Web Security How Email Works

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Web Security How Email Works Email Security Web Security How Email works Some terminology: I MUA (Mail User Agent) - programs used for retrieving, reading and managing e-mail. I MSA (Mail Sending Agent) - programs that receive emails from MUA's who then forward them to MTA's. - will check an email's format and quickly report errors to the author (e.g., an empty To field etc.) I MTA (Mail Transfer Agent) - programs responsible for transmitting email messages from sender to recipient. I MDA (Mail Delivery Agent) - programs responsible for delivering email from an MTA to a local recipient's mailbox. Web Security SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol): a simple text-based application-layer protocol used for sending e-mail. Courtesy of Wikipedia Web Security POP (Post Office Protocol) I designed to support clients with dial-up connections I client connects to their MDA, downloads any new messages, deletes those messages from the server, disconnects IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) I allows clients to connect to mail server and maintain persistent connection I clients can search for messages, etc. Web Security Lack of confidentiality I subject to packet sniffing I SOLN: encryption No built in authentication I the "FROM" portion of the email can be spoofed; it can appear that the email came from someone you trust I SOLN: use digital signatures Email Security Issues Suggestions? Web Security Email Security Issues Suggestions? Lack of confidentiality I subject to packet sniffing I SOLN: encryption No built in authentication I the "FROM" portion of the email can be spoofed; it can appear that the email came from someone you trust I SOLN: use digital signatures Web Security Encryption at the Transport Layer - Use SSL/TLS protocols between each client-server pairs - e.g., between MUA and local MTA, sender and recipient MTA's, recipient MTA and MDA, MDA and recipient. Web Security Alternative: Encrypt the actual contents of the email. Using SSL/TLS: I prevents inflight eavesdropping I but requires a level of trust in the mail servers handling the messages; e.g., the contents of the emails can still be read at your ISP's mail servers. Web Security Using SSL/TLS: I prevents inflight eavesdropping I but requires a level of trust in the mail servers handling the messages; e.g., the contents of the emails can still be read at your ISP's mail servers. Alternative: Encrypt the actual contents of the email. Web Security PGP: Pretty Good Privacy I first written by Phil Zimmerman in 1991. I he has been a long time anti-nuclear activist; he developed PGP so that he and similarly-minded folks might be able to communicate with each other and store files securely. Web Security Courtesy of Wikipedia Web Security Since PGP is using public key cryptography, it must have a way of verifying that the validity of the public keys. This is done using what's called a web of trust. Zimmerman's description from the manual of PGP 2.0: As time goes on, you will accumulate keys from other people that you may want to designate as trusted introducers. Everyone else will each choose their own trusted introducers. And everyone will gradually accumulate and distribute with their key a collection of certifying signatures from other people, with the expectation that anyone receiving it will trust at least one or two of the signatures. This will cause the emergence of a decentralized fault-tolerant web of confidence for all public keys. Web Security From Stinson's Cryptography: Theory and Practice, 3rd Edition Each PGP certificate contains an email address (ID), a public key (PK), and one or more signatures on this (ID, PK) pair. For example: I data = (ID= [email protected], PK=123456) I signatures = (sigAlice (data), sigBob(data), sigCarlos (data)) By signing Alice's data, Bob and Carlos are telling others that they believe that 123456 is indeed Alice's public key. Web Security Alice keeps a collection of PGP certificates which she gradually accumulated over time. She keeps them in a data structure called a keyring. Each certificate in the key ring has two fields: I OTF: Owner trust field - indicates how much Alice trusts the owner - values: implicitly trusted, completely trusted, partially trusted or untrusted I KLF: Key legitimacy field - indicates how much Alice trusts the PK - values: valid, marginally valid or invalid. Web Security 1. The KLF for user U's certificate is set to valid if - the data of U is signed by at least one user whose OTF-value is "trusted" or - by at least two users whose OTF-values are "partially trusted" 2. It is set to marginally valid if the data of U is signed by a user whose OTF-value is "partially trusted" 3. Otherwise, it