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UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatantsat US NavalBaseGuantanamoBay, Cuba TO AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOF EVIDENCEFOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARDINTHECASEOF AL HARBI, SALIMSULIMAN 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary . 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: ( 1) release you to your home state ; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state ; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. 3. Thefollowingprimaryfactors favor continueddetention: a . Commitment 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan in 1990/1991 for the Jihad . 2. The detainee decided that he wanted to go to Afghanistan inorder to make a profit from the drug trade. 3. The detainee stated that he left Mecca to get away from debts he owed from his failing business. The detainee sold his automobile to finance his trip to Afghanistan. 4. The detainee left his home to seek an improvedlifeinAfghanistan inearly February 2001. 5. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan where he stayed ten days. The detainee then traveled to Quetta for ten days. Afterwards , the detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed for ten days before traveling to Kabul and eventually to Khowst, Afghanistan where he stayed a drug dealer for four months. 6. While livinginKhowst, the detaineewas approachedina localmarketby a memberof the TablighiJamaatwho traveledwiththe detaineeandothermembersofthe TablighiJamaat aroundKhowstto spreadthe wordofIslam . 7. The detainee was recruited by a man who was employed as a school teacher outside of the Tablighi Jamaat. DMOExhibit1 Page 1of4 UNCLASSIFIED 000113 ISN057 UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARD INTHE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIMSULIMAN 8. The Jama'atAlTablighiis a Pakistanbased Islamicmissionaryorganizationused as a cover to masktraveland activitiesofterrorists, includingmembersofalQaida. 9. The detainee acknowledged the possibility ofthe Tablighi Jamaat assisting the families of Taliban soldiers . 10. ThedetaineeacknowledgedthattheTablighiJamaatmayhavebeeninterestedin recruitingsomeonesimilarto himto exploithis skillsinvolvingfraud, theft, drugtrafficking, and travel. 11. The detainee had access to the drug trade inAfghanistan, which was known to be supported by the Taliban as a major source of income. 12. The detainee was inKhowst, Afghanistan when the coalition bombing campaign began. 13. The detaineetraveledfromKhowstto Miram - Shah, Pakistanwith two Afghanimen fromthe TablighiJamaat. 14. The detainee was questioned about conflicting statements regarding his injuries he sustained in Afghanistan. a . The detainee was injuredina motorcycleaccident, so he headedto Pakistanto seek medicalattention. After walking for six to seven hours towards the Afghanistan Pakistan border, the detainee was interceptedby Pakistaniauthorities. b. The detaineeclaims hewas on a busthatwas hitduringa UnitedStates air raid and receiveda headwound which left himunconsciousfor two days. An Afghan escortedhim to the bordercrossingat Miramshahwherehewas apprehendedby Pakistaniauthorities. b . Connections/ Associations 1. After the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan , he was introduced to Darwish al Said , who instructed the detainee to fly to Karachi, Pakistan where he was met by a man he stayed with for ten days. 2. Darwish al Sayid is also known as Abu Hashim . 3. AbuHashimal-SayyidDarwish's appears on a list ofalQaidamartyrsthat was discoveredon a computerharddriveseizedduring the capture ofa senioral Qaidaoperative. Page2 of4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN 4. Manyal Qaidaoperativeshadjoined the religiousorganizationJama'at al-Tablighi/ JT in orderto travelinthe guiseofIslamicmissionaries. The JT is also knownas TablighiJamaat. 5. The detainee advised that there were approximately ten Afghani men who were part of the Tablighi Jamaat that he was associated with inKhowst, Afghanistan. 6. The detainee's alias was in the pocket litter of a Mujahedin traveling from Bosnia to Croatia in 1996. OtherRelevantData 1. A foreigngovernmentservice statedthe detaineewasjailed inMakkahaftersome financialproblemswith Interpolin 1998-1999. 2. The detainee spent two years inprison for stealing and possessionof a controlled substance. The detaineewas inprison inRiyadh, Saudi Arabia for about one month andwas then transferred to a prison inUnitedArab Emirates. He was imprisonedapproximately seventeen months for defraudinga satellite cellular phonecompanyofcellular phones, which he soldon the open market. 4. The detainee'sreason fortraveling to Afghanistanafter he was released from jail, was to get away from everything and stay high. Drugs such as opium and hashish are very cheap in Afghanistan 5. The detaineestatedthat hetraveledto Afghanistanfor drugsand notfor the Tablighi Jamaat. The detaineestatedthat he hadcompileda significantdebt afterleavingprisonin the UnitedArabsEmirates. 6. The Tablighi Jamaat has been known to pay off the debts of members willing to travel for the group 7. The detainee stated he lost his passport inKhowst. 8. The detaineedid nothavehispassportinhis possessionwhe hewas takeninto custody. The detaineeindicatedthat hispassporthadbeen stolenduring his time inAfghanistan. 9. A foreigngovernmentservice identifiedthe detainee as a priority target. 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer : Page3 of4 UNCLASSIFIED 000115 UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD INTHE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN a . The detainee insists that he has never been to the United States. b . The detainee regrets his decision to travel to Afghanistanbecause ofall the trouble it has caused him c. The detainee denied ever participating inany armed conflict while he was inAfghanistan. d . When the detainee heard that the Americans were coming to Afghanistan, he decided to leave. He wanted nothing to do with the fighting and had no weapon while he was living in Afghanistan e . The detainee denied having fired a gun of any type during his life. f . The detaineedenied knowledgeof any trainingcamps locatednearKhowst. g . The detaineedid notknowanyonefighting for the Taliban, al Qaidaor the Northern Alliance. h. The detaineestatedthat eventhoughhe stayedwithmembersofthe TablighiJamaat whilehewas inKhowst, Afghanistan, hewas not a memberofthe groupand spentthe majority ofhistimeobtaining, usingand sellingdrugs. i . The detaineestatedthat hewas notapproachedby any membersofthe TablighiJamaatto join forces withthe Taliban, al Qaida or any otherIslamicFundamentalistmovements. j . The detainee denied havingknowledgeofthe attacks in the UnitedStates prior to their execution on September 11th . k . Ifreturnedto SaudiArabia, the detainee wouldbuilda houseand open a restaurant. The detainee wouldnot leave SaudiArabia ever again and would not take up arms against his government. 5. Youwillbeafforded a meaningfulopportunityto be heard andto presentinformationto the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically presentat the proceeding. The Assisting MilitaryOfficer (AMO) will assist you inreviewingall relevantandreasonablyavailable unclassifiedinformationregardingyour ca e. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continueddetention, nor may the AMO form a confidentialrelationshipwithyouor represent youinany other matter. Page4 of4 UNCLASSIFIED 000116.
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