Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. Jumper Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Donald G. Cook http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Donald A. Lamontagne Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Col Bobby J. Wilkes

Editor Col Eric A. Ash http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Senior Editor Lt Col Scott G. Wierschke

Associate Editors Dr. Doris Sartor Maj Donald R. Ferguson Capt Gilles Van Nederveen

Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor http://www.au.af.mil George C. Porter, Contributing Editor Mary J. Moore, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Mary P. Ferguson, Prepress Production Manager Aerospace Power Chronicles http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil Luetwinder T. Eaves, Managing Editor The Aerospace Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the . It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova­ tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of na­ tional defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc­ tion of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or Visit Aerospace Power Journal on line at in part without permission. If they are reproduced, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil the Aerospace Power Journal requests a courtesy line. or e-mail to [email protected] Winter 2001 Volume XV, No. 4 AFRP 10-1

Flight Lines Medicinal Thoughts ...... 5

Ricochets and Replies ...... 6

Features Focus:Aerospace Medicine New Millennium, New Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Expeditionary Era ...... 8 Lt Gen Paul K. Carlton Jr., USAF, MC, CFS Challenges of Aeromedical Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era ...... 14 Brig Gen Bruce Green, USAF Operational Medical Support for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine ...... 27 Col James J. Dougherty, USAF, MC, CFS, DMO

Linking Resource Allocation to Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Air Force Challenge ...... 34 Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF Lt Col James A. Hubert, USAF Maj Keith H. Maxwell, USAF

Ira C. Eaker Award Winners ...... 46

Silver Flag: A Concept for Operational Warfare ...... 47 Col Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF

The Cult of the Quick ...... 57 Dr. Thomas Hughes

Thinking about China and War ...... 69 Dr. Jeffrey Record

Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Century ...... 81 Lt Col Phil M. Haun, USAF

PIREP C-9 Nightingale: From Dedicated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Transport ...... 89 Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired

VORTICES The War on Drugs: Two More Casualties ...... 91 Lt Col Stephen P. Howard, USAF Net Assessment Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective ...... 96 William H. Mott IV Reviewer: Capt Clifford E. Rich, USAF

Pearl Harbor ...... 97 Touchstone Pictures Reviewer: Maj Gary Pounder, USAF, Retired

MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader ...... 99 William M. Leary Reviewer: Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN

Desert Warriors: Australian P-40 Pilots at War in the Middle East and North Africa, 1941–1943 ...... 99 Russell Brown Reviewer: Maj Robert F. Tate, USAFR

Angels Zero: P-47 Close Air Support in Europe ...... 100 Robert V. Brulle Reviewer: Dr. Daniel Mortensen

Ripcord: Screaming Eagles under Siege, Veitnam 1970 ...... 101 Keith William Nolan Reviewer: 1st Lt Glenn D. Leinbach, USAF

Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage ...... 102 Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson Reviewer: Maj James P. Gates, USAF

The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History ...... 102 Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan Reviewer: Maj James P. Gates, USAF

The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy ...... 103 William C. Davis Reviewer: Maj James P. Gates, USAF

Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War ...... 103 James M. McPherson Reviewer: Maj James P. Gates, USAF

The ...... 104 Korea Institute of Military History Reviewer: Kenneth P. Werrell

Right Backed by Might: The International Air Force Concept ...... 105 Roger Beaumont Reviewer: Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Black Sheep One: The Life of Gregory “Pappy” Boyington ...... 106 Bruce Gamble Reviewer: Lt Col Phil Bossert Jr., USAF

The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs ...... 107 J. D. Pendry Reviewer: CMSgt Gilbert Duenas, USAF

Winter Journey through the Ninth: The Story of Tactical Air Power as Illustrated by the Exploits of the in Europe ...... 108 Harry A. Franck Reviewer: Kenneth P. Werrell

The Second-Luckiest Pilot: Adventures in Military Aviation ...... 109 D. K. Tooker Reviewer: C1C Brooke Carr, USAF Academy

The Ultimate Terrorist ...... 110 Jessica Stern Reviewers: Col (Dr.) Jim Davis and CDR Drew Mullin, USN

Index ...... 112

Mission Debrief ...... 126 Aerospace Power Journal Board of Reviewers For many years, we have informally used a referee process of anonymous peer review to help select articles for publication and to enhance the content and quality of APJ. We would like to recognize the now formally es­ tablished Board of Reviewers and thank its members for the invaluable service they provide as recognized au­ thors and experts in various fields of aerospace power. Along with our Editorial Board (listed on the inside back cover), the Board of Reviewers is critically important to promoting APJ as the premier forum for aero­ space power dialogue and debate.

Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Dr. Tom Keaney Duke University School of Advanced International Studies Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired Johns Hopkins University Melbourne, Prof. Theodore Kluz Lt Col Matthew Caffrey, USAFR USAF Air War College Operations Directorate Dr. Charles Krupnick Headquarters USAF US Army War College Brig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, Retired Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Monument, RAND Dr. Don D. Chipman Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired USAF Squadron Officer College Montgomery, Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Karl P. Magyar US Army War College Montgomery, Alabama Prof. Mark Clodfelter Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired National War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. James Corum Dr. Jerome V. Martin USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies Peru State College Dr. Conrad Crane Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, Retired Strategic Studies Institute Science Applications International Corporation US Army War College Dr. John H. Morrow Jr. Dr. Dik A. Daso University of National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution Dr. Daniel Mortensen USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Dr. Lee Dowdy Alabama State University Prof. James Mowbray USAF Air War College Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies Dr. Karl Mueller RAND Col Charles Dunlap Jr., USAF Staff Judge Advocate Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF Air Education and Training Command USAF Air Command and Staff College Dr. Stephen Fought Col Robert Owen, USAF USAF Air War College Headquarters Col David M. Glanz, USA, Retired Dr. Reina J. Pennington Journal of Slavic Military Studies Norwich University Col Thomas E. Griffith, USAF Dr. James Smith USAF 39th Support Group USAF Institute for National Security Studies Incirlik, Turkey Col James Spencer, USAF Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. USAF Academy State University Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Grant T. Hammond Toffler Associates Center for Strategy and Technology Air University Dr. James Titus Air University Prof. Daniel Hughes USAF Air War College Col Mark Wells, USAF USAF Academy Dr. Thomas Hughes USAF Air War College Dr. Ken Werrell Christianburg, Virginia Lt Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Space Division Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Weapons School USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies

4 COL ERIC ASH,EDITOR Medicinal Thoughts

E USUALLY DON’T think about ous organizations, it experiences the growing breathing until we can’t. This lit­ pains of new wineskins. Global engagement erally involves one of the most has tremendous implications for the Air important facets of war—medi­ Force Medical Service, and just as airmen— cine.W Just as weaponry, reconnaissance, com­ from fighter pilots to joint force air component munications, and myriad other technologies commanders—have to accommodate the de­ have experienced phenomenal advance­ mands of timely decision making, so does the ments, so too has pro­ medical service find itself in an observe- gressed in quantum leaps of a revolutionary orient-decide-act (OODA) loop in its world- nature. Far removed from the era of Florence wide challenges. Basically, the challenge calls Nightingale during the Crimean War, military for doing more things faster with a lighter, medicine now enjoys capabilities that trans- leaner medical force. The argument presented late into significantly increased comfort and by Dr. Tom Hughes in one of our articles— prospects of survival for injured combatants that quicker may not always be better—has a on the battlefield or for innocent civilian vic­ perplexing application to military medicine, tims of terrorist attacks or natural disasters. in which one measures the difference be- Despite its critical importance and the dra­ tween life and death in seconds and heart- matic improvements in practices, military beats. medicine has remained an obscure topic in Threats to national security, vital national most professional military journals, including interests, and international stability are be- this one. In fact, a cursory glance at the his- coming increasingly complex and unpre­ tory of Aerospace Power Journal (as well as that dictable. Similarly, military medicine is facing of its predecessor, Airpower Journal) reveals a far more complicated challenges. But as some paucity of attention afforded to aerospace medicine—until now. We are focusing on this of the articles in this issue point out, Air Force important topic with several interesting medicine is up to the task. The piece by Lt pieces that suggest a new perspective on mili­ Gen Paul Carlton Jr. highlights the current tary medicine for most readers. Similar to shift in emphasis on patient care to quicker, aerospace superiority (another thing, like leaner, lighter, and essential-only systems that breathing, not to be taken for granted), mili­ can react appropriately in support of the ex­ tary medicine is not only essential to mission peditionary Air Force. Brig Gen Bruce Green success but can be the mission itself. Military explores the same theme by looking at the medicine finds itself more closely linked to history and current state of aeromedical evac­ the very essence of our national policy in uation—not just some peripheral issue but a terms of engaging globally with humanitarian “line of the Air Force” concern. In another ar­ and disaster assistance and connecting with ticle, Col James Dougherty points out the force protection—of paramount importance unique nature and “special” challenges of to military involvement worldwide. providing medical support to special opera­ As military medicine becomes increasingly tions forces. Finally, the Vortices opinion involved with the total force, jointness, and piece by Lt Col Stephen Howard attacks the coalition efforts with other nations and vari­ rationale behind the drug-war efforts in

5 6 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

South America, a topic with important med- spond and decreasing in size and response ical considerations for today’s environment. time. Integral to the overall effort is medical Air Force medicine is moving from the situation awareness on the part of the entire realm of the supporting to that of the sup- Air Force, including this journal. Hopefully, ported—from the shaft to the tip of the spear. readers will understand this as they take their As such, it is increasing in its capability to re- next breath and read on.

We encourage your comments via letters to the pability of airpower is a problem for airmen editor or comment cards. All correspondence too, not merely “Western politicians.” should be addressed to the Editor, Aerospace Second, if he prefers to call these state­ Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell ments of mine “truths with asterisks” instead AFB AL 36112-6428. You can also send your com­ of myths, that is fine. In doing so, he accepts ments by E-mail to [email protected]. We reserve the point of the exercise in saying that we the right to edit the material for overall length. ought not be overwhelmed with the military triumph without examining some of the ques­ MYTHS? OR TRUTHS WITH ASTERISKS? tions about it. It is like making claims about Lt Col Martin Wojtysiak is to be commended the best team in baseball in 1994. That was for taking the time to write his article “An- the strike season—the division winners are other View of the Myths of the ” (Fall listed as of August, when the strike occurred, 2001), in which he rebuts my earlier article but there were no play-offs, no pennant win­ “Myths of the Gulf War: Some ‘Lessons’ Not ners for the year, and no World Series. It is to Learn” (Fall 1998). I set out to be pur­ “truth with an asterisk.” That is, one needs posely provocative and feared that I may have some extra explanation to put the listing of failed in provoking a response. Apparently, I accomplishments in proper perspective. did not. Third, a “militarily intact Iraq” does not Rather than rebut his views point by point, control . While that is a truly good out- which seems overly academic, let me make come of the Gulf War, it is not the whole story. some general comments about his remarks. Iraq is largely militarily intact, and Saddam is First, the bulk of my article was a presentation stronger in many ways—with less domestic given to the chief of staff of the Air Force’s opposition (from Kurds or Marsh Arabs), Airpower Symposium, a gathering of general even after the destruction in the war and de- officers and major-command participants spite the sanctions, the no-fly zones, the in­ held at in the fall of spections by the United Nations Special Com­ 1992, well before most of the works Colonel mission, and so forth—than was the case Wojtysiak cites as making some of the same ar­ before the war. Iraq’s weapons of mass de­ guments that I make. I just didn’t get around struction have not been destroyed, the Re- to publishing it outside the professional mili­ publican Guard has been largely reequipped, tary education environment for some time. the sanctions leak like a sieve, and regularly But these arguments have been made and re- scheduled Iraqi airliners fly routinely in the iterated within the Air Force, by me and oth­ supposed “no-fly zones,” as do . ers, for some time. The overselling of the ca­ And more than a decade after the Gulf War, RICOCHETS 7

Iraq represents a threat to the region and the ized the harm that may occur from being US forces stationed there. I suspect that many overly boastful. I do this not to demean the people expected more from a “victory.” contributions of the Air Force or its airmen. Fourth, Colonel Wojtysiak points to the They are exceptionally well trained, dedi­ Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) and the cated, and capable men and women who are Department of Defense’s (DOD) Report on the achieving remarkable operational prowess in Conduct of the Gulf War as sources of informa­ their service. And the Air Force’s accomplish­ tion on the Air Force’s performance in the ments in the Gulf War and Kosovo were con­ Gulf War. The DOD report, a major public- siderable—but not without fault. I don’t want relations effort, is at variance with several us to lose sight of airpower’s limitations amid other analyses, including RAND studies and the euphoria of limited military triumphs. Government Accounting Office reports, also My fear is that we will try to use airpower to commissioned by the US government. The cure all foreign ills and ask it—continually— GWAPS report—designed as an equivalent to to do things it may not be able to do because the United States Strategic Bombing Survey—has it is misunderstood, ill funded, or misapplied. an interesting history. Originally, there were No degree of operational prowess can substi­ to be some 3,000 unclassified copies printed. tute for a failed strategy. As I stated in the But some senior Air Force officers and civil­ more recent article cited above, “Airpower is ian officials wished to suppress it because it a precious asset. Merely because it can be was more objective and critical than they used does not necessarily mean it should be wished. Ultimately, the print run was changed used.” In our euphoria over the public to only 500 copies on a carefully controlled demonstration of airpower’s considerable distribution list. That does not promote truth abilities and accomplishments, we should not and trust in the Air Force. oversell it or lose sight of its limitations. That Fifth, and most importantly from my per­ said, I welcome the larger debate and the spective, is the fact that Colonel Wojtysiak contributions of Colonel Wojtysiak. fails to answer the main question of the piece. Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz made a set of Dr. Grant T. Hammond Maxwell AFB, Alabama summative assessments about the effective­ ness of airpower in World War II that were largely “rediscovered” in the Gulf War. I asked, “Why did airmen not understand what LEADERSHIP BY WALKING AROUND we had achieved over 50 years ago? How did Your Summer 2001 issue contained some ex­ they let these insights disappear from their cellent articles about leading airmen. How- understanding of war and the application of ever, I failed to find a single article on the airpower?” I think the late Carl Builder in­ human aspect of “leading” airmen. It seems cluded a major part of the answer in his book to me that Air Force leaders, especially those The Icarus Syndrome. We should not presume in the midlevel noncommissioned officer airpower’s capabilities or success and should (NCO) and officer ranks, have no concept of be mindful of its limitations. That’s a healthy what I will call “Leading by Walking Around” attitude, not an unjust criticism. Promise only (LBWA), an adaptation of a term borrowed what we can deliver, and deliver all we can from management experts—“Management promise. by Walking Around.” By LBWA, I mean show­ Last, I eagerly await Colonel Wojtysiak’s ing genuine concern for the lives and families reply to my more recent article “Myths of the of the people being led. More importantly, a Air War over Serbia: Some ‘Lessons’ Not to leader needs to communicate genuine appre- Learn” (Winter 2000). It reviews the same myths—plus one—and suggests that we still have not placed things in perspective or real­ Continued on page 95 New Millennium, New Mind-Set The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Expeditionary Era

LT GEN PAUL K. CARLTON JR., USAF, MC, CFS*

S COLD WAR scenarios fade from Editorial Abstract: Diverse threats to our na­ memory and dozens of small-scale tion’s security, both at home and abroad, chal­ lenge the Air Force’s medical personnel to de­ contingencies around the world velop innovative solutions to provide medical A challenge deployed military med­ support for a wide range of military operations. ics, military medical services are rethinking By using highly portable medical teams and their readiness philosophies to fit a new par­ modularizing deployable assets, commanders adigm. Each service must prepare for a spec­ can tailor medical response to fit the unique trum of operations much broader than the features of each situation. Partnering with traditional wartime role. What are the diverse sister-service and coalition medical services missions faced by the military medics who achieves synergistic effectiveness. must support these operations? What are the readiness roles in these uncertain times?

*I wish to recognize the coauthors of this article: Col Richard Hersack, USAF, MC, CFS; Col Kerrie Lindberg, USAF, NC; Col Stephen Waller, USAF, MC, FS; Col Joan C. Winters, USAFR, BSC; and Capt Melissa Ulitzsch, USAF, NC.

8 NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW MIND-SET 9

The National Military Strategy of the United worldwide economic catastrophe and subse­ States, Joint Vision 2020, and Air Force Vision quent potential conflict. 2020 all point to continued global, proactive Since each situation is unique, lessons engagement by Air Force people. Because learned from previous disasters will not solve this cannot happen without effective medical support, the Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) is transforming itself in order to de­ velop the necessary expeditionary culture. Medics face diverse and frightening My “vision” for the AFMS emphasizes that challenges as our military increases its Air Force medical personnel must be able to participation in nontraditional roles. support the Air Force mission throughout the full continuum of military operations in which airpower may be employed, as de- all the problems of a new crisis. But one can scribed in Air Force Doctrine Document 2, learn general lessons and apply them to the Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, development of generic plans for responding 17 February 2000. To do this, medics must be to different types of disasters. On the one able to provide support across three broad hand, earthquakes, for example, can result in categories of deployment scenarios: humani­ major surgical casualties, particularly in the tarian and civic assistance (HCA), medical re­ first three days after the event. The need for sponse to disasters, and support of traditional intensive care and renal dialysis may over- wartime operations. These scenarios also di­ whelm the civilian medical system’s capabil­ rectly support Air Force Vision 2020. For exam­ ity. On the other hand, a flood or hurricane ple, HCA missions demonstrate vigilance by may cause few surgical casualties but increase promoting democracy, peaceful relationships demand for emergency-room and public- (military-to-military and military-to-civilian), health services as well as ongoing basic and economic vitality—a sort of “preventive health-care needs, such as refilling prescrip­ medicine” against war. We demonstrate reach tions. by responding promptly and appropriately to This scenario, combined with the potential disasters when invited by an allied country loss of medical infrastructure, may overwhelm and when called upon to augment disaster re­ the local civilian medical system, as recently sponse by civil authorities at home. Both demonstrated when floods struck Houston, HCA and disaster-response missions create , during Tropical Storm Allison. The Air opportunities for our medical personnel to Force deployed a 25-bed field hospital within gain valuable experience during deploy­ 24 hours of receiving urgent requests from ments that carry over to support wartime op­ Texas and the Federal Emergency Manage­ erations. Thus, they support power, our tradi­ ment Agency. In such cases, the rapid inser­ tional readiness mission. tion of lightweight, rapidly deployable, well- Medics face diverse and frightening chal­ equipped surgical teams and field hospitals lenges as our military increases its participation may prove critical to saving as many victims as in nontraditional roles. Potential scenarios possible while decompressing the civilian could involve weapons of mass destruction, health-care system enough to give it a chance natural disasters, and complex technological/ to recover. Most disasters create chronic political/natural crises. A regional or world- needs for the local population that require wide epidemic, such as the outbreak of in­ long-term development work for full recov­ fluenza in l918, could have enormous impact ery. As the civilian health-care sector’s ability on all medical personnel. None of us need to to respond to sudden increases in casualties be reminded of the recent tragic consequences declines, senior government officials and cit­ of terrorism that put medical response to a izens more than likely will expect military severe test. Controlling such events can avert medics to assist quickly. 10 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Medical-response missions could occur ei­ teams tailored to the unique disaster scenario ther just outside a domestic military base or at hand. overseas. Requests for domestic civil support Such modular-response teams take full ad- would originate from local and state govern­ vantage of revolutionary medical electronic ments to appropriate federal agencies, which equipment. Instruments formerly too large to would then route the requests to the Defense move are now carried in one hand. Patient Department. Overseas, these types of requests monitoring, once confined to an intensive- would come through the State Department, care unit, can now be done under field con­ as they did after Hurricane Mitch struck ditions. These improvements and careful lo­ Nicaragua in l998 and floods swept through gistics allow a small team with backpacks to Mozambique. provide impressive medical care quickly in Responding appropriately and rapidly—a any corner of the world. Personnel can even new paradigm for the military’s medical per­ travel with the 70-pound packs as normal lug- sonnel—requires the efficient use of limited gage on a commercial airliner if military air- airlift so that critical medical supplies and as­ lift is not available. Historically, relief workers sistance reach the people who need it most. have experienced inevitable delays before Since moving large field hospitals may not sat­ they could reach the site of a disaster. Yet, a isfy this requirement, the answer lies in light, team of military medics with man-portable lean, and mobile medical teams with a small medical equipment will be able to meet the footprint that can make modular, “tiered and initial disaster-response needs of the commu­ tailored” responses. nity and then pass control on to other, larger This way, one can literally custom-build med­ relief agencies or sister-service medical units ical support for each mission. By creating small, when they are able to respond. multifunctional teams, the medical service can Expeditionary medical support (EMEDS) provide the on-scene commander with a flexi­ consists of numerous modular teams ranging ble response tailored for the specific contin­ in size from just two personnel with equipment gency. These “medical building blocks” permit in backpacks to components of the modular problem-specific treatment—analogous to the Air Force theater hospitals (AFTH). Specifi­ flexibility available from the modern practice cally, the two-person preventive medicine/ of using blood components rather than the tra­ aerospace medicine (PAM) team can provide ditional whole-blood treatments of the World initial medical assessment of disasters, public War II era. Small, portable medical teams health/preventive medicine, and emergency/ extend limited resources and maximize op­ flight/primary-care medicine. Ground critical- tions for commanders, public-health officials, care teams (GCCT), three-person intensive- or host-nation governments. No longer is it care units based on critical-care air-transport necessary to task eight C-130s to haul a large teams (CCATT), have performed critical care air-transportable hospital when a five-person, and patient transport in hundreds of real- backpack-portable surgical team can provide world missions. The five-person mobile field the needed care. After hurricanes or floods, for surgical team (MFST) provides emergency example, one may have a great need for public- general and orthopedic surgery to 10 patients. health and preventive-medicine assessment. Together, these teams—PAM, GCCT, and Deploying a two-person aerospace-medicine/ MFST—make up the 10-person small portable public-health team or several such teams may expeditionary aeromedical rapid-response be the ideal response, as was the case after Hur­ (SPEARR) team, a disaster-response “force ricane Mitch. The first tier of disaster response package” that travels with backpacks only (no comes from local and host-nation sources, fol­ pallet space) or with a small trailer (one pallet– lowed by additional tiers of teams, as needed. equivalent) that can be loaded by a sling. It The availability of modular teams allows host does not require a forklift, and one can pull it nations to request specific, focused medical with a standard pickup truck or airlift it by NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW MIND-SET 11 . The team provides a broad scope critical-care-capable patient-evacuation system. of care and has intrinsic communication ca­ The AES now has CCATTs that literally convert pability for aeromedical coordination, con­ any airframe into a flying intensive-care unit. sultation, or resupply. The SPEARR team has completed its development process, including successful field-validation tests in both San Antonio, Texas, and Alaska, and has exer­ Modularity and global engagement are cised side by side with the international med­ having a dramatic international impact. ical and surgical response team, a volunteer Other nations have modeled their own unit from General Hospital modular disaster-response capability tasked with responding to medical emergen­ after that of the AFMS teams. cies overseas. Finally, the AFTH consists of ad­ ditional modules of personnel with palletized equipment. Building around the SPEARR, EMEDS-Basic adds two pallets with a holding These teams have successfully conducted mis­ capacity of four beds. Beyond that, AFTH+10 sions, including transoceanic flights lasting sev­ and AFTH+25 boast 10 and 25 beds, respec­ eral hours, that have evacuated hundreds of tively. Indeed, the EMEDS system is designed critically ill and injured patients. to build incrementally up to AFTH+500. In support of Air Force Vision 2020, the One must understand that these medical AFMS is also focusing on global engagement. teams provide essential rather than definitive Specifically, it has developed the interna­ care in the field. In high-paced scenarios, the tional health specialist (IHS), a new career military finds it more efficient to evacuate track and specialty code modeled after the and replace personnel who cannot be re- US Army’s foreign area officers (FAO) pro- turned to duty in a reasonable period of time. gram. IHS team members, handpicked from Providing definitive care at a forward loca­ all corps and ranks for their expertise (lan­ tion in order to avoid evacuation requires guage, culture, politics, military, economics, vast amounts of logistical support and, thus, medicine, and regional issues) in the area of more airlift than is realistically available when responsibility (AOR), are interwoven with the military must meet other operational medical-readiness shops and platforms needs. Hence, the Aeromedical Evacuation through-out each commander in chief’s System (AES) is shifting patient-care doctrine (CINC) AOR. Teams are specifically tasked to and reducing the holding capability in the support the CINC’s theater engagement AFTHs. This action has two implications: (1) plan, create partnerships with medical col­ the AES must be able to transport critically ill leagues from nations within their region, fa­ or injured patients and (2) to maintain cilitate military-to-military and military-to- proper patient flow, it must undergo modu­ civilian interactions, and support medical- larization to build incrementally, as do the planning operations and deployment execu­ EMEDS modular teams. Thus, the AES has tion within their AOR. modularized the components of the basic The first group of 26 IHSes is receiving mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) new duties within the AOR and getting up to into rapidly deployable and, in some cases, speed on responsibilities. Team members will man-portable teams. be called upon to act as advisors and advanced- Shifting from definitive to essential care echelon personnel or to facilitate HCA, hu­ permits the evacuation of more patients in “sta­ manitarian medical relief operations (HMRO), bilized” rather than “stable” condition. In or other missions into the region of their ex­ other words, the fact that they may require pertise. IHS personnel will maintain individ­ much more than basic nursing care during ual clinical competency and provide regional evacuation drives a requirement to provide a medical expertise throughout their careers. 12 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

This career track will become a key credential San Salvador to help with medical care and for a successful Air Force medical career in save lives. Clearly, this type of partnership and future years as the international role contin­ training can benefit all nations and create re­ ues to expand. gional political stability and economic pros­ perity, thus reducing the likelihood of future conflict. In essence, the AFMS has created an ex- In essence, the AFMS has created an ex- portable commodity that potentially could portable commodity that potentially lead to the development of a worldwide, re­ could lead to the development of a gionally focused, coalition-based medical disaster-response system. Providing the mod­ worldwide, regionally focused, coalition- ular concept as well as the training and edu­ based medical disaster-response system. cation necessary to facilitate casualty care and management will help ensure that deployed personnel receive high-quality medical care if Modularity and global engagement are and when they need it, no matter where they having a dramatic international impact. are or which nation responds with teams. Other nations have modeled their own mod­ Military medics have now become the “tip ular disaster-response capability after that of of the spear.” For example, an Air Force HCA the AFMS teams. For example, the Chilean deployment in Nicaragua in June l996 repre­ air force has created an interoperable team, sented the first US military presence in that the Escuadrilla de Redespliegue Sanitario Modu­ country in 17 years! Two more HCA teams lar, a 25-person complete hospital in two pal- followed in 1997 and 1998, and during re­ lets, which can respond to disasters in Chile covery efforts following Hurricane Mitch, the and neighboring countries. Nicaraguans reported that military medical In addition, US Air Force medics taught teams had created a climate of trust that ben­ regional disaster-response and trauma-systems efited US military civil-engineering teams. courses, sponsored by the Expanded Interna­ Thus, the HCA missions provided the basis tional Military Education and Training Pro- for a mutually beneficial liaison with a new gram of the Defense Security Cooperation partner nation. Agency, to nearly 700 students in Ecuador, As Air Force medics continue to fulfill the El Salvador, the Czech Republic, and South global-engagement mission, we will need Africa. Furthermore, military and civilian other international partnerships. Acting in medics from adjacent countries have attended my capacity as the Air Force surgeon general and participated in the discussion and labo­ at last summer’s meeting of the International ratory exercises. The courses emphasize re­ Committee of Military Medicine (ICMM), I gional (multinational) involvement, disaster proposed creating regional disaster-response response, trauma care, leadership, civilian- networks among the membership and re- military collaboration, resource management, porting the results of this effort at the next and “train-the-trainers” skills. In El Salvador, meeting in 2002. The membership’s develop­ host-nation graduates of the first course, held ing nations, particularly those devastated by in 1999, taught over 100 colleagues and com­ disasters in recent years, strongly supported pletely redesigned the emergency department this proposal. In fact, national representatives of their Central Military Hospital to handle voted unanimously to adopt the plan, open­ trauma patients more efficiently. When earth- ing a new era of regional and worldwide co­ quakes devastated that country in January operation among military medical services. and February of 2001, medics and hospitals The upcoming ICMM meeting in South were ready, and graduates of the Air Force Africa in 2002 will focus upon regional- course from adjacent countries returned to response networks and some of the principles NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW MIND-SET 13 for success, such as establishing and building organizations by offering “what we do best” to international coalition partnerships; building regional coalitions. By building on each international medical “bridges” of friendship member’s strengths, the regional disaster- and cooperation; facilitating disaster pre­ response network achieves synergy. Using the paredness among partner nations; and devel­ proper chain of command and government oping regional-response systems, whose value channels, the AFMS must communicate with has been proven through mutual exercises other organizations before, during, and after and responses to regional disasters. Following each disaster response so that neighbors can these principles allows successful networks benefit from each other’s successes and fail­ among neighboring nations’ military medical ures. This includes training together in realis­ services to support the political and economic tic exercises so that military medics of coali­ goals of member governments. tion nations can learn to work efficiently with These successes, along with many others, new technologies and procedures shared by are impressive and hold great hope for the future. After the recent earthquake in Turkey, medical experts from various organizations both Egypt and Israel responded promptly and nations. This effort should result in a bet­ with portable medical teams; this effort not ter worldwide medical system. only saved lives but also provided military It goes without saying that full implemen­ medical personnel with valuable readiness tation of the AFMS vision for expeditionary training. Quick response requires good prep­ medical support and global engagement re- aration, planning, and execution, including quires involvement of the Total Force. The the establishment of diplomatic agreements AFMS’s fundamental concern entails devel­ and the efficient packing of critically needed oping the capability to complete the mission, supplies and equipment. regardless of where modular teams are as- Optimal medical readiness also demands signed. In other words, whether a SPEARR, rapid deployment of appropriate technology. EMEDS-Basic, AFTH+10, MASF, or some Military medics must capitalize on advance­ other modular component is assigned to ments in computers and surveillance equip­ Guard, Reserve, or active duty units, it must ment to ensure real-time, state-of-the-art be able to fulfill its role according to the con­ surveillance and monitoring for biological cept of operations. Even though a particular pathogens or chemical toxins. Medics must concept of operations may seem to make cer­ involve themselves in scientific inquiry to tain modular teams especially well suited for meet the needs of citizens, governments, and Guard and Reserve units, the emphasis must military commanders/war-fighting CINCs. The remain on providing an overall, integrated Air Force’s medical-readiness officers have em- capability for medical support. This philoso­ braced this tasking as part of the mission. phy will ensure the AFMS’s overall success in To promote the process, the Developmental Center for Operational Medicine at Brooks Air the Air Force vision for global engagement. Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, is charged Readiness remains the fundamental core with inserting innovative technology into readi­ competency of Air Force medics. Building ness platforms. It also serves as a liaison with reliable regional coalitions through partner- civilian disaster-response agencies, seeking to ships and training as well as developing inter- improve the capabilities and interoperability of changeable medical teams that can respond both civil and military medical teams. by invitation to assist each other in emergencies Finally, to optimize disaster response, are tasks that we can accomplish now. By utiliz­ AFMS must avoid redundancy with agencies ing new tools, we can fulfill our diverse readi­ of the United Nations, private volunteer ness missions and engage the full spectrum of groups, and nongovernmental disaster-relief operations in the new millennium. Challenges of Aeromedical Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era

BRIG GEN BRUCE GREEN, USAF*

Editorial Abstract: Arguably, aeromedical evacuation (AE) is the most important and visible aspect of aerospace medicine. In this article, General Green recounts the 80-year history of AE and discusses current and future challenges that face this community. In order to support our war-fighting expedi­ tionary forces in both peace and war, aerospace medical professionals are adopting a strategy of main- streaming AE and employing the full spectrum of lift to support its mission.

IR FORCE AEROMEDICAL evacua- has engaged since World War I. In addition, tion, the transportation of patients during both war and peace, AE has moved under the supervision of AE crew thousands of family members who required members on fixed-wing aircraft, en- medical care beyond that available in their joysA a proud heritage that spans more than 80 local communities. The AE system is made up years. The AE system has been instrumental of AE crews; command and control (C2) ele­ in saving the lives of thousands of America’s ments; mobile/fixed patient-staging facilities; soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines through- and a multitude of communications, logistics, out every contingency in which our country and support components. Today, the AE system

*I wish to recognize the coauthors of this article: Col Sheila A. W. Millette, USAF; Col Bob Brannon, USAF, retired; and CMSgt Pamela Trammell, USAF, retired.

14 CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 15 faces new and demanding challenges. In the US Army Medical Corps used airplanes order to ensure the effective and efficient op­ primarily to transport flight surgeons to the eration of AE in the new millennium, a major site of airplane accidents to assist in the transformation of AE, led by Air Mobility ground transportation of casualties. Command (AMC), is now under way. A brief By war’s end, the US Army realized the history of AE will set the stage for that trans- need to transport the wounded by air. In 1918 formation. Maj Nelson E. Driver and Capt William C. Ocker converted a Curtiss JN-4 Jenny biplane into an airplane ambulance by modifying the An Illustrious History rear cockpit to accommodate a standard Army stretcher carrying an injured person in The concept of moving the wounded by air a semireclined seat. The modification allowed began almost simultaneously with the con­ the US Army to transport patients by airplane cept of fixed-wing aircraft flight.1 Shortly after for the first time. This success led to an order the Wright brothers successfully flew their directing all military airfields to have an air first airplane, two US Army medical officers, ambulance. Capt George H. R. Gosman and Lt A. L. Rhodes, designed an airplane to transport pa­ Between the World Wars tients. Using their own money, they built and flew the world’s first air ambulance at Fort The success of the Jenny air ambulances during Barrancas, Florida, in 1910. Unfortunately, World War I paved the way for the further de­ on its first test flight, it flew only 500 yards at velopment of air evacuation, with several other an altitude of 100 feet before crashing. This types of aircraft converted successfully for this flight, followed by Captain Gosman’s unsuc­ purpose. In 1920 the DeHavilland DH-4 air- cessful attempt to obtain official backing for craft modification allowed it to carry a medical the project, proved to be only the beginning attendant and two side-by-side patients in the of many challenges for the new concept. fuselage. Shortly thereafter, the Cox-Klemmin aircraft became the first plane built specifically World War I Era as an air ambulance, carrying two patients and a medical attendant enclosed within the fuse­ Air evacuation was very limited during World lage. The building of the Curtiss Eagle in 1921 War I; however, it was remembered most as allowed the transport of four patients on litters the time during which air-ambulance design and six ambulatory patients. Unfortunately, in made significant progress by trial and error. A its first year of service, an Eagle crashed during French medical officer, Dr. Eugene Chas­ an electrical storm, killing seven people. saing, first adapted French military planes for Despite the crash setback, aeromedical use as air ambulances by inserting two pa­ transportation continued to progress. In 1922 tients side by side into the fuselage behind the US Army converted the largest single- the pilot’s cockpit. The first actual evacuation engine airplane built at the time, the Fokker of wounded in airplanes specifically equipped F-IV, into an air ambulance designated the A-2. for patient movement occurred in Flanders in In the same year, a US Army physician, Col Al­ April 1918, using a modified Dorand II air- bert E. Truby, listed the potential uses of the craft. airplane ambulances as follows: The United States began to use airplanes • Transportation of medical officers to the for evacuating the injured from the battle- site of crashes and evacuation of casual- field in World War I but found it difficult to ties from the crash back to hospitals. use planes not designed for patient airlift. Specifically, the fuselages were too small to ac­ • Transportation of patients from isolated commodate stretchers, and the open cockpits stations to larger hospitals, where they exposed patients to the elements. As a result, could receive better treatment. 16 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

• In time of war, transportation of the se­ piloting an L-1 with three wounded British pas­ riously wounded from the front to hos­ sengers, was forced down over 100 miles be- pitals in the rear. hind Japanese lines. Deep in the jungle where an airplane could not land, unable to move be- • Transportation of medical supplies in cause of the injured Brits, and ground-rescue emergencies. forces days away, the downed men hid from Before long, others began to recognize the nearby enemy soldiers. The only option was to need for air transportation of patients and the dispatch a YR-4 helicopter with its 175-horse- special training that would be required for power engine to try a rescue. The YR-4 could medical attendants. Mary Beard, registered carry only one passenger at a time, straining its nurse (RN) and director of the American Red engine past the redline just to lift off. Despite Cross Nursing Service in 1930, stated, “No one these difficulties, four trips were made in and of our nursing organizations, no leading school out to a sandbar, where the men could safely of nursing, nor any other professional group, transfer to an L-5. The mission was a great suc­ has taken up this subject seriously and defi­ cess. Successful combat rescues and air evacua­ nitely tried to promote the organization of a tions were to continue throughout the Hump group of nurses who understand conditions operation. surrounding patients when they are traveling The need to transport large numbers of ca­ by air.” After a 15-year crusade, visionary Lau­ sualties back from distant theaters of war was retta M. Schimmoler, RN, succeeded in estab­ apparent, but designated air-evacuation air- lishing the Aerial Nurse Corps of America. craft did not exist. AAF policy was to use trans- port planes for air-evacuation flights as their World War II secondary mission. Transport aircraft were re- At the beginning of World War II, the com­ configured for air evacuation, using removable mon belief was that air evacuation of the sick litter supports. In this way, aircraft that trans- and wounded was dangerous, medically un­ ported men and supplies to the theaters of op­ sound, and militarily impossible. The Army eration were utilized as air-evacuation aircraft Medical Department did not believe that the on their return trip. By January 1942, AAF C-47 airplane was a substitute for field ambulances, Skytrain aircraft had transported more than even when it was necessary to evacuate casu­ 10,000 casualties from Burma, New Guinea, alties over long distances. The surgeon for and Guadalcanal. the Army Air Forces (AAF) Combat Com­ As air evacuation evolved, it became clear mand, Maj I. B. March, was concerned that that specially trained personnel were needed field ambulances would not be sufficient to to optimize casualty care during air transport. cover the aerial paths of the air forces. In re­ Because there were not enough physicians to sponse, the surgeon general of Third Air put on every flight, Brig Gen David Grant, Force, Lt Col Malcolm C. Grow, stated that AAF air surgeon, proposed establishing a the “chief stumbling block in the way of [air] flight-nurse corps. Despite opposition from ambulances has been the lack of interest on the Army surgeon general, the designation the part of the [Army] Surgeon General. “flight nurse” was created for specially trained Until he accepts the airplane as a vehicle [for members of the Army Nurse Corps assigned casualty transportation], I doubt if very much to the AAF Evacuation Service. In February can be done about it.” 1943, the first class of flight nurses graduated The war soon demonstrated the necessity of from , Kentucky. The four-week air evacuation. The Burma Hump airlift opera­ course taught aeromedical physiology, air- tion saw what was probably the first use of heli­ craft-loading procedures, and survival skills. copters for combat rescue, often the first step This specialized training was the beginning of in the air-evacuation process. In one instance, trained medical personnel providing in-flight TSgt Ed Hladovcak of the 1st Air Commandos, care—the catalyst for the current AE system. CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 17

Before long, regular AE routes were estab­ orders in 1949 to provide AE for the entire lished, and hospitals were built along airstrips US military. to care for the wounded who needed to remain In May 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) overnight along the route. In early 1943, AE directed the Air Force to establish “evacuation aircraft began transatlantic flights from Prest­ systems” for both the Army and Air Force. On wick, Scotland, to the United States. By the 7 September 1947, Secretary of Defense Louis end of the same year, transpacific AE flights E. Johnson made a policy announcement di­ were returning patients to the continental recting that the transportation of patients of United States (CONUS) via . In 1944 a the armed services would be accomplished by southern Atlantic route to the United States, aircraft when air transportation was available, originating in North Africa with stopovers in when conditions were suitable for air evacua­ the Azores and Bermuda, began serving pas­ tion, and when there was no medical con­ sengers. Aircraft used for AE during the war traindication to air transport. included the C-46 Commando, C-54 Skymas­ The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) ter, C-64 Norseman, C-87 Liberator Express, had researched aircraft development in the and the aforementioned C-47. In addition, AE role before its formal organization. The bombers and tankers moved patients from for- C-47 and C-54 were the mainstays of early ward battle zones during tactical AE. CONUS AE. MATS provided regularly sched­ The sheer number of patients transported uled AE missions and transported 12,369 during World War II reflects the great impor­ patients within the CONUS from June tance of AE. At its peak, the AAF evacuated the through December 1948. During this same sick and wounded at a rate of almost 100,000 period, 5,151 patients were moved from loca­ per month. A one-day record of 4,704 AE pa­ tions outside the continental United States tients evacuated was set in 1945. In his state­ (OCONUS) (i.e., overseas) to the CONUS. ment on 18 June 1945, Gen of the Army Dwight Intertheater AE from Europe began on 11 D. Eisenhower said, “We evacuated almost October 1949, with the C-121 Constellation every one of our forward hospitals by air, and it (Connie). The C-121 provided a higher ser­ has unquestionably saved hundreds of lives— vice ceiling, pressurized cabin, and smoother thousands of lives.” General Eisenhower placed transatlantic crossings than the C-54. Eventu­ AE in a class with sulfa drugs, penicillin, blood ally, the C-121 replaced the C-54 on the twice- plasma, and whole blood as a chief factor in weekly “Benefactor” AE missions from Rhein- cutting the fatality rate of battle casualties. Main, , to Westover Air Force Base The risk of evacuating patients by air had (AFB) Massachusetts. During this same pe­ been a concern since the beginning of the war. riod, C-54 aircraft serviced the Pacific theater. However, as AE crews gained experience, the On 1 June 1950, the new MATS C-97A Strato­ risk of death during AE dropped to six patients freighter was introduced into the AE role. in 100,000 by 1943. At the end of the war, the With its larger carrying capacity and pressur­ risk was down to one and one-half patients in ized cabin, the weekly C-97A flight replaced 100,000, thus proving that AE was one of the the four trips per week flown by the C-54. most important medical advances in decreas­ ing the mortality rate associated with warfare. The Korean War Whereas World War II had proved the value Postwar Period and a New Service of AE, the Korean War established it as the The postwar drawdown changed the face of preferred method of evacuation for US casu­ the US military’s AE system. By 1946 the sys­ alties. Although bad weather, mountains, and tem consisted of 12 aircraft at the School of enemy fire hampered AE in the Korean War, Aviation Medicine and one C-47 at each of Air Force rescue helicopters (C-47/C-54) still the 12 regional US hospitals. In 1947 the US managed to evacuate most of the war’s casu­ Air Force (USAF) was established, receiving alties. 18 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Air Force H-5 rescue helicopters of the 3d ical equipment such as an iron lung, ortho­ Air Rescue Squadron went into action as pedic bed, artificial kidney machine, or infant frontline medical craft. C-47 transports of the incubator. All Samaritans were distinctly 315th Air Division, carrying AE crews, flew marked with a red cross on the tail. into the most forward airstrips under enemy In June 1966, Headquarters USAF directed fire, saving thousands of American lives. The Air Force Systems Command to submit a Air Force’s 801st Medical Air Evacuation proposed source-selection and procurement Squadron (one of the first units to receive a plan for a new AE aircraft. In July 1966, the distinguished unit citation) evacuated more Department of Defense agreed to initiate a than 4,700 casualties from the Chosin Reser­ modernization program, and in January 1967 voir in December 1950. This aeromedical it approved the expenditure of $34 million to support enabled the embattled 1st Marine purchase eight aircraft plus spares. Three Division to execute a successful fighting with­ contractors responded with proposals: Mc- drawal to the port of Hungnam on the north- Donnell-Douglas (DC-9A), British Aircraft east coast of Korea. The Army soon set up its Corporation (BAC-111), and Boeing (B-737). own helicopter-evacuation service and, by late On 31 August 1967, McDonnell-Douglas re­ 1951, combined AE support to enable naval ceived the contract, with the first aircraft de- ships in-theater to serve as floating hospitals livery scheduled for August 1968, followed by rather than simply transports for the wounded. one per month for seven months. The rollout Most American patients were airlifted to , ceremony of the C-9A Nightingale occurred Hawaii, and the United States. on 17 June 1968. The aircraft was tested and MATS used C-46, C-47, C-54, and C-124 air- delivered to Scott AFB, , on 10 August craft to transport 137,950 patients between 1968. Eventually, 21 C-9As were purchased stations overseas and from OCONUS to the between 1967 and 1971. CONUS during the Korean War. Additionally, MATS provided for the movement of 215,402 The War patients within the CONUS. In a restatement of the USAF mission in 1953, MATS was Advances in AE improved medical care dur­ charged with “the provision of airlift for pa­ ing the . Rapid evacuation of the tients of the Department of Defense on over- wounded from Vietnam’s battlefields by heli­ seas routes over which MATS operates, from copters, followed by jet transports, saved ports of debarkation, and between air facili­ many lives. (PACAF) oper­ ties serving hospitals within the zone of inte­ ated in-country aeromedical service and rior.” AE was now a major mission of MATS— transoceanic jet service to hospitals at Clark no longer a corollary task limited to the Air Base (AB), Philippines, as well as Yokota forward delivery of cargo or passengers. AB and Tachikawa AB, Japan. (MAC)—the successor to MATS— Specialized Aircraft for AE helped evacuate many casualties from Viet­ The next major AE development was the in­ nam, handling all patient movement to the troduction of the Convair C-131A Samaritan. United States. Although the Air Force ac­ This pressurized aircraft, with a specialized in­ quired its first C-9A in August 1968, C-9As did terior for AE, offered fast service for the short not begin flying missions in Southeast Asia air routes of Europe and North Africa. The until March 1972. Ordinary transport planes— C-131A, which made its debut on 26 March primarily the C-7 Caribou, C-130 Hercules, 1954, had a cruising speed of 235 knots; it and C-141 Starlifter—equipped with litters had room for 37 ambulatory patients or 27 flew most of the war’s aeromedical missions. litter patients plus four ambulatory patients, PACAF’s 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squad­ as well as a medical crew of three. The aircraft ron provided the first mobile casualty-staging configuration accommodated specialized med­ facility during this war. CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 19