is set to invalid. Alice sets the OTF in her own certificate as implicitly trusted. If she sets Bob's certificates OTF as completely trusted, she is saying: 1. Bob's PK is valid and 2. She trusts that Bob won't sign invalid (ID, PK) pairs. Once all the OTF values have been set, PGP computes the KLF values of the certificates as follows: Web Security Alice sets the OTF in her own certificate as implicitly trusted. If she sets Bob's certificates OTF as completely trusted, she is saying: 1. Bob's PK is valid and 2. She trusts that Bob won't sign invalid (ID, PK) pairs. Once all the OTF values have been set, PGP computes the KLF values of the certificates as follows: 1. The KLF for user U's certificate is set to valid if - the data of U is signed by at least one user whose OTF-value is "trusted" or - by at least two users whose OTF-values are "partially trusted" 2. It is set to marginally valid if the data of U is signed by a user whose OTF-value is "partially trusted" 3. Otherwise, it is set to invalid. Web Security Suppose Alice's key ring contains the following certificates. Whose PK's does Alice consider as valid, marginally valid, invalid? Web Security I More recent PGP (OpenPGP) specifications support the use of trust signatures which are issued by certificate authorities. I They also support the use of certificate revocation lists as well as certificate expiration dates. I To strengthen the web of trust, key signing parties have been organized. Courtesy of Wikipedia Web Security I To strengthen the web of trust, key signing parties have been organized. Courtesy of Wikipedia I More recent PGP (OpenPGP) specifications support the use of trust signatures which are issued by certificate authorities. I They also support the use of certificate revocation lists as well as certificate expiration dates. Web Security Authentication Two main approaches: I authenticating the sender - to be effective, mail users must have their own private-public keys (hard!) - hence, seldom used in practice I authenticating the sending MTA - identifies the author's organization (e.g., ISP, university, etc.) but not the individual author - used more in practice When authenticated email is in transit, it is important that it is never modified because otherwise the signature verification process will fail. A formatting process called canonicalization tries to reduce the risk of modification. Web Security Authenticating the sender: For this to work: I The MUA's of the sender and recipient must (1) support the cryptographic operations associated with signing and verifying, and (2) agree on the cryptosystem to be used. I There must be a mechanism for the recipient to obtain the sender's public key. Web Security Example: An S/MIME message consists of a header and a body. The body contains the message { text, attachments, etc. and a signature over the body of the message. Web Security Authenticating the sending MTA: A first approach is DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM). It associates a domain name to an email message by means of a digital signature. I The effect here is that the domain is claiming responsibility for the message. I The recipient can obtain the signer's PK using DNS, which can then be used to verify the message. Web Security Structure of a DKIM Message: The DKIM signature covers not only the body of the message but also selected headers. In particular, the FROM field must be signed. Because the PK of the domain is obtained from DNS, DKIM is also vulnerable to attacks on the DNS infrastructure. Web Security I DKIM is now used by the webmail services of Yahoo, AOL and Gmail. Any mail from these organizations carry a DKIM signature. I Additionally, Gmail rejects all messages claiming to be from eBay and PayPal unless they have a valid DKIM signature verifying their origin. I Nonetheless, as Google learned, if the keys used for creating the digital signatures are \short", DKIM signatures can be spoofed! Web Security Web Security "He" = Zach Harris, a 35-year old mathematician based in Jupiter,FL. Web Security Zach Harris created an email that was sent "from" Sergey Brin to Larry Page and vice versa: Web Security I Weaknesses: vulnerable to IP source spoofing attacks and DNS cache poisoning attacks; doesn't protect the integrity of the message; doesn't support mail forwarding I Advantages over DKIM: faster to process and simpler to implement since it doesn't use cryptography. Another approach for authenticating sender MTA is the Sender Policy Framework (SPF). I SPF does not use cryptography. I Instead, it makes use of the fact that in the MAIL FROM SMTP command, the IP address of the sender's MTA is listed. I Using DNS, the receiving MTA checks that this IP address is in the list of authorized IP addresses for the sender's domain.
