House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Second Report of Session 2005–06
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 15 February 2006
HC 522 Published on 8 March 2006 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00
Foreign Affairs Committee
The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the administration, expenditure and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.
Current membership Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South), Chairman Mr Fabian Hamilton (Labour, Leeds North East) Rt Hon Mr David Heathcoat-Amory (Conservative, Wells) Mr John Horam (Conservative, Orpington) Mr Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central) Mr Paul Keetch (Liberal Democrat, Hereford) Andrew Mackinlay (Labour, Thurrock) Mr John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Mr Greg Pope (Labour, Hyndburn) Mr Ken Purchase (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Ms Gisela Stuart (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston) Richard Younger-Ross (Liberal Democrat, Teignbridge)
The following member was also a member of the committee during the parliament.
Rt Hon Mr Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell)
Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm.
Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Sarah Ioannou (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay, (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Catherine Jackson (Secretary) and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk).
Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 1
Contents
Report Page
Conclusions and recommendations 3
1 Introduction 9 Background to the inquiry 9 Form of the annual Departmental Report and related papers 9 Assessing performance 11 A year of two presidencies 12
2 Transparency and openness 13 Relations with Parliament 13 Freedom of Information (FoI) 15 Classified PSA scorecards 16
3 Efficiency and effectiveness 17 The Collinson Grant Report 17 Management 20 Leadership 21 Project management 22 Financial management 22 Performance review 23 Staff 25 The need for professional skills 25 Efficiency measures directly affecting staff 28 Prism 29 Other IT projects 33 ‘Rationalising’ the home estate 33 Reinvesting efficiency savings 34 Conclusion: the FCO’s response to Collinson Grant 34
4 Consular Services 38 Emergency response 40 The Indian Ocean tsunami 40 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 42 Paying the bills 43 Conclusion 43
5 Diplomatic representation overseas 46 ‘Alternative representation’ 46 The overseas estate 49
6 FCO personnel issues 54 Security of FCO personnel 54 Disciplinary procedures 54 Publication of memoirs 55
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Senior diplomatic appointments 57 Diversity 58
7 BBC Monitoring 60
Formal minutes 64
List of witnesses 73
List of written evidence 74
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Conclusions and recommendations
Form of the Annual Departmental Report and related papers 1. We conclude that the presentation of the FCO’s performance against its Public Service Agreement targets in the Autumn Performance Report is an improvement over the presentation of similar information in the annual Departmental Report. (Paragraph 5)
2. We conclude that the delay of over two months in signing off and publishing the FCO’s Resource Accounts for 2004–05 was excessive and that it had the unacceptable consequence of depriving Parliament and the public of an important tool for exercising scrutiny. We recommend that the FCO explain in its response to this Report what caused this delay and why it missed even the revised target for signing off its accounts. (Paragraph 6)
Assessing performance 3. We conclude that performance targets defined in terms of inputs and outputs may often be more appropriate for the FCO than targets based on outcomes, particularly where a target is based on outcomes which it is beyond the capacity of the FCO to deliver. We recommend that the FCO discuss with the Treasury the potential for redefining some of its targets and performance indicators accordingly. (Paragraph 12)
4. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO publish a summary of the results of the NAO’s review of the data systems underlying its PSA targets, together with its commentary on how it proposes to implement any conclusions reached by the review. (Paragraph 13)
A year of two presidencies 5. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide a full breakdown of the costs of the G8 and EU presidencies, how they were met, and whether the diversion of resources to service the presidencies led to any adverse consequences for its other work. (Paragraph 15)
Transparency and openness 6. We conclude that the failure of the FCO to share with Parliament the reports prepared for its Board by Collinson Grant Ltd and by Norman Ling is evidence of a disturbing aversion on the part of FCO management to proper scrutiny of its activities. Accountability of the executive to Parliament is a fundamental feature of the United Kingdom’s constitution. We therefore welcome recent undertakings by the FCO to be more open with this Committee in future; we will evaluate this new policy in the light of experience. (Paragraph 23)
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7. We congratulate the Foreign Office on being one of the better departments at dealing with freedom of information requests in a timely manner, but we are concerned that the FCO is also one of the departments most likely to withhold information from enquirers. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO publish a statistical analysis of its handling of FoI requests, showing the grounds on which requests were not met or were only partially met. (Paragraph 26)
8. We accept that where there are good reasons for PSA scorecards to be classified according to the usual criteria, they should not be published, but we recommend that the classification of such scorecards be reviewed regularly, with a view to timely publication where possible. In cases where classification of scorecards remains essential, we recommend that consideration be given to publishing a declassified summary. (Paragraph 29)