Subsequent to Vietnam, AE supported a ments from the Air Force and medical units variety of contingency and humanitarian op­ from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, a coordi­ erations over the next two decades. The more nated, multitheater chain of evacuation was notable ones included Operation Homecom­ created to evacuate potential casualties. The ing—the return of US prisoners of war from Air Force AE system, totaling over 1,950 per­ Vietnam; return of the 52 American hostages sonnel, included 19 AE liaison teams, 12 held in Iran for over 400 days; evacuation of MASFs, 99 tactical AE crews, 46 strategic AE casualties from the bombing of the US Em­ crews, and 22 flight surgeons, as well as a bassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut; number of C2 and support elements. The and evacuation of 167 casualties from Grena­ plan was to use medically configured C-130s da. Officially designated mobile aeromedical for dedicated evacuation flights within the staging facilities (MASF) were in the AE in­ Persian Gulf, followed by a combination of ventory and available when Operation Ur­ dedicated and retrograde C-141s evacuating gent Fury in Grenada took place in October the most seriously wounded to Europe and 1983 but were not used. the CONUS. The mobilization and deployment of Air Re- Operation Just Cause and the Gulf War serve Component (ARC) forces were essential AE proved to be a key factor in the overall to the evacuation plan due to extremely high success of Operation Just Cause in December patient-movement planning factors—up to 1989. During that short but violent conflict to 6,000 per day. ARC accounted for almost 97 oust Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, percent of the total AE forces, serving in a wounded American soldiers, sailors, airmen, multitude of AE elements that created an and marines received care at the joint casu­ elaborate evacuation chain stretching from alty collection point (JCCP) at Howard AB, Southwest Asia to the CONUS. The planning Panama. The JCCP, which included both factors for AE, predicated on a six-week conventional and special-operations assets, rather than six-day air war were very high. combined surgical and mobile aeromedical­ Predictions averaged over 1,000 intratheater staging capability into one element by em­ patient movements per day, and intertheater ploying MASFs for the first time. The JCCP AE movements were predicted to average an treated 276 patients, stabilizing and evacuat­ additional 900 patients per day. ing 257 to military hospitals in San Antonio, Most Air Force planners did not anticipate Texas, on nine AE missions (using eight C-141s that the air and ground fighting during Desert and one C-130). Four of the nine missions Storm would hardly tax the medical system. (which evacuated 192 casualties) took place Coalition casualties were so light that the staff during the extremely intense first 24 hours of at Air Force contingency hospitals in Europe, the operation. The overall survivability rate like many of their counterparts in the Arabian for American service members treated at the Peninsula, practiced very little combat medi­ JCCP during the operation was 99.3 percent cine. From August 1990 to March 1991, disease (276 total casualties treated; only two died and nonbattle injuries accounted for most of from their wounds). Furthermore, no deaths the patients evacuated from Southwest Asia to occurred during AE missions. Europe during Desert Shield/Storm. An ag­ The next challenge for AE came in re­ gressive preventive-medicine campaign was im­ sponse to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August plemented, proving very effective in minimiz­ 1990. During the weeks preceding the start of ing losses to disease. Operation Desert Storm, United States Cen­ During Desert Shield/Storm, several signif­ tral Command predicted that as many as icant issues arose to challenge the AE forces, 15,000 Americans would be wounded in the including the lack of Kevlar protective equip­ early stages of the allied invasion to reclaim ment for many of the Guard/Reserve person­ Kuwait. With the help of aeromedical ele­ nel; the need for contingency training for the 20 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 ground AE elements as well as a more stream- course trains AE personnel in a standardized lined, coordinated process for patient regulat­ manner regarding general philosophy, capa­ ing; and review of interface points with the bilities, organization, operations, C2, and sup- AE system. Nonetheless, the mission involved port required to provide full-spectrum AE ca­ the largest deployed AE force in history, total­ pability during contingencies. ing over 12,632 patients evacuated on 671 AE In 1999 a Critical Care Air Transport Team flights with no in-flight deaths—a complete (CCATT) course was developed at Brooks AFB, success. Texas, to prepare teams of physicians, nurses, and technicians to provide structured en route Change in the Nineties care for critically ill and injured patients when- A new era in airpower history began on 1 June ever and wherever required. The course in­ 1992 with the inactivation of MAC, Strategic Air cludes a detailed review of the CCATT mission, Command, and Tactical Air Command. Two equipment, and organization, as well as famil­ new organizations— iarization training with AE aircraft, orientation (ACC) and AMC—developed from the ele­ to the stresses of flight, and refresher training ments of the deactivated commands. Shortly af­ through a fundamental critical-care support terward, AMC divested itself of infrastructure course. and forces not directly related to Global Reach. Throughout the nineties, AE units contin­ Among the units affected were C-130 airlift ued to be engaged in a variety of contingency squadrons and AE squadrons at Rhein-Main operations covering multiple theaters. AMC AB, Germany, which transferred to United and AMC-gained units deployed 60 medical States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and sim­ personnel for 90 days in the fall of 1994 to ilar squadrons at Yokota AB, Japan, which trans­ manage an air-transportable hospital in sup- ferred to PACAF. These transfers—along with port of Operation Uphold Democracy. Those the majority of active and ARC C-130 airlift medical personnel were responsible for treat­ squadrons; the active-duty AE squadron at ing and aeromedically evacuating, if neces­ Pope AFB, ; and the 19 gained sary, all military personnel deployed. In addi­ AE squadrons from the ARC—all went to ACC tion, Air Force medics deployed to austere in order to align all theater (combat) support locations throughout Haiti to take part in the under one command. However, in 1997 these humanitarian-assistance program. same assets were transferred back to AMC. Additionally, active duty and ARC AE In 1996 the Global Patient Movement Re­ forces joined to support operations in Kenya, quirements Center (GPMRC) was established Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, Soma­ within US Transportation Command to fa­ lia, and Kosovo. AE evacuated many critically cilitate and streamline patient validating and injured Rangers and special operations forces regulating. Theater Patient Movement Re­ to Ramstein AB, Germany, after the 3 Octo­ quirements Centers also stood up in US Euro­ ber 1993 “Bloody Sunday” firefights in Moga­ pean Command and US Pacific Command. dishu, Somalia. AE personnel supported Op­ These centers are responsible for definition eration Allied Force with crews and mobile and management of patient-movement re­ aeromedical-staging facilities. Moreover, those quirements, patient in-transit visibility, and col­ same personnel concurrently supported Op­ laboration with their respective theater or eration Shining Hope, a humanitarian cause. joint-task-force movement-control agency to The first four AE missions flown out of coordinate bed and lift plans. Tirana, Albania, were on C-17 Globemaster Because of lessons learned in Desert IIIs, demonstrating the effective use of op­ Shield/Storm, an Aeromedical Evacuation portune airlift. In each operation, the pres­ Contingency Operations Training (AECOT) ence of AE forces ensured the prompt and course was developed and fielded at Shep­ safe aeromedical evacuation of military per­ pard AFB, Texas, in September 1998. The sonnel who needed more care than was avail- CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 21 able locally. Finally, throughout the nineties, AMC command surgeon. In September 1999, AE units supported humanitarian civic-action a multicommand AE Tiger Team (AETT) was operations in various locations throughout formed to address the following areas: re­ Central and South America. With the adop­ quirements, doctrine, operations, airframes, tion of a new casualty-replacement policy and organization, resourcing, equipment, com­ a smaller presence in overseas contingency munications, information management/in- theaters, AE became even more important as formation technology, education, training, the twentieth century closed. and awareness. This team generated a com­ prehensive final report—the road map to im­ plement recommendations. Time for Change By the late nineties, AE faced new and Major Findings and Key Recommendations daunting challenges. Modern conflict, rou­ Requirements. Wartime casualty projections, in­ tinely characterized by rapid, short-duration, cluding an added 25 percent to account for high-intensity combat, has resulted in casualty weapons of mass destruction, were 30–55 generation with very little lead time. As a result, percent lower than in 1996.2 Peacetime pa­ there is often no opportunity to set up en route tient movement was greatly reduced in the contingency hospitals, and critically ill patients CONUS due to TRICARE, but OCONUS re­ frequently have to be evacuated long distances quirements remained fairly constant because to reach comprehensive medical care. This ne­ TRICARE was not as robust and quality-of-life cessitates the movement of “stabilized” (rather issues mandated the need for AE. than fully stable) patients, who often require in­ Doctrine, Operations, and C2. Recommenda­ tensive care during evacuation. tions included the following: In December 1998, during an internal re- view of current AE posture, AMC identified a • Insert an AE control team in the air mo­ number of critical issues with significant po­ bility division (AMD) with coequal sta­ tential to affect future AE operations. These tus to the existing airlift, air refueling, included the Air Force’s evolution into the and air mobility control teams. expeditionary aerospace force (EAF) concept • Align the patient-movement require­ and air expeditionary force (AEF) structure; ment centers under the appropriate implementation of TRICARE; evolving doc- mobility control centers at the unified trine and command relationships; changing commands. patient-movement requirements; the im­ pending retirement of the core strategic AE • Formally establish AE cells in the air aircraft, the C-141, which currently performs mobility control centers of the compo­ the majority of peacetime intertheater AE nent air commands (Tanker Airlift Con­ missions; and the status of the dedicated in­ trol Center in AMC and Air Mobility tratheater AE platform, the aging C-9A, which Operations Control Centers in USAFE requires major modifications to meet both and PACAF). global air traffic management and stage III • Clarify the chain of command for fielded noise-compliance requirements. As evidenced AE forces, with AE as a line/operations by the above, today’s AE system is designed function under the joint force air compo­ for a world that no longer exists. Today’s nent commander (JFACC) through the changing environment demands a new look. deployed mobility wing commander and In August 1999, Lt Gen Walter S. Hogle Jr., the operations group commander. AMC vice commander, directed a review of the entire AE mission area and established an • Change AE processes to a requirements- integrated product team chaired by AMC based system and optimize the use of Plans/Programs (XP) with the support of the limited airframes. Mix patients and 22 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

cargo when appropriate; gain visibility, proach provides significantly enhanced mis­ using routine training missions for live sion flexibility and reduces airlift require­ missions; and use space required/space ments from seven to three C-130s. Another available, opportune airlift, or commer­ proposal was to form “virtual combination cial air service. units,” which would allow geographically sep­ Airframes. The major recommendations in­ arated units the opportunity to work, train, cluded the following: deploy, and fight together, thereby improving integration and meeting ongoing Air Force • Option One—Pursue a strategic-distance Total Force efforts for the future. aircraft dedicated to AE. Resourcing. The team reinforced the concept • Option Two—If the short-term financial that the Defense Health Program (DHP), op­ constraints (acquisition costs) of such a erated and funded by the Office of the Secre­ purchase preclude option one, turn both tary of Defense/Health Affairs, was responsible the peacetime and wartime intratheater for all means of peacetime patient movement. AE missions over to the C-130 fleet in a However, Air Force aircraft may accomplish designated role, which would require a some patient movement by using training slight increase of C-130s in each theater. missions funded by operations and mainte­ nance (O&M). The program budget decision • Investigate the concept of modifying transferred all funding for active duty C-9A KC-135s as an immediate, short-term in­ and AE squadron operations from DHP to Air tertheater fix for the retiring C-141s. Force O&M on 1 October 2000. The team This would require AMC funding for recommended decentralizing DHP funds to electrical modifications to a small num­ each theater to provide flexibility for patient- ber of KC-135s for testing and follow-on movement options. This funding would allow funding for additional KC-135s, based the purchasing of seats or pallet spaces on ex­ on test results. Pursue funds for a roll- isting cargo missions, AE channel missions (if on/roll-off litter capability. required), and civilian air ambulance or com­ Since publication of AETT’s report, factors mercial airlines (when appropriate). such as fiscal limitations, aircraft tasking and Equipment, Communications, and Information availability, and changing national strategy Management/Information Technology (IM/IT). have prompted a relook at all aircraft recom­ Recommendations included the following: mendations. Further, analysis is ongoing to • Fund the deployable oxygen-system ini­ determine whether a shortfall of organic AE tiative. aircraft exists. Another focus is on main- streaming AE into airlift operations and en­ • Exercise Care in the Air (CiA), airborne hancing operations with the use of seats, pal- wideband, and other AE communica­ let spaces, and palletized system concepts. tion and IM/IT initiatives during the Organization. The team had begun to joint expeditionary force experiment reengineer and incrementalize existing AE (JEFX) 2000. flying and ground-support unit type codes (UTC) in order to eliminate the need to rou­ • Finalize a stopgap communication plan tinely pare and tailor them to meet opera­ to meet fiscal year 2002 joint require­ tional requirements. For example, the existing ments. 50-bed MASF (which includes 39 personnel • Complete redistribution of high-fre­ and requires seven C-130s to move it) was quency communications assets. reengineered and incrementalized. The new MASF consists of a 10-bed basic package that • Continue integrating and maintaining can be augmented with additional 20-bed computer-based training for the Spitfire packages, as needed. This building-block ap­ (PSC-5) radio. CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 23

• Continue pursuing the joint tactical theaters, because of TRICARE’s lack of robust­ radio system. ness and because of quality-of-life issues, the re­ quirements remained steady. This was also due • Publish the AE communication concept to the significant closing of OCONUS medical of operations on the Air Force surgeon facilities after the Cold War, requiring the general (SG) Web page. movement of patients to CONUS facilities. • Update and incrementalize AE commu­ With regard to wartime requirements, the over- nications allowance standards. all wartime casualty projections were 30–55 per- cent less than the projections made in 1996. Education, Training, and Awareness. Recom­ The projections were based on changes in war- mendations included the following: fighting concepts, evacuation policies, theater • Create an “Aeromedical Evacuation medical capabilities, and the smaller numbers Center of Excellence” as a one-stop of soldiers at risk.4 shop for AE education and training. One recommendation, to insert an AE control team into the , • Develop a flight-qualification program to was approved and articulated in Air Force standardize initial qualification for AE Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization crew members. and Employment of Aerospace Power, February • Train “universal” crew members, elimi­ 2000. In addition, a decision brief presented nating the “tactical/strategic and multi- in January 2001 defined the roles and respon­ qualified crew” paradigm in use today. sibilities of the unified/component command. Specially qualified AE crew members Also, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) will be certified in multiple airframes to and GPMRC finalized a memorandum of provide CiA. agreement that addressed communication flow and responsibilities. The AE “Tactics, Gen Charles T. Robertson Jr., AMC com­ Techniques, and Procedures” was published mander, approved the AETT report on 26 through the Doctrine Center in June 2001, fol­ September 2000, and Gen Michael E. Ryan, lowed by approval of the AE Doctrine Template then the Air Force chief of staff, lauded the by the AMC commander in July 2001. The use effort: “Please pass on to your XP and SG of the approved template in updating various folks that they have done a yeoman’s job on joint and allied publications resolved long- AE reengineering. General Carlton and I are standing joint and service doctrinal issues. impressed with the incrementalization/re­ Another key factor in aligning the AE or­ vamping of AE assets to better match the AEF ganizational structure took effect 1 October and the Air Force medical system’s direction 2000, when the TACC stood up an AE cell of smaller, leaner, and more capable deploy­ 3 designated TACC/XOGA. Major benefits in ment units.” scheduling, improved response time, and de- creased cost were realized almost immedi­ Accomplishments to Date ately as the cell implemented various recom­ By the end of 2000, the AETT had accumulated mendations. The cell began working mixed an impressive list of accomplishments, begin­ cargo and AE missions on Atlantic Express C- ning with the determination of peacetime and 17s and used air-refueling missions, when ap­ wartime AE requirements. In peacetime, with propriate, as well as Patriot Express passenger the changeover to TRICARE medical coverage, missions for patient movement. These mixed the need to move patients had declined in the missions resulted in an overall increase in AE CONUS from approximately 69,700 patient mission reliability. C-141 AE missions contin­ movements in 1995 to 19,500 movements in ued to be scheduled, but their reliability re­ 1999, with only 1 percent classified as priority mained an issue. In the Pacific, mixed mis­ or urgent. As mentioned earlier, in the overseas sions continued using C-17s and KC-135s 24 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 while exploring other options. For example, competing with other Air Force moderniza­ an August 2000 mission involved a C-17 re- tion programs, and recognition of the inevi­ configured after a repatriation mission from table continuing evolution of AE—prompted AMC to redefine basic AE constructs. Brig Gen Jim Roudebush, AMC surgeon, drafted The vision represents a shift from a concept known as “A Vision for Aeromed­ the way we do business today and calls ical Evacuation: Supporting Global Reach, for the military community to Vigilance and Power into the New Millen­ refocus its view of AE from what nium,” November 2000, which outlined sev­ eral precepts for AE in the future.6 The vi­ was suitable in the past to what sion represents a shift from the way we do is necessary for the future. business today and calls for the military com­ munity to refocus its view of AE from what was suitable in the past to what is necessary Pyongyang, Korea, in an urgent attempt to for the future. save a five-day-old baby girl. The AE crew, The military has evolved from a strategy of made up of active duty and Reserve person­ containment to a strategy of engagement. nel, flew the 14-hour return leg from Yokota We have moved from a monolithic threat en­ AB, Japan, to the United States, refueling in- vironment with a heavily forward medical in­ flight from a KC-10 Extender, which was also frastructure to the present environment carrying an urgent-care patient. In another characterized by complex asymmetric threats, example, a C-17 cargo mission moved a litter a light forward medical presence, and a heavy patient from the Pacific to the CONUS. In reliance on AE to transport more critically ill the past, this would have resulted in the initi­ and injured forces and their families. ation of an AE channel mission costing ap­ In May 2001, this vision evolved further dur­ proximately $81,000. In this case, purchasing ing preparation for a briefing at CORONA.7 space for a cost of $1,415 resulted in a savings The AE system is now in a period of transi­ of $79,585. These are just two examples of the tion from an “outlier” process with separate benefits of TACC and AE cell interface and funding, scheduling, and flying to “main- their efforts to embrace the changing AE streaming” into operational airlift processes. process and to continue working with the the­ The vision incorporated the AETT analysis aters to meet their patient-movement needs.5 and road map and includes the following key Other efforts under way include transition­ precepts necessary to mainstream and mod­ ing AE personnel and functions from AMC/SG ernize AE: to AMC/director of operations (DO) and • View AE as a specific medical-airlift mis­ AMC/XP, reengineering the aeromedical stag­ sion capable of supporting patients on ing facilities, integrating CCATTs, funding war- any appropriate airlift platform. reserve material, defining a homeland defense mission, and sponsoring a regional Total Force • Adapt AE to fully capitalize on the use virtual-group pilot study. of current organic-lift platforms. • Develop light, modularized, and in- A New Vision for AE dependently operable AE equip­ ment. In addition to the AETT final report, sev­ • Design an adaptable, multiairframe­ eral other factors—maturing TRICARE re­ capable, palletized litter/seat sys­ gionalization, the imminent C-141 and C-9A tem. retirements, recently validated planning factors increasing the wartime casualty stream by 25 • Capitalize on contract lift opportuni­ percent, fiscal realities of AE modernization ties—Patriot Express, commercial air- CHALLENGES OF AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 25

lines, and civilian air ambulance— and training AE crew members for the flexi­ where the use of these modalities is ap­ ble use of the organic-lift platforms. AMC lead­ propriate and cost-effective. ership is committed and fully engaged to sup- port the following: • Establish AE qualification training de- signed to support AE on all appropriate • Assuring space in the airlift flow for AE platforms. requirements. • Address the critical interface be- • Adapting AE to all appropriate air- tween the aircraft crew and the AE frames. crew. • Aggressively pursuing the full spectrum • Focus on two fundamental concepts: of airlift options for AE. a crew is a crew and CiA. • Standardizing and enhancing training • Develop a universal checklist that AE requirements. crew members could use on any AE- capable airframe. • Planning and programming to assure that the AE mission is fully supported. • Acknowledge the continued require­ ment for mobilization of the AE Civil Consistent with this new vision, as the C-9A Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in wartime. nears the end of its distinguished role in the Air Force, it will continue its service in a des­ • Design AE capability into all appropri­ ignated versus dedicated capacity. In February ate future airframes. 2001, the Air Force chief of staff directed the removal of the red cross markings from the C- • For example, multirole mobility plat- 9A AE fleet.8 The C-9A will continue to be a forms, KC-X (the future tanker and primary AE asset; however, the new decision replacement for the KC-135) mission will permit flexible use of the aircraft in trans- needs statement (MNS), and C-130J/ porting duty and space-available passengers, X upgrades. as well as nonmedical supplies and equip­ • Recognize that as the C-9A and C-141 ment—without risking violation of domestic retire; as AE is assimilated into organic or international law. In concert with the deci­ lift, to the extent possible; and as con- sion, AMC/Logistics (LG) designed and ac­ tract-lift modalities are utilized, . . . quired a nonpermanent, quick-application analysis indicates a residual shortfall in red cross for use during times of war, contin­ AE lift to meet echelons three and four gency operations, or other instances in which wartime requirements. the display of the red cross would be both de­ sirable and appropriate. This capability will • The AE MNS identifies AE integral allow the quick application of the red cross to requirements for future mobility air- any aircraft specifically dedicated for AE. This frames and addresses that shortfall provides protection for patients, while allow­ between the AE wartime require­ ing both AMC/TACC and theater air mobility ment and available lift in the most operations control centers (AMOCC) addi­ demanding scenarios. tional flexibility in selecting from all available The strategy for AE of the future was vetted AE-capable aircraft for such missions.9 The by key stakeholders, including commanders reengineered AE system will focus on re­ in chief (CINC), Air Staff, major commands, quirements-based scheduled support by pur­ and the Reserve/Guard. Their feedback in­ chasing seats and pallet spaces on the most cluded many positive and supportive com­ appropriate aircraft rather than paying for ments, the major concerns centering on as­ entire airplanes. Government-contracted com­ suring availability of lift for the AE mission mercial augmentation use, complemented by 26 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

scheduled routes based upon CINC-driven the­ the Line of the Air Force, AE will be a part of the ater requirements, form the construct. Within mission portfolio of all appropriate aircraft, the construct, a variety of aircraft will be avail- either integrally or by maximizing the use of able to support AE. Moreover, during contin­ portable AE equipment suited to all air- gencies, the staging of AE crew members and frames. AE crews will be as flexible as the air- en route ground-support UTCs at any airhead craft they use. where AE requirements may be generated, The new vision has taken the initial defini­ rather than tying them to specific aircraft bed- tive step to ensure that the AE system is able down locations, will allow increased flexibility.10 to support the entire spectrum of AE require­ With the institutionalization of this new AE ments, from peacetime/steady-state to the vision, changes to AE aircrew training and qualification become imperative. Unlike most full-scale casualty flow of two simultaneous crew members, AE crews will not be limited major theater wars. The strategy of main- by qualification on specific airframes. The streaming AE and employing the full spectrum of new vision will drive the need for a broad- lift to support the AE mission will assure that based flight-qualification program, using sim­ AE will be capable of supporting our war- ulators to train and qualify AE crew members fighting expeditionary forces in peacetime on all potential airframes. In keeping with and war. AE will be here for our forces and the flexible and expeditionary approach of families, now and in the future.

Notes

1. This section draws upon Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Il­ AMC/SGX, Scott AFB, Ill., 14 July 2000, in “Aeromedical Evacu­ lustrated History of the Military Airlift Command, 1941–1991 (Scott ation Tiger Team Final Report,” September 2000. AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Command His­ 6. Brig Gen James G. Roudebush, briefing, subject: A Vision torical Office, May 1991). for Aeromedical Evacuation: Supporting Global Reach, Vigi­ 2. This section draws upon “Aeromedical Evacuation Tiger lance, and Power into the New Millennium, November 2000. Team Final Report” (U), AMC/Medical Readiness and Aeromed­ 7. Brig Gen James G. Roudebush, AMC, Scott AFB, Ill., talk­ ical Evacuation Division (SGX) and AMC/Plans and Programs ing paper, subject: Aeromedical Evacuation: Supporting Global Studies and Analysis Flight (XPY), September 2000. Reach, Vigilance, and Power into the New Millennium, 21 May 3. Message, 181630Z Jul 00, Air Force chief of staff (CSAF), 2001. to AMC commander, 18 July 2000. 8. “Emblem Removed on C-9 Aircraft,” Air Force News Service, 4. Briefing, Col Sheila A. W. Millette, AMC/SGX, subject: February 2001, on-line, Internet, 30 October 2001, available from Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) 2000: Supporting Our Expedi­ http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2001/n20010212_0204.shtml. tionary Forces, 15 November 2000, in “Aeromedical Evacuation 9. Col Sheila A. W. Millette, AMC, Scott AFB Ill., talking Tiger Team Final Report,” September 2000. paper, subject: Red-Cross Marked Aircraft, April 2001. 5. Background paper, subject: Aeromedical Evacuation Tiger 10. For more information on the AE reengineering, integra­ Team, AMC/XPY, 25 October 2000; briefing, AE 2000: Support­ tion, and modernization effort, see Air Mobility Command/SG, ing Our Expeditionary Forces; and plan, subject: Air Mobility on-line, Internet, 30 October 2001, available from https://amc. Command Concept of Operations for Aeromedical Evacuation, scott.af.mil/sg/sg.cfm.

Treaties are observed as long as they are in harmony with in­ terests. ––Napoléon Operational Medical Support for the Tip of the Spear The Heart of Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine

COL JAMES J. DOUGHERTY, USAF, MC, CFS, DMO

Editorial Abstract: The war on terrorism has focused the attention of the military establish­ ment on special operations forces (SOF), which will become the “tip of the spear” in this con­ flict. But how will aerospace medicine support these “light, lean, and lethal” units? Colonel Dougherty explains how SOF’s unique operational environment shapes the training and technology required by SOF medical teams and what advances are needed to ensure support. According to Colonel Dougherty, “SOF medicine is operational medicine.”

HE TERRORIST ATTACKS on 11 September 2001 in and , D.C., as well as the crash of the hijacked aircraft in TPennsylvania, reminded Americans of the traumatic necessity of providing medical as­ sistance to the injured, especially in time of war. Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the fact that the United States had suffered relatively few friendly casualties in recent conflicts (e.g., the Gulf War and Kosovo) may have created the impression that we could fight relatively unscathed. Though understandable, such expectations are extremely naive, especially when one considers the dangerous world of special operations. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), as estab­ lished by Title 10, section 167 of the United States Code, has principal missions, including “combating terrorism” and taking “direct ac­ tion,” that involve inherently dangerous activi­ ties. Consequently, as USSOCOM’s air com­ ponent, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) must ensure effective medical support for its people—a huge

27 28 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 challenge for a force designed to be “light, different tools and training that require lean, and lethal.” unique medical support as well. This raises In the decades prior to 1990, one could certain questions: How much “medical” capa­ not distinguish the Air Force’s medical sup- bility is needed and supportable? Why should port to special operations forces (SOF) from it be different? What does it need to do? What that provided to conventional forces. The air- tools are necessary? What are the desired transportable clinic provided conventional characteristics of the interface with the rest of aviation medical support as well as disease the medical system? This article describes ef­ and injury prevention to deployed bases. De- forts to develop operational support for SOF signed to support a system of echelons that that have taken place during the last decade. met theater and strategic-planning models In addition, it outlines current initiatives to during the Cold War, the clinic proved suc­ improve the conduct of that support, includ­ cessful with conventional forces. A squadron ing the interface of SOF medicine with con­ medical element, consisting of three person­ ventional theater support and the aeromed­ nel (including one physician), could take a ical-evacuation system. Finally, it suggests single pallet of medical equipment and sup- future improvements for SOF medical sup- plies to a fixed base and provide routine med­ port. The paramount message for successful ical care with some limited trauma support medical support is simply that SOF medicine for 30 days to a fighter squadron–sized unit of must be operational medicine.2 approximately 500 personnel. But this process could not accommodate SOF. First, medical personnel often found The Focus on Operations themselves supporting other units; occasion- SOF medicine must be operational medi­ ally, the Air Force physician was the only med­ cine because a preponderance of SOF activi­ ical officer deployed in support of a joint op- ties are not associated with fixed-base opera­ eration.1 Flight surgeons faced a scope of tions. AFSOC owns only one base, and it has responsibility broader than their medical only an outpatient medical facility. All other skills could support. Second, they found special operators are in AFSOC tenant units themselves on unfamiliar ground since most that regularly deploy to fixed-base or beyond- squadron flight physicians were in their first fixed-base locations, where they often are not operational assignment, had never worked the lead units and where the logistical tail and with SEAL and special forces units, and had links to higher levels of medical care do not no experience with medical issues related to exist. In some cases, the presence or absence such matters as diving gas mixtures and high- of higher-level care is irrelevant since, for se­ altitude, low-opening jump operations. Third, curity reasons, one cannot establish linkage airlift for medical equipment was almost non- to aeromedical evacuation or deployed mili­ existent. Organic aircraft had no space for a tary hospitals. In sum, the medical-support palletized clinic, and nesting boxes and back- plan may assume an isolated capability from packs became the mode du jour, each medic the start. If casualty transfer is possible, it deciding what to take on any given occasion. would probably move rearward to interface Replacements for items left behind were pur­ with the aeromedical-evacuation system or chased locally with little consideration of suit- hospital, using opportunistic airlift and or­ ability and standardization. Thus, over time, ganic medical personnel for en route care. each unit accumulated different—sometimes The constraints of far-forward medical incompatible—medical equipment. care drive a set of challenging, unique med­ The word special in special operations does ical requirements for personnel, equipment, not imply a rejection of conventional Air and training. As codified by joint doctrine, Force processes in search of independence. special operations rely on “adaptability, im­ Rather, it refers to unique missions driving provisation, innovation, and self-reliance,” OPERATIONAL MEDICAL SUPPORT 29 emphasizing “small size, unique capabilities, bility but reduce the footprint and support tail. and self-sufficiency (for short periods of A third option calls for maintaining a substan­ time).”3 The challenge has always been to tial off-the-shelf capability but modularizing the take these characteristics and determine the contents so that their usage depends upon the right mix of medics, medical equipment, and specifics of the individual mission. medical training to provide the best possible In practice, both the second and third strate­ support to the special operator. gies have proved successful. They abjure large The conundrum is that the demand for power supplies and equipment items for light- flexible capability and self-sufficiency flies in weight pieces such as hand-powered water pu­ the face of the necessity of remaining small and rifiers and suction pumps. Using solar power light. Obviously, all medical-support planning panels for certain items remains an option, but must deal with this dilemma, but not to the high cost, inadequate durability, and low extreme that SOF does. For example, in time- charge rates limit their utility. In addition, light- critical rescue and disaster-response scenar­ weight materials and minisized devices have ios, SOF forces must determine what (and been substituted wherever possible, a process how much) needs to go on the first aircraft, not unique to special operations since the Air the number of Security Forces assets to secure Force Medical Service as a whole seeks oppor­ the area against further damage and injury, tunities to reduce size, number, and weight. and the types of medical assets to treat exist­ Seminal efforts of this service have trans- ing casualties. Unfortunately, such decisions formed the traditional echelons (levels) of care are sometimes made during highly vocal, last- 4 into an expeditionary medical-support system minute flight-line discussions. more capable of meeting the needs of our expeditionary Air Force. For example, tradi­ How Much Organic Medical tional medical-support packages like the air- transportable hospital and the contingency Capability Does AFSOF Need? hospital have given way to integrated building The answer to that question starts with rec­ blocks that one can use to establish any level ognizing that special operations are hazardous. of capability, from mere initial response to According to some sources, SOF accounted for that provided by a major fixed facility—and 31 percent (71/228) of total US combat deaths to transfer that capability to other medical (killed in action) from Desert One through assets, such as a civilian medical community, Allied Force.5 This percentage, disproportion­ host nation, or nongovernmental agency. This ately high for such a small fraction of the total approach is very similar to the one taken by force, argues for a robust medical-support ca­ special operations. pability that caters to the dangerous missions Keying on the third process of modulariza­ these units undertake. tion, special operations is focusing on modu­ Again, the challenge lies in being robust and larizing unit type code (UTC) equipment and light/lean at the same time. In the past, opera­ personnel packages. For example, AFSOC’s tional medics received training in basic lifesav­ rapid-response deployment kit and the consoli­ ing skills, used basic splints and bandages, and dated SOF medical element are representative accepted the fact that they could do little for ca­ of this strategy. Conceived in 1992–93 and sualties until they arrived at a fixed medical- brought on-line the following two years, the treatment area. “Acceptable” loss then be- new UTCs paralleled similar efforts of the con­ comes a planning factor but an abhorrent one, ventional side of the medical service to stream- especially when medical science can accom­ line the medical-support “piece” of operations: plish so much more if provided immediately in Europe, the United States Air Forces in (i.e., far forward). An alternative process in­ Europe command surgeon had developed volves seeking trade-offs, alternatives, and sub­ small surgical packages (mobile field-surgical stitutions that maintain a flexible medical capa­ team) and, subsequently at Air Education and 30 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Training Command, critical-care teams for that the mission commander must balance mis­ casualty movement (critical-care aeromedical­ sion accomplishment with casualty survival in transport team). That beginning, as well as the the context of limited medical assets, a strategy cross-fertilization of ideas that occurred be- that gives that commander information on how tween the mobile field-surgical team and the much delay he or she can tolerate prior to critical-care aeromedical-transport team on the treatment by different categories of casualties one hand and the rapid-response deployment will be of great use. kit and air-transportable treatment unit on the Toward that end, USSOCOM’s Biomedical other, laid the groundwork for development of Initiatives Steering Committee, with compo­ expeditionary medical support. “Lighter and nent sponsorship, has undertaken a study to es­ leaner” began to catch on. tablish protocols for commanders in the field The rapid-response deployment kit repre­ that do just that. For instance, one could define sents one step up from man-portable medical the risk of limb loss over time for injuries that equipment.6 The kit weighs 790 pounds and disrupt blood supply to the limb. In other consists of four nesting boxes organized along words, once this type of casualty occurs, how functional lines: cardiac, trauma, environmen­ much more time does a commander have to tal, and medical. Three kits fit on a single pal- complete the mission before the risk of perma­ let, and one can mix and match the compo­ nent disability and death becomes too great? nents to suit mission requirements. The kit can Until we develop this tool, however, mission be augmented with a laboratory module, and, commanders must develop medical go/no-go in those instances in which airlift limitations plans in consultation with their deployed sur­ geons, theater medical planners, or Joint Spe­ are not as critical or the mission is of long du­ 8 ration, other options are available.7 If all mod­ cial Operations Task Force surgeons. ules are deployed, the assemblage and person­ nel can provide medical care for a population What Does It Take to of 600–800 for up to 30 days. In practice, the smaller configurations are the most useful. Use That Capability? The strength and power of this arrange­ The truism that “knowledge has minimal ment lies in modularity—providing light- weight and cube” is important in the pursuit of weight, highly mobile capability for austere light and lean. The training necessary to pro- environments in a building-block approach vide the best medical care possible continues to and increasing or decreasing this capability grow. Medical technology is not static, and the as the mission evolves. Medical personnel can special operator deserves the same care offered either hand-carry or store their medical equip­ to any service member or citizen. In special op­ ment in containers small enough to add to erations, whose missions may occur in remote available space on board an aircraft or ground and hostile locations, the level of training must vehicle. This parallels the core philosophy of remain as high as one can possibly sustain since expeditionary medical support and supports medical technicians or physicians, who operate the Air Force Medical Service’s doctrine at an alone and without backup, have correspond­ even lighter/leaner level. ingly greater responsibility. In addition, adopting this process helps an­ As mentioned above, the SOF medical offi­ swer how far and how much medical care one cer often becomes the consultant for medical can take into the field. Defining limitations on aspects of dive, jump, and aerospace operations what one can treat allows planners to anticipate for which standard flight-surgeon training is in- situations that will exceed the capability of de­ adequate. Second, SOF medical officers and ployed medical forces. In this context, deci­ enlisted medics find themselves closer to com­ sions that recognize supportable medical skill bat operations than is typical for Air Force levels and plan to keep losses acceptable can medical personnel. Thus, they need training in make claim to moral authority. To the extent survival/escape and response to terrorism, as OPERATIONAL MEDICAL SUPPORT 31 well as tropical-medicine courses. In addition, aeromedical-evacuation training is necessary to one cannot meet the often-encountered chal­ conduct the casualty-evacuation mission. In lenge of working with host-nation forces or total, this formidable and unique level of capa­ civilian organizations just with enthusiasm and bility makes the AFSOC medical technician no training. The newly created position of in­ one of the most highly trained medics in the ternational health specialist can fill this gap. Air Force. Even the pararescueman, also an The enlisted medic in AFSOC frequently op­ EMT-P, is not trained or expected to provide erates independently in providing patient care nonrescue medical care. and casualty management, at least in the initial Historically, the AFSOC unit commander’s stages. Some casualty-evacuation missions may occur in proximity to ground combat and ne­ greatest dissatisfaction with medical support cessitate the same preparatory training as that is the fact that the unparalleled training received by officers.9 Doctrinally, the medical (table 1) necessary to bring the SOF medic to training necessary to operate independently in mission-ready status takes up to half a tour of this environment is designated emergency duty. Therefore, a training pipeline for medical technician-paramedic (EMT-P), with AFSOC medics—something the other ser­ Air Force independent-duty medical techni­ vices have always had—is long overdue. An cian (IDMT) certification. In addition, formal enterprise philosophy of interchangeable

Table 1 Higher Headquarters Requirements for AFSOC Medical Training

Flight Surgeon Enlisted Medic 1 week ISOC 1 week ISOC 1 week DIT 1 week DIT 1 week ACLS 1 week ATLS 1 week ATLS 1 week Water Survival School 1 week Water Survival School 1 week Treatment of Chemical and/or Biological Casualties 1 week Treatment of Chemical and/or 2 weeks Trauma Rotation Biological Casualties 2 weeks Trauma Rotation 12 weeks IDMT School 2 weeks Aircraft Mishap Investigation 12 weeks EMT Paramedic* 2 weeks C4 6 weeks Air Evacuation Technical School 2 weeks Global Medicine

ISOC Introduction to Special Operations Course DIT Dynamics of International Terrorism Course ACLS Advanced Cardiac Life Support ATLS Advanced Trauma Life Support C4 Combat Casualty Care Course * EMT paramedic training time will increase up to a total of 20–24 weeks, based on standard curriculum changes as of January 2002. ______Sources: Air Force TTP 3-42.6, USAF Medical Support for Special Operations Forces (SOF), 5 September 2001, 28; USSOCOM 40- 2, Medical Services: Organizational and Operational Alignment of Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center, 6 March 1997, 2, par. i; and AFSOC Instruction 48-101, Special Operations Aerospace Medical Operations, 1 August 2000, 10–12, pars. 10–11. 32 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 medical personnel among the major com­ category only to defend themselves and their mands is the wrong answer for AFSOC. patients against brigandage. For this reason, conventional aeromedical­ evacuation personnel usually have not received Dedicated But sufficient training in combat skills to reason- ably ensure survivability on, or in proximity of, Nonorganic Capability the battlefield. Further, they require a fixed lo- Occasionally, AFSOF has medical require­ cation to prepare casualties for further move­ ments beyond those of the aviation-support ment, whereas SOF may frequently relocate, packages discussed so far—an area that still making the lifeline for casualty evacuation ten­ needs work. The air-transportable hospital uous. Hence, although ad hoc decision making may have great capability, but it alone is larger may have served reasonably well in the past, it than most AFSOC mission packages. There- is no longer acceptable. We must have doctri­ fore, the answer lies in expeditionary medical nal and procedural adjustments to guide pro­ support. The fact that its configurations re- gramming and planning for the delivery of op­ main pallet-bound suggests the need to graft erational medical support. the modularization idea onto an AFSOC- assigned expeditionary medical-support package that would tailor an already opti­ The Future of AFSOF Medicine mized UTC to SOF limitations. AFSOC has accomplished a great deal since it stood up as a major command in 1990. The Air Force Medical Service has transformed a Critical Interface with large, static, slow-responding capability into a Conventional Medical Support light and lean force, but today’s success has a fi­ nite life span. The future of AFSOF medicine The interface between SOF and conven­ calls for visionary thinking and dynamic adap­ tional medical care is fluid, occurring farther tation along three paths: (1) modernization of forward on some occasions but still avoiding equipment, (2) enhancement of diagnostic potential exposure to ground combat. SOF sensory inputs, and (3) further efforts to mod­ medics, on the other hand, must operate in ularize and tailor medical equipment to mis­ proximity to ground combat, with the poten­ sion requirements. tial for direct exposure if dedicated rescue- Modernizing equipment is an ongoing and-recovery forces are not available.10 process, not only for the Air Force Medical Ser­ Where should we draw the lines? vice but also for the entire Department of De­ As the Air Force Medical Service attempts to fense. Medics must advocate improvement in bring technology and expertise ever closer to lifesaving, with an emphasis on the opera­ the casualty-causing event, it should think out tional-support piece of health care and the policy guidelines and make them available to modernization needed throughout the force. the commander. This won’t be easy because it In that endeavor, special operations must be- goes against Geneva conventions concerning come a partner. The Biomedical Initiatives combat status and involves debates about gen­ Steering Committee, mentioned above, has a der equity and opportunity. In the sister ser­ charter that considers only the physiological vices, the SOF medic is a combat medic, ex­ enhancement, not medical care, of war fight­ pected to shoulder a weapon as a primary ers. Yet, modernization of SOF medical capa­ combatant—an asset for “reconstitution” in bility, as a treatment and prevention activity in the event of severe loss of ground-combatant operations, must proceed along service lines. strength. Air Force medical personnel, how- The second opportunity for the future, di­ ever, are protected under the Geneva conven­ agnostic sensory input, comes from personal tions and entitled to use weapons under that observation of treating casualties—on board OPERATIONAL MEDICAL SUPPORT 33 an aircraft maneuvering at low level and at night, blacked out on night-vision goggles, and marked by extreme noise and vibration. Much equipment is available to assess and stabilize ca­ sualties, if only the environment were more co­ operative. But it won’t be. Medical skills would dramatically improve if one could perform basic techniques of observation, inspection, palpation, and percussion (not to mention probing, injecting, and the like) reliably under extreme adversity. For instance, a glove- The V-22 Osprey can be used for . mounted scanner transmitting an image to a heads-up display and using vibration-canceling package that focuses on the scenario and technology would fit part of the bill. No theo­ wastes nothing. Or telemetry may permit the retical impediment to such devices exists. To monitoring of an inbound casualty in enough accurately assess and stabilize a life-threaten­ detail to configure a real-time treatment kit ing, intra-abdominal injury without requiring ready to use immediately upon arrival. Some transport to a secure area would be a boon. But of this already occurs through voice communi­ training will have to keep pace with technology cation but with a limited degree of anticipa­ if such a capability becomes reality. tion. In SOF, the need is acute. SOF medical Finally, as regards becoming lighter and support must seek opportunities to carry all leaner by modularizing the medical-support that is needed and, at the same time, only what package for any given mission, the current test is needed to do the job. of success is limited to backpacks and nesting In the struggle against terrorism and other boxes. Given state-of-the-art computer systems threats to national security, the demand for and automated inventory management, one light, lean, and capable medical care will con­ has no difficulty imagining clinical guidelines tinue since the nation is likely to call upon SOF for mission scenarios that would link to the as the force of choice. This challenge focuses types of casualties expected and the medical on technology and training to provide the nec­ equipment needed. It should be possible to essary medical support when and where it is configure in minutes a medical-equipment needed.

Notes

1. To progress from intern or first-postgraduate-year trainee profit organization that provides scholarships and counseling to to Joint Special Operations Task Force surgeon can overwhelm surviving children of SOF personnel killed in the line of duty. the abilities of even the most talented physician. Imagine gradu­ 6. Each and medical technician carries a 70- ating from pilot training and immediately becoming a deployed pound vest and backpack SOF medical kit that provides for short- mission commander. notice, first-responder support. 2. One need not address each principal and collateral spe­ 7. The air-transportable treatment unit—an AFSOC UTC— cial operations mission and define the medical support needed includes a trailer, tentage, power, and climate control but weighs for each type of mission since it matters little to a casualty’s future 6,000 pounds. 8. The theater special operations commanders are autho­ whether a penetrating chest wound, for example, occurred in di­ rized an international health specialist on their staffs to conduct rect action or special reconnaissance. medical-planning activities. This new Air Force specialty offers 3. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, extra utility for SOF. 17 April 1998, vii. 9. The term casualty evacuation describes a mode of move­ 4. This happened in response to the Dar Es Salaam and ment that occurs prior to aeromedical evacuation, a convenient— Nairobi Embassy bombings in 1998. rather than doctrinal—term. 5. Although the total number of combat deaths is small by 10. Air Force pararescuemen, though not primarily medics, world-war standards, many people have argued that low casualty have paramedic skills. They deploy frequently and sometimes rates will become more likely in combat scenarios for the fore- find themselves stretched thin. In their absence, commanders seeable future. The data presented were collected from service have had to decide whether to send medical personnel on rescue- sources by the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, a non- and-recovery missions in proximity to ground combat. Linking Resource Allocation to Performance Management and Strategic Planning An Air Force Challenge

MAJ GEN STEPHEN R. LORENZ, USAFÄ LT COL JAMES A. HUBERT, USAFÄ MAJ KEITH H. MAXWELL, USAFÄ

Editorial Abstract: As a service, the Air Force fights much better than it buys things. In fact, our service—the world’s most powerful and capable air force—would probably fail quickly as a business corporation. We must do better, and this article raises some thought-provoking ideas about how to improve.

