DOCSLIB.ORG

Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts bs_bs_banner European Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 42–56. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA Non-Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty: Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts Thomas Christiansen* and Mathias Dobbels** Abstract: The reform of comitology and the introduction of the new instrument of delegated acts in the Lisbon Treaty were followed by protracted negotiations on the implementation of both articles. This article examines the resultant system that has emerged for both types of non-legislative instruments. In the area of implementing acts, a new regulation sets out important changes: a reduction in the number of procedures, the extension of the scope to trade defence measures and the replacement of a referral to the Council with a new appeal committee. With respect to delegated acts, the search for an overarching framework resulted in a Common Understanding. Our analysis not only demonstrates the need to go beyond the treaty provisions in understanding the nature of non-legislative rule making in the EU, but also emphasises the importance of informal procedures and non-binding agreements in fully assessing the nature of non-legislative rule making in this area. I Introduction ‘Comitology’, the system of legislative oversight of implementing powers delegated to the European Commission, has long been a mainstay of the EU’s administrative system. From the early 1960s onwards, Member States accompanied the delegation of powers to the Commission with the establishment of implementing committees that would ‘assist’ the Commission in the execution of these powers. Effectively, these comitology committees provided a mechanism for scrutiny by national administra- tions over the way in which the Commission sought to implement delegation. While this system has generally been considered effective in that it facilitated the involvement of Member State representatives in the adoption of thousands of implementing acts annually, it has also been the source of occasional, and recently increasing, tensions between the European Parliament (EP) and the other institu- tions. With the creation of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent expansion of co-legislative powers for the EP, the Member States’ monopoly over the scrutiny of implementing acts became a bone of contention * Jean Monnet Professor of European Institutional Politics at the Department of Political Science at Maastricht University. **PhD Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Maastricht University. January 2013 Non-Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty between the two legislative institutions. A series of intermediate reforms throughout the 1990s and 2000s provided the EP with limited rights to information and powers of scrutiny, but inter-institutional tensions persisted with the EP’s demand for legislative equality to be matched by equality with regard to the scrutiny of the Commission’s delegated powers. The Lisbon Treaty marked a milestone in this regard for two reasons: first, it established a new legal base in the treaty for the work of comitology committees, replacing the use of the consultation procedure with the ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of the general rules and procedures under which the Commission has to submit its draft implementing acts to the committees (Article 291, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)); and second, it created an entirely new instrument of ‘delegated acts’ that are directly scrutinised by the legislative institu- tions, without any use of comitology (Article 290 TFEU). Both articles, individually and taken together, give the Council and Parliament equal status in the treaty with regard to the scrutiny over implementing and delegated acts, and thus constitute a certain finalité in terms of the EP’s quest. The history of inter-institutional tensions in comitology over the past 20 years demonstrates that disagreements about non-legislative rule making can capture the interests of the legislative institutions and have the potential for disrupting Union decision making. Far from being ‘low politics’, comitology—the procedures as well as the substantive decisions taken through its procedures—has often been politicised. This makes it important to study the implications of the new post-Lisbon system of delegated powers, and to ask what impact the above changes will have on the nature of non-legislative rule making. In the following, we briefly review the key elements of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and its subsequent implementation, before then examining in more detail the kind of proceduralisation with respect to the two instruments—delegated acts and implementing acts—that are now being used in the EU to delegate imple- menting powers to the European Commission. A final section will compare the degree of formalisation that has been developed in either case and addresses its significance in terms of the wider practice of non-legislative rule making in the EU. II Background: The Lisbon Treaty Reform of Delegated Powers A Articles 290 and 291 TFEU The Lisbon Treaty establishes a new legal basis for the comitology procedures and makes the distinction between delegated and implementing acts. Article 290 of the TFEU provides for the possibility to delegate the power to adopt non-legislative delegated acts that are of ‘general application’, and ‘supplement or amend non- essential’ elements of the basic legal act to the European Commission.1 The article also provides for post hoc control to be exercised by the EP and the Council, either through the right to revoke the delegation or the right to object to the adoption of a specific delegated act within a time limit set by the basic legal act. Article 291 TFEU, on the other hand, confers the right to implement legislation to the Member States.2 1 European Union, Consolidated Treaties (Publications Office of the European Union, 2010), at 172. 