Efficiency and effectiveness 9. We are disappointed and concerned that the FCO apparently takes the view that, because a study costing hundreds of thousands of pounds and with potentially huge implications for the FCO’s management of its resources was intended for internal consumption only, there was no need to ensure that it was error-free. (Paragraph 35)
10. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO list the additional frontline activities which are being funded by efficiency savings and asset sales, giving the amount of funding in respect of each such activity. (Paragraph 36)
11. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide further details of the restructuring of its Human Resources Directorate, including full information on the reduction in its size and of any consequences for performance of the HR function in the FCO. (Paragraph 40)
12. We welcome the FCO’s commitment to changing aspects of its culture and to giving leadership and management skills their appropriate place in the organisation. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out how it intends to advance this agenda. (Paragraph 42)
13. We conclude that the FCO failed seriously in its duty to the Committee in not informing the Committee about what the National Audit Office has described as “the largest identified loss by fraud in the Department’s history” and about other frauds. We are extremely concerned that the Tel Aviv fraud continued undetected for at least four years as a result of weaknesses in financial control and involved clear breaches of long standing accounting procedures. We recommend that the FCO in its response to this Report set out the other significant frauds which have taken place in the last five years, and the specific steps it has taken to prevent any recurrence. (Paragraph 48)
14. We welcome the FCO’s new focus on reform of its finance function. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO provide a detailed explanation of the nature of these and related reforms and of the timescale for implementing them. We further recommend that in future the FCO inform this Committee promptly of any incident involving major fraud or financial mismanagement. (Paragraph 50)
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15. We recommend that the FCO keep this Committee informed of the progress of the ‘capability to deliver’ review being carried out by the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit and, in due course, of its results. (Paragraph 52)
Staff 16. We conclude that the FCO needs to catch up with the rest of Whitehall, by recruiting professionally qualified, experienced people to the top roles in finance, human resources and estate management. We recommend that it do so without delay. (Paragraph 57)
17. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO list the senior management jobs which will be cut or downgraded during the SR04 period, and that it state the net increase or reduction in staff numbers that it expects to result from this exercise. (Paragraph 60)
18. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide full information on the work of its PROSPER group. (Paragraph 61)
Prism 19. We conclude that the Ling report has exposed a woeful lack of professional skills and a disturbing series of failings in senior FCO management. We welcome acceptance of the conclusions of the report and we recommend that the FCO Board remain fully seized of the need to implement them. We further recommend that the FCO keep this Committee fully informed of the state of play on progress with putting each of the Ling report’s recommendations into practice; that it provide us with updates on the continuing implementation of Prism; and that it supply us with copies of Gateway reviews of further large, high-risk programmes. (Paragraph 69)
20. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out how it proposes to achieve its targets for prompt payment of invoices. (Paragraph 72)
Other IT projects 21. We recommend that in its response to this report the FCO provide full information on how refusal and fraud rates for on-line visa applications compare with those for conventional applications. (Paragraph 73)
Reinvesting efficiency savings 22. We support the FCO’s efforts to reclassify more of its expenditure on front-line services as programme rather than administrative expenditure and we recommend that it present a strong case to the Treasury for making this change. (Paragraph 79)
The FCO’s response to Collinson Grant 23. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO identify all those observations, conclusions and recommendations in the Collinson Grant report that
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it does not accept, in each case with a full explanation. We also recommend that the FCO state in that reponse what stage it has reached in implementing each recommendation in the report that it does accept. We further recommend that the FCO publish in its response the list of activities classified as red, amber or green, which is referred to in the report. (Paragraph 84)
24. We congratulate FCO managers on their decision to invite external consultants to carry out a study of their efficiency, effectiveness and control of costs, although we have concerns about the lack of thoroughness with which the review was carried out and about the lack of seriousness with which the FCO regarded and appears still to regard the project. We conclude that, having commissioned the study, the FCO must deal with it seriously: this suggests that the FCO should change some of its management practices and its efficiency savings targets or it should defend and justify them, explaining where and how the consultants are mistaken in their conclusions. So far, we have seen no evidence that it is succeeding in doing either. (Paragraph 85)