N LATE 2000, the service chiefs testified before Congress that the US military re­ quired upwards of $100 billion per year of additional spending (a 30 percent in- Icrease) to maintain readiness and modernize the force. But the recent tax cut, a slow econ­ omy, and spending increases needed for non- military priorities make a 30 percent increase in defense spending unlikely. Without the needed funds, the military will face many dif­ ficult decisions concerning allocation of the remaining resources. The question is and al­ ways has been, What is the best way to allocate those limited resources? The approach to allocating resources throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) at the beginning of the twenty-first century has several deficiencies. It doesn’t provide a connection among where we are (performance), where we want to go (strat­ egy), and how we get there (resources). In addition, the process identifies shortfalls but not the sources to pay for them. It rewards ad­ vocates who are the most adept at articulating increases in spending but sometimes pun-

34 LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 35 ishes programs that can produce savings. Process (AFRAP).2 Led by Maj Gen Danny A. Even worse, it lacks fundamental measures of Hogan, the AFRAP team recommended a ca­ value on which to base decisions. Eliminating pabilities-based process for allocating re- these deficiencies may not solve the shortfall sources.3 As a result, Headquarters Air Force in resources, but it can ensure that we spend chose a new approach for building the the money we have more wisely. budget for fiscal year 2003 (FY03) as an initial The key to enabling Air Force leaders to step to implementing the AFRAP recommen­ make better resource decisions lies in imple­ dations. Each major command received a top- menting three major changes in the way we do line dollar amount along with the direction to business. First, we must link resource allocation present a balanced, capabilities-based input to performance management and strategic to the Amended Program Objective Memo­ planning. These three management functions randum for FY03. must work in unison to ensure consistent di­ The USAFE team responded by develop­ rection. Second, we need a process that is sim­ ing a Resource Allocation Model (RAM) that ple, transparent, and reproducible. It must be produced a balanced program and at the simple enough to be implemented quickly and same time provided tremendous insight into improved upon; it must be transparent to iden­ the command’s capabilities. The purpose tify the trade-offs and provide incentives for here is not to wave the USAFE flag but to use cost reduction; and it must be reproducible its experience as a case study. The USAFE through a structured planning framework that RAM not only works for an operations and relates capability to cost. Third, we must deliver maintenance command but also offers prom­ the best value to the war fighter over time and ise towards improving resource allocation for with the resources available. This requires the entire Air Force. measuring Air Force capabilities and relating them to resources and operational effective­ ness for the near, mid, and long terms. We’re on a Journey Such changes are within reach; however, Throughout history, military spending has getting there requires a cultural change. The been based on available resources that the cit­ Air Force management processes currently in izens of a country were willing to spend in place provide little incentive to reduce costs peacetime and war. At the macrolevel, we won and only limited accountability for those the Cold War by engaging in a long-term ex­ costs. Gen Gregory S. Martin, commander of penditure of resources while maintaining a United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), large standing military. Today, with our vision recently observed that “the only way we’re of Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power, signif­ going to get anywhere in the Air Force today icant technological advantages have changed is to develop the tools and performance this equation. Vigilance has progressed from measures which will allow our people to have scouts and spies taking days or weeks to pro- control and accountability for their resource vide information, to satellites and unmanned and mission performance. And then we can aerial vehicles producing results in minutes. push decisions hard and fast to the lowest Reach has progressed from the walking pace level possible. . . . That’s the only way we’ll re- of horse-drawn wagons to moving millions of ally make major progress in the future.”1 ton-miles-per-day (thousands of tons halfway The Air Force has recognized the need for around the world every day). Technological change and is making the transition. Under advances in precision and stealth have signifi­ the leadership of F. Whitten Peters, the for­ cantly changed the nature of power in battle mer secretary of the Air Force, and Gen from using numerous, large munitions to de­ Michael E. Ryan, the former chief of staff, stroy a target, to using fewer, more precise Headquarters Air Force created a team to weapons to achieve desired effects. Beginning reengineer the Air Force Resource Allocation with Operation Desert Storm and progressing 36 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 further during the air war over Serbia under mal process used by DOD to establish force the leadership of Gen John P. Jumper, then structure.7 the commander of USAFE, the goal has now In 1993 Congress passed the Government become “effects-based” operations.4 Technol­ Performance and Results Act, which requires ogy has enabled us to pick and choose which government agencies to take responsibility of the enemy’s centers of gravity to affect and for effectively allocating and expending re- to strike them with crippling speed. sources through strategic planning and per­ In the past, military spending drove the formance management.8 It also spawned the pace of technology. Militaries were both National Partnership for Reinventing Gov­ technology- and resource-limited. Over time, ernment, which, over the last eight years, has technology became profitable enough so that fostered numerous studies, experiments, and the private sector now takes the lead in many reforms in government planning and man- areas. As a result, we are faced with more agement.9 In response to the Government technological choices than we can pursue Performance and Results Act, DOD pub­ with our available resources. Being resource- lished its performance plan and captured its constrained puts a premium on planning that strategic plan through the Quadrennial De­ is compounded by a rapid increase in system fense Review. Until recently, DOD and Air complexity. Automation and computers have Force reforms have failed to address the key resulted in systems-of-systems interdependent deficiencies in the PPBS process. with other systems-of-systems. For example, In 2000, the AFRAP process reengineering satellite navigation, radio communications, team developed a capabilities-based approach precision weapons, and aircraft form com­ for resource allocation, reviewing PPBS and the plex systems-of-systems used to perform many related processes in place to establish require­ attack missions. ments, make acquisition decisions, manage ex­ In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Secretary ecution, and perform analysis. The recommen­ of Defense Robert McNamara and his “whiz dations included significant enhancements to kids” responded to the increasing difficulty in the planning portion of PPBS by combining allocating resources with the Planning, Pro­ programming and budgeting and adding exe­ gramming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).5 cution management.10 Until that time, each department received fis­ The fundamental key to implementing cal spending limits along with direction on AFRAP is development of an Air Force capa­ how to spend the resources. Today, the major bilities framework to tie the elements of re- force programs and associated program ele­ source allocation together and serve as a basis ments provide the PPBS framework. Each for making decisions. Once the capability rela­ program element is programmed with funds tionships are established, the AFRAP solution for five to six years in advance of the current develops numerical capability objectives and budget. DOD went from little involvement in projects them over time. These objectives are how the services spent their resources to de- validated through the rest of the process by tailed programmatic insight. planning the capability solutions and associ­ At the time of PPBS development, the mil­ ated resources over an 18-year time frame. Fi­ itary planning system was considered the best nally, accounting and performance-manage­ ever. But we have since realized that military ment systems provide feedback directly to the planning has two broad categories: opera­ capabilities assessment in order to judge prog­ tional planning and force planning.6 Al­ ress. though military operational planning and the associated logistical planning have proven ex­ But We Have Miles to Go tremely capable, force planning has never been highly developed. Even today, the Qua­ DOD and the Air Force have transformed drennial Defense Review is part of an infor­ themselves in many ways recently, but until LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 37

AFRAP, neither adequately addressed the be generated anew. Also contributing to this overarching issue of affordability. As a result, busywork is the fact that the relative priority we still don’t really know whether we are of the shortfalls changes as well. Adding a spending our resources effectively and effi­ 30–50 percent turnover in personnel every ciently. A recent acquisition-reform effort first year to these conditions has the potential identified affordability as the missing link. In for disaster. 1995 Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of Ultimately, we are trying to determine defense for acquisition and technology, cre­ how much of each capability to invest in re­ ated an initiative called “Cost as an Indepen­ lation to maintaining readiness of the forces dent Variable.”11 A team, formed with the ob­ we have. But how can we do this without jective of treating cost as importantly as knowing the relative value of each capabil­ performance, concluded that the key lay in ity? All the new business practices coming establishing “affordable cost targets” for ac­ out of for-profit industry could help the Air quisition programs. Force if it weren’t for one detail—we don’t Since one can define “affordable” only in make a profit! As Secretary Roche has said, relation to the total budget, the solution lies “We recognize this is not a business. We not in acquisition reform but in improving the don’t have a product, as in the open mar­ resource-allocation process. Our entire culture ket.”13 All tough business decisions are focuses on stovepiped portions of resource al­ based on the relative value of the choices. location, producing a system that sometimes The new process improvements coming encourages self-serving resource-allocation be­ from the commercial sector are designed to haviors instead of a cross-functional capabilities help industry leaders find a balance be- approach. tween short-term profitability and sustained The root cause of this behavior within our health of the business. Without profit as a process is that we manage by shortfall. Dr. value measure, the military must develop James G. Roche, secretary of the Air Force, standards of value to improve resource allo­ said, “Given the demands on the forces, . . . cation. the demands for situational awareness, and a great deal of technology, . . . you can’t do the stovepipe game the way you used to.”12 In Building a Balanced Program our current process, we direct the partici­ In August 2000, USAFE began creating its pants to identify their shortfalls and bring RAM in response to the Air Staff’s direction them to the table. The result is a process de- to develop a balanced, capabilities-based signed to spend more money. Those who are input to the Amended Program Objective successful in funding their shortfalls are the Memorandum for FY03. USAFE’s approach winners. In addition, since everything we do entailed dividing the initial top line into in the military is very important—life or groups of capability by assigning each pro- death issues—cutting back or canceling a gram element to a cross-functional capabili­ program is extremely hard to do. A process ties group. Formation of the groups was of managing by shortfall provides no infor­ based on the relationships between the com­ mation on where we can afford to make mand’s mission-essential tasks and goals, with those cuts. A lack of information increases the scope of responsibility defined by the syn­ the impact of opinions. In other words, per­ ergies between the products of these tasks, sonalities fill the vacuum. their relationships to the command’s goals, Management by shortfall also leads to a and efforts to minimize the resources that tremendously inefficient process for re- cross group boundaries. source allocation. Because individual short- Because USAFE is an operations and main­ falls tend to differ each year, the majority of tenance command, management of day-to- the information needed by the process must day resources drove the definition of capabil- 38 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 ity groups. The command created five 1.1 groups—Information Superiority, Aerospace Maximum Usable Operations, Logistics Support and Infrastruc­ 1.0 ture, People, and Medical—tasked with as- 0.9 sessing the capability provided by each pro- gram element and developing a balanced 0.8 Top-Line Performance capability within the assigned top line. Each Capability Rating 0.7 group also had to provide information for Minimum Acceptable USAFE’s leadership to balance resources 0.6 across the groups. 200 300 400 500 600 700 A simple rating system facilitated compar- Program Resources ($Million) isons among diverse capabilities. Each pro- gram-element monitor was tasked to quantify the capability provided by his or her program Figure 2. Capability versus Resources element. The maximum usable and mini- mum acceptable capabilities were defined and assigned scores of 1.00 and 0.70, respec- Although the capability ratings provided a tively (fig. 1).14 Each monitor was also tasked means for portraying the health of each pro- to assign a dollar amount to the maximum gram, they did not form the basis for decision and minimum capabilities and define what making. Balancing resources within a group or the resources would purchase. Once the scale between groups is a process of making trades— was established, the monitor was then tasked taking from one program to help another. to assign a capability rating to the initial top To facilitate balancing resources, program- line (fig. 2). Although in many cases data element monitors were tasked to identify trade- were not available to assign a truly objective ups and trade-offs of capability with the associ­ rating, each program-element monitor had to ated resources for their programs. In this way, defend his or her assessment under the the group could compare the value of a given scrutiny of peers and to the group. trade-up for one program with a trade-off for another and develop an understanding of where the balance lay. Each group identified trades that achieved improved balance across its programs and then prioritized trade-ups and trade-offs for the group as a whole. The groups 1.1 = Exceeds maximum mission capabilities presented this information to the USAFE lead­ ership, who used it to balance capabilities and Low Risk 1.0 = Maximum usable resources among the groups. Assuming that capability the overall command is capable of performing its mission beyond the bare minimum, the goal Moderate Risk 0.9 = Fully mission capable, with of making trades was to ensure that each ele­ minor shortfalls ment of capability had enough resources to High Risk 0.8 = Mission capable, with earn a rating greater than 0.70. significant shortfalls This simple methodology resulted in vastly Very High Risk 0.7 = Minimum acceptable capability improved understanding of the capabilities and needs within the command. During the trading process, over $50 million moved Below 0.7 = Not mission capable/ among programs to correct imbalances. This unexecutable program amount represented only 2 percent of the com­ mand’s total resources, but the movement rep­ resented 65 percent of those resources within Figure 1. Capability Rating Scale USAFE’s control, indicating how unbalanced LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 39 the program had become without meaningful Amended Program Objective Memorandum participation from the major commands.15 Im­ for FY03, the process was refined, with de- plementing this process also highlighted sev­ tailed work sheets provided to the program- eral improvements needed within USAFE, element monitors. They were tasked with along with information the command required defining the capabilities and supporting from the Air Force to improve the balance fur­ measures for each of their programs during ther. The command used these lessons learned summer 2001 in advance of the command’s ef­ to make improvements for the next cycle. fort to balance resources. These definitions were documented and available for continual improvement during each cycle of the Doing It Again—Only Better process. In addition, USAFE held a capabili­ ties workshop with Air Force Materiel Com­ One key to successfully implementing a mand personnel who were involved in per­ process change is to include continual pro­ formance-based budgeting. The workshop cess improvement in the design. A good ex- also received support from the Air Force Stud­ ample of preplanned improvement comes ies and Analysis Agency, which shared tech­ from software developers as they actually de- niques for assessing programs and tieing their fine processes. In the software industry, the performance to higher-level capabilities. incremental approach for continual improve­ A major change implemented for Spiral 2 ment is called spiral development, whereby a came from aligning the processes for strategic spiral includes the development and fielding 16 planning and performance management with of operational code. The first spiral might USAFE’s RAM. During a two-day workshop in field 60 percent of the desired functions, with March 2001, the command’s senior leaders cre­ succeeding spirals learning from the previous ated the integrated-management construct for one and fielding increased functionality. In the USAFE Strategic Vision Process (fig. 3), in- this light, USAFE’s RAM for the Amended tended to define where USAFE is through per­ Program Objective Memorandum of FY03 is formance management, where it wants to go Spiral 1, and the command’s approach for through strategic planning, and how it is going the Program Objective Memorandum of FY04 to get there through resource allocation. is Spiral 2. The improved RAM/Spiral 2 is the result of lessons learned during the FY03 Amended Program Objective Memorandum and the desire to tie the model to strategic planning and performance management. Mission Vision One lesson learned was that managing five groups requires too much manpower from headquarters. In addition, several changes to Capabilities Goals the group structure were needed to align complementary capabilities, resulting in Mission-Essential Objectives three groups: Command and Control, Aero­ Tasks Resource Strategic space Operations and Logistics, and People Allocation Planning and Infrastructure. The realignment added Programs Milestones logistics to aerospace operations, where it is Performance needed most. It also put medical and people Management together with the infrastructure that supports them and operations. Performance Measures Another lesson was simply that more time, more training, and a more rigorous process Figure 3. Integrated Management Con­ were needed to better implement USAFE’s struct for the USAFE Strategic Vision RAM. Following the submission of the Process 40 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

The integrated-management construct links go, the new construct will directly improve the three process elements and ties them di­ the resource-allocation process. Dividing the rectly to resources; links capabilities to re- capability groups into 14 mission-essential sources by defining the command’s total mis­ tasks increases the fidelity for making trades. sion capability within three capability areas; The new capability groups and their mission- and then breaks those three capabilities into 14 essential tasks used in Spiral 2 align the com­ subelements defined as new mission-essential mand’s 124 program elements (fig. 4). The tasks of the command. Assigning each program approach for the FY04 Program Objective element to a mission-essential task aligns all Memorandum involves balancing the re- command resources with the capabilities. The sources within each program element, bal­ construct aligns strategic planning and re- ancing the program elements assigned to source allocation by identifying a command each mission-essential task, and then balanc­ goal for each of the three capability areas. One ing those tasks within each group. The ap­ achieves linkage between performance man­ proach is simple, but experience during Spi­ agement and resource allocation by aligning ral 1 proved that establishing capability the performance measures directly to the measures and requirements is challenging. mission-essential tasks. The result is a simple Few programs have useful measures of what is framework for aligning strategic planning expected from the resources allocated. Com­ and performance management with resource paring the health of each program element allocation. and its contribution to total capability re- In addition to aligning resources to take quires measures of that capability that cas­ USAFE from where it is to where it wants to cade down to the program-element level.

$2.6 Billion Top Line USAFE Mission Capability Three Capability Groups C1. Command C2. Aerospace C3. People and Control Operations and Installations and Logistics

M1.1. Information M2.1. M3.1. Protecting Infrastructure Air Superiority the Force

M1.2. Battle-Space M3.2. Quality Picture M2.2. Mobility People 14 Mission-Essential Tasks M1.3. Decision M2.3. Global Attack M3.3. Installation Superiority Readiness

M2.4. Agile Combat M3.4. Quality Support Housing

M2.5. Developing and Maintaining M3.5. Medical Relations Operations

M3.6. Support Operations 124 Program Elements

Figure 4. USAFE’s RAM LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 41

Another significant change during Spiral 2 capabilities, and implementing a process to involves integrating the wings’ financial and balance them over time. Dividing our re- manpower planning into USAFE’s RAM. The sources in a meaningful way requires devel­ wings were tasked to create a capabilities-based opment of a planning framework to catego­ financial plan for FY02. The groups reviewed rize capabilities. Setting the values for those the results of the plan along with manpower as­ capabilities demands analysis coupled with sessments to refine their understanding of continual process improvement. Balancing command capabilities. For FY03, the wings are our capabilities over time means adding an- using Spiral 2 of the RAM to develop an im­ other dimension to the RAM. proved capabilities-based financial plan and Henry Ford taught us that managing any- manpower assessment. Each subsequent spiral thing requires breaking it down into defin­ will iterate between the wings and command able pieces. The key lies in making the pieces headquarters to develop affordable standards meaningful and useful for resource alloca­ of performance across the command. Those tion. Over the last 20 years, DOD, the Joint standards will improve USAFE’s ability to pro- Staff, and the Air Force have developed many vide balanced inputs to the Air Force’s Pro- excellent planning frameworks (table 1). gram Objective Memorandum. These frameworks were developed for many The biggest change needed for full imple­ different purposes but not specifically for re- mentation of USAFE’s RAM will not occur source allocation. Consequently, they don’t until Spiral 3 or beyond and must come from include all resources, don’t adequately ad- implementation of AFRAP. The required bal­ dress support functions, and don’t provide ance among capabilities within the command distinct categories meaningful to operations. ultimately depends on having an Air Force These characteristics are fairly easy to definition of the relative value of each capa­ achieve, but none of the existing planning bility. As an operations and maintenance frameworks has them all. command, USAFE receives forces based on Table 1 higher-level decisions on what capability each weapon system should have, how many sys­ Existing Planning Frameworks tems to purchase, and whether to place them in-theater or deploy them from the continen­ US/DOD/Joint Planning Frameworks tal United States. Implicit in these decisions • 13 Title 10 functions are value judgements based on each system’s • 2 DOD goals contribution to national security. An opera­ • 8 tasks in the Universal Joint Task List tions and maintenance command has neither • 6 elements in Joint Vision 2020 the resources nor the information to make • 12 areas for the Joint War-Fighting Capabilities such judgements. For this reason, USAFE is Assessment working to define what is required from the • 8 areas for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review Air Force to enable the command’s resource Air Force Planning Frameworks allocation. • 3 aspects of the vision • 6 core competencies Application to the Air Force • 7 Air Force tasks • 14 critical future capabilities Development of an Air Force RAM is con­ • 6 mission areas in CONOPS 2020 sistent with the direction being taken by • 7 elements and 5 capabilities in the strategic AFRAP and would enable the Air Force to concept balance its resources, based on capabilities. • 4 elements in the Expeditionary Aerospace Forces Building an Air Force RAM requires three construct crucial steps: dividing the resources among • 7 focus areas in the Vision Force capabilities, determining the value of those • 3 Air Force goals 42 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Since the purpose of the framework is to • Global Power is the key combat capabil­ allocate resources, one must include all re- ity—the capacity to destroy or disable sources. Existing frameworks for visions or desired targets. • Global Reach is the capacity to move forces—an enabling capability for en- The Air Force’s core competencies gaging targets and a primary capability provide an excellent list of the for humanitarian missions. service’s unique functions, but the • Global Vigilance is the capacity to use in­ fact that they are unique keeps formation—an enabling capability for them from being complete. both Reach and Power and a primary capability for deterrence. concepts of operations address operational These three areas encompass the capabilities functions, but they leave out the significant that directly contribute to operational effects. peacetime roles assigned by Title 10, United The proposed RAM also provides coverage States Code. Balancing only a part of the of all the Air Force’s Title 10 resources in suf­ budget will fail to provide the information ficient detail: that decision makers need. • Agile Combat Support is the capacity to Dividing the whole into manageable support forces, whether deployed or pieces is particularly important. Joint and Air not. Force task lists provide definition for opera­ tional tasks but combine all Title 10 functions • Quality People provides a category for all under a single category. Title 10 breaks “or­ our people programs. ganize, train, and equip” into 13 functions, • Enterprise Management allows insight into showing that greater detail is required to de- the resources we spend on our im­ scribe the roles. However, Title 10 does not mense management task. address the operational roles of our forces. Our customers are the joint operations we • Innovation and Modernization groups are tasked to support. Since the customer es­ those capabilities used to transform our tablishes value, the framework must relate force and keep it viable into the future. our resources distinctly to operational effects. Each of these four capability areas includes as- The Air Force’s core competencies provide sets that deploy to support operations, along an excellent list of the service’s unique func­ with many used only for Title 10 functions. tions, but the fact that they are unique keeps All seven of the proposed areas need to them from being complete. Resources can- have direct costs allocated as much as possi­ not be cleanly divided between precision en­ ble. For example, if hangars are needed for gagement and global attack. One approach global-attack platforms, the cost of construc­ puts weapons under precision engagement tion and use should be captured under and platforms under global attack. But both global attack. The costs of acquiring, operat­ are usually needed to engage targets, and the ing, and maintaining the platforms and asso­ operational customer cannot possibly choose ciated equipment need to be allocated as between them. well. In addition, manpower and any special­ The Air Force Task List describes all the ac­ 17 ized training attributable to global attack tivities performed by our service. A thor­ must be accounted for. This is the key to im­ ough review of this list, along with applica­ plementing activity-based costing. As Secre­ tion of the above characteristics, leads to a tary Roche said, “We start really hampered by possible Air Force RAM intended to relate di­ the fact there’s not an activity-based costing rectly to effects-based operations: system.”18 Accounting for costs of the prod- LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 43 ucts we deliver is the only way to assess their infrastructure: balancing our readiness today value. with our readiness tomorrow.”19 Achieving this Once a planning framework is established, balance requires implementation of the plan- the hard part becomes determining the value of the individual capabilities. To do so, one must define the optimum capability measures and associated requirements, which necessi­ The problem we are dealing with in tates defining standardized or generic effects allocating 10s of billions of dollars applicable to different operational scenarios. every year across a nearly infinite series For example, we successfully use the “ton- of needs is complex. miles-per-day” unit to help describe our abil­ ity to move materiel. Similarly, we need to ad- dress the number of meaningful targets-per- day of power. Then we must do the same for ning portion of AFRAP. The proposed Air vigilance and the other capability areas. Fi­ Force RAM enables this implementation by nally, we must apply these effects to a variety providing the capabilities-based planning of standardized operational scenarios to de­ framework and the value of those capabilities. termine the driving requirements. Finally, if the Air Force integrates strategic Repeated use of capability measures for planning, performance management, and re- allocating resources will result in standards source allocation through a RAM, the result of performance, some of which we can would be a truly “balanced scorecard”20 ap­ adapt from measures already available, such proach to management. as C-ratings for combat and support sys­ tems. We already apply C-ratings to our fa­ cilities. Over time, expectations will be gen­ Summary and Conclusion erated for other peacetime services as well. Making the “billion dollar” decisions that As standards are developed and adjusted, we need to operate efficiently and effectively the process of allocating resources will be- in the twenty-first century requires three key come simpler. These standards will flow di­ changes in the way the Air Force does busi­ rectly down to the major command and unit ness. The first involves linking resource allo­ levels through the capabilities framework. cation to performance management and The three USAFE capability groups in Spi­ strategic planning. We developed the current ral 2 map onto the proposed Air Force processes without a unifying construct. Our RAM. experience shows that a management con­ The step not yet addressed in USAFE’s Spi­ struct relating capabilities to mission-essential ral 2—which must be addressed for Air Force tasks and to programs provides the needed implementation—is addition of the time di­ linkage. The strategic goals align with each ca­ mension. Today’s modernization-planning pability, and the organizational-performance process is easily adaptable to AFRAP planning. measures align with each mission-essential After developing capability measures and val­ task. ues, one can then establish near-, mid-, and The second key change is to create a long-term objectives. Current imbalances, process that is simple, transparent, and repro­ the environment, and the affordability of po­ ducible. The new process must be simple— tential solutions will drive these capability ob­ both to implement and to use. The problem jectives. Capability options will be estab­ we are dealing with in allocating 10s of bil­ lished, and a robust set of options will be lions of dollars every year across a nearly infi­ funded to ensure a reasonable level of risk. nite series of needs is complex. We can’t af­ Gen Larry D. Welch said, “It’s all about bal­ ford to wait while sophisticated techniques ancing modernization, readiness, people, and for decision making are developed. We have 44 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 to get started by tackling the whole budget, egorization scheme. Genghis Khan used a not just shortfalls. To do so, we will need to decimal system to manage his armies in implement an approach based on continual groups of 10,000 (called a “tuman”): “Who- ever can manage his own house well can also manage an estate, whoever can keep ten men in order in accordance with conditions may “Whoever can manage his own house be given a thousand and a tuman and he will also keep them in order.”22 well can also manage an estate, The third key change entails developing whoever can keep ten men in order in capability measures that allow Air Force deci­ accordance with conditions may sion makers to deliver the best value to the be given a thousand.” war fighter over time. Gregory S. Martin, then a lieutenant general and principal deputy as­ sistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisi­ tion, said, “Tying our resources to our capa­ improvement. Our current promotion system bilities is the single most-important issue serves as a good example of a simple process facing the Air Force today.”23 We have shown that is subject to continual improvement; it is that in order to determine value, capabilities also transparent and reproducible. As with must be related to resources on the one hand any new process, it was not as good when first and to operational effects on the other. After introduced as it is today. Over the years, im­ provements have made it a highly rated and these relationships are established, we can as­ fair promotion process. sess the value of our investments over short-, To be successful, a resource-allocation mid-, and long-term planning horizons. Esti­ process must also be transparent. Discussing the mating the value of capabilities and invest­ new DOD management councils for improv­ ment options will require analysis, but, in the ing business practices, Secretary Roche said, end, the proposed RAM is a tool for the deci­ “We are going to be extraordinarily transpar­ sion maker—not the analyst. ent, and so when monies are saved in one area, Our warriors can embrace this particular those monies will then be . . . applied to an- revolution. It is based on the fundamental other area. . . . This is the incentive that is principles of establishing teamwork, ensuring healthy; it’s a win-win for everyone.”21 The capability for the war fighter, and following process has to reveal the total capability pro­ the money! The improved decision making vided by every program and lay the facts on the that results will lead directly to real savings table for all to see. By defining both the trade- and increased performance by spending the ups and the trade-offs, one can establish the resources where they are most needed. In ad­ relative value of each choice despite a lack of dition to these direct savings, aligning our ef­ perfect knowledge. Only then can we agree on forts will enhance the productivity of the en- what is affordable and reward people for tak­ tire Air Force. The biggest obstacle to ing cuts for the good of the service. motivation occurs when people don’t know Reproducibility, the key to the new process’s what is expected of them. Sun Tzu said, “He survival, must be based on standards of value will win whose army is animated by the same that can be established, reused, and improved spirit throughout all its ranks. . . . But when over time. A single planning framework will the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is help develop the standards, record them as sure to come.”24 The ultimate improvement they are established, and clarify the links in the Air Force will come when our people among programs and their intended opera­ can be rewarded for providing the war fighter tional effects. This framework is actually a cat­ the most “bang for the buck.” LINKING RESOURCE ALLOCATION 45

Notes

1. USAFE council meeting, , Germany, 20 12. DOD news briefing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul April 2001. Wolfowitz and service secretaries, 18 June 2001, on-line, Internet, 2. AFRAP was created in January 2000 under Headquarters available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/ Air Force 2002, a major process-reengineering effort led by Lt t06182001_t618dsda.html. Gen Joseph H. Wehrle, deputy chief of staff for plans and pro- 13. Ibid. grams (AF/XP), and guided by Mr. William A. Davidson, admin­ 14. Any scale could have been used, including green-yellow- istrative assistant to the secretary (SAF/AA). red or A-B-C. However, allocation of resources favors a numerical 3. General Hogan was the mobilization assistant to AF/XP system because the next step calls for relating the capability rat­ (see note 2). ing to dollars. 4. Col John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Air- 15. Dollars moved internally totaled $52 million. Total power Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 40–55, on-line, Internet, USAFE resources for the Amended Program Objective Memo­ available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchroni­ randum of FY03 were $2.6 billion. A $76 million trade space was cles/apj/warden.html; and James A. Kitfield, “Another Look at calculated by subtracting the estimated discretionary funds re­ the Air War That Was,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 10 (October quired for minimum acceptable performance ($1,376 million) 1999), on-line, Internet, available from http://www.afa.org/maga­ from the top-line discretionary funding ($1,452 million). zine/1099eaker. html. 16. George Wilkie, Object-Oriented Software Engineering: The 5. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 7045.14, The Professional Developer’s Guide (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub­ Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 22 May 1984. lishing Co., 1993), 111. 6. Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 17. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Air Force Task 13 April 1995, I-1. List, 12 August 1998. 7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 18. DOD news briefing. 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 September 1999, E-5. 19. Meeting, Headquarters USAFE, Ramstein Air Base, Ger­ 8. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law many, 2 July 2001. 103-62. 20. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Score- 9. “Vice President Gore’s National Partnership for Reinvent­ card: Translating Strategy into Action (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Busi­ ing Government,” on-line, Internet, 2 October 2001, available ness School Press, 1996). from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/default.html. 21. DOD news briefing. 10. The AFRAP process design consisted of four key sub- 22. H. G. Wells, The Outline of History (Garden City, N.Y.: Gar- processes: Determine Capability Objectives, Develop Capability den City Publishing Co., 1925), 61; and Valentin A. Riasanovsky, Options, Allocate Resources, and Assess Performance. The entire Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law (Bloomington: Indiana Uni­ process was to be supported by end-to-end analysis. versity, 1965), 200. 11. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Tech­ 23. Tiger Team meeting, subject: Future Modernization Pri­ nology), memorandum, subject: Reducing Life Cycle Costs for orities and Process, Arlington, Va., September 1999. New and Fielded Systems, 4 December 1995, attachment 2, Cost 24. Lionel Giles, The Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in as an Independent Variable (CAIV) Working Group Paper. the World (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1944).

It is better to see and communicate the difficulties and dangers of an enterprise, and to endeavor to overcome them, than to be blind to everything but success till the moment of difficulty comes, and to despond. ––Duke of Wellington Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the 2000–2001 Academic Year

First Place

Lt Col Paul C. Strickland, USAF “USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine: Decisive or Coercive?” (Fall 2000)

Second Place

Lt Col Peter Hays, USAF, and Dr. Karl Mueller “Going Boldly—Where? Aerospace Integra­ tion, the Space Commission, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space” (Spring 2001)

Third Place

Charles Tustin Kamps “The JCS 94-Target List: A Vietnam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought” (Spring 2001)

46 Silver Flag A Concept for Operational Warfare

COL BOBBY J.WILKES, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Wargaming is like deterrence. It has to be credible, believable, and clearly communicated. Red Flag exercises have internalized this concept very well in a training context, but as Colonel Wilkes points out in this article, Air Force wargam­ ing would improve if it incorporated the Red Flag approach. Just as Red Flag exer­ cises the tactical level of war, so would Silver Flag wargaming steer to the operational level. In doing so, our wargaming could rally back to a valuable use of the human dimension of gaming and better organize its processes and infrastructure by capital­ izing on available assets.

ITH THE WAR on terrorism and homeland defense in full swing, along with many other national- defense challenges, the urgent butW continuing need for effective education and training is enormous. Wargaming can and should play an important role in that process.1 Red Flag has become a monumen­ tal success in “training as we fight” at the tac­ tical level, and we should capture the same vi­ sionary approach by using wargaming in education and training at the operational level of war (OPWAR). A Silver Flag, based on an effective use of wargaming, could comple­ ment our present Blue Flag exercises to round out an overall systemic approach to OPWAR. For nearly two centuries, wargames have proven vital in teaching military leader- ship how to think better—how to ask the right questions, how to anticipate, and how to adapt.2 Wargaming promotes understanding of the “operational art” of war. It provides ex­ perience in decision making. It makes book learning and classroom study come alive, re­ inforcing the lessons of history and illuminat-

47 48 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 ing the theories behind effective planning Issues developed from wargaming benefit war fight­ and execution. These tremendous benefits ers via education, training, and analysis. from wargaming, however, do not come with- out an investment that starts with recognition of the value of wargaming to professional mil­ itary education (PME) and training as well as The Basis for to military operations. This article promotes Good Decision Making wargaming as an innovative tool for achieving successful war-fighting strategies. It shows how wargaming is an integral part of the “or­ ganize, train, and equip” mission of the ser­ vice. It argues for a back-to-the-future focus ations aining r Oper on the human aspects of wargaming to en­ T Education Analysis hance greater effectiveness in how the Air Force approaches wargaming today. Finally, it Wargaming recognizes the need for improved organiza­ tional efficiencies in the service’s wargaming Force Structure, Scenarios, Adjudication, infrastructure to better meet current and fu­ Methodology, Modeling, and Simulation ture national-security needs.3 Historically and pragmatically, strong reasons exist for refo- Figure 1. The Foundation of Decision cusing and refining our use of this invaluable Making tool in order to better plan and execute war. pose here.4 For one thing, historians can only One should not argue about whether guess as to how frequently and substantially wargaming represents education or train- previous wargaming experiences may have in­ ing—or whether it is operational or analytical. fluenced wartime commanders’ decisions. It is all-inclusive. All tenets are instrumental in The unrecorded continuity between wargam­ producing issues that prepare war fighters and ing and the thoughts of war-fighting com­ planners to be good decision makers (fig. 1). manders is immense. Nevertheless, one finds Along with its supporting tools of modeling value in recognizing that wargaming has had and simulation, wargaming teaches people to a historically important influence on the op­ process issues more effectively in making good erational art of war. decisions. In that sense, the professional ap- For example, the famous German offen­ plication of wargaming can span a broad spec- sive plan to envelop at the start of the trum of times, scenarios, and circumstances. First World War was a fatally modified version No doubt, professional wargaming is a mis- of the so-called Schlieffen Plan, one originally nomer in that it reflects a very serious busi- influenced to a great extent by Prussian ness. Considering it a luxury is foolish. Our wargaming under Chief of the General Staff military personnel and organizations must be Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.5 Later in that well prepared, and wargaming can make the same war, military-member representatives to difference, in terms of decisive training and the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles, education, in leaders’ competence (or incom- France, participated in a wargame, trying to petence) in the heat of battle. anticipate the level of German success. Play- One finds many historical examples of ers representing the enemy (German) side wargaming’s contribution to successful strate- wore their hats backwards as they accurately gies, operations, or tactics, and it is tempting predicted the timing and location of Ger­ to try to prove the value of gaming by point- many’s final major offensive.6 These exam­ ing to direct causality between wargames and ples were operationally oriented games de- success in war. But that ploy, which constitutes signed to predict outcomes based on various an abuse or misuse of history, is not the pur- strategies and force structures. SILVER FLAG 49

One may find another example, this one in­ Fletcher, and Marc Mitscher most likely had volving wargaming in an educational context, an impact on their ability to fight decisive car­ by examining the US Naval War College rier battles. Not only the admirals but also (NWC), where gaming became part of the their staffs learned through human interac­ school curriculum only three years after the tion to improve adaptive decision-making school was founded at Newport, Rhode Island, abilities. They gained experience, learned to in 1887. Lt (later Capt) William McCarty Little ask the right questions, and learned to antici­ was the primary initiator of wargames at the pate the enemy and fog of war. NWC, but, for the most part, the institution’s Wargaming during the interwar period was leadership also enthusiastically embraced them not unique to the Navy, of course. At the Air as valuable educational tools and made them Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Langley integral to the course of study. In particular, Field, Virginia, and then Maxwell Field, Al­ during his second term as college president, abama, faculty members such as Maj Claire L. from 1918 to 1922, Adm William S. Sims be­ Chennault and Capt George Kenney devel­ lieved that the primary purpose of the NWC oped and conducted games, exercises, and was to provide realistic education—more prac­ “illustrative problems” to explore tactical and tical than theoretical. The goal was to have stu­ operational uses of airpower for attack, bom­ dents leave with the ability to command at bardment, pursuit, and observation—often sea—so they needed decision-making experi- using methods other than those traditionally ence.7 Wargames helped provide exactly that. envisioned by the Navy and Army.9 No doubt, As a result, the college did not conduct just one this activity had enormous subsequent impact capstone game a year to reinforce classroom on American aviation during the Second teaching. It did lots of wargaming! World War. But the actual gaming and exer­ For example, between the First and Sec­ cise process at ACTS was less than optimally ond World Wars, the NWC conducted more effective due to arbitrary restrictions and than 300 games, mostly with scenarios of blue rules to ensure, for example, that bombers versus orange fleets that usually involved con­ would always succeed and that pursuit would flict with Japan. Admittedly, people have always support bombardment in a prescribed made too much of the apocryphal remark at­ manner.10 By contrast, NWC wargaming had a tributed to Adm Chester Nimitz that no sur­ better approach. prises occurred in the Second World War in In large part, the reason for NWC wargam­ the Pacific except the kamikazes.8 Obviously, ing’s success lay in its balanced approach to disastrous “surprises” at Pearl Harbor and the the process of learning itself. In wargames, Philippines, for example, did not speak well the learning process is usually more impor­ for the fact that NWC wargaming had indeed tant than the outcome of the gaming battle. explored such contingencies. On the other Whether one conducts analytical or manual hand, that same NWC wargaming had not wargames, it is imperative not to “cook” the been intended for predictive purposes but to data to try to “prove” a desired outcome. In teach decision making. In that respect, a other words, one cannot allow the tools to more important point becomes the NWC dominate the process.11 In addition, the more wargames’ direct influence upon the evolu­ we develop machine-centered analytical tools, tion of War Plan Orange, used to defeat Japan the more we must strive to maintain a bal­ during the war. Although much of that influ­ anced state of wargaming that continues to ence was indirect and could never be proven recognize the value of human interaction.12 historically, it was likely due to the fact that Alarmingly, however, the present trend is people like Nimitz and Adm Ernest King had to move away from that vital characteristic of played those wargames. In particular, the human involvement in decisions. There is an fleet-exercise experience of “carrier admi­ insatiable appetite for detailed simulations, rals,” such as William “Bull” Halsey, Frank empowered by the exponential increase in 50 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 computational power of the last 20 years, in scheme of maneuver. Thus, wargaming, which pursuit of the unattainable—predicting a cer­ could have been an effective support tool for tain outcome. By reinvigorating the old empha­ exploratory campaign planning, was not nearly sis on the human dimension of wargaming, as significant a contributor to planning for the we can tap its power to illuminate pertinent is- Gulf War as it could have been. Not much has sues in the complex national-security envi­ changed in the last decade to improve the flex­ ronment of the twenty-first century. Wargam­ ibility of databases and models. ing could thus regain its utility as a thought- In the quest for Jominian prescriptive provoking tool that leads the way to military answers, quantitative mathematical analyses understanding and innovation. clearly have their advantages. Yet, they have We are no longer in a static national-security disadvantages as well (fig. 2). Reproducibility environment characterized by well-defined ad­ can make mathematical simulations very use­ versaries and expected conflict. Admittedly, in ful from an analytical perspective, but their the context of the cold war, in which potentially abstractness, by definition, produces only an decisive combat would occur between the large approximation of reality. Consequently, they armored and mechanized forces of two super- are less than perfect for future leaders trying powers and their allies on the central German to grapple with the chaos of war. But arguing plains, precise numbers really did matter. for one type instead of the other misses the point. Against an opponent with 10,000 tanks, an at­ Wargaming should not be a zero-sum “game” be- trition rate of 29 percent rather than 30 per- tween mutually exclusive types; rather, these types cent equates to 100 more enemy tanks in the are mutually complementary. Just as we should not rear area. Thus, wargaming models appropri­ discredit the value of analytical simulations, so ately clashed large armored forces in areas should we not allow machine-centered analysis to where terrain was of little consequence and eclipse computer-assisted gaming that takes advan­ where minor differences in projected attrition tage of human interaction in exploring the com­ rates were more important than human inter- plexities of warfare that cannot be precisely modeled action and decision making. With attrition as mathematically. the key issue, the explosive increase in compu­ Part of the reason wargaming has ebbed tational power during the latter half of the and flowed with inconsistent popularity, wan­ twentieth century enabled the development of ing support, and erratic integration into PME, models and simulations that were highly de- as well as the nonacademic military environ­ tailed in their representation of such attrition. ment, lies within the wargaming process itself. But such increased modeling and simulation It has a flaw that can prove fatal. This flaw, as complexity, addressing ever-increasing force depicted in figure 2, has to do with conven­ levels and attrition rates, led to large, mono­ ience, flexibility, and—correspondingly—time­ lithic events requiring sizable investments in liness. As one of the world’s first wargamers, supporting technological infrastructures and Baron von Reisswitz learned in the early nine­ extended periods of preparation time. teenth century that the king did not appreci­ As a result, the thought processes of opera­ ate waiting a year for a wargame to be ready.14 tional art degrade while the inflexibility of the A dose of reality is that to be effective, wargaming models under development increases. This, in must be timely and flexible enough to accommodate turn, leads to the types of doctrinal voids in the the desired objectives of the game sponsor. Many Air Force so well articulated in Carl Builder’s wargames have gone the way of the dinosaurs. book The Icarus Syndrome.13 When much of the They lacked organizational commitment, took Air Force initially approached Operation too long to spin up, did not adapt to changing Desert Storm with a doctrinal mind-set of Air- needs of the sponsor, and failed to produce Land Battle, our wargaming correspondingly valuable learning. The Air Force is now expe­ depicted airpower’s principal function as the ditionary, light, lean, and lethal—and wargam­ delivery of “fires” to support the ground ing must adjust accordingly. SILVER FLAG 51

Military No Interactive Pure Field Exercises Manual Computer-Assisted Man-in-the-Loop Computer Mathematical and Wargames Wargames Computer Experiments Simulations Simulations Analyses

More Human-Decision Impact and Operational Realism Less

Less Degree of Abstraction More

Less Outcome Reproducibility, More Generality More

More Convenience and Flexibility Less

Figure 2. Spectrum of Gaming and Analysis

More specifically, successful wargaming With a good plan that drives an adaptable but must effectively address key questions involv­ timely process, the goal of zero disconnects ing the interaction of the principal actors in between each acting agency in the design- the wargaming process (fig. 3). The sponsor’s and-execution loop is achievable. desires in fulfillment of the intended purpose As the service continues to organize, train, of the game must drive the overall process to and equip, wargaming can spearhead thought produce a valuable experience for partici­ processes. To maximize the benefits of its in- pants and sponsor. This requires good plan­ vestment in wargames, the Air Force must inte­ ning; an ad hoc approach will certainly fail. grate efforts with exercises, battle labs, experi­ mentation, and analysis offices (fig. 4). The insights provided by wargaming help drive an “innovation battle space” and can take the form of issues requiring further exploration in dif­ Game Controller ferent areas: command and control proce­ dures, quantitative system or force-structure trade-offs, or basic system capabilities that ap­ Players pear highly attractive but need a feasibility Sponsor Capability check from a battle lab or an advanced concept Issues Campaign technology demonstration (ACTD) effort. Insights Getting down to pragmatics, wargaming Force-Structure Issues simply must relate more closely to the fight Key and become more relevant for war fighters. A Issues Analyses mistaken impression exists that educational wargames, in particular, are just for students in PME courses. Not so. All war fighters can • Objectives • Issues and should benefit greatly from experience • Measures of Merit • Analyses with wargaming. Currently, however, users complain about the artificiality of wargames. Figure 3. Game Process Unfortunately, they are often correct. War- 52 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Orga n ize

Air Force Vision

Strategic Tr Plan ain ip Air Force qu E Studies Doctrine and Analyses Agency Professional Concept of Annual Military Small Operations Planning and Education Business Programming Innovation Guidance Research Professional Wargames and Continuing Education Advanced Technology Experiments Demonstration Joint Warrior Air Force Interoperability Research Battle Demonstration Laboratory Labs Joint Test and Evaluation

