propaganda: the Message and the Channel

2. Instilling terror so as to push European citizens are indoc- trate major terrorist attacks to a destabilizzation of West- trinated by IS propaganda against civilians in European ern lifestyles and consequent and persuaded to join terrorist cities. sociopolitical tension; activities in the Middle East, 3. Gaining ideological and fi- mainly in Iraq and Syria. Fight nancial support among old casualties in these countries Today terrorist and new sympathizers, as well already include hundreds of jihadist violence as winning the competition young European citizens; for leadership against other 2. The risk that some of these is simultaneously terrorist groups; European fighters return to ushered by drones 4. Recruiting new members. This their countries after being last goal represents the real nov- indoctrinated and militari- of Tweets and elty of IS terrorist jihadist com- ly trained, with the agenda munication. With more than and the ability to perpetrate YouTube videos three thousand IS fighters major terrorist attacks against holding European passports, civilians in European cities, Given these risks, a major effort the phenomenon is difficult such as those that recently of intelligence is required. This to underestimate. took place in Belgium, France, effort must aim at several goals. and Denmark; On the one hand, short-term in- From the specific point of view 3. The risk that supporters of IS vestigative goals; it will prove of European countries, the shift who are European residents, increasingly fundamental to: in communication by IS involves even without training outside three major security risks: of Europe, are given detailed • Know history, evolution, knowledge, mainly through the present state, and prospec- 1. The risk that especially young Internet, about how to perpe- tive lines of development of

31 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Semiotics of Violent Jihadist Propaganda: the Message and the Channel

jihadist terrorist media agen- goals:5 jihadist terrorist propa- erence to sacred texts and val- cies; ganda is not an isolated phenom- ues;6 labeling the Other as “the • Analyse media strategies ad- enon in history, but one that can infidels”; inciting believers to opted by these agencies; be compared and contrasted with forced conversion or to the an- • Analyse texts produced and other instances of violent confes- nihilation of “infidels”; evok- distributed through these sional persuasion that emerged ing through words, images, and agencies; in other socio-cultural contexts, other signs the idea of an idol- • Study the circulation of these historical periods, and religious atrous enemy to be violently messages through the web; domains. subjugated; instilling the desire • Gather evidence and formu- of embarking on dangerous re- late hypothesis about the cog- ligious missions and invoking nitive, emotional, and prag- The evolution of the sweetness of martyrdom; matic impact of these media media technology destroying the cultural and re- campaigns and messages on ligious artifacts of the Other: Western audiences; pushes toward new all these elements appear recur- • Investigate the potential and levels of efficacy rently in history, often adopting actual Western targets of ji- expressive and emotional for- hadist terrorist propaganda, in Research must therefore put ji- mulae that thin lines of cultural order to understand whether hadist messages in cross-cultural, genealogy link to past represen- they share a common social, trans-historical, and interdisciplinary tations, but that the evolution of cultural, or psychological media technology pushes toward perspective, in order to under- 7 background. stand the transversal features new levels of efficacy. of violent religious propaganda. 6 Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, On the other hand, investiga- Gaining authority through ref- ‘Reframing Sacred Values,’ 221-46. tive goals should be paralleled Negotiation Journal, July, 2008. by long-term comprehension 7 Massimo Leone, ‘Sémiotique du fon- 5 Scott Atran, ‘God and the Ivory damentalisme religieux : messages, Tower,’ Foreign Policy, August, rhétorique, force persuasive’ Paris: 2012. l’Harmattan, 2014. 32 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Semiotics of Violent Jihadist Propaganda: the Message and the Channel

The author

Massimo Leone is Professor of Semiotics and Cultural Semiotics at the Department of Philosophy, University of Turin, Italy. He graduated in Communication Studies from the University of Siena, and holds a DEA in History and Semiotics of Texts and Documents from Paris VII, an MPhil in Word and Image Studies from Trinity College Dublin, a PhD in Religious Studies from the Sorbonne, and a PhD in Art History from the University of Fribourg (CH). He was visiting scholar at the CNRS in Paris, at the CSIC in Madrid, Fulbright Research Visiting Professor at the Graduate Theological Un- ion, Berkeley, Endeavour Research Award Visiting Professor at the School of English, Performance, and Communication Studies at Monash University, Melbourne, Faculty Research Grant Visiting Pro- fessor at the University of Toronto, “Mairie de Paris” Visiting Professor at the Sorbonne, DAAD Visiting Professor at the University of Potsdam, Visiting Professor at the École Normale Supérieure of Lyon (Collegium de Lyon), and Visiting Professor at the University of Kyoto. His work focuses on the role of religion in modern and contemporary cultures. Massimo Leone has single-authored six books, Religious Conversion and Identity - The Semiotic Analysis of Texts (London and New York: Routledge, 2004; 242 pp.); Saints and Signs - A Semiotic Reading of Conversion in Early Modern Catholicism (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010; 656 pp.), Sémiotique de l’âme, 3 vols (Berlin et al.: Presses Académiques Francophones, 2012), Annunciazioni: percorsi di semiotica della religione (Rome: Aracne, 2014, 1000 pp.), and Spiritualità digitale: il senso religioso nell’era della smaterializzazione (Udine: Mimesis, 2014), Sémiotique du fundamentalisme: messages, rhétorique, force persuasive (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2014), edited twenty collective volumes, and published more than three hundred articles in semiotics and religious studies. He has lectured in Africa, Asia, Aus- tralia, Europe, and North America. He is the chief editor of Lexia, the Semiotic Journal of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Communication, University of Torino, Italy and member of the jury that determines the Mouton d’Or Prize given to the best article published in the internationa journal Semiotica (de Gruyter) in a year (2012, 2013, 2014, chair of the jury in 2014). He is member of the scientific board of fifteen international journals. He is editor of two series of books, including Semiotics of Religion, at Walter de Gruyter. He speaks Italian, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish, and has a working knowledge of Farsi and other ancient and modern languages.

33 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Jihad as a Lifestyle

Jihad as a lifestyle by Rik Coolsaet

‘Pop-jihad as a lifestyle’, so the Dutch Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism opined, when expressing his worries about the appeal of jihadist symbols to young Europeans.1 Starting in 2012, many thousands Europeans have travelled to join jihadist groups in Syria, in particular the so called Islamic State (aka ISIL or ISIS). Numbers vary from 3,400 to 5,000. By July 2015, from Belgium alone some 440 individuals have gone to the region (included are the 50 or so who never made it to Syria). But looking into the motivations and backgrounds of this relative large group from a small country might help to shed a light on the journey of Westerners to “a country they do not know, in a culture they are not familiar with, and where a language is spoken that they do not understand.”2 In past decades, Europeans have been joining jihadi battlefields. But today’s European foreign fighters are difficult to compare with the jihadis of the past decades. Several characteristics set them apart from

1 Janny Groen, “Nieuw: ‘popjihad’, flirten met de symbolen van Al-Qaeda”, De Volkskrant, November 26, 2013, http://www. volkskrant.nl/dossier-burgeroorlog-in-syrie/nieuw-popjihad-flirten-met-de-symbolen-van-al-qaeda~a3551228/. 2 According to Ben Hamidou, who plays the role of ideological leader of a group of men leaving for Syria, in Djihad, a successful theatre play in Brussels theaters in 2014. 34 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Jihad as a Lifestyle

their predecessors. The first dif- justice was often a starting point same mechanisms were at play ference is related to their age: in their predecessors’ journey during the protest movements the Syria fighters are on aver- towards extremism and terror- in the 1960s and the 1970s, when age many years younger than ism. Now, personal estrange- parts of the younger generation their predecessors. In previous ment has become the primary also rebelled against society, decades, the average age was 28 engine. to the bewilderment of their years and the typical age range parents, who couldn’t possibly 25–35. Nowadays however, it is Once in Syria and Iraq, their comprehend their youngsters’ more likely to be close to 20, yearning to place themselves at discontent. and the age range of the foreign the centre of events (with nu- fighters from Belgium seems to merous selfies and social media be typically 20–24. Unfortunate- posts on trivia like kohl make- However the ly, teenagers are no exceptions, up for boys and other teenage uncomfortable and neither are entire families, themes) reflects a degree of nar- and mothers with small children cissism that was largely absent truth is that just travelling to Syria. among their older predecessors. as in the terrorist The suddenness of their deci- However the uncomfortable truth campaigns of sion to leave for Syria is also a is that just as in the terrorist striking characteristic for most campaigns of the past, today’s the past, today’s of the youngsters. As a result of foreign fighter phenomenon is foreign fighter this, and of their younger age, rooted in the characteristics of their religious knowledge is even our modern society. It is fair to phenomenon more superficial than their pre- characterize the current foreign is rooted in the decessors’, as is their acquaint- fighters phenomenon as part of ance with international politics. a youth subculture that has de- characteristics Geopolitics is less important to veloped against a very specific them than to their predecessors, social and international context. of our modern who felt motivated by the strug- Moreover, it is a generational society gle against the superpowers. In- conflict. Up to a point, the very

35 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Jihad as a Lifestyle

But society now differs signifi- happens in an environment that from now?’). Nowadays, the chil- cantly from society in the 1960s has become very complex, with dren and grandchildren of the and 1970s. fewer benchmarks and points of migrant workers are still being reference, as a result of the dy- confronted with their origins. To begin with the most obvi- namics of globalisation and the They are still routinely labelled ous transformation, society to- post-industrial revolution. And ‘migrant communities’ – notwith- day puts much greater pressure on top of this, the future doesn standing the fact that these fam- on young people than it did 40 not look bright: “The generation ilies have now been present on years ago. Individualism and the coming of age in the 2010s faces European soil for three or four lifting of traditional political, re- high unemployment and precar- generations, and that many of ligious and ideological fault lines ious job situations, hampering them have acquired Belgian (or leave youngsters much earlier to their efforts to build a future and other European) nationality. their own devises and exposed raising the risk of social unrest.”4 to society than their peers back Moreover, after 9/11 a general then. At a much earlier stage, to- Secondly, pessimism rules today. stereotype developed to equate day’s young people have to make All European countries have been ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’. The their own decisions in a society increasingly under the spell of significant diversity within dias- that offers incomparably more pessimism, according to surveys. poric communities from Mus- choices in all dimensions of life. This pessimistic outlook stands lim-majority countries was thus Simply put, it is more demand- in stark contrast to the optimistic compressed into a single mono- ing to be young today than it was zeitgeist of the 1960s and 1970s, lithic category of ‘Muslim com- back then. when the horizon looked bright, munity’, conflating ethnicity with activism thrived, and radical religion, and setting them apart as changes for the better appeared group. Prompted by this ‘stigma’, Struggling with to be within reach. But when many started to think of them- identity and self- pessimism is all-pervading, ide- selves first as Muslims rather als die, resignation is omnipres- than as citizens of their country.5 image might have ent, and the energy to strive for ‘Proud to be a Muslim’ became change fades away. the theme in lyrics and Facebook been demanding accounts. Around 2008, a ‘Cool for youngsters Thirdly, an additional factor Islam’ movement emerged, de- of potential estrangement puts veloping into a youth subcul- since time pressure on a specific segment ture, with its own rap, designer immemorial, but of youngsters in Europe. Exact- clothes and magazines.6 Some ly 30 years ago, a French weekly who could afford to started to modern times featured the portrait of a veiled look for opportunities to emi- gave it a new label: Marianne to illustrate the cov- grate to more welcoming places, er story: ‘Serons-nous encore like Montreal or New York.7 ‘teenage angst’ Français dans trente ans?’(‘Will we still be French in 30 years 5 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Firstly, struggling with identity “Muslims in Europe: economic and self-image might have been Hebdo attack. Ahmad Benali, “From worries top concerns about religious demanding for youngsters since Teenage Angst to Jihad. The Anger and cultural identity,” Washington of Europe’s Young Marginalized D. C.: Pew Global Attitudes Project, time immemorial, but modern Muslims”, New York Times, Janu- 2006. times gave it a new label: ‘teen- ary 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes. 6 Maruta Herding, “Inventing the age angst’.3 Today, moreover, this com/2015/01/14/opinion/the-an- Muslim cool: Islamic youth culture ger-of-europes-young-marginali- in Western Europe,” Bielefeld: zed-muslims.html?_r=0. Transcript Verlag, 2014. 3 The Dutch novelist Abdelkader 4 World Economic Forum, “Global 7 Nadia Fadil, “Moslims trekken Benali has used this label in a Risks 2014, Ninth Edition,” Geneva: niet enkel richting Syrië,” De poignant reflection on the Charlie World Economic Forum, 2014. Morgen, April 15, 2013, http:// 36 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Jihad as a Lifestyle

is indeed also intimately inter- of overcoming these situations twined with real inequalities in the foreseeable future, has Nowadays, the that have been growing in Eu- been prevalent for some time children and ropean societies too. Socio-eco- now. Some of these youngsters nomic inequality is one of them. feel as if they have ‘no future’ grandchildren Citizens with a non-European as their horizon. ‘Un sentiment of the migrant background are overrepresent- d’abandon’ (‘a feeling of aban- ed in the lower rungs of most donment’), was the prevailing workers are still socio-economic categories (un- sentiment Latifa Ibn Ziaten, the employment, housing, health, mother of one of the soldiers being confronted education). Compared to their killed by Mohammed Merah in with their origins peers, youngsters in this group 2012, had sensed when speaking are confronted with a number at schools in the French cités.8 But not everybody has this op- of real obstacles, in particular portunity. Last but not least, discrimination on the job and this cultural divide in Europe the real estate market and ed- 8 Latifa Ibn Ziaten, “Le message de ucational deficiencies. Within paix de la mère d’une victime de migrant communities, despair, Mohamed Merah,” 2015, http:// www.demorgen.be/buitenland/ www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/ moslims-trekken-niet-enkel-rich- discouragement, and even fear terrorisme/le-message-de-paix-de- ting-syrie-a1614738/ about their youngsters’ chances latifa-ibn-ziaten_826641.html.

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Citizens with a life in Belgium. To all these push factors, IS provides for an outlet. non-European Posts on social media sometimes background are refer to Tupac Shakur, icon of overrepresented American gangsta rap. His life and his rap lyrics indeed seem in the lower to fit well into the world out- rungs of most look of this group. The foreign fighter phenomenon is rooted in socio-economic a specific youth subculture that has developed in reaction to an categories environment young people feel and perceive as complex, de- This is the conducive environ- manding, unequal and devoid of ment for the wide array of per- hope for improvement. It is no Flickr/CHRISTOPHER DOMBRES © Via sonal, age-related motivations longer the result of a more or through which youngsters may less protracted process of polit- eration that gave birth to the be tempted by a departure for ical radicalisation. It is foremost subculture in which this new Syria. Frequently they refer to an escape from their estrange- generation of foreign fighters the absence of a future, to per- ment from society and the ap- thrive, is barely acknowledged sonal difficulties that have to parent lack of empathy of soci- by mainstream politics, and is be coped with in everyday life. ety to their situation. essentially overshadowed by the Often their stories point to a de- reductionist debate on the com- sire to leave all this behind, to patibility of Islam with western be ‘someone’, to be accepted. Often their stories values. Ultimately, to find refuge in a more welcoming environment. point to a desire Straightforward moral abso- to leave all this lutes appeal to them, as a way out of the complexities of their behind, to be environment. More malicious ‘someone’, to be motives are at play too, evad- ing prison sentences, kicking on accepted Rambo-style violence, adventure seekers, looking for something This fault line between socie- more thrilling than everyday ty and part of the younger gen-

The author

Rik Coolsaet is Professor of International Relations at Ghent University (Belgium). He was invited to join the original European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (established in 2006) and the subsequent European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER). His latest publications on terrorism and radicalisation include: What drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? (www. egmontinstitute.be/publication_article/what-drives-europeans-to-syria-and-to-is-insights-from- the-belgian-case), and Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences (Ashgate, 2011).

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39 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence

The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence1 by Mia Bloom

We remain fascinated by terrorist acts and how seemingly normal people transform into cold-blood- ed killers. We have certain preconceived notions about who becomes a terrorist and why. Much of the conventional wisdom and preconceived notions are more conventional wisdom that empirically based on reality and facts. Mohammed Emwazi previously known as ‘Jihad John’ an educated middle class British citizen who became notorious for beheading Western aid workers and journalists in Syria

1 This work was supported in part by a MINERVA N000141310835 grant on State Stability under the auspices of the Office of Naval Research. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be inter- preted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Defense, the Office of Naval Research or the U.S. government. 40 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence surprised many who saw an ed- for attempted murder. The tri- natural progression from their ucated Westernized person with al of the century attracted huge involvement in radical and rev- no history of radical views.2 The crowds including the entirety olutionary struggles of the past.5 stereotypes about terrorists in- of Russia’s intellectual elite. On The women of Narodnaya Volya clude faulty assumptions about the stand Zasulich balked at the were reportedly more willing to sanity, a history of anti social attempted murder charges lev- die for the cause than their male behavior, poverty, or drug and ied against her. “I am a terror- comrades.6 Women engaged in alcohol abuse.3 More often than ist... not a murder!” She proudly anti-colonial and revolutionary not, terrorist groups use these proclaimed. Vera was ultimately struggles in the Third World for assumptions to their benefit. acquitted as the crowd lifted her decades. Among the many assumptions out of the courtroom and carried about level of education, wealth, her on their shoulders in victo- Historically women’s primary and ethnic background inevita- ry. Among Zasulich’s associates contribution to political move- bly has also been that of gender. in Narodnaya Volya were oth- ments was to give birth to the er women, Vera Figner, Maria future generation of fighters and When most people superficially Oshanina, Anna Yakimova, and raise them to be ideologically picture the stereotypical terror- Sophia Perovskaya were all key steadfast and perfect soldiers. In ist, they usually think of a male, members of the organization the modern period, to the extent between the ages of 18 and 30, and as much as one third of the that women were involved, they perhaps of Middle Eastern or core leadership of the People’s tended to play a more peripheral Arabic descent. Few people im- Will was female. After the tri- role by providing support to ter- mediately associate terrorism al, Zasulich was celebrated as a rorist groups. with women even though wom- martyr for the oppressed social en have always been involved in classes and became the face of Beginning in 1968, women be- terrorism and political violence. the revolution.4 came involved in all manner From the very beginning as far of insurgent and terror groups back as the nineteenth century from the Marxist organizations women have played key roles Few people in Europe, to the nationalist in violent extremist organiza- immediately movements of the Middle East. tions. The very first person ever Female militants came from all to be tried for terrorism, Vera associate parts of the globe and from all Zasulich, was a woman and an terrorism with walks of life; Italy’s Red Bri- anarchist for the Narodnaya gades, Germany’s Baader-Mein- Volya (People’s Will) in Tsarist women even hof group, the Black Panthers, Russia. In January 1878 Vera and the Weathermen, and the Japa- her co-conspirator Masha Ko- though women nese Red Army included prom- lenkina shot Theodore Trepov, have always inent women.7 For the organi- the governor general of St. Pe- tersburg with a revolver hidden been involved 5 Women and Social Protest. Guida under her shawl. Trepov sur- West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg in terrorism and (eds.), Oxford University Press, 1991. vived the assassination attempt. 6 Alisa Stack O’Connor, “Picked Last: Zasulich was arrested and tried political violence Women and Terrorism,” JFQ, issue 44, 2007, NDU press, p.95. Women’s participation in ter- 7 Stefan Aust, The Baader Meinhof 2 http://www.huffingtonpost. Complex, NY: Random House, 2008; co.uk/2015/02/26/mohammed-em- rorism may be considered a Leonard Weinberg and William wazi_n_6759714.html Eubank, “Italian Women Terrorists,” 3 http://www.homeland- Studies in Conflict and Terrorism securitynewswire.com/ 4 Ana Siljak, Angel of Vengeance: The Vol. 9 Iss 3, 1987, pp 421-262; Susan dr20150127-women-more-active- Girl who shot the governor of St Stern and Laura Browder, With the in-extremist-islamist-groups-than- Petersburg and sparked the age of Weathermen: The Personal Journal previously-thought. assassination. NY: St Martin’s 2009. of a Revolutionary Woman. Rutgers 41 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence

zations that addressed women’s hoff helped found the Baader volvement) women represented equality as part of their political Meinhof group also known as less than 20 percent of the to- platform, women rose through the Red Army Faction in Ger- tal. More importantly, women the ranks and became leaders in many. Her partner in the orga- often played secondary roles their own right. nization, Astrid Proll was a vi- to men. Leonard Weinberg and tal operative in several attacks. Bill Eubank explained, “Women While Meinhoff lent her name who carried out attacks or who Women became to the group as its key ideologue, served as leaders were exceed- involved in most women did not emerge as ingly rare.”8 leaderships. Russell and Miller’s all manner of landmark study analyzed 350 Women nevertheless provided a insurgent and terrorists from 1966 to 1976 in powerful symbol of the struggles which women were associated and were featured in the organi- terror groups with terrorist movements such zations’ propaganda. In part this the Red Army Faction and the might have been an attempt to from the Marxist Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse). portray a more egalitarian so- organizations The study assessed membership ciety or perhaps to attract male in the major left wing and na- recruits. So while they were not in Europe, to tionalist groups in South Amer- leaders, they were important el- the nationalist ica, Western Europe, the Middle ements of the propaganda. One East, and Japan. Despite the high- such example was Leila Khaled movements of the ly visible exploits of a handful of who became the poster child for women; the general pattern for Palestinian militancy as a mem- Middle East most terrorist organizations was ber of the PFLP (Popular Front that women were dramatically In the 1960s and 1970s, women underrepresented. Aside from played key roles in some of the the German Red Army Faction 8 Leonard Weinberg and William Lee European groups. Ulrike Mein- Eubank, “Italian Women Terror- and Revolutionary cells (that ists,” Terrorism: An International included a substantial female in- Journal, Volume 9, Number 3, 1987 University Press, 2007. pp.242-243. 42 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence for the Liberation of Palestine). with active service units (ASUs) some countries exceeds as much Khaled was involved in multiple by sisters Dolours and Anne as fifty percent of the operatives. hijacking operations between Price who intimidated in their The women have killed hun- 1969 and 1970 and became an ability to kill and deceive the dreds of men, women, and chil- icon of Palestinian resistance, British Authorities.11 dren and their acts have maimed, inspiring poems and songs in six While women have been in- blinded or crippled thousands different languages. volved in violent extremism in more. Dozens more women have Europe for decades, the face of tried and failed, and allegedly Another female source on in- Islamist extremists and Salafi hundreds are being trained for spiration (terrorist ‘cover girl’) Jihadis has traditionally been the future.14 The numbers have was Mairead Farrell of the Pro- male because of patriarchal in- increased in the past five years visional IRA in Northern Ire- terpretations about women’s partly because groups like Boko land. Shot in Gibraltar in 1988 freedom of movement and Haram, Al Shabaab, the Taliban during an operation to bomb expectations about the appro- and others have begun to deploy British soldiers, Farrell was a priate role a woman can and female operatives in greater leading member of PIRA.9 She should have. For the past few numbers. While Al Qaeda was a participated in the dirty protests years, this has ceased to be the late adopter of this tactical inno- (refusal to bathe or wash) and case. Groups that previously es- vation, by 2005 it became clear even led several women to join chewed engaging women now that women could do things men the hunger strikes in 1981. As the recruit and engage women with could not. leader of women in Armagh jail. increasing lethality. Women Farrell was so revered that she is have played a variety of roles Groups like still lionized by Republicans and in terrorist groups, as recruiters, dissidents alike.10 propagandists, quartermasters, Boko Haram, fund-raisers, and even as suicide bombers. Groups that previously Al Shabaab, the While they were eschewed women’s involvement Taliban and others not leaders, they now recruit women and girls de- liberately.12 have begun to were important deploy female elements of the Between 1985 and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 operatives in propaganda suicide attacks (representing about a quarter of the total) on greater numbers Farrell was not the only woman behalf of many different ter- The media fetishizes female involved with the Provisional rorist organizations.13 The per- terrorists and contributes to the IRA. Women’s roles ranged from centage of women since 2002 in belief that there is something banging garbage can lids to alert unique, something just not right the men that the British soldiers about the women who kill. The were coming, (as portrayed in 11 Heidensohn, Frances. “Gender and Crime: A Cautionary Tale.” acjrd: 24 Western media make assump- the film ‘71), to involvement http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/schools/ tions about what the women SchoolofLaw/Research/Research- 9 Nell McCaffrey, The Armagh Wom- Projects/ChildhoodTransitionand- think, why they do what they do, en. Co-op Books, 1981 and Jenny SocialJusticeInitiative/FileStore/ and what ultimately motivates McGeever ‘The Story of Mairead Filetoupload,190399,en.pdf#page=26 them.15 Women are hardly the Farrell,’ Magill Magazine, Oct. 1986. 12 Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and 10 Bloom, Mia, Paul Gill, and John Terrorism. University of Pennsylva- Horgan. “Tiocfaidh ar mna: women nia Press, 2011. 14 French police were on the alert for in the Provisional Irish Republican 13 Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, Algerian female suicide bombers, Army.” Behavioral Sciences of “The Western Muhajirat of ISIS” October 2010. Terrorism and Political Aggression Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15 Page Whaley Eager, From Freedom 4.1 (2012): 60-76. April 2015. Fighters to Terrorists: Women and 43 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence obvious or natural choice for Marine officer who fought in If anything, the appearance of terrorism. the Battle of Falluja said, “If we late-term pregnancy has dis- Considered nurtures and not are not allowed to look at Iraqi couraged invasive body searches destroyers, they are often re- women, then how can we search and frisking for fear of alienat- garded as too “soft” and vulner- for the bomb under the abaya?”16 ing and antagonizing the local able for terrorism. Innovative population.17 terrorist groups exploit gender Between 1985 stereotypes and cultural clichés Women bypass to their advantage. After all, per- and 2010, petrating acts that cause wanton security destruction, death and disorder female bombers seem incompatible with the tra- committed over checkpoints, often ditional stereotypes of women manned by male – to be nurturing, caring figures 257 suicide attacks that provide stability consis- (representing members of the tent with the principles of UN- security apparatus SCR 1325. Terrorist groups use about a quarter women when male operatives or military are unavailable, when a target is of the total) on especially difficult to penetrate behalf of many Alternatively, depending on the or when they hope to evade cap- context in order to throw off ture. different terrorist security personnel, instead of organizations loose billowing robes, female Innovative bombers might hyper West- Female suicide bombers appear ernize their appearance, wear terrorist groups to be ideal operatives as they heavy make up and immodest exploit gender can penetrate the defenses of clothing, like mini-skirts, midriff the security forces. Women by- baring shirts, and revealing tank stereotypes and pass security checkpoints, often tops. This transformation of traditional women from demure to cultural clichés to manned by male members of the security apparatus or mili- attractive, distracting and invis- their advantage tary. The traditional and modest ible has been convincingly por- robes easily conceal a vest or belt trayed in the film “The Battle of Assumptions that women are in- packed with explosives. The im- Algiers” wherein Algerian wom- herently more peaceful or not a provised explosive device (IED) en cut and dye their hair, put threat have lulled security forc- is placed under traditional and on makeup and Western dress- es into complacency. As late as loose fitting clothing, strapped es to smuggle weapons through French military checkpoints and 2006, US soldiers in Iraq were around the woman’s midsec- 18 told not to invasively search tion to give the impression of a plant bombs in cafes. Iraqi women in the Sunni trian- late-term pregnancy. Security Fifty years on, using female op- gle for fear of antagonizing the personnel make assumptions eratives remains one of the best local population. A former U.S. about the inherent peacefulness ways to get through checkpoints, of women. An expectant mother because even after all the years Political Violence, Ashgate 2008 carries with it a host of addition- and Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Portrayal al stereotypes and expectations. 17 Bloom, Mia. “Bombshells: Women of Female Terrorists in the Media: and terror.” Gender Issues 28.1-2 Similar Framing Patterns in the (2011): 1-21. News Coverage of Women in Pol- 16 Farhana Ali, “Rising Female Bomb- 18 Matthew Evangelista, Gender, Na- itics and in Terrorism.” Studies in ers in Iraq, An Alarming Trend,” tionalism, and War: Conflict on the Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 28 Iss 5, counterterrorismblog.org/2008/04/ Movie Screen. Cambridge Universi- 2005 pp 435-451. rising_female_bombers_in_iraq.php. ty Press, 2011. 44 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence

of female terrorists and suicide (posing as a family) is even more target? Women more easily ac- bombers (since 1987 and across effective. For several years the cess markets and restaurants over a dozen different conflicts) US military had in place a pro- where they kill scores of civil- people are still amazed when a file for car and truck bombers ians. Recent attacks by Boko Ha- woman is involved (e.g., recent- with one exception, if there was ram at Global Cell Phone mar- ly Hayat Boumedienne in the a child in the car, there was no kets or the Chicken Market in Paris attacks). need to worry. Al Qaeda in Iraq Yobe and Borno states provide Women provide an excellent used this to their advantage and an illustration of this dynamic. cover when they are acting in- began to strap children into their Not only did the terrorist organi- dividually or in teams. If the au- car bombs to use as decoys to zation use women, but also very thorities are on the lookout for evade the profile.20 young girls aged 10-12. male perpetrators, the presence Female operatives are especial- of a woman (often posing as part ly useful when the groups target of a couple) can help avoid de- civilians and other “soft targets.” When the tection - as was often the case When the terrorists want to kill terrorists want with male Active Service Units civilians, what better choice than of the Provisional IRA or male/ an operative who resembles the to kill civilians, female teams in Somalia for al 19 what better choice Shabaab. A couple with a child Somalia.” September 30, 2013 http://www.newyorker.com/maga- than an operative 19 Routledge International Handbook zine/2013/09/30/now-serving. of Crime and Gender Studies, 20 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: Gener- who resembles the Claire M. Renzetti, Susan L. Miller, al David Petraeus and the American Angela R. Gover (eds.), Routledge, Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006- target? 2013; Xan Rice, “Letter From 2008. NY: Penguin, 2009. 45 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence

Gandhi and eight others, including the photographer who cap- tured the scene.22

US military had in place a profile for car and truck bombers with one exception, if there was a child in the car, there was no need to worry. Al Qaeda in Iraq used this to their advantage and began to strap children into their car bombs

This assassination was a turning point for the LTTE. It was significant not just because the attack In South Asia, women active- the target.21 killed a major political figure, ly participated in the fight for In 1991, Thenmuli Rajarat- but also because the perpetrator Tamil Independence as part of nam code-named Dhanu (aka was a woman. Women proved the Liberation Tigers of Tam- Gayatri) was selected to kill for- to be indispensable to the LTTE il Eelam (LTTE). In 1987 the mer Indian Prime minister, Ra- and comprised as much as 30% Tamil Tigers created separate jiv Gandhi. As Gandhi was cam- of the total number of suicide at- 23 units for women led by women. paigning for reelection in Tamil tackers from 1991-2007. Wom- While many people incorrectly Nadu, the LTTE sent Dhanu to an en also formed specific attack assume that the LTTE invented election rally with a garland of units that were highly successful female suicide bombing, the re- flowers. As former Prime Min- ality is that they improved the ister Gandhi bent down to accept 22 Roberts, Michael. “Killing Rajiv technique to create the perfect the offering, she detonated 700 Gandhi: Dhanu’s sacrificial meta- stealth weapon. Female bomb- grams of explosives strapped morphosis in death.” South Asian ers have managed to kill several around her waist, killing herself, History and Culture 1.1 (2009): 25-41. Presidents and Prime Ministers 23 Bloom, Mia. “Female suicide bomb- and using women allowed the 21 John Lee Anderson, “Death of a Ti- ers: a global trend.” Daedalus 136.1 armed group to get up close and ger,” New Yorker Magazine, January (2007): 94-102 and Cunningham, personal with the target, again 17, 2011, http://www.newyorker. Karla J. “Cross-regional trends in fe- com/magazine/2011/01/17/death- male terrorism.” Studies in Conflict because they can get access to of-the-tiger and Terrorism 26.3 (2003): 171-195. 46 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence on the battlefield24 including the tives: one from the vantage point organizations are cognizant that all female tank unit able to rout of the terrorist group and the oth- stereotypes exist and adjust the the Sri Lankan military on a reg- er from the women themselves. kinds of tactics and operatives ular basis for example, the Battle For terrorist organizations, there accordingly. During the course for Elephant pass. are enormous benefits to using of research conducted on map- female operatives and especially ping the adaptation of terrorist While women in the LTTE female suicide bombers. networks to counter terrorism initially appeared to join vol- (CT) strategies, we determined untarily, journalistic reports that the terrorists pay close at- have emerged in which several Several women tention to the policies and tac- women admitted to being mo- admitted to tics employed by the police and bilized and recruited coercively security personnel. If the po- sometimes at the behest of fam- being mobilized lice have a specific profile, the ily members or as the result of and recruited groups alter their operatives to gender based violence. In this fall under the radar screen. If a respect, the recruitment pro- coercively standard operating procedure is cess mirrors that of the Jihadi put into place, terrorists adapt at Salafi groups who found new sometimes at the a far faster pace unencumbered and innovative ways to exploit behest of family by bloated bureaucracies that women. While the secular or make changing police or mili- left-wing groups may welcome members or as the tary procedures time consuming women as front-line soldiers or result of gender and difficult.27 Because of exist- suicide bombers, Jihadi groups ing stereotypes about the inher- have included a wider variation based violence ent peacefulness of women, CT of women’s involvement. officials, and security personnel Diverse groups such as al Extremist groups tend to use have been glacially slow to adapt Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Ha- women on the front lines at spe- and consider that women might ram in Nigeria and Hamas have cific periods during conflicts. As be involved in militant activities. used women to devastating ef- explained, women are better at fect in the past two decades. avoiding detection and better Put simply, extremist groups use While the total percentage of able to penetrate checkpoints. the stereotypes of their targets. female to male suicide bomb- During the course of a anti-ter- Nobody expects the bomber to ers never exceeds 30% (except rorist campaign, it becomes in- be a woman. Because soldiers for the LTTE and Chechen Black creasingly difficult for men to in Iraq in 2006 were instructed Widows)25 women are able to ac- travel, pass through checkpoints that invasively searching wom- complish tasks as operatives that or reach their intended targets. en was a cultural faux pas and men cannot. Security personnel, police and would cause great offence to the counter-terrorism professionals local Iraqi population. Iraqi mil- To understand female suicide create profiles to help pre-empt itant groups and terrorists like bombers we need to examine the bombers and make it impossible Abu Musab al Zarqawi identified phenomenon from two perspec- to succeed in their mission.26 The a tactical advantage. Groups like Ansar al Sunnah and Al Qaeda

24 Joshi, Manoj. “On the razor’s 26 Bloom, Mia M. “Death Becomes edge: the liberation tigers of Tamil Her: The Changing Nature of 27 Horgan, John, et al. “Adversarial Eelam,” Studies in Conflict & Ter- Women’s Role in Terror.” Geo. J. Behavior in Complex Adaptive Sys- rorism 19.1 (1996): 19-42. Int’l Aff. 11 (2010): 91 and Garrison, tems: An Overview of ICST’s Re- 25 Speckhard, Anne, and Khapta Carole. “Sirens of Death: Role of search on Competitive Adaptation Akhmedova. “Black widows: The Women in Terrorism. Past, Present, in Militant Networks.” Engineering Chechen female suicide terrorists.” and Future.” Editorial 181 Gorazd Psychology and Cognitive Ergo- Female suicide bombers: Dying for Meško, Tom Cockroft and Charles nomics. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, equality (2006): 63-80. Fields (2006): 332. 2011. 384-393. 47 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence in Iraq started to send women pendable’ than men. They found When terrorist to deliver bombs to civilian tar- it easier to manipulate women to gets. Women can penetrate a tar- become bombers. Understanding groups used get more deeply and gain better the social pressures, they knew access. While a male operative that women would want to prove female operatives, might be stopped at the entrance, their dedication to the men of they garnered a woman will usually be able to the community and show that get to the back of the room.28 they were just as fierce as their significantly more This allows small amounts of ex- brothers, fathers and sons. media and press plosive to have the destructive Terrorist groups understand the capability of larger bombs. public relations benefit of de- attention for the ploying female bombers. During the course of my research about story Terrorist leaders women and terrorism I ob- This has been punctuated in the served a pattern that when ter- have relayed women’s last will and testament rorist groups used female opera- martyrdom videos,32 in which to me that they tives, they garnered significantly female suicide bombers have more media and press attention believed that made the point of saying that for the story.30 The result could they are stepping forward to car- the women were be as much as 8 times as many ry out the martyrdom operation stories compared to when the (which they call ‘amalyat ishti- ‘more expendable’ groups use a male bomber. Be- shadiyya’) because the men are cause publicity and the media than men. They unwilling and not man enough to are the lifeblood of terrorism, do it themselves. found it easier this is a huge benefit women bring to terrorist organizations. to manipulate Finally, female suicide bombers Extremist groups likewise un- are able to do something that a women to become derstand Western gender stereo- man could not easily accomplish, types as well as those that exist to disguise the bomb as late term bombers within their own cultures. When pregnancy. Anoja Kugenthirar- the extremist organizations face sah was tasked with killing the In talking with terrorist leaders challenges in recruitment, using chief of the Sri Lanka military over the past several years, they a woman will goad more men in charge of the government’s expressed a belief that women into participating. The groups campaign against the Tamil Ti- are less capable fighters on the are able to shame men into join- gers. For several weeks prior to battlefield but may be better able ing the cause because failure to the attack she visited the mater- at killing civilians because they do so may make the men appear 29 nity clinic at the military hospi- blend in with the target. Over weak and unmanly by allowing tal in order to establish an alibi the years, terrorist leaders have women to do their job.31 relayed to me that they believed that she was in fact pregnant and that the women were ‘more ex- make sure the sentry guards at the gate knew her. After three 33 28 Jackson, Brian A., et al. Breaching 30 Sjoberg, Laura, and Caron E. Gentry. weeks she was ready. As Gen- the fortress wall: understanding ter- “Reduced to bad sex: Narratives of rorist efforts to overcome defensive violent women from the Bible to technologies. Rand Corporation, the War on Terror.” International 32 Post, Jerrold M. “Reframing of mar- 2007. Relations 22.1 (2008): 5-23. tyrdom and jihad and the socializa- 29 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, Columbia 31 Jacques, Karen, and Paul J. Taylor. tion of suicide terrorists.” Political University Press, 2005, Mia Bloom, “Male and female suicide bombers: Psychology 30.3 (2009): 381-385. Bombshell: Women and Terrorism different sexes, different reasons?.” 33 Bloom, Mia M. “In Defense of Hon- University of Pennsylvania Press, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31.4 or: Women and Terrorist Recruit- 2011. (2008): 304-326. ment on the Internet.” 48 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence eral Sarath Fonseka’s limou- the past ten years, women have cial media have now become a sine approached the entrance been increasingly involved in crucial element in the recruit- she waited with her suicide belt terrorism via new technologies ment of foreign fighters going strapped around her waist and such as the Internet and recent- to Syria or to inspire home- detonated her explosive. She ly, social media. In the 1990s, grown lone actor attacks within failed to kill Fonseka but killed most al Qaeda training camps re- North America. When a woman several of his aides and herself quired relocation to Afghanistan from Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, in the process. or the Sudan. The emergence of Colleen La Rose was arrested the Internet allowed people to in October 2009, the reaction become radicalized in the com- to a blonde convert was one of Women have used fort of their own homes and with shock and surprise.34 Online her their gender to a click of the mouse. Supporters nom de guerre was ‘Jihad Jane’ of al Qaeda, ISIS and other ter- and she was arrested and found imply, if you were rorist groups now meet on the guilty for planning to kill Danish a REAL man, you Internet, in password protected cartoonist Larks Vilks for mock- chat rooms and on social media. ing the Prophet Mohammed. La would go to Iraq There are cases of women using Rose did not fit the conventional these forums to goad men into profile of an Al Qaeda terrorist and fight the Jihad action. Women have used their operative – she was white, from gender to imply, if you were a Michigan and had no known con- While several groups engaged REAL man, you would go to Iraq nections to violent extremism. women on the front lines as and fight the Jihad. She converted to Islam in 2005 fighters and bombers, many of the more traditional Jihadi Sala- Women, the Internet and fi groups tended to hold back on 34 Barrett, Devlin. “Jamie Pau- social media lin-Ramirez Charged In ‘Jihad Jane’ tapping 50% of the population. In Women on the Internet and so- Case, Plot To Kill Swedish Cartoon- ist.” The Huffington Post 2 (2010).

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and via the Internet, La Rose media have provided a platform her website.36 Aroud’s transfor- plotted to kill Lars Vilks with her for Jihadi messages or venues mation set the tone for other friend Jamie Paulin-Ramirez (Ji- for posting videos and other women who followed a similar had Jamie) and six other co-con- audio-visual propaganda in the trajectory first as wife and then spirators. Vilks remained on Al service of terrorism. In Bel- as source of emulation. The wife Qaeda’s most wanted list (along gium, Malika El Aroud created of 7/7 bomber Jermaine Lind- with Charlie Hebdo cartoonists a website, Min Bar - SOS, ded- say, Samantha Lewthwaite be- and Ayaan Hirsi)35 and was the icated to inciting her readers to came known as the White Wid- target of the attack in Denmark join the Global Jihad. Aroud’s ow when in the aftermath of his in January 2015 when an ISIS first husband was the first sui- death she joined al Shabaab and inspired supporter attempted to cide bomber in Afghanistan and recruited for the Global Jihad.37 finish off the job. killed Ahmed Shah Masood, the The transformation from wife leader of the Afghan Northern to heroine has been a powerful Women online and on social Alliance two days before 9/11. lure for women and explains Being the wife of a martyr trans- how ISIS is both able to convince 35 “Wanted: Dead or Alive for Crimes formed Aroud into one of the Western women to join the Is- Against Islam,” the page reads. The most prominent female jihadists list includes: Molly Norris, Ayaan in Europe. She used her fame Hirsi Ali, Flemming Rose, Mor- 36 Sciolino, Elaine, and Souad Me- ris Swadiq, Salman Rushdie, Girt and notoriety to goad “Muslim khennet. “Al Qaeda warrior uses Wilders [sic], Lars Vilks, Stephane men to go and fight” and rally internet to rally women.” The New Charbonnie, Carsten Luste, Terry “women to join the cause” on York Times 28 (2008). Jones, and Kurt Westergaard. http:// 37 Anzalone, Christopher. “The Nai- www.thewire.com/global/2013/03/ robi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media al-qaeda-most-wanted-list/62673/. Strategy.” CTC Sentinel 6.10 (2013). 50 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence lamic State and cast the benefits It is often alleged that any woman bers). One is struck by the fact of being a martyrs’ wife. involved in terrorism has done that Chechen bombers (like so for personal reasons. A con- Irish militants and activists) Redemption, Revenge, ventional wisdom among schol- have often joined as part of fam- Respect, Relationship and ars of terrorism is that women ily units and history is replete Rape who become suicide bombers with siblings acting in concert or To explain women’s motivation, are seeking to redeem them- in coordinated attacks. we can summarize the phenom- selves through an act of martyr- enon as the five R’s. Redemp- dom. If a woman has something There is a view that women tion, Revenge, Respect, Relation- shameful in her past for which seek the respect of their peers. ship and Rape. While it should she needs to atone, this singular Through violence, women can be stressed that women are mo- action will clear the slate and show that they are just as dedi- tivated by multiple sources and anything that transpired before cated to the cause. Although this overlapping reasons, there are is forgotten. The only thing that perspective is most often argued not significant differences be- people will remember about the by Feminist scholars research tween what motivates men ver- woman is that she was a martyr has shown that few women in- sus women in joining extremist for the cause. Another equally volved in terrorist movements organizations. It is equally im- popular explanation for wom- consider themselves to be Fem- portant to stress the fact that en’s involvement has been that inists. the conventional wisdom that women are seeking revenge for portrays women as motivated the loss of loved ones. Chechen The R the best predicts a wom- by emotion while men are moti- female suicide bombers are al- en’s involvement in political vated by politics, religion or na- leged to have lost fathers, broth- violence is “relationship.” In tionalism has established a false ers and sons during several wars particular if a woman has a male dichotomy. The reality is far with Russia since 1999. The Rus- relative who is already a mem- more complex and in fact wom- sian authorities have christened ber of the group, this exponen- en and men are all motivated by them ‘Black Widows” although a tially increases the likelihood a combination of reasons, some detailed examination of women that she will be welcomed into personal and some political al- in Chechnya and Dagestan who the organization. In many con- though perhaps in different per- have perpetrated acts of suicide texts involvement in terrorism centages or at different times. terrorism include several who becomes the family business. were unmarried or were rad- Involving members of the same icalized well before the death family is also the best way for To explain of a loved one. Furthermore, terrorist groups to prevent in- women’s Chechen women have tended to filtration and ensure that a new join Imirat Kavkaz in groups and recruit is not an informer. A motivation, we while the loss of loved ones may woman whose family member can summarize contribute to their personal mo- is also a member, is less likely tivations to become involved, af- to change her mind at the last the phenomenon ter two Chechen wars one would moment for fear of causing em- be hard pressed to find women barrassment or disappointment as the five R’s. who have not been affected in within her kinship network. Redemption, one way or another. The loss of a loved one may be a necessary Although many women have Revenge, Respect, though insufficient explanation. joined terrorist groups for a va- Relationship and By this same token, many of the riety of political and personal male suicide bombers have also reasons, in the past few years an- Rape lost loved ones (sons, brothers, other major reason has emerged. fathers or female family mem- Rape. Women have been vul-

51 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence nerable to sexual exploitation or cide bombers for Ansar al Sun- such example comes from Iraq attack especially at checkpoints nah, an offshoot of al Qaeda in when a fifteen-year-old girl, Ra- or during nighttime search and Iraq (AQI) the precursor group niya Mutleg told her family she seizures of their homes. When to ISIS.39 wanted to become a doctor. They women are raped in traditional Several cultures around the scoffed at this goal and explained and patriarchal societies, they world extol the virtues of mar- it was unlikely that she would are subject to existing honor tyrdom and self-sacrifice. These grow up to be a doctor but cer- codes, which hold women re- cultures of martyrdom exist in tainly she could become a mar- sponsible for their sexual pro- Islamic societies and in Tamil tyr.42 She was preempted by priety and blame women who society - although in a secular Iraqi National Police en route have shamed their families for form (self gift or thatkodai).40 to a Shi’a girls’ school before having been raped. Terrorist or- Teenagers and youth in contexts she could detonate the explosive ganizations provide a haven for that laud martyrdom will idolize device strapped around her mid- these women. By becoming a famous suicide bombers. Parks, section. suicide bomber, the shame of squares and streets are named rape disappears and is replaced after the deadliest bombers.41 by the pride associated with be- The appreciation for violence Terrorist ing a martyr for the cause.38 has perverse effects on young organizations people whose priorities and role are increasingly By becoming a models are distorted in favor of violent terrorists. Specifical- raping the women suicide bomber, ly, such cultures of martyrdom convey an insidious message to or arranging for the shame of rape women, they can accomplish women to be raped disappears and is more with their death than they ever could with their lives. One replaced by the In a variety of settings and across several regions, wom- pride associated 39 Mostarom, Tuty Raihanah. en who sacrifice their lives are “Al-Qaeda’s female jihadists: the celebrated. In Belfast, murals on with being a Islamist ideological view.” (2009); Blenman, Eboni. “Instruments of the Falls Road depict Mairead martyr for the Violence or Unwitting Pawns: A Farrell, the leader of the women Triangulative Analysis of the Recent in Armagh prison as a heroine. cause Phenomenon of Female Suicide In Palestine, Ayat al Akras, a Bombers, with a Focus on Al Qaeda in Iraq.” 2012 NCUR (2012). Palestinian bomber is immortal- While historically, the women and Bloom, Mia, Bradley A. Thayer, ized. Wafa Idris, the first Pales- were raped by soldiers on the and Valerie M. Hudson. “Life Sci- tinian suicide bomber has graced other side, the terrorist orga- ences and Islamic Suicide Terror- the cover of Time magazine, was nizations are increasingly rap- ism.” (2011). 40 Guribye, Eugene. “Sacrifice as the subject of a series of novel- ing the women or arranging for coping: A case study of the cultur- las about her life and her image women to be raped. In Iraq, al-political framing of traumatic is emblazoned on posters and Samira Ahmed Jassim is alleged experiences among Eelam Tamils in pamphlets. According to one to have orchestrated the rape of Norway.” Journal of Refugee Studies (2011): fer004 and Roberts, Michael. watchdog organization, there is 80 women to turn them into sui- “Filial devotion in Tamil culture even a training camp for young and the Tiger cult of martyrdom.” 38 Bloom, Mia. Dying to kill: The Contributions to Indian Sociology Allure of Suicide Terror. Columbia 30.2 (1996): 245-272. University Press, 2005 and Cun- 41 Moghadam, Assaf. “Palestinian 42 Agence France Press, “Would-be ningham, Karla J. “Cross-regional suicide terrorism in the second inti- girl bomber wanted to be doctor” trends in female terrorism.” Studies fada: Motivations and organizational http://www.qatarliving.com/forum/ in Conflict and Terrorism 26.3 aspects.” Studies in conflict and politics/posts/would-be-girl-bomb- (2003): 171-195. terrorism 26.2 (2003): 65-92. er-wanted-be-doctor. 52 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The Changing Nature of Women in extremism and political violence

43 girls named after her. © Via Flickr/Hani Amir

By being a bomber she trans- formed herself from being a source of shame to her family (her husband divorced her after she could not bear children) to a source of great admiration in the community. In Sri Lanka, the Ti- gers have a museum dedicated to their memory.