Recommended publications
  • Can We Trust Cryptographic Software? Cryptographic Flaws in GNU Privacy Guard V1.2.3
    Can We Trust Cryptographic Software? Cryptographic Flaws in GNU Privacy Guard v1.2.3 Phong Q. Nguyen CNRS/Ecole´ normale sup´erieure D´epartement d’informatique 45 rue d’Ulm, 75230 Paris Cedex 05, France. [email protected] http://www.di.ens.fr/˜pnguyen Abstract. More and more software use cryptography. But how can one know if what is implemented is good cryptography? For proprietary soft- ware, one cannot say much unless one proceeds to reverse-engineering, and history tends to show that bad cryptography is much more frequent than good cryptography there. Open source software thus sounds like a good solution, but the fact that a source code can be read does not imply that it is actually read, especially by cryptography experts. In this paper, we illustrate this point by examining the case of a basic In- ternet application of cryptography: secure email. We analyze parts of thesourcecodeofthelatestversionofGNUPrivacyGuard(GnuPGor GPG), a free open source alternative to the famous PGP software, com- pliant with the OpenPGP standard, and included in most GNU/Linux distributions such as Debian, MandrakeSoft, Red Hat and SuSE. We ob- serve several cryptographic flaws in GPG v1.2.3. The most serious flaw has been present in GPG for almost four years: we show that as soon as one (GPG-generated) ElGamal signature of an arbitrary message is released, one can recover the signer’s private key in less than a second on a PC. As a consequence, ElGamal signatures and the so-called ElGamal sign+encrypt keys have recently been removed from GPG.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Analysis and Trust Models in Wireless Networks Lela Mirtskhulava
    Security Analysis and Trust Models in Wireless Networks Lela Mirtskhulava [email protected] Department of Computer Sciences Faculty of Exact and Natural Sciences Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University University str., 13, Georgia In the given work, we analyse the serious weaknesses recently discovered in WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 2) in October 2017 and KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack) attack on WPA2 announced by Computer Science Scientists. The KRACKs were introduced to abuse design flaws in cryptographic protocols to reinstall an already-in-use key. Several types of cryptographic Wi-Fi handshakes are affected by the attack. There are different forms of trust to address different types of network security problems and reduce risk in certain conditions. This paper explores the trust models applied by various cryptographic schemes: a) the web of trust employed by Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) where users using their own set of trusted public keys, b) Kerberos, a secret key distribution scheme using a trusted third party, c) certificates, which allow a set of trusted third parties to authenticate each other and, by implication, each other's users. Each of the above mentioned trust models differs in complexity, scope, scalability and general applicability. Which model of trust to apply in certain circumstances and types of wireless networks are discussed in the given paper. It describes the major security issues and their techniques of building trust model by monitoring network behavior. It is intended to use secure and faster cryptographic solution for Wi-Fi networks security by using an open source public-key NTRU cryptosystem that uses lattice-based cryptography.
    [Show full text]
  • SIGMA: the 'Sign-And-Mac' Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE Protocols
    SIGMA: the `SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and its Use in the IKE Protocols ∗ Hugo Krawczyky June 12, 2003 Abstract We present the SIGMA family of key-exchange protocols and the \SIGn-and-MAc" approach to authenticated Diffie-Hellman underlying its design. The SIGMA protocols provide perfect forward secrecy via a Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with digital signatures, and are specifically designed to ensure sound cryptographic key exchange while supporting a variety of features and trade-offs required in practical scenarios (such as optional identity protection and reduced number of protocol rounds). As a consequence, the SIGMA protocols are very well suited for use in actual applications and for standardized key exchange. In particular, SIGMA serves as the cryptographic basis for the signature-based modes of the standardized Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol (versions 1 and 2). This paper describes the design rationale behind the SIGMA approach and protocols, and points out to many subtleties surrounding the design of secure key-exchange protocols in general, and identity-protecting protocols in particular. We motivate the design of SIGMA by comparing it to other protocols, most notable the STS protocol and its variants. In particular, it is shown how SIGMA solves some of the security shortcomings found in previous protocols. ∗A shortened version of this paper appears in the proceedings of CRYPTO'03. For further information related to the SIGMA protocols see http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/sigma.html yEE Department, Technion, Haifa, Israel, and IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. Email: [email protected] 1 Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Preliminaries: On the Security of Key-Exchange Protocols 4 2.1 Overview of the security model and requirements .