Figure 4. OPWAR/Wargaming Nexus (Adapted from Air Force Policy Directive 10-23, “Innovation Pro- gram,” draft, 30 August 2001, 2) games are a waste of time and effort if they rithms, year after year negates the very utility don’t reflect reality and if they are artificially of wargaming. But the opportunity to address engineered toward a “desired” outcome. new concerns with new gaming is immense. Wargaming students, whether from num­ For example, the Air Force sees the air op­ bered air forces or PME schools, are no erations center (AOC) as a weapon system. As fools—they expect legitimacy. Tremendous such, it needs capable people there to help potential value lies in the legitimate intellec­ plan and execute the air portion of the cam­ tual exploration of doctrinal issues, new con­ paign. Yet, many personnel arrive at AOCs cepts of operations, aspects of information with insufficient knowledge, experience, or warfare, ways of apportioning and allocating decision-making ability. AOC strategy and high-demand/low-density assets, and other plans divisions do not have longer-range leading-edge concerns that wargaming can wargaming efforts. Therefore, gaming centers address. However, playing the same tired sce­ should work this problem with realistic scenar­ narios, based on outdated attrition algo­ ios and facilities that can accurately depict and SILVER FLAG 53 exercise the process from objectives to assess­ still haunt the process. Analytic tools focused ment. Although wargaming is certainly not a on attrition require painstaking efforts to re- weapon system, it can help portray one accu­ focus them on different geographic areas or rately. Again, the human element is key. The force structures.16 Their inflexibility in ad- AOC uses machines, but it depends upon dressing present and near-future war-fighting people as decision makers. issues in wargames produces large, expensive Critics will still try to argue that this con- games that are equally inflexible and require fuses training with education. Certainly, as­ excessively long lead times. In fact, prepara­ pects of learning how to operate in an AOC tion for the various service Title X wargames are purely a matter of training. But such train­ and capstone games supporting PME schools ing does not have to isolate itself from educa­ takes longer than many real-world opera- tional needs. In other words, we must ask tions.17 Even the games’ seemingly impressive such important questions as, What role does analytic capability often comes up short in wargaming play in the education and training shedding light on important nonattrition, of AOC personnel? Our wargaming centers nonkinetic war-fighting issues of the day. should then execute the process involved In addition, a review of recent Title X with that answer. games shows a definite tendency to posit con­ Today, the most notable wargames in the flict with adversaries committing large force Department of Defense are the services’ Title structures to the conflict, oftentimes in less X games, which, unsurprisingly, the Navy ini­ 15 than optimal geographic locations. Clearly, tiated in 1981. The Air Force entered this such force levels can be assembled within the Title X gaming arena when Gen Ronald next 10–20 years, but that is not the trend in Fogleman, as chief of staff, recognized the today’s national-security environment. value of the NWC games and the need to es­ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld re­ tablish a level playing field for all the services. cently stated, “Our current national security The resultant Air Force Title X effort was environment is dynamic with limited forecast­ based upon a game-design concept then in ing visibility.”18 In the Quadrennial Defense Re- use for the Aerospace Power Symposium’s wargame conducted annually at Maxwell Air view Report, he notes that “it is not enough to Force Base, Alabama, which involved corpo­ plan for large conventional wars in distant rate and senior civic leaders in an attempt to theaters. Instead, the United States must increase their understanding of the issues fac­ identify the capabilities required to deter and ing the military services. General Fogleman, defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, however, changed the audience to senior deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve 19 members of joint war-fighter staffs and refo­ their objectives.” Again, the message is clear. cused their purpose to address near-term, op­ Wargaming must have greater agility in ad- erational-level, war-fighting issues. dressing smaller-scale scenarios with multiple The initial game took place in 1996 under branches and sequels. the title “Strategic Force ’96” and has subse­ In short, we risk losing the wargaming vi­ quently evolved into the Global Engagement sion and lesson from Newport. Wargaming (GE) series. More recently, the Air Force has must meet the educational and training added two more games: an Air Force Future needs of war fighters and students in terms of Capabilities game, which looks at a more dis­ timeliness, flexibility, realism, and focus. It is tant time period, and a Space wargame, dedi­ a mistake to demand definitive answers to cated to examining future issues related to complex issues from a tool best used to raise the military use of space. questions. Again, the strength of wargaming Developing these wargames has been a lies in exploring alternatives and enhancing positive step for the Air Force; unfortunately, insights into likely courses of action, not in the wargaming problems identified earlier providing quantitative results. 54 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

For example, one of the most enlightening force application. To make this happen, how- and helpful wargames in some time was the ever, assessors must be able to adjudicate ap­ South Asia game conducted concurrently plicable factors with effective support materi­ with the 1999 Global game at Newport. The als. Otherwise, they have to rely exclusively on former provided a forum for exploring the personal judgment—both for attrition and operational aspects involved with the after- nonattrition phenomena—which does not math of a nuclear exchange. It allowed for ex­ meet the mark. Some of the hypothetical ploration of US interagency coordination as campaigns developed during recent games well as coalition-government cooperation suggest a singular inability to understand the with nongovernment organizations and pri­ complex interaction of these factors. vate volunteer organizations in a military op­ Representation of the protagonist is an- eration other than war. Aside from some ball- other area that requires examination. Have park casualty estimates for the detonation of we consciously decided that having a profes­ the nuclear weapons, it required no direct sional red team is not a good investment? Ef­ model support. This might be the kind of fective wargames cannot constrain the oppo­ game that is exceedingly relevant and timely, sition to the extent that the moves do not given current national-security concerns of reflect the adversary’s operational art. Simi­ terrorist attacks on the continental United larly, we can improve our common treatment States. of logistics, whose critical limiting factors are Turning toward suggestions for the future, frequently overlooked to prevent them from the services’ Title X efforts have identified interfering with the unfolding of the opera­ some important war-fighter issues but not to tional plan. the depth required. For example, we need A deliberate effort to refine investment in more work on coalition relationships—espe­ Air Force wargaming could dramatically im­ cially exploration of command, control, com­ prove synergistic effects across all aspects of munications, and computer capabilities re­ the innovation battlefield. Without getting quired for allies—as well as on technological too much into the weeds, this funneled effort and doctrinal gaps. After GE IV, although could lead the way to a more efficient study of some parties expressed solid support for a OPWAR (table 1) and could produce results game on key coalition issues, budgetary limi­ for OPWAR similar to those produced by Red tations precluded a game focused solely on Flag for the tactical level of war. this critical topic. Other examples of poten­ Table 1 tially key issues for the Title X series include exploring improved employment concepts Potential Initiatives for the air expeditionary force; better under- for a Silver Flag OPWAR standing of escalation-control measures; un­ derstanding the trade-offs between air, space, • “Train as we fight” at the OPWAR—a Silver Flag. and surface intelligence, surveillance, and re­ connaissance (ISR) capabilities; and examin­ • Link the fields of doctrine, concepts of ing numerous issues regarding both policy operations, research, education, and and technology of information operations. gaming—synergy through wargaming. The human-centered, qualitative nature of • Better address the key issues for which wargaming can and should make great con­ games are sponsored, going beyond sur­ tributions to furthering our understanding of face concepts—detailed analysis. operational art, specifically in the emerging areas of information operations, homeland • Improve assessment methodology, ex­ defense, and effects-based operations. In ad­ ploring a “building block” approach by dition, we can improve in the area of gaming using in-depth, pregame analysis of a economic and political realities of military range of likely interactions selected and SILVER FLAG 55

assembled during game execution— concerns. For example, in addition to the building blocks. AOC issue already discussed, numerous as­ pects of weaponizing space relate to home- • Shift the emphasis from the large, cul­ land defense and pose viable challenges. minating event to multiple, intensely fo­ A key ingredient to the success of NWC cused events—smaller games. wargaming was the Navy’s opinion that the • Dramatically shorten wargame develop­ “opportunity to pit one intellect and will ment time—improved models. against another was seen as an essential ele­ ment in the education of a naval officer.”20 To • Design game-assessment methodologies promote this concept, service variety in the that better reflect the shift from attri­ ranks of senior game assessors and “higher tion warfare to effects-based warfare— better modeling and simulation. authority” players seems to make good sense. Again, the goal is to examine ideas and ex­ • Develop a campaign-planning-level war- plore concepts descriptively rather than pre­ gaming capability that can be brought scriptively. Therefore, we must build a game to war fighters; tailored to their scenarios, construct and atmosphere that intensify rather than areas of responsibility, and issues of in­ dilute the competition of ideas. Accordingly, an Air terest; and integrated into home-station Force–only assessment of Air Force–centered con­ staff education and training—a suitcase cepts may prove shortsighted. Air Force members wargame. better understand the attributes of airpower • Develop a cadre of experts equipped when they confront competing arguments— with appropriate resources—in-house not when they insulate themselves from con­ red-team expertise. trary concepts. Finally, we can streamline some of the • Build a state-of-the-art Silver Flag facility wargaming preparatory process. Under cur- rivaling those at Carlisle Barracks, rent game-design constructs, participants , and Newport to educate often spend most of their time deciding how and train leaders, generate ideas, and to deploy, employ, and (hopefully) sustain develop issues, making it the source of forces—typically, not the major objectives of OPWAR thinking—a Silver Flag home. the wargame but definitely part of their task­ The challenge is to reinvigorate the support that ing. Certainly, the requirement to develop a wargaming provides to developing the operational campaign plan may be the primary purpose art of war by refocusing the objectives of Title X of wargames run in the operational or PME wargaming toward addressing the uncertainties of environment, where the learning experience the future—a challenge laid out by the secretary of is paramount. On the other hand, briefings defense in the “terms of reference” for the Quadren­ by game-control teams on some of the more nial Defense Review. Capitalizing on the signifi­ fundamental matters of force employment cant investments in game-preparation materi­ and campaign planning, based on limited in- als made for Title X wargames and coupling puts from key players, could free players to focus that with a transportable gaming capability, primarily on the key issues identified by the game one could provide the essential tools for the sponsor without undermining player buy-in to the staffs of the numbered air forces and the game. Typically, however, the Title X games commanders in chief to begin exploring their are run to develop a better understanding of a understanding of adversary options as well as few key issues. Freeing Title X players from the branches and sequels. deployment and employment issues allows Just as the US Army is currently wargaming them to focus on cutting-edge policy issues. its “transformation” at Carlisle Barracks, so The Newport wargaming that contributed might the Air Force capitalize on the benefit to War Plan Orange involved more than a of a Silver Flag center’s exploration of new single game; similarly, our PME institutions 56 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

could benefit from increased integration of into issues and concepts of current and future wargaming (not just capstone experiences) operations. It does not reside in trying to pre­ into curricula. The challenge, of course, is dict or prove outcomes, such as for budgetary limited budgets and limited time. Thus, the and force-structure justification. The GE ex­ coupling of Title X resources for analysis sup- perience shows that games can reveal fruitful port with PME wargaming, as well as the link­ areas for subsequent in-depth analysis. Issues ing of wargaming assets across the Air Force developed from wargames could serve as a and Department of Defense, should be a win­ road map to focus the efforts of battle labs, ning combination. The Air Force could bene­ war-fighting centers, joint-experimentation fit from an overall review of its sizable invest­ projects, and expeditionary-force initiatives. ment in Title X wargaming, modeling, and This map would promote a coherent, efficient, simulation, keeping in mind the value in and economical wargaming effort. Just as air- using gaming to reach as many of the right men have learned the most effective ways to people in critical positions as possible. apply aerospace power, so should we explore The main value of wargaming lies in ex­ the most productive uses of wargaming. ploring operational art to develop insights

Notes

1. Although wargaming is distinct from modeling and simu­ craft, thereby restricting their freedom of action. See also Robert lation, for simplicity’s sake, this article uses the terms inclusively T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940 (1955; to focus primarily on seminar-style educational wargames con­ reprint, Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), ducted to explore operational-/strategic-level issues, for the en­ 63–68. lightenment of either the sponsor or the participants. 11. Perla, 8. 2. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The 12. Ibid., 163–67. Throughout his book, Perla implies that Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 26. In the principal discriminator between wargames and closed-form, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (New York: Basic Books, simulation-based analyses is the ability to accommodate the Inc., 1976), 27–35, Norman Dixon discusses the difficulty of human-decision element. human decision making in the two basic activities of war—deliv­ 13. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power ering energy and communicating information. Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, 3. The purpose is definitely not to argue for wargaming over N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 3–37. modeling and simulation. They are complementary tools, each 14. Perla, 24. serving a unique and vitally important function for our service. 15. The Global Wargame series started in 1981 as a summer 4. Wargaming literature often omits incidents concerning activity for students arriving to attend the Naval War College. wargaming’s deleterious effects on decision making in war. Al­ Over time the game grew to be the largest and best-known though this article touches on just a few historical examples for wargame within the Department of Defense. Although early par­ purposes of illustration, for a more comprehensive look at the ticipants were known to have “proven it at Newport” and at least history of wargaming, see Matthew Caffrey Jr.’s “Toward a History- one game culminated with the NWC president thanking the Based Doctrine for Wargaming,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 3 gamers for having “proven” the maritime strategy, game design­ (Fall 2000): 33–56; and Peter P. Perla III, The Art of Wargaming: A ers have had considerable license to experiment, both with na­ Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis: Naval Institute tional-strategy issues and with wargaming methodologies. As a re­ Press, 1990), 1–160. sult, the game has been a major contributor to the advancement of 5. Perla, 41. the wargaming art form. 6. Eric Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 16. Such tools generally involve complex, computer-driven 1912–1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 99. algorithmic equations. 7. Perla, 70. 17. GE IV took 15 months of preparation. Allied Force took 8. Ibid., 73. 78 days. The trend is not encouraging: GE VI will take over 24 9. See course text titled The Air Force (Langley Field, Va.: Air months. Corps Tactical School, 1930), 19; and Caffrey, 42. 18. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Terms of Reference for Quadren­ 10. The Air Force, 59. It is interesting to ponder whether nial Defense Review,” pamphlet, 22 June 2001, 9. Chennault himself, or perhaps one of his disciples at ACTS, scrib­ 19. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Re- bled “OUT ! ! ! !” in the margin of a copy of the course text, re­ port, 30 September 2001, iv, on-line, Internet, 5 November 2001, ferring to an underlined passage mandating how pursuit aircraft available from http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf. had to follow a prescribed rendezvous with bombardment air- 20. Perla, 68. The Cult Editorial Abstract: Speed is the mantra of the Air Force. We seek rapid aerospace dominance of the Quick and push to cow enemies quickly with shock and awe. But does fast always mean success­ DR.ThOMAS HUGHES ful? The doctrinal “cult of the offensive” in World War I championed quick victory in the­ ory but experienced disastrous stalemate in cult: great or excessive devotion or dedication practice. Suggesting the relative newness of to some person, idea, or thing . . . such de­ our worship of speed, Dr. Hughes uses histor­ votion regarded as a literary or intellectual ical precedent to show that a more gradual ap­ fad or fetish. proach to warfare can achieve military objec­ ––Webster’s Third New tives as well as the quick strike. International Dictionary

N OCTOBER 1999, the US Senate Armed Services Committee heard testimony from American leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ Ition’s (NATO) air war over Kosovo the pre­ vious spring. In his remarks, Lt Gen Michael Short, US Air Force, found fault with the targeting and pace of Operation Allied Force (OAF). Had he been in charge, he told the senators, “I’d have gone for the head of the snake on the first night. I’d have dropped the bridges across the Danube [River]. I’d have hit five or six political and military headquarters in downtown Belgrade. [Serbian president Slobodan] Milosevic and his cronies would have waked up the first morning asking what the hell was going on.” often marked by Throughout OAF, Short had clashed with his differences, particu­ superior, the US Army’s Gen Wesley Clark, larly on issues relating NATO commander, on a score of issues––to to the nature, prepara­ the point that some staff officers for both tion, and conduct of warfare. These dif­ men believed Clark should have relieved ferences, manifest to even casual ob­ Short. However, on the matter of the proper servers, make Department of Defense pace of military operations, Clark agreed with (DOD) efforts such as the Quadrennial Defense his aggressive subordinate. “I think one of the Review and the process of writing joint doc- lessons that comes out of Allied Force,” Clark trine difficult and often acrimonious. But testified, “is the need that once you cross the also, like Clark and Short, Pentagon officials threshold to move as rapidly as possible to the appear to speak with one voice on the matter decisive use of force.”1 of speed in war. Universally, across all services, Like the relationship between Clark and among military officers and civilian staffers, Short, the one among US military services is and from the chairman’s office to the enlisted

57 58 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 corps, those charged with the stewardship of Of Doctrine and Dictate national defense view speed as an inherent advantage in warfare. In their view, speed has References to speed are everywhere in the intrinsic value in the strategic, operational, DOD. Service doctrine is full of it. “The mili­ tary’s ability to respond quickly and decisively,” asserts the Army’s basic manual on operations, Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, “is Current DOD orthodoxy, however, fundamental to Army operations doctrine.”3 makes no adequate distinction be- For its part, the Navy’s capstone doctrine tween time and speed. Rather, claims that the forward presence of its ships military thinkers prescribe rapidity of and aircraft is “essential to permit the United States to act quickly in meeting any crises that action as the only way to leverage 4 time in the conduct of war. affect our security.” Beyond this, the Navy be­ lieves that “rapid high tempo actions” are among the best ways to exploit the dynamics of and tactical conduct of war. With increasing war and that “tempo is more than a means to employ weapons better; it is a weapon it- unanimity, professionals and pundits alike 5 extol the virtues of velocity. They link it inex­ self.” The Marine Corps, sometimes self-de- orably with the decisive use of force and scribed as the nation’s 911 force, agrees. “Of all judge any suggestion or effort to restrain the the consistent patterns we can discern in war,” Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, pace of military operations as anathema to Warfighting, explains, “there are two concepts the sound principles and long experience of of universal significance in generating combat warfare. power: speed and focus. Speed is rapidity of ac­ War is far too variable and local circum­ tion. It applies to both time and space. Speed stances are far too diverse to sustain any such over time is tempo—the consistent ability to hoary maxim. Time, as distinct from speed, is operate quickly. Speed over distance, or space, of course an essential element of war; one is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are keen observer believes it “will rule tactically genuine sources of combat power. In other and operationally” and is “undoubtedly the words, speed is a weapon” (emphasis in origi­ least forgiving of error among strategy’s di­ 6 2 nal). mensions.” Current DOD orthodoxy, how- The Air Force, the fastest of the services, ever, makes no adequate distinction between also extols speed. Its slender 85-page Air time and speed. Rather, military thinkers pre- Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force scribe rapidity of action as the only way to Basic Doctrine, contains at least 22 references leverage time in the conduct of war. But the to speed as an advantage in war.7 Elsewhere, utility of time across all levels of warfare also Air Force doctrine asserts a “new American requires the willingness and ability to reduce Way of War” that “uses the rapid employment the pace of military operations, as any careful of sophisticated military capabilities to en- examination of military experience demon­ gage a broad array of targets simultaneously, strates. Ironically, without tolerance for the strongly, and quickly, with discriminate appli­ gradual and incremental conduct of war, the cation, to decisively shape the conflict and American military has undercut the value of avoid the results of previous wars of attrition its vaunted capacity for speed. It is the will­ and annihilation.”8 ingness to modulate operations over time, far DOD joint doctrine mirrors service pro­ more than a simpleminded pressure on the nouncements. Joint Publication (Pub) 1, Joint throttle, that makes speed an advantage in Operations of the Armed Forces of the United States, war and best defends against enemies who proclaims, “American arms seek rapid decision may employ patience––time of a different in simultaneous application of all appropriate sort––as a weapon. dimensions of combat power.”9 Moreover, the THE CULT OF THE QUICK 59 basic goal in all war operations is a “rapid” de­ speed. “Military power,” he has asserted, is cision, and “arriving first with the most capabil­ “increasingly defined not by size and mass but ity clearly remains the objective.”10 The basic by mobility and swiftness.”18 joint manual for operations goes a step further, Perhaps commentary about the 1999 air war mandating that objectives in war “must directly, over Kosovo best reveals this ingrained dictate quickly, and economically contribute to the for speed. Dozens if not hundreds of news ac­ purpose of the operation.”11 Clearly, at a time counts as well as many academic, scholastic, when disputes among the services have com­ and professional articles added weight to Gen­ pelled some Pentagon observers to liken the eral Short’s carping about the pace of OAF.19 DOD to a schizophrenic as it tries to relate ser­ The Air Force, the service with the preponder­ vice and joint doctrine, the entire military pays ant responsibility in Kosovo, loudly criticized uniform homage to the important element of the conduct of the campaign. A leading Air speed in war.12 Force surrogate complained, “Allied Force This reverence for rapidity is not limited to began as an attempt to signal Milosevic that doctrine. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s NATO was serious about using force rather (JCS) Joint Vision 2010 to Marine Corps Strategy than as a decisive military operation designed 21 to an Air Force booklet titled 10 Proposi­ to achieve victory.” As a result, “it took NATO tions Regarding Air Power, official publications 30 days to do what General Norman Schwarz­ revel in speed.13 Gen Eric Shinseki, Army kopf did in about three days in the Gulf War.”20 chief of staff, promises to convert the Army An official Air Force report, while careful to from a plodding, cold-war behemoth to a claim the “decisiveness of airpower,” also de- swift, new-world dynamo in a series of shifts cried the gradual approach of the war. “Admit­ known inside the Army as the “Transforma­ tedly, the campaign did not begin the way that tion.”14 Gen John Jumper, Air Force chief of America would normally apply airpower—mas­ staff, has a similar initiative. His Global Strike sively,” the report’s authors wrote. But as soon Task Force “is a rapid-reaction, leading-edge, as the “air campaign grew in intensity,” it power-projection concept that will deliver “achieved its desired outcome.” The authors massive around-the-clock firepower” in a bid then set out to undercut whatever precedent to become the nation’s “kick down the door might exist in OAF for the gradual application force.” Through something called “predictive of force: battle-space awareness,” Jumper believes that Because air power offers the potential for great the Air Force should strive not merely for destruction while ordering relatively few war­ swift reaction but also for fast preemption in riors into harm’s way, its use becomes an attrac­ the conduct of war.15 For its part, the Joint tive political option. By default then, it becomes Staff’s professional journal, Joint Forces Quar­ acceptable to commit incrementally to military terly (JFQ), regularly trumpets the virtue of operations calibrated by the success or failure quickness. The Summer 1998 issue, dedi­ of the previous increment of military action. cated to “a look back at the best of JFQ,” un­ The attraction is obvious, in that one can avoid derscored the value of speed. One article a commitment to the intensity and violence re­ claimed that “the need to identify, target, and quired by a decisive and rapid military victory. The risk is failure.21 attack in near real-time is now a fact of life” and that “the commander can no longer af­ In isolation and at a glance, the DOD’s glo­ ford the luxury of thinking in terms of days, rification of speed appears reasonable. Strate­ weeks, or months to phase campaigns or move gic circumstances certainly exist in which ra­ forces.”16 Another article, which grandly iden­ pidity of action could be valuable—even tified time as the fourth dimension of war critical. However, this bias for speed ignores alongside air, land, and sea, insisted that local conditions. Surely, speed’s legitimate ad- speed was the only way to exploit time.17 Pres­ vantage in warfare under some circumstances ident George W. Bush reflects all this stress on does not ensure its value under all circum- 60 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 stances. Kosovo is not the entire Balkans, the Civil War, the Anaconda Plan reflected Persian Gulf, Korean Peninsula, or Chinese the Union Army’s strategic preference to de- mainland, which in turn is not the new topog­ feat the Confederacy through a slow and de- raphy of international terrorism. At a time liberate squeezing; it was the South, the when the American military has global com­ weaker military power, that sought a swift out- mitments arrayed at variable threats, both come on the battlefield. Throughout the real and potential, the Pentagon’s single- frontier wars, which stretched from well be- minded view of speed leaves the nation’s de- fore independence to shortly before 1900, fenders poorly prepared for the range of mil­ the American Army marched westward no itary opposition and enemies they may face. faster than expanding white settlement de­ manded and required. The desire for speed gathered momentum The Journey to Speed in the twentieth century as America’s strategic The DOD’s love affair with speed is neither obligations broadened across the globe. After ageless nor inevitable. Emerging over time, it the Spanish-American War, the United States is the product of larger cultural trends as well needed to provide a naval defense in the At­ as the Pentagon’s perceived lessons of past lantic and Pacific Oceans using a navy ade­ warfare and its assessment of present threats. quate for the protection of only one ocean at Military institutions are part of larger soci­ a time, a condition that stressed mobility and eties, and since the Enlightenment, Western speed. The Navy’s Great White Fleet voyage of populations have generally pursued the ca­ 1907–8 was designed to test the nation’s abil­ pacity for quickness as an intrinsic good. This ity to reach Earth’s four corners, and the pattern, especially prevalent in industrial so­ Panama Canal was built in large part to en- cieties like the United States, has fostered a sure a speedy transfer of fighting ships from host of scholastic and popular commentary. the Atlantic to the Pacific. Before World War The modern computer age has acted as a I, War Plan Orange, the Navy’s operational kind of steroid in this process, elevating speed plan for combat with Japan, stressed the need to a virtual theology.22 to project power quickly across the vast Pa­ Larger cultural trends are not the only in­ cific to protect the nation’s new colony in the fluences that condition martial ideas, how- Philippine Islands. In the interwar years, Or­ ever.23 Well-developed military institutions ange was also a powerful impetus to the de­ are marked by a high degree of internal co­ velopment of aircraft carriers, increasingly hesion. Morever, they maintain rigid entry re­ seen as a means of rapid movement. In fact, quirements and provide internal training and from the genesis of Orange in 1904 until education. In other words, they are capable of World War II, the speed of a fleet movement internal intellectual trends. Within the DOD, across the ocean was the central determinant then, the quest for speed stems also from be­ of the war plan’s many variations.24 liefs about past military experience and pres­ Land-based military aviation furthered this ent assessments of future threats. speed-mindedness. In the 1920s, airplane theo­ Rapidity was not always a touchstone in rists and advocates like Brig Gen William American military thought, despite positive Mitchell trumpeted aviation’s capacity to cul­ references to it in many of the strategic analy­ minate war quickly, an attractive proposition to ses favored by the Pentagon. In the War of In- a generation soured by the memory of long, dependence, George Washington’s Continen­ deadly, and seemingly indecisive trench com­ tal Army leveraged a patient, incremental, bat during World War I. In the 1930s, America’s and modulated campaign against the world’s growing strategic interests around the world, greatest military force. Eventually, the British the memory of the Great War, and the promise Empire decided that further hostilities in the of a quicker war next time encouraged a con­ New World were not in its interests. During centration on rapidity among war planners. As THE CULT OF THE QUICK 61 a result, by the eve of World War II, no one se­ proach to warfare.27 By the 1980s, this view of riously questioned the dictum of Gen George Vietnam had become conventional wisdom. It Marshall, Army chief of staff, that no democ­ was enshrined in Secretary of Defense Caspar racy could endure a 10-year war.25 Weinberger’s famous tests for military involve­ For good reason, the atomic age further ac­ ment abroad as well as in the dictum of Gen cented the virtues of velocity. During the cold Colin Powell, chairman of the JCS, to employ war, the United States, for the first time in its overwhelming force in military operations. Be­ history, stood vulnerable to widespread de­ yond their advocacy of massive force linked to struction at a moment’s notice. As a result, clear objectives, the Weinberger Doctrine and America’s strategic deterrence rested on the the Powell Corollary also embodied a strong tactical ability to deliver a nuclear strike of its bias toward speed in war. “Decisive means and own in a matter of hours, even minutes. The results are always to be preferred,” Powell once military organization first entrusted with this explained, “so you bet I get nervous when so- deterrent mission, the Air Force’s Strategic Air called experts suggest that all we need is a little Command, came to dominate both the fiscal surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the and cultural dimensions of the DOD by the late desired result isn’t obtained, a new set of ex­ 1950s. At the same time, the nation’s strategic perts then comes forward with talk of a little es­ posture in Europe and the Pacific mandated calation. History has not been kind to this ap­ the capacity to fight two major regional con­ proach.”28 Drawing on his memory of the flicts simultaneously. This caused the position­ Vietnam War, Powell later told the New York ing of vast amounts of war materiel and service Times, “As soon as they tell me it is limited, it members around the globe, hair-triggered to means they do not care whether you achieve a spring into action—a condition that survives result or not.”29 today. By the beginning of the Vietnam War, American military organizations had come to value both speed in war and speedy wars as in­ Of Speed and Decision trinsic goods, preferences not obvious in ear­ The short Gulf War of 1990–91 appeared to lier eras. validate the wisdom of massive force applied These beliefs banged against the reality of with lightning speed. At about the same time, limited war in Indochina. American military the Pentagon’s exultation of a contentious per­ leaders had hoped to wage a fast, massive air sonality reflected an increasingly codified be- campaign against North Vietnam, but political lief in speed. Since the 1960s, Col John Boyd, fears of a wider war with China, or perhaps the a maverick Air Force officer, had conducted a Soviet Union, compelled an incremental ap­ lonely campaign to champion his OODA Loop proach to the war. Operation Rolling Thunder, (the observe, orient, decide, and act decision a gradual escalation of bombing to coerce cycle). A fighter pilot, Boyd had derived this North Vietnam into surrender, raised hackles schematic from his experiences dogfighting among military leaders. The senior American North Korean MiGs, during which he had commander for much of the war, Adm U. S. learned that quicker decisions often led to vic­ Grant Sharp, labeled this slow campaign a “re- tory in aerial combat. After the Korean War, treat from reality” that avoided the difficult de­ Boyd extrapolated this concept from the tacti­ cisions and “treaded the mushy middle cal level of war to a new principle for every- ground.” In his view, this incremental approach thing from procurement to national strategic to war not only betrayed a weak resolve but also behavior.30 emboldened enemies; it was “guaranteed to For years, the DOD was hostile toward produce a true strategy for defeat.”26 Boyd’s ideas, in part because the imperatives of After the Vietnam War, the vast majority of combat at the tactical level of fighting did not military officers and Pentagon observers easily translate as guidelines for the operational adopted Sharp’s criticism of a gradual ap­ or strategic conduct of war. In the 1990s, how- 62 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 ever, an appreciation for war’s complexity was time-competitive process, and timeliness of de­ combined with the growing potency of tactical cisions becomes essential to generating weapons to compress and sometimes to oblit­ tempo.”35 Boyd’s own service, the Air Force, erate the analytical boundaries between the tac­ which had earlier been belligerent to him and tical, operational, and strategic levels of war. In his ideas, now praises the OODA Loop. But in an influential booklet published in 1995, Col the process, the service confuses speed and David Deptula (now a major general), US Air time. As explained by one Air Force booklet Force, described how new precision-guided recommended to all incoming officers, munitions might profitably be used in “parallel Air power increases speed of movement by or­ war” to “exploit three dimensions—time, space, ders of magnitude. This conquest of time by air and levels of war.” Using the Gulf War as an ex- power provides surprise, and surprise in turn af­ ample, he exhorted his colleagues to “focus on fects the mind, causing confusion and disorien­ systematic effects rather than individual target tation. John Boyd’s entire theory of the OODA destruction” and argued that new weapon sys­ Loop . . . is based on the premise that telescop­ tems could simultaneously shape each level of ing time—arriving at decisions or locations rap­ war.31 That same year the Pentagon’s Joint Pub idly—is the decisive element in war because of the enormous psychological strain it places on 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations, proclaimed that 36 “advances in technology, information age an enemy. media reporting, and the compression of time- Concurrent with this development, swift mil­ space relationships contribute to the growing itary operations became officially identified interrelationships between the levels of war. with the decisive use of force, which has consti­ Commanders at every level must be aware that tuted the Holy Grail of military strategy since at in a world of constant, immediate communica­ least the Battle of Waterloo.37 For the American tions, any single event may cut across the three military, this quest for decisive action has fueled levels [tactical, operational, and strategic].”32 some of the great intramural service squabbles. Deptula and others were advocating more The Army Air Forces’ (AAF) assertion of avia­ careful thought about compelling enemy be­ tion’s decisive effect in World War II drives an havior. However, this exhortation also served ongoing debate, and today each combat arm to diminish the analytic utility that had but- carefully lays claim to decisive ability in official tressed the levels-of-war paradigm for at least statements of doctrine and strategy. Through a century. As a result, Boyd’s ideas of war were most of the twentieth century, however, the more likely to meet acceptance in the na­ search for and debate about decisive force tion’s military. Before this development, rested on traditional concepts of decisiveness, strategists often believed that the factors classically defined as the ability or capacity to which shaped speed’s value in war varied decide some issue or compel some decision on across the levels of conflict, as Carl von the battlefield.38 The AAF did not claim to have Clausewitz had suggested in On War.33 But won World War II quickly, after all; it merely with the growing inconsequence of these lev­ claimed it was the most important element in els of war, the way was clearer to proclaim deciding the contest. speed an intrinsic, inherent advantage in All this changed in the 1980s and 1990s. war—in all conditions and at every level.34 Speed became, if not synonymous with deci­ The Marine Corps was the first to warm to siveness, at least an indispensable adjunct to Boyd, and its capstone Warfighting doctrine the concept, a link seen in the 1992 iteration now revels in the idea of the OODA Loop. For of the National Military Strategy: marines today, warfare is necessarily a function Once a decision for military action has been of decision making, and “whoever can make made, half-measures and confused objectives and implement decisions consistently faster exact a severe price in the form of a protracted gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. conflict which can cause needless waste of Decision making in execution thus becomes a human lives and material resources, a divided THE CULT OF THE QUICK 63

nation at home, and defeat. Therefore, one of pidity in both combat and war, but it also the essential elements of our national military teaches patience and perseverance. In World strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the War II, both Japan and Germany based their forces needed to win—the concept of applying tactical, operational, and strategic war plans decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and on speed; when compelled into longer fights, thereby terminate conflicts swiftly and with minimum loss of life.39 they lost. In the Korean War, the combatant that struck first and fast eventually lost. In the Subsequent versions of the National Mili­ Vietnam War, the combatant with persever­ tary Strategy rooted the bond between decisive ance and a modulated campaign won the day. force and speed deeper into the military lexi­ Although it is too early to derive sound con­ con. Today, each service routinely appends clusions, this past decade’s fights in the the concepts together. Soldiers believe “it is Balkans also seem to buttress incremental the Army’s ability to react promptly and to war. In 1995, for instance, Operation Deliber­ conduct sustained land operations that make ate Force saw NATO jets dropping bombs on it decisive” (emphasis in original).40 Sailors just 12 of the campaign’s 22 days with at least stress the forward presence of ships around one pause of five days.44 the world as a means to attain a “rapid, favor- A different view of the past also challenges able end to hostilities,” while criticizing the positive correlation between speed and slower attrition warfare as “frequently indeci­ decision so prevalent in doctrine and strate­ sive and inherently costly in terms of person­ gic thought. When the abrupt end of World nel, resources, and time.”41 For their part, fly­ War I fuelled theories of conspiracy between ers boldly assert that “decisive maneuver the German government and Western pow­ requires rapidly deployable, highly mobile ers, discontents like Adolf Hitler seized upon joint forces that can outpace and outmaneu­ the war’s swift conclusion to rise to power and ver opposing forces.”42 All this finds reflec­ help make the Great War an indecisive con­ tion in joint doctrine, which holds that “the flict. In World War II, despite great emphasis most important” characteristic of American on the Battle of Midway as a turning point arms is “the visible ability to act rapidly and deci­ and the atomic missions as the culminating sively in regions of U. S. interests” (emphasis point, the basic outcome of the Pacific War in original).43 turned more on the attrition of combat in the For those in charge of the nation’s military South and Southwest Pacific theaters and the strategy, then, a patient approach to war has sustained submarine assault on Japanese ship- become antithetical to the decisive use of ping. Likewise, the incredible crucible of the force. Speeding, already embedded into the eastern front, played out over four years, con­ military’s worldview, had now appropriated tributed more to the basic decision of the Eu­ the strategic high ground of decisive effect ropean war than any lightning attack con­ and was no longer the sort of cultural prefer­ ducted by any combatant.45 ence all militaries, and societies, exhibit. The More recently, the swift pace of the Gulf War demand for speed in war had now become a may well have worked against its potential for decree, to be pursued without regard to local decisive effect by catalyzing a strategic moment circumstance, strategic condition, or enemy on the highway to Basra before military com­ character. The quest for speed had become manders and political leaders could properly cultish. interpret plans and modify objectives. Instead, the coalition led by the United States simply Speeding Is Dangerous stopped the war, which allowed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to survive and badger the re­ This dangerous dictate rests on a facile, gion. Beyond these hot wars, the modulated, even contrived, sense of military experience. patient, and half-century-long cold war was per- Recent history demonstrates the value of ra­ haps the most decisive war in American history. 64 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

In the 1990s, the quest for swift war, replete pattern especially true of colder-climate soci­ with exit strategies and premature cease-fires, eties with large populations and prominent ur­ has led to less, not more, decisive war, as Ed- banization. However, societies elsewhere may ward Luttwak argues. For him, wars nowadays reference time not to clocks but to events; in rarely “run their natural course” to “burn them- this worldview, time is less discrete and more selves out and establish the preconditions for a variant.48 Certain languages, moreover, contain lasting settlement.” Instead, they “become en­ no functional analogue to the word time, and demic conflicts that never end because the the conjugation of verb tense is not universal.49 transformative effects of both decisive victory Surveying the variety of time, one keen ob­ and exhaustion are blocked.” The present server notes that “some Mediterranean and struggle against terrorism may well prove an Arab cultures define only three sets of time: no acid test for Luttwak’s point.46 time at all, now (which is of varying duration), These thumbnail assessments of America’s and forever (too long).”50 Clearly, different cul­ recent wars are not infallible. They do assert, tures approach time with different attitudes. however, an alternative view of military his- This potential mismatch is evident be- tory in which the value of speed and its link to tween Eastern and Western cultures. The pre- decisive effect are not uniform. The past is a eminent pieces of strategic writing in each dangerous lover. It promiscuously proclaims culture, Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s lessons to please a variety of insights and in­ The Art of War, approach time differently. One terests and seduces suitors according to cul­ scholar argues that “differences in worldview tural preference and institutional faction. and in concept of time” make for distinct The Pentagon’s insistence that slower wars strategic precepts in these books. Sun Tzu are necessarily less effective and intrinsically conceived strategy over a longer period of more expensive in material and lives may be time than did Clausewitz, and each marked intuitively plain to American officers, for in- his own time in the tactical and strategic con- stance, but it is not an inherent truth based duct of war. Sun Tzu characterized time in on military experience or possibility. Only in prolonged, cyclical, and integrated units a society obsessed with speed and only within while Clausewitz measured time in distinct, a military sensitive to civilian restraint, for in- short, and linear increments.51 These writings stance, could the lesson from the Vietnam do not correspond directly to strategic War be to conduct faster operations next choices made by nations in the contemporary time. A more balanced assessment would cer­ world, of course, but their continuing influ­ tainly include an appreciation for the patient ence indicates enduring national preference approach, a weapon deployed with great suc­ in the business of strategy making. At a time cess by North Vietnam. Moreover, nuclear when the Pentagon increasingly looks to the war, certainly swift war by any measure, is ma­ East, to strife in the Arab world, and to strate­ terially expensive to prepare and would be gic competition on the Asian landmass, these immeasurably expensive in lives to conduct. potential differences in time ought to matter. For the future, the American military’s sim­ Evidence of time’s physical and cultural ple view of the temporal dimensions of strategy determinants should worry those responsible leaves it vulnerable to adversaries who may for the nation’s defense. The Pentagon’s de­ place different measures and different values cree for speed across all levels of war commits on time. In the physical world, scientists are un­ a cardinal sin of strategy by assuming a con­ sure of time’s consistency, and Albert Einstein’s sistent value of velocity between ally and ad­ theory of relativity rests on time’s elasticity.47 In versary. This decree ignores cultural variety the political world, cultures use discrepant mea­ regarding time, and in the process, strategists sures of time. Western societies tend to mark dismiss their own exhortations of the dangers time by constant velocity in standard ways: of mirror-imaging enemies. In making speed minute, hour, day, month, and year; this is a a mandated weapon in its repertoire, the Pen- THE CULT OF THE QUICK 65 tagon makes patience an asymmetric threat operations other than war or small-scale con­ in the quivers of those who would wait out an tingencies, does not demand speed in war. impulsive America. While it does not openly advocate a patient ap­ proach, MOOTW doctrine does recognize con­ ditions under which an incremental approach A Way Forward might work best. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine As with most cults, the range of military for Military Operations other than War, describes thought contains within it the path to reform. MOOTW as actions “more sensitive to political Although not numerous, there are skeptics of considerations,” which are conducted within this demand for speed. Two civilian analysts “more restrictive rules of engagement” than 56 argue that “the fast, overwhelming and decisive war proper. Often designed to “keep the day- application of maximum force in the minimum to-day tensions between nations below the time . . . may produce effective, short term re­ threshold of armed conflict or war,” operations sults [but it may] be irrelevant, probably even short of war “may last for an extended period of 57 counterproductive, when matched against the time.” This approach to operations is re­ very difficult internal problems that form the flected in service doctrine, especially that of the underlying problems in target countries.”52 A Air Force. AFDD 2-3, Military Operations other small contingent of officers concurs and be­ than War, defines MOOTW as “those military lieves that the crux of this potential mismatch is actions not associated with sustained, large- a doctrine that prescribes quick and massive scale combat operations” and “as a result, the force. One experienced pilot, for instance, ar­ objectives of MOOTW usually do not include gues that Air Force doctrine “provides the na­ overwhelming a military opponent.”58 tion with one and only one way to prosecute an Because of perceived differences from war, air campaign.” This doctrine “prepares airmen joint MOOTW precepts promulgate a distinct quite well to fight their political masters over set of principles to guide commanders in op­ the right way to prosecute war, but leaves them erations short of war. Among these are re­ empty-handed when forced to fight an adver­ straint to “apply appropriate military capabil­ sary in a politically constrained environment.”53 ity prudently” and perseverance to “prepare Gen Joseph Ralston, NATO supreme com­ for the measured, protracted application of mander, believes that while massive application military capability in support of strategic of force may be more efficient and popular aims. Some MOOTW may require years to than an incremental strategy, “whether or not achieve the desired results.”59 For its part, the we like it, measured and steadily increasing use Air Force extols its commanders to use only of air power against an opponent may be one “appropriate ‘tailored’ force” to attain and of the options for future wars.”54 Although Ral­ maintain legitimacy while pursuing “the pa­ ston and others view incremental war as a pos­ tient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of na­ sible political necessity, instead of as a poten­ tional goals and objectives,” which “is para- tially positive way to conduct operations, they mount” in MOOTW.60 Moreover, compared do point to doctrine as one place to remedy the to its war-fighting doctrine, the Pentagon’s obsession with swift, overwhelming force.55 pronouncements on MOOTW are more sen­ The relationship between doctrine and strat­ sitive to contextual influences on strategy: egy is close and complex with no one model of these pronouncements advise commanders interaction adequately describing or explain­ to understand local conditions, especially re­ ing their respective orbits. Yet, they undoubt­ ligion, through effective interaction with edly influence each other. Doctrine, derived other government agencies and private or­ from the Latin verb doctrina (to teach), does in- ganizations via an “international civil-military deed offer alternatives for the conduct of con­ operations center.”61 flict. Doctrine for military operations other Doctrinal publications on MOOTW could than war (MOOTW), sometimes called simply moderate the military’s love affair with speed in 66 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 war. But this reformation faces obstacles. Al­ against terrorism.62 Many military officers be­ though many observers view MOOTW as far lieve that in war today, “a commander can no more likely than war in the near term, military longer afford the luxury of thinking in terms professionals have long been ambivalent to- of days, weeks, or months to phase campaigns ward operations short of war. In their doctrine, or move forces.”63 Actually, the opposite will they have sought to fire-wall MOOTW from war sometimes be true. War will sometimes value by espousing very different principles for each; thought stretching beyond the horizon even war is guided by offensive, surprise, and mass, as the technical capacity for rapid movement while MOOTW relies on restraint, persever­ pulls the mind in another direction. In con­ ance, and legitimacy. ventional or nonconventional war, the ability As a result, military professionals tend to to think counterintuitively just might be a view any action through the prism of war, commander’s greatest asset in the future. whether or not those operations fit the defini­ Obsession with speed denies the fundamen­ tional parameters of war. Commentary on OAF tal truth that in strategy, everything is contex­ reveals best this hesitancy toward MOOTW: vir­ tual, and circumstance is paramount. It trans- tually every professional critique of the opera­ forms doctrine into dogma, a condition that tion sprang from a conception that OAF con­ undercuts careful, clear, and nuanced thought stituted war, when it may have more closely about the relationship between power and resembled MOOTW. Allied Force was an oper­ purpose—the nexus of strategy. When the ation sensitive to issues of legitimacy, designed modern experience of war and its contempo­ to keep a smaller problem from becoming a rary tools eroded the analytic utility of the lev­ larger one, and conducted within political and els of war, officers and pundits alike wrongly as­ coalition constraints. Disputes among Balkan sumed a uniform value for speed across all states were not, and are not, ripe for any ma­ levels and in all kinds of conflict. The Air ture political settlement, and OAF (as well as Force’s advocacy of preemptive military opera­ Operation Deliberate Force, for that matter) tions, for example, may well deliver great tacti­ was designed to manage, not solve or decide, cal and operational advantages in the context contention in the region. Seen through the of war, but their costs at the strategic level of lens of MOOTW, the conduct of OAF becomes conflict may well be prohibitive, and their less objectionable, if not quite yet a textbook effects counterproductive. At a time when the case of the use of coercive force. American military faces state, substate, and If reform through MOOTW doctrine is im­ interstate threats and challenges across the probable, it is not impossible. But whether globe, devotion to speed is akin to a dan­ through greater appreciation of MOOTW gerous one-kind-fits-all mentality. The Penta­ and its doctrine or by some other mechanism, gon rightly strives for the capacity to conduct the DOD should temper its obsession with war quickly, but it should not allow that capac­ speed and decisive effect. Speed has not the ity to drive all planning and execution as, for intrinsic value claimed for it, and its relation- example, the cult of the offensive did at the ship to decisive effect is unclear. Undoubtedly start of World War I. appropriate under some conditions, the ideal In the end, current military thinking about of swift, decisive action may not always square speed mistakes an important and expensive with broader geopolitics. The very quest for capacity for an inherent and intrinsic advan­ decision on the battlefield is misplaced in an tage. This thinking also brokers little toler­ era when combat is used to manage, shape, ance for competing views that may point the and adjust ongoing conflict and tension. way to success under some of the conditions Graduated and moderated military cam­ America may face. To be sure, this cult of the paigns, for instance, might well prove more quick is partly the result of broad cultural effective than swift, decisive strikes in the trends. Some might even argue that today’s Balkans, the Middle East, and the fight constant news cycle requires the military’s de- THE CULT OF THE QUICK 67

votion to speed. But this devotion also comes as an ally.”64 This is true only if they appreci­ from trends and pressures internal to the ate that timeliness may be slow as well as Pentagon, as well as its own assessments of quick. Instead of leveraging time, devotion to military history and future threats. Having speed shackles military professionals to a had a hand in creating it, the Pentagon is not simple view. Time becomes the master, and impotent to curb this cult of speed. soldiers, sailors, and pilots are enslaved to ad­ Gen Charles Krulak, former Marine Corps versaries who might make a different use of commandant, believed that John Boyd’s strategy’s temporal dimension. OODA Loop taught officers how to use “time