2 ibid at 174. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 43 European Law Journal Volume 19 However, where there are uniform conditions for implementation, it shall in principle be conferred to the Commission—except for duly justified specific cases and matters of common foreign and security policy and defence for which the Council is respon- sible. In all other cases, however, neither the Council nor the EP has the right to substantially control the Commission’s exercise of these implementing powers, which is the prerogative of the Member States. This is an important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, as under the previous regime the Council still had a decision-making role in case certain thresholds were not met in the committee that exercised control on the proposed act.3 Article 291 TFEU also requires that regulations are adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure in order to lay down the rules and general principles with mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of the implementing powers, whereas Article 290 TFEU stands on itself and requires no formal implementing measures. It is the first time the EP is co-legislator on such a regulation, as in the past the mechanisms for control were adopted through Council decisions. The distinction between delegated and implementing acts may be clear at first reading, but a potential source of confusion is that—as opposed to Article 290 TFEU on delegated acts—Article 291 TFEU does not define what an implementing act is but rather refers to its trigger, namely ‘uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts’.4 However, if there are ‘uniform conditions’ of general applica- tion to supplement or amend a legislative act, the correct instrument would be a delegated act. The focus to make the distinction, therefore, lies in the verbs ‘amend’, ie making formal changes to a text (deleting, replacing or adding non-essential ele- ments), and ‘supplement’, ie adding new non-essential rules or norms, as opposed to ‘implement’, where no new rules or norms are established and the act is supposed to give effect to the rules that have been laid down in the basic legislative act.5 In other words, the main difference is whether there is simply a need to adopt acts to give effect to the rules set by the legislator or whether it is necessary that the Commission has the power to change (amend) or add (supplement) some of the rules of the legislation that are of a non-essential nature. In its guidelines to its services, the European Commission6 concludes that a handy way of making the distinction lies in asking the question ‘what’ Member States should do, which constitutes a delegated act, as opposed to ‘how’ Member States are to act to carry out the obligations set by a legislative act, which would constitute an implementing act. It is important to 3 In the management procedure, which was mainly used for the implementation of agricultural measures and financial support programmes, the Commission could adopt the implementing measure only if there was no qualified majority against the proposal. In case this threshold was met, the matter was to be referred to the Council, who had the opportunity of adopting a different decision. Under the regulatory procedure, instead, measures could only be adopted by the Commission if a qualified majority of Member States was in favour. Otherwise, the act had to be forwarded to the Council, who could ultimately adopt the act. This procedure, used for all implementing measures having a ‘legislative impact’, especially in the field of health and safety of persons, foresaw also the possibility for the EP to exercise its right of scrutiny in case of lack of positive opinion within the Committee. 4 See also J. Bast, ‘New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law’, (2012) 49(3) Common Market Law Review 885–927.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 16.12.2019 COM(2019)
    EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 16.12.2019 COM(2019) 638 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE WORKING OF COMMITTEES DURING 2018 {SWD(2019) 441 final} EN EN REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE WORKING OF COMMITTEES DURING 2018 In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers1 (the ‘Comitology Regulation’), the Commission hereby presents the annual report on the working of committees for 2018. This report gives an overview of developments in the comitology system in 2018 and a summary of the committees’ activities. It is accompanied by a staff working document containing detailed statistics on the work of the individual committees. 1. OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMITOLOGY SYSTEM IN 2018 1.1. General development As described in the 2013 annnual report2, all comitology procedures provided for in the ‘old’ Comitology Decision3, with the exception of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, were automatically adapted to the new comitology procedures provided for in the Comitology Regulation. In 2018, the comitology committees were therefore operating under the procedures set out in the Comitology Regulation, i.e. advisory (Article 4) and examination (Article 5), as well as under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny set out in Article 5a of the Comitology Decision. The Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 20164 recalls, in its point 27, the need to align the regulatory procedure with scrutiny: ‘The three institutions acknowledge the need for the alignment of all existing legislation to the legal framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the need to give high priority to the prompt alignment of all basic acts which still refer to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.