They scoffed at this goal and explained it was unlikely that she would grow up to be a doctor but certainly she could become a martyr

While we are familiar with the male face of terror, there are new faces primed to take their place. The face of yesterday was Bin Laden’s, today it is perhaps Samira Ahmed Jassim, and to- morrow, who knows, we are seeing more and more children ma- nipulated into becoming violent extremists. This is an insidious form of child abuse and as we move into the future, we should The author know that the face of terror always changes. Mia M. Bloom is a Professor of Communication at Georgia State University. Bloom is the author of Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror and Bombshell: Women and Terrorism. She is 43 According to MEMRI, see also currently writing a book on children’s involvement in terrorist Dunn, Shannon. “The Female Mar- tyr and the Politics of Death: An Ex- networks in Pakistan, the Middle East and North Africa entitled amination of the Martyr Discourses Small Arms: Children and Terror with Dr. John G. Horgan of Vibia Perpetua and Wafa Idris.” for Cornell University Press (2016). She can be reached at Journal of the American Academy [email protected]. of Religion (2010): lfp090. 53 PRISM Workshop on Hate Speech and Hate Crime to take place in Rome

A training workshop targeting law enforcement authorities and legal professionals will be held in Rome from 27-29 October 2015.

The event will be organized by UNICRI as a component of PRISM – Preventing, Redressing and Inhibiting hate Speech in new Media – a project funded by the FRAC Programme of the European Commission, in cooperation with the Institute for International Legal Studies of the National Research Council of Italy (CNR) and the other partners.

The 15 hour-training course will take place at the oces of CNR and will cover a wide range of topics: including an overview of the concepts of racism and anti-discrimination, the legal frameworks for dealing with hate speech and hate crime at the international, EU and Italian levels, and information on how to investigate and report these issues, with a focus given to victims’ assistance.

The workshop is free of charge, and approximately 30 participants will have the possibility to attend. Lawyers participating in the specialized training will be awarded Educational credits issued by the Bar Association of Rome. The working language will be Italian.

For more information and to register, please contact Ms. Elena D’Angelo at [email protected] and visit UNICRI’s webpage dedicated to the PRISM Project, which can be found at: http://www.unicri.it/special_topics/hate_crimes/

54 Extreme violence rose to unprecedented levels in 2014, leading to a dramatic increase of grave violations against children. Children have been disproportionately affected and were often the direct targets of acts of violence intended to inflict maximum casualties, terrorize entire communities and provoke worldwide outrage. A tactic of extremist groups is the targeting of schools since they fundamentally object to the goal of universal education for children because they are an emblematic target. In other instances, schools located in areas controlled by extremist armed groups have had their curriculum changed to reflect the groups ideology. […] The military responses to the threat caused by extreme violence have also raised serious child protection concerns. In a number of situations where extreme violence is prevalent, military operations led by regional or international coalitions or by neighbouring countries have resulted in the killing and maiming of children. Children have also been subjected to se xual violence and recruited and used by pro-Government militias. An area of particular concern related to the response to extreme violence is the deprivation of liberty of children due to their alleged association with extremist groups. The report includes the list of parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim children, commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, or engage in attacks on schools and/or hospitals in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council.

55 Some highlights from the Report Violations are thought to be largely underreported because of lack of access and limited monitoring capacity on the ground.

Afghanistan

48% increase in child casualties 163 attacks against schools Parties in Afghanistan:

Central African Republic

464 cases of new recruitment 146 children killed and 289 injured rape of 405 girls and 1 boy, between the ages of 7 and 17 at least 34 abductions Parties in Central African Republic Ex-Séléka coalition and associated armed groups Local defence militias known as the anti-Balaka Lord’s Resistance Army

Democratic Republic of Congo

The UN released 121 children 241 new cases of recruitment 80 children (52 boys, 28 girls) were killed and 92 maimed 334 cases of sexual violence Twenty-two schools were attacked at least 108 children abducted Parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) Mayi Mayi Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) “Colonel Janvier” Mayi Mayi “Lafontaine” and former elements of the Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO) Mayi Mayi Simba “Morgan” Mayi Mayi Kata Katanga Nduma Defence Coalition (NDC)/Cheka Mayi Mayi Nyatura Lord’s Resistance Army 56 Iraq

At least 45 Yezidi children died (shortages of food and water) 679 children killed 505 injured 1,297 children abducted 67 attacks on schools Parties in Iraq: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

Israel and State of Palestine

At least 561 children (557 Palestinian; 4 Israeli) killed and 4,271 injured (4,249 Palestinian; 22 Israeli)

Lebanon

Children joined armed factions in Palestinian camps and Syrian Arab Republic 40 children killed and 4 injured

libya

57 South Sudan

81 children recruited 147 abducted 90 killed and 220 injured 490 bodies of children in mass graves Parties in the Central African region: Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) SPLA in Opposition White Army Lord’s Resistance Army

Mali

Hundreds of children engaged in hostilities 38 incidents of sexual violence against girls Parties in Mali: Mouvement national de liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) Ansar Dine

Myanmar

53 escaped from the Tatmadaw, 13 arrested on charges of desertion Parties in Myanmar: Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) Shan State Army South (SSA-S) Tatmadaw Kyi, including integrated border guard forces United Wa State Army (UWSA)

58 Somalia

Al Shabaab Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) Somali National Army

Sudan

75,000 children in need of food and medical care Parties in Sudan: Government security forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Sudan Police Forces Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Pro-Government militias Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N)

Syrian Arab Republic

Recruitment of children Sexual violence and forced marriage Parties in the Syrian Arab Republic:

59 Yemen

156 boys recruited between the ages of 9 and 17 Parties in Yemen:

Colombia

At least 9 children were killed and 60 were maimed, landmine incidents Parties in Colombia: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP)

india

Recruitment and use of children as young as six years of age by armed groups

Nigeria

Recruitment and use of boys and girls 314 children killed at school 276 girls abducted at school Parties in Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad also known as Boko Haram

60 Pakistan

At least 132 boys, as young as 8 years of age were killed. At least 133 persons were injured, the vast majority of them children

Philippines

Military use of several schools and one hospital Parties in the Philippines: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) New People’s Army (NPA)

Thailand

Recruitment and use of children by armed groups. Administrative detention of children for alleged association with armed groups 10 students killed - 15 students injured

61 Recommendations of the Secretary General of the United Nations

I am deeply concerned at the increase of grave violations outlined in the present report and call upon all parties to immediately end, and take all measures to prevent, grave violations against children.

Accountability is crucial to preventing grave violations, and I urge Member States to place it at the core of national and international responses to violations.

I call upon Member States to ensure that their response to threats to peace and security are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law. Member States should ensure that responses include specific mitigating measures for the protection of children.

I strongly urge all parties listed in the annexes to the present report who have not yet done so to enter into dialogue with the United Nations to agree on and implement measures to end grave violations and assist victims.

I call upon Member States to allow independent access to the United Nations for the purposes of monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children.

I also call upon Member States to facilitate contact between the United Nations and non-State armed groups for dialogue and follow-up on action plans in order to bring an end to violations. Such dialogue does not prejudge the political or legal status of those non-State armed groups.

I urge Member States to consider alternatives to the deprivation of liberty or prosecution of children for their alleged or actual association with armed groups or as part of counter-terrorism measures. At a min- imum, Member States should ensure that procedures or trials are consistent with international juvenile justice standards and the principle of the best interests of the child.

The recruitment and use of children by extremist groups pose new challenges with regard to their protection, rehabilitation and reintegration. I encourage Member States to highlight and address the need for prevention and appropriate measures to rehabilitate those children recruited and used, including education programmes and vocational training, in compliance with the principle of the best interest of the child and respecting the child’s primary status as a victim.

I encourage Member States, regional organizations, international mediators and special envoys to continue including child protection provisions in peace negotiations and agreements.

I welcome the leadership and contribution of regional and subregional organizations in the protection of children. I call upon regional and subregional organizations to continue integrating child protection con- siderations in their policies, planning of peace support operations, training of personnel and conduct of operations.

I call upon all parties to respect the civilian character of schools and cease attacks against them and attacks and threats of attacks against students and teachers.

I call upon the Council to expand the tools available to child protection actors to gather information and report on the abduction of children, including through adding abductions as a trigger violation for listing in the annexes of the present report.

62 I also call upon the Council to continue to support the children and armed conflict agenda by strengthening provisions for the protection of children in all relevant mandates of United Nations peacekeeping, special political and peacebuilding missions. I also welcome and encourage the inclusion of grave violations against children as criteria for sanctions in Security Council committees.

I welcome the engagement and progress made so far regarding the “Children, Not Soldiers” campaign. I call upon all Member States to continue to mobilize political and financial support to ensure that progress achieved is institutionalized and durable.

I again urge all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its three Optional Protocols.

63 InFocus

ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: Funding terrorism through art by Annelies Pauwels

64 This section of Freedom From Fear includes the opinions and analyses of young people. Young people represent the most valuable capital countries have. Their opinions have to be heard and considered while designing and planning new strategies to build better societies.

65 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: funding terrorism through art

The self-proclaimed Islamic State conflict have engaged in such ac- The trade in looted of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) re- tivities in order to acquire their cently shocked the world by weapons. Reportedly, not only artefacts from destroying a number of archaeo- have rebel groups taken advan- logical sites throughout the region tage of the trafficking in looted Syria and Iraq to under its control, among which artefacts, but Syrian regime sol- the rest of the were the ancient Assyrian cities diers as well.1. In Iraq, the looting of Nineveh and Nimrud. Deter- of archaeological sites has been world represents mined to impose its culture as practiced before the current a major source of the dominant one in the region, conflict. Both during the coun- Daesh – the Arabic equivalent try’s isolation after the first Gulf income for the of ISIS – calls for the destruc- War and after the 2003 inva- tion of all cultural property of sion, plundering and antiquities terrorist group other religious groups, as well trafficking became a common After taking over vast areas of as Islamic artefacts it considers source of income for insurgency northern and eastern Syria and haram or forbidden in Islam, groups.2. Iraq, ISIS has become the major such as religious shrines and art player in smuggling the region’s depicting human faces. In real- 1 Peter B. Campbell, “The Illicit cultural goods. Despite the fact ity, the trade in looted artefacts Antiquities Trade as a Transnational that it did not “invent” the prac- from Syria and Iraq to the rest Criminal Network: Characterizing tice of archaeological looting in of the world represents a major and Anticipating Trafficking of both countries, ISIS is believed source of income for the terror- Cultural Heritage”, International Journal of Cultural Property, 2013, to have intensified and acceler- ist group. 20:113–153, http://www.academia. ated the pre-existing situation.3. edu/4146904/The_Illicit_Antiq- In fact, the current looting in the Taking over the Mesopota- uities_Trade_as_a_Transnation- region is estimated to be massive mian antiquities trade al_Criminal_Network_Character- izing_and_Anticipating_Traffick- and its unprecedented scale has Surely, ISIS is not the first group ing_of_Cultural_Heritage. that saw the financial benefits of 2 Brigadier General (Ret.), Russell 3 Deborah Amos, “Via Satellite, illicit trafficking in the region’s Howard, Jonathan Prohov, Marc Tracking the Plunder of Middle East cultural property. Since the out- Elliott, “Digging in and Trafficking Cultural History,” NPR, March 10, out: How the Destruction of Cultural 2015, http://www.npr.org/blogs/ break of the civil war in Syria, Heritage Funds Terrorism,” CTC parallels/2015/03/10/392077801/ different groups involved in the Sentinel, Vol 8 Issue 27, February via-satellite-tracking-the-plun- 27, 2015. der-of-middle-east-cultural-history. 66 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: funding terrorism through art

been referred to as “the worst- world’s oldest traces of civilisa- Additionally, one case scenario”.4. tion, belongs to human patrimo- ny and should be protected by should not ignore The value of cultural heritage the international community. Amidst the long list of war crimes, Additionally, one should not ig- the economic crimes against humanity, serious nore the economic and devel- and development human rights violations and pos- opment opportunities tourism sibly even genocide attributed to could offer to both countries opportunities ISIS,5. the destruction of cultural once the region stabilises. For tourism could property within these war-torn instance, before the beginning of countries might seem to lack im- the uprisings in 2011, tourism in offer to both portance and significance. Nev- Syria accounted for an estimated ertheless, the region’s cultural 5% of the GDP.6. Moreover, the countries heritage, comprising some of the potential healing power of cul- Perhaps, a more persuasive rea- tural property, which might help son for the international commu- 4 Franklin Lamb, “Looting is the bringing together communities nity to intervene is the enormous Greatest Threat to Our Cultural within such heterogeneous so- Heritage in Syria,” Foreign Pol- amount of financial resourc- cieties, should not be underesti- icy Journal, December 29, 2014, es the illicit trafficking in sto- http://www.foreignpolicyjournal. mated. com/2014/12/29/looting-is-the- len art and antiquities offers greatest-threat-to-our-cultural-her- to ISIS. In February 2015, the itage-in-syria/. 6 MapAction, “Impact of the conflict United Nations Security Coun- 5 Report of OHCHR on the human on Syrian economy and livelihoods cil (UNSC) adopted its resolution rights situation in Iraq in light of Syria Needs Analysis Project, Syria abuses committed by the so-called Needs Analysis Report - July 2013,” 2199 (2015), which extends to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant July 29, 2013, http://www.mapac- Syria the prohibition of trade in and associated groups, March 13, tion.org/component/mapcat/down- cultural objects already in place 2015 (published on 19 March 2015). load/2960.html?fmt=pdf. 67 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: funding terrorism through art for Iraq since 2003 under reso- the local population. Its involve- viding permissions and levying lution 1483. In its resolution, the ment in illicit trafficking in cul- taxes to looters, but it also mon- UNSC expressed its concern that tural goods allows ISIS to diver- itors the artefacts and decides the Islamic State and others “are sify their financing. It has been which objects are to be sold or generating income from engag- estimated that more than a third destroyed. The useful and trans- ing directly or indirectly in the of Iraq’s 12,000 important ar- portable objects are smuggled looting and smuggling in cultur- chaeological sites are now under by intermediaries to the neigh- al heritage items (…) to support ISIS’ control, while the smug- bouring countries Turkey, Jor- their recruitment efforts and gling of archaeological artefacts dan and Iran through traditional strengthen their operational ca- represents their second largest smuggling routes. At this point, pability to organize and carry source of funding.8. internationally connected antiq- out terrorist attacks”.7. While oil uities dealers and collectors are revenues represent a significant The route of smuggled thought to act as a link between portion of the group’s income, Mesopotamian artefacts the illicit and licit trade. other primary income sources Further research is needed to are generated from systematic deepen knowledge of ISIS’ ex- A large number of artefacts sup- extortion in the areas under its act level of involvement in and posedly end up in antiquities control, private foreign dona- modus operandi of the antiqui- markets in Jordan, where they tions, kidnap ransoms, and loot- ties trade. Nevertheless, Daesh is are being sold to tourists. The ing of banks and stealing from believed to play an active role in internet has enlarged the possi- controlling the trade; not only is bilities of this illicit market. In 7 United Nations Security Council it in charge of the looting by pro- fact, antique dealers are selling (SC), “Security Council resolution 2199 (2015) [on threats to interna- 8 Janine di Giovanni, Leah McGrath stolen antiquities from ancient tional peace and security caused Goodman, Damien Sharkov, Mesopotamia not just through by terrorist acts by Al-Qaida],” “How does ISIS fund its reign of the traditional channels, but also February 12, 2015, S/RES/2199 terror?”, Newsweek, November through the Deep Web. Even cer- (2015), http://www.un.org/ga/ 6, 2014, http://www.newsweek. search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis- tain auction houses have been RES/2199%282015%29. fund-its-reign-terror-282607.html. reported to sell on the open mar-

68 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: funding terrorism through art kets illegal artefacts from ISIS some of which are extensive and of their criminal justice policies, controlled regions, accompanied difficult to control. ISIS makes strategies, and legislation as well by false documentation.9. Such use of smuggling networks that as cooperation mechanisms with antiquities appear to be partic- operate through long-standing regards to the trafficking in cul- ularly desired by private buyers routes, often passed on with- tural property.11. in Europe and the United States, in families from generation to and also in the Gulf countries generation. The same routes are Other key aspects in the fight and China. In fact, many of the also used for trafficking in arms, against the illicit trade in cultur- stolen artefacts end up in private drugs and human beings. al objects are the development buildings, where they are being of documentation of the arte- displayed as a status symbol. facts’ origin as well as inserting However, it is also expected that Even certain such information into invento- a majority of the stolen cultural auction houses ries, both at a national and inter- goods are being held in storage national level. Similar databases rooms for future sale at higher have been might assist authorities during prices.10. reported to sell on investigations of trafficking in archaeological artefacts, but also It has been the open markets guide auction houses in checking illegal artefacts the provenance before selling estimated that cultural objects. Examples are from ISIS INTERPOL’s Stolen Works of more than a Art Database and the so-called third of Iraq’s controlled regions “red lists”, issued by the Inter- national Council of Museums 12,000 important Additionally, antiquities smug- (ICOM). In addition, it is nec- glers take advantage of gaps in essary to raise awareness that archaeological the relevant legislative frame- collecting looted antiquities is a sites are now work or in its implementation. crime that contributes to the fi- Since the 1970s, a number of in- nancing of terrorism. In March under ISIS’ ternational conventions as well 2014, three UN agencies started control as soft law agreements, aimed at such an awareness-raising ini- reducing illegal trafficking of art, tiative, aimed at travellers and antiquities and cultural proper- the tourism industry.12. International efforts to fight ty, have been agreed upon. One illicit art trafficking of the main instruments is the Undoubtedly, international co- 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on operation and coordination are stolen or illegally exported cul- 11 United Nations General Assembly key aspects in the response to tural objects, which obligates trafficking in cultural property. (GA), “General Assembly resolution antiquities buyers to check the 69 (196) [International Guidelines Antiquities smugglers are fa- legitimacy of their purchase. for Crime Prevention and Criminal cilitated by the “open” borders This convention, however, has Justice Responses with Respect to surrounding both Syria and Iraq, Trafficking in Cultural Property not been ratified either by Syria and Other Related Offences],” and Iraq or by some of the main December 18, 2014, A/RES/69/196 9 Philipp Jedicke, “Germany at- States in which illicit Mesopo- (2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/ tracts trade in looted artefacts”, tamian artefacts end up. In De- search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ Deutsche Welle, October 24, RES/69/196. 2014, http://www.dw.de/germa- cember 2014, the United Nations 12 UN News Centre, “New UN-led ny-attracts-trade-in-looted-arti- General Assembly adopted a set anti-trafficking campaign to help facts/a-18019083. of non-binding guidelines aim- raise tourists’ awareness”, March 10 Franklin Lamb, “Looting is the ing to assist Member States in the 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/ Greatest Threat to Our Cultural news/story.asp?NewsID=47286#. Heritage in Syria.” development and strengthening VT-hJyGqqko. 69 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: funding terrorism through art

Conclusions decline in the case of ISIS.13. In Being a cash-based Although ISIS in appearance is fact, being a cash-based organ- a religiously inspired group, its isation that also heavily relies organisation that funding operations resemble on hawalas or informal money those of an “ordinary” organised transfer networks, ISIS is able to also heavily relies criminal network. By raising avoid legitimate banking chan- on hawalas or money through a wide array of nels. It is, however, essential essentially criminal activities, to enhance border controls, in informal money ISIS appears to be a self-sustain- particular with the neighbouring transfer networks, ing organisation that makes most States, and establish additional of its money from the territory custom operations to prevent ISIS is able to under its control, rather than re- smuggling. The international lying heavily on foreign money community should also focus avoid legitimate flows, such as private donations. on promoting States’ adher- banking channels It is, therefore, critical to tackle ence to and implementation of their financial resources, includ- the relevant international le- The relevance of the involve- ing the money generated by the gal framework, encouraging the ment of Daesh in the illicit trade illicit art trade, which consti- documentation of archaeolog- in archaeological goods from an- tutes one of their main sources ical sites in the affected States, cient Mesopotamia should not of income. enhancing the monitoring of the be underestimated. Despite the cultural property market, and fact that this criminal activity The effectiveness of traditional raising public awareness on the seems to fade away among the channels used for tackling fi- seriousness of the issue. horrendous atrocities that con- nancial terrorist funding, such tinue to be perpetrated in the re- as closing bank accounts and 13 Howard J. Shatz, “How ISIS funds gion, its financial impact appears blocking money transfers, may its reign of terror”, The Rand Blog, September 8, 2014, http://www. to be vital to the organisation. rand.org/blog/2014/09/how-isis- funds-its-reign-of-terror.html.

The author

Annelies Pauwels holds an M.A. in Linguistic and Cultural Mediation from the University of Milan with a specialization in the Arabic and Russian languages. She recently obtained an LL.M in Inter- national Criminal Law from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), with a Master thesis focusing on the Belgian Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and Iraq. After having interned at UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch, she is currently serving at UNICRI.

70 71 InFocus

The governance of Roma people in Italy: A shifting paradigm

by Alberto Mallardo

72 This section of Freedom From Fear includes the opinions and analyses of young people. Young people represent the most valuable capital countries have. Their opinions have to be heard and considered while designing and planning new strategies to build better societies.

73 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm

Foreword from schools and low education- years is estimated to represent As suggested by the sociologist al attainment, poorer housing the 60% of the total, three times Luigi Manconi, Roma people1 conditions and constricted by higher than the national average are unpleasant to many people the scarce availability of sites. for the same age group.7 and there is no doubt that some of them live committing crimes and inducing their children to The European Roma communi- beg. Although the Roma, like Commission iden- ties are confronted everyone else, are accountable for their actions, other factors tified in 2004 the with higher child have concurred to shape this sit- condition of Roma mortality rates, uation. This article analyses the effectiveness and the outcome people as one of shorter life expec- reached by the different policy measures towards Roma people the ‘most pressing tancies and limited adopted by the Italian Govern- political, social, access to health ment since the spring of 2008. and human rights services The Italian context issues facing Eu- The European Commission identi- In the light of the aforemen- fied in 2004 the condition of Roma rope’ tioned data, Roma groups cur- people as one of the ‘most press- rently living in Italy do not ing political, social, and human Roma people living in Italy are compose a homogeneous com- rights issues facing Europe’.2 estimated to range from 110,000 munity but rather have different In 2013, also the United Nations to 180,000, representing about the cultural identities. Nonetheless, expressed concern for the very 0,23% of the total population.4 A these groups are often identified serious human rights and devel- majority of them, about 60%, are with the exonyms zingari (gip- opment issues related to these Italian citizen, live mostly in per- sies) and nomadi (nomads). The communities, particularly in manent houses, and do not adopt former has been adopted even Europe.3 In comparison to other any type of nomadic lifestyles. in official documents to indi- minority groups, Roma commu- The bulk of the remaining 40% cate the considerable number of nities are confronted with high- includes groups of Roma that Roma communities in Italy while er child mortality rates, shorter arrived in Italy in recent times.5 the latter expresses the belief life expectancies and limited ac- Only 8% of them still practice that all or most of these people cess to health services, exclusion some form of nomadism while live a nomadic life.8 Both terms the vast majority of the other emphasise and objectify the id- iosyncratic traits of these com- 1 Within this work, the term Roma is Roma people living in Italy have adopted to indicate groups of people no experience of nomadism.6 munities, contributing to shape the that share similar cultural charac- In addition, the percentage of Gypsy stereotype. teristics, such as Sinti, Camminanti, Roma people below the age of 18 Kalé, Travellers, Gens du voyage etc. As argued by the Office for 2 European Commission Director- ate-General for Employment and 4 UNAR, ‘Strategia Nazionale d’Inclu- Democratic Institutions and Social Affairs, ‘The Situation of sione dei Rom, dei Sinti e dei Cam- Human Rights in 2008, often Roma in an Enlarged EU,’ Luxem- minanti,’ 2012, p. 14 http://www. bourg: Office for Official Publica- unar.it/unar/portal/wp-content/ tions of the European Communities, uploads/2014/02/Strategia-Rom-e- 7 Associazione 21 Luglio Onlus, 10, 2004. Sinti.pdf ‘Rapporto Annuale 2014,’ Rome, 3 United Nations, ‘The role of the 5 Ibidem 8-9, 2014, http://www.21luglio.org/ United Nations in advancing Roma 6 Paola Arrigoni and Tommaso wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Rap- inclusion,’ 2013, http://www. Vitale, ‘Quale legalità? Rom e gagi a porto-annuale-Associazione-21-lu- europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Pub- confronto, ’ Aggiornamenti Sociali, glio.pdf. lications/RomaInclusion.pdf (03), 182-194, 2008. 8 74 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm

Gadje (non-Roma people) and The State of Emergency held on what has been called Roma communities have been In the run-up to the general the problem of nomads (prob- perceived as dichotomously election of 2008, the growing lema nomadi). Different voices opposed.9 Analysing the gov- number of illegal camps and from both ends of the political ernance of Roma people in settlements of Roma people, the spectrum used buzzwords such Italy allows us to unveil some many Roma children begging in as emergency, urgency, threat to of the factors that have contrib- the streets and the presence of public safety and public enemy. uted to generate such an unbear- unaccompanied Roma minors able situation both for Roma and increasingly raised local ten- non-Roma communities. sions and contributed to ampli- Roma groups cur- fy the echo of the past but still rently living in existing stereotypes and preju- The vast majority dices.10 Moreover, the atrocious Italy do not com- of the other Roma murder of an Italian woman in pose a homogene- the outskirt of Rome by a Roma- people living in nian Roma in November 2007 ous community Italy have no ex- made the ‘Roma issue’ a topic of national importance. but rather have perience of no- Roma people climbed the pub- different cultural lic arena, appearing in the po- madism litical and media agenda as a identities major concern for the Italian national security. From the Ital- ian Parliament to popular talk Consistent with their promises, immediately after the election 9 OSCE, ‘Assessment of the human shows, numerous debates were rights situation of Roma and Sinti in in May 2008, the newly formed Italy,’ Warsaw: The Hague, 2009. 10 Ibidem p.7 right wing Government declared 75 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm a ‘State of Emergency in relation relation to the actual scale of ence of Roma’s settlements and to nomads’ community settle- the security threat related to an extraordinary and exception- ments’ and conferred special immigration and the situation al disruption of order and pub- powers to the prefects of Milan, of Roma settlements’.13 The for- lic security. Hereupon, all the Rome and Naples to solve the so- mer head of UNICEF in Italy, measures undertaken based on called emergency.11 The adopted Vincenzo Spadafora, expressed the ‘State of Emergency’ were measures ranged from the mass serious concerns about the situ- declared illegal.17 collection of biometric data of ation of Roma children in Italy, Roma groups, to the demolition emphasising the fact that ‘the of shantytowns and the repatria- government would be acting in a We have been told tion of EU citizens allegedly pos- discriminatory fashion unless it – that they are ing a threat to public security. would have fingerprinted every These measures were justified child in Italy’.14 Even the former evil - not only the as necessary to provide support President of the Italian Repub- Roma but also to to individuals in camps and to lic, Giorgio Napolitano meeting prevent further degradation of a group of students on the 18th the Romanians - their living conditions, as well anniversary of the Convention as to identify people involved in on the Rights of the Child ar- and therefore we criminal activities. gued: ‘We have been told – that should be scared they are evil - not only the Roma However, as suggested by Ales- but also to the Romanians - and of them sandro Simoni, associate profes- therefore we should be scared of sor of comparative legal systems them. Nevertheless, we must not Further policies: the National at the Department of Law of the be scared. We need to help them Strategy University of Florence, besides to integrate into society.’15 In 2011, increased attention was indicating the inclination of the given to the inclusion of Roma Italian Government towards Eventually, in November 2011, communities due to the en- an emergency approach over a the Italian Council of State ruled hanced efforts of the European long-term and structural plan- that the ‘State of Emergency’ de- institutions. The European Com- ning, the extraordinary meas- clared by the Government was mission clearly defined the con- ures undertaken could have unlawful, claiming that some as- dition of many of the estimated contributed to construct a highly pects of the Decree constitute de 10-12 million of Roma people racialized ethnic category.12 facto a form of racial discrimina- living in the continent as un- tion.16 The Council of State ruled bearable because of the growing International and national re- that there was no evidence of a prejudices, intolerance, discrim- sponses causal link between the exist- ination and social exclusion ex- Among the different concerns perienced by them.18 raised at the international and 13 OSCE, ‘Assessment of the human national level, the Organisa- rights situation of Roma and Sinti in 17 Although the Italian Government tion for Security and Co-op- Italy,’ Warsaw: The Hague, 2009. appealed to the Court of Cassa- 14 Tom Kington, ‘Unicef among Critics tion in April 2013 the appeal was eration in Europe considered of Italian Plan to Fingerprint Roma rejected by the Court. ERRC ‘Italy: a the above-mentioned adopted Children,’ The Guardian, June 27, report by the European Roma Rights measures: ‘disproportionate in 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/ Centre,’ 2012, http://www.errc.org/ world/2008/jun/27/race.italy. cms/upload/file/italy-country-pro- 15 Giorgio Napolitano, ‘Conclusioni,’ file-2011-2012.pdf. 11 G.U. n.122, May 26, 2008, http:// Giornata nazionale per i diritti 18 European Commission, ‘Communi- www.governo.it/Governo/Provved- dell’infanzia e dell’adolescenza cation from the Commission to the imenti/testo_int.asp?d=39105 sotto l’Alto Patronato del Presidente European Parliament, the Council, 12 Alessandro Simoni, ‘Per una lettura della Repubblica, November 20, the European Economic and Social romanì del pacchetto sicurezza, ’ 2007, pp. 49-50. Committee of the Regions: An EU 2009, http://www.juragentium.org/ 16 Set. n. 6050 Cons. St.,, November framework for National Roma forum/rom/it/simoni.htm#n3 16, 2011. Integration Strategies up to 2020,’ 76 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm

The European Commission es- number of weaknesses has to tions also at the local level. 22 tablished the EU framework for be identified in the lack of clear national Roma integration strat- targets, absence of performance Towards a more effective pol- egy defining the improvement of indicators, poor budgeting and icy the Roma situation as a social and lack of monitoring and evalua- Over the years, a number of economic imperative for the EU tion tools.21 Considering the lack reasons have limited the social and its Member States. 19 In 2012, of such clear requirements in and economic inclusion of Roma the Italian Government translat- terms of planning policy, local communities in Italy. Although ed the European indications into authorities have continued to the Roma share part of the reaction and put in place the new postpone the implementation of sponsibility for the lack of inte- National Strategy for Roma in- the strategy, substantially posing gration, other causes have played clusion.20 The then Minister for at risk the whole policy design. a key role in this failure. Integration Policies and Inter- national Cooperation, Andrea The UN has assisted in gener- First, Roma communities have Riccardi, strongly supported the al social inclusion policy pro- been largely misunderstood and adoption of the National Strate- cesses in EU frameworks, such as a consequence anti-Roma sen- gy for Roma Integration and on as by supporting the develop- timents are widespread throughout several occasions stressed the ment of National Action Plans the country. In 2011, a survey car- importance of changing the se- for social inclusion targeting a ried out by the Italian Senate curity-driven approach on Roma number of vulnerable groups Commission on Human Rights issues to a more inclusive strat- including Roma. In May 2012, a found that most of the popula- egy. report on the situation of Roma tion have partial or very lim- in 11 EU Member States provid- ited information on the Roma In line with the EU framework, ed comprehensive data on the living in Italy. Yet, 84% of the the new strategy established socio-economic status of Roma participants presumed that the four key areas of intervention: while also examining discrimi- majority of Roma people adopt education, employment, health, nation and rights awareness. The nomadic lifestyles; another and housing. However, although data also served as background 92% thought that petty theft and at the national level the need to for the European Commission’s shoplifting are an integral part put a definitive stop to mainly simultaneous Communication of the Roma culture; while 82% security-based measures was on progress in this area, as re- of the participants believed that reaffirmed, at local level the flected in the National Strategies those communities have delib- endorsed principles of social for Roma Integration. erately chosen to live in camp justice and equity were not ful- sites at the edge of ‘our cities’.23 filled. A number of reasons had As stated by the UN “the strate- in fact, limited the implementa- gies need to be followed by con- As Nando Sigona – one of the tion of the planned measures. crete action”. Too often, capaci- most prominent experts on According to the non-profit or- ty in this regard is still poor, par- ganisation 21 Luglio, which stands ticularly at the local level where 22 United Nations, ‘The role of the up for the rights of Roma, a the real problems are and need United Nations in advancing Roma inclusion,’ 2013, p.3, http://www. to be addressed. For the national europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Pub- April 5, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/ strategies to succeed, they need to lications/RomaInclusion.pdf justice/policies/discrimination/ be operationalized into tangi- 23 Commissione straordinaria per la docs/com_2011_173_en.pdf. ble, results-oriented interven- tutela e la promozione dei dirit- 19 Ibid. ti umani, ‘Rapporto Conclusivo 20 National Office on Anti-Dis- dell’indagine sulla condizione di criminations National Focal Point, 21 Associazione 21 Luglio Onlus, Rom, Sinti e Camminanti in Italia,’ ‘National Strategy for the Inclusion ‘Rapporto Annuale 2014,’ Rome Rome: Senate of the Italian Repub- of Roma, Sinti and Camminanti 2014, http://www.21luglio.org/ lic, 2011, http://www.senato.it/doc- communities – European Commis- wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Rap- umenti/repository/commissioni/ sion Communication No.173/2011,’ porto-annuale-Associazione-21-lu- dirittiumani16/RAPPORTO%20 February 28, 2012. glio.pdf. ROM%20.pdf 77 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm

Roma issues and fellow at the fact that Roma people represent menting policies towards Roma University of Birmingham – has a constant threat that have to be people. The demographic profile pointed out, the portrayal of addressed. of these communities shows that Roma people as nomadic popu- most of the Roma living in Italy lation has been used to reinforce are minors. Rather than rein- the idea that those people are The portrayal of forcing their racial segregation stateless and deserve different Roma people as and fuelling a racing marginali- rights from the rest of the popu- sation process, which trap them lation.24 Nonetheless, most of the nomadic popula- in a vicious cycle of inequalities, groups of Roma that moved to It- tion has been used the Italian Government and the aly in the last decades had lived Italian local authorities should a settled life for centuries.25 to reinforce the invest in education, vocational The Roma in the camps tends training and in work placement inevitably to ghettoize in that idea that those programs. Twenty-nine million dimension of social marginalisa- people are state- euros have already been allo- tion and self-government, which cated by the European Union is the perfect substrata for ille- less and deserve for the Roma inclusion in Italy,26 gal business and illicit activity. different rights non investing properly these re- In the meanwhile, those who sources would have consequenc- live near those settlements are from the rest of es on many future generations progressively convinced of the the population both of Roma and non-Roma. 24 Nando Sigona, ‘Figli del ghetto. Gli italiani, i campi nomadi e l’invenzi- In this context, it is difficult to 26 Sabina Anderini and Anna Rita one degli zingari,’ Civezzano: Nonlu- find space for integration and Racioppo, ‘I rom nella program- oghi libere edizioni, 2002. empowerment. Nonetheless, mazione 2014-2020, Come tradurre 25 Leonardo Piasere, ‘Che cos’è un one factor could be particularly le strategie dei Fondi strutturali in campo nomadi?,’Achab, (8), 8-16, azioni concrete,’ Osservatorio Isfol, 2006. relevant in planning and imple- (1-2), 113-114, 2013.

The author

Alberto Mallardo graduated from London Metropolitan University with an MSc in Health and Social Services Management and Policy. His dissertation focused on the housing and planning policies for Roma and Traveller communities in the UK. His interest in Romani people issues stemmed from the experience as a cultural mediator among Roma communities. He did an internship at UNICRI Communication and Public Information Department and is now working in Lampedusa with Mediterranean Hope, a project of the Federation of Protestant Churches in Italy.

78 79 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

The economics of ISIS A case of theft or money laundering? by Svenja Berg and Killian J. McCarthy

Introduction Founded in 2004, the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has striven to set up what they call an Islamic state within what is currently Syria and Iraq (Mirror, 2014). Since its inception, ISIS has prospered and expanded. According to CIA estimates, it has recruited 20- 30,000 fighters, conquered a large swath of land and makes as much as two million US dollars a day.1

1 Shane Croucher, “Western Banks, Terrorism and Isis: The Nihilism of Dark Finance Fuelling Global Insecurity,” Inter- national Business Times, November 13, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/western-banks-terrorism-isis-nihilism-dark-finance-fuelling-global-insecurity-14745080. 80 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

Observers have already suggest- Thirdly, ISIS is known to be en- million (US) dollars to ISIS, used that ISIS is probably one of gaged in activities such as smug- ing normal financial transfers.5 largestand wealthiest terrorist gling (people, drugs, and archae- Of the four financial streams, organizations in the world. ological artifacts), racketeering donations are the least signifi- For scholars, this raises a number and tax levying. In certain areas cant source of income in terms of interesting questions. From a such as those densely populated, of scale.6 The majority of ISIS’ business perspective, ISIS pos- this can lead to significant reve- income, therefore, is generated es a striking organizational and nue generation. illegally. For most criminal or- operational case, whereas for ganizations – such as the drug legal scholars the goals of ISIS, cartels in South America – gen- in terms of setting up a new How does erating a large share of the or- state, also present noteworthy ganizations’ revenues by illegal subjects. When looking at the ISIS make its means creates problems. Legally organization from an econom- money? Does generated cash, or ‘clean’ mon- ic angle, however, probably one ey, can be consumed,convert- of the most important issues to it simply steal ed and invested, while illegal- raise is: How does ISIS make its ly generated money can only money? Does it simply steal it it or does ISIS be consumed.7 The so-called or does ISIS participate in the ‘dirty’ money, thus, has fewer international economy and op- participate in uses, and it is therefore worth erate in the money laundering less. To maximize the value of market? the international its revenues, most criminal or- economy and ganizations, therefore, have to The ISIS Business Model ‘wash’ their money, using mon- ISIS has created a number of operate in ey laundering services, aimed at revenue streams. Firstly, ISIS “conceal[ing] or disguise[ing] the acquires a large part of its rev- the money nature, location, source, owner- enues through plundering. The ship or control” of money.8 And looting of banks in Mosul in laundering of course such services cost: 2014, for example, caught the research suggests money laun- public’s attention, and boost- market? ed the organization’s coffers to ter/press-releases/Pages/jl2651. about two billion US dollars.2 Finally, it is known that many rich individuals, particularly aspx Secondly, ISIS has acquired a 5 Christine Duhaime, “White Paper number of assets that allow it to from the Gulf States, have made on Islamic State Funding: Terrorist generate revenues. In 2012, for sizable donations to ISIS. For Financing and the Islamic State,” Duhaime Law, April 2015, http:// example, it commandeered the example, Tariq Bin-Al-Tahar Bin Al Falih Al-‘Awni Al-Har- www.antimoneylaunderinglaw. oil fields in Eastern Syria, and com/2014/09/islamic-state-who- since then has managed these ziwas known as a high-profile finances-isis-and-bank-risk-factors- resources as a source of income.3 ISIL member, he worked to raise for-terrorist-financing.html. funds, recruit and facilitate the 6 Charles Lister, “Cutting off ISIS’ travel of fighters for the terrorist Cash Flow,” Brookings, October 24, 2 Ian Black, Rania Abouzeid, Mark 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/ 4 Tran, Shiraz Maher, Roger Tooth organization. He donated two blogs/markaz/posts/2014/10/24- and Martin Chulov, “The terri- lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al-nus- fying rise of ISIS: $2bn in loot, network,” The Guardian, June 15, ra-cash-flow. online killings and an army on 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ 7 McCarthy, K.J., P.van Santen, and I. the run,” The Guardian, June 16, world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest- Fiedler, “Modeling the money laun- 2014, http://www.theguardian. jihadists-wealth-power. derer: Microtheoretical arguments com/world/2014/jun/16/terrify- 4 U.S. Department of Treasury on anti-money laundering policy,” ing-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions. Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign International Review of Law and 3 Martin Chulov, “How an arrest in Terrorist Fighter Facilitators, Economics, 2014. Iraq revealed Isis’s $2bn jihadist http://www.treasury.gov/press-cen- 8 McCarthy et al., 2014. 81 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

derers charge commissions of its own economy that is most- So does ISIS launder money? 5-50%. ly cash-based. This makes it If ISIS establishes its own cash- impossible to track down the based economy, and limits its occurring money flows.9 In ac- activity to that economy then Some of the cordance with their operating no, the terrorist organization has pattern, ISIS has been described no incentive to engage in mon- world’s best as a “half-mafia-style commer- ey laundering. If, however, ISIS known and cial enterprise, half pious in- aims to become active outside its ternational charity”10, meaning current economy – because, for most respected that ISIS openly employs illegal example, it needs to buy supplies practices to acquire funds, such on a legitimate market – then financial as theft and extortion, but at the yes, it will need to disguise the same time is working econom- origin of any illegally generated institutions have ically when selling oil, even at money. In order to disguise the discount prices. As such, ISIS is origin of its funds, ISIS needs been involved a new type of terrorist organiza- to lodge them into the finan- in the financing tion; one “grounded in territorial cial system. Local banks in the control, annexation and declara- countries they operate or have of criminal tions of sovereignty”.11 connections are likely to be the first target for this. Having done and terrorist 9 Shane Chroucher, 2014. so, ISIS will be able to access fi- 10 RT, “All you need to know about nancial institutions and markets organizations ISIS and what is happening in in Europe, the USA and Asia. It Iraq,” June 20, 2014, http://rt.com/ news/166836-isis-isil-al-qaeda- has already been observed, how- However, a significant differ- iraq/. ever, that ISIS has been sending ence between ISIS and other 11 Mario Abou Zeid, “ISIS: Terrorism people to other countries, be- terrorist organizations is that Upgrade”, The National Interest, ISIS has managed to establish July 8, 2014, http://nationalinterest. org/feature/isis-terrorism-upgrad- ed-10825. 82 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

©UN Photo/John Isaac

yond the region, with large sums But who would help ISIS? address recommendations and of money. In other words, we Unfortunately, some of the publish the list of high-risk and can presume that ISIS is making world’s best known and most non-cooperative jurisdictions.13 use of money laundering prac- respected financial institutions At the top of the list FAFT high- tices.12 have been involved in the fi- risk and non-cooperative juris- nancing of criminal and terrorist dictions there areIran, Demo- organizations. Many multina- cratic People’s Republic of Korea The financial tional financial organizations, (DPRK, Algeria, Ecuador and including Western-based insti- Myanmar. The financial system, system, as tutions have been convicted for as it stands, is generally quite it stands, is having being involved in money vulnerable to terrorist organiza- laundering, financing of terror- tions. One of the major concerns, generally quite ism and organized crime. The especially in regards to the fi- Financial Action Task Force nancing of terrorism, is the fact vulnerable (FATF) has established stan- that a vast amount of circulating dards to combat money launder- cash complicates the tracking of to terrorist ing and financing of terrorism. financial transfers and therefore FAFT assess countries’ level organizations of compliance with and pro- 13 The FATF Recommendations: gresses achieved in the imple- http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/ 12 Christine Duhaime, “White Paper fatfrecommendations/documents/ on Islamic State Funding”, 2015. mentation of these standards, fatf-recommendations.html. 83 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering? also diminishes the opportunity it is difficult to obtain informa- mentation of these recommen- of impeding these flows. Anoth- tion about the destination of the dations.17 er obstacle is characterized by transaction as these individuals the variety of financial systems are likely to be politically influ- Conclusions and their regarding institutional ential or the country is lacking We argue that, while ISIS has a contexts. Overall, a common ap- sustained political commitment number of ways of funding its proach needs to be established, to execute anti-money launder- operations in a domestic setting, which is difficult to achieve, ing measures.16 if the organization is to oper- though, as the implementation ate outside of this sphere, it is of such is dependent on the laws also likely to be involved in the and regulations prevailing in The United money laundering market. The the country. Additionally, the problems that European and US fact that terrorism financing Nations has banks face in terms of detect- and the role of financial insti- already taken ing money laundering, and the tutions and systems is a rather complexity of ISIS’ cases – in new one, points towards a lack action in this which a fledgling state is active- regarding the establishment of ly attempting to undermine the proper measures and indicators domain by systems’ detection mechanisms what terrorism financing actu- – means that ISIS is very likely ally encompasses. The United issuing the using the same banks that we do Nations has already taken action to fund its murderous campaigns in this domain by issuing the In- International in Syria and Iraq. This empha- ternational Convention for the Convention for sizes the pressing urgency to Suppression of the Financing further work on developing a of Terrorism.14 Article 2 of this the Suppression common approach for all bank- Convention considers commit- ing systems in order to disclose ting an offence any person who of the Financing such streams or at least estab- by any means, directly or indi- lish a platform of collaboration rectly, unlawfully and willfully, of Terrorism between banks from different provides or collects funds with institutional contexts in order to the intention that they should Apart from the aforementioned identify possible niches ISIS is be used or in the knowledge that Convention, the Counter-Ter- making use of. The fact that ISIS they are to be used, in full or rorism Implementation Task is equally employing the same in part, in acts of terrorist.15 In Force (CTITF) represents an ef- banks as we do plus the inabili- this framework, also donations ficient UN body dealing with the ty to expose these streams pres- from wealthy individuals can problem of terrorism financing ents a sobering thought, and one be regarded as illegal. Due to the and how to mitigate it. Progress which we hope that regulators interdependence between the can be seen in the report issued and academics will dedicate at- political and financial systems, by the CTITF in 2009, whose tention to in future. findings and recommendations have built the base for an Action 14 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Plan developed by the Interna- Terrorism, http://www.un.org/law/ tional Monetary Fund (IFM) cod/finterr.htm. in order to facilitate the imple- 15 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Adopted by the General 16 Counter-Terrorism Implementation Assembly of the United Nations in Task Force, “CTITF Working Group 17 Counter-Terrorism Implementation resolution 54/109 of 9 December Report: Tackling the Financing of Task Force, “Working Group on 1999 Terrorism,” 2009, New York, http:// Tackling Financing of Terrorism: http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr. www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/ Overview,” http://www.un.org/en/ htm. pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final.pdf. terrorism/ctitf/wg_financing.shtml. 84 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

©UN Photo/Mark Garten

The authors

Killian J. McCarthy is an Assistant Professor of economics at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). He did his Bachelors studies in Cork (Ireland), and completed Masters in Utrecht (Netherland) and Vienna (Austria), before writing his PhD at the University of Groningen. His research focuses on explaining merger performance; he has written two books on the subject. He has also published, however, on the topics of tax competition, money laundering and criminal finance, as well as on the influence of media power on consumer and business sentiment. Contact: [email protected]

Svenja Berg completed her Bachelor studies in International Business at the University of Gron- ingen (the Netherlands). She is planning on pursuing a Research Master and a PhD in the field of money laundering and its connection with terrorism. University of Groningen, the Netherlands, Faculty of Economics and Business

85 Dossier

Interview with the Mayor of Aarhus Jacob Bundsgaard

by Marina Mazzini, UNICRI

Please outline the main elements of the Aarhus model to prevent radicalization. Generally speaking, the essence of the Aarhus model is preventing radicalization by working with at-risk citizens to improve their possibilities for inclusion in society and to help them develop better life skills. The specific intervention depends on the situation - for example, counselling parents or at-risk youth themselves, mentorship programs or parent networks. Regardless of the intervention, the aim is to include these at-risk youth in society again as active, participating citizens. But don’t get me wrong. If someone has committed a criminal offence, that person will be prosecuted and convicted as a matter of course. This is not some kind of get-out-of-jail-free card, but a combination of dialogue and a firm hand. That’s why it’s also important to emphasize that this initiative is being carried out in close cooperation between the City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police, as well as involving Aarhus University, the Prison and Probation Service, and other partners.

What are the main achievements? Well, for example we’ve succeeded in reducing the number of young people travelling to Syria to participate in the conflict from 31 in 2013 to one in 2014 and two in 2015. We can’t demonstrate a causal relationship, but we believe that our efforts have had a significant impact. We’ve established a dialogue with the milieus and minority groups with a history of recruitment to violent extremism.

In 2004, the City Council in Aarhus adopted the Aarhus model for citizen involvement based on the values of the city: reliability, respect and commitment. How did this process impact your deradicalization programme? The citizen-centric model for citizen involvement inspired the central role citizen involvement plays in the City of Aarhus’ integration policy (2007), in which our anti-radicalization efforts are anchored. Although the model for citizen involvement in relation to the prevention of radicalization is significantly more differentiated, it is still based on our values.

The Aarhus’s exit programme builds on a longstanding, integrated approach to crime prevention that has operated for decades, what are the main strengths of this approach? A major strength of our approach is the close collaboration that has been established between the different government agencies, particularly between the city and the police, because it

86 provides unique opportunities to identify and intervene in relation to youth who may be at risk for radicalization, just as the involvement of several local government agencies makes it possible to take a holistic approach to intervention.

Please explain how citizens are involved in preventing radicalization and promoting deradicalization. Dialogue is central to our approach to prevention, for example in relation to identifying young people who are already on the path to radicalization. To facilitate this, we have a number of concrete initiatives, such as an ‘Info house’ that parents, caseworkers, teacher and youth club staff can contact if they’re concerned that a person is at risk of radicalization. This is also relevant in relation to prevention in general; we facilitate dialogue-based workshops for young people in lower secondary school and youth education programs, and we have established parents’ groups for relatives of people from Aarhus who are suspected of participating, are currently participating, or have participated in the conflict in Syria to provide them with counselling and support.

What is the role played by minority groups in addressing the risks of violent extremism? This depends on what specific minority groups are in question. But because our efforts in the most general sense are aimed at inclusion, maintaining respectful but critical dialogue with the city’s various minorities is an important factor in strengthening our anti-radicalization efforts. However, it’s also clear that in relation to a milieu such as the highly publicized Grimhøj Mosque, they have to decide whether they want to be a part of the problem or a part of the solution.

87 Dossier

Who are the main actors engaged in your deradicalization programme, how many experts are involved? The City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police. We also work with the Prison and Probation Service and Aarhus University. There are also additional partners at a national and international level. It’s difficult to provide a concrete ‘head count’ of the employees involved, both because they also have other functions, and also because of the broad nature of our efforts, which means that schoolteachers and after-school club staff can also play a role.

Do you have former extremists involved as mentors? No former extremists are involved as mentors.