Notes

1. Senate, testimony before the US Senate Armed Services 17. Ajay Singh, “Time: The New Dimension in War,” Joint Committee, 21 October 1999 (Federal Document Clearing Forces Quarterly, Summer 1998, 124–29 (originally published Win­ House [FDCH] Political Transcripts). In his recent book Waging ter 1995). Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: 18. President George W. Bush, cited in USA TODAY, 16 Janu­ Public Affairs, 2001), General Clark seems to moderate this belief ary 2001, 2A. slightly, going so far as to say that the classic principles of war may 19. For an example of the former, see William Matthews, not be well suited to modern conflict. However, he could not let “Military Analysts Say Air War Is Lost, Send in the Troops,” Navy go of speed: “In US military thinking, we seek to be as decisive as Times, 3 May 1999, 18. For an example of the latter, see Andrew possible once we begin to use force. This meant that the sooner Bacevich, “Target: Belgrade,” National Review, 3 May 1999, 29–31. we could strike the most sensitive targets, the greater the coercive 20. Stephen P. Aubin, “Operation Allied Force: War or ‘Co­ leverage against the Serbs” (449). ercive Diplomacy’?” Strategic Review, Summer 1999, 4–12. 2. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University 21. Brig Gen John D. W. Corley, Initial Report: The Air War Press, 1999), 43. over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force (Washington, 3. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, April 1995, 1. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 2000), 33, 36. 4. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, 28 22. See, for example, James Gleick, Faster: The Acceleration of March 1994, 20. Just About Everything (New York: Pantheon Books, 1999). 5. Ibid., 40–41. 23. For a good case study of culture’s influence on military 6. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfight­ doctrine, see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and Military ing, 20 June 1997, 40. Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 7. See Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD)1, Air Force Press, 1997). See also Gray, 28–29. Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997. 24. For a masterful analysis of War Plan Orange, see Nathan 8. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, February 2000, ix. 1897–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991). Miller 9. Joint Publication (Pub) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of identifies planners who advocated a quick strike across the Pacific the United States, 14 November 2000, III-2. as “Thrusters,” while planners who supported a more method­ 10. Ibid., IV-8. See also Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera­ ological fleet movement to the western Pacific were “Cautionar­ tions, 10 September 2001, vii. 11. Joint Pub 3-0, A-1. ies.” 12. See, for example, Alan Zimm, “Desert Storm, Kosovo, 25. For a good account of the influence exerted by war plan­ and ‘Doctrinal Schizophrenia,’” Strategic Review, Winter 2000, ning on the valuation of speed, see Colin Gray, “Defense Plan­ 32–39. ning and the Duration of War,” Defense Analysis 1, no. 1 (1985): 13. See, for example, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington, 21–36. D.C.: Department of the Navy, 3 November 2000). The last decade 26. U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect has seen literally dozens of books published on the virtues of (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993), 105, 131. speed in war. For an edited work reflecting this development 27. James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (Washington, D.C.: among senior military officials, see Harlan Ullman et al., Shock Brassey’s, 1997), describes the officer corps’s general vilification and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, D.C.: Center of the gradual approach in Vietnam. for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 1996). 28. Colin Powell, “U. S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign 14. For a popular assessment of this transformation, see USA Affairs, Winter 1992–1993, 40. TODAY, 16 January 2001, 1A; and a more careful analysis can be 29. Editorial, “At Least Slow the Slaughter,” New York Times, 4 found in Brian Dunn, “The Path to the Future Army,” Military Re- October 1992, E16. view, September/October 2000, 91–95. 30. The best exploration of Boyd is Grant T. Hammond, The 15. Gen John P. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, D.C.: forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” Aerospace Power Journal Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 24–33. 31. Gen David Deptula, Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of 16. Frederick Strain, “The New Joint Warfighter,” Joint Forces Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1995), 5. Quarterly, Summer 1998, 39 (originally published Autumn 1993). 32. Joint Pub 3-0, II-2. 68 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

33. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Department of the Air Force, 1993). Press, 1976), 209. 45. For World War II’s strategic contours, see Gerhard Wein­ 34. Boyd’s theories of time were more complex than most berg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: people believed; he stressed speed not as some absolute objective Cambridge University Press, 1994). but as a relative measure of time, and he allowed for the modu­ 46. Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, lation of speed across time. However, this nuance fell on deaf ears July/August 1999, 36, 45. in a sound-bite era, and even today, the DOD “finds it easier to 47. For a short description of the physical qualities of time, address Boyd’s complex truisms with simple models rather than see Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam lengthy discourses in their capstone and derivative manuals.” Books, 1988). (Robert Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory—Is It Relevant to 48. Robert Levine, A Geography of Time: The Temporal Misad­ the Army?” Defense Analysis 16 [2000]: 272.) ventures of a Social Psychologist (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 35. MCDP 1, 85. 49. The Sioux language, for example, has no word to express 36. Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power time, lateness, or waiting. (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 50. Grant Hammond, “Time, Elasticity, Tempos, and Rhythms,” 1995), 31–32. Like other defense publications, this booklet unpublished manuscript in author’s possession. I acknowledge a equates decision with action, which of course is not the case. It debt to Hammond for pointing out the cultural determinants of also misstates the OODA Loop’s basic thrust; the real object for time. For a published view of similar matters, see Robert Bathurst, Boyd was to think more rapidly than the opponent, which is dif­ Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy (New York: Sage ferent from an absolute devotion to speed. Publications, 1993). 37. See Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for De­ 51. Laure Paquette, “Strategy and Time in Clausewitz’s On cisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana War and in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” Comparative Strategy 10 University Press, 1991), for a history of this most elusive military (1991): 37, 48. goal. 52. Donald Snow, From Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Pol­ 38. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines decisive itics in the American Experience (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), as something “having the power or quality of deciding.” 325–26. 39. Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States 53. Ellwood Hinman IV, “Airpower’s Political-Military Gap,” (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), 8–9. Although Strategic Review, Fall 2000, 26. this document used several standard principles to guide strategic 54. General Ralston, cited in Elaine Grossman, “Ralston Sees behavior (forward presence, collective security, and technologi­ Potential for More Wars of Gradual Escalation,” Inside the Penta­ cal superiority), its emphasis on decisive force stood out. For fur­ gon, 16 September 1999, 1. ther reading on decisive force as both a phrase and an analytic 55. For supporting commentary, see Lt Col Paul Strickland, construct, see F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way “USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine: Decisive or Coercive?” Aero­ of War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996). 40. FM 100-5, chaps. 1 and 2. space Power Journal 14, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 13–25; and David Tucker, 41. NDP 1, 9, 33. “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Igno­ 42. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 4. rance and Sloth?” Parameters, Autumn 2000, 66–76. 43. Joint Pub 1, III-1. 56. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other 44. For the Air Force’s tortured assessment of Deliberate than War, 16 June 1995, vii, I-1. Force, see Robert Owen, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effec­ 57. Ibid., viii, I-7. tive Campaign Planning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 58. AFDD 2-3, Military Operations other than War, 3 July 2000, 1. 2000). Owen acknowledged Deliberate Force’s success, but he 59. Joint Pub 3-07, II-4. worried that the campaign might encourage “half-hearted or in- 60. AFDD 2-3, 1. complete air operations,” which “would be indecisive” (476). 61. Ibid., 5. Air Force exhortations on religion reflect an un­ Lacking any appreciation or framework for the potential of a derstanding of the importance of circumstance in strategic graduated air campaign, another author of the study wrote in be­ choice: religion “will often play a major role in the lives of local wilderment of “Deliberate Force’s remarkable success, which was inhabitants. An understanding of host nation or regional reli­ largely unpremeditated and resulted from the unforeseen impact gious beliefs is vital to the success of many types of MOOTW” of the stopping and restarting of the air campaign” (127). In fact, (47). For Air Force experience in MOOTW and its future possi­ the study devotes an entire chapter to an excellent counterfac­ bilities, see James Corum, “Airpower and Peace Enforcement,” tual scenario that explores the possibility that another, more ro­ Airpower Journal 10, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 10–25; and Carl Builder, bust, operation would have worked better. See Lt Col Robert D. “Doctrinal Frontiers,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): Pollock, “Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches to Opera­ 6–13. tion Deliberate Force,” in Deliberate Force, 431–53. This fine intro­ 62. For insight into the nature of decisive war, see Michael spection stands alone in the annals of official air surveys; other re- Howard, “When Are Wars Decisive?” Survival 41, no. 1 (Spring ports on air operations more closely aligned with preconceived 1999): 126–35. After 40 years of patience, the Korean Peninsula ideas do not benefit from similar questions, though the inquiry may be one place increasingly ripe for some kind of decision to has validity independent of individual cases. See, for instance, be found on a battlefield. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland Pub­ 63. Strain, 39. lishing, 1976) (World War II); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot 64. Krulak, quoted in Hammond, 3.

The hurrier I go, the behinder I get.

––folk saying Thinking about China and War

DR.JEFFREY RECORD

Editorial Abstract: The current focus on international terrorism does not mean that China has gone away. This thought-provoking piece by Dr. Record not only reminds us that China remains an area of potential future conflict but also uses the perspective of past conflict to paint a picture of what a future war with China might look like. China’s leaders aren’t as naïve as Saddam Hussein in their appreciation of America’s high-tech capabilities.

HINA’S XENOPHOBIC AND in­ creasingly strident nationalism rein- forces the argument that it is des­ tined to become America’s next Cgreat strategic rival and, therefore, that the United States should begin to think seriously about the possibility of war with that country. 1 The combina­ tion of continued autocracy in Bei­ jing, China’s militant assertiveness across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, and the growing influ­ ence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “in the development of China’s na­ tional identity and security policy” all point to a determination to displace American power in East Asia and the Western Pacific.2 The new Bush administration is certainly prepared to take a harder line than its prede­ cessor on the noneconomic dimensions of the Sino-American relationship, including Beijing’s myriad human-rights abuses and ratization, which, in turn—or so it is believed— military bullying of its neighbors. The admin­ will undermine the very autocracy that has istration has rejected the illusion of strategic embraced extreme nationalism as a legiti­ partnership with China, has been explicit on mizing substitute for failed communist ideol­ US protection of Taiwan against an attack ogy. The Bush administration sees eye to eye from the mainland, and is openly reorienting with its predecessor on the attractiveness of at- America’s primary strategic focus from Eu­ tempting to subvert China politically via trade- rope to Asia. It is, in short, moving to contain assisted economic democratization. China even while it embraces expanded trade A policy of containing Communist Chinese with that country. Indeed, for the Bush ad- expansionism is hardly new. It began in 1950, ministration, trade serves as a means of con­ when the Truman administration ordered the tainment; trade promotes economic democ­ interposition of the Seventh Fleet between

69 70 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 the mainland and what was then known as Kingdom was the dominant power in its world; Formosa as a means of preventing Mao Ze­ only recently, beginning with the Opium Wars dong’s takeover of that island. The adminis­ of the midnineteenth century, did China fall tration subsequently fought Chinese forces to victim to over a century of Western and, later, a standstill in Korea. Containment continued Japanese intrusion and humiliation. China, during the 1960s, when the Kennedy and notes Henry Kissinger, “has rarely had the ex­ Johnson administrations escalated US mili­ perience of dealing with other societies on the tary intervention against the advance of Viet­ basis of equality.”4 Even unburdened of its pro- namese communism, which they believed was found sense of victimization by the West, China a stalking-horse for Chinese imperialism in as a rising power is likely to insist on an inter- Southeast Asia. Even during the era of Sino- national order that reflects its power growth American tacit strategic alignment against the relative to that of the United States. Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s, Precautionary thinking about a war with the United States insisted on a nonviolent res­ China must address at least four issues: the olution of Taiwan’s relationship with the economic, political, military, and foreign- mainland. policy ingredients of China as a qualified But the China that the United States sought strategic rival; the likely causes of a Sino- to contain during the Cold War was poor and American war; the strengths and weaknesses preindustrial and, under Mao Ze-dong, period­ each side would bring to the conflict; and ically plunged into domestic political upheaval. the likely scope of combat. Thinking about For Mao, political purification was always more a war with China also profits from an exam­ important than wealth creation, and his no­ ination of the Korean War—the one and tions of industrialization were idiotic. Accord­ only Sino-American war to date and a ingly, the Chinese economy remained a sham­ marathon of mutual incomprehension and bles until the late 1980s. Moreover, for most of miscalculation. the Cold War’s last two decades, China’s mili­ tary posture was defensive and focused north- ward on the Soviet Union. China as the Next Strategic Rival Although the emergence of China as a Postulation of China as the next functional qualified strategic rival is far from inevitable, equivalent of the Soviet Union rests on several it is time to think about a future war with necessarily speculative assumptions. The first is China. Beijing’s core political values are hos­ that China will continue to sustain high growth tile to everything America stands for; China is rates in gross national product. China’s eco­ territorially unsatisfied; its military potential is nomic growth in the late 1980s and 1990s was impressive if only slowly mobilizable; and impressive, to be sure, although it has slowed Sino-American flash points are present in the over the past several years. But the economic Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. More- boom started from a very low base and has over, history teaches that the relative power been jarringly uneven between the coastal and influence the United States enjoys provinces and the still-backward interior.5 around the world today will inevitably decline Much of China’s industrial production remains at some point. That point may be 50 or even economically worthless, state-owned goods. 200 years away, but it will come—because no Corruption is rampant throughout the econ­ great power remains so forever. omy, and levels of unemployment and under- The history of both China and the interna­ employment are staggering and potentially tional political system as a whole also suggests destabilizing.6 Even if China’s official statistics that an emergent Chinese hegemon is unlikely were reliable, no basis exists for a simple ex­ to be a cooperative state willing to accept a con­ trapolation of past growth rates into the future. tinued American-dominated international Nonetheless, even the most conservatively order.3 For most of its long history, the Middle estimated growth rates still significantly surpass THINKING ABOUT CHINA AND WAR 71 those of the United States and reaffirm the Though ethnically homogeneous (except strategic wisdom of Deng Xiaoping’s momen­ along its northern and western peripheries), tous decision to unleash capitalism in China. China has always been difficult to govern, even Unlike his politically dreamy and romantic in the absence of significant social and eco­ predecessor, the realist Deng understood that nomic change. Post-Marxist China, however, security could not be had without power and has invited enormous change; never before has that the foundation of national power was any regime tried to move so many people so wealth creation. Economic success remains a quickly into economic modernity, and it is far prerequisite for China’s military competitive­ from certain that Beijing’s rulers can pull it off ness. The Soviet Union lost the Cold War be- without revolutionary upheaval, which was the cause it became a one-dimensional superpower norm for China in the twentieth century. The whose declining economic performance could ongoing crackdown on the seemingly harmless not sustain its imperial ambitions. Falun Gong spiritual movement underscores A second assumption is continued autoc­ the regime’s insecurity and its preoccupation racy in Beijing. During the past two decades, with preserving its own legitimacy, which in the dictatorial rule has taken a beating around post-Marxist period has rested heavily on eco­ the world, including East Asia, and both the nomic progress as well as nationalism. Richard history of Europe and recent political change Betts and Thomas Christensen properly cau­ in Taiwan and South Korea suggest that eco­ tion that “before one laments the rise of Chi­ nomic democratization can indeed exert a nese power, one should consider an even more powerful and ultimately irresistible pressure uncertain alternative: Chinese weakness and for political democratization. Thus, prospects collapse. Nothing ordains that China’s march for a democratic China cannot be dismissed, to great power status cannot be derailed.”8 and the evidence suggests that democracies A fourth assumption is that China has impe­ are much less warlike toward one another rial ambitions whose realization would com­ than are autocracies to each other and to promise fundamental American security inter­ democracies. (This certainly does not mean a ests. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has no peaceful transition; more often than not, the pretensions to a global imperium. Its ambitions road from autocracy to democracy is a violent are neither global nor ideological but national one because autocrats are not disposed to re­ and regional in scope, including the assertion linquishing power without a fight.) of sovereignty over Taiwan and the South Yet, even if Adam Smith and James Madi­ China Sea. The real issue is whether China is son beat Lenin in China, the question re- prepared to act on those ambitions in a way mains whether a democratic China would be that would elicit a violent US response. The less fervently nationalist. The present regime United States could hardly object to a peaceful in Beijing has both excited and curbed the incorporation of Taiwan on terms satisfactory expression of popular nationalist passions: to both the Chinese and Taiwanese, even witness the encouragement of street demon­ though it would significantly increase China’s strations after the accidental US bombing of economic and latent military power. American the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the sub- interest lies in the manner—not the fact—of sequent suppression of such demonstrations China’s reunification. As for the South China following the Chinese ramming of a US elec­ Sea, China has seized small bits of disputed tronic-surveillance aircraft. Could not a dem­ rock there, but it has not challenged interna­ ocratic regime become more a prisoner of na­ tional freedom of navigation through the sea. tionalist passions than a dictatorial one? Beyond Taiwan and the South China Sea A third assumption is that China remains are those territories over which Imperial unified. Its long history has been one of cyclical China held sway at one time or another. They alternation between effective central political include much of Central Asia and the Russian control and degeneration into warlordism.7 Far East (RFE) as well as northern and central 72 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Vietnam (which China ruled for a millen­ ical to the economies of Japan and other US nium). Will China seek to recover these “lost” allies and friends. territories, and will it be prepared to use force Chinese military action against Asian main- to do so? Or has it come to understand, as do land states not allied with the United States most modern industrial and postindustrial probably would not occasion a direct, armed states, that extent of territory per se is not a US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Viet­ key ingredient of modern national power? namese war scenarios of the kind that tran­ The scope of China’s ultimate territorial and spired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, other ambitions in Asia is simply not evident would not directly engage the vital interests of at this juncture in history—probably not even the United States—unless they spilled over to China itself. into attacks on US forces and allies. Why US security interests in East Asia are also would the United States intervene in such subject to change. Indeed, they could evolve conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest over the coming decade to the point where in peace and stability on the Asian mainland one could come to regard the present robust, and a specific interest in deterring nuclear forward American military presence as un­ war between other states. But would it go to necessary. The bottom-line justifications for war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, that presence today are deterrence of North say, Russia and China? It was certainly not pre- Korean aggression against South Korea, any pared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani ex- attack on Japan, and a Chinese invasion of change during the South Asian nuclear-war Taiwan. Yet, these justifications would be hard scare of 1999. to sustain in the event of Korean reunifica­ What if China began absorbing the RFE? tion, a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, or Tai­ This prospect is certainly plausible. Moscow’s wan’s willing return to governance by main- control over the RFE has steadily weakened land China. Even in the absence of such since the Soviet Union’s demise; the RFE’s events, there remains the possible emergence economy is fast becoming a subsidiary of of irresistible domestic political pressure for China’s; and Chinese demographic infiltra­ US military retrenchment overseas. The tion of the RFE could eventually raise the American people have never lusted for the issue of the RFE’s self-determination in costly burdens of being a great power. China’s favor. Yet, on what basis would the United States intervene against even an overt Chinese inva­ War Starters sion of the RFE, and could it intervene effec­ The most obvious war starter would be a tively? To be sure, China’s assumption of con­ mainland assault on Taiwan in the form of ei­ trol over the RFE’s littoral and Siberia’s vast, ther an overt military invasion or an attempt if hard to extract, resources would call for a to wreck Taiwan’s economy by blockade and fundamental reassessment of Chinese inten­ other acts of intimidation of the kind Beijing tions and capabilities in Asia—perhaps lead­ employed in 1996 to influence Taiwan’s first ing to the creation of new security alliances in genuine presidential election. A forcible take- South and Southeast Asia and major increases over of a democratic and economically vi­ in defense expenditure. But it is difficult to brant Taiwan would be strategically unaccept­ imagine an American war on behalf of Russian able to the United States. Another casus belli attempts to hold on to nineteenth-century would be Chinese attempts to challenge free­ czarist territorial gains in the Far East. But for dom of navigation in the South China Sea (or its long-range nuclear missiles, one could anywhere else in the western Pacific). Free­ consider Russia finished as a great power; in dom of navigation is a bedrock principle of any event, it is highly doubtful that US air- American statecraft, and through the South power alone could overturn a Chinese inva­ China Sea move oil and other commerce crit­ sion of the RFE. During the Cold War, the THINKING ABOUT CHINA AND WAR 73

United States and its Pacific allies lived with a Comparative Advantages hostile East Asian mainland littoral stretching from the Bering Sea to the South China Sea. and Disadvantages Why should the United States fear Chinese Primary Sino-American war starters seem nuclear missiles in the RFE more than it did to be Chinese aggression against Taiwan and Soviet missiles there? in the South China Sea. Yet, a US defense of A Sino-Indian war, which for reasons of ge­ Taiwan and of freedom of navigation in the ography would be waged largely in the air western Pacific would play greatly to Amer­ (and potentially in space) and perhaps at sea, ica’s traditional military strengths while at the also would not engage US war-fighting inter­ same time exploit long-standing Chinese ests. The same may be said of Chinese aggres­ weaknesses. sion against Vietnam, which has recurred Historically, China’s sole strategically im­ throughout Vietnam’s history—most recently pressive war-fighting suit has been the quantity in 1979. of its ground forces, which counts for little in Obviously, a Chinese attack on Japan (or the pursuit of offshore imperial ambitions. As­ any other US treaty ally) would be an auto­ serting and maintaining dominance over Tai­ matic war starter. Such an attack could be pre­ wan and the South China Sea require mastery ventive, aimed at thwarting the resurrection of air and naval power—arenas in which the of a militarist Japan. China is hardly the only United States is peerless and likely to remain so victim of past Japanese aggression that is for decades (assuming no retreat to isolation- upset by a still unalterably racist Japan whose ism plus a determination to maintain both con­ leaders and citizen inhabitants are in an in­ ventional military supremacy and a forward creasingly disturbing state of denial of their military presence in East Asia—neither to be nation’s behavior in Asia from 1895 to 1945. taken for granted). Chinese naval and air In a Sino-American crisis, Japan might also in­ forces are rudimentary by US standards, but vite attack, or at least armed intimidation, be- perhaps an even greater deficiency is the ab­ cause of the access it provides US military sence of any modern combat experience. power in Northeast Asia. Attempted coalition China has not fought a major war since Korea busting is a must for most American adver­ (where US airpower pummeled the PLA), saries because the United States relies heavily whereas the United States has had a virtual cor­ on coalitions for political legitimacy and lo­ nucopia of such experience since the end of gistical access. Peeling off Japan from the the Cold War. Practice may not make perfect, United States in the middle of a Sino-American but it is surely better than sitting on the military military confrontation in Asia would be an bench for almost half a century. (China’s brief enormous coup for Beijing. and highly restricted invasion of Vietnam in One should not forget that the emergence 1979 pitted masses of poorly armed and trained of Japan as a great power in the first half of the Chinese troops against better-equipped North twentieth century came largely at China’s ex­ Vietnamese combat veterans.) pense: first, the extraction of economic conces­ Crucial to sound thinking about war with sions, then the conversion of Manchuria into a China is recognition that to shift America’s Japanese puppet state, and finally the invasion primary strategic focus from Europe to Asia is and brutal occupation of much of China to shift from a predominantly ground-air to a proper. Although China has only minor terri­ predominantly air-sea theater of operations. torial disputes with Japan, the emergence of Why? Because of the asymmetrical distribu­ China as a great power will inevitably come in tions of wealth and power between the two re­ part at Japan’s expense in terms of its economic gions. Most of Asia’s wealth and power still and political clout in Asia. This will be espe­ lies in offshore and peninsular states, whereas cially the case if Japan’s economic and demo- in Europe it is concentrated ashore. Thus, graphic stagnation continues. maintaining a balance of power in Europe 74 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

(i.e., preventing Europe’s domination by a talist trading order. Indeed, China’s whop- hostile power) mandated a willingness and ping annual trade surpluses with the United capacity to wage ground warfare deeply in- States have been indispensable to sustaining land. In contrast, maintaining an Asian bal­ China’s remarkable economic growth and ance of power requires performing the sim­ have provided large amounts of hard cur­ pler task of keeping offshore and peninsular rency with which to finance its selective mili­ Asia outside a continental hegemon’s grasp.9 tary modernization. A war with the United Large land-warfare operations in the Asian in­ States would destroy Sino-American com­ terior are not just unnecessary; they are to be merce (as well as China’s lucrative trade with avoided at all costs because they would pit US and investment from Taiwan). China’s attrac­ weaknesses against a continental hegemon’s tiveness as a magnet for foreign capital would strengths. Even Gen Douglas MacArthur, who cease. The consequent effects of collapsed in 1951 wanted to expand the Korean War growth would not be just economic. Because into an air and sea assault on China, declared the post-Marxist regime in Beijing has staked that “it would be a master folly to contem­ so much of its legitimacy on its ability to de- plate the use of United States ground troops liver higher living standards, a war-caused in China,” adding that “I can conceive of no economic depression could topple the gov­ strategic or tactical position where I would ernment itself. put in . . . units of American ground troops in Over time, of course, China’s stake in the in­ continental China.”10 ternational trading order could diminish if In addition to naval and air inferiority, China shifted its primary focus from expanding China would approach war with the United its export markets to developing internal mar­ States with significant strategic disadvantages. kets. The historic Middle Kingdom was more Regionwide suspicion of China’s imperial am­ or less economically self-sufficient, and a fu­ bitions has deprived Beijing of significant al­ ture China bent on displacing an American- lies and even friends in East Asia, whereas the dominated international political and eco­ United States is rich in both. India remains a nomic system would have a powerful interest in strategic competitor, and Chinese behavior in reducing its dependence on that system. In- the South China Sea has alienated most of deed, it is critical to distinguish between eco­ Southeast Asia. The post–Cold War rap­ nomic growth as an end in itself and eco­ prochement between China and Russia has nomic growth as a means to a political end. not eliminated centuries-old national and Clearly, China has opted in the near term and racial animosities between the two countries, midterm for the primacy of economic growth animosities that can be heightened only by and its attendant dependency on the American- the growth of Chinese economic influence dominated international economic order. and demographic “aggression” in the RFE. In But to what end? For its own sake? Or for the any event, Russian military power has virtually purpose of putting China in a position some evaporated in Asia. A robust, land-based decades hence to assert political and military strategic nuclear deterrent is the only real primacy in Asia? asset that Moscow could make available to A recent RAND Corporation assessment of China in a Sino-American war, but it staggers these questions concludes that a policy of as­ the mind to imagine that Russia would invite sertiveness is likely for two reasons: “First, the its own destruction on behalf of promoting unique and long-standing Chinese experience Chinese interests in East Asia. of geopolitical primacy and the association of Finally, a war with the United States could that primacy with good order, civilization, be economically and even politically cata­ virtue, and justice, may make the pursuit of strophic for the communist rulers in Beijing. geopolitical centrality through assertive behav­ Unlike the defunct Soviet Union, China has ior again attractive.” Second, “an assertive an enormous stake in the international capi­ China is likely to appear over the long haul . . . THINKING ABOUT CHINA AND WAR 75 precisely because the United States, the estab­ lished hegemon, will—if the historical record pertaining to previous declining hegemons holds—prepare to arrest its own gradual loss of relative power and influence.”11 Both history and ideology inform the Chinese that the United States cannot avoid decline, and many people involved in managing Chinese security believe that the United States is already in mili­ tary decline—a recipe for miscalculation if there ever was one.12 Hope that China’s participation in a glob­ Chinese Dong Feng-31 transporter-erector launcher on parade. alizing economy will alter its approach to se­ curity issues may be misplaced. David Lamp- ton believes that while “it is easy to assume that might encourage a decision for war in a that globalization will slowly erode Beijing’s Sino-American crisis. First and foremost of them, especially in a fight over Taiwan, would dedication to its narrow national interest and be a greater strength of interest and, there- practice of realpolitik” and while “there is fore, a willingness to sacrifice. The future of plenty of evidence of increasing Chinese co­ Taiwan can never be as important to the operation and conformity with international United States as it is to China, and China norms, there is little evidence that considera­ could be expected—as was the case in Korea, tions of national interest and realpolitik fig­ where it felt directly threatened by Mac- ure any less prominently in Chinese thinking 13 Arthur’s advance to the Yalu River—to display than they always have.” a much higher tolerance of casualties than To be sure, by any rational calculation of would the United States. The analogy most interest, China—now and for the foreseeable relevant here is the Vietnam War, in which su­ future—would be foolish to risk war with the perior American firepower and technology United States over the future of Taiwan and was defeated by an enemy whose greater the South China Sea. Yet, states are motivated strength of will to win manifested itself in a by fear and honor as well as by calculations of remarkable strategic patience and willingness interest, and China’s hypernationalism could to accept horrendous manpower losses. easily become an enemy of strategic pru­ The Chinese are not afraid to threaten or dence. The Chinese are exceptionally touchy use force, even in circumstances in which the about righting real and imagined wrongs vis­ objective military balance is weighted heavily ited upon them by Western, Japanese, and against them, as it was in Korea in 1950 and Russo-Soviet imperialism during the century the Taiwan Strait in 1996. Indeed, the Chi­ stretching from the outbreak of the first nese appear to believe that military weakness Opium War to the consolidation of the Chi­ requires a superior will to use force. John nese Communist revolution. Betts and Chris­ Garver argues that “Chinese strategic think­ tensen believe “there is little reason to assume ing has often concluded that periods of weak­ that sober economic interest will necessarily ness required forceful policies precisely be- override national honor in a crisis.”14 Were a cause the enemy may be tempted to exploit crisis to occur, Beijing’s leaders could lose China’s vulnerability.” Examples of this in- control of popular nationalist passions and verse relationship between bellicosity and find themselves facing the stark choice of strength in Chinese foreign policy include making strategically reckless decisions or risk­ “the decision for war with the United States in ing their own domestic political survival.15 October 1950; the decision to launch an in- Moreover, China would bring to war some tense political struggle against Khrushchev in important advantages over the United States 1960 just as China’s economy was collapsing; 76 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 the 1962 decision for war with India when including informational—inferiority, but they China was experiencing mass famine and its also represent a military tradition, as Gerald alliance with Moscow had collapsed; and the Segal points out, that places an “unusual em­ 1969 decision for military confrontation with phasis” on “cunning stratagems” and “minimiz­ the Soviets on the Ussuri River as the PLA was ing brute force.”17 They also have reoriented preoccupied with the chaos of the Cultural their strategic focus from continental defense Revolution.”16 to preparation for “local, limited war under Nor do the Chinese confuse military suc­ high-tech conditions” (i.e., precisely the Amer­ cess with casualty minimization. China has an ican threat they perceive).18 excessive population and a long history of subordinating individual human lives to the imperatives of statecraft. Communist China Limited War by Default? has used force in Korea and Tibet; against is- Assuming the absence of mindless escala­ lands held by the Nationalist Chinese off the tion to a general nuclear exchange, a war be- mainland coast; and against India, Vietnam, tween China and the United States would be and Soviet forces along the Ussuri River. constrained by limited military capacity and China also accepts war as a continuation of political objectives. For openers, neither politics rather than as a substitute for politics, China nor the United States is capable of in­ and force as an indispensable companion to vading and subjugating the other, and even if diplomacy with unfriendly states. the United States had the ability to do so, China’s geographic proximity to Taiwan and avoidance of a land war on the Asian main- the South China Sea also works to its advan­ land has long been an injunction of American tage. Chinese lines of communication are short strategy. The objectives of a Sino-American compared to those separating East Asia from war over Taiwan or freedom of navigation in the United States. Even though Chinese naval the South China Sea would be limited—just and air forces would be no match for their as they were in the Sino-American war in American counterparts for the foreseeable fu­ Korea. And since the outcome in either case ture, China has an expanding missile force ca­ would be decided by naval and air forces, with pable of striking Taiwan and targets in the regular ground forces relegated to a distinctly South China Sea directly from mainland secondary role, a war over Taiwan or the launch positions. Bringing Taiwan under sus­ South China Sea would also be limited in tained missile strikes could wreck Taiwan’s terms of the type of force employed. This was economy, to say nothing of complicating the is- not the case in the Korean War, in which land’s defense. ground combat dominated. (To be sure, the A third advantage is the high probability US position on the ground would have been that the Chinese would avoid challenging untenable without air dominance.) American military power on its own terms. The During the Korean War, however, the Chinese have learned from the Gulf War that United States refrained from attacking targets trying to beat the Americans at their own game in China. (The Truman administration was is a recipe for disaster. The Chinese almost cer­ feverishly rearming the United States and did tainly would pursue an asymmetric war against not wish to escalate a war in Asia at a time the United States involving attempted preemp­ when Europe remained defenseless against a tion of US military access to the region; disrup­ possible Soviet invasion. Thus, it rejected tion of US sea and air lines of communication; MacArthur’s call for what amounted to a lim­ and attacks on US command, control, and ited war against China itself in place of the communications, possibly including satellites. limited war being waged against Chinese forces The Jominian American military would be con- in Korea.) Could an effective defense of Tai­ fronted with the deceptive warfare of Sun Tzu. wan or freedom of navigation be mounted The Chinese recognize their technological— without attacks on mainland targets? Obvi- THINKING ABOUT CHINA AND WAR 77 ously, Chinese naval and air units approach­ horror of appearing to be a supplicant. Where ing Taiwan or operating in the South China Washington looks to good faith and good will as Sea could be attacked separately. But what the lubricant of international relations, Beijing about their operating bases on the mainland? assumes that statesmen have done their home- And what about missile launch sites, espe­ work and will understand subtle indirections; insistence is therefore treated as a sign of weak­ cially in the absence of effective Taiwanese ness, and good personal relations are not them- theater missile defenses? In circumstances of selves considered a lubricant of serious dia­ air and missile attacks on Taiwan, military and logue. To Americans, Chinese leaders seem political pressures for counterattacks against polite but aloof and condescending. To the Chi­ associated targets on the mainland would nese, Americans appear erratic and somewhat likely prove irresistible. But such counterat­ frivolous.19 tacks, in turn, would invite Chinese escalation The Korean War stands as a case study in against US bases in the western Pacific and miscalculation by both Washington and Bei­ perhaps even terrorist assaults on population jing, notwithstanding repeated attempts by targets in the United States itself. How would both sides to signal intentions to each other. an American president respond to a Chinese- The United States grossly underestimated suspected-but-not-provable biological or chem­ China’s willingness and ability to defend its ical attack on an American city? strategic interests in Korea; indeed, the Tru­ man administration had difficulty accepting The Last Sino-American War the very presence of such interests. Max Has­ tings observes that because the “United States China and the United States last warred in was convinced that its policies . . . presented Korea from 1950 to 1953, and although each no threat to any legitimate Chinese inter­ country’s knowledge of the other has greatly est[,] Washington therefore persuaded itself expanded since then, cultural and historical that Peking would reach the same conclu­ barriers to effective communication remain sion.”20 As MacArthur’s forces crossed the formidable enough to provide grist for war 38th parallel and advanced toward the Yalu, via miscalculation. Henry Kissinger’s depic­ the administration believed it sufficient sim­ tion of the two countries’ differing ap­ ply to declare that it had no designs on Chi­ proaches to policy bears quoting at length: nese territory; it apparently never occurred to China’s approach to policy is skeptical and pru­ President Truman or Secretary of State Dean dent, America’s optimistic and missionary. Acheson that Beijing might regard the estab­ China’s sense of time beats to a different lishment of a reunified, anticommunist Korea rhythm from America’s. When an American is adjacent to China’s industrial heartland as a asked to date a historical event, he refers to a strategic threat. (After all, had not the Japa­ specific day on the calendar; when a Chinese nese used Korea as a jumping-off point for describes an event, he places it within a dynasty. their conquest of Manchuria?) This lack of And of the fourteen imperial dynasties, ten imagination contributed in turn to the ad- have lasted longer than the entire history of the United States. ministration’s virtual deafness to Beijing’s nu­ merous warnings that it was prepared to enter Americans think in terms of concrete solutions the war rather than accept an American client to specific problems. The Chinese think in state along the Yalu. Even when first contact terms of stages in a process that has no precise was made with Chinese forces, the adminis­ culmination. Americans believe that interna­ tration refused to believe that it represented tional disputes result either from misunder­ anything more than political posturing, a standings or ill will; the remedy for the former 21 is persuasion—occasionally quite insistent— token intervention. and, for the latter, defeat or destruction for the The administration’s incomprehension of evildoer. The Chinese approach is impersonal, China’s motives—specifically, its failure to patient, and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a grasp that country’s strength of interest in 78 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Korea—was attended by disdain for China’s quent operations, the PLA displayed a mastery military capacity. MacArthur and the rest of of march discipline, night-infiltration tactics, the American military had nothing but con- concealment, and camouflage that partially off- tempt for Chinese fighting power; indeed, set the US advantage in firepower. PLA com­ MacArthur assured Truman that he would manders also displayed an insensitivity to casu­ make short work of the Chinese if they tried alties relative to that of their American to intervene. At his meeting with Truman on counterparts. Yet, the PLA’s initial success Wake Island, he said there was “very little” along the Yalu owed much to MacArthur’s own chance of Chinese intervention. “They have recklessness and the Truman administration’s no air force. Now that we have bases for our inability to control its vain Far Eastern com­ Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get mander. Moreover, US firepower, while unable down to Pyongyang, there would be the great­ to crush the Chinese, proved more than ade­ est slaughter.”22 From an American perspec­ quate to block any chance of a Chinese expul­ tive, an army of simple peasants armed with sion of US forces from Korea (only MacArthur bolt-action rifles and lacking air cover was no was panicked into believing that US forces were match for US forces, and if this fact was self- headed for an Asian Dunkirk). By the spring of evident to the Americans, then obviously it 1951, the combination of ceaseless aerial would also be to the Chinese. MacArthur’s pounding of lengthy Chinese supply lines and pet corps commander, Gen Edward Almond, the savage application of firepower against exhorted his Yalu-bound troops, “Don’t let a massed frontline Chinese forces had severely bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you.”23 restricted the PLA’s ability to sustain offensive There was no appreciation of the strengths of operations over both space and time. Unfortu­ the PLA—its superb discipline, tenacity, and nately for many PLA soldiers, the Chinese com­ capacity to endure hardship—or the degree mander in Korea recognized this unpleasant to which terrain in northern Korea could be fact well before Mao, who continued to believe exploited by guerrilla tactics at the expense of that will alone was the key to victory and or­ a conventional, roadbound army. dered yet additional—and doomed—offen­ Yet, if the Americans miscalculated in sives aimed at sweeping the Eighth Army into Korea, so did the Chinese leadership. Mao Ze­ the sea. US troops, especially with the arrival of dong not only believed that Chinese inter­ Gen Matthew Ridgway as Eighth Army com­ vention was imperative, he also believed that mander, also fought with a degree of skill and the PLA could sweep the Americans off the determination that belied Mao’s preinterven­ peninsula—a conviction strengthened after tion assumptions about the Americans’ fight­ the PLA routed the Americans along the ing qualities. Yalu.24 If the Americans placed excessive faith Because the Korean War was fought to a in material superiority, Mao believed that military stalemate, neither side could claim a human factors—superior will, discipline, and decisive victory. The United States restored fighting skills—and, above all, a superior South Korea’s territorial integrity but failed to cause could defeat firepower-rich US forces. reunite the Korean peninsula under an anti- He regarded US troops as roadbound, creature- communist government. Likewise, China comforted softies who were fighting for the evil saved North Korea but failed to reunite the cause of imperialism—and, therefore, were peninsula under communist auspices. But incapable of mustering the capacity for sacri­ China, by far the weaker side, was nonetheless fice characteristic of seasoned PLA forces.25 the relative winner of the conflict. That the The PLA’s actual performance against US Chinese David had even stalemated the Amer­ forces was impressive, especially the massive ican Goliath greatly elevated Chinese prestige surprise assault in late November 1950, which throughout Asia and emboldened communist inflicted upon MacArthur the longest retreat in revolutionary movements everywhere. The American military history. In this and in subse­ war established China as a tough risk-taker THINKING ABOUT CHINA AND WAR 79

and a force henceforth to be reckoned with, Chou En-lai noted to President Nixon in 1972, quite a contrast to China’s prewar image as an “America [was] more careful about China in object of contempt and a soft punching bag the Vietnam War than it had been in Korea.”26 for the imperial powers. There would be no The idiosyncrasies of the Korean War tell us more talk of Chinese laundrymen. nothing about how a future Sino-American war China’s intervention and military perfor­ would come about and play out. But as distant mance in Korea also exerted a chilling effect as that war is, it remains an object lesson in cul­ on subsequent US military intervention in the tural incomprehension and consequent politi­ Vietnam War. For fear of provoking a repeti­ cal and military miscalculation. And while tion of Chinese intervention, the Johnson ad- thinking about war with China is hardly predic­ ministration limited the US war aim to the tive—China’s emergence as America’s next preservation of a noncommunist South Viet­ qualified strategic rival is not inevitable—ignor­ nam and placed significant restrictions on air ing the possibility of war would be a profes­ operations against North Vietnam. As Premier sional dereliction of duty.

Notes

1. See, for example, Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan 8. Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Get­ to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco,: Encounter Books, ting the Questions Right,” The National Interest, Winter 2001); Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict 2000/2001, 29. with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and Robert Kagan, 9. Imperial Japan’s conquest of Manchuria and of coastal “What China Knows That We Don’t,” The Weekly Standard, 20 Jan­ China proper did not pose a direct threat to core US security in­ uary 1997. For a more benign view of an emergent China’s im­ terests in Asia. That threat emerged only when Japan expanded plications for US security, see Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. its aggressive focus to offshore and peninsular Asia. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security 10. Senate, Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur before the (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1997); Gerald Segal, “Does Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the United States China Matter?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, 24–36; Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 103, 108 (3–5 May 1951; reprint, Pat­ and Nicholas Berry, “China Is Not an Imperialist Power,” Strategic erson, N.J.: Hour-Glass Publishers, 1966). Review, Winter 2001, 4–10. 11. Swaine and Tellis, 231, 233. 2. Nan Li, From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative 12. See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security En­ Nationalism: The Chinese Military’s Discourse on National Security and vironment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Identity in the Post-Mao Era (Washington, D.C.: United States Insti­ 2000), 63–105. tute for Peace, 2001), 12. See also Koro Bessho, Identities and Se­ 13. David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Secu­ curity in East Asia, Adelphi Paper 325 (London: International In­ rity Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing and Does It Matter?” in stitute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 27–37. Lampton, 25. 3. See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting 14. Betts and Christensen, 22. China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, 15. See James Miles, “Chinese Nationalism, U.S. Policy and Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2000), especially pages 151–241. Asian Security,” Survival, Winter 2000–2001, 51–57; and Joseph 4. Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in Lampton, 2001), 139. 151–87. 5. In 1997 gross domestic product per capita (in yuan) 16. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Tai­ ranged from 25,750 in Shanghai Province to 2,215 in Guizhou wan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, Province. See Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang, “The Ex­ 1997), 62–63. ternal Relations of China’s Provinces,” in The Making of Chinese 17. Gerald Segal, Defending China (Oxford: Oxford Univer­ Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, ed. David sity Press, 1985), 40. M. Lampton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 18. See Paul H. B. Godwin, “The PLA Faces the Twenty-First 95. Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Op­ 6. See Bruce Gilley, “People’s Republic of Cheats,” Far East- erations,” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James R. Lilley ern Economic Review, 21 June 2001, 59–60. and David L. Shambaugh (Washington, D.C.: American Enter­ 7. The “Chinese state has been united as a single entity prise Institute, 1999), 39–63. under Chinese rule for only approximately one-half of the period 19. Kissinger, 137–38. since the end of the Han Dynasty in 220 A.D. During the other 20. Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and half of this period, China has been embroiled in domestic con­ Schuster, 1987), 135. flict, divided between Chinese and non-Chinese regimes, or en­ 21. Assessments of Chinese behavior and American miscal­ tirely ruled by non-Han Chinese invaders.” Swaine and Tellis, 13. culations in the fall of 1950 appear in Allen S. Whiting, China 80 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: 22. Quoted in Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, Macmillan, 1960); Chien Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The 1950–1953 (New York: Times Books, 1988), 348. Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia 23. Quoted in Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Unde­ University Press, 1994); Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s De­ clared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950–51 (New York: Newmar­ cision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China ket Press, 1988), 260. Quarterly, March 1990, 94–115; Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, 24. Ibid., 239. Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s 25. For the best work on Mao’s excessive confidence in the Korean War Telegrams,” International Security, Summer 1992, PLA and incomprehension of the fighting power of American 122–54; Michael H. Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June forces in Korea, see Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanti­ 1950–June 1951,” Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1992, 453–78; H. cism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence, Kans.: Uni­ A. DeWeerd, “Strategic Surprise in the Korean War,” Orbis, Fall versity Press of Kansas, 1995). See also Memoirs of a Chinese Mar­ 1962, 435–52; David S. McLellan, “Dean Acheson and the Korean shal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), trans. War,” Political Science Quarterly, March 1968, 16–39; Eliot A. Zheng Longpu, ed. Sara Grimes (English text) (Beijing: Foreign Cohen, “ ‘Only Half the Battle’: American Intelligence and the Languages Press, 1984); Bin Yu, “What China Learned from Its Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950,” Intelligence and National Se­ ‘Forgotten War’ in Korea,” Strategic Review, Summer 1998, 4–16; curity, January 1990, 129–49; Alexander L. George and Richard and Xiaoming Zhang, “China and the Air War in Korea, Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice 1950–1953,” Journal of Military History, April 1998, 335–70. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 140–234; and John 26. Quoted in James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 54–84. Vintage Books, 2000), 45. Airpower versus a Fielded Army A Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Century

LT COL PHIL M. HAUN, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Most readers are familiar with Col John Warden’s five-ring theory and the reticence of Air Force commanders to use aerospace power to attack fielded ground forces. However, political realities will likely dictate that we do so in future, as evidenced by Opera­ tion Allied Force. Colonel Haun feels that we must learn from Kosovo and prepare to sup- port an air-first strategy. The services need to organize, train, and equip for such operations, especially in the areas of target location, identification, and battle damage assessment.