    [Show full text]
  • Preparation of Eurogroup and Informal Council of Economics and Finance
    0(02 Brussels, 5 September 2002 3UHSDUDWLRQ RI (XURJURXS DQG ,QIRUPDO &RXQFLO RI (FRQRPLFVDQG)LQDQFH0LQLVWHUV Copenhagen 6-7 September 2002 (Gerassimos Thomas & Jonathan Todd) The EU’s Economics and Finance Ministers will start with a meeting on Friday 6 September at 15.00 hrs. A press conference by the Presidency and the Commission is scheduled at 17.00 hrs. Eurogroup Finance Ministers are due to meet at 17.30 hrs on the same date. A press conference by the Eurogroup President and the Commissioner is scheduled at 19.30 hrs. The informal Ecofin meeting will resume on Saturday with the participation of central bank governors for the whole day. A press conference by the Ecofin President, the responsible Commissioners and the ECB is scheduled for 18.00 hrs. (XURJURXS *7 The Eurogroup will start with an exchange of views on the economic situation and policy stance. This discussion will also serve as an input to the preparation of the upcoming G7 meeting. Commissioner Solbes will inform Ministers about the launch of the excessive deficit procedure for Portugal. The launch of the procedure is automatic according to the Treaty following the release of a 4.1% of GDP deficit figure for 2001. The Commission will propose to Ministers a timetable for the various steps envisaged by the Treaty. Ministers are also expected to discuss the possible budgetary effects of the disastrous floods in August. ,QIRUPDO&RXQFLORI(FRQRPLFVDQG)LQDQFH0LQLVWHUV 6DYLQJVWD[DWLRQ -7 Following a debriefing by Danish Finance Minister Thor Pedersen, the current President of the Council of Finance Ministers, on his meeting with the Swiss President and Minister for Finance Kaspar Villiger on 30 August 2002, Taxation Commissioner Frits Bolkestein will report to Ministers on the progress to date of negotiations with third countries on the taxation of savings and particularly the results of the latest discussions with Switzerland.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutions, Policies and Enlargement of the European Union
    This booklet is published in all the ofiicial EU languages of the European Union: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, ltalian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. European Commission Directorate-General for Education and Culture Publications Unit, rue de la LoiAffetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussels A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000 lsBN 92-828-8282-9 O European Communities, 2000 Reproduction is authonsed provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Belgium Pnrrurro oN wHtrE cHLoRtNE-FREE pApER Foreword This publication is an update of the previous edition of 'Glossary: The reform of the European Union in 150 definitions' that was produced in 1997. As indicated by its original title, this glossary was produced in order to help people to gain a better understanding of the challenges facing the European Union at the time of the Intergovemmental Conference that opened in 1996. It was subsequently expanded to cover the fundamentals ofEuropean integration, the operation of the institutions, the policies of the Community and the contributions of the Amsterdam Treaty. The inclusion of the essential aspects of the enlargement process and of Agenda2}O} and, in the future, the results of the Intergovemmental Conference of 2000, confirms the glossary's vocation of follow- ing European current affairs and explaining them to the public. An update of the definitions contained in this publication is available on the SCADPIus site, which can be accessed on the Europa server at the following address : http ://europa.eu.infl scadplus/.