    [Show full text]
  • Security & Privacy for Mobile Phones
    Security & Privacy FOR Mobile Phones Carybé, Lucas Helfstein July 4, 2017 Instituto DE Matemática E Estatística - USP What IS security? • That GRANTS THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE THE ASSURANCES above; • That ENSURES THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THIS SYSTEM KNOWS EACH other; • That TRIES TO KEEP THE ABOVE PROMISES forever. Security IS ... A System! • That ASSURES YOU THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF AN INFORMATION AS WELL AS ITS authors; 1 • That ENSURES THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THIS SYSTEM KNOWS EACH other; • That TRIES TO KEEP THE ABOVE PROMISES forever. Security IS ... A System! • That ASSURES YOU THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF AN INFORMATION AS WELL AS ITS authors; • That GRANTS THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE THE ASSURANCES above; 1 • That TRIES TO KEEP THE ABOVE PROMISES forever. Security IS ... A System! • That ASSURES YOU THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF AN INFORMATION AS WELL AS ITS authors; • That GRANTS THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE THE ASSURANCES above; • That ENSURES THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THIS SYSTEM KNOWS EACH other; 1 Security IS ... A System! • That ASSURES YOU THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF AN INFORMATION AS WELL AS ITS authors; • That GRANTS THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE THE ASSURANCES above; • That ENSURES THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THIS SYSTEM KNOWS EACH other; • That TRIES TO KEEP THE ABOVE PROMISES forever. 1 Security IS ... A System! Eve | | | Alice "Hi" <---------------> "Hi" Bob 2 Security IS ... Cryptography! Eve | | | Alice "Hi" <----"*****"------> "Hi" Bob 3 Security IS ... Impossible! The ONLY TRULY SECURE SYSTEM IS ONE THAT IS POWERED off, CAST IN A BLOCK OF CONCRETE AND SEALED IN A lead-lined ROOM WITH ARMED GUARDS - AND EVEN THEN I HAVE MY doubts.
    [Show full text]
  • Loki: Location-Based PKI for Social Networks
    LoKI: Location-based PKI for Social Networks Randy Baden University of Maryland [email protected] http://www.cs.umd.edu/~randofu/loki Categories and Subject Descriptors decentralized OSNs. The out-of-band exchange of keys, how- C.2.0 [Computer Communications Networks]: General—Data ever, has proven too onerous for typical users [7]. We therefore communications; C.2.1 [Computer Communications Networks]: choose to design techniques that users are able to more readily Network Architecture and Design—Wireless communication; C.2.4 employ based on how users interact with each other in modern [Computer Communications Networks]: Distributed Systems— settings. Client/server, Distributed applications; C.5.3 [Computer Sys- Our main contribution is a system, LoKI, in which we use the tem Implementation]: Microcomputers—Portable devices (e.g., ubiquity of mobile devices to provide users with a new method laptops, personal digital assistants); E.3 [Data Encryption]: for verifying identities that does not require immediate user in- [Public key cryptosystems] teraction. Concretely, we propose collecting shared secrets from nearby mobile devices over the course of typical mobile activ- ity, then using these shared secrets post-hoc to perform identity General Terms verification based on user recollection of when real-world meet- Security, Design, Performance ings occurred. We estimate the frequency of real-world meet- ings among social network users with a data set of interactions recorded by Foursquare, Facebook, and Twitter. We evaluate Keywords the technical constraints of collecting and storing shared secrets Public Key Infrastructure, Online Social Networks, Location, in terms of storage space and power consumption based on the Mobility frequency of mobile device encounters.
    [Show full text]
  • Analysis of Key Management in Matrix
    Bachelor thesis Computing Science Radboud University Analysis of key management in Matrix Author: First supervisor/assessor: Floris Hendriks Prof. J.J.C. Daemen s4749294 [email protected] Second supervisor: Dr. B.J.M. Mennink [email protected] Second assessor: Dr. C.E. Dobraunig [email protected] January 17, 2020 Abstract This thesis presents an analysis of Matrix’s key management. Matrix is an end-to-end encrypted and decentralised application layer proto- col, developed by The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. The protocol is used, among other applications, to end-to-end encrypt messages in a decen- tralised chat system. To date, Matrix is not equipped with a clear and well-described overview on how keys enable end-to-end encryption in a decentralised network. This thesis therefore describes how keys in Ma- trix are established, used, stored, exchanged and verified. Moreover, the analysis also explores the limitations of Matrix’s key management and potential improvements. Contents 1 Introduction3 1.1 Research questions........................5 1.2 Structure..............................6 2 Preliminaries7 2.1 Data formats used in Matrix...................7 2.2 Security principles........................8 2.2.1 Forward secrecy......................8 2.2.2 Backward secrecy.....................8 2.2.3 Deniability.........................8 2.2.4 Confidentiality.......................8 2.2.5 Integrity..........................9 2.2.6 Authentication.......................9 2.3 Cryptographic primitives used in Matrix............9 2.3.1 Cryptographic hash functions..............9 2.3.2 HMAC............................9 2.3.3 HKDF............................ 10 2.3.4 Cryptographic ratchets.................. 10 2.3.5 Curve25519........................ 11 2.3.6 EdDSA and Ed25519..................