INCE OPERATION DESERT Storm, emphasis on attacking military forces serves Air Force strategic planners have been to atrophy the Air Force’s ability to strike enamored with Col John Warden’s five ground forces. The joint force air component concentric rings and the underlying as- commander (JFACC) is tasked with attacking Ssumption that enemy military forces are of centers of gravity identified by the objectives limited importance compared to enemy lead- of the National Command Authorities (NCA) ership. However, Warden’s attractive para- and the joint force commander. Recent shifts digm reduces airpower’s flexibility when a de- in policy and strategy have favored airpower

81 82 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 as the military instrument of choice to attack tuted the best use of airpower.3 However, not only traditional strategic targets but also NATO drove the planning, and its stated mil­ fielded forces, independent of friendly itary objectives included two that dealt di­ ground operations. As air operations in both rectly with the Serbian fielded forces: deter- Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate, political leaders ring further Serbian action against the are seeking to coerce opponents by ordering Kosovar Albanians and reducing the ability of direct attacks on fielded forces, conducted the Serbian military to continue offensive op­ primarily—if not solely—by airpower. erations against them.4 Although people still debate over whether This was no easy task! Concealed within such attacks represent the most effective use of the verdant, cloud-covered valley of Kosovo airpower, events over the last decade have roamed 40,000 soldiers of the Serbian Third made this strategy a reality. During that time, Army equipped with hundreds of tanks, ar­ America’s leaders have directed the Air Force mored personnel carriers (APC), and ar­ to attack an enemy’s fielded forces, so our ser­ tillery pieces—interspersed with over a mil- vice should prepare itself to do so again when lion Kosovar Albanians. In addition, a wall of the next call comes. Valuable lessons from the mobile, radar-guided surface-to-air missiles; experience in Operation Allied Force point to man-portable missiles; and antiaircraft pieces, a new, systemic, operational, and tactical frame- as well as a squadron of MiG-21 fighters, pro­ work for more efficiently conducting air opera­ tected Third Army from NATO air forces.5 tions against fielded forces. In developing plans to use against the Ser­ bian Third Army, US air planners relied on Operation Allied Force:Attacking suppression of enemy air defenses and elec­ tronic jamming assets to confuse and degrade the Serbian Third Army the Serbs’ integrated air defense system. But For anyone who believed that one could after strike aircraft could safely enter Kosovo, attack fielded forces only on a flat, open two tactical problems remained: how to locate desert, Allied Force demonstrated otherwise. and identify the targets and how to successfully During that operation, a combination of con- attack them while limiting collateral damage. text, policy, and overall military strategy com­ A-10 and F-16CG (Block 40) forward air con- pelled airmen to apply airpower in direct at- trollers airborne (FACA) trained in visual re­ tack of a fielded army. The much-publicized connaissance and air-strike control would 6 caveat that the Serbian army would face no identify targets and limit collateral damage. threat from North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ FACAs would search out targets identified ei­ tion (NATO) ground forces further compli­ ther from intelligence, surveillance, and re­ cated the situation.1 connaissance (ISR) assets during premission Planning for possible air operations planning or real time from joint surveillance, against Serbia began in earnest in May 1998. target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft. By July, Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied After the targets were identified, the FACAs commander Europe, was focusing NATO’s would control strikes, using available NATO military actions around a phased air opera- aircraft. tion.2 However, during negotiations at Ram­ Air attacks against targets in Serbia and bouillet, France, General Clark ordered the Kosovo were conducted under strict rules of Air Force’s combined force air component engagement (ROE), part of which included commander, Lt Gen Michael Short, to in- an above-ground-level altitude restriction of crease the scope of planned attacks from 15,000 feet (later lowered to 10,000 feet for punitive strikes against fixed targets to attacks FACAs) to protect NATO aircraft from hostile on the Serbian Third Army deployed in ground fire.7 As Allied Force progressed, the Kosovo (fig. 1), even though General Short ROE underwent continual adjustment to re- was not convinced that direct attacks consti­ strict the types of targets for attack. By early AIRPOWER VERSUS A FIELDED ARMY 83

Figure 1. Kosovo 84 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

there.9 In-theater tactical-reconnaissance assets were available; however, dissemination of the information proved inadequate. Serbian soldiers sitting still on the sides of the roads during strike windows limited the usefulness of JSTARS and its ground moving- target indicator.10 But the real limitation of JSTARS was the lack of a viable, onboard target- identification capability. Even when JSTARS could see vehicles moving around Kosovo, it still could not distinguish a tank from a trac­ tor pulling a trailer loaded with refugees. Eventually, JSTARS crews did develop tactics in an attempt to overcome this deficiency and, on occasion, were able to correlate vehicle- identification data supplied by unmanned aer­ ial vehicles (UAV) to provide real-time target­ ing information to FACAs. For example, the Predator UAV could identify targets through its real-time video output. Yet, UAVs also experi­ enced efficiency limitations during Allied A-10 FACAs provided visual reconnaissance and air- Force, due mostly to the lack of integration strike control during Operation Allied Force. with operational forces. UAVs had never been integrated into the air tasking order with strike packages, and the lack of training between June, FACAs had to receive permission from UAVs and FACAs made tasks such as altitude the combined air operations center (CAOC) deconfliction and target talk-ons difficult. Even for any targets attacked. so, the ability of UAVs to locate and identify NATO’s first air missions against Serbian Serbian forces was a much-needed capability, 8 fielded forces occurred on 30 March. FACAs and operational techniques were patched to­ circled overhead, searching for Serbian Third gether as quickly as possible. In the end, UAV­ Army units that kept their military vehicles off FACA employment techniques were still in the roads as hundreds of thousands of Kosovar their infancy as Allied Force drew to a close, Albanian refugees streamed out of Kosovo. and they had yet to produce a significant num­ Problems quickly surfaced for FACAs facing a ber of target engagements. static enemy. Intelligence support and imagery NATO’s in-theater intelligence organiza­ provided to aircrews proved insufficient to ac­ tions at the joint analysis center in Molesworth, complish the mission. Tactical imagery of the England, and at the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy, Serbian Third Army was inadequate, both in monitored the Serbian Third Army. Neither fa­ quantity and timeliness of dissemination. Poor cility was fully prepared for the enormous de­ weather over Kosovo during late March and mand for tactical imagery that aircrews needed early April prevented reconnaissance assets to attack fielded forces efficiently. In particular, from producing imagery, and the products re­ lack of a strong Army intelligence presence at ceived were outdated. Even with good weather, the CAOC was part of the problem.11 This over- requests for tactical imagery had to compete at all weakness in intelligence capability existed the NCA level for priority. Aircrews often re­ throughout the operation, but arrival of the ceived timely photographs of refugees hiding Army’s Task Force Hawk in Tirana, Albania, in the hills but no accompanying imagery of and construction of a flexible targeting cell the Serbian armor that had driven them within the CAOC improved matters somewhat. AIRPOWER VERSUS A FIELDED ARMY 85

Given the limited support from intelli­ approximate reality, however, an accurate num­ gence, imagery, JSTARS, and UAVs, the FACA ber/percentage of vehicles destroyed remains had to independently locate and identify the meaningless without some yardstick to measure Serbian army. Specifically, FACAs had to posi­ overall effectiveness.13 tively identify all targets prior to attack. Visual target identification proved difficult during Table 1 the day and virtually impossible at night, even Tactical BDA Estimates from Allied Force with the use of night-vision goggles and tar­ geting pods. On the other hand, despite the BDA Source Tanks APCs Artillery difficulty of locating and identifying targets, destroying them was relatively easy after they Gen Henry Shelton 120 220 450 were identified. Precision-guided munitions (10 June 1999) proved effective against Serbian armor, as did cluster bomb units and general-purpose Serbian army 13 6 27 bombs dropped by aircraft with computed de- livery systems. For the most part, once FACAs Newsweek 14 18 20 identified a target, aircraft could kill it. (15 May 2000) Despite this capability, results against Third Army were mixed and merit some ex- NATO 93 153 389 planation. Measuring the effectiveness of air (16 September 1999) strikes proved as problematic as locating and identifying Serbian armor. Unlike Desert Architecture for Attacking Storm, whose mission objectives called for 50 percent attrition of Iraq’s armor, no such Fielded Forces quantitative objective was ever set for Allied Allied Force demonstrated that target lo- Force. Furthermore, total numbers of Ser­ cation, identification, and BDA are three of bian armored vehicles in Kosovo were never the most important and challenging aspects well tracked, leaving no way for NATO intelli­ of applying airpower. Easily located and iden­ gence to adequately assess attrition rates, tified fixed-target sets tended to be politically even if that had been an objective. When sensitive, and the targets most politically ac­ asked in a NATO news conference of Sep­ ceptable for attack—namely, the Serbian tember 1999 how much of Third Army had Third Army in Kosovo—were much more dif­ been destroyed, General Clark replied, ficult to locate and identify. Yet, how were our 12 “Enough.” The measurement of success lay airmen trained going into this war? They not in counting the number of vehicles de­ were trained, prepared, and organized to at- stroyed but in how well air attacks prevented tack exactly the types of fixed targets that the Serbs from conducting offensive opera­ ended up being off limits! And they were rel­ tions and deterred them from acting against atively untrained and ill prepared to attack a the Kosovar Albanians. mobile army in the field. The challenge of at- Obviously, battle damage assessment (BDA) tacking fielded forces from the air is not lim­ is critical because war fighters need to know ited to the Air Force but requires a joint/ whether they have met objectives and airmen combined approach. The Air Force has no need to know whether they have to fly in monopoly on the requisite ISR assets and in­ harm’s way once again to meet those objectives. telligence expertise; furthermore, given the Unfortunately, controversy has clouded Allied realities of the joint/combined command Force’s BDA ever since the air strikes in Kosovo structure, an airman might not make key air- ended. But that controversy has concerned a power decisions. discrepancy in numbers reported from several Therefore, the argument presented here sources (table 1). Regardless of which numbers does not call for the Air Force to abandon its 86 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 capabilities for strategic attack, based on the control authority resides with a terminal-attack politically sensitive nature of its target set. controller.15 Likewise, when attacking fielded Rather, it urges acknowledgment and accept­ forces without the help of friendly ground ance of the reality that enemy fielded forces forces, the JFACC may assign terminal-control will continue to be viable targets and that the authority to an airborne terminal-attack con- Air Force will continue to attack these forces troller in order to limit the potential for col­ prior to the onset of, or in the absence of, lateral damage and to accept responsibility friendly ground operations. for the difficult task of locating and identify­ Again, the key to future success lies with ing mobile targets. target identification and BDA. The JFACC Terminal-attack controllers must first be must contend with the unique challenge and able to develop and maintain situational aware­ special requirements of attacking an army ness in order to orchestrate successful attacks. from the air without the helpful, clarifying This means surviving within the battle space in presence of friendly ground forces. order to observe and maneuver to identify not When attacking fielded forces, one must in­ only targets but also threats and the potential tegrate a unique set of capabilities into a sys­ for collateral damage. Second, controllers must tem designed for the rigorous, fast-paced na­ have onboard target-identification capability. ture of war against a reactive and mobile Third, they must be trained in attacking fielded enemy. At the operational level, the JFACC forces, which entails recognizing enemy armor must have a joint air operations center (JAOC) and understanding how to direct strikers onto with an intelligence shop (J-2) capable of targets. Controllers must also be familiar with maintaining an up-to-date ground order of strikers’ capabilities and limitations as well as battle while simultaneously processing applica­ tactics. In short, controllers are key tacticians ble ISR products for real-time or near-real-time who determine what targets will be attacked use by combat operations—a monumental and how. task. Intelligence should use an Allied Terminal air controllers have responsibility Force–styled flex-targeting cell to receive and for final identification and prioritization of integrate BDA to continuously update the bat­ targets, but the striker delivers the firepower.16 tle-space picture for the JFACC. At the tactical In determining the suitability of a striker, one level, a mixture of national- and tactical-level must consider three critical characteristics: ISR assets should be used to locate, identify, the aircrew’s training, the platform, and the and track fielded forces in real or near-real munitions available. During Vietnam, the en- time. Joint assets such as the US Navy’s tactical- tire Air Force fighter community was well reconnaissance pods or the US Army’s coun­ versed in CAS procedures. With the introduc­ terbattery radar may be required to provide ca­ tion of the A-10 in the late 1970s, however, CAS pabilities not available from Air Force assets. became the specialty of one airframe, while Terminal-attack-control assets capable of final the remainder of the fighter force gravitated target identification and collateral damage as­ towards interdiction, strategic attack, and air- sessment will remain critical, as will strikers superiority missions. Today, most fighter air- trained to attack mobile targets and accurately crews no longer receive training in CAS. Al­ deliver a variety of munitions. though, by definition, attacking fielded forces It is at the tactical level that targets are without the presence of friendly ground physically destroyed, and the JFACC influ­ troops is not CAS, the fundamental skills re- ences these attacks by designating terminal- main the same.17 These skills include an un­ control authority14 as necessary to address the derstanding of terminology and coordination nature of the conflict and the types of mis­ procedures, target marking and talk-on proce­ sions conducted. During close air support dures, restrictions, and final control proce­ (CAS) missions in proximity to and coordina­ dures. Aircrews performing striker missions tion with friendly ground forces, terminal- must also have proficiency in weapons deliv- AIRPOWER VERSUS A FIELDED ARMY 87 ery. Only direct hits kill armor, particularly armor that is dug in or on the move. The po­ tential for collateral damage may further re- strict attack headings or delivery options, making successful attack more difficult. Strikers must also have a survivable plat­ form—a factor the JFACC needs to weigh against the risk of shootdown. The platform must also have a compatible secure-commu­ Over Kosovo, UAVs like the Predator provided real-time nications suite. Otherwise, strikers may de- targeting information to FACAs. grade communications security, which, in turn, degrades survivability. Further, the plat- form should be able to accurately deliver a va­ Conclusion riety of munitions, whether precision-guided Given US policy makers’ current prefer­ or free-fall weapons delivered from the alti­ ence for using airpower in crisis situations, tude dictated by the ROE. The best possible the US military should prepare to support an aircrew proficiency imaginable cannot make air-first strategy. Its services need to organize, up for a platform that cannot deliver muni­ train, and equip for such operations. Air- tions with requisite accuracy.18 power can destroy what it finds; however, an Finally, munitions must be able to destroy enemy under air attack quickly adapts, using the target without causing undue collateral dispersal and deception to conceal his loca­ damage. The munition of choice depends tion. Based on the experience of Allied Force, upon the situation, but a combination of pre­ a systems approach helps to efficiently locate cision and nonprecision weapons normally and attack such an enemy. At the operational provides the flexibility needed for successful level, the JAOC’s J-2 requires a flex-targeting aerial attack.19 cell, manned by Air Force and Army intelli­ Obviously, this architecture for attacking gence personnel, to build and maintain situ­ fielded forces is systemic, relying on the ex­ ational awareness on enemy ground forces isting JAOC structure and modifications at and to process ISR products for near-real- the operational and tactical levels to promote time targeting and BDA. Intelligence must time-critical targeting required to attack mo­ have immediate access to a variety of ISR as- sets, and it must be able to process the infor­ bile targets successfully. The flex-targeting mation quickly. This includes not only Air cell becomes the central location for process­ Force and national assets but also joint and ing ISR inputs and for developing and dis­ combined assets, such as Army and coalition tributing targeting products, as well as main­ UAVs, counterbattery radar, and Navy and taining the enemy’s order of battle. coalition tactical-reconnaissance platforms. Operations (J-3) then becomes responsible This systems approach will be effective for the command and control of assets, en­ only if one can prosecute the targeting infor­ suring the translation of the commander’s in- mation at the tactical level. Terminal air con- tent into appropriate action. At the tactical trollers, such as FACAs, must have the capa­ level, terminal air controllers are responsible bility to locate and identify targets on the for identifying and prioritizing targets as well battlefield. Advances in optics and infrared as determining attack restrictions, based on targeting systems continue to increase the ca­ criteria such as potential collateral damage or pability of medium-altitude target identifica­ ROE. Finally, with inputs and guidance from tion during day-and-night operations. Like- the terminal air controller, the striker com­ wise, developing tactics, techniques, and pletes the attack. procedures during peacetime to more fully 88 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

integrate UAVs into operations will improve than fighting the way they have trained. the target-marking or talk-on ability of these Training develops the tactical skills and mind- aircraft. Finally, strikers must train with set that define a combat force’s capabilities. FACAs to attack mobile targets and become Major exercises such as Red Flag and Air War­ familiar with the unique and flexible nature rior should incorporate attacks on fielded of attacking fielded forces. forces without the presence of friendly The Air Force needs to adjust its training ground forces as a primary mission. Given and tactics. The adage of “train the way you this mission’s unique challenges, if the Air fight” has validity. It makes sense to take into Force fails to develop adequate training or ef­ combat time-tested tactics and techniques fective tactics, it will likely fail to meet the honed during peacetime training. In the heat combat expectations of either the theater of battle, military forces have no option other commander in chief or the NCA.

Notes

1. This article uses the terms Serbia and Serbian to refer to the Lt Gen Nebojsa Pavkovic of the Serb army refuted the numbers Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its forces, respectively. offered by Cohen and Shelton, citing a much lower total. Re­ 2. Air War over Serbia: Initial Report (Ramstein Air Base, Ger­ becca Grant, “True Blue: The Real Story behind the Kosovo Num­ many: United States Air Forces in Europe, Studies and Analysis bers Game,” AFA Issue Brief, 1 June 2000, on-line, Internet, October Directorate, April 2000), 8. 2000, available from http://www.afa.org/library/issues/trueblue. 3. General Short believed that the key to meeting NATO’s html. By mid-July, General Clark had ordered an Air Force mis­ objectives lay in attacking the political leadership in Belgrade. Lt sion-effectiveness analysis team to go see what was on the ground. Gen Michael Short, USAF, retired, lecture, School of Advanced On 16 September, General Clark presented NATO’s BDA—similar Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 21 November 2000. to Cohen and Shelton’s but with slightly lower numbers, based on 4. Air War over Serbia, 9. multiple strikes that had previously been double-counted. Clark 5. R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “Anatomy of a and Corley, NATO press conference. Purge,” Washington Post, 11 April 1999, A1. 14. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, Counter- 6. Lt Col Phil M. Haun, unpublished A-10 war diary, land, 27 August 1999, 98. Terminal control, a type of air control, March–June 1999. Eventually, FACAs expanded to include US is the authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft delivering ord­ Navy F-14s and Marine F/A-18D Hornets. nance to a specific target. 7. Ibid. Later, further modifications to the ROE allowed 15. Ibid. A terminal-attack controller is a qualified officer or strike aircraft to fly as low as 8,000 feet above ground level during enlisted member who, from a forward ground or airborne posi­ diving deliveries of weapons. This altitude restriction was further tion, provides terminal control to aircraft performing CAS to reduced to 5,000 feet after the bombing of a Kosovar refugee col­ ground forces. umn by F-16CG FACAs on 14 April 1999. 16. This does not mean that controllers with inherent kill ca­ 8. Due to poor weather over Kosovo, the first strikes against pability may not perform both controller and striker functions. mobile targets did not take place until 6 April. 17. AFDD 2-1.3, 92. CAS involves air action by fixed- and ro­ 9. Lt Steven Smith, intelligence officer, 81st Fighter tary-wing aircraft against hostile targets in proximity to friendly Squadron, discussions with author, April 1999. 10. JSTARS is a long-range, air-to-ground surveillance system forces, requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the aboard the E-8C (a modified ) consisting of (1) a syn­ fire and movement of those forces. thetic-aperture radar capable of producing an image of a selected 18. An excellent example is use of the British GR-7 during area and (2) a moving-target indicator designed to locate slow- Allied Force. Although Royal Air Force pilots were some of the moving ground targets. most professional and well trained available, at medium altitude 11. Unlike Air Force intelligence, Army intelligence assesses the GR-7 delivered the BL-755 cluster bomb unit extremely inac­ the capabilities of the enemy army. Its familiarity with the ISR as- curately due to the absence of a computed delivery solution for sets best suited for observing enemy ground forces adds a wealth this munition. Thus, the pilots had to perform a modified man­ of expertise to the CAOC in this area. ual delivery from medium altitude with the aid of an electro­ 12. Gen Wesley Clark, USA, and Brig Gen John Corley, optical targeting pod. The first canister impacts were recorded as USAF, NATO press conference, Brussels, Belgium, 16 September far away as one to two kilometers from the target. Haun diary. 1999, on-line, Internet, 18 September 2001, available from 19. A common misunderstanding is that the use of precision http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm. munitions lowers the potential for collateral damage. Although 13. Briefing, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Gen precision munitions such as laser-guided bombs or Maverick mis­ Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Ini­ siles are more accurate than free-fall munitions, if precision tial BDA Assessment, Washington, D.C., 10 June 1999, on-line, In­ weapons do not guide properly, they can miss their targets by ternet, October 2000, available from http://www.defenselink. miles. Compare this to free-fall general-purpose bombs delivered mil/news/Jun1999/t06101999_t0610asd.html. On 16 June 1999, from a dive, which might miss by meters but never by miles. Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to use this department to let readers know about aerospace-power items of interest.

C-9 Nightingale From Dedicated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Transport

CAPT GILLES VAN NEDERVEEN, USAF, RETIRED*

N ORDER TO provide specialized aero­ cations—including oxygen outlets, a medical medical evacuation, the Air Force refrigerator, a separate ventilation system, and bought 24 variants of the commercial a folding ramp—designed to provide for the DC-9 series 30 model in 1968. Twenty C-9A care and comfort of 40 patients. In peacetime, INightingales—the only dedicated medical- patients are stabilized prior to transport, but airlift aircraft in the world—continue to serve equipment on board the aircraft allows med­ with the 86th Airlift Wing at Ramstein Air ical personnel to stabilize patients in flight. Base, Germany; the 374th Airlift Wing at Yokota Air Base, Japan; and the 375th Airlift Wing at , Illinois. In 2000 the C-9As based in the continental United States (CONUS) transported over 30,000 pa­ tients in 1,300 missions to military, Depart­ ment of Veterans Affairs, and civilian hospi­ tals. Aircraft at the overseas locations moved more than 10,600 patients in Europe and an- other 1,000 in the Pacific theater, helping en- C-9A sure that those patients received the special­ ized care they needed. Additionally, three VC-9Cs configured as VIP transports operate from , , as part of the 89th Airlift Wing. (The remaining aircraft crashed in a fatal accident.) Capable of carrying a mix of litter or ambu­ latory patients, the C-9A has numerous modifi­ VC-9C

*Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, a former associate editor of Aerospace Power Journal, is a career intelligence officer who flew on RC-135, EC-130, and E-8 aircraft. He has worked in both national and joint intelligence assignments.

89 90 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

However, age is quickly catching up to these tract worth up to $800 million from the U.S. Air airframes, which have noisy, inefficient en­ Force to supply as many as seven C-40B and gines; an older cockpit layout; and outdated C-40C aircraft and 10 years of logistics support. navigational aids. Although the Air Force has The aircraft are based on the Boeing Business recently updated some of the avionics, it still Jet and will be used to support the needs of Air needs to replace the aircraft between fiscal Force commanders-in-chief and the Air Na­ years 2004 and 2010. In the interim, Air Mobil­ tional Guard. The firm order for one C-40B ity Command (AMC) is working on roll-on/ makes it the second such aircraft procured by roll-off pallets so it can use other aircraft in the the Air Force.”1 The first C-40Bs will be based aeromedical role. These pallets will allow at Andrews Air Force Base, where they will re- aeroevacuation nurses to stabilize patients, but place the C-22 (Boeing 727) transports used by most of the other AMC airframes, such as the Headquarters . C-21, cannot transport patients until they have been stabilized. Furthermore, in an attempt to cut costs for dedicated platforms, the Air Force is conducting an ongoing analysis of AMC air- craft, looking for aeromedical-evacuation alter- natives. Like the C-141 before it, the C-17 al­ ready flies long-distance aeromedical flights from overseas theaters to the CONUS. Both the elimination of the C-141 in active-duty squadrons and the small number of C-17s have forced airlift planners to look at other air- frames for theater-evacuation missions, includ­ ing the use of Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft such as the Boeing 767. C-40 Meanwhile, downsizing of the US military overseas has proved stressful for intratheater airlift. As the need to move large numbers of The US Navy also is currently buying the patients has declined, C-9s have been pressed C-40—a Boeing 737-700—to replace its C-9 into service for nonmedical airlift duties. Con­ cargo/passenger fleet. The C-40’s range of sequently, in order to comply with the Geneva 3,700 nautical miles; glass cockpit; and newer, convention covering the use of the Red Cross quieter, and more efficient engines make it symbol, the Air Force is removing the cross attractive to the US military. The Navy version from the T-tails of the C-9 fleet so that it can use comes equipped with a seven-by-11-foot door, these aircraft for other airlift missions. which facilitates the loading not only of cargo Current service planning has not identi­ pallets but also litter patients if the C-40 is fied a replacement for the C-9 Nightingale. used as an aeromedical-evacuation aircraft. Part of the answer may involve the 89th Airlift Thus, the US military is taking steps—includ­ Wing’s three VC-9Cs, which a VIP/special air ing the updating of existing airframes and mission (SAM) fleet review found lacking in the purchasing of new aircraft—to ensure terms of range and carrying capacity. Specifi­ that the vital mission of medical airlift con­ cally, the VC-9C can transport 22 passengers tinues uninterrupted. for only 2,150 nautical miles—too short a dis­ tance for medium VIP airlift. Thus, AMC has Note recommended the purchase of three C-40Bs to replace the VC-9C airframes. 1. “U.S. Air Force to Award C-40B Contract,” Forum, on-line, Internet, 24 September 2001, available from Indeed, according to an announcement by http://www.boeing.com/commercial/forum/issues/ Boeing, the company “is being awarded a con- 0301/htm/a06.htm. The art of war is divided between art and stratagem. What cannot be done by force must be done by stratagem. —Frederick the Great The War on Drugs Two More Casualties

LT COL STEPHEN P. HOWARD, USAF*

E MUST ADD two more names to the casualty list of America’s so-called war on drugs. On 20 April 2001, a Peruvian military aircraft shot down a civilian Cessna 185, killing American Christian missionary Roni Bowers and her seven-month-oldW daughter Charity: A CIA-contracted American crew aboard a US drug interdiction aircraft tried to stop Peruvian authorities from shooting at a plane that turned out to be carrying American missionaries. . . . Three Americans contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and a Peruvian air force officer, were aboard the Cessna Citation 2, about one mile (1.6 km) from where the missionaries’ plane was flying, the official said. . . . The two-engine US Department of Defense aircraft was providing tracking and detection information as part of joint US-Peruvian efforts to stem drug trafficking.1 Incidents like this give us the opportunity to reflect upon the broader implications of policies that have gone awry. The facts and miscalculations of this incident will probably never receive full disclosure. News reporters, commentators, and others will “spin” the episode into a “terrible tragedy,” “careless accident,” or “unfortunate incident.” We will have difficulty uncovering the truth because too many special interests have a hand in this war on drugs. Each of these groups tries to push its own agenda instead of promoting what is best for solving America’s illegal-drug dilemma. Political transitions such as the one currently under way in Washington, D.C., provide the opportunity to look at previous policies from a new

*Colonel Howard is chief of the Training Branch of the Operations, Plans, and Policy Center at Headquarters United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

91 perspective. On the one hand, the course of action followed by the United States for over a decade to counter the “supply side” has not yielded the results hoped for by the American people. Supply-side advocates say that the US surveillance flights (like the one that tipped off the Peruvian air force, which ultimately shot down the Bowers’ plane) play a vital role in stopping the spread of illegal drugs in America. What they will fail to say is that such interdiction efforts have failed miserably for over 10 years. On the other hand, “demand side” advocates point to this incident as another example of overzealous law enforcement and of military officials trampling the rights of average citizens. They suggest that full funding of treatment programs for addictive behavior would do more good than shooting down civilian aircraft. Neither view is completely correct. The most important point at stake in this issue is that the US military is the wrong tool for stopping the use of illegal drugs in America. We should not involve military force in domestic law-enforcement issues either inside or outside the borders of the United States. Rather, we should train, equip, and prepare our military forces to fight the nation’s “real” wars. Because of ignorance and self-serving agendas, many people have lost sight of the intended use of the US military. Uninformed individuals support counterdrug interdiction operations by the military (such as the Peruvian aircraft shootdown) because they have little understanding of what military force can or should do. To them, the military is an expensive burden that should find gainful employment. Counterdrug interdiction operations sound like just the right sort of employment for the military. Although such operations squander America’s military capability, some advocates are willing to misuse our national-defense assets in return for drug-seizure headlines and costly, yet ineffective, surveillance and interdiction operations. Furthermore, some special interests prosper financially or philosophically by using America’s military personnel to fight a war that doesn’t exist. The Nixon administration transformed America’s perspective on illegal drugs from “concern” to “war” in 1971, when the president first proclaimed a war on drugs. Like the war on poverty, it was a catchy phrase. In their haste to do something, well-intentioned government leaders could say, “We’re taking action.” Sadly, a great deal of misguided “action” has also taken place while presidential administrations have tried to figure out how to deal with the problem of illegal drugs in the United States. But this problem is so complex and profitable that it defies dissection and analysis. Each administration since 1971 has looked for a quick fix to stem the tide of illegal drugs flowing over our borders. For national-defense crises, the nation’s “911” capability lies within the Department of Defense. Because drug trafficking had become a transnational problem, it seemed logical to pass the responsibility for battling illegal drugs to the military. Until 1990, US generals and admirals had opposed such a tasking. They knew of the huge physical and philosophical differences that existed between

92 law enforcement and military operations. However, after America won the Cold War, those same generals and admirals feared losing their market share in the New World Order. Without the Soviet Union to fight (or at least to prepare to fight), senior military leaders sought missions that would maintain their relevancy in the minds of the American people. The “peace dividend” represented an alarming concept to the military-industrial apparatus (both civilian and military) that had staked its future on the Cold War. When that war ended, it sought any mission that would maintain the US military’s Cold War infrastructure. Whether the military was the correct tool or not, senior military leaders reversed themselves and embraced an active military role in counterdrug interdiction operations. But at what cost? According to the US Department of Justice, the federal government has spent more than $179.5 billion over the last two decades combating the importation and illegal use of drugs in the United States. Yet, according to those same statistics, the supply and purity of illegal drugs have increased. At the same time, the price of illegal drugs has decreased. What have we purchased with those billions of tax dollars? For one thing, military readiness has steadily declined during the past 10 years. The war on drugs isn’t solely responsible, but it has contributed. Likewise, military recruitment and retention are falling. This decade has seen sharp declines in the numbers of men and women willing to serve in the military. Again, counterdrug operations are not the sole cause here but do contribute to the problem. The reliability of military equipment and hardware is also on a steady decline. Interdiction operations tend to create shortages of spare parts, reduce the time devoted to routine maintenance, push weapon systems beyond their reasonable life cycles, and add to the wear and tear on personnel—all of these effects reduce military capability. We cannot entirely blame counterdrug operations for the military’s decline, but they are a factor. And the US taxpayer receives little benefit from this considerable expenditure of funds and manpower. If America continues to wage a war on drugs, more lives will be lost and more costs will be incurred. What if the downed Cessna aircraft had carried a load of cocaine? Would it have mattered? Would the price of cocaine in New York City, Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles have risen? US government statistics clearly show that one airplane full of drugs has no impact on the total quantity or retail price of cocaine on the streets of America. What price did we pay over the jungles of Peru? And for what purpose? Today, according to Roger Rumrill, a Peruvian author and expert on the drug trade, “more than 70 percent of the drug traffic between Peru and Colombia now moves by sea along the Pacific coast, not by air.”2 Since the air-interdiction effort has forced drug traffickers to change their business practices, should we launch submarines from Hawaii or San Diego to interdict and sink boats suspected of carrying illegal drugs? Is this the next logical step in the war on drugs?

93 Illegal drug use in the United States is a terrible dilemma that requires serious thought and action. However, military action is not the answer. Instead, perhaps it is time to transfer responsibility for the war on drugs from the military generals and pass it to the surgeon general. Using America’s soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is not the solution to this “war.” Instead, we should continue to prepare them for the wars they are meant to fight. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Notes

1. “Official: CIA Crew Opposed Peru Plane Attack,” China Daily, 23 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 4 October 2001, available from http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/docs/2001-04-30/3357.html. 2. Quoted in Kevin G. Hall, “Peru Is Fighting Drugs—And Itself,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 24 September 2001, available from http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n719/a06.html.

“Feedback and Discussion”

In the Summer 2001 edition of Aerospace Power Journal, we introduced the CGO Voices Web page, which has received favorable feedback. Lt Jeff Mustin leads the discussion of our July/August topic, “The Future of Pilots in the Cockpit,” declaring that “humans, not machines, fought Desert Storm, and their training in the technology, not the technology itself, won the war.” In “To UAV or Not to UAV: That Is the Question: Here Is One Answer,” Capt Patrick Eberle responds to Mustin by arguing that contemporary advancements in weapons are seldom revolutionary, but failure to look to such advances in technology and warfare will lead to service stagnation and demise. He further notes that lack of diversity and poor strategy rather than reliance on technology are the causes of technology failures. We encourage you to join this good discussion by submitting articles and/or ideas for topics and comments to CGO Voices at [email protected]. In our Contributor’s Corner section, 2d Lt Katrine M. Waterman discusses whether women are capable of being successful in military flying careers. Her article “The Aviatrix in Military Aviation” observes that achieving such success requires motivation, dedication, and knowledge. Visit our Web site at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil to check out these articles or E-mail the editor at [email protected]. Security measures imposed as a result of the recent terrorist attacks have intermittently prevented access to our site from locations outside the Department of Defense. We regret the inconvenience to our readers and appreciate everyone’s patience. Please continue to check Chronicles for access.

Luetwinder T. Eaves Managing Editor Aerospace Power Chronicles

94 RICOCHETS 95

Ricochets and Replies LEADERSHIP ISSUE APPRECIATED Continued from page 7 ciation for the work airmen accomplish. I was very impressed with the Summer 2001 Everyone has a need for feedback to varying issue of APJ, which featured articles on leader- degrees, but regardless of one’s generation— ship. Every one of them contained information whether boomer or Generation Xer—a little I can use. Although APJ’s principal audience positive reinforcement and the tried-and-true is the officer corps, I feel that this journal “pat on the back” go a long way toward re­ should be in every office, back shop, and or­ cruiting and maintaining a quality force. ganization on base. Thank you for the inspi­ I am the father and father-in-law of two ration that you provide. active-duty Air Force E-4s (Generation Xers). Guess what aspect of the Air Force displeases TSgt Matthew W. Denslow them most? (Hint: it isn’t the pay, the de­ Biloxi, ployments, or the home-station operational- readiness exercises or 12-hour shifts.) It is very simply the lack of positive feedback from im­ mediate and midlevel supervisors. To a lesser degree, senior NCOs and squadron and wing BOOK REVIEW REVIEWED commanders who purport to lead airmen are I commend Col Eric Ash for his insightful re- also among the guilty. The focus of these so- view of the long-awaited biography of John called leaders is merely production, to the Boyd The Mind of War: John Boyd and American detriment of a motivated workforce that looks Security by Grant Tedrick Hammond in the forward to reenlisting and providing service Fall 2001 issue of APJ. I take issue with only above self. To me, LBWA is the real “passion one of Ash’s statements: “Counterfactual for the responsibility of command” and is the speculation is ahistorical and antischolarly.” way leaders “inspire airmen to continue to Recent counterfactual scholarship by Niall move forward,” as stated by Gen Michael Ferguson, Philip Tetlock, Richard N. Lebow, Ryan in his introduction to APJ’s Summer issue. and others firmly refutes this proposition. Vir­ In my 27-year Air Force career as a follower tual History, a collection of essays edited by and a leader, I have seen the best and the Ferguson, is particularly compelling. The worst. Now that I am more of a leader, col­ forthcoming collection Unmaking the West: leagues often ask me how I recruit and retain Counterfactual Thought Experiments in History, hardworking NCOs and officers who always edited by Tetlock, Lebow, and Geoffrey maintain a positive attitude and work ethic. Parker (with some chapters already available LBWA is the answer. in draft form on the Internet), holds the same promise. Lt Col Gregory Miller, USAF Texas Air National Guard Lt Col Ralph Hitchens, USAFR, Retired Lackland AFB, Texas Washington, D.C. War is a science which depends on art Mott advances his argument of uniformities among the case studies by asserting that “relevant for its application. components of the donor and recipient relation- ––B. H. Liddell Hart ship . . . coalesce in four prominent features that seem holistically associated with achieving donor aims” (p. 21). The following briefly summarizes Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective by those features: convergence of donor and recipient William H. Mott IV. Greenwood Publishing goals, control by the donor, commitment of donor Group (http://www.greenwood.com), 88 Post combat forces, and coherence or suitable integration Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, 1999, of donor military assistance with other donor poli­ 384 pages, $65.00. cies and strategy. Mott later points out that “the presence of all four features . . . provides high con­ This work provides readers a comprehensive fidence that military assistance can be expected to study of the dynamics that affect wartime military- achieve donor aims” (p. 266). Simply put, the assistance programs. Although most of the author’s more features present in a given donor-recipient eight case studies address American experiences relationship, the greater the odds of donor success. with assistance programs from the twentieth cen­ One of two observations I found of interest, as re­ tury, he includes examples of French and British gards the author’s analysis of American assistance, assistance from the eighteenth and nineteenth was the tendency for policy makers to recommend centuries. Mott’s premise is that successful assis­ greater amounts of economic aid and military assis­ tance programs have certain uniformities that in- tance even though such assistance, by itself, might crease the potential for meeting donor aims, while not achieve their aims. For example, Mott states that programs that lack these uniformities—what Mott “simply increasing aid and expecting the Vietnamese terms “lawlike regularities”—are more likely to fail. to help themselves, had not produced results” (p. For policy makers, Mott provides a touchstone for 196). It follows that, without tying assistance to spe­ judging if a given assistance program has the right cific aims, it is unrealistic for donors to assume that policy mix to meet its goals. For the operator who increasing the funding for a program will ensure its is personally involved in military-assistance pro- success. The second flaw, often present in US assis­ grams, Mott provides a rich, historical reference tance programs, is the tendency to focus aid efforts that may shed light on why particular initiatives are on only one group of indigenous elements in a re­ destined to succeed and others to fail. Personnel cipient country. In postwar China, “American diplo­ involved in the process of providing military assis­ macy had no means readily available to influence the tance in any service branch and at any level will Communists” (p. 152). In Vietnam, advisors told benefit from reading this book. President Kennedy, “We have virtually no contact Prior to delving into the case studies, Mott, a with meaningful opposition elements and we have political scientist at heart, takes time to address the made no attempt to maintain a U.S. position inde­ history behind military assistance and the different pendent of [President Ngo Dinh] Diem” (p. 195). methodologies commonly employed to analyze These quotations illustrate how the tendency to such assistance. Authors dealing with the social sci­ focus assistance efforts on one actor limits the ability ences sometimes attempt to quantify historic data of donor nations to exert pressure on aid recipients, to make their work appear more “scientific.” But which may ultimately result in a failure to meet Mott manages to address the military-assistance donor aims. issue through qualitative analysis and does a fabu­ The aforementioned remarks about donor expe­ lous job of meeting the multidisciplinary challenge riences as regards America’s past roles only scratch posed by the subject. His paradigm of lawlike reg­ the surface of the lessons Mott shares with his read­ ularities between donor and recipient nations is re­ ers. Assuming that his audience consists primarily of inforced by the parallels he draws among the case Americans, I have one complaint about the chapter studies. that addresses US involvement in Vietnam. Knowing

96 NET ASSESSMENT 97 the different phases of American involvement in 100 books and at least seven motion pictures— Vietnam, the author appropriately divides analysis of evidence of our lasting fascination with America’s US military assistance into three studies. However, worst wartime disaster. he could have included a case study that addressed Although many of the books about Pearl Har­ either Soviet or Chinese military assistance to North bor have been outstanding (Walter Lord’s Day of Vietnam. Such a juxtaposition would have better Infamy, Gordon Prange’s At Dawn We Slept, and balanced the latter part of the book and given read­ Robert Stinnett’s recent Day of Deceit), the battle’s ers an opportunity to see Mott’s paradigm fit an ex- record on the silver screen is less than impressive. ample other than American military assistance in the Realistic films on Pearl Harbor (such as 1970’s twentieth century. Tora, Tora, Tora) proved ponderous and dull, while Mott includes nine appendices that contain some of the better movies about that era (e.g., quantitative analysis, tables of assistance funding, From Here to Eternity) use the Japanese attack as a and topics ranging from the Strategic Hamlet pro- counterpoint for other story lines. So far, the de­ gram to the impact of National Security Council di­ finitive movie about what happened on 7 Decem­ rectives on the evolution of US military-assistance ber 1941 exceeds Hollywood’s grasp. programs. Much of the data in the appendices Perhaps that’s why Pearl Harbor, the latest film to doesn’t fit the case-study paradigm but is essential to depict this epic event, generated such anticipation. further study of variables that tend to affect military- In tackling the project, producer Jerry Bruck­ assistance programs. heimer (Top Gun) and director Michael Bay (The Military Assistance should be required reading for Rock, Armageddon) vowed to make a Pearl Harbor all personnel involved in military-assistance pro- movie “by which all other films are measured.” grams. Mott illustrates aspects of donor-recipient re­ Pledging to honor the service and sacrifice of lationships that may indeed lend themselves to law- those who served at Pearl Harbor, they told the US like regularities or uniformities, which form the basis Naval Institute, “Our goal is to stage the event with for a policy paradigm. Such a paradigm should help utmost realism.” policy makers determine if the correct policy mix is being applied to a given relationship, which should Sadly, their film fails to deliver on any of its increase the chance of attaining donor aims. At a promises. Instead, Bruckheimer and Bay offer up a minimum, readers will gain a better understanding rather conventional (and dull) love story, cast of what dynamics are involved in military-assistance against an improbable series of events that lead up programs and how we can avoid the mistakes of our to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The plot features a predecessors. pair of Tennessee crop dusters turned Army Air Corps pilots—Rafe and Danny (played by Ben Af­ Capt Clifford E. Rich, USAF fleck and newcomer Josh Hartnett, respectively). F. E. Warren AFB, While assigned to a training unit on Long Island— commanded by Lt Col Jimmy Doolittle—Rafe falls in love with a Navy nurse named Evelyn (Kate Pearl Harbor by Touchstone Pictures. Starring Ben Beckinsale). Unfortunately, their romance is cut Affleck, Josh Hartnett, Kate Beckinsale, Cuba short when Rafe is transferred to England, where Gooding Jr., Tom Sizemore, Jon Voight, Dan he participates in the Battle of Britain as a sort of Aykroyd, and Alec Baldwin. Produced by Jerry “combat exchange officer” with the Royal Air Bruckheimer and Michael Bay, written by Ran­ Force (RAF). dall Wallace and directed by Michael Bay, 183 By this time, even the most casual viewer real­ minutes, rated PG-13 (mild profanity and sani­ izes that Bay and screenwriter Randall Wallace tized violence). (Braveheart) are quite willing to suspend historical facts in the interest of plot development. The real­ Adm Thomas Fargo, commander of the US Pa­ ity that Doolittle wasn’t on active duty in early 1941 cific Fleet, said it best: “No single event is more and that American volunteer pilots resigned their central to our concept of national tragedy and commissions before joining the RAF becomes less conviction than the events of December 7, 1941.” important than getting Rafe off the screen—at Indeed, the shock of Japan’s surprise attack against least for a while—so Danny can fall in love with Pearl Harbor still resonates in the American psyche, Evelyn. Predictably, their love affair blossoms after almost 60 years after that fateful Sunday morning. both are transferred to (surprise!) Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor has provided the grist for more than just months before the Japanese attack. 98 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