    [Show full text]
  • Governance by Committee: the Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy
    Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Research Paper 00/GHA Return to Introduction STATE OF THE ART REPORT CONTRACT NUMBER: HPSE-CT-1999-00019 PROJECT NUMBER: SERD-1999-00128 TITLE: GOVERNANCE BY COMMITTEE, THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION MAASTRICHT, MAY 2000 Table of Contents 1. General Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4 Subproject 1: The Standing Committees in the European Parliament 2.1..................Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6 2.2..................The Evolution of the European Parliament: From Consultative ............................... 6 Assembly to Co-legislator 2.2.1...............The EP as a Legislative Actor after Maastricht......................................................... 7 2.2.2...............EP and Council on an Even Footing after Amsterdam.............................................. 8 2.2.2.1. ..........The Streamlining of the Co-decision Procedure........................................................ 9 2.3..................The Role of EP Committees in the Legislative Process ............................................ 10 2.3.1...............Membership in EP Committees.................................................................................12 2.3.2...............Powers and Competences of EP Committees...........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 11. Agreement on Comitology
    29.11.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 339/269 Thursday 17 February 2000 21. Takes the view that implementation of the stabilisation and association agreement should be accompanied by a White Paper to serve as a precise guide for the country in its efforts to approximate to the acquis communautaire and to assess progress in implementation not merely after a period of five years in a Commission report, but continuously on a biennial basis; 22. Takes the view that implementation of the programmes should be decentralised and shifted from Brussels to Skopje, with due attention being paid to enhanced coordination between programming, man- agement, implementation and follow-up, with as short-term priorities improving the civil service, customs and frontier management and promoting small and medium-sized enterprises; 23. Is of the opinion that in order to enhance and strengthen coexistence a specific programme should be directed to the development of interethnic initiatives and projects both in civil society and the eco- nomic field; 24. Repeats its call for the Commission representation in Skopje to be upgraded to delegation status; 25. Hopes that the dialogue now being conducted between Greece and the FYROM within the UN will result as soon as possible in a name which is acceptable to both sides; 26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council. 11. Agreement on comitology A5-0021/2000 European Parliament resolution on the agreement between the European Parliament and the Com- mission
    [Show full text]
  • The Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System
    The Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System II: The legacy of ‘laboratories’ and the cost for fundamental rights and the rule of law Joanna Parkin April 2011 Abstract This paper seeks to understand the reasons behind the considerable complications facing the project to develop a new, second generation version of the Schengen Information System (SIS II). Despite the centrality of this large-scale EU database for immigration and border control purposes and the increasing prioritisation of security technologies within the EU’s internal security strategy, the project has encountered substantial delays, an escalating budget, political crises and criticisms of the new system’s potential impact on fundamental rights. To uncover the underlying causes of these difficulties and deficiencies, the paper examines the decision-making processes that have shaped the development of SIS II over the last decade. It argues that there are strong parallels between the policy processes surrounding SIS II and decision-making under the old Schengen regime, where expert driven, security oriented and fragmented decision-making took place outside the EU framework and beyond the reach of democratic and judicial oversight. The paper contends that decision-making on SIS II undermines principles of proportionality, accountability and fundamental rights and, by extension, puts into question the political legitimacy of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations intended to inform the future development of large-scale EU IT systems. Research for this paper was conducted in the context of INEX, a three-year project on converging and conflicting ethical values in the internal/external security continuum in Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter Three Months on from 23 June, We Are Seeing Incredible and Enduring Improvisation
    COMMISSION WITHDRAWS DRAFT ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS: OMBUDSMAN DEMANDS MORE MEASURE ON ROAMING STATE OF PLAY TRILOGUE TRANSPARENCY Brexit: the genie is out of the bottle Newsletter Three months on from 23 June, we are seeing incredible and enduring improvisation. We are barely starting to realise the huge complexity presented by the three phases of GUIDING YOU THROUGH THE LABYRINTH Brexit. WITH THE LATEST NEWS The first phase, involving the triggering of Article 50, poses www.comitology.eu #30, September 2016 countless questions: does the UK Parliament need to vote? Would this vote be binding or advisory? Could there be a general election? How and when will the assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland give their opinion? And what about the DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET negotiating framework, which the UK Public backlash forces Commission into climbdown on must propose since it is the departing Member State? roaming implementing act Once triggered, Article 50 will give When it comes to roaming, the EU cannot the new four-week consultation tool, with rise to a tapestry of preliminary be accused of phoning it in. Last November the aim of afterwards tabling it for a vote in talks: the European Council (Heads the Institutions reached a landmark deal the competent comitology committee. of State or Government) will have that will see the abolition, from 15 June to set down ‘guidelines’, on which 2017, of all tariffs for EU residents making But straight away, the proposal provoked basis the Commission will draw up or receiving mobile calls while in another a flood of condemnation from civil society ‘recommendations’, while it is up Member State.