    [Show full text]
  • The GNU Privacy Handbook the GNU Privacy Handbook Copyright © 1999 by the Free Software Foundation
    The GNU Privacy Handbook The GNU Privacy Handbook Copyright © 1999 by The Free Software Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front- Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License". Please direct questions, bug reports, or suggestions concerning this manual to the maintainer, Mike Ashley (<jash- [email protected]>). When referring to the manual please specify which version of the manual you have by using this version string: $Name: v1_1 $. Contributors to this manual include Matthew Copeland, Joergen Grahn, and David A. Wheeler. J Horacio MG has translated the manual to Spanish. Table of Contents 1. Getting Started................................................................................................................................................ 6 Generating a new keypair............................................................................................................................ 6 Generating a revocation certificate .................................................................................................... 8 Exchanging keys ......................................................................................................................................... 8 Exporting a public key......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptography and Evidence
    UCAM-CL-TR-780 Technical Report ISSN 1476-2986 Number 780 Computer Laboratory Cryptography and evidence Michael Roe May 2010 15 JJ Thomson Avenue Cambridge CB3 0FD United Kingdom phone +44 1223 763500 http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ c 2010 Michael Roe This technical report is based on a dissertation submitted April 1997 by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of Cambridge, Clare College. Technical reports published by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory are freely available via the Internet: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/ ISSN 1476-2986 Summary The invention of public-key cryptography led to the notion that cryptographically protected mes- sages could be used as evidence to convince an impartial adjudicator that a disputed event had in fact occurred. Information stored in a computer is easily modified, and so records can be falsified or retrospectively modified. Cryptographic protection prevents modification, and it is hoped that this will make cryptographically protected data acceptable as evidence. This usage of cryptogra- phy to render an event undeniable has become known as non-repudiation. This dissertation is an enquiry into the fundamental limitations of this application of cryptography, and the disadvan- tages of the techniques which are currently in use. In the course of this investigation I consider the converse problem, of ensuring that an instance of communication between computer systems leaves behind no unequivocal evidence of its having taken place. Features of communications protocols that were seen as defects from the standpoint of non-repudiation can be seen as benefits from the standpoint of this converse problem, which I call “plausible deniability”.
    [Show full text]
  • User Manual V.1.3 (“NTRU Release”) 1 What Is Goldbug?
    Secure Instant Messenger User Manual v.1.3 (“NTRU Release”) http://goldbug.sf.net 1 What is GoldBug? GoldBug is a secure Instant Messenger. You can be sure with using GoldBug (GB), that no third party can look into your chat communication. Private user-to-user communication remains private. GoldBug therefore uses strong multi-encryption with different layers of modern encryption technologies of well known and revised crypto libraries (like libgcrypt (GnuPG) and OpenSSL). For example it generates more than 8 public / private encryption keys based on RSA or NTRU or ElGamal. The app offers as well decentral and encrypted Email and decentral public E*IRC-Chat. As in every Messenger, you can share and transfer files. With tools like Rosetta Cryptopad and/or the File-Encryption tool you can convert text and files into ciphertext. 2 Why encryption matters: Today mostly every WIFI is protected with a password. In a few years as well every plaintext message or email to friends over the internet will be encrypted too. It is not a question to have something to hide or not, • it is a question to control by yourself the security of your communications - or having it controled by others. • It‘ s a question of free thinking and • taking away the presumption of innocence.*) • Democracy requires the thinking and debate of alternatives in private and public. "The question is not 'do you have something to hide?' Strong-Multi-Encryption ensures the The question is whether we control declaration of human rights in broad constitutional consensi and is a digital or they controls us." - Oliver Stone self-defense, everyone needs to learn http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0U37hl0n9mY and utilize.