How many at-risk- youth and returning foreign fighters have been involved in the programme? This depends on which part of the program you’re referring to. Parts of the preventive program (for example workshops (150+) in schools and at youth education institutions/public meetings) have been aimed at hundreds of young people. We have had 165 specific cases of at-risk youth reported to our Info house over the last four years. Most of these cases have been dealt with through counselling. So far, nineteen people have been involved in the mentor program. Eight individuals are still being mentored; some of them are foreign fighters, some of them are at-risk youth - in relation to political as well as religious extremism. To the best of our knowledge, we have had thirty-three individuals who have left for Syria/Iraq from Aarhus, of whom sixteen have returned and five are presumed dead.

Would you share with us a success story? For obvious reasons, I can’t share individual case stories with you. However, I can say that we regard the fact that we have stopped or significantly reduced the traffic to Syria as an unconditional success story.

Please explain how the rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for former terrorists are perceived by the citizens of Aarhus. They have been positively received, although there will always be critical voices. This is why it’s been important to us to emphasize at every step of the way that although the program can never provide any kind of guarantee, our results document that it works in relation to a large majority of the at-risk youth involved. In this way, the Aarhus model is also important to our citizens’ sense of safety and security.

What are the main challenges and main criticism you have received in Aarhus and in Denmark? Criticism of the model has been limited. The major criticism has been that our approach is too soft, which in my view is misdirected. It’s important for me to point out that our work is based on two pillars: efforts based on social dialogue and efforts based on police involvement. This is not a get-out-of-jail-free card for people who have committed or who are committing crimes.

Do you think the perceived threat of terrorism is increasing the clash of values, discrimination and polarization of the societies, putting at risk efforts to build cohesive

88 and inclusive communities? At worst, I fear that this may be case. That’s why it’s important for the City of Aarhus to link the prevention of radicalization with efforts to promote citizenship and reduce discrimination. We want to be a social cohesive city with equal opportunity for all.

How much do you think that unemployment, the sense of alienation and frustration young people experience in our modern society are determinants in generating violent extremism? That’s a difficult question, because there’s no clear-cut answer. However, there are many indications that discrimination is one of the most significant factors in creating the conditions that favor radicalization. And this is one of the reasons that we place such a high priority on citizenship, inclusion, cooperation with our citizens, and employment.

To which extent do you think the Aarhus model is adaptable to different environments? What are the main challenges of promoting such model in societies where civil society participation and dialogue with institutions are weak? I don’t think that it’s necessarily a good idea to copy others’ approaches, but on the other hand I do believe that we can find inspiration elsewhere and apply that to our own local contexts. That said, however, cooperation with citizens, influence and trust are important parameters no matter where you are. If you don’t have that trust and that cooperation with your citizens, you have to ask yourself why not? And start there.

A modern society pretending “to enforce laws to legislate on how people think, feel or believe”, is a weak society undermining democratic values as well as the possibility of creating the ground for peace and development. What is the strategy you suggest to achieve people security without undermining human rights and fundamental freedoms? The combination of dialogue and trust - or the development of this combination where it does not already exist. Constructive, positive citizenship instead of oppositional, negative ‘counter citizenship’. Community and shared responsibility.

89 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change

Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: Challenges and opportunities, connectors and the transtheoretical model of change1

by Basia Spalek

1 Whilst the Transtheoretical Model (TTM) cannot provide any causal explanations in relation to radicalisation and de-radicalisation, it might help to document the ways in which individuals have experienced change. Like all models, the TTM has attracted some criticism. For example, some researchers argue that in practice, people can go through the different stages of change in a matter of minutes. It might be argued, however, that whether change is viewed as stage-like or as more of a continuum does not detract from the TTM providing an overview of a person experiencing psycho-behavioural change (Prochaska & Norcross, 2010). Prochaska, J. & Norcross, J. (2010) Systems of Psychotherapy: a transtheoretical analysis 7th edition USA: Brooks/Cole 90 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change

The role that communities play er, with the twenty-first century concern for their welfare rather in relation to violent extremism focus upon exploring and devel- than to gather intelligence; the is controversial. On the one hand, oping people-centred approach- existence of strict information communities might be viewed as es - that stress the importance sharing protocols, with clear possibly supporting or endors- of human security, for exam- boundaries regarding what will ing violent extremism, on the ple, freedom from fear or want and what will not be shared be- other hand, communities might - there has been a rapid rise tween police and communities; be seen as helping to prevent across many parts of the World police responding to commu- or challenge violent extremism. in developing initiatives that in- nity concerns, whether those There is also a wider question clude both state and non-state have anything to do with vio- about what ‘community’ is, and actors and agencies. lent extremism or not; and the whether its ill-defined nature existence of shared goals that means that it is ill-advised to use A growing body of research sug- individuals can work together this as a unit of analysis. These gests that programmes involv- towards. varying positions reflect some ing police and communities can of the complexities when trying work in relation to preventing A large body of research also to design and implement initia- violent extremism. This research highlights the challenges and tives involving non-state actors suggests that effective police and tensions to police and communi- and organisations to counter vi- community initiatives include ty initiatives. Community mem- olent extremism. some or all of the following el- bers can feel that they are being ements: efforts at building re- spied upon, particularly when Counter-terrorism has tradition- lationships and trust between many initiatives have become ally been dominated by state-led community members and po- intelligence-gathering tools for approaches involving security lice officers; police officers en- the authorities. Trust may be and policing agencies. Howev- gaging with communities out of difficult to build within a wider

91 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change

climate of suspicion and distrust, by wider policing cultures that extreme mentalities can be dis- when antagonism between po- perhaps stress crime fighting cussed and appropriately chal- lice and communities may have a over building relationships, and lenged. long and sustained history. Trust that deny the significance of can be eroded by heavy-handed state foreign policies on com- techniques and operations used munity cultures. Those commu- A growing body of by the police, tactics such as stop nity members who engage with research suggests and search, surveillance and police may be viewed as grass- detention without trial. Com- es by their wider networks. As that programmes munity members may also have a result, they may come under involving police material concerns about foreign attack verbally or physically, or policies and the impacts these they may be ostracised, by their and communities are having on individuals in oth- acquaintances, friends and fam- er parts of the World that they ilies. Community members are can work in identify with, and where these also at risk of losing credibility relation to concerns are not taken seriously with their grassroots networks by state actors trust can be diffi- because they can be viewed as preventing violent cult to build. Further challenges helping police reach their ob- extremism lie in risks that both police of- jectives rather than helping ficers and community members their own. This is particularly It may be that we think about have to take when involved in problematic within political and the role of ‘connectors’ in deal- initiatives aimed at countering social contexts that stress that ing with violent extremism rath- violent extremism. Those police extreme views are as danger- er than communities. Within officers who manage to build ous as extreme acts, as there is social contexts marked by sig- trust with community members, a risk that community members nificant distrust of the police, and who are empathic with com- are co-opted into policing ideas where there may be poverty and munities’ concerns, may find and beliefs rather than provid- violence, research that I have that their work is not supported ing safe spaces within which 92 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change undertaken suggests that there necessarily community leaders. worth drawing upon the Trans- can be state and non-state ac- Some connectors may be dis- theoretical Model (TTM). tors who build important bridges senters, for example, challenging between themselves and with social injustice as and when they marginalised youth, who may perceive or experience it, and so Trust can be be at risk of committing crime, they may be viewed as ‘trouble- eroded by heavy- anti-social behaviour and ter- makers’, by wider communities rorism. Connectors can be youth or by those in positions of au- handed techniques workers, they can be police of- thority. Importantly, it seems and operations ficers and they can also be com- that connectors are key compo- munity members with no formal nents of the intricate networks used by the police, training. Connectors are people of connectivity that young peo- who are excellent at building ple themselves can draw upon tactics such as relationships of trust. The role in order to manage the multiple stop and search, that connectors play in dealing impacts of their challenging en- with violent extremism is per- vironments, marked by pover- surveillance and haps different from the kind of ty, victimisation, marginalisation detention without crime control mechanisms that and processes of criminalisation. naturally exist within cohesive Counter-terrorism initiatives that trial communities. Connectors may aim to include marginalised youth act within contexts character- therefore perhaps rely substan- This is a psychosocial model ised by low political and social tially on connectors for their ef- that conceptualises and anal- trust, where there is little sense fectiveness and workability. yses psychological and behav- of agreement regarding the le- ioural change. When exploring gitimacy of counter-terrorism Finally, when examining the ex- the journeys that formers ex- approaches. It is also important periences and perspectives of tremists have made in relation to stress that connectors are not former extremists, it might be to their ideologies, actions, per-

93 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change

sonal and other identifications, el of their situational problems, relationship; amongst others. It it seems that this model might their cognitions, their interper- may be that effective connec- offer some useful insights. sonal relationships, their fam- tors intuitively understand some According to the TTM, psy- ily relationships and their own of these stages, levels and pro- cho-behavioural change can be intra-personal, conflicts. The cesses of change. It may be that conceptualised through stages, processes of change within the training people in key elements levels and processes of change. TTM explain how people under- of the TTM, whether these are There are six stages of change go psychological and behaviour- community members or police – pre-contemplation, contempla- al change: consciousness raising; officers, might help prevent vio- tion, preparation, action, mainte- dramatic relief; self re-evalua- lent extremism. Further research nance and termination. There are tion; environmental re-evaluation; and analysis is needed. five levels of change that a per- self-liberation; social liberation; son can experience – at the lev- counterconditioning; a helping

The author

Professor Basia Spalek obtained a BSc (Hons) in Psychology at Warwick University in 1991; she then went on to complete an MA in Criminology at Leicester University, before then completing a PhD at Brunel University in Victimology. Basia has over twenty years experience of research and teaching, focussing on victimisation, violence, trauma, social justice and violent extremism. Basia was made a university Professor in 2013. She regularly writes journal articles and books and is also regularly invited as an international speaker at academic, policy and practitioner conferences on victimisation, policing, trust and confidence, and community based approaches to violence prevention and counter-terrorism. Basia is currently lecturing on an MA programme at Derby University on Integrative Counselling and Psychotherapy. Basia also supervises a number of doctoral researchers and she leads many international and national research projects. Basia is also a practising psychotherapist, special- ising in trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, arising from conflict, violence and other instiga- tors, and working with prisoners. Basia can be contacted on [email protected]

94 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror‘

Liberian ex-combatants learn new farming skills: Livelihood opportunities can provide young people with an alternative to taking up arms. Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror’ by Ernest Harsch

News headlines and television clips provide ample evidence of the military side of the ‘war on terror’: bombing raids against Islamic State fighters in Iraq, special forces incursions in Somalia, or ground operations against Islamist rebels in northern Mali. The killings of civilians by such insurgents generally provide the justification for forceful action. The heat of battle and the atmosphere of urgency often seem to leave government officials and military commanders little time to ask a fundamental question: Can terrorism be defeated primarily through arms? When pressed, they will likely respond, ‘Of course not’. Addressing why some disaffected youths join terrorist groups is also vital, they may acknowledge, both to shrink insurgents’ bases of support and to prevent future recruitment. As John Brennan, US President Barack Obama’s top counter-terrorism ad- viser, put it in 2009, effectively opposing ‘ideologies of violence and death’ requires that governments see to the well-being of their citizens through a ‘political, economic and social campaign to meet the 95 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror‘ basic needs and legitimate griev- © UN Photo/Marco Dormino ances of ordinary people’.1 While officials often recognize the ‘soft’ side of combating terrorism, they seem less able to harness enough financing or political commitment to follow through. Even if the resources and will were available, however, identifying the best responses is not easy. Terrorism as such is not always distinguishable from other types of armed strife—and is often labeled so largely for political reasons. Moreover, the factors that precipitate large- scale armed violence are usually multiple, interact in complex ways, and vary greatly from ‘Just trying to feed their fam- security officials, civil society country to country. ilies’ activists and others is develop- One way to pinpoint some of the Although only a small fraction ment. more common and promising of poor people ever join armed areas for action is to look to the insurgencies, the links between When asked about experience of conflict preven- poverty and rebel recruitment tion efforts, including in Africa are real. Sometimes confirmation the best way to (which this article takes as its comes from insurgents themselves. focus). In 2012-13, most of northern Mali counter terrorist was occupied by armed Islamist recruitment, the groups, which competed not only The factors that with the central government but most frequent precipitate large- also with an ethnic Tuareg sep- aratist faction, the Mouvement answer given scale armed national pour la libération de by government l’Azawad (MNLA). Referring to violence are the ex-fighters from two of the authorities, usually multiple, Islamist groups, Moussa Ag As- security sarid, an MNLA spokesman, said, interact in ‘I was personally able to witness officials, civil complex ways, and former combatants who said they were not jihadists, not even Isla- society activists vary greatly from mists. They were just people try- and others is ing to feed their families’.2 country to country When asked about the best way development to counter terrorist recruitment, the most frequent answer giv- Their understanding of that term 1 Daniel Dombey and Alexandra Ul- en by government authorities, may be expansive, encompassing mer. “US shifts focus of anti-terror economic opportunities, greater strategy,” Financial Times, August 2 Rosalind Adams and Maxime de education, improved health care 6, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/ Taisne. “Interview with Moussa Ag and more active citizen engage- cms/s/0/cf54d9f2-82c0-11de-ab4a- Assarid, MNLA spokesperson for 00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XC7JgPzx Europe,” April 3, 2014. ment. Or it may be more specif- 96 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror‘ ic, such as jobs and micro-enter- marginalisation.4 Both UN and prise support for at- risk youths. Evidence shows that targeted in- The United Nations takes a broad terventions can have an impact. independent perspective. Its Global Count- In Côte d’Ivoire in 2008 - a time er-Terrorism Strategy, adopted of stalemate in that country’s analysts detected a in 2006, not only emphasizes civil war - the UN Peacebuild- notable decline in preventing and directly combating Fund provided modest fi- ing terrorism, but also promot- nancing for 526 ‘micro-projects’ crime and unrest ing conflict resolution, religious designed to entice combatants by ex-combatants and cultural dialogue, economic from both sides to farm, raise and social development, coun- small livestock, sell second-hand in the project tering social exclusion, and sup- clothes, and run restaurants, cy- porting good governance, human ber cafés, car washes, and other areas rights, and the rule of law.3 A small businesses. Both UN and Similarly, a variety of ‘Peace through few years earlier, in 2002, the independent analysts detected Development’ projects have been African Union’s Plan of Action a notable decline in crime and implemented by the UN, the US on the Prevention and Combat- unrest by ex-combatants in the Agency for International Devel- ing of Terrorism in Africa also project areas.5 opment and non-governmental went beyond a strict security approach to include the reduc- 4 African Union, “Plan of Action tion of poverty, deprivation, and of the African Union High-Level to 4 September 2009,” USA: UNDP, Inter-Governmental Meeting on 2009; Kåre Lode, Milfrid Tonheim, the Prevention and Combating of Ibrahim Ag Youssouf, and Adol- 3 UN General Assembly, “The United Terrorism in Africa,” Addis Ababa: phe Balekembaka Musifiri. “An Nations Global Counter-Terrorism African Union, 2002, independent evaluation of the 1,000 Strategy: resolution adopted by the http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org. Micro-Projects for Socio-Economic General Assembly,” 20 September ar/ar/libros/iss/pdfs/oau/PoAfinal. Reintegration of Ex-combatants, 2006, A/RES/60/288, http://dac- pdf. Ex-militia Members and Youth at cess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 5 DPKO, PBSO, UNDP and DPA, Risk in Côte d’Ivoire,” Côte d’Ivoire: GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488. “Joint review of the Priority Plan Centre for Intercultural communi- pdf?OpenElement. for Côte d’Ivoire, from 31 August cation, 2009.

97 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror‘ groups such as Search for Com- © Via Flickr/ World Bank Photo Collection mon Ground in Chad, Niger, Mali and other Sahelian countries where youths have been recruited by insurgent groups. These initiatives usually combine job creation and micro-enterprise promotion with literacy classes, local government capacity building and other ‘soft security’ interventions. The aim is to provide local youths with alternatives to rebel enlistment.6

And what about justice? Government officials frequently seem more than ready to cite economic factors as contributors to terrorism and other forms of armed conflict, especially if that connection induces donor agencies to provide extra financing. Far less often are they willing to undertake deep-going reforms to tackle the fundamental social and political injustices that also motivate young people to rebel. Surveys and interviews with they also frequently cite social provinces of the Democratic Re- young former fighters in vari- and political grievances: eth- public of the Congo, attempts to ous African countries and other nic or other types of exclusion, address local ethnic tensions, land parts of the world confirm that rights violations, poor gover- disputes, and other sources of con- their reasons for joining insur- nance, and other systemic or flict were largely overshadowed 7 gencies can be multiple. Many institutional failings. Those who by a focus on demobilizing the do act on the basis of perceived espouse extremist approaches remaining armed factions and material interests, believing that often try to seize on such griev- strengthening the national po- victory may bring them jobs, ances to secure support. litical process - far away in the 8 money and other economic op- Yet social injustice, corruption capital. portunities. But apart from ide- and political exclusion often get ology or simple self-defense, only limited attention from na- In the Central African Republic, tional governments or external several peace agreements failed 6 Daniel P. Aldrich, “First Steps To- actors. In the turbulent eastern to address the marginalisation wards Hearts and Minds? USAID’s Countering Violent Extremism Pol- 7 Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, of the poor and largely Muslim icies in Africa,” Terrorism and Po- “Young Soldiers: Why They Choose north, spurring support for a litical Violence, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2014, to Fight, Boulder,” Colorado: Lynne takeover by the mainly Muslim pp. 523-546; United Nations and the Rienner Publishers, 2004; Macartan Seleka rebel group in 2013 — Republic of Niger, “Jeunes, paix et Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, développement dans le region de “What the Fighters Say: A Survey Tahoua,” Niger: Republic of Niger, of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone 8 Séverine Autesserre, “The Trouble 2013; Search for Common Ground, Working Papers Series, Center with the Congo: Local Violence and “Peace through Development II,” on Globalization and Sustainable the Failure of International Peace- 2014, https://www.sfcg.org/peace- Development,” New York: Columbia building,” Cambridge: Cambridge through-development-pdev-ii/. University, 2004. University Press, June 2010. 98 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Both jobs and justice in the ‘War on Terror‘ which in turn prompted horrific In the language of international rorism cannot be resolved without reprisals by Christian militias.9 peacebuilding, tackling the ‘root social justice and deep institution- causes’ of conflict requires deal- al reforms, by both nations and ing squarely with such inequities the international community, so Many do act on the and injustices. Yet too often that as to eliminate all disparities and basis of perceived has remained at the level of rhet- wrongs. We must attack the prob- oric, with little actual reform. lem at its root.’12 material interests, This shortcoming lies not only in believing that the poor countries where armed insurgents are most active, but The problem of victory may also in the richer ones where terrorism cannot some of their fighters are re- bring them jobs, cruited. Many Muslims living be resolved money and in Europe, for example, have a without social sense of social exclusion, leaving other economic them more susceptible to extrem- justice and deep opportunities ist ideas, noted Volkan Bozkir, Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs. institutional In Mali, the French and African To counter terrorist recruiters he reforms, by both advised European governments to military defeat of the main Isla- nations and the mist insurgent factions in 2013 take action so that their Muslim populations stop feeling they are did not lead to open political di- 11 international alogue with the Tuareg and other ‘outside the circle’. disaffected ethnic groups in the As one African newspaper col- community, so as north. Instead it was followed umnist put it: ‘The problem of ter- to eliminate all by more central state dominance, tion,” Journal of Intervention and ‘failed efforts to decentralize pow- Statebuilding, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, 2014, disparities and er and growing socio-cultural p. 207. wrongs cleavages’.10 11 Associated Press, “Turkish official: To end extremism, give Muslims 9 International Crisis Group, “Central opportunity,” Washington Post, African Republic: Priorities of the March 21, 2015, http://www. 12 Boundi Ouoba, “Marche contre le Transition,” Nairobi/Brussels: Crisis washingtonpost.com/world/eu- terrorisme en Tunisia: Tant qu’il y Group, 2013. rope/turkish-official-to-end-ex- aura des injustices…,” Le Pays Burki- 10 Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan tremism-give-muslims-op- na Faso, March 31, 2015, http:// M. Spears, “Fighting for Liber- portunity/2015/03/21/1655d- lepays.bf/marche-contre-le-terror- al Peace in Mali: The Limits of c0a-cfb6-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_ isme-en-tunisie-tant-quil-y-aura- International Military Interven- story.html des-injustices/

The author

Ernest Harsch is a writer and academic who focuses on African political and development issues. He earned his PhD in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York, and currently is an adjunct associate professor of international affairs at Columbia University as well as a research scholar affiliated with that university’s Institute of African Studies. He also worked on African issues for more than 20 years at the United Nations Secretariat in New York, including as managing editor of the UN’s quarterly development journal Africa Renewal. His most recent book is the biog- raphy Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary (Ohio University Press, 2014), after earlier books on the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and the Angolan civil war.

99 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges

Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges1 by Christophe Paulussen

Introduction:

The foreign fighters phenomenon is currently omnipresent on the agenda of police officers, prosecutors, de-radicalisation experts, researchers, policy makers, municipalities, governments, international organisations and think tanks. The problem is too complex and multi-faceted to analyse in just a few pages. Therefore, the following article, based on a speech presented to the Council of Europe’s

1 This article is based on Ch. Paulussen, ‘Responding to Foreign Fighters: A Quick Overview for People with Little Time’, ICCT Commentary, 21 April 2015, available at: http://icct.nl/publication/responding-to-foreign-fighters-a-quick-overview-for- people-with-little-time/ (last accessed 13 June 2015). 100 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges

Committee on Political Affairs 20,000. The estimated worldwide Neumann notes that the highest and Democracy on 16 March total is 20,730, surpassing the populated European countries 2015, should merely be seen as a conflict in Afghanistan in the - France, the UK, and Germany - quick and elementary snap-shot, 1980s.4 According to these also produce the highest numbers providing some basic features of estimates, nearly a fifth of the of fighters (1,200, 500-600 the current problem. foreign fighters in Syria and and 500-600). However, the This article will address four Iraq, almost 4,000, consists of most heavily affected countries points: 1) General information on residents or nationals of Western are Belgium (440, up to 40 per the scale of the phenomenon; 2) European countries.5 Neumann million inhabitants), Denmark Root causes; 3) Implications for notes that this nearly doubles (100-150, up to 27 per million countries/societies of origin and his organisation’s estimate of inhabitants), and Sweden (150-180, 4) Responses. A special emphasis December 2013, which means up to 19 per million inhabitants).8 will be put on the root causes that “the flow of Westerners and the responses, which are key travelling to Syria is [indeed] Nevertheless, it is important to elements in understanding and increasing at an alarming rate.”6 underline the lack of a generally addressing the phenomenon. Although the problem is of accepted definition of ‘foreign course most serious for Syria’s fighters’. Various documents, neighbouring countries - with including the legally binding 1. General information on the up to 11,000 foreign fighters, UN Security Council resolution scale of the phenomenon the Middle East remains the 2178 (2014),9 use the notion Almost every article or contribution dominant source of foreigners ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ to on foreign fighters starts by in the conflict7 - the focus of this define, “individuals who travel stating that this is not a new article will be on the European to a State other than their States phenomenon and indeed, it context. of residence or nationality for is not. Osama Bin Laden is the purpose of the perpetration, probably one of the most famous 4 See P.R. Neumann, ‘Foreign fighter planning, or preparation of, or former foreign fighters.2 What is total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds participation in, terrorist acts, new these days is the scale of 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan or the providing or receiving of conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR, 26 3 the threat. On 26 January of this January 2015, available at: http:// terrorist training, including in year, Peter Neumann, Director icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fight- connection with armed conflict”. of the International Centre er-total-syriairaq-now-ex- for the Study of Radicalisation ceeds-20000-surpasses-afghani- However, proper consideration stan-conflict-1980s/ (last accessed and Political Violence, wrote 21 April 2015). should be paid to the fact that that it has been estimated 5 Ibid. not all foreign fighters can be that the number of foreign 6 Council of Europe, Parliamentary seen as such. In addition, a lack fighters in Syria/Iraq exceeds Assembly, ‘Foreign Fighters in Syr- of clarity regarding a universal ia’, Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Dirk Van der MAELEN definition of ‘terrorism’ persists, 2 See ‘Addressing the Foreign Ter- and other members of the As- due to the lack of consensus on rorist Fighters Phenomenon from sembly, Doc. 13559, 30 June 2014, this highly political issue. a European Union Perspective: available at: http://assembly.coe.int/ Indeed, what is a terrorist? In UN Security Council Resolution nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF. 2178, Legal Issues, and Challenges asp?FileID=21085&lang=en (last some jurisdictions, is considered and Opportunities for EU Foreign accessed 21 April 2015). terrorist an individual committing Security and Development Policy’, 7 See P.R. Neumann, ‘Foreign fighter specific acts of terrorism, target- Global Center on Cooperative Secu- total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds rity, Human Security Collective and 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan International Centre for Count- conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR, 26 8 Ibid. er-Terrorism – The Hague, Decem- January 2015, available at: http:// 9 United Nations Security Council, ber 2014, available at: http://www. icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fight- S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September icct.nl/download/file/Dec2014_EU- er-total-syriairaq-now-ex- 2014, available at: http://www. FTFS_GCCS_HSC_ICCT.pdf(last ceeds-20000-surpasses-afghani- un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. accessed 21 April 2015), p. 1. stan-conflict-1980s/ (last accessed asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20(2014) 3 Ibid. 21 April 2015). (last accessed 21 April 2015). 101 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges ing the civilian population. For group (comradery), as well as questions on life. Instead of others, it may suffice if the per- a thirst to find an identity and addressing religious leaders for son in question joins a designat- adventure. Psychological health answers, they create their own ed terrorist organisation, such issues might also play a role. Do-It-Yourself or DIY Islam as the Al-Nusrah Front or ISIS, in basements or through the regardless of that person’s indi- Internet, becoming vulnerable to vidual acts. It is important to consider Terrorist manipulation and recruitment. that countries adopt different defi- fighters, namely In addition, the political climate nitions of ‘terrorism’, which will af- in some Western countries, fect their implementation of the individuals who as well as the (perceived) provisions of Resolution 2178.10 travel to a State discrimination on the labour market, may push away youngsters 2. Root causes other than their from their society of origin, There are many ingredients for increasing their marginalization. a person to radicalise, but the States of residence It is also important to stress that, recipe is always different. Indeed, or nationality for as the conflict in Syria evolves, each radicalisation process is also the motivations of foreign to some extent unique and the purpose of fighters may change. While individuals will go to Syria for the perpetration, someone initially may have different reasons. gone to Syria for ideological This diversity in the radicalisation planning, or reasons, hoping to assist the process makes it extremely local population, he or she may difficult to come up with the preparation of, have chosen to remain in order solution to the problem. This or participation to support groups such as ISIS. point will be further elaborated Others might end up, perhaps in section 4. Reasons why young in, terrorist acts also for practical reasons - such Europeans radicalise and choose or the providing as the lack of financial resources - to fight in Syria or Iraq can in criminal organisations, involved be, for instance, of a personal, or receiving of in the trafficking of arms, drugs ideological or religious nature. and human beings. Clearly, Personal reasons are probably terrorist training, there is a need to develop a far the most important reasons including in better understanding of drivers/ and can include a perceived push and pull factors of foreign lack of future perspectives connection with fighters. in their country of origin, a armed conflict desire to achieve status or 3. Implications for countries/ to feel and become part of a From an ideological point of societies of origin view, some youngsters leaving Clearly, the impact of the conflict 10 See ‘Addressing the Foreign Ter- for Syria or Iraq face feelings in Syria and Iraq is most serious rorist Fighters Phenomenon from for these countries themselves, a European Union Perspective: of angriness or disillusionment, UN Security Council Resolution which may be caused by the in terms of fear, destruction, 2178, Legal Issues, and Challenges events in the Middle East, in loss of innocent lives etc. Also and Opportunities for EU Foreign particular the injustice suffered neighbouring states, which have Security and Development Policy’, to accommodate hundreds of Global Center on Cooperative Secu- by the Syrian people and the rity, Human Security Collective and perceived indifference of the thousands of refugees, and International Centre for Count- West. which may be confronted with er-Terrorism – The Hague, Decem- As for the religious dimension, a spill-over of the conflict, ber 2014, available at: http://www. suffer greatly from the conflict. icct.nl/download/file/Dec2014_EU- some young Muslims may be FTFS_GCCS_HSC_ICCT.pdf (last struggling with fundamental However, for Europe, the biggest accessed 21 April 2015), p. 10. 102 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges

fear is undoubtedly to face a this percentage is relatively also cause serious harm, without Madrid or London-style attack small, the absolute numbers of having crossed any borders, as from foreign fighters returning to foreign fighters are rising, and was the case in recent incidents their country of origin. But how thus are the chances of an attack, and attacks in Australia, Canada big is the risk that such an attack in view of the applicability and Denmark. In addition to occurs? Research has shown that of that same percentage to lone actor attacks, there is also “[...] of all of those who have been higher numbers. Furthermore, the risk of the formation of convicted of jihadi terrorism it should be considered that, new or the strengthening of related activities in Europe despite all calculations based existing terrorist networks. Al between 2001 and 2009, about on percentages, in the end only Qaida was basically established twelve percent had been abroad one returnee may suffice to by a network of former foreign prior to their attack, either for execute a successful attack, as fighters at the end of the Soviet ideological training, military exemplified by the attacks in intervention in Afghanistan training or participation in Toulouse and Brussels. in the late 1980s. Since the foreign conflicts.”11 Even though Additionally, sympathisers with beginning of the armed conflict or emulators of violent jihad in Syria in 2011, a higher number 11 See E. Bakker, Ch. Paulussen might also pose a risk, even if of foreign fighters has been and E. Entenmann, ‘Dealing with they do not go to Syria or Iraq. identified than during ten years European Foreign Fighters in Syria: These extremists might engage in of Afghan war. It is believed that Governance Challenges & Legal Implications’, ICCT Research Paper, copycat crimes at home that can networks are now being formed 16 December 2013, available at: between individuals (either http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ within Iraq and Syria or with ICCT-Bakker-Paulussen-Enten- eign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf (last individuals residing in other mann-Dealing-With-European-For- accessed 21 April 2015), p. 4. 103 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges countries, including their home made between various measures, disillusioned foreign fighter), countries) and organisations and States should arguably focus but also at the level of the as such (see for instance Boko more on prevention policies, State (eradicate discrimination Haram’s pledge of allegiance to instead of fighting symptoms, in the labor market, offer job the Islamic State).12 which do not really address the opportunities and encourage underlying issue. Preventive social inclusion). Too often, 4. Responses measures, however, will contribute statements by political leaders To stem the flow of foreign to effective policies in the long undermine the positive effects fighters to Syria and Iraq and term. of social inclusion policies and to counter the risk returnees Despite the fact that the success deteriorate the situation. may pose, various responses of these ‘soft’ measures is more Additionally, several repressive are available at both the difficult to assess than repressive measures are nowadays being national and international level. measures – in fact, how can you proposed and adopted by a These include de-radicalisation prove that someone did not number of governments, but programmes, criminal prosecutions radicalise? – States should invest their effectiveness and necessity and administrative sanctions, in prevention, addressing the might be debatable. An example including the withdrawal of root causes and contributing to is the call for new terrorism passports and even citizenships. a sustainable approach of the legislation, while the necessity Even though the most recent foreign fighters’ phenomenon. is dubious, and the inadequacy national and international of the existing legislation not agreements demonstrate a greater proven. Also the effectiveness focus on the preventative side States should and necessity of the measure than was the case in the past – arguably aimed at withdrawing a foreign an example is resolution 2178, fighter’s passport and even which greatly emphasizes the focus more citizenship should be critically importance of international law on prevention examined. It rather appears to – in practice, States are drawn by be simply a symbolic measure, repressive measures. policies, instead of meant to brand the foreign However, repressive approaches fighter as an outcast of society. alone might not be effective fighting symptoms, Indeed, there is a clear need and could even be counter- which do not for an effective monitoring and productive.13 A balance should be evaluation framework to analyze really address the impact and effectiveness of 12 See ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram pledges underlying issue existing and future policies and allegiance to Islamic State’, BBC, practices. 7 March 2015, available at: http:// In addition, there is a need www.bbc.com/news/world-afri- Possible solutions include measures ca-31784538 (last accessed 21 April at individual level (i.e. establish for an increased exchange of 2015). an emergency phone line experiences and best practices 13 See also M. Singleton, ‘Paris 7-8 for parents with radicalized between governments, as well January: Darkness in the City of as a coordinated approach of the Light’, ICCT Op-Ed, 9 January 2015, children), at group level (offer available at: http://icct.nl/publica- a credible counter-narrative, different initiatives organized by a tion/paris-7-8-january-darkness- preferably from a former and growing number of organizations, in-the-city-of-light/ (last accessed with a view to avoid overlapping. 13 June 2015): “Empirical data indicates that the perceived legiti- communities everywhere. We macy of counter-terrorism policies should never allow the attacks in Conclusion: is the primary factor shaping the Paris on civil rights and liberties to The foreign fighters topic will willingness of Muslim communities open up another Pandora’s box of stay with us for many years in the US and the UK to support and draconian measures that, in the end, to come. It is therefore of the help. Aggressive counter-terrorism only serve to limit the foundations policies, on the other hand, have of our societies and render us more utmost importance to quickly had the effect of alienating Muslim vulnerable.” 104 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges

deepen our knowledge of the root causes of this phenomenon and to take adequate responses accordingly to bring results in the long term. This should be done in the above-mentioned order, i.e. focusing first on the root causes and then on the responses. The current responses sometimes appear to point to a lack of strategy and understanding, and also their necessity and effectiveness is not always clear. Although it is quite understandable that politicians will adopt as many measures as possible, in the hope of not getting the reproach afterwards by their constituents of not having done enough to thwart an attack, we should continue to strive for necessary, proportionate, sustainable and international law and human rights-respecting responses only.

The author

Christophe Paulussen is a senior researcher international humanitarian law/international criminal law and coordinator of the Public International Law cluster at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in The Hague. In addition, he is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). The T.M.C. Asser Instituut is a foundation with the purpose of performing and maintaining scientific research and education in the areas of international and European law and the ICCT is an independent think tank and knowledge hub that focuses on information creation, collation and dissemination pertaining to the preventative and international legal aspects of counter-terrorism.

105 The Universal Peace Federation is an NGO in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council ofthe UN www.upf.org The Women’s Federation for World Peace is an NGO in General Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council ofthe UN www.wfwp.org

FOOTBALL FOR PEACE

The conflict between Israel and Palestine influences not only the Middle East region but the entire world. Many initiatives have been undertaken during the years to bring peace, give hope and alleviate the suffering of the people in conflict zones. However, even if political solutions are important, they are not effective if there is not trust and reconciliation among the population. Sport is an extremely powerful element to bring young people together, to help them create harmony and bring down the barriers of diversity. This project wishes to be a support in creating the conditions necessary to constitute a platform of reconciliation and education towards young people through football.

The idea was born years ago, more precisely in 2008, following a meeting with the Palestinian Minister of Sport, Abu Daqqa and, successively with the Israeli Minister of Sport, Majadle. The suggestion was that an international NGO could create a meeting point in a neutral zone between Israel e Palestine. Proposals supporting this initiative also came from Jordan, in particular, to help in the training of Israeli and Palestinian referees. How can football contribute to the construction of peace? It educates about the real sense of sport – football helps young people to develop values of team work and fair-play. It promotes wellbeing – football promotes a healthy mind and body and helps to develop positive physical strength. It gives a positive direction to young people – football brings joy and inspiration and channels the energy of young people towards positive goals. It resolves conflicts and prevents violence – football gives young Israeli and Palestinians an opportunity to get to know each other as future leaders of their respective nations.

However, a favourable neutral environment is necessary in order that this very process of reconciliation through sport can begin. Italy is viewed both by Israel and Palestine as a favourable nation, a meeting ground without prejudices and non-partisan. This project is inserted in the framework of peace initiatives in the Middle East and as such, will have great prominence in the scope of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 106 Goals of the Project: To bring mixed youth teams (Israeli-Palestinian) – starting with under-13, under-15 and under-17 – to play friendly football matches with their Italian counterparts. To allow young people to meet each other and create team spirit and friendship in freedom (a very complex aspect to bring about today in Israel and Palestine). To give young people a special occasion, an emotionally unique moment: a meeting with the great Italian football tradition and, compatibly with the sporting commitments, with important reference figures: football heroes of the past and present. To continue visit and exchange projects between football teams and trainers supporting Football for Peace, as international support for the realization of a platform for peace in the Middle East through football: The diffusion of the project in football sports centres for young people of all the parties in conflict The support of their respective prerogatives The construction of an environment for the formation of a club composed of Israelis and Palestinians.

Messages from the children who visited the UN Campus in Turin Abed Elmagid: I was really grateful and astonished for being able to participate in this delegation. It gave me a feeling of joy and happiness, that I could meet some wonderful people from my neighbourhood, that I never had a chance to meet and become good friends with. I still keep close contact with them, this was all due to the delegation. I found the experience interesting and am so grateful for the chance to go abroad, it was my first experience out of the country.

Moemen: The experience as a whole was like a beautiful dream. I had many fears and was anxious about the experience in the beginning, especially being away from home and in another country. But I came to really enjoy myself and loved my time spent in Italy.

Mahdi: I was so happy to receive an invitation to participate in this once in a lifetime trip, I was so grateful to be able to travel with my parents abroad, but more grateful to be a part of this wonderful delegation. Had I not been there, I couldn’t have met some wonderful new friends from the Jewish community of Affula, and I regularly keep contact with them.

Ahmad: This experience abroad was so great I will remember for years to come. We played so much football I couldn’t have been happier. The Italians really respected us all and it really left a feeling of acceptance and gratitude and I was so very impressed. We travelled the country, and visited many impressive and important places in Italy. The feeling I had, having the opportunity to participate in a football game with Juventus, was of overwhelming gratitude. Such an amazing experience! I try my best to stay in touch with the other children who participated from Affula.

Mohammad: I really appreciate and thank all the people who could help in giving us and especially me the chance to participate in this life changing delegation. I feel the program as a whole was spectacular, and really hope that there will be many more opportunities to participate in activities like this in future, both for myself and many others. 107 108 Ward: I really enjoyed my time spent with the wonderful people in this delegation, and made some wonderful new friends. We visited many places all across Italy that held great importance to all of us. I still stay in contact with the children in Affula and hold them in high regard.

Abdallah: This delegation that I could be a part of was splendid. I am really so grateful to the organisers and those in positions of responsibility, for giving all of us this wonderful opportunity. I liked all the activities we could participate in, but I really enjoyed the time we could spend playing football. I really came to appreciate the children from Affula and keep in contact with them.

Din: I really enjoyed spending time to play with all of the various groups across Italy. I found it exciting and enjoyable to visit the different places, particularly a museum for cars. I had the opportunity to learn a lot of new things, but above all about the organisation of UNICRI. It’s an experience I will never forget.

Shahar: What I liked most during this trip to Italy, were the wonderful sites we were able to visit, the buildings, the sculptures, I liked them so much. I really enjoyed the time spent with the children playing football. Playing with the Italians gave me a feeling of overwhelming joy. And to be together with the Jewish and Arab children was a very nice experience.

Menachem: I am so eternally grateful to the organisers and to UNICRI for the wonderful opportunity to be able to participate in such an important delegation such as this one. Without these wonderful organisations I would never have been able to participate. It was such a wonderful experience to visit the places of Italy, particularly Juventus and Torino left me with a happy feeling. .

Minoy: This experience I received was that of once in a lifetime. It was the very first time I had been offered to play on a real life football pitch, and was so grateful to be able to watch a professional game abroad and in the flesh. The time I got to spend together playing in Juventus and Torino was magnificent, and a time I will really never forget.

El Roei: Like all my friends I enjoy watching top league football games. It was an experience of a once in a life time. I also enjoyed playing with the local Italian children from those games. I enjoy the art in the museums we visited. I would like to show my deep gratitude for all the people that help this deep experience happen. I personally feel honoured to participate in a delegation that only few people could have joined. Thank you!

Sahar: I would like to show my gratitude for opening for us the door for such a special experience. I would like to thank all the people that made this happens, to all the people who donated their time, money, enthusiasm, determination and heart. I love Italy 109 110 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach

Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: Ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach by Andrea Cerase, Elena D’Angelo, Claudia Santoro

111 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach The rise of racism in Europe out within the framework of the social media “virality” by In recent years online racism the European project LIGHT cloaking the real source(s) of has seen a quick and serious ON3. Nowadays, racist claims such messages and promoting growth in many European are often hidden under a sub- sharing of such contents, with and non-European countries, tle and sophisticated retho- the final aim of manipulating till to become a worrying ric. In fact, a huge amount of people worries and outrage5. global phenomenon.1 One disguised racist contents is Some scholar argued: “One of the most striking exam- currently published on the gets the impression that they ples of such process is the Internet in form of occa- have now crossed the weak rise of White Supremacist sional bigotry or individuals’ shelters of censorship and Movements online. Their outburst, whereas they are, self-censorship that until re- strategy mainly consists in as a matter of fact, intend- cent years made difficult to disguising their hidden po- ed to foster racist attitudes explicitly pronounce racist litical agenda and attempting among people and to support discourses in public. Topics to subvert and destroy civ- the “normalization” of rac- such as «anti-social behav- il rights by presenting their ism. Some scholars defined iors» of the Roma people, the standpoints through an over- as “common sense racism” identification of immigration turn of the rhetoric of the civil or “rational racism” talking with crime, the danger of cer- rights movement.2 Undoubtedly, against immigrants, refugees, tain «races», the invitation to the increasing racism which is minority members (as well as sink immigrants’ boats - that rotten in hidden racist ex- homosexuals and disabled) as once a time was a domain (or pressions, is exploiting “fa- undesirable and avoiding to prerogative) of the [North- vorable” conditions as the fi- be labeled as “racist”4. ern] League’s6 rhetoric [in nancial crisis, the increase of Italy] - are now spoken pub- social conflicts and the rise of Internet and the normaliza- licly without any shame, and populist issues in politics. In tion of racism not only by right wing speak- Italy, as an example, UNAR, The Internet is playing a cru- ers”7. the Italian national anti-dis- cial role in the so-called nor- crimination Office, documented malization of racism: racist 5 Andrisani, P. (2014), “Quando il movements are well aware razzismo nel web diventa ‘virale’”, that complaints for online racism in Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS weighed for 30.9% of the over- about the potential of so- (eds.) Rapporto Unar. Dalle Discrim- all cases involving the media cial media in the diffusion inazioni ai diritti, IDOS, Roma, pp. of hate speech. They exploit 249-252. (UNAR, 2013). Similar situa- 6 The Lega Nord (Northern League) is tions also occurred in other a federalist and regionalist political party in Italy, established in 1991 by European countries such as 3 LIGHT ON project, JUST/2012/ Umberto Bossi. This party advocates Slovenia, Finland, Hungary and FRAC/AG/2699, co-financed by for secession of the North of Italy United Kingdom, as it emerged Fundamental Rights and Citizenship and its members are very often of the European Commission. involved in racist and xenophobic by part of the research carried 4 Capdevila, R., and Callaghan, J. E. political talk (see Avanza, M. (2010), (2008), “It’s not racist. It’s common “The Northern League and its 1 Perry, B., and Olsson, P. (2009), sense. A critical analysis of polit- ‘innocuous’ xenophobia,” in Mam- “Cyberhate: the globalization of ical discourse around asylum and mone, A., and Veltri, G. A. (Eds.) hate”, Information & Communi- immigration in the UK,” Journal of (2010), “Italy today: The sick man of cations Technology Law, 18(2), Community and Applied Social Psy- Europe,” Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 185-199. chology, 18(1), 1-16.; Meddaugh, P. 131 – 142). 2 Daniels, J. (2009), “Cyber racism: M., and Kay, J. (2009), “Hate Speech 7 Rivera, A.M (2008), “La normaliz- White supremacy online and the or ‘Reasonable Racism? The Other zazione del razzismo,” in Naletto new attack on civil rights,” Rowman in Stormfront,” Journal of Mass G. (ed.), Sicurezza di chi? Come & Littlefield Publisher. Media Ethics, 24(4), 251-268. combattere il razzismo, edizioni 112 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach

Hate speech online is there- tremist groups touches upon hate crimes11. fore a dangerous weapon that an important ethical dilem- potentially everyone, includ- ma: how can we tackle this Populist movements often ing violent extremists, can use phenomenon without under- exploit racist arguments in to promote hate and perpetrate mining freedom of speech? their discourse; in all cases hatred behaviors. “Extremists allegations of racism, and es- and violent extremists are Hate speech pecially of racist hate speech, using the Internet and social must be substantiated by ev- media to inspire, radical- online is therefore idences and every complaint ise and recruit young peo- a dangerous must be proven to be realistic. ple to their cause, whether weapon that as passive supporters, active How can we tackle enthusiasts or those will- potentially ing to become operational”8. this phenomenon everyone, The extremist groups were without among the early users of the including violent undermining Internet, or more in general extremists, can use of electronic communication freedom of networks9. As explained by to promote hate the Crown Prosecution Ser- speech? vice (UK), there are a num- and perpetrate ber of offenses that can be hatred behaviors Since hate speech is per se a considered when dealing controversial concept, and at with violent extremism, and The question has been effec- the moment broadly accepted these include “offenses aris- tively summarized by Nils definitions are still missing, ing through spoken words, Muižnieks, Commissioner for policy makers and law en- creation of tapes and videos Human Rights at the Coun- forcement agencies must deal of speeches, internet entries, cil of Europe. As it is rec- with the intrinsic ambiguity chanting, banners and writ- ognized, hate speech is not and the polysemy of such con- ten notes and publications”10. about freedom of speech: it tents. Given that these mes- is a threat against the rights sages can result in different An ethical dilemma of others and public safety, interpretation by different The complex and controver- since hate speech and violent people, it is more essential sial issue of hate speech and action appear to be tightly to ground reporting, assess- its use also by violent ex- intertwined. Many incidents ments and legal prosecution occurred in the recent past on objective and factual argu- dell’asino, Roma: 55-61. easily demonstrate how hate ments, taking carefully into 8 Institute for Strategic Dialogue account all the available in- (2014), “Policy briefing: Countering speech can be actually per- the appeal of violent extremism ceived as an authorisation to formation about the source online,” p. 3. engage in violence, which is and the context in which 9 Gerstenfeld P.B., Grant D.R., Chiang C.P. (2003), “Hate online: a content likely to lead in committing analysis of extremist internet sites, real-life crimes. That is why 11 Muižnieks, N. (2013), “Hate speech in analysis of social issues and pub- is not protected speech,” ENARgy lic policy,” vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 29-44. is necessary to deal simulta- The European Network Against 10 https://www.cps.gov.uk/publica- neously with hate speech and Racism’s webzine, available at tions/prosecution/violent_extrem- http://www.enargywebzine.eu/spip. ism.html php?article332. 113 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach messages have been spread. Furthermore, looking at this are at least partially true, al- Indeed, on line communica- type of online monitoring though carefully selected to tion strategy of hatemongers from a broader perspective, it induce certain effects such is often grounded on old style clearly emerges that a trans- as persuasion and mobiliza- propaganda techniques, in national approach is needed, tion.15 which authorship, source, or as it is demonstrated by the real intention of a publication findings of the research car- Some of the main tools de- or broadcast are intentionally ried out by national teams in veloped within the project cloaked or disguised.12 five European countries, us- LIGHT ON (database, glos- ing tools such as a visual data- sary, training manual, toolkit, Hate speech is not base and a collaborative glos- guide on ‘how to spot online sary. which are presented on racism’ etc.) can provide some about freedom the LIGHT ON website These non-arbitrary evaluation pa- of speech: it is a digital tools, that allow users rameters in order to differen- to filter entries per country, tiate between what constitutes threat against the target, typology and target an actual instigation to hate rights of others group, demonstrate “[…] how from what does not, also in European Nazi and Fascist view of the ethical dilemma and public safety groups are tightly connected, concerning hate speech vs. in order to create a wide racist freedom of speech (further Light On Project: breaking up the vicious cycle network across Europe. Many discussed later on in this pa- The transnational experience racist watchwords and sym- per) – unfortunately at the of the LIGHT ON project bols are indeed the same in core of the dramatic events shows that defining whether different countries and Nazi which took place in Paris at a content is racist or not can websites often have many the beginning of 2015, one of be facilitated by joining expe- shared inbound and outbound the worst security crisis in riences from different sectors. links with their correspon- French in decades which be- 14 Indeed, investigations on a sus- dents in other countries.” gun with the massacre at the pected hate speech case, and In particular, the LIGHT ON offices of the satirical mag- 16 the related prevention poli- project research has found azine Charlie Hebdo . Con- cies, must take into account many examples, ranging from sidering incidents happened diverse information about the the so-called “black” propa- in the aftermath of Charlie source and the context in which ganda, aimed to deceive tar- Hebdo attacks could help to messages have been spread: get groups by spreading false better understand how hate “Collecting and analyzing the material through a disguised speech and hate crimes are different expressions of con- source, to the “grey” propa- intimately related. In fact, temporary racism is essen- ganda, in which sources are only five days after the mur- 17 tial to understand the phe- not identified and contents ders in Paris, Tell Mama - a nomenon and to design new 15 Jowett, G. S. O’Donnell V., (1992), strategies to contrast it”13. Gorizia (ISBN 978-88-89825-32-7). “Propaganda and Persuasion,” 14 Cerase, A. (2014) “Racist symbols London: Sage; McQuail, D. (2000), and discourses: from Essentialist “Mass media theory: An introduc- 12 Daniels (2009), p. 119. to Far-right racism”, ENARgy The tion,” London: Sage. 13 Boileau, A., Del Bianco D., Velea, R. European Network Against Racism’s 16 For a context analysis of the events (eds., 2014), “Understanding the per- webzine, April 2014, available at see for instance: http://www.bbc. ception of racism. Research as a tool http://www.enargywebzine.eu/spip. com/news/world-europe-30708237. against racism,” Light On Project, php?article349. 17 Tell Mama UK – Standing against 114 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach UK Muslim advocacy project speech produces and retains a tailing a pretended right to a monitoring, measuring and social climate of discrimina- violent self-defence23. Other classifying anti-Muslim at- tion and hatred, facilitating an similar examples of such vi- tacks - reported at least fifty unequal treatment of groups cious cycles effects are also attacks (bomb blast, arsons and grounded on race, gender, and found in hatred discrimina- graffiti) against Muslims in sexual orientation, in order tion against LGBT people24, France; even London Mosques to reinforce historical asym- disable people25, as well as in received threats, hate mail and metrical relationships among cyberbullying26. offensive drawings18. ethnic or minority groups21. The above-mentioned rela- Since single hate incidents Modern narratives and im- tion should be assessed as the may not produce an imme- agery of racism: notes from a provisional result of a vicious diate and visible harm, their preventive approach cycle process19. According to cumulative impacts actually One of the main aims of the Carey’s ritual model of com- produce, maintain, transform LIGHT ON research was to munication20, media con- and repair a reality of rising investigate modern verbal sumption (including discrim- submission and self-reinforc- and visual manifestations of inating or hatred contents) ing hate22. racism and xenophobia. Very is a complex social process often racist symbols and im- aimed to portray or confirm The normalization of racism our particular views of a in mainstream media, social 23 Scagliotti, L. (2010), Racist violence conflicting world, dramati- media and political discourse in Italy, Brussels: ENAR/OSI; Binot- to, M., Bruno, M., Lai, V. (2012); cally calling for engagement is often shaped as a wave of Cerase, A. (2013), “Colpevoli per and action. Hence, we may sensationalist news after an elezione: Gli immigrati nella lente consider that hate speech incident or a crime involving della cronaca nera,” Communicazi- onepuntodoc, n.7, pp. 69-88; Orrù, P. and hate crimes are not only immigrants and ethnic mi- (2014), “Racist discourse on social tightly intertwined, but they nority members. This kind networks: A discourse analysis of Facebook posts in Italy,” Rhesis, reinforce each other. In par- of media coverage is regu- International Journal of Linguistics, ticular, ritual model can be larly followed by “common Philology, and Literature, 5(1), pp. adopted to explain how racist people’s” comments on pop- 113-133; Cerase, A. (forthcoming), “Il circolo vizioso della rappresentazi- ular social platforms and/or one mediale,” in Binotto, M., Bruno, bigotry and prejudice http://tell- by flaming politicians state- M., Lai, V. (eds), Tracciare i confini. mamauk.org/. ments intended to depict im- L‘immigrazione nei media italiani, 18 “France sees more than 50 an- FrancoAngeli, Milano. ti-Muslim incidents after Charlie migrants and minorities as 24 Dunbar, E. (2006), “Race, gender, Hebdo shootings,” The Journal.ie, threats to be countered, using and sexual orientation in hate crime Jan 12th 2015, available at http:// victimization: Identity politics or www.thejournal.ie/anti-muslim-in- every possible means. identity risk?,” Violence and Vic- cidents-france-1877960-Jan2015/. Furthermore, such statements tims, 21(3), pp. 323-337; Meyer, D. 19 The adjective provisional stays to and comments contribute cre- (2008), “Interpreting and experi- indicate the possibility of overturn encing anti-queer violence: Race, the process through monitoring and ating a vicious cycle of fear, class, and gender differences among community actions. anger and contempt, often en- LGBT hate crime victims,” Race, 20 We should not focus only on “in- Gender & Class, pp. 262-282. formation acquisition, though such 25 Sherry, M. (2012), “Disability hate acquisition occurs, but of dramatic 21 Calvert, C. (1997), “Hate speech and crimes: Does anyone really hate action in which the reader joins a its harms: A communication theory disabled people?”, Ashgate Publish- world of contended forces as an perspective,” Journal of Communi- ing, Ltd. observer at play.” In: Carey (1989), cation, 47(1), pp. 4-19. 26 Titley, G., Keen, E. and Földi, L. “Communication as culture: Essays 22 Carey’s argument in the explanation (2014), “Starting points for combat- on media and society,” New York, of his ritual model, In: Carey (1989), ing hate speech online,” Council of Routledge, p. 17. p.22. Europe, October 2014. 115 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach

ages are accepted as normal dangerous normalization of The LIGHT ON project brought social expressions, but as racism. Indeed, the European together experts working in they convey much meaning, Commission against Racism different fields, bringing their intent and significance in a and Intolerance of the Coun- contribution on the state of communicative and immedi- cil of Europe warned on how national legislations, political ately recognizable form, they “such public manifestations issues on national agendas, influence personal and collec- risk fuelling racism, xenopho- policies for prevention, me- tive behaviors, especially when bia, anti-Semitism and intol- dia reporting and relevant ac- they are shared on the Internet, erance.”28 When the tolerated ademic literature. They con- where these visual expressions level of violence rises, intol- tributed to the data collection can easily engage broad audi- erance becomes widespread phase with their multi-secto- ences. “These ‘newer’ forms and well-rooted in the soci- rial expertise: victim support of racism are so embedded ety, creating the basis to per- groups, for example, stressed in social processes and struc- petrate hate crimes, which how certain contents have the tures that they are even more are not sporadic outbursts of precise scope to harm people, difficult to explore and chal- extremist individuals: they and thus must be discerned lenge”.27 These expressions are the result of a cultural from jokes, irony and satire, are used as tools to carry out process articulated on preju- and labeled for their strong racist arguments, raise the dices that can lead to violent negative impact. Such synergy level of violence tolerated extremism. among different stakeholders by the society and lead to a suggested the importance of a victim-centered approach, 27 Bajt, V., (2014). “Contemporary rac- 28 ECRI (2013), “Annual Report on and also the importance of ism across Europe”, Freedom From ECRI’s Activities,” (1 Jan - 31 Dec, Fear Magazine, 9, 36-41. 2012) Council of Europe, Strasbourg. the cooperation among civ- 116 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach il society, researchers, local dressing the racist cases iden- line hate speech and racist authorities and law enforce- tified during the monitoring propaganda emerge as an es- ment agencies. or reported by victims. In- sential component in the fight deed, despite online monitor- against these phenomena, also Certain contents ing can be intended as a de- in view of improving and in- terrent and a tool to prevent creasing the response of the have the precise - or control – racist contents, law enforcement authorities. scope to harm its effectiveness results stron- Understanding the main rea- ger when monitoring is linked sons why hate speech on the people, and thus to the action of support groups Net often go unreported is a must be discerned or national authorities at na- starting point to draw guide- tional level, in order to show lines for reporting and tips from jokes, irony the impact of monitoring and for monitoring online ma- and satire, and also to encourage self-report- terials promoting violent ing. extremism.29 Some of these labeled for their reasons are linked to the strong negative Going back to both preven- lack of confidence in the po- tion and action against hate lice by the victims, concern impact speech, among the most important findings of the It also stressed the role of na- 29 FRA (2012), “Making hate crime LIGHT ON project, the mon- tional authorities and groups visible in the European Union: itoring role of users and their Acknowledging victims’ rights”, providing legal support in ad- key function in reporting on- FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Brussels.

117 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach about revenge attacks or fear in this case for the users is: and/or block the contents. of retaliation, acceptance of always have a backup of the Moreover, even when the on- violence and abuse (nothing content of the hate speech in- line reporting fails, ISPs and will change anyway!), fear of cident! The LIGHT ON train- Social Networking companies having privacy compromised, ing manual includes a list of may have established policies fear of jeopardising immigra- different concrete steps on to collaborate more efficient- tion status, cultural language how to backup, among other ly with national authorities barriers or lack of victim sup- tips). on the regulation and remov- port system. al of hate speech. The main steps for report- Moving in this perspective ing violent extremism on Always have a the LIGHT ON project elab- the most used social media orated, within the training (Facebook, Twitter, Wikipe- backup of the manual on Investigating and dia and You Tube) are also content of the hate Reporting Hate Speech On- outlined in the LIGHT ON line30, a set of general tips training materials: acquiring speech incident! for online reporting, with a this knowledge makes it easier particular focus on the main for law enforcement to adopt Going back to the impor- social networks as one of the a victim-centered approach tance of recognizing hatred main vehicles for spreading and effectively help victims contents, in order to prop- violent extremism and popu- by pointing them to the right erly address them, the huge list propaganda. path of reporting online. dilemma regarding the rela- One of the first “tips” for us- tion between populist argu- ers to report correctly an on- Authors are well ments and violent extremism line hate incident is to evalu- on the Internet, on one side, ate the content of the speech aware that this and freedom of speech on the and select the best strategy could make their other can not be left aside, accordingly31. The user should especially in these dramatic consider whether the content identification days in Europe.32 is generated in his/her own easier, therefore “Reconciling rights which country and thus subjected to are at the core of democra- national legislation. However, they place the cy, such as freedom of belief authors are well aware that contents out of and religion and freedom this could make their identi- from discrimination, with the fication easier, therefore they their country, right to freedom of expres- place the contents out of their violating the sion represents a significant country, violating the nation- challenge. When comedy and al rules on servers located national rules on dark humour are included in abroad. The main suggestion servers located the picture, establishing clear abroad boundaries between what 30 UNICRI (ed. 2014), “Investigating and reporting online hate speech. 32 Council of Europe, (2012), “Cyber- Training manual,” Light On Project, The different social network- hate and freedom of expression” Turin. ing sites have different pol- (paragraph 3), in Mapping study on 31 Mnet (2012), “Responding to Online projects against online hate speech. Hate,” Media Awareness Network, icies on definition of hate DDCP-YD/CHS (2012) 2, Council of Ottawa, Canada. speech and methods to report Europe, Strasbourg. 118 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach constitutes freedom of expression and what falls under the category of hate speech becomes an ever more complex challenge”.33 But where do we draw the line? Even if comedy and satire, as forms of expressions, are protected by laws dealing with freedom of expression they also come with duties and responsibilities and, as such, may be subjected to restrictions or penalties as prescribed by law. This im- plies that in democratic societies, governments may limit freedom of expression where necessary, but only in so far as they are regulated by law and in a manner which is proportionate. The test against which such limitations are evaluated is a strict one.

The authors

Andrea Cerase (PhD) is a media and culture sociologist, who has been working over the years on discrimination, racism and media portrayals of minorities. He has been a research fellow at La Sapi- enza University of Rome and also taught as adjunct lecturer at Florence and Sassari Universities. He also carries on research activities on risk communication, risk issues, journalism and applied social network analysis.

Elena D’Angelo is a Project Officer within the Emerging Crimes Unit at UNICRI. Her work is mainly focused on applied research and training for law enforcement and legal professionals. Ms. D’Angelo is the author and co-author of several publications on the following topics: counterfeiting, organized crime, data protection and anti-discrimination, including online hate-speech.

Claudia Santoro has been working at Progetti Sociali since 2012; mainly working on EU funded transnational projects on minorities, migrants, integration, racism and anti-discrimination. Progetti Sociali is an Italian social enterprise based in Pescara, working on the planning, implementation and coordination of social projects. More information: www.progettisociali.it.

119 InFocus

Green corruption More than “victimless” crimes by Vittoria Luda Di Cortemiglia and Annelies Pauwels, UNICRI

120 121 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes

The estimated the environmental field to make the phenomenon in the specif- significant profits at the expense ic case of Italy; thanks to the economic loss of the environment and citizens. important cooperation of many Exploiting essential and inalien- Italian law enforcement and caused by green able goods of the community, judicial institutions, it analyses corruption in Italy the so-called phenomenon of some of the many and various “green corruption” represents investigations conducted by the amounts to circa a particularly serious form of main Italian law enforcements 10 billion euro corruption. In fact, illicit activi- agencies involved in the fight ties regarding the environmen- against corruption, environmen- per year in terms tal sector pose a major threat to tal crimes and other related ille- the preservation of the environ- gal activities. The research also of gross domestic ment and to the health and safe- provides an accurate overview product, circa 170 ty of citizens, but also have a di- of the relevant legal framework sastrous impact on the economy. and mechanisms and presents euro per year per With a view to fill the knowledge some of the initiatives aimed at capita income gap on the relationship between preventing and repressing envi- corruption and environmental ronmental corruption. and more than 6 crimes, UNICRI initiated the research “Green Corruption - The More than “victimless” crimes percent in terms case in Italy”. The research1 Although often referred to as of productivity provides an accurate view on “victimless crimes”, the devastating effects of corruption and Perfect accomplice of eco-crim- environmental crimes on the 1 Funded by Compagnia di San Paolo, Italian society and economy do inals, corruption allows those the research was conducted from involved in illegal activities in October 2013 to March 2014 and not have to be underestimated. finalized in May 2014. The estimated economic loss 122 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes caused by green corruption in Recurring aspects of green condition the normal function- Italy amounts to circa 10 billion corruption ing of democracy. Moreover, euro per year in terms of gross The analysis of the judicial in- from a legal point of view, the domestic product, circa 170 euro vestigations in UNICRI’s pub- link between corruption and en- per year per capita income and lication aims to point out the vironmental crimes is facilitated more than 6 percent in terms dynamics, the situational back- by a legal approach that in Italy of productivity. However, one ground and the key actors in- - as in most OECD countries - is should not forget the indirect volved in the illegal activities. formalistic, i.e. focused on leg- damages including its impact on The cases taken into consider- islation that would punish envi- youth unemployment, but also ation allowed the identification ronmental crimes on the basis of its effect on the credibility of the of a number of characteristics of abstract danger, regardless of the economy. green corruption in Italy. actual damage caused.

Three sectors appear to be more The extensive exposed to environmental crim- Three sectors corruption in inality, namely the waste man- appear to be agement, the construction sec- the construction tor’s industry and the renewable more exposed to sector, on the energy sector. Throughout these environmental sectors, there are several recur- other hand, ring aspects: the presence of sig- criminality, nificant availability of money, has diminished the trans-regionality of those namely the waste earthquakes involved, and no geographical management, limitations of the operations. resilience of It also appears that, despite the the construction buildings presence of a variety of actors, sector’s industry public officials are always in- Undoubtedly, the economic dam- volved in the corrupt practices. and the renewable ages are not comparable to the energy sector risks environmental crimes pose The links beween corruption to the health and safety of citi- and environmental crimes appears to be favoured by a num- The judicial investigations ex- zens. Among the social and health amined in “Green Corruption – costs of green corruption are the ber of circumstances. First of all there are several conditions that The case in Italy” demonstrate environmental disasters, such as that environmental corruption landslides, caused by indiscrim- favour the recurrence to corruption: in particular a high tax is a poison that impacts on the inate use of land and amplified whole country; the analysed by widespread corrupt practices. burden, an excessive regulation of the legal markets and exces- cases involve 15 Italian regions The extensive corruption in the and have been addressed by 34 construction sector, on the oth- sive bureaucratic regulation in general, and high public spend- public prosecutor’s offices even- er hand, has diminished earth- ly distributed between the North quakes resilience of buildings. ing. In addition, green corruption seems to thrive well due to (13), Centre (11) and South (10) In addition, illicit waste disposal of Italy. Although the data anal- in the provinces of Naples and a high level of moral acceptance and a low sense of statehood, ysed by geographic area show on Caserta, the so-called “Earth the one hand a record for num- of Fires”, caused an increase in vulnerabilities in control and authorisation systems, and the ber of arrests in the North-West- cancer diseases and congenital ern regions (39.9%), on the other malformations within the re- existence of complex criminal systems, mafia and non, able to hand, it shows the incidence of gion. the phenomenon in the regions

123 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes traditionally affected by the ma- for various offences, including rently scattered in several texts, fia (Campania, Apulia, Calabria criminal association with the codes and decrees, should be and Sicily), with 36.9% of the mafia, fraudulent transfer of systematised. A specific section national total of arrest warrants. assets and illegal financial ac- on crimes against the environ- tivities. This specific case saw ment should be inserted in the the involvement of the Calabrian Penal Code, providing effective Several conditions mafia in the construction sec- and proportionate penalties as re- that favour the tor’s industry: some of the clans quested by the European Directive of the ‘ndrangheta had created a 2008/99/EC on the protection of recurrence to joint criminal group which dealt the environment through crimi- corruption: in mainly with the construction of nal law. In addition, a legislative private building. As a result of simplification of the processes particular a the investigation, 14 companies regarding environmental pro- and a total of 90 million euro tection is needed, in order to high tax burden, were seized, and 90 raids were make the system less vulnerable an excessive carried out in Calabria, Pied- to corruption. mont, Veneto, Lombardia and regulation of the Apulia. It is necessary legal markets The way forward to improve the and excessive Over the last years, a number institutional bureaucratic of initiatives, tools and databases have been put forward with a collaboration regulation view to fight green corruption. Examples include the REBUILD between the The “ecomafia” and the REVISUAL systems, different agencies As suggested by the above-men- which are information systems tioned figures, organised crime that provide valuable informa- and stakeholders networks appear to be envi- tion on companies and that can ronmental crimes key actors. serve as monitoring tools for involved in Italian mafia groups, as well as the law enforcement agencies. environmental other criminal groups, are keen Another essential prevention on controlling public resources tool is the Carta di Pisa. This protection by influencing the activities of code of ethics was adopted in the public administration, both 2012 by the Association Avvi- In terms of repression, it is nec- at local, provincial, regional and so Pubblico, the Italian national essary to improve the institu- national level. network of local entities for the tional collaboration between civil training against the mafia, the different agencies and stake- Among the numerous examples with a view to promote the rule holders involved in environ- illustrating the involvement of of law and transparency of local mental protection, which are organised crime networks in en- authorities. currently characterized by a vironmental crimes, it is worth kind of mutual distrust imped- mentioning the anti-mafia in- In the research report, a num- ing effective collaboration and vestigation whose code name ber of suggestions to the sectors’ exchange of information. In addi- was Araba Fenice. In December policy makers are put forward. tion, virtuous public-private part- 2013, this investigation led to the Firstly, the existing environ- nerships regarding environmental arrest of 47 people in Calabria2 mental standards, which are cur- protection should be promoted. It is to be noted that Italy has 2 Calabria is a Region of Southern main Mafia-type organization is recently approved a new law Italy. The ‘Ndrangheta, one of the based in this Region. 124 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes

to counter corruption (legge 27 Conclusions illegal circuit, impoverishes the maggio 2015, n. 69). The new law, The investigations UNICRI an- country on the economic, polit- which will be enforced starting alysed thanks to the availabil- ical, cultural and environmental from 14 June, aims at fighting ity and cooperation of the Ital- level. It poses a serious threat to corruption and in particular is ian authorities shed lights on a the credibility of the economy, addressed to corrupted public of- phenomenon that affects many the stability of public finances, ficials, companies, and mafia-type countries and many actors. The and domestic and international organizations. The new law will case of Italy offers many im- investments, but also puts the increase sanctions and monitoring portant insights in the modus health and safety of citizens at mechanisms with specific atten- operandi and the enabling con- risk. Consequently, green cor- tion paid to the Government’s ditions of green corruption. It is ruption is an issue that should monitoring of corruption related clear that corruption in the en- occupy an important position in to crimes against the environ- vironmental field, by draining the political agenda, not only in ment. resources from the legal circuit Italy but in all countries affected and channelling them into the by this phenomenon. 125 InFocus

China strengthens the judiciary not the rule of law by Giovanni Nicotera

126 127 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists China strengthens the judiciary not the rule of law

The fourth plenum of the 18th be indispensable for attracting is the case of this October’s ses- Chinese Communist Party (CPC) foreign direct investment and sion, with only one exception. In Central Committee ended on 24 technology transfer. Thus legal 1999 the concept was endorsed October 2014. For the first time in reforms had started in China by adding the following sentence the history of China this import- with a peculiarity with respect to Article Five of the Constitu- ant party session was devoted to to many other countries: the tion: “The People’s Republic of the rule of law. Considering that primary motivation for under- China practices ruling the coun- the country is ruled according taking legal reforms in China try in accordance with the law to the one-party system without was economic, and it was not a and building a socialist country separation of powers, the event question to bring the rule of law of law.” After that the govern- has led many to hope that time to the Chinese people at least in ment focused back on economic has come for China to initiate the Western sense of separation growth, and the rule of law did her path toward constitutional- of powers, human rights and de- not have again the centrality it ism and democracy. mocracy. has gained in recent times.

Indeed, the importance of this What has happened? The Com- high-level meeting can be com- For the first time munist Party has now other pri- pared to the third plenary ses- in the history orities beyond economic growth. sion of the 11th Central Com- Its main concern is ensuring sta- mittee held in December 1979 of China this bility which is threatened by an when Deng Xiaoping announced important party increasing income gap between the opening-up policies. On that rich and poor and by the wide- occasion, Deng made it clear session was spread corruption among local that at least a Soviet-style legal officials who abuse their powers system would be indispensable devoted to the rule for personal gain. The enforce- because without law, it would be of law ment of existing laws by a more impossible to re-establish State competent and, more indepen- authority throughout a country In between these two histori- dent and less corrupt judiciary laying into the moral and ma- cal events, rule of law appeared - rather than the adoption of new terial ruins following the Cul- a very few times in the govern- laws - has become in the last years tural Revolution. Moreover, he ment agendas, moreover never in a top priority that the leadership had understood that laws would position of pre-eminence as at it wants to address more resolutely 128 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists China strengthens the judiciary not the rule of law and without delay. ly creating judicial districts that ical and Legal Committees which do not overlap anymore with are present at any level in the In fact while progress was achieved administrative divisions. In this government have not been abol- with respect to the 1980s and way local party leaders have ished and their representatives 1990s when cases were adjudicat- less opportunities to interfere may continue interfering with ed by former police officers or in the judicial process. Secondly, the judicial process if they de- decommissioned military offi- and still to avoid interferences, cide to. Moreover, the plenum cers without legal training, much it has established circuit courts failed to address criminal law, more needs to de done. The per- whereby judges can now hold the system of rules which most centage of graduates from law sessions at several different lo- needs revision if work on rule of schools, which has increased cations for pre-specified peri- law is to be truly effective. over the years, all too often ods of time. Thirdly, measures It is exactly these measures that have no practical legal experi- have been adopted to strength- have been left out from the ple- ence before joining the courts en judges’ training, their super- num’s deliberations that elucidate in their 20s and, moreover, they vision and punishment as well that the party was not aiming at have to cope with an expanding as to increase their salaries, to introducing rule of law at this workload. In fact, according to bring their appointments, and stage of the Country’s develop- the Supreme People’s Court, in promotions, and the courts’ bud- ment. The real intent was anoth- 2013 Chinese courts accepted gets away from local authorities er one: strengthening the judi- 14.2 million cases, including ap- to avoid corruption and undue ciary to reinforce central power peals, retrials and enforcement pressure. over local officials who, through hearings: a 7.4 percent increase corruption, abuse of power and compared to the previous year ignoring Beijing’s directives, dam- that obliges judges to handle an In 2013 Chinese age the party’s reputation. average of 750 cases a year. The courts accepted Nevertheless, even if this fourth main concern, however, is re- plenum did not bring about the lated to the perception of cor- 14.2 million landmark changes hoped for by ruption: if Chinese believe that cases, including many in the West, the outcome judges, prosecutors and police of this important communist can be bribed, or their decisions appeals, retrials conclave must not be discarded influenced by officials who con- as it definitely improves the Chi- trol their careers and budgets, and enforcement nese legal system. In fact, and if the stability and growth of the hearings the announced measures will be society is undermined. implemented as announced, the Here the plenum stopped in its plenum has addressed a sense The October plenum has es- reform efforts and fell short of of lack of justice among the ma- sentially sought to address this addressing the key issue that jority of Chinese who can now very specific problem and has prevents the judiciary from be- expect a betterment in the way adopted the following measures. coming independent and China legal cases are handled. Firstly, it has addressed the ter- from achieving more progress ritorial competence by basical- towards the rule of law. The Polit-

The author

Giovanni Nicotera, Attorney at Law, is a Technical Advisor at the Vienna International Justice In- stitute based in Austria. Previously he served with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in different capacities and lately as its head of the office in the People’s Republic of China.