    [Show full text]
  • The Governance of the European Statistical
    The Governance of the European Statistical Eurostat A1 Ms Åsa Jacob System (ESS) Mr Aaron Cachia Mr Dietmar Maass January 2018 Content of the presentation • Introduction to the European Statistical System (ESS) • Main governance bodies in the ESS • European Statistical System Committee (ESSC) • Partnership Group (PG) • DGINS Conference • European Statistical Advisory Committee (ESAC) • European Statistical Governance Advisory Board (ESGAB) • ESS Website • Question Time 2 The European Statistical System • Partnership between Eurostat and the national statistical authorities • Defined in European Statistics Regulation 223/2009 Member states collect and Eurostat processes the received data process the national data and disseminates European official statistics 3 Regulation 223/09 on European statistics • ESS is legally recognised and defined for the first time • Introduces the statistical principles (Art 2): • professional independence • impartiality • objectivity • reliability • statistical confidentiality • cost effectiveness • Establishes the ESS Committee (Art 7) • Introduces concept of collaborative networks (Art 15) • Introduces European approach to statistics (Art 16) 4 The European Statistical System governance bodies 5 Statistical governance structure Political level Commission Council Europ. Parliament Strategic advice ESSC DGINS ESF STC Strategic level PG ESF Bureau Management Directors Groups VIG level VIN Working level Working groups Task forces ESCBFolie 6 The European Statistical System Committee (ESSC) • At the heart of the
    [Show full text]
  • The Secret Life of Comitology Or the Role of Public Officials in EC Environmental Policy*
    The Secret Life of Comitology or the Role of Public Officials in EC Environmental Policy* Christoph Demmke Senior Lecturer, EIPA 1. Introduction towards “denationalisation” and “deparliamentarisation” In his book “Politics of Globalisation”, Ulrich Beck1 will further increase as decisions are taken more and asks what would happen if the European Union were to more at international and global level. As a result the apply for membership of the European Union. In Beck’s role of the executives will be heightened and a new form view, the EU’s application would be rejected owing to of international elite will be created with the its lack of democratic structures. responsibility for decision-making. But what about the Member States themselves? Historically, the “Act”, “Loi” or “Gesetz” has first This rather naïve question is much more difficult to of all symbolised its source, namely the will of the answer because – although the Member States of the people, and then its effect, namely its supremacy over European Union are certainly democratic states – they the monarch’s ordering powers.4 Today, international are being deprived more and more of their capacities to organisations have become the monarch and the people act as sovereign democratic states. have – through their parliaments – lost their supremacy The Member States have had to face up to this when deciding on an “Act”, “Loi” or “Gesetz”. In this reality for years. The environmental sector serves as just respect, one might say that the national parliamentarians one example: up to 90% of all environmental legal acts are increasingly turning into executive policy-makers within the national legal systems are of EU origin and who have to obey international obligations.