    [Show full text]
  • Improving PGP Web of Trust Through the Expansion of Trusted
    2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology Improving PGP Web of Trust through the Expansion of Trusted Neighborhood Guibing Guo, Jie Zhang, and Julita Vassileva∗ School of Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore ∗Department of Computer Science, University of Saskatchewan, Canada {[email protected]} Abstract—PGP Web of Trust where users can sign digital In this paper, we first modify PGP Web of Trust to accept signatures on public key certificates of other users has been negative feedbacks in signatures from users indicating that successfully applied in securing emails and files transmitted over a certificate is believed to be inauthentic. Accordingly, the the Internet. However, its rigorous restrictions on utilizable trust relationships and acceptable signatures limit its performance. In way of verifying the authenticity of a certificate based on this paper, we first make some modification and extension to provided feedbacks is also modified. We then extend PGP PGP Web of Trust by relaxing those constraints. In addition, we Web of Trust by also considering indirect trust relationships propose a novel method to further expand trusted neighborhood of users. Indirect trust is computed using the concept of trust of users by merging the signatures of the trusted neighbors and propagation [2]. In this way, the pool of other users trusted by finding the similar users based on the merged signature set. Confirmed by the experiments carried out in different simulated a user (called trusted neighborhood) may get expanded. real-life scenarios, our method applied to both the modified and More importantly, we propose a novel method to further extended PGP methods can improve their performance.
    [Show full text]
  • Multi-Device Secure Instant Messaging
    SoK: Multi-Device Secure Instant Messaging Antonio Dimeo, Felix Gohla, Daniel Goßen, Niko Lockenvitz {antonio.dimeo, felix.gohla, daniel.gossen, niko.lockenvitz}@student.hpi.de Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam April 17, 2021 Abstract The secure multi-device instant messaging ecosystem is diverse, varied, and under- represented in academia. We create a systematization of knowledge which focuses on the challenges of multi-device messaging in a secure context and give an overview of the current situation in the multi-device setting. For that, we analyze messenger documentation, white papers, and research that deals with multi-device messaging. This includes a detailed description of different patterns for data transfer between devices as well as device management, i.e. how clients are cryptographically linked or unlinked to or from an account and how the initial setup can be implemented. We then evaluate different instant messengers with regard to relevant criteria, e.g. whether they achieve specific security, usability, and privacy goals. In the end, we outline interesting areas for future research. Contents 1 Introduction3 1.1 Group Messaging vs. Multi-Device Messaging............... 4 1.2 Methodology.................................. 4 2 Multi-Device Messaging7 2.1 Context...................................... 7 2.2 Transferring Data Between Different Devices of One User........ 7 2.2.1 Storing Data on a Server........................ 8 2.2.2 Using Messages to Exchange Data.................. 9 2.3 Transferring Data to a Different User..................... 11 2.3.1 Without End-to-end Encryption................... 11 2.3.2 End-to-end Encryption With Shared Group Key.......... 13 2.3.3 End-to-end Encryption Per Recipient...............
    [Show full text]
  • Internet Security (SS 2011)
    Internet Security (SS 2011) 01 Basic concepts and definitions – Dichotomy (splitting the topic „security“ into two subsets) ● Host • node, physical or virtual machine • is (or can be) well-controlled by well-developed authentication and authorization models • strong notion of „privileged“ state • usually penetrated via a buggy application • focus of Jean-Pierre Seifert's lectures ● Network • anyone can connect • connectivity can only be controlled in very small, well-regulated environments, maybe not even then • different OS have different or no notions of user Ids and privileges • focus of Anja Feldmann's lectures – Principle: Trust nothing. A host should trust nothing that comes over the wire. – Network security tools ● Cryptography ● Network-based access control (e.g. firewalls) ● Monitoring ● Protocol analysis by formal verification ● paranoid design – Protocol design ● heavy use of crypto and authentication ● ensure that sensitive fields are protected ● bilateral authentication ● proper authorization ● defend against • eavesdropping • modification • deletion • replay • and combinations thereof – Definition of Computer Security: ● deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorized actions by users or others of a system. ● Main components: • Confidentiality: prevent unauthorized disclosure of information, origin: historical link of security to secrecy (few organizations dealing with classified data) • Integrity: prevent unauthorized modification of information • Availability: prevent unauthorized withholding of information
    [Show full text]