129 InFocus

Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned by Bryan Lee

130 131 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned

The challenge global safety and security. Many products or deliver the services Chemical, Biological, Radiolog- industries such as mining, phar- all of us use every day, but these ical, and Nuclear (CBRN) in- maceuticals, and health care rely same materials can cause great cidents pose a rising threat to on these materials to make the harm in the event of an industri-

132 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned al accident or deliberate misuse. training materials to be hosted awareness course. The James Unfortunately, many countries indefinitely at no cost to the user Martin Center for Nonprolifera- do not have the resources to or the developer. Finally, online tion Studies - in Monterey, Cal- prepare themselves adequately formats allow for easy and cen- ifornia - was selected to create to respond to this threat. Equally tralized modification and updat- the course which is currently in troubling is the fact that inter- ing of course materials. This en- its pre-release version (www. national training and assistance sures materials are current and cnscourseware.com). What fol- programs are also under budget- conform to international best lows are five lessons we learned ary pressure, with many lack- practices. in creating “Project 10” for the ing the resources to develop the Recognizing these advantages, CBRN community. sustained follow-on training and in April of 2012 the European cooperation necessary to address Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, this threat fully. Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) One way to Risk Mitigation Centres of Excel- address this lence (CoE) Initiative (EU CBRN Many countries CoE)1 issued a call for propos- challenge do not have als to develop an online CBRN is through the resources technology. 1 The EU CBRN CoE Risk Mitigation to prepare Initiative enhances CBRN policies We are living and capabilities by creating a net- themselves work of regional initiatives to pro- in the midst of mote and support the development adequately to and implementation of national an education CBRN policies. It aims at strength- respond to this ening regional security by increas- revolution ing local ownership, local expertise threat and long-term sustainability. This includes sharing good practices and Five Lessons Learned The Solution capabilities, developing guidelines # 1 Know your audience as well as identifying, collecting, One way to address this chal- The first and most important task analysing and deploying resources in developing online training is lenge is through technology. We to respond to the needs identified are living in the midst of an ed- by partner countries. The initiative to identify the training audience. ucation revolution. For example, also facilitates the identification Besides the obvious role this plays and implementation of projects and Stanford University in the Unit- in curriculum development, the ensures that capacity building is part audience also drives how the con- ed States recently offered a so- of a coordinated and sustainable called Massively Open Online approach. tent is presented and marketed. Course (MOOC) in computer The EU CBRN CoE Initiative is It is counterintuitive, but a small funded by the European Commis- science to any student with an audience is much harder to reach sion and implemented in coop- and market to than a large audience internet connection. The result eration with the United Nations was an astonishing class en- Interregional Crime and Justice because it has a narrower prefer- rollment of more than 150,000 Research Institute (UNICRI) and ence for training. A group of med- the European Commission Joint Re- students from around the world. ical doctors, for example, might search Centre (JRC). The European only be interested in a course Such online training seems al- External Action Service is also in- most tailor made to address the chal- volved in the follow-up of the initia- if it corresponds to their specif- lenges mentioned above. Training tive. The initiative is developed with ic specialty. A large audience is the technical support of relevant platforms and software are free much easier to reach, but there international and regional organi- is a risk of watering down the to use for both trainers and re- sations, the EU Member States and cipients, and publicly available other stakeholders, through coher- course content to the point that content sharing services such ent and effective cooperation at the the training value is diminished. national, regional and international The solution is to work closely as YouTube or Wordpress allow level. 133 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned

with the existing set of contacts selves - which narrowed the tar- and one project leader should be in a country. Project 10 relied get audience for the courseware assigned to ensure consistency heavily on the EU CBRN Centres to officials most in need of this and unity of effort. of Excellence Regional Secre- type of overview training. tariats coordinators.2 Working # 3 Use an Instructional De- through these officers allowed # 2 Assign a Project Manager signer us to reach out directly to the When developing an E-learning Asynchronous E-learning mod- Regional Secretariats and the course, there is an understand- els using pre-recorded lectures corresponding National Focus able impulse to rely on a lead in- work well for introductory cours- Points - points of contact estab- structor or subject matter expert es. They do not require instructor lished by the host nations them- to manage the course develop- interaction, and students are able ment. This approach works well to learn at their own pace and for a traditional course, but less spend more time with the course 2 The EU CBRN CoE Regional Sec- retariats ensure cooperation and so for online learning. Unlike materials. The danger of such a coordination with partner countries a traditional classroom course, semi-automated course is it can and are responsible for supporting an E-learning course is a hybrid come across as simplistic or too them with the identification of of the educational process of standardized. To avoid this, on- needs, the formulation of regional project proposals, the development curriculum design and the busi- line course managers should in- of national action plans and the ness process of software deliv- clude an instructional designer implementation of projects. The ery. There are many pieces that as part of the project team. In- EU CBRN CoE initiative currently must be integrated into a func- structional designers are experts involves 51 countries in 8 regions of the world (African Atlantic Façade; tioning whole, and must be done in adult learning and can help to Central Asia; Eastern and Central so on time and on budget. To ensure course materials and as- Africa; Gulf Cooperation Coun- accomplish this, strong project sessments take full advantage of cil Countries; Middle East; North management planning and im- the online medium while main- Africa; South East Asia; and South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, plementation skills are required taining the optimal flow and se- Moldova and Ukraine). 134 F3 Magazine Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned quence of course content to im- tors to spend significantly more means even the most remote prove learning. They also serve time preparing and presenting government outpost can today as valuable referees between materials. For example, a video have access to training materi- subject matter and technology lecture may require several sep- als developed and presented by experts, helping to maintain bal- arate filming sessions as well as world-class experts. ance between engaging course the preparation of a complete content and technical feasibility. written transcript. In addition, explanations and questions that Online courses # 4 Mind the Technology work well in a live session may can provide a The explosion of free and stan- have to be changed or adapted to dardized open-source software suit video lectures. The techni- cost-effective is a boon for E-learning. Today cal team may also require more and sustainable there is no need to use expen- time than they are used to as sive and complicated commer- they try to find optimal video training solution cial software or hosting services and software solutions to con- to conduct E-learning courses. vey the entirety of the instruc- for partner nations Popular free blogging platforms tional materials. Our team, for such as Wordpress offer a suite example, found an elegant solu- To take advantage of this of sophisticated course manage- tion for an online quizzing fea- E-learning revolution requires ment tools, and numerous video ture, only to discover later that an up-front investment of tech- hosting sites such as Youtube or our Arabic translations caused nical expertise, planning, and Dailymotion allow course lec- it to malfunction. When work- project management skills be- tures to be hosted and viewed ing with complex materials and yond that required for tradition- for free. new technologies, such difficulties al classroom training. The re- While these technologies cer- are as unpredictable as they are sults, however, can be leveraged tainly make creating an E-learn- inevitable. Recognizing this fact in ways that far exceed what is ing course cheaper and easier, and building extra time into the possible in a classroom. The ul- they do not remove the need for project schedule at the outset is timate success of this or any oth- technical expertise. To be success- the best way to ensure project er training effort lies with the ful, the technical and instructional success. people reached and the contacts teams must work side-by-side. developed. With their reach, Video editing, website coding and Conclusion flexibility, and sustainability, patching, and software compatibility Online courses can provide a E-learning courses offer a new issues are only a few of the tasks cost-effective and sustainable and powerful tool for engage- that the technical team must be training solution for partner na- ment. prepared to address. If the techni- tions. Free software solutions cal team is integrated into the in- and expanding internet access structional development process at the very beginning, many of the technical difficulties can be addressed and resolved before The author they become major obstacles. Bryan Lee is the Interim Deputy Director of the James Martin # 5 Allow Plenty of Time Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) where his work fo- A final key to success is to al- cuses on Eurasian nonproliferation and new media analytical low sufficient time to develop tools. A retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, he has developed and fully test the E-learning and managed numerous cooperative training programs for the course. Unlike traditional cours- U.S. government in the fields of counter-proliferation and an- es, E-learning requires instruc- ti-terrorism.

135 Agenda 2015

20-22 July 2015 Turin, Italy UNICRI Journalism and Public Information Programme on New Threats

It is estimated that about 3 billion people across the planet are connected to the internet, while mobi- le-cellular subscriptions have reached almost 7 billion in 2014. If nobody can deny that progress in information technologies is creating new opportunities, advanced services and potential global benefits, it is also true that modern society’s dependence on digital infrastructures has generated the new threats of the hyper-connected world. Cyber warfare, cyber espionage, terrorist use of the internet, online crimes against property and persons embody growing transnational menaces. Conversely, governments’ responses to counter cyber threats and to safeguard national security through the internet are triggering an ethical debate: are security measures putting freedom of expression in danger? Media is a key component in promoting awareness with regards to potential gains and risks of the digital era. Within this constantly evolving cyber landscape, knowledgeable and accurate journalism, and responsible public information are needed more than ever to frame ethical debates surrounding new digital trends and complex security issues. To deepen the understanding of these emerging challenges, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) organizes a specialized course on cyber security from 20 to 22 July 2015. The course aims at increasing knowledge, accuracy and accountability with regards to reporting on new threats as well as fostering constructive connections, dialogue and exchange of experiences between different sectors in this area. www.unicri.it

16 - 19 August 2015 Dallas, U.S.A 41st National Organization for Victim Assistance Conference

Choose from over 100 workshops and plenary sessions for new, intermediate, and advanced victim advocates. Educational topics include: counselling and advocacy; restorative justice; program management; identity theft/cyber crimes; spiritual and mental health services; homicide issues; domestic violence and sexual assault; victims in the military; special concerns for children, the elderly, and victims with disa- bilities; public policy; law enforcement and prosecution models; Native American justice; self care and burnout; interdisciplinary services and collaboration; and much more. http://connect2justice.ncja.org/events/event-escription?CalendarEventKey=- dcac38ba-b8e9-4604-89c0-8ede6c275ed3&EventTypeKey=&Home=/events/calendar

136 9 September 2015 Venice, Italy Anti-counterfeiting technologies: protection of Intellectual Property and economic development

Counterfeiting is growing to epidemic proportions across the globe due to transnational criminal networks exploiting the dark side of globalization. An integrated approach involving multiple stakeholders from the public and private sector is needed to support the response to this crime. The event, organized by UNICRI, the World Bank, the Italian Ministry for Economic Development and Assonime, will focus on how anti-counterfeiting technologies can support the fight against illicit trade from both the public and private perspective.

10-11 September 2015 Birmingham, England Contentious and Contemporary Issues in the Study of Terrorism Society for Terrorism Research 9th Annual International Conference

Within democratic societies, counter-terrorism is almost exclusively about crime prevention. A broad and holistic approach to preventing terrorism can be based on nine preventive mechanisms: Building normative barriers against terrorism, reducing radicalization and recruitment, deterrence, disruption, incapacitation, protecting vulnerable targets, reducing benefits to terrorists, reducing harm, and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. Counter-terrorist policies which are only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side-effects which serve to enhance the problem rather than reducing it. A more holistic approach, making use of the entire range of preventive mechanisms, may lighten the impact of the “hard” measures by relying more on the impact of the “softer” and more positive measures to build moral barriers, reduce recruitment, and facilitate exit from terrorist movements. The goal of the conference, hosted by the University of Birmingham, is to highlight ongoing and emerging academic research in terrorism and counter-terrorism; promote collaboration between academia, industry and counter-terrorism practitioners; and explore new ways of translating the results of research on terrorism for multiple audiences, agencies and communities. http://www.societyforterrorismresearch.org/annual-conference

13 - 17 September 2015 Zurich, Switzerland 20th International Association of Prosecutors Annual Conference

The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) is the only worldwide organization of prosecutors. Established in 1995 has members from over 171different countries. Its 20th annual conference will focus on White-Collar Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering. Among the Conference themes: prevention of corruption: democracy, guarantee of human rights, indepen-

137 Agenda 2015

dence of justice as a condition of a clean financial and business centre; clean money strategy; anti-money laundering legislation; international cooperation and assistance in the area of prevention; identification, confiscation and recovery of illicit assets. http://www.iap-association.org/Conferences/Annual-Conferences/Annual-Conference-2015

18 September 2015 London, United Kingdom What shapes trends in crime?

Drawing on new research, this event will discuss why crime rose so much during the 1980s and the implications for current policy. This event is a unique opportunity to hear from some of the key experts on how economic and social policies influence long-term trends and patterns of crime, victimisation and fear of crime. Among the themes covered in the event will be: the long-term consequences of social and economic policies from 1979 to 1997 on crime and criminal justice; how changes in crime rates have an impact on the types of criminal justice policies pursued; how the era in which one grew up affects the beliefs one holds about crime and about what works in tackling it; how specific social policies in one arena can create ‘spill over’ effects in criminal justice; the implications for future crime trends in the context of ongoing public sector cuts and austerity. http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/civicrm/event/info?reset=1&id=75

1-2 October 2015 Brussels, Belgium Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe

First Vice President for Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Frans Timmermans, in cooperation with EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Vìra Jourová, will host the first Annual Colloquium on fundamental rights in the EU. The Colloquium will aim at improving mutual cooperation and greater political engagement for the promotion and protection of fundamental rights in Europe. It will seek to strengthen dialogue between the EU and international institutions, policy makers, academia and civil society, and deepen the understanding of challenges for fundamental rights on the ground. Another key objective will be the identification of gaps and achieving progress on topical fundamental rights issues. For this first edition the central theme will be: Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe. The Colloquium will bring together a selected number of high level participants from across the EU: national Ministers, representatives of leading NGOs and international institutions, MEPs and renowned academics and philosophers. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/colloquium-fundamental-rights-2015/index_en.htm

138 15 - 16 October 2015 Johannesburg, South Africa Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 6th international conference: National and international perspectives on crime, violence reduction and criminal justice

This premier annual event brings together researchers, academics, policy makers and practitioners with an interest in criminology and associated disciplines to discuss research findings and exchange ideas. The networks established at these conferences have led to collaboration across the globe on crime and justice issues. The event provides an excellent opportunity to exhibit the latest criminological and related research as well as policy initiatives from Africa and beyond. http://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/events/iss-6th-international-conference-national-and-international-perspectives-on-crime-violence-reduction-and-criminal-justice

5-7 November 2015 Berlin, Germany Europe’s Strategic Choices: Building Prosperity and Security

Launched in 2014, this annual European strategic dialogue will explore economic competitiveness, energy investment and security policy issue bringing together senior politicians, business leaders and academics to discuss how European countries can respond individually and collectively to global challenges, exploring developments between Europe and its neighbours through three themes: security, prosperity and energy. http://www.chathamhouse.org/Conferences/Europe2015#sthash.yTqxv4Qk.dpuf

16-21 November 2015 Luxembourg City, Luxembourg Europe’s Strategic Choices: Building Prosperity and Security

The course is organized by SALTO-YOUTH, a network of eight Resource Centres working on European priority areas within the youth field. The training aims at empowering youth activists with practical tools to counter hate speech. It will combine the tools of No Hate Speech campaign and Non-Violent Commu- nication. Time will be devoted for the planning of a campaign, as well as the development of new projects with Erasmus+/ Youth in action. The course is addressed to young activist involved locally or regionally in the No Hate Speech Movement as well as to persons who have been confronted with hate speech, and youth workers.

139 UNICRI’s Library Selection

Pearse, John Investigating Terrorism: Current Political, Legal and Psychological Issues, Wiley, 2015

The book presents different terrorist cases in the UK, from the debates held in both the Houses of the Parliament, through investigation, arrest, prosecution and imprisonment. It confronts many of the crucial political, law enforcement, legal and psychological issues currently influencing major decision makers. The book provides the reader with an exhaustive and indepth review of first-hand experiences of a wide range of professionals. Points of view included in the publication are from politicians, prosecution and defence lawyers, detectives, security experts and forensic psychologists.

United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, United Nations Publication, 2014

Trafficking in persons is a serious world-wide issue which affected between 2010 and 2012 at least 124 countries. Most of the victims are woman, who too often are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour. Although women are the most frequent victims of this phenomenon, trafficking in persons also affects a significant number of male victims. Among the victims, it is increasing the number of children who every year are involved in this atrocious trafficking. The UNODC ‘Global Report on Trafficking in Persons’ covers 128 countries and provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons at global, regional and national levels, based on the trafficking cases detected. The Report highlights the role of organised crime in trafficking in persons, and includes an analytical chapter on how traffickers operate. The worldwide response to trafficking in persons is also a focus of this Global Report.

140 Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac, Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Michael Kilchling (eds.) Mapping the Criminological - Landscape of the Balkans For the first time, this volume brings together experts in the fields of criminology, Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac The Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology (MPPG) is a criminal law and criminal justice from across the Balkans, to discuss the state of the Zagreb-based research division jointly established by the Max Planck art of criminology and current crime trends in a region that has thus far largely been Hans-Jörg Albrecht Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg (MPI) and the University of Zagreb’s Faculty of Law. It is headed by neglected by European criminological research. Michael Kilchling (eds.) Assist. Prof. Dr. Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac. The MPPG promotes, The first chapter analytically describes and defines the Balkan region, not only as a conducts and facilitates scientific research in the field of criminology unique historical region, but also as a religious and legal territory, as well as a region and criminal justice and hosts the Balkan Criminology Network. of migration and violence and a criminological region sui generis. These facts are Mapping the Criminological The MPPG’s current research programme focuses on three main used to explore and promote the likely benefits of a coherent regional criminological research areas, specifically targeting criminal phenomena that are of particular relevance to the Balkan region, or that may threaten its research approach – with the long-term goal of creating a sustainable ‘criminological Landscape of the Balkans future security and stability: I. Violence, Organized Crime and Illegal landscape’. Contributions from all members of the Balkan Criminology Network Markets; II. Feelings and Perceptions of (In)Security and Crime; III. – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, International Sentencing. Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey – then provide an A Survey on Criminology and Crime with an Recently, a new line within the Research Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research Series of the Max Planck The MPPG’s main goals are to foster criminological research on in-depth overview of facts and background information about criminological education Expedition into the Criminal Landscape of the Institute for Foreign and International Balkan-relevant topics including the dissemination of findings to the Assist. Prof. Dr. Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac heads the Max and research and data about crime, general crime trends, and current crime and criminal Balkans Criminal Law broader scientific community, capacity building for young academics Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology and lectures justice challenges. The final chapter presents selected research projects from the actual from the region through training and PhD research, creation of a at the University of Zagreb’s Faculty of Law. Her interest Publications of the Max Planck sustainable network of criminological experts throughout the research agenda of the Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology (MPPG). Partner Group for Balkan Criminology in the Balkans started in 2001 with research into terrorism Edited by Hans-Jörg Albrecht Balkans, and positioning Balkan Criminology in the European and political violence, which then evolved into related This selection makes the book an essential reader for anyone interested in the current & Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac research area and beyond.Foreign The Balkan Criminology publication and International Criminal Law (MPI), Freiburg, Germany was launched– areas such as organized crime, illegal markets, general criminological setting of the Balkans and an excellent starting point for regional or series provides a forum for the presentation of the MPPG’s scientific violence research and security perception and questions country specific crime research. Volume BC 1 output; it also connects the research potential present in the Balkans concerning how to interconnect the criminological research with the research agenda of the MPI, thereby ensuring cutting edge potential of the region. She heads several international “This volume marks the beginning of a new publication series of the Max Planck criminological research of the highest quality. research projects in Croatia and has published in English, Partner Group for Balkan Criminology. It provides an informative overview of the German and Croatian, but also Spanish and Italian, on state of the art of criminology across the Balkan region. [...] The multitude of crimi- terrorism, hate crimes, political violence, Croatian crimi- the “Publications of the Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology”. The nology, organized crime and fear of crime. nological aspects successfully covered in this first volume cannot help but leave one curious about the scientific papers, research results and meetings yet to come.” Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hans-Jörg Albrecht is Director of the Max Prof. Dr. Helmut Kury, Freiburg i.Br. Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, and heads the Department of Criminology. “A masterpiece, […] showing pathways for a solid and fruitful further development His research interests span the breadth of modern legal of criminology in the Balkans.” and criminological discourse, ranging from topics such as book series, edited by Hans-Jörg Albrecht & Anna-Maria GetošKalac, is published by sentencing theory, juvenile crime and justice, illegal drug Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Kerner, former President of ISC and ESC, policy, and environmental and organized crime to evaluative Emeritus Director of the Institute of Criminology, University of Tübingen research on the role of criminal justice in transitional legal systems. He has authored, co-authored, and edited numerous works, including volumes on sentencing, day-fines, re- ISBN 978-3-86113-248-6 (Max Planck Institute) cidivism, child abuse and neglect, drug policies, and ISBN 978-3-428-14494-5 (Duncker & Humblot) Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac, Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Michael Kilchling (eds.) Mapping the Criminological Landscape of Balkans ISBN 978-953-270-085-5 (Zagreb Faculty of Law) MPI and the University of Zagreb – Faculty of Law. It will regularly publish research victimisation. BC 1 findings of the Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology (MPPG), a joint

114471_MPI_BC_1_Kalac_Albrecht_v1.indd 1 venture23.06.15 15:01 of MPI and the Zagreb Faculty of Law. More details on MPPG’s research program and further research activities are provided at www.balkan-criminology.eu.

The book is the first volume of the Series. Its introductory chapter – Marking of the Territory – deals with the Balkans as a European region sui generis and sets the stage for the following analyses of criminology and crime in the Balkans. This part is opened by Holm Sundhaussen who defines the basic terms (e.g. the Balkans, Southeastern Europe, etc.) from a historical perspective, focusing on the Balkans’ uniqueness regarding history, geography, religion, legal tradition, and migration. He also critically reviews the image of the Balkans as a ‘violence-prone’ region. The following contribution by Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac concentrates on the Balkans as a criminological region sui generis and in this context presents the concept of a ‘Balkan Criminology’ together with its regional key players – the MPPG and the Balkan Criminology Network (BCNet). The background, methodology, and scope of the ‘mapping’ are presented as well as some of the key findings on the state of art in criminology and crime across the Balkans. The introduction concludes with an analysis of the Balkan’s criminological landscape in terms of networking and capacity building. John Winterdyk & Michael Kilchling put emphasis on the significance of – principled – comparative approaches in modern criminology and discuss the necessary steps for the development of sustainable research structures. They come to the conclusion that Balkan Criminology has the potential to gain a position within European criminology that can develop to become similar to that of Scandinavia. In chapter II the ‘country mappings’ are presented. These capture the current situation in criminological education and research, but also basic crime trends and major criminal justice challenges in a total of 14 Balkan and relevant neighbouring countries. Renown scholars and experts as well as young academics from the region, all involved in the BCNet, joined in a collaborative research effort that provides for a clear picture of the criminological setting in their countries. Each of the ‘country mappings’ is a unique scientific discovery trip into the criminological and criminal landscape of the respective country providing for a vivid picture of the Balkans’ criminological landscape and also represents essential readings on the specific crime and criminal justice situation. A selection of research projects of the MPPG and first findings are presented in chapter III – Expedition into the Criminal Landscape of the Balkans. Here the members of the MPPG discuss their research questions, explain the designs chosen and present first findings from empirical, literature, and normative research. The subjects addressed cover a wide scope of issues: international sentencing and its enforcement (Filip Vojta), juvenile delinquency (Reana Bezić) and trafficking in human beings in the Balkans (Karlo Ressler), economic crime in periods of transition (Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička) and problems of how to adequately deal with criminal offences committed by political parties (Aleksandar Maršavelski).

141 UNICRI’s Library Selection

United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Gender Responsive Urban Legislation, Land and Governance, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2015

Nowadays the majority of the world’s population lives in urban environments. More job opportunities, better living conditions and access to services and infrastructures have attracted to cities more than half of the world’s population. However, living in urban areas combines these advantages with a number of disadvantages. Therefore, urban policy makers are called to recognise and respond to the emerging and different needs, concerns and interests of urban women, men, boys and girls. This volume attentively analyses how urbanisation processes affect in different ways women and man; examines the consequences of gender inequalities in urban context and highlights responsive interventions which have proved to strengthen gender equality and women’s empowerment in urban settings.

International Atomic Energy Agency with the support of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2014 Radiological Crime Scene Management - An Implementing Guide, 2014

Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other radioactive materials are known, or suspected, to be present. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event.. This publication aims to provide law enforcement officials, national policy makers, decision makers, local authorities and technical support personnel with guidance on the framework and functional elements for managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scenes. Such guidance may then be adopted or adapted to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions and competent authorities within each Member State.

142 CYBERCRIME: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) RISKS FOR THE ECONOMY AND ENTERPRISES AT THE EU AND ITALIAN LEVEL Cybercrime and the risks for the economy and enterprises at the European Union and Italian level, 2014

Cybercrime is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. Targeting all types of companies, it is one of the most serious threats to the global economy, steadily growing over the past decade. In addition to large companies, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are increasingly affected by cybercrime attacks. The research study aims to provide a framework to assess the impact of cybercrime on the economy, and to evaluate the vulnerabilities of SMEs to cyber-attacks. The research focuses on the impact of cybercrime at the international, national (Italian) and local level. Targeted interviews and case study analysis have been conducted to provide an overview of the tools currently used by criminals, the most common reasons that lead to these criminal acts, and the major risks and vulnerabilities for businesses. Interviews with institutional players and companies have helped to clarify key problems and suggest a need for a coherent strategy for SMEs to defend themselves against cybercrime.

pub_napoli_cover_executive.pdf 1 12/11/2014 12:48:33

Voci contro il crimine United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute a Napoli (UNICRI) Voices against Crime in Naples, 2014

CMY K The publication presents the findings of a project aimed at empowering victims as agents of change, by taking their stories as the starting point for the definition of crime prevention strategies, assistance and development. Con il supporto di The book includes stories from the victims, experts and practitioners contributions, NGO suggestions and UNICRI’s recommendations. The analyses of the stories sheds light on many different type of crime and support the identification of good practices and critical issues to be addressed with respect to victims’ support policies and practices, ultimately with the goal of building resilience. UNICRI’s recommendations highlight the centrality of a national plan for victims, including guidelines on victims protection and support before and after the investigation and judicial process and the enhancement of restorative justice practices. Empowering victims through the assessment of their experience with crime, the understanding of the problems they face and including victims in the designing of new strategies to prevent victimization and awareness to combat violence is fundamental. As highlighted by the report, actions to promote crime prevention and security in urban settings must involve the integration and convergence of all actors, inclusive strategies, community policing and training and working opportunities for at-risk youth.

143 144 145 Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law

Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law

Günterstalstraße 73 79100 Freiburg i. Br.

Tel.: +49 (761) 7081-0 Fax: +49 (761)146 7081-294 E-Mail: [email protected]