If this concept of “romance against the back- during the raid, allowing final resolution of the drop of disaster” sounds familiar, it should. Bay love triangle between the pilots and Evelyn. and Wallace have borrowed heavily from director There is much to dislike in this movie. Histori­ James Cameron’s playbook, creating a sort of Ti­ ans and military buffs will cringe at the ersatz mix tanic meets World War II and meshing a rather of fact and fiction. At one point, Jon Voight’s pedestrian love story with eye-popping special ef­ FDR—looking like he just came from Madame fects. Unfortunately, Wallace’s screenplay seems Tussaud’s Wax Museum—rises unaided from his less inspired by Titanic than by every B movie pro­ wheelchair, trying to inspire a timid staff. A de- duced by Warner Brothers during World War II. tailed re-creation of Pearl Harbor’s battleship row Rafe, Danny, and Evelyn are little more than stock is spoiled by the sight of modern warships, some- characters, mouthing lines that are trite and unin­ how augmented into the 1941 fleet. And a prewar tentionally funny. When Rafe told Evelyn, “If I only sequence on the USS Arizona was clearly filmed on had one more night to spend, I’d spend it with the USS Missouri, a poor substitute for a World War you,” there were more than a few groans in the the­ I–era dreadnought. ater, and rightly so. It is odd—and disappointing— From a cinematic standpoint, Pearl Harbor that such twaddle came from an Oscar-winning proves equally disappointing. Affleck, Hartnett, screenwriter. Wallace is clearly off his game in and Beckinsale’s cutout characters do little more Pearl Harbor. than occupy the screen between battle scenes. Al­ Likewise, director Bay devotes too much time to though Bay’s action sequences represent a high the love story and not enough to events leading point in the film, even those segments seem oddly up to the attack. By the time enemy aircraft arrive disjointed. For example, when casualties begin over Diamond Head (roughly 80 minutes into the streaming into Beckinsale’s naval hospital, Bay film), many viewers will be rooting for the Japanese, shoots the entire sequence in gauzy, soft focus, hoping for anything that might enliven such leaden thereby losing an opportunity to underscore the proceedings. Fortunately, the battle sequences harsh reality of Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. don’t disappoint, thanks (in part) to impressive In all fairness, the film has its moments—al­ visual effects from George Lucas’s Industrial Light though they are decidedly few and far between. and Magic organization. Scenes of exploding bat­ The aerial sequences involving Affleck in the Bat­ tleships, sailors trapped in capsized vessels, and tle of Britain are quite good, and Cuba Gooding Jr. hundreds of dead bodies floating in the harbor are delivers a fine performance as Dorie Miller, the quite stunning, adding a gritty realism that is so Navy mess steward who became the first African- often missing from this picture. American to win the Navy Cross for shooting down Regrettably, Bay dilutes the impact and power of two Japanese planes at Pearl Harbor. In less than the battle sequences by placing his cardboard char­ 10 minutes of screen time, Gooding creates a acters squarely in the middle of the action. Not con- character that is far more compelling than any- tent to let Rafe and Danny get off the ground and thing concocted by Wallace, Bay, or the other actors. engage Japanese fighters in their P-40s, Bay also has Perhaps one day Hollywood will get it right: a his­ them play a game of aerial “chicken,” causing four torically accurate film about Pearl Harbor that’s Zeros to collide in midair. Moments later, these in­ equally entertaining. Pearl Harbor clearly falls short of trepid pilots even stage an ambush of the attacking that mark. Despite a lavish production—and the as­ Japanese, luring more enemy aircraft past the base’s sociated hype—Pearl Harbor is a tedious film with ab­ control tower, where their colleagues blast them with solutely no historical value. Audiences looking for a a .50-caliber machine gun. realistic account of events at Pearl Harbor would be Still unsatisfied, Bay and Bruckheimer devote well advised to read Gordon Prange’s book or rent a the final minutes of their film to a further distor­ copy of director John Ford’s award-winning docu­ tion of historical fact. Anxious to avenge Pearl Har­ mentary December 7th. Comparatively speaking, this bor, President Roosevelt approves a plan to attack newest Pearl Harbor film lives up to its advance Japan, using B-25 bombers launched from an air- billing in only one sense. By releasing Pearl Harbor, craft carrier—the famous Doolittle raid. And Bruckheimer and Bay have produced a disaster ri­ whom does Doolittle recruit for his daring mis­ valed only by the real Japanese attack in 1941. sion? Why, none other than Rafe, Danny, and their fellow pilots from Pearl Harbor. It doesn’t take a Maj Gary Pounder, USAF, Retired genius to figure out that one of our heroes will die Oxford, Mississippi NET ASSESSMENT 99

MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader says deal with MacArthur’s open insubordination edited by William M. Leary. University of Ne­ and contempt for President Harry Truman, which braska Press (http://www.nebraskapress.unl. led to his being relieved of command. This conflict edu), 233 North 8th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska further strengthened our constitutional democ­ 68588-0255, 2001, 538 pages, $40.00. racy and cemented the importance of the subordi­ nation of military leaders to their commander in Gen Douglas MacArthur is one of a handful of chief. MacArthur and the American Century provides admirals and generals to be given five-star rank a fascinating look at a general who made an in­ (admiral of the fleet or general of the army). delible mark on American history. MacArthur was complex, controversial, and bril­ liant; right or wrong, he ranks among the most im­ Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN portant military figures in US military history. Washington, D.C. Many books have been written about him, and scholars still debate aspects of his career. The latest volume, MacArthur and the American Century, con­ Desert Warriors: Australian P-40 Pilots at War in tains 36 essays and accounts. Some of the essays the Middle East and North Africa, 1941–1943 were written by MacArthur himself; others were by Russell Brown. Banner Books (http://www. penned by distinguished historians like Stephen banner-books.com.au), 122 Walker Street, Ambrose and Clark Reynolds. Maryborough, Queensland, 4650 Australia, Most Americans remember the flamboyant gen­ 2000, 320 pages, approximately $49.00 (US). eral wading through the shores of Leyte in the Philippines in 1944. This fulfilled a promise he It is always refreshing to see a book come along made in 1942 to return to the islands, where he that has the ability to drastically change one’s per­ served as field marshal to President Manuel Que­ ception of a significant historical event. Finally, zon. But had MacArthur not participated in World there is a book dealing with the contributions of War II, he would be remembered as a hero of Australian pilots in North Africa during the middle World War I, an innovative superintendent of the stages of the Second World War. Although there US Military Academy, and Army chief of staff (the have been many books dealing with this largely for- Army’s equivalent to the Navy’s chief of naval op­ gotten episode of military history, most of them erations). But controversy was not far behind. deal with either a general explanation of the For example, MacArthur was instrumental in desert air war or, more likely, simply discuss it clearing out the Bonus Expeditionary Force through either German or British eyes. This story camped in makeshift shacks around the nation’s of Australian aviators has certainly been decades in capital in 1932. These World War I veterans were the making. demanding bonuses appropriated by Congress for Russell Brown is a relative newcomer to the future payment. President Hoover authorized the writing of aviation history. Although he has au­ US Army to clear the marchers and burn the thored several magazine articles, with this book he shacks. This blunder would cost Hoover his presi­ has hit the proverbial home run at his first appear­ dency and would mar General MacArthur’s repu­ ance at the plate. A retired schoolteacher from tation. Even at the end of his life, the general Australia, the author has completed a wonderfully maintained that Communist insurgents had infil­ researched and masterfully presented book that is trated these marchers. certain to make an impact in the area of the desert The book’s essays cover these topics as well as air war. Desert Warriors deals primarily with the explore the reasons why MacArthur would survive Royal Australian Air Force’s 3 and 450 fighter (politically) the Japanese invasion of the Philip- squadrons and with other Australian pilots flying pines while Adm Husband Kimmel and British flag in Royal Air Force fighter squadrons in North officers in Singapore and Malaya would be rooted Africa and the Middle East. For those readers fa­ out of their respective armies and navies. In his miliar with Fighters over the Desert, Hans Ring and essay, Clark Reynolds highlights a General Christopher Shores’s definitive work on the desert MacArthur who looks beyond terrain into a mar­ air war, Desert Warriors, follows a similar chronolog­ itime strategy of defeating Japan’s Imperial Army. ical format. Since Brown focuses strictly on the The general’s lessons learned, which called for Australian contributions, however, there is under­ using combined air, land, and sea forces, would be standably less information reported on a daily repeated at Inchon, Korea, in 1950. The final es­ basis. This in no way detracts from the book but 100 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 bolsters the author’s thesis by concentrating on man superiority. Although the Germans did have Australian contributions. This, in turn, allows very successful pilots in North Africa, the author is Brown to shed light on aspects of the desert air able to compare some German claims to actual war, about which most people will likely have little losses on several occasions, demonstrating the not- or no knowledge. too-uncommon habit of German overclaiming. In order to capture the spirit and intensity of The author does this not to imply that German this conflict, the author uses many primary claims were widely distorted, admitting that over- sources, including original squadron operational claiming occurred on both sides, but to suggest records and pilot interviews. Very few original doc­ that, on occasion, things were not as they neces­ uments other than combat reports can give a sarily seemed. reader the timely flavor of actual warfare, and Without a doubt, Desert Warriors is a valuable Brown successfully uses these to great advantage contribution to the history of the North African throughout the book. Having studied the desert campaign. It is by far the most important book air war for years, primarily from the German side, written in years on this aspect of the Second World I found it both refreshing and enlightening to see War. Although Brown is an Australian, there ap­ combat reports from Australian pilots in actual pears to be little or no bias in his reporting, and, as combat with the Luftwaffe. In addition to so much a student of the Luftwaffe in North Africa, I believe valuable primary reference material, the author I would have spotted any unfair or critical bias im­ has included 166 superb photographs. Coming mediately. It is about time this aspect of the desert from private collections, most of these have never war was brought to light, and the author has done before been published and are a wonderful tes­ an excellent job in presenting objective informa­ tament to the Australian commitment in North tion. Because of this book, my respect for Aus­ Africa. Finally to be able to put faces to the names tralian aviators in the Second World War has of men who fought in the desert is something that, grown immensely, and my hope is that, somewhere in itself, makes this book a worthwhile study. Desert in South Africa, some writer is doing the same Warriors is also replete with 14 appendixes that thing for the contributions of the South African air cover aspects such as Australian aces, decorations, force pilots in this theater. victory claims from each of the Australian I highly recommend this book to anybody in­ squadrons, short biographies of some notable pi- terested in the air war in North Africa and the Mid­ lots, and 16 impressive P-40 color profiles painted dle East. It is rare for me to stress something as a by artist Juanita Franzi. “must have” book, but Desert Warriors is just that. It Perhaps the true significance of this book is would indeed be almost impossible to have a full Brown’s detailed and scholarly research, coupled and balanced understanding of the desert air war with its excellent presentation. In many books and without this book as an indispensable reference. articles on the desert air war, pilots of the desert air Since Desert Warriors is published in Australia, one forces, primarily Australian and South African, are can order it directly from the publisher’s Web site often considered second rate. When we view them (see above) or from the only US distributor, Paul through our typical ethnocentric American eyes, Gaudette Books in Tucson, Arizona, telephone we often want to downgrade their abilities in order (602) 791-3868. to justify the apparent kills of their German coun­ Maj Robert F. Tate, USAFR terparts. It is apparent that the Australian pilots Maxwell AFB, Alabama had their fair share of “Stuka parties” and drew blood against the Luftwaffe on a regular basis. However, they are often incorrectly portrayed as hapless pilots forced to cower for safety in the de­ Angels Zero: P-47 Close Air Support in Europe by fensive Lufbery Circle while hotshot Luftwaffe pi- Robert V. Brulle. Smithsonian Institution Press lots had their way with them, shooting them down (http://www.si.edu/sipress), 470 L’Enfant Plaza, in droves time and time again. In our minds, how Suite 7100, Washington, D.C. 20560, 2000, 176 else could the top Luftwaffe aces have achieved the pages, $29.95 (hardcover). victories they claimed if their opponents were any- thing but substandard? Not only does this book Robert Brulle’s book is an interesting cross be- demonstrate the quality, professionalism, and tween a firsthand memoir and an operational ac­ tenacity of pilots within the Royal Australian Air count of the air war in Europe from the pilot’s per­ Force, but also it debunks the myth of natural Ger­ spective. The author served with the 390th NET ASSESSMENT 101

Squadron in the 366th Fighter Group, flying P-47s cover the ground was prone to pull up, become ir­ in the tactical-air-support role and completing 70 regular due to wet ground, or become very slip­ combat missions. During this time, he destroyed a pery and coated with ice during the winter. great deal of German war materiel. He saw Ger­ Missions flown during the Battle of the Bulge man aircraft in the air only once, during the strikes were still very dangerous but had greater rewards on various American airfields on 1 January 1945, than previous ones. Brulle states that the pilots when he shot down one FW-190. Although the sub- were less concerned over the seriousness of the at- title includes the phrase Close Air Support, a great tack since they felt that once clear weather re- many of Brulle’s missions were armed reconnais­ turned, they would severely pummel the attacking sance or interdiction sorties, while frontline sup- German columns. Despite living in tents for the port made up a smaller percentage. duration and facing overcasts that made taking off, The greatest strength of Angels Zero is the com­ forming up, and landing exceedingly dangerous, bination of firsthand recollections mixed with an the Fighter Group flew as often as possible to aid overall perspective of events. Brulle relies on his the ground units. Oftentimes they attacked own memory and a diary he kept during the war to through very narrow holes in the clouds into the give the usual memoir feel of “I did this” and “I felt teeth of intense German flak. Although losses were like this” that one would expect. He uses his active still heavy, pilot morale was higher during this pe­ membership in the 366th Fighter Group Veterans’ riod. The fact that the Army greatly needed their Association to include other pilots’ firsthand ac­ help and that they had discernable targets, includ­ counts to broaden his study. He also did a fair ing several columns hit while the Germans were amount of secondary research to give an opera­ traveling in the open under what they thought was tional perspective of the various campaigns. The safe cloud cover, contributed to the heightened result is a balanced narrative that relates the indi­ morale. vidual’s perspective while keeping the reader in- Brulle finishes with the final battles into Ger­ formed of the overall flow of events. Because nei­ many. During this time, he took his turn as an ther aspect is so detailed or overwhelming that it air/ground controller for two weeks. Although he becomes tedious, this creates a uniquely readable, agreed that having pilots direct their squadron informative book. The pilot’s view of the entire war mates onto targets was desirable and that two weeks experience is foremost throughout the book. was too short to adequately learn the duty and carry Brulle includes two short chapters on his pilot it out, he did not enjoy the time on the ground. The training that remind us how long it took to pre- Germans were obviously beaten, but flak in the Ruhr pare a combat pilot. He began on 30 January 1943 Valley continued to be dangerous up to the end. and did not finish until 8 June 1944. Even then, he Angels Zero is an excellent account that gives a had to undergo an additional 26 hours of in- pilot’s unique perspective of the war. Instead of re- theater training before he was assigned to the counting endless dogfights or mission recaps, Fighter Group. Brulle shows the attitudes and viewpoints of the Brulle’s account shows that the pilots found men who were primarily engaged in tactical air column-cover missions during the drive across support. He places the Fighter Group’s efforts in France very satisfying. Results of their attacks were the larger picture without losing that personal per­ easy to determine, and the panels displayed to in­ spective. Anyone interested in World War II air- dicate American units were easy to identify. Unfor­ power would be well advised to read this book. tunately, this period of high morale soon gave way Dr. Daniel Mortensen as the Battle of Hürtgen Forest began. Brulle Maxwell AFB, Alabama shows us that infantrymen were not the only ones to suffer during this protracted battle of attrition. His group lost more pilots here than at any other time. The static lines allowed German flak to con­ Ripcord: Screaming Eagles under Siege, Vietnam centrate on likely targets, creating a hazardous en­ 1970 by Keith William Nolan. Presidio Press vironment for low-flying aircraft. Group morale (http://www.presidiopress.com), P.O. Box 1764, also declined due to the monotony of the missions, Novato, 94948, 2000, 480 pages, lack of observable targets, and indeterminate re­ $29.95 (hardcover). sults. In addition to the dangers of flying low-level missions, landing on the airfields was often equally At first glance, Keith Nolan’s Ripcord seems to dangerous. The pierced-steel planking used to have little to do with the Air Force other than to 102 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 serve as a reminder of the importance the F-4 probe the jungles around Ripcord to test enemy played in close air support and the B-52 played in strength. He follows them up nearby Hill 1000, the bombing campaign in Southeast Asia. After all, from which the NVA pounded Ripcord with mor­ this is the story of Fire-Support Base Ripcord, an tar and 55 mm fire. Nolan tells of the men on Rip- Army installation. The fight in the hills around cord who provide suppressing fire for the men in Ripcord was an infantryman’s fight, holding little the field around the camp, and he walks with the or no interest for an Air Force audience. men in the field who try in vain to knock out mor­ Although this is true, members of the Air Force, tar and gun emplacements that threaten Ripcord. especially its leadership, would do well to read Finally, he follows the men off Ripcord as they Nolan’s book. What it chronicles, beyond the hor­ evacuate the base while NVA troops victoriously rific scenes of battle, is the story of several hundred swarm the hilltop. men fighting a battle they have already lost. It tells Although the besieged men were happy to evac­ how these troops, faced with an impossible mis­ uate their living hell, they questioned the reasons for sion, begin to mistrust their leadership and how establishing the base if it was to be abandoned so their anger begins to spread. quickly. Chris Straub, a retired lieutenant colonel Fire-Support Base Ripcord was established as who saw action during the Ripcord siege, wrote to the first part of a campaign to push the North Viet­ Nolan, noting that the evacuation “confirms my view namese Army (NVA) out of the A Shau Valley, an that from the start the 101st’s push into the Ripcord operation that never really came to fruition as orig­ AO [area of operations] was not in consonance with inally conceived. The ridge on which Ripcord what the U.S. was trying to accomplish in Vietnam in would be built was seized in April 1970 but re­ 1970” (p. 411). If Ripcord did not mesh with overall verted to the NVA only three months later, on 23 US objectives, one wonders why so many men died July. Because of political considerations, writes before it was abandoned. Again, the question of Nolan, “division headquarters proved reluctant to leadership raises its head. be drawn into the kind of bloody slugging match Ripcord is a quality piece of investigating, and that would have been required to push the enemy Nolan deserves credit for his dedication to reveal­ out of their entrenchments around Ripcord” (p. 11). ing as many sides of the story as he can. His ability Ripcord is especially powerful when it examines to humanize the men who fought is commend- leadership, from the platoon all the way up to divi­ able. Most importantly, however, Nolan is able to sion level. Nolan expertly and evenhandedly dis­ provide present military leadership with a case sects eyewitness accounts of both good and bad study in effective battle management. We owe it to leadership in the field. The grunts who followed future conflicts to read and internalize the lessons their leaders into battle often did so reluctantly, Ripcord presents. largely because of the overwhelming nature of the obstacles before them. In the interviews and letters 1st Lt Glenn D. Leinbach, USAF Nolan presents, these soldiers’ impressions of pla­ Osan AB, South Korea toon and company leadership are mostly positive. The questions surrounding leadership arise mostly at the battalion level and above, starting with Lt Col Andre Lucas, the battalion commander tasked with the defense of Ripcord, and with Brig Gen Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Sidney Berry, acting commander of the 101st Air- Southern Heritage by Grady McWhiney and borne Division. Each of their subordinates has a Perry D. Jamieson. University of Alabama Press different opinion, and Nolan is careful to let readers (http://www.uapress.ua.edu), Box 870380, make up their own minds about each man’s lead­ Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0380, 1982, 232 ership qualities. Again and again, the book returns pages, $15.95. to the issue of leadership: what proved effective and what did not; whether a commander could have done more or less; who had responsibility; The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History and what leadership could have done differently. edited by Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan. Beyond this case study in leadership is the fasci­ Indiana University Press (http://www.indi­ nating story of several battalions of men who faced ana.edu/~iupress), 601 N. Morton Street, the horrors of war every day. Nolan takes his read­ Bloomington, Indiana 47404, 2000, 256 pages, ers on patrol with the ranging platoons as they $29.95. NET ASSESSMENT 103

The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Con­ of historical distortions of Ulysses S. Grant in order federacy by William C. Davis. University Press of to explain away his victory over Lee. Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2501 James McPherson’s Drawn with the Sword is a col­ West 15th Street, Lawrence, Kansas 66049, 1996, lection of previously published works. On the one 240 pages, $24.95. hand, it has no true unifying theme. On the other hand, McPherson has synthesized over a decade of scholarship into one compact volume. The author Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the Ameri­ divides the 15 chapters into five parts or themes. The can Civil War by James M. McPherson. Oxford first section, “Origins of the Civil War,” contains University Press (http://www.oup-usa.org), 198 three chapters, “The War of Southern Aggression” Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016, perhaps being the most enlightening. McPherson 1996, 272 pages, $27.50 (hardcover), $14.95 outlines the steps taken by the South in general and (softcover). in particular that led to the war. Al­ though it is still popular in the South to call the Civil Perhaps no other subject of American history War the “War of Northern Aggression,” McPherson has more written about it than the US Civil War. turns that phrase on its head when he quotes candi­ There seems to be no end to the interpretations, date Abraham Lincoln replying in 1860 to Southern reinterpretations, and re-reinterpretations. Just claims that a Republican administration would lead when an author writes the definitive biography of to war: “You say you will destroy the Union and then, some general or of some battle, new information you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be becomes available that destroys long-held convic­ upon us! . . . A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, tions. Most historians strive to be accurate and to and mutters . . . ‘Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, explain “what happened,” but a few deliberately and then you will be a murderer!’ ” McPherson in­ bend the truth for personal or political reasons. cludes a section of four chapters on why the North The “lost cause” myth is one example of bending won. Ultimately, the South lost not out of loss of will, the truth. These four histories, which attempt to more Yankees, or weak central government but be- set the record straight, are a must for any person cause Union armies defeated Confederate armies and because the North’s first string of leaders was interested in the Civil War and the lost cause. better than the South’s first string. Other themes in As Alan Nolan eloquently states in his essay in the book include “The War and American Society,” The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, “The Enduring Lincoln,” and “Historians and Their there are two versions of the history of the Civil Audiences.” Each chapter in the book is thought War. First, there is the truth—the account of what provoking and sometimes directly, sometimes indi­ actually happened, when, why, and how. Then rectly, destroys an aspect of the lost-cause myth. there is the Southern interpretation of the truth. William Davis’s The Cause Lost, like The Myth of The editors have assembled a superb cast of lead­ the Lost Cause and Drawn with the Sword, is a collec­ ing historians to write essays that persuasively de­ tion of the author’s thoughts about the Civil War. molish the elements of the lost-cause myth. Nolan However, unlike McPherson, Gallagher, and certainly sets the tone of the book and attempts to Nolan, Davis writes from a more Southern-centric knock the Southern apologists’ collective noses point of view. In fact, several of the chapters deal out of joint. Space does not permit a recounting of more with the strategy and tactics of the war than each argument. Quite frankly, some are stronger with lost-cause topics. The Cause Lost’s four sections than others. Suffice it to say that Nolan debunks deal with Jefferson Davis, war on the periphery, ex­ the myths that slavery was not the issue that caused cuses for losing, and the Confederacy in myth and the war, that the South would have given up slavery memory. By far the two most interesting chapters eventually, that slaves were happy, and that South- concerning the lost cause are the one on the ern war leaders were without fault. Each of the South’s lost will to fight and the one that describes book’s nine chapters tackles a different aspect of the myth and reality of the Confederacy. In the the lost cause. Perhaps the most interesting are lost-will chapter, Davis argues that the Union suc­ Gary Gallagher’s assessment of Gen Jubal Early ceeded because, even in defeat, it had a stronger and his contributions to the creation of the myth; sense of nationhood than did the Confederacy. Jeffry D. Wert’s examination of the vilification of When the South started losing, the will to fight and James Longstreet for daring to criticize Robert E. resist slowly but irrevocably declined. In the chap­ Lee in writing; and Brooks D. Simpson’s summary ter on myth and reality, Davis shows that, despite 104 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 the revisionists’ best efforts to argue that the war from an American viewpoint. Not only do we have was not about slavery, that the North was responsi­ little material on our former enemies (with the ble for causing the war, or, incredibly, that the possible exception of the Germans), but also we South simply withdrew from the war, a careful read­ have precious little on our allies. In some cases, ing of history and an examination of the facts eas­ however—Vietnam, for example—we have more ily bring out the truth. on the Vietcong and North Vietnamese than on Attack and Die, although not a lost-cause book, our South Vietnamese allies. This bold effort by nevertheless supports many of the arguments of the Korea Institute of Military History attempts to the other three books. Its basic theme is that come to grips with this situation regarding the Ko­ Confederate leaders wasted their chances to win rean War. by throwing away their troops in suicidal offen­ The series consists of three huge volumes (vol­ sives. All Southern leaders, from Lee on down, ume one is over 900 pages, and volumes two and receive criticism for not understanding how war- three are each over 800 pages). They are updated fare had changed since the end of the Mexican- and condensed versions of an earlier 11-volume American War. Rifles had rendered the massed study begun in 1967. The study makes use of US charge obsolete, and Lee realized too late that and Republic of Korea (ROK) sources as well as he could not compete with the North when it Communist documents. The first volume relates came to manpower. Although conventional wis­ the conflict from its beginnings to the Chinese in­ dom says that the Southern soldier was better be- tervention in late November 1950; the second cause the South suffered fewer casualties, the au­ traces the story up to the stalemate and armistice thors dispel this myth. In a series of very of June 1951; and the third follows the final course enlightening tables, McWhiney and Jamieson of the war. support debunkers of the lost-cause myth, show­ On the positive side, these books offer a de- ing that while Lee might have inflicted 134,000 tailed and candid view of the war from an ROK Union casualties while suffering only 121,000, he perspective. The English is fairly fluid although crippled his own army in doing so. For all his tac­ not altogether smooth in places. Language prob­ tical genius, Lee suffered 20 percent casualties lems and frequent typographical errors are some- while inflicting only 15 percent on his enemy. times annoying but not serious—readers will have Grant, on the other hand, suffered 18 percent ca­ no trouble overlooking them. The tone is rather sualties but inflicted 30 percent on his enemy. flat and devoid of hyperbole, reflecting both the The authors argue that the South should have professionalism of the authors and the 50-year per­ adopted the tactical defensive, forcing the Union spective. Numerous maps helped this reader con­ armies to attack. After all, one man in a trench siderably. was worth three or four attackers. On the negative side, the books are very long These four entertaining books are a joy to read. and dense. They spend an inordinate amount of They shed new light—at least for this reader—on time on US forces and thus place too much re­ many of the sacred truths of the US Civil War that were not true after all. They deserve a place on the liance on US sources. Frequently, the reader fol­ shelf of every Civil War buff and every academic. lows units day by day and place by place with seem­ ingly little purpose. In short, we have much Maj James P. Gates, USAF narrative but little analysis. Los Angeles AFB, California Clearly, all students of the Korean War—and twentieth-century warfare, for that matter—should be aware of this series. For that reason, major li­ braries should include it in their collections. Per­ sonally, I much prefer the less detailed and shorter The Korean War by the Korea Institute of Military (thus narrower) From Pusan to Panmunjom (Dulles, History, introduction by Allan R. Millett. 3 vols. Va.: Brassey’s, 1992) by Paik Sun Yup. It is shorter, University of Nebraska Press (http://www. much better written (and perhaps translated), and nebraskapress.unl.edu), 233 North 8th Street, more clearly gives the ROK view. The Korean War is Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0255, 2001, 2,621 an important contribution to military history, but pages, $95.00 (paper). is not for the everyday reader. One of the enduring problems of American Kenneth P. Werrell military history is that operational history is written Maxwell AFB, Alabama NET ASSESSMENT 105

Right Backed by Might: The International Air Force addition, he spends much time covering the League Concept by Roger Beaumont. Praeger Publishers of Nations, collective security arrangements, and var­ (http://www.greenwood.com/imprints/index. ious disarmament initiatives during the interwar pe­ asp?ImprintID=I8), 88 Post Road West, West- riod, but this tends only to confuse the issue. In fact, port, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2001, 216 pages, there were more attempts to abolish airpower be- $64.00. tween the wars than there were to turn it into a co­ ercive instrument of world peace. This is a challenging book both to read and to His coverage of World War II and the five understand. Part of the problem is the inherent decades since is similarly unfocused and meander­ difficulty in attempting to write the history of a ing. Ironically, as the new century dawns, some nonevent—an international air force has never ex­ people see a movement towards an IPF composed isted. Writing the history of an idea has special largely of a powerful IAF. Conflicts in the Persian problems and requires a deft hand. The author Gulf and the Balkans were marked by broad inter- does not help matters by employing convoluted national support and were dominated by airpower. and leaden prose, continually mixing the chronol­ Yet, the real story of the past decade has been the ogy, and writing vaguely about precisely what he is greatly expanded role of the United Nations in examining. peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking) oper­ Widespread attempts to abolish war have oc­ ations around the world. However, peacekeeping curred for more than a century. A variety of peace forces tend to be composed largely of ground groups and pacifists, as well as sober statesmen troops, not always armed, who are relegated to who understand the cost of war, has sprung up in police and humanitarian functions. These opera­ various times and places, advancing schemes to tions have principally used airpower’s airlift and promote world peace—usually through some sort intelligence-gathering capabilities—subjects barely of international government. Paradoxically, many touched upon in this book. of the people who promote such ideas have been The numerous factual errors throughout this willing to use force to keep the peace. Airpower work are surprising, given the credentials of the au­ would play a key role in that enforcement. Roger thor and publisher. Some of them are relatively Beaumont, a military historian with several books minor (though still inexcusable), such as giving er­ to his credit, attempts to tell this complex story, roneous dates for the Casablanca Conference and emphasizing the role of airpower and the ways it the duration of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, would be used. and promoting Carl Spaatz to five-star rank. Others Regrettably, Beaumont quickly descends into a are a bit more serious—placing Dienbienphu [sic] in semantic morass from which he never emerges. Laos rather than Vietnam and basing USAF B-52s in Terms such as disarmament, isolation, collective secu­ the Philippines. Still other mistakes, however, call rity, pacifism, internationalism, and appeasement, al­ into question the author’s credibility and basic though related to some degree, are not the same knowledge of the subject: he misses the date when thing. But Beaumont too often treats them as if the Air Force began receiving the largest share of the they were. People who advocated these concepts US defense budget by nearly a decade; President generally had varying goals, methods, and levels of Eisenhower threatened China, not North Korea, support. An “America firster” like Charles Lind­ with nuclear weapons in 1953; and air operations bergh, for example, was unquestionably both a over Serbia in 1999 were not more intense than strong believer in airpower and a staunch isola­ those in Operation Desert Storm—they were far less tionist. He was not, however, an advocate of disar­ intense (an average of around 300 combat sorties per day versus over 1,700). Indeed, the profusion of mament—much less pacifism. errors dealing with easily verifiable facts makes one The author’s failure to define clearly these terms wonder about the accuracy of his major premises. and movements makes for a confusing melange that Right Backed by Might does have utility, however. never comes into focus. Thus, he tends to combine Beaumont has done an enormous amount of re- the idea of a notional international police force search on the diverse topics he discusses. His foot- (IPF), which would encompass land, sea, and air notes (there is no bibliography), therefore, con­ forces, with that of an international air force (IAF), tain a wealth of contemporary sources that should which constitutes only one component of that police prove a useful starting point for other researchers. force. Because an IAF has never existed, however, he resorts to concentrating on the numerous, though Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired still mostly unsuccessful, attempts to form an IPF. In McLean, Virginia 106 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Black Sheep One: The Life of Gregory “Pappy” pilot whose professionalism on the ground was in­ Boyington by Bruce Gamble. Presidio Press versely related to his flying skills. One event at (http://www.presidiopress.com), P.O. Box Coronado indicates his moral bankruptcy—he got 1764, Novato, California 94948, 2000, 384 a woman pregnant but resolved the “problem” by pages, $29.95. making a quick trip with her to Mexico. After a deployment on the famed aircraft car­ Black Sheep One is an engaging, informative, and rier Yorktown, Boyington was barely promoted to at times shocking biography of the leading Marine first lieutenant because of his mounting personal Corps ace of World War II, Medal of Honor winner, problems and sent back to Pensacola, Florida, to and former prisoner of war (POW). Through de- be an instructor pilot. Here his problems came to tailed research, Gamble weaves an in-depth picture a head. His wife—now an alcoholic, like him— of a very unconventional hero who was dogged filed for divorce, and a judgment for $4,000 from throughout life by horrendous personal problems. 28 debts in five states finally caught up with him. Written chronologically, the book thoroughly After he met a recruiter for the famed Flying describes Boyington’s early years growing up in Tigers, he signed up with them to make the big Idaho and Washington State. These years marked bucks so he could get out of debt. His pay with the themes that would dominate his life: a dys­ them was two to three times more than he earned functional family, alcoholism, financial hardship, a in the Marine Corps, and he received a bonus for need to find acceptance, perseverance, and a love every Japanese plane shot down. He resigned from of flying. His alcoholic father—who, he would later the Marines, and the corps made sure his prob­ discover, was really his stepfather—moved from lems were adequately documented in his person­ job to job because of his drinking, causing con­ nel records so he couldn’t rejoin. stant money woes for the family. Despite these While with the Flying Tigers, Boyington contin­ problems, Gregory managed to do well in high ued his streak of impressive flying and personal irre­ school and then entered the University of Wash­ sponsibility. He flew P-40s out of bases in Burma and ington to study engineering. He joined the Reserve racked up six supposed Japanese kills, although only Officer Training Corps, earned a degree in aero­ two were ever confirmed. After getting into continu­ nautical engineering in 1934, got hired by Boeing, ous trouble with Claire Chennault and the staff of and then entered the first of four marriages. the American Volunteer Group, and after the entry While working as a draftsman on the XB-15, a of the United States into World War II, he left the test bed for the B-17, he dreamed of flying, but Tigers, earning a dishonorable discharge because he during the Great Depression there was little op­ broke his contract with them. portunity to do so. In April 1935, however, Con­ The highlight of Black Sheep One occurs in the gress passed the Aviation Cadet Act, designed to South Pacific after he was barely allowed back into train thousands of new pilots. He applied via the the Marines. The corps needed pilots, especially Marine Corps Reserve program but lied about his those with combat time. Flying Corsairs and later marital status (applicants had to be single); he was the F4U from airfields in Guadalcanal, Bougain­ accepted and went off to Naval Air Station Pen­ ville, Turtle Bay, and others, he racked up a total of sacola, leaving his wife and a newborn back home. 22 more kills—several questionable—earned the Forty percent of the people who started flight Medal of Honor for making five kills in one day, school washed out; surprisingly, the future ace (28 became a squadron commander, and finally got kills) almost did just that on more than one occa­ shot down by a Zero. He was picked up by a Japa­ sion. In fact, he busted nine check rides and met nese sub—sunk just 13 days later—and spent the three review boards during his training. From there next 20 months in three prison camps. The de­ he went to Quantico, Virginia, to fly the UF-9M. He scription of his POW experiences was the most immediately got in trouble by entering an unau­ moving and poignant account in the entire book. thorized dogfight directly over the base just three Throughout his exploits as a Flying Tiger and days after he arrived. He finally brought his family Black Sheep, he received enormous press cover- with him but did not advertise the fact that he was age, and by the time he was shot down, he had be- married. Debt problems began to pile up, along come a media sensation. Initially, the public knew with a drinking habit he had developed in flight little about his drinking, unprofessional conduct, school. From Quantico he went to Coronado, Cali­ and sorry personal life, but all of this came out fornia, where he began to cheat on his wife as he after the war, when he went on a tour promoting further developed his reputation as a skilled fighter the Marine Corps but began appearing at func- NET ASSESSMENT 107 tions drunk. By August 1947, the Marine Corps Honor—his moral and ethical bankruptcy overshad­ had had enough and medically retired him. owed his accomplishments. For the rest of his life, Boyington struggled I recommend this book to readers interested in through three more marriages; frequent periods military history and matters of character. The only of destitution; struggles with alcohol (including criticisms I have of Black Sheep One are that it is too long periods of sobriety but also relapses involving detailed at times; it occasionally offers inferential driving under the influence [DUI]); and the pub­ analysis; and it includes some trite phrases. Despite lication of two books, including Baa Baa Black these minor flaws, the book is well worth a reader’s Sheep in 1958 (a big best-seller) and a novel that time. mocked Chennault, for which he was heavily criti­ Lt Col Phil Bossert Jr., USAF cized. In the 1970s, his famed squadron became McGuire AFB, the only military flying unit used as the subject of a TV series; Robert Conrad starred as Boyington. The following are some interesting facts I learned about Boyington from Black Sheep One: The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leader- • He was an absentee father to his three chil­ ship for NCOs by J. D. Pendry. Presidio Press dren. One daughter committed suicide, and (http://www.presidiopress.com), P.O. Box one son graduated from the 1764, Novato, California 94948, 2000, 256 Academy class in 1959. pages, $24.95. • He suffered from cancer twice—lung and The Three Meter Zone provides a comprehensive prostate—but continued to smoke and yet easy to follow review of several fundamental drink. I was surprised that he lived as long as leadership principles for noncommissioned offi­ he did (75 years). cers (NCO). Not only is the book a work of art, but also it has functional value for today’s NCO. The • He often flew either drunk or with a hangover, author addresses the principles of NCO leadership frequently endangering both himself and his via personal and professional experiences, quota­ squadron mates. Later in life, he was arrested tions from political and military leaders, historical for DUIs but was never busted for flying under military accounts, and extracts from US Army field the influence (FUI) while on active duty. manuals. Command Sergeant Major Pendry, USA, presents the material in such a way that NCOs in • The original name for his famous squadron any military service can easily use it to take care of was “Boyington’s Bastards,” but the unit’s their people and accomplish the mission. public-affairs officer made them change it to The book is essential reading for the junior, mid- “Black Sheep.” He was the commander only level, and senior NCO, offering a practical pre­ four months before getting shot down. scription for tackling leadership issues in the • He often embellished his accomplishments, twenty-first century. The author candidly discloses especially his accounts to the media and personal experiences—each striking anecdote those in his autobiography; several of his lends clarity and realism to leadership concepts kills were never fully confirmed. such as selfless service, integrity, trust, and confi­ dence. In a sense, Pendry invites the reader into a • The Black Sheep Squadron did not house a very natural discussion about leadership philoso­ bunch of misfits, as depicted in the TV series phy, one that underlies the NCO’s role as mentor, and popular lore. Actually, the squadron— disciplinarian, motivator, and communicator. He unlike Boyington—was very disciplined. The declares that an NCO’s influence is indispensable unit’s alumni association ostracized him be- to the character and growth of the military organ­ cause of the way he depicted its members. ization, insisting that the NCO is the backbone of the US armed forces. He died of cancer and was buried in Arlington A second key strategy of the author involves the National Cemetery with great fanfare. At the end of frequent use of probing questions to challenge the Black Sheep One, I felt a sense of emptiness for Boy­ reader to carefully examine the implications of lead­ ington. Despite his heroic contributions—which in­ ership decisions. This in-depth exploration of lead­ cluded surviving 20 months as a POW in horrific ership issues suggests that the NCO may often con- Japanese prison camps and earning the Medal of front situations which require more than a 108 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001 superficial solution. More importantly, NCOs may books about his extensive journeys. His experi­ need to use a holistic approach to fully understand ence, writing skills, and language abilities made all facets of a leadership challenge prior to advocat­ him a natural to turn this book out quickly. The ing or implementing a decision. Similarly, Pendry military granted Franck exceptional latitude by al­ suggests that yesterday’s leadership solutions are not lowing him to interview its top leaders—the nu­ necessarily appropriate for today’s peacekeeping, merous air and ground generals in the theater—as humanitarian, or combat-superiority missions. Such well as many group and squadron commanders constant questioning is not only welcome, but also and aces. The book was finished by May 1945 but essential to the continued physical, mental, and was not published. Franck’s grandson and wife an- emotional development of the NCO. notated the book and published it in 2001. A third element that distinguishes this text Winter Journey is a narrative of the author’s ex­ from other books is the author’s unique writing perience from the time he departed the United style. I was pleasantly surprised to see that Pendry States in the fall of 1944 to his service in newly de­ tells us what he truly feels about NCO leadership! feated Germany in May 1945. It does have pictures, He candidly discloses his personal and profes­ a name index, explanations of the origins of the sional perspective on leadership and the role of book, and an epilogue written 50 years later by the NCO: accomplish the mission and ensure the Franck’s subordinate and traveling companion. welfare of the soldier. These convictions reflect The body of the book consists of vignettes of the years of military tradition, tutelage under both author’s experiences during his travels across west- good and bad leaders, and training in one of the ern Europe and conversations with both the fa­ nation’s finest military branches of service. Fur­ mous and those “who also served.” Franck was a thermore, end-of-chapter summaries effectively true adventurer, flying on one medium-bomber encapsulate the principles under discussion, giving mission and suffering a slight wound in the last today’s NCO the knowledge and motivation to days of the war as he watched a tank-artillery duel lead, discipline, communicate, and motivate. in a German town. Writing in a journalist style that The Three Meter Zone is an excellent book that will includes long quotations from GIs and generals, capture its readers’ attention and challenge them to he notes the varied background of AAF officers examine their long-held leadership beliefs and prac­ and their youth, especially relative to their rank. tices. I encourage NCOs in any military service to in- Throughout the book, he displays his language vest a few hours of leadership-development time in skills by using French and German phrases. Con­ reading this text. In turn, I challenge my fellow cerning the language issue, Franck is critical of NCOs to test his ideas and instill fundamental pre­ Americans, decrying their inability to speak for­ cepts of leadership and followership. In the final eign tongues: “Evidently even worse taught now in analysis, our subordinates, our military profession of the United States than they were back in the days arms, and our great nation ask for nothing less! of World War I.” He also deplores Americans who speak French “with a sophomoric ineptitude that CMSgt Gilbert Duenas, USAF emphasizes our provincialism” (p. 81). Maxwell AFB, Alabama The result is a unique work because of its can­ dor, detail, and viewpoint. Franck is candid and critical in describing a number of American prob­ Winter Journey through the Ninth: The Story of lems, attitudes, and failures. He details poor AAF Tactical Air Power as Illustrated by the Exploits bombing accuracy and instances of US aircraft of the Ninth Air Force in Europe by Harry A. bombing friendly forces; he also mentions an Franck. Prince of the Road Press (http://www. American study which found that the claims of ve­ p-ndesigns.com), 8987 E. Tanque Verde, no. hicle destruction in the famous Falaise-Argentan 309-155, Tucson, Arizona 85749-9399, 2001, 305 pocket were only 10 percent accurate. Also noted pages, $21.95. is the callous talk of American pilots who believed that “any living thing east of the Rhine was fair In November 1944, the Army Air Forces (AAF) game” (p. 150). In Franck’s words, “Most fighter- had Harry Franck write the story of its Ninth Air bomber pilots reminded me . . . of high school Force, the tactical air force supporting US troops boys, basketball players more than anything else; in the European campaign. The author was un­ naïve and uncultured, even a little ill at ease, like usual: in his 60s, he had served 19 months in most American kids outside their own business— World War I and earned his living writing travel which is flying—but at that were superbly con- NET ASSESSMENT 109 scious of their competency” (p. 151). One Army D. K. Tooker, a pilot who flew nearly 150 com­ general lived quite well, in “almost barbarian bat missions over Korea and retired as a Marine splendor,” while others’ accommodations were Corps lieutenant colonel in 1968, describes his more spartan. Another commander had “a Lincol­ personal experiences along with those of his fellow nesque gentleness or sweetness . . . which is all too pilots in The Second-Luckiest Pilot, an exhilarating rare among regular Army officers” (p. 63). book. Each chapter is dedicated to a different, Franck includes details seldom mentioned in true-life incident concerning survival. Most of the other accounts, such as the AAF’s lack of training, accounts describe surrealistic events that usually fear of flying, and less than admirable officers. The involve cheating death—but not always. Some of author also mentions German and American the events are heartbreaking instances of lives lost. atrocities, as well as American looting. He repeats The title refers to Tooker’s personal story, de- the views of aircrews about fighting and flying, to­ scribing the time he ejects from his aircraft, lands gether with the virtues and vices of various AAF tac­ in the sea, and is luckily rescued by a Navy de­ tical (medium) bombers and fighters. The book stroyer. Although some accounts are autobio­ makes clear that AAF losses seemed both substan­ graphical, most of them relate other pilots’ bone- tial and almost arbitrary: one B-26 unit lost only 13 chilling encounters. men in 11 months of action but also had 61 men Tooker’s narrative extends from World War II missing in one day. to the 1990s. In one example, an F-8 Crusader The book and story are not above reproach, pilot falls 15,000 feet with an unopened chute but however. Winter Journey’s oftentimes heavy prose survives, suffering two broken ankles, a severed and richness of detail may prove slow going for tendon in his left foot, a fractured right pelvis, a some readers. Some of the author’s feelings, fractured vertebra, a partially collapsed left lung, words, and attitudes may strike a sour note with a and completely inactive kidneys and intestines. In modern audience since they occasionally betray one account, however, Lady Luck is not so forgiv­ his “ugly American” views. But one must keep in ing. Trapped in a burning Corsair, Ensign Jesse mind that this annotated, unedited (uncensored) Brown has no choice other than sending his help publication is the product of a 62-year-old man away and facing death alone. Tooker offers that “it writing 55 years ago. is only for God to know whether the fire, the cold, In sum, this book is a firsthand account of the or the enemy stilled Jesse Brown’s heart forever.” American tactical air war in France during the last The men involved in the rescue attempt cannot months of World War II by a careful, experienced, forget this haunting event. nonflying observer. The author conveys both the With the exception of Jesse Brown, Tooker spirit of the day and details available nowhere else, knew each person he writes about; for that reason, giving us feelings and facts about the last months he is able to bring his own insights into play. Thus, of the war from an American perspective. Al­ he conveys to his readers not only the details of the though overly long and tedious at times, Winter incidents, but also the victims’ thought processes Journey offers refreshing and often critical views on and emotional experiences. some familiar subjects while adding a number of Photographs scattered throughout the book interesting details. As such, students of tactical air- complement the stories, imbuing them with real- power in World War II should consider this book a ism and personality. They capture the camaraderie “must” addition to their libraries. and dedication exemplified by these men throughout their careers. Kenneth P. Werrell The book is heavy with emotion, evoking laugh­ Maxwell AFB, Alabama ter in one chapter, disbelief in the next, and tears in yet another. Obviously not a scholarly study, The Second-Luckiest Pilot concerns itself with people and emotions rather than wars and politics. Anyone The Second-Luckiest Pilot: Adventures in Military who appreciates the dangers of military aviation Aviation by D. K. Tooker. Naval Institute Press should read this delightful book and be prepared (http://www.usni.org/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/ for an unforgettable, touching experience. press/press.html?E+scstore), 2062 Generals Highway, Annapolis, Maryland 21401, 2000, 216 C1C Brooke Carr, USAF pages, $27.95. USAF Academy, Colorado 110 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