    [Show full text]
  • Governing a New Broad Instrument for EU External Action: the Ins and Outs of the Institutional Power Struggle
    Making policies work BRIEFING NOTE No. 107 Governing a new broad instrument for EU external action: the ins and outs of the institutional power struggle MFF By Alexei Jones, Emmanuel De Groof and Joanna Kahiluoto December 2018 Summary In this briefing note, we set the scene for the institutional battle over the governance of the proposeds 89.2 billion Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). We identify a number of thorny issues to look out for in the upcoming negotiations between the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission. These three institutions have their own interests, which they will seek to advance to maintain – and even enhance their influence over the instrument. Yet, in doing so they must not lose sight of the bigger picture and the acknowledged need for a more strategic, coherent and responsive EU external action. A number of trade-offs will be needed to find the right balance between a more interest-driven and flexible instrument on one hand, and enhanced transparency and accountability on the other. This will mean: • clarifying the role of the European Parliament in shaping policies, • creating mechanisms for the strategic steering of the instrument and an appropriate forum to involve the member states, • giving a stronger role to the European External Action Service in the overall coordination of the instrument, and • specifying the criteria and guarantees for tapping into the flexibility cushion. Moving forward, a number of considerations should be kept in mind for the future governance setup of the NDICI: • avoiding creating additional processes, but building on and improving what is already in place, • fostering smoother communication between external affairs and foreign policy actors that the NDICI aims to bring together, • promoting informal mechanisms too, beyond the purely legal/procedural regulations.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Council Has Become the New Centre of Political Gravity in EU Decision-Making by Blog Admin
    blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/30/the-european-council-uwe-puetter/ The European Council has become the new centre of political gravity in EU decision-making by Blog Admin This month saw another in a long line of European Council summits aimed at reforming the institutional framework of the eurozone. Uwe Puetter looks at the rise of deliberative intergovernmentalism in the European Union through European Council summits, and finds that while agreement is required at the highest level to make this system work, the process is remarkably stable. The European Council recently met in Brussels to discuss the recurrent issue of ref orming the institutional f ramework of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) including the tricky question of coordinating domestic budgetary policies more ef f ectively. Banking union was also discussed. As usual the meeting triggered a great deal of media attention and Europe’s top policy-makers were quite talkative ahead of the summit. Herr (French President Francois) Hollande expressed impatience with the decision-making on euro area ref orm and the question of EU-level bank bailout schemes, and Madame (German Chancellor Angela) Merkel replied that this meeting was about discussing these issues f urther – not about making a f inal decision. She stressed that this was on the agenda only f or the next meeting. Yet, the Franco-German couple as well as all the other “heads” knew in any case that there soon will be another opportunity to sort these things out: the next European Council meeting. What I f ound more interesting in this regard was another statement by Hollande published in Le Monde on 17 October, the day bef ore the European Council.
    [Show full text]
  • CPS 2006/60/10/EN – Revision Page 10 TABLE DOCUMENT 60TH MEETING of the STATISTICAL PROGRAMME COMMITTEE LUXEMBOURG 16 NOVEMBE
    CPS 2006/60/10/EN – revision page 10 TABLE DOCUMENT 60TH MEETING OF THE STATISTICAL PROGRAMME COMMITTEE LUXEMBOURG 16 NOVEMBER 2006 Item 10 of the agenda New comitology rules - "Comitology for Non-Jurists " "COMITOLOGY FOR NON-JURISTS" The purpose of this document is to provide all useful and practical information, simply worded, which could provide guidance in the field of comitology . The basic rules for this document can be found in the following legislation 1: Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission 2 – (hereinafter referred to as the " Comitology Decision" ) and the related declarations; Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission 3 (hereinafter referred to as the " new Comitology Decision" ) and the related declarations; the agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission concerning the detailed rules for implementing Decision 1999/468/EC4; the standard rules of procedure adopted by the Commission on 31 January 2001 5 which serve as a reference for the rules of procedure adopted by the Committees of Eurostat 6. 1. WHAT DOES THE WORD "COMITOLOGY" REFER TO? According to the Treaty establishing the European Community, it is in principle the responsibility of the Commission to enforce legislation at Community level. The legal acts adopted by the Council, either alone or jointly with the European Parliament under the co-decision procedure, may contain provisions conferring the power to implement the act in question on the Commission and defining the procedures for doing so.
    [Show full text]