The Ultimate Terrorist by Jessica Stern. Harvard the book is an overview, and the repetition pro­ University Press (http://www.hup.harvard. vides positive reinforcement during the learning edu), 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Massachu­ process to the nascent student of WMD terrorism. setts 02138, 1999, 214 pages, $24.00 (cloth). Additionally, Stern’s remarks regarding funding and missile defense might seem to be confusing— This book immediately catches the reader’s at­ if not incorrect. tention with a sobering fictional vignette that por­ For example, Stern’s point that the United States trays the effect of a small, one-kiloton nuclear device needs to put more funding toward deterring the detonated in New York City. The device would kill threat of WMD terrorism is well taken, but her belief thousands and devastate the infrastructure for miles. that building five fewer Stealth bombers would save Stern’s book continues in an orderly overview of an estimated $10 billion is somewhat of a non se­ nearly every conceivable weapon-of-mass-destruction quitur. Currently, there are no plans to build addi­ (WMD) issue in today’s world. She explores the em­ tional Stealth bombers. Perhaps a better comparison ployment of chemical, biological, radiological, or would be the cost savings resulting from another nuclear weapons by terrorists against the United round of military base closings against the proposed States. She finishes her work with a reasonable but cost of a nationwide antiterrorism program. brief list of recommendations on how the United Additionally, her belief that “WMD terrorists will States should proceed if it is to thwart the efforts of probably not use ballistic missiles” is likely correct, “the ultimate terrorist.” This book is a superb primer but her inference that the current administration for any individual who is serious about wanting to and the Department of Defense have a misguided understand this emerging threat––it is factual, com­ emphasis toward ballistic-missile defense is some- pelling, and easy to read. what off the mark. Obviously, the current president’s Starting with a brief history of terrorism dating proposal for a missile defense system targets “rogue back to the first century zealot, Sicarrii, Stern ex- nations” such as North Korea and Iraq—not terror­ plains how some consider terrorism moral while it ists. In reality, both a missile-defense system and a is repugnant to others. This contrasting of ideals robust antiterrorism program are necessary. provides a deeper understanding for the reader. In addition to being a superb overview of many of Stern does an excellent job in describing why the the WMD threats facing our nation, the 33 pages of use of WMD is more attractive than ever before to citations fortify the credibility of the many interest­ the modern terrorist. She makes a particularly ing vignettes Stern uses. Readers wanting to do more sobering point—one terrorist may be all it takes to advanced study into this subject will certainly find carry out an effective and devastating WMD event the references a rich source of material. in the United States. Stern makes good use of The Ultimate Terrorist is recommended reading three recent situations—the Aum Shinrikyo cult, for both the beginner who needs a good introduc­ the relative ease of obtaining WMD in the former- tion to the current WMD threat as well as the more Soviet states, and the ongoing issue of WMD in seasoned reader for its detailed citations. Iraq—and builds a solid basis for her conclusion Col (Dr.) Jim Davis and recommendations. Maxwell AFB, Alabama Criticisms, though minor indeed, are that a reader well versed with WMD issues might find it a CDR Drew Mullin, USN bit too basic and repetitious. On the other hand, Norfolk, Virginia NET ASSESSMENT 111

In this section of “Net Assessment,” you will find additional reviews of aviation-related books and CD- ROMs but in a considerably briefer format than our usual offerings. We certainly don’t mean to imply that these items are less worthy of your attention. On the contrary, our intention is to give you as many reviews of notable books and electronic publications as possible in a limited amount of space. Unless otherwise in­ dicated, the reviews have been written by an APJ staff member. Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, ington, D.C. 20036-2188, 2001, 200 pages, America and the Politics of Secret Service by $24.95. Richard J. Aldrich. Cambridge University Press (http://www.cup.org), 40 West 20th Street, Few current defense topics spark as much con­ New York, New York 10011-4221, 2000, 524 troversy as national missile defense (NMD). Lind­ pages, $34.95. say and O’Hanlon cut through the rhetoric of both the left and the right to give us the unadulterated Using recently declassified documents from facts about this important issue. They meticulously American and British archives, Richard Aldrich analyze current and future ballistic-missile threats looks at Anglo-American secret-service activities at all levels, from the future of the Russian ICBM against the Japanese during World War II in the In­ arsenal down to Iraq’s potential for deploying dian and Chinese theaters. He quickly touches on ICBMs in the next 20 years. This analysis includes the pre–Pearl Harbor years from the British and discussion of the types of weapons of mass destruc­ American perspectives, refuting the claim that tion (WMD) practically deployable on missiles Britain did not warn the United States about the likely to be used by so-called rogue states. The au­ Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. He divides thors also eloquently scrutinize the likelihood of the Far East into four areas: India, whose citizens alternative methods of WMD employment by these resented the strong British colonial presence; states (e.g., they expose the myth of the “suitcase China, involved in an internal three-way struggle nuke” as an exaggeration). After concluding that in addition to the war with Japan; the Southwest the threat of ICBM proliferation to nations hostile Pacific, isolated from the secret services by General to US interests is limited but real, Lindsay and MacArthur; and Southeast Asia. Aldrich focuses on O’Hanlon proceed to explore the political impli­ how the secret services worked in India and China, cations of various strategies for NMD and theater setting up overlapping divisions and units. Intelli­ missile defense (TMD), especially with respect to gence and the War against Japan is an excellent US-Sino-Russian relations. Defending America also choice for anyone who wants to understand the byzantine workings of the American and British se­ examines the status of the technologies required cret-service elements in India and China. to make TMD and NMD realities, again parting the veil of rhetoric that has surrounded the re- porting of missile-defense tests. The book’s appen­ Defending America: The Case for Limited Na­ dices contain the full text of the ABM Treaty and tional Missile Defense by James M. Lindsay and pertinent excerpts from the Rumsfeld Commission Michael E. O’Hanlon. Brookings Institution report and national intelligence estimates. This Press (http://www.brook.edu/press/press_hp. important book provides the most balanced treat­ htm), 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Wash­ ment of this difficult topic to date. AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL Volume XV

AUTHOR INDEX

Ash, Col Eric. “Medicinal Thoughts” (editorial), no. 4 Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian (Winter 2001): 5. Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): ———. “Precision Doctrine” (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 42–50. 2001): 3–4. Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control ––––––. “Propositions Concerning the Aerial RMA” (edi­ and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall torial), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 3–4. 2001): 21–31. ––––––. “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for Un­ Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical healthy Rivalry,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter Ash, Lt Col Eric A., Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell, Col Allan W. 2001): 14–26. Howey, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dy­ Hall, Col Tom. “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the namic Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Air Force Officer Corps” (vortices), no. 2 (Summer 101–7. 2001): 82–85. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ 58–66. tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ 2001): 74–84. sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New Mind- (Spring 2001): 34–49. Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Expedi­ Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two tionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. More Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ 91–94. tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall Howey, Col Allan W., Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell, Lt Col Eric 2001): 60–65. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic da Rocha, Dr. Alexandre S. “The Ethical Problem in Plu­ Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. ralistic Societies and Dr. Toner’s ‘Mistakes,’ ” no. 1 Hubert, Lt Col James A., Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, (Spring 2001): 81–94. and Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Alloca­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: tion to Performance Management and Strategic Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Planning: An Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 85–91. 2001): 34–45. Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): (Winter 2001): 57–68. 106–9. Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’” no. for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: (Winter 2001): 27–33. Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small 23–31. Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Drohan, Col Tom, and Col Doug Murray. “Responding to Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ 32–41. ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: (Spring 2001): 24–33. Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ 66–73. nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 Endersby, Lt Col Gary, Col Edward Mann, and Tom (Spring 2001): 67–80. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Kohn, Dr. Richard H., ed. “The Early Retirement of Gen tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Erbschloe, Col Donald R., and Dr. Louis S. Metzger. Force,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. Leinbach, 1st Lt Glenn. “For Lieutenants Only!” (vor­ Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ tices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 90–92. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer Link, Maj Gen Charles D. “Leading Airmen,” no. 2 (Sum­ 2001): 65–77. mer 2001): 7–12.

112 INDEX 113

Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, and Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Allocation to 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- Searle, Tom, Col Edward Mann, and Lt Col Gary Endersby. Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations” Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Szvetecz, Maj Thomas S., Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell, Col Allan tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. W. Howey, and Lt Col Eric A. Ash. “Global Dynamic Op­ Maxwell, Maj Keith H., Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, and Lt erations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Col James A. Hubert. “Linking Resource Allocation to Thirtle, Dr. Mike. “Developing Aerospace Leaders for the Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Twenty-First Century: A Historical Context for the Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. DAL Concept,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 52–57. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “C-9 Nightingale: From Ded­ crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): icated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Transport” 12–20. (pirep), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–90. Mets, Dr. David R. “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century ———. “A Light Dawns: The Airborne Laser” (pirep), Air-Leadership Model: Fodder for Your Professional no. 1 (Spring 2001): 95–97. Reading,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. ––––––. “Technology for the Future Leader: Interna­ Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. tional Command and Control Enhancements” “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. Michael, Maj Steve. “Air Force Doctrine and Leadership” Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric (vortices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 86–89. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Mueller, Dr. Karl, and Lt Col Peter Hays. “Going Boldly— Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ Wilkes, Col Bobby J. “Silver Flag: A Concept for Opera­ sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 tional Warfare,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 47–56. (Spring 2001): 34–49. Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of Murray, Col Doug, and Col Tom Drohan. “Responding to the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. (Spring 2001): 50–55.

TITLE INDEX

“Air Force Doctrine and Leadership” (vortices), Maj “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indirect Approach” (vor­ Steve Michael, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 86–89. tices), Capt Robert Dietrick, no. 1 (Spring 2001): “Air Force and Future Space Directions, The: Are We 106–9. Good Stewards?” Brig Gen Simon Peter Worden, no. “Challenges of Aeromedical Evacuation in the Post-Cold- 1 (Spring 2001): 50–55. War Era,” Brig Gen Bruce Green, no. 4 (Winter “Air Force Transformation: Past, Present, and Future” 2001): 14–26. (pirep), Maj Gen David A. Deptula, no. 3 (Fall 2001): “Cult of the Quick, The,” Dr. Thomas Hughes, no. 4 85–91. (Winter 2001): 57–68. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Construct for Air Op­ “Developing Aerospace Leaders for the Twenty-First Cen­ erations in the Twenty-First Century,” Lt Col Phil M. tury: A Historical Context for the DAL Concept,” Dr. Haun, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. Mike Thirtle, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 52–57. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations” (vor­ Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, tices), Col Edward Mann, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and 1927–33,” Dr. Wray R. Johnson, no. 3 (Fall 2001): Tom Searle, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. 32–41. “Early Retirement of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of “Another View of the Myths of the Gulf War,” Lt Col Mar- Staff, United States Air Force, The,” Dr. Richard H. tin Wojtysiak, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Kohn, ed., no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. “Out of Balance: Will Conventional ICBMs Destroy De­ “Essence of Aerospace Power, The: What Leaders Need terrence?” Dr. Robert L. Butterworth, no. 3 (Fall to Know,” Col Dennis M. Drew, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 2001): 74–84. 23–31. “C-9 Nightingale: From Dedicated Aeromedical Evacua­ “Ethical Problem in Pluralistic Societies and Dr. Toner’s tion to Theater Transport” (pirep), Capt Gilles Van ‘Mistakes,’ The,” Dr. Alexandre S. da Rocha, no. 1 Nederveen, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–90. (Spring 2001): 81–94. 114 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

“Global Dynamic Operations” (vortices), Dr. Kenneth P. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Casualty Avoid­ Werrell, Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric A. Ash, and ance and the American Public” (vortices), Kent D. Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Johnson, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. “Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, “Precision Aerospace Power, Discrimination, and the Fu­ Forged by Experience,” Gen John P. Jumper, no. 1 ture of War,” Col Phillip S. Meilinger, no. 3 (Fall (Spring 2001): 24–33. 2001): 12–20. “Going Boldly—Where? Aerospace Integration, the “Precision Doctrine” (editorial), Lt Col Eric Ash, no. 1 Space Commission, and the Air Force’s Vision for (Spring 2001): 3–4. Space,” Lt Col Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller, no. 1 “Professional Military Education for Company Grade Of­ (Spring 2001): 34–49. ficers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’” Capt Alisen Iversen, no. “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the Air Force Offi­ 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. cer Corps” (vortices), Col Tom Hall, no. 2 (Summer “Propositions Concerning the Aerial RMA” (editorial), 2001): 82–85. Lt Col Eric Ash, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 3–4. “JCS 94-Target List, The: A Vietnam Myth That Still Dis­ “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for Unhealthy Ri­ torts Military Thought,” Charles Tustin Kamps, no. 1 valry,” Lt Col Eric Ash, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. (Spring 2001): 67–80. “Responding to the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initia­ “Leadership and Reorganization: A New Model for the tive: A Master Attack Plan for Reforming Undergradu­ Air Force,” Lt Col John M. Fawcett Jr., no. 2 (Summer ate Professional Development,” Col Tom Drohan and 2001): 65–77. Col Doug Murray, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. “Leading Airmen,” Maj Gen Charles D. Link, no. 2 (Sum­ “Riding the Information-Revolution Tiger” (vortices), mer 2001): 7–12. Maj Louis E. McNamara Jr., no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. “For Lieutenants Only!” (vortices), 1st Lt Glenn Lein­ “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Air-Leadership bach, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 90–92. Model: Fodder for Your Professional Reading,” Dr. “Light Dawns, A: The Airborne Laser” (pirep), no. 1 David R. Mets, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. (Spring 2001): 95–97. “Shades of Sentinel? National Missile Defense, Then and “Linking Resource Allocation to Performance Manage­ Now,” Lt Col Charles E. Costanzo, no. 3 (Fall 2001): ment and Strategic Planning: An Air Force Chal­ 60–65. lenge,” Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, Lt Col James A. “Silver Flag: A Concept for Operational Warfare,” Col Hubert, and Maj Keith H. Maxwell, no. 4 (Winter Bobby J. Wilkes, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–95. 2001): 34–45. “Technology for the Future Leader: International Com­ “Medicinal Thoughts” (editorial), Col Eric Ash, no. 4 mand and Control Enhancements” (pirep), Capt (Winter 2001): 5. Gilles Van Nederveen, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. “Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Polic­ “Thinking about China and War,” Dr. Jeffrey Record, no. ing, The,” Group Captain Peter W. Gray, no. 3 (Fall 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. 2001): 21–31. “Transforming Warfare with Effects-Based Joint Opera­ “New Millennium, New Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical tions,” Lt Col Price T. Bingham, no. 1 (Spring 2001): Service in the Air Expeditionary Era,” Lt Gen Paul K. 58–66. Carlton Jr., no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. “War on Drugs, The: Two More Casualties” (vortices), Lt “Operational Medical Support for the Tip of the Spear: Col Stephen P. Howard, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. The Heart of Air Force Special Operations Forces “War Termination in the Persian Gulf: Problems and (AFSOF) Medicine,” Col James J. Dougherty, no. 4 Prospects,” Col Mark Garrard, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 42–50. (Winter 2001): 27–33. “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” Dr. Louis S. Metzger and “Organizing for Success: Theater Missile Defense in Col Donald R. Erbschloe, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. Korea,” Col Dale C. Eikmeier, USA, no. 3 (Fall 2001): “Word from the Chief, A: Transformational Leaders,” 66–73. Gen Michael E. Ryan, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5.

SUBJECT INDEX Aerospace Expeditionary Force/Expeditionary Aero­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: space Force Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: 85–91. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: 85–91. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- 23–31. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control (Spring 2001): 24–33. and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall Aerospace Power 2001): 21–31. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ 58–66. tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. INDEX 115

Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— Air Campaign Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): (Spring 2001): 34–49. 58–66. Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 85–91. 32–41. Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 42–50. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. (Spring 2001): 67–80. Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, (Winter 2001): 57–68. and Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Alloca­ Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- tion to Performance Management and Strategic Plan­ forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 ning: An Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): (Spring 2001): 24–33. 34–45. Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ (Spring 2001): 67–80. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ 2001): 12–20. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. 2001): 12–20. “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Airpower History Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter (Spring 2001): 50–55. 2001): 14–26. Aerospace Power History Air Superiority Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 23–31. 58–66. Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall 42–50. 2001): 21–31. Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 32–41. 32–41. Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 67–80. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Kohn, Dr. Richard H., ed. “The Early Retirement of Gen crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air 2001): 12–20. Force,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 12–20. Arms Control Mets, Dr. David R. “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ Air-Leadership Model: Fodder for Your Professional ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall Reading,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. 2001): 74–84. 116 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Asian Region Bradley, James, with Ron Powers. Flags of Our Fathers, re- Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. viewed by Maj Gary Pounder, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. 112–13. Brown, Russell. Desert Warriors: Australian P-40 Pilots at War Aviation Technology in the Middle East and North Africa, 1941–1943, reviewed Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. by Maj Robert F. Tate, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 99–100. “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. Brulle, Robert V. Angels Zero: P-47 Close Air Support in Eu­ Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “C-9 Nightingale: From Ded­ rope, reviewed by Dr. Daniel Mortensen, no. 4 (Winter icated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Transport” 2001): 100–101. (pirep), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–90. Chinnery, Phillip D. Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes, ———. “A Light Dawns: The Airborne Laser” (pirep), 1950–1953, reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 2 no. 1 (Spring 2001): 95–97. (Summer 2001): 110–11. ———. “Technology for the Future Leader: Interna­ Clark, Gen Wesley K. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, tional Command and Control Enhancements” and the Future of Combat, reviewed by William M. Arkin, (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. no. 3 (Fall 2001): 123–25. Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ Cooper, Belton Y. Death Traps: The Survival of an American ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 Armored Division in World War II, reviewed by Maj Gary (Spring 2001): 50–55. Pounder, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 112–14. Crouch, Tom D. et al. The Genesis of Flight: The Aeronauti­ Balkans Conflict cal History Collection of Colonel Richard Gimbel, reviewed Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A by Lt Col Eric A. Ash, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 110–11. Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ Dando, Malcolm. The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Pro­ tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. liferation, and Control (touch and go), reviewed by APJ staff, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 124–25. Ballistic Missile Defense Davis, William C. The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ Confederacy, reviewed by Maj James P. Gates, no. 4 tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall (Winter 2001): 103–4. 2001): 60–65. Duffner, Robert W. Science and Technology: The Making of Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: the Air Force Research Laboratory (touch and go), re- Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): viewed by APJ staff, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 123–24. 66–73. Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephan P. Waring. Power to Ex­ Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “A Light Dawns: The Air- plore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Center, borne Laser” (pirep), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 95–97. 1960–1990, reviewed by Col Jon Campbell, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 106–8. Bibliographic Essays Echevarria, Antulio J., II. After Clausewitz: German Military Mets, Dr. David R. “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Thinkers before the Great War, reviewed by Harold R. Air-Leadership Model: Fodder for Your Professional Winton, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 104–5. Reading,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. Edwards, Lee, ed. The Collapse of Communism, reviewed by 1st Lt Glenn Leinbach, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 113–14. Book Reviews Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War Air Force History and Museums Program, Steadfast and History, reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 2 (Sum­ Courageous: FEAF Bomber Command and the Air War in mer 2001): 121. Korea, 1950–1953, reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. Franck, Harry A. Winter Journey through the Ninth: The Story 1 (Spring 2001): 121–22. of Tactical Air Power as Illustrated by the Exploits of the Aldrich, Richard J. Intelligence and the War against Japan: Ninth Air Force in Europe, reviewed by Kenneth P. Wer­ Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (touch rell, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 108–9. and go), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 111. Funabashi, Yoichi. Alliance Adrift, reviewed by John H. Beaumont, Roger. The Nazis’ March to Chaos: The Hitler Era Barnhill, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 114–15. through the Lenses of Chaos-Complexity Theory, reviewed Gallagher, Gary W., and Alan T. Nolan, eds. The Myth of by James S. Corum, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 105–6. the Lost Cause and Civil War History, reviewed by Maj ———. Right Backed by Might: The International Air Force James P. Gates, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 102–3. Concept, reviewed by Col Phillip S. Meilinger, no. 4 Gamble, Bruce. Black Sheep One: The Life of Gergory (Winter 2001): 105. “Pappy” Boyington, reviewed by Lt Col Phil Bossert Jr., Bergström, Christer, and Andrey Mikhailov. Black no. 4 (Winter 2001): 106–7. Cross/Red Star: The Air War over the Eastern Front, re- Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons viewed by James S. Corum, no. 2 (Summer 2001): Learned from World War II to Kosovo, reviewed by Lt Col 120–21. Eric Ash, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 123. Bracken, Paul. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Guelff, Richard, and Adam Roberts, eds. Documents on the Power and the Second Nuclear Age, reviewed by Carmel Laws of War, reviewed by Dr. Marcus Hanke, no. 1 Davis, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 111–12. (Spring 2001): 124–25. INDEX 117

Hammond, Grant Tedrick. The Mind of War: John Boyd Nalty, Bernard, and Wayne Thompson. Within Limits: The and American Security, reviewed by Lt Col Eric Ash, no. United States Air Force and the Korean War, reviewed by 3 (Fall 2001): 122–23. Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 121–22. Hays, Peter L., et al. Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space Nolan, Keith William. Ripcord: Screaming Eagles under Siege, and U.S. National Security (touch and go), reviewed by Vietnam 1970, reviewed by 1st Lt Glenn D. Leinbach, APJ staff, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 125. no. 4 (Winter 2001): 101–2. Jackson, Kathi. They Called Them Angels: American Military Owens, Adm Bill, with Ed Offley. Lifting the Fog of War, re- Nurses of World War II, reviewed by C1C Brooke Carr, viewed by Maj Peter W. Huggins, no. 2 (Summer no. 3 (Fall 2001): 123. 2001): 108–9. Johnston, A. M. “Tex,” with Charles Burton. Tex Johnston: Pagedas, Constantine A. Anglo-American Strategic Relations Jet-Age Test Pilot, reviewed by John H. Barnhill, no. 1 and the French Problem, 1960–1963: A Troubled Partner- (Spring 2001): 115–16. ship, reviewed by Capt Sam Grable, no. 2 (Summer Kaplan, Robert D. Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the 2001): 109–10. Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, reviewed by Pendry, J. D. The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership Michael R. Hickok, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 114–15. for NCOs, reviewed by CMSgt Gilbert Duenas, no. 4 Keegan, John, ed. The Book of War: 25 Centuries of Great (Winter 2001): 107–8. War Writing, reviewed by Maj Jeffrey C. Alfier, no. 1 Pocock, Charles L. Viper-7: Forward Air Controlling in South (Spring 2001): 116. Vietnam in 1966, reviewed by Col James E. Roper, no. Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War, re- 2 (Summer 2001): 111–12. viewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 4 (Winter 2001): Roberts, Adam, and Richard Guelff, eds. Documents on the 104. Laws of War, 3d ed., reviewed by Dr. Marcus Hanke, Lambeth, Benjamin S. The Transformation of American Air- no. 1 (Spring 2001): 124–25. power, reviewed by Maj Mustafa “Kujo” Koprucu, no. 2 Roe, Patrick C. The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean (Summer 2001): 116–20. War, June–December 1950 (touch and go), reviewed by Leary William M. Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: Combat Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 124. Cargo in the Korean War, reviewed by Kenneth P. Wer­ Rubin, Barry. Revolution until Victory: The Politics and His- rell, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 121–22. tory of the PLO, reviewed by Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, ———, ed. MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 122. reviewed by Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, no. 4 (Winter Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorist, reviewed by Col (Dr.) 2001): 99. Jim Davis and CDR Drew Mullin, no. 4 (Winter 2001): Lindsay, James M., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Defending 110. America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense Tal, Israel (trans. Martin Kett), National Security: The Is­ (touch and go), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 111. raeli Experience, reviewed by Lt Youssef H. Aboul- McGuire, William C., II. After the Liberators: A Father’s Last Enein, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 123–24. Mission, A Son’s Lifelong Journey (touch and go), re- TalonSoft. The Operational Art of War: Century of Warfare viewed by Dr. Daniel Mortensen, no. 2 (Summer (CD-ROM), reviewed by Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, no. 2001): 125. 1 (Spring 2001): 118–21. McPherson, James M. Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on Tangredi, Sam J. All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View the American Civil War, reviewed by Maj James P. Gates, of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025 (touch no. 4 (Winter 2001): 103. and go), reviewed by Dr. Karl P. Magyar, no. 2 (Sum­ McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: mer 2001): 124. Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, re- Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force viewed by Maj James P. Gates, no. 4 (Winter 2001): and North Vietnam, 1966–1973, reviewed by Maj Mustafa 102, 104. “Kujo” Koprucu, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 115–20. Mallmann-Showell, Jak P. U-Boats at War: Landings on Hos­ Thompson, Wayne, and Bernard Nalty. Within Limits: The tile Shores, reviewed by Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, no. United States Air Force and the Korean War, reviewed by 2 (Summer 2001): 121–22. Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 121–22. Messimer, Dwight R. Escape from Villingen, 1918, reviewed Tooker, D. K. The Second-Luckiest Pilot: Adventures in Mili­ by 1st Lt Glenn Leinbach, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 108. tary Aviation, reviewed by C1C Brooke Carr, no. 4 Mets, David R., and Harold R. Winton. The Challenge of (Winter 2001): 109. Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, Touchstone Pictures. Pearl Harbor, reviewed by Maj Gary 1918–1941, reviewed by Capt Barry H. Crane, no. 1 Pounder, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 97–98. (Spring 2001): 117–18. Wakin, Malham M. Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Mikhailov, Andrey, and Christer Bergstrom. Black Cross/Red Philosopher, reviewed by Lt Col Eric Ash, no. 2 (Sum­ Star: The Air War over the Eastern Front, reviewed by James mer 2001): 112. S. Corum, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 120–21. Waring, Stephan P., and Andrew J. Dunar. Power to Ex­ Mott, William H., IV. Military Assistance: An Operational plore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Center, Perspective, reviewed by Capt Clifford E. Rich, no. 4 1960–1990, reviewed by Col Jon Campbell, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 96–97. (Summer 2001): 106–8. 118 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Warnock, A. Timothy, ed. The USAF in Korea: A Chronology, Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— 1950–1953, reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 1 Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ (Spring 2001): 122–23. sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 Weland, Gerald. Words of War: From Antiquity to Modern (Spring 2001): 34–49. Times, reviewed by Maj Jeffrey C. Alfier, no. 1 (Spring McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- 2001): 117. Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Winton, Harold R., and David R. Mets. The Challenge of 108–16. Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. 1918–1941, reviewed by Capt Barry H. Crane, no. 1 “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. (Spring 2001): 117–18. Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “Technology for the Future Y’Blood, William T. MiG Alley: The Fight for Air Superiority, Leader: International Command and Control En­ reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, no. 1 (Spring 2001): hancements” (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. 122–23. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Budget/Planning Process Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ and Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Alloca­ ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 tion to Performance Management and Strategic Plan­ (Spring 2001): 50–55. ning: An Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. Company Grade Officer Issues Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for China Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’” no. Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. Leinbach, 1st Lt Glenn. “For Lieutenants Only!” (vor­ Civil-Military Relations tices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 90–92. Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ Counterinsurgency rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control 106–9. and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian 2001): 21–31. Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small 42–50. Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): More Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 32–41. 91–94. Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Defense Reform Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 85–91. Close Air Support Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. 66–73. Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer (Spring 2001): 24–33. 2001): 65–77. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 2001): 12–20. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ Cold War mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic 2001): 74–84. Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Command and Control Desert Shield/Storm Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 58–66. 106–9. Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 66–73. 42–50. INDEX 119

Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ Deterrence ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ (Spring 2001): 50–55. ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 74–84. Editorials Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ Ash, Col Eric. “Medicinal Thoughts,” no. 4 (Winter tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 5. 2001): 60–65. ———. “Precision Doctrine,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 3–4. Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: ––––––. “Propositions Concerning the Aerial RMA,” no. 3 Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): (Fall 2001): 3–4. 66–73. Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. Doctrine Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Precision Doctrine” (editorial), no. 1 Effects-Based Operations (EBO) (Spring 2001): 3–4. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 58–66. 58–66. Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New 85–91. Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Expeditionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: (Spring 2001): 24–33. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom 85–91. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ 23–31. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: 2001): 12–20. Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 66–73. Electronic Warfare Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Gulf: Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 42–50. 58–66. Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. 85–91. Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom (Spring 2001): 34–49. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. (Winter 2001): 57–68. Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “Technology for the Future (Spring 2001): 24–33. Leader: International Command and Control En­ Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom hancements” (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Ethics/Values/Virtues tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Unhealthy Rivalry,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall da Rocha, Dr. Alexandre S. “The Ethical Problem in Plu­ 2001): 12–20. ralistic Societies and Dr. Toner’s ‘Mistakes,’ ” no. 1 Michael, Maj Steve. “Air Force Doctrine and Leadership” (Spring 2001): 81–94. (vortices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 86–89. Hall, Col Tom, “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Air Force Officer Corps” (vortices), no. 2 (Summer A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic 2001): 82–85. Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Kohn, Dr. Richard H., ed. “The Early Retirement of Gen Wilkes, Col Bobby J. “Silver Flag: A Concept for Opera­ Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air tional Warfare,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 47–56. Force,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. 120 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

European Region Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, and forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Allocation to (Spring 2001): 24–33. Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. International Relations Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two Geopolitics More Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. 91–94. 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. Interservice Conflict Global Dynamic Operations Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Unhealthy Rivalry,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Joint Force Air Component Commander Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Humanitarian Operations fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New Mind- 58–66. Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Expedi­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: tionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ 85–91. rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- 106–9. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support (Spring 2001): 24–33. for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ (Winter 2001): 27–33. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 14–26. 2001): 12–20. Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Information Warfare Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Joint Operations 58–66. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 58–66. 85–91. Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Expeditionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. 108–16. Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ 85–91. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “Technology for the Future (Winter 2001): 27–33. Leader: International Command and Control En­ Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical hancements” (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter Intelligence 2001): 14–26. McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick” no. 4 Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): (Winter 2001): 57–68. 108–16. Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Interdiction “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic 58–66. Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. INDEX 121

Kosovo Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Cen­ (Spring 2001): 24–33. tury,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88. Management/Organization Latin American Region Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two More Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. Expeditionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 32–41. 85–91. Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Leadership/Management Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ Unhealthy Rivalry,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: (Winter 2001): 27–33. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: 23–31. Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Drohan, Col Tom, and Col Doug Murray. “Responding to 66–73. the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. 2001): 65–77. Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 65–77. 2001): 14–26. Hall, Col Tom. “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Air Force Officer Corps” (vortices), no. 2 (Summer forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 2001): 82–85. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, and Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’ ” no. Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Allocation to 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Kohn, Dr. Richard H., ed. “The Early Retirement of Gen Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Force,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Leinbach, 1st Lt Glenn. “For Lieutenants Only!” (vor­ tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. tices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 90–92. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Link, Maj Gen Charles D. “Leading Airmen,” no. 2 (Sum­ A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic mer 2001): 7–12. Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Mets, Dr. David R. “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Air-Leadership Model: Fodder for Your Professional Medical Forces/Issues Reading,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. Ash, Col Eric. “Medicinal Thoughts” (editorial), no. 4 Michael, Maj Steve. “Air Force Doctrine and Leadership” (Winter 2001): 5. (vortices), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 86–89. Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. Expeditionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. Thirtle, Dr. Mike. “Developing Aerospace Leaders for the Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Twenty-First Century: A Historical Context for the for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ DAL Concept,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 52–57. cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “Technology for the Future (Winter 2001): 27–33. Leader: International Command and Control En­ Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical hancements” (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 14–26. Low-Intensity Conflict Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “C-9 Nightingale: From Ded­ Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ icated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Transport” fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): (pirep), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–90. 58–66. Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control Middle East Region and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Gulf: 2001): 21–31. Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 42–50. Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 32–41. 2001): 21–31. 122 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 2001): 12–20. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. Military Education Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. Drohan, Col Tom, and Col Doug Murray. “Responding to “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “A Light Dawns: The Air- ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ borne Laser” (pirep), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 95–97. sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. ———. “Technology for the Future Leader: Interna­ Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for tional Command and Control Enhancements” Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’ ” no. (pirep), no. 2 (Summer 2001): 78–80. 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. Military Thought Military Operations other than War Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Precision Doctrine” (editorial), no. 1 Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indirect (Spring 2001): 3–4. Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 106–9. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ 58–66. cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: (Winter 2001): 27–33. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control 85–91. and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: 2001): 21–31. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical 23–31. Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ 2001): 14–26. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two More Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. 2001): 65–77. Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ (Winter 2001): 57–68. tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ Military Revolutions tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Precision Doctrine” (editorial), no. 1 Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric (Spring 2001): 3–4. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 58–66. Military Training Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Drohan, Col Tom, and Col Doug Murray. “Responding to Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ 85–91. ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ 23–31. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- 2001): 65–77. forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Hall, Col Tom. “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the (Spring 2001): 24–33. Air Force Officer Corps” (vortices), no. 2 (Summer McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- 2001): 82–85. Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’ ” no. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Missiles and Missile Operations A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall Military Technology 2001): 74–84. Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 60–65. 2001): 60–65. INDEX 123

Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ 66–73. tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. National Security Policy Persian Gulf Conflict Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 2001): 60–65. 23–31. Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— Garrard, Col Mark. “War Termination in the Persian Gulf: Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ Problems and Prospects,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 42–50. sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 Wojtysiak, Lt Col Martin. “Another View of the Myths of (Spring 2001): 34–49. the Gulf War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 51–59. Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two More Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): Personnel Issues 91–94. Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. 2001): 65–77. Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ PIREP ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: (Spring 2001): 50–55. Past, Present, and Future,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 85–91. National Strategy Van Nederveen, Capt Gilles. “C-9 Nightingale: From Ded­ Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ icated Aeromedical Evacuation to Theater Trans- tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall port,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–90. 2001): 60–65. ———. “A Light Dawns: The Airborne Laser,” no. 1 Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— (Spring 2001): 95–97. Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ ———. “Technology for the Future Leader: Interna­ sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 tional Command and Control Enhancements,” no. 2 (Spring 2001): 34–49. (Summer 2001): 78–80. Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 Planning (Winter 2001): 57–68. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 58–66. (Spring 2001): 50–55. Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Nuclear War Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ 85–91. ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ 2001): 74–84. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ 2001): 65–77. tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall Hughes, Dr. Thomas. “The Cult of the Quick,” no. 4 2001): 60–65. (Winter 2001): 57–68. Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Pacific Region forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: (Spring 2001): 24–33. Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ 66–73. nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 67–80. Peacekeeping Operations Lorenz, Maj Gen Stephen R., Lt Col James A. Hubert, and Carlton, Lt Gen Paul K., Jr. “New Millennium, New Maj Keith H. Maxwell. “Linking Resource Allocation to Mind-Set: The Air Force Medical Service in the Air Performance Management and Strategic Planning: An Expeditionary Era,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 8–13. Air Force Challenge,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–45. Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ 106–9. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. (Winter 2001): 27–33. Green, Brig Gen Bruce. “Challenges of Aeromedical Political-Military Affairs Evacuation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” no. 4 (Winter Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indirect 2001): 14–26. Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 106–9. 124 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Record, Dr. Jeffrey. “Thinking about China and War,” no. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ 4 (Winter 2001): 69–80. crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 12–20. Preparedness Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ Metzger, Dr. Louis S., and Col Donald R. Erbschloe. tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer “Who’s Got the Big Picture?” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 6–11. 2001): 65–77. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Principles of War Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Royal Air Force 2001): 12–20. Gray, Group Captain Peter W. “The Myths of Air Control Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” no. 3 (Fall A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic 2001): 21–31. Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Johnson, Dr. Wray R. “Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Professionalism Campaign, 1927–33,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 32–41. Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Purple Virtues: A Leadership Cure for Unhealthy Rivalry,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 32–39. Space Operations da Rocha, Dr. Alexandre S. “The Ethical Problem in Plu­ Hays, Lt Col Peter, and Dr. Karl Mueller. “Going Boldly— ralistic Societies and Dr. Toner’s ‘Mistakes,’ ” no. 1 Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commis­ (Spring 2001): 81–94. sion, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” no. 1 Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: (Spring 2001): 34–49. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): Worden, Brig Gen Simon Peter. “The Air Force and Fu­ 23–31. ture Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” no. 1 Drohan, Col Tom, and Col Doug Murray. “Responding to (Spring 2001): 50–55. the ‘Developing Aerospace Leaders’ Initiative: A Mas­ ter Attack Plan for Reforming Undergraduate Profes­ Special Operations sional Development,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 13–22. Dougherty, Col James J. “Operational Medical Support Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “Leadership and Reorganiza­ for the Tip of the Spear: The Heart of Air Force Spe­ tion: A New Model for the Air Force,” no. 2 (Summer cial Operations Forces (AFSOF) Medicine,” no. 4 2001): 65–77. (Winter 2001): 27–33. Hall, Col Tom. “ ‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two More Air Force Officer Corps” (vortices), no. 2 (Summer Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. 2001): 82–85. Strategic Bombing Iversen, Capt Alisen. “Professional Military Education for Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: Company Grade Officers: Targeting for ‘Affect,’ ” no. What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 2 (Summer 2001): 58–64. 23–31. Kohn, Dr. Richard H., ed. “The Early Retirement of Gen Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 Force,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6–23. (Spring 2001): 67–80. Mets, Dr. David R. “In Search of a Twenty-First-Century Air-Leadership Model: Fodder for Your Professional Strategy Reading,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40–51. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): Public Affairs 58–66. Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 106–9. 85–91. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Drew, Col Dennis M. “The Essence of Aerospace Power: Ash, Lt Col Eric. “Propositions Concerning the Aerial What Leaders Need to Know,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): RMA” (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 3–4. 23–31. Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 85–91. (Spring 2001): 24–33. McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Revolution Tiger” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 108–16. (Spring 2001): 67–80. INDEX 125

Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Ryan, Gen Michael E. “A Word from the Chief: Transfor­ Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ mational Leaders,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 4–5. tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. 2001): 12–20. Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric Vietnam War A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Operations” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 Tactics (Spring 2001): 67–80. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “Transforming Warfare with Ef­ Vortices fects-Based Joint Operations,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 58–66. Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: rect Approach,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 106–9. Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Hall, Col Tom. “‘I’d Rather Be Flying’: The Ethos of the 85–91. Air Force Officer Corps,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 82–85. Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 More Casualties,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. (Spring 2001): 24–33. Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Kamps, Charles Tustin. “The JCS 94-Target List: A Viet­ Casualty Avoidance and the American Public,” no. 1 nam Myth That Still Distorts Military Thought,” no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. (Spring 2001): 67–80. Leinbach, 1st Lt Glenn. “For Lieutenants Only!” no. 2 Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom (Summer 2001): 90–92. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ McNamara, Maj Louis E., Jr. “Riding the Information- tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Revolution Tiger,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 108–16. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Precision Aerospace Power, Dis­ crimination, and the Future of War,” no. 3 (Fall Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom 2001): 12–20. Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ tions,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. Terrorism Michael, Maj Steve. “Air Force Doctrine and Leader- Dietrick, Capt Robert. “Casualty Sensitivity and the Indi­ ship,” no. 2 (Summer 2001): 86–89. rect Approach” (vortices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): Werrell, Dr. Kenneth P., Col Allan W. Howey, Lt Col Eric 106–9. A. Ash, and Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz. “Global Dynamic Johnson, Kent D. “Political-Military Engagement Policy: Operations,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 101–7. Casualty Avoidance and the American Public” (vor­ tices), no. 1 (Spring 2001): 98–105. War on Drugs Theater Missile Defense Howard, Lt Col Stephen P. “The War on Drugs: Two More Eikmeier, Col Dale C., USA. “Organizing for Success: Casualties” (vortices), no. 4 (Winter 2001): 91–94. Theater Missile Defense in Korea,” no. 3 (Fall 2001): 66–73. War Gaming Wilkes, Col Bobby J. “Silver Flag: A Concept for Opera­ Transformation tional Warfare,” no. 4 (Winter 2001): 47–56. Deptula, Maj Gen David A. “Air Force Transformation: Past, Present, and Future” (pirep), no. 3 (Fall 2001): Weapons of Mass Destruction 85–91. Jumper, Gen John P. “Global Strike Task Force: A Trans- Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. “Out of Balance: Will Con­ forming Concept, Forged by Experience,” no. 1 ventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?” no. 3 (Fall (Spring 2001): 24–33. 2001): 74–84. Mann, Col Edward, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom Costanzo, Lt Col Charles E. “Shades of Sentinel? Na­ Searle. “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Opera­ tional Missile Defense, Then and Now,” no. 3 (Fall tions” (vortices), no. 3 (Fall 2001): 92–100. 2001): 60–65. MISSION DEBRIEF 127

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Lt Gen Paul K. Carlton Jr. (USAFA; MD, Uni­ Brig Gen Bruce Green (BS, University of Wis­ Col James J. Dougherty (BA, Rice University; versity of Colorado at Denver) is the surgeon consin; MD, Medical College of Wisconsin; MD, Baylor College of Medicine; MPH, Johns general of the Air Force, Headquarters, MPH, Harvard University) is command sur­ Hopkins University) is command surgeon, USAF, Bolling AFB, D.C. He serves as func­ geon, United States Transportation Com­ Headquarters Air Force Special Operations tional manager of the USAF Medical Services mand (USTRANSCOM) and Headquarters Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. He leads (AFMS). He advises the secretary of the Air Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott AFB, the directorate that drafts and oversees exe­ Force and Air Force chief of staff, as well as Illinois. He is a director on the staff of the cution of policy related to direct medical sup- the assistant secretary of defense for health commander in chief, United States Trans­ port of Air Force special operations and pro- on matters pertaining to the health of Air portation Command. In this capacity, he en­ vision of health care for beneficiaries within Force people. The general has authority to sures both the maximum wartime readiness the command. He has spent most of his ca­ commit resources worldwide for AFMS, to and combat-support capability of worldwide reer in aerospace medicine, from squadron make decisions affecting the delivery of med­ patient movement, aeromedical evacuation, flight surgeon to tactical hospital com­ ical services, and to develop plans, programs, the Global Patient Movement Requirements mander. A chief flight surgeon with more and procedures to support peacetime and Center, and AMC’s 12 community-based med­ than 1,000 flying hours, Colonel Dougherty is wartime medical-service missions. He exer­ ical-treatment facilities. He leads more than also a senior parachutist and jump master cises direction, guidance, and technical man­ 8,000 AMC medical personnel, providing with 70 static-line deployments and a US Navy agement of more than 42,400 people as- care to more than 456,000 beneficiaries, and closed- and open-circuit diver. signed to 78 medical facilities worldwide. oversees an annual budget of $796 million. As the command surgeon of USTRANSCOM, he advocates the Department of Defense’s ef­ forts to reengineer the Global Patient Move­ ment System.

Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz (USAFA; MPA, University of Northern Colorado) is deputy assistant secretary for budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Finan­ cial Management and Comptroller, Head- Lt Col James A. Hubert (BS, Oregon State quarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. He University; MS, George Washington Univer­ Maj Keith H. Maxwell (BS, University of previously served as director of plans and pro- sity) is chief of the Strategy and Programming Maine; ME, University of Florida) is senior grams, Headquarters US Air Forces in Eu­ Branch, Headquarters United States Air military advisor to the commander for Rhein- rope, Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany. A Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. Main Transition, Spangdahlem AB, Germany. Recent assignments have included member command pilot with 3,300 hours in eight air- Recent assignments have included chief of craft, he has served as a staff officer at two of the Air Force Resource Allocation Process programs and legislative liaison, Headquar­ major commands, the Air Staff, and the Joint Reengineering Team, Washington, D.C.; ters US Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Staff, as well as having commanded an air- chief of Acquisition Management Policy and Germany; Peace Vector IV construction man­ refueling squadron and a geographically sep­ Acquisition Strategic Planning, Washington, arated operations group. The general has D.C.; electronic-warfare program manager, ager, Sakara AB and Gianaclis AB, Egypt; commanded three wings—an air-refueling Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; and Air Force chief of the Geotechnical Division and assis­ wing, an air-mobility wing, and a training technology coordinator for identification of tant professor, United States Air Force Acad­ wing at the Air Force Academy, where he was ground forces, Langley AFB, Virginia. The emy; and electromagnetic project leader, also the commandant of cadets. General holder of two patents and the author of sev­ Phillips Lab, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Lorenz is a graduate of Squadron Officer eral technical papers, Colonel Hubert is a Major Maxwell is a graduate of Squadron Of­ School, Air Command and Staff College, Air graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air ficer School and Air Command and Staff Col­ War College, and National War College. Command and Staff College. lege. 128 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2001

Col Bobby J. Wilkes (USAFA; MS, Embry- Dr. Thomas Hughes (BA, St. John’s Univer- Dr. Jeffrey Record (BA, Occidental College; Riddle Aeronautical University; MS, George sity; MA, PhD, University of Houston) is an MA, PhD, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Washington University) is commander of the assistant professor at the USAF Air War Col- International Studies) is professor of strategy College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and lege, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is the author and international security at the Air War Col­ Education (CADRE), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. of Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Tri- lege, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and senior re- He has served as commander of the 355th umph of Tactical Air Power in World War II, search fellow at the Center for International Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, and as which is on the USAF chief of staff’s profes­ Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Geor­ director of operations, Joint Task Force South- sional reading list. Dr. Hughes is currently gia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. west Asia. He is a command pilot with more writing a biography of Adm William F. Halsey He previously served as a professional staff than 3,800 flying hours in the T-38, A-10, and Jr. member on the Senate Armed Services Com­ F-16. Colonel Wilkes is a graduate of Squad­ mittee; legislative assistant to Sen. Sam Nunn, ron Officer School, Air Command and Staff Sen. Bob Krueger, and Sen. Lloyd Bentsen; College, Armed Forces Staff College, Air War senior fellow at BDM International, Hudson College, and Industrial College of the Armed Institute, and Institute for Foreign Policy Forces. Analysis; advisor to Sen. William Cohen and Sen. Gary Hart; research associate and Rock­ efeller Younger Scholar at the Brookings In­ stitution; and assistant province advisor in the Republic of Vietnam. Dr. Record is the au­ thor of The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998) and Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Viet­ nam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).

Lt Col Phil “Goldie” Haun (BA, Harvard Uni­ versity; MA, Vanderbilt University) is a student at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has served as chief of weapons and tactics for the 52d Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem AB, Germany; flight commander of the 25th Fighter Squad­ ron at Osan AB, South Korea; and instructor of economics at the United States Air Force Academy. A graduate of the USAF A-10 Weap­ ons School and Air Command and Staff Col­ lege, Colonel Haun has published articles in Air Land Sea Bulletin and Flight Journal Maga­ zine. EDITORIAL BOARD

Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University Dr. Richard H. Kohn, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, National War College, National Defense University Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Airpower Studies Col Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

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