Consular services 25. We conclude that the FCO’s failure in 2004–05 to achieve four out of the six Public Service Agreements for its consular services is disappointing, although we recognise that the targets are demanding and that activities carried out at Posts overseas will always be subject to pressures or to events which may be more extreme than those which apply in the United Kingdom. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO set out in detail the goals, work programme and achievements to date of its new Nationality and Passports Best Practice Unit. We further recommend that the FCO identify those Posts which have registered failures in respect of consular services PSAs in financial years 2004–05 and 2005–06 and that it supply this Committee with full details of the Board’s proposal on the future of issuing passports overseas. (Paragraph 92)
26. We conclude that it would be wrong in principle for the FCO to be required to fund its response to unpredictable disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami. We recommend that the FCO take a strong line in its discussions with the Treasury and that Ministers accept the need for additional funding to be made available in such circumstances. We further recommend that consideration be given to increasing the resources available through the Emergency Disaster Reserve. (Paragraph 102)
27. We conclude that in recent years excessive and unrealistic expectations have arisen of what the FCO is able to do for people who get into difficulties abroad, including in circumstances such as natural disasters. We recommend that Ministers take a firm line in explaining to the public, not only through their official publications but also through the media, that there are practical limits to the consular support that British citizens who choose to travel abroad are entitled to receive, not least because of the FCO’s duty to make efficient and effective use of public funds. We nonetheless recommend that in the case of a further natural disaster on the scale of the Indian Ocean tsunami, exceptional assistance should be provided, tailored to the circumstances. (Paragraph 107)
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28. We conclude that in most respects the FCO’s response to the immense challenge posed by the Indian Ocean tsunami was timely and successful. We conclude that the same can be said of the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It is important, however, that the FCO learns from the experience of responding to these major incidents and, in particular, from the mistakes which were undoubtedly made. We therefore welcome the FCO’s very informative and helpful progress report on how it is implementing the lessons learned from its handling of these disasters and we recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide an updated version of that table. (Paragraph 109)
Diplomatic representation overseas 29. We conclude that although co-location of a British sovereign Post with or within the post of another country is in general undesirable, it is almost always likely to be preferable to outright closure. We recommend that the FCO consider very carefully the case for co-location when adjusting its international priorities or when looking to achieve financial savings from its overseas operations. (Paragraph 118)
30. We conclude that the forthcoming referendum on Montenegro is likely to add to the case for the FCO to upgrade its Post in Podgorica to one headed by its own British Ambassador and appropriately staffed, and we recommend that this be done without further delay. (Paragraph 119)
31. We recommend that the FCO make the opening of an Embassy in Bishkek a priority. (Paragraph 120)
32. We conclude that there is no clear basis for the FCO’s projected receipts of £10 million from estate sales over the next three financial years. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO explain how it arrived at this projection, whether it regards the figure as a target, and if so how it expects to achieve it without “further large sales or other deals”, particularly involving properties of special architectural or historical importance. (Paragraph 128)
33. We conclude that the provision of information on the FCO’s management of its overseas estate has improved in recent years. We welcome the quarterly reports which the Committee now receives from FCO, and we will continue to scrutinise these and the policies which underlie them closely. (Paragraph 130)
FCO personnel issues 34. We continue to be concerned for the welfare of staff who serve their country in the more dangerous parts of the world. We recommend that the FCO maintain its commitment to ensuring that adequate safety and security measures are put in place, with an appropriate level of funding. This funding should be in addition to the FCO’s agreed public expenditure allocation, in recognition of the exceptional nature of the cost of protecting personnel and property from terrorist attacks. (Paragraph 132)
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35. We strongly support the decision by Sir Michael Jay to write to Ambassadors and High Commissioners, reminding them of the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers. We conclude that the breaking of trust or breaching of confidence on either side is against the best interests of officials and politicians alike and that it can be inimical to the conduct of effective foreign policy. However, we also conclude that where FCO officials comply with the Radcliffe rules and criteria, they should remain free to publish if they so choose. (Paragraph 141)
36. We recommend that the FCO provide the Committee with full details of any representations made by the Holy See, by the outgoing British Ambassador to the Holy See, or by the British Ambassador to Italy, about the propriety or acceptability of locating the Embassy to the Holy See or the residence of the Ambassador to the Holy See within the campus of the British Embassy to the Republic of Italy. (Paragraph 145)
37. We conclude that the FCO Board is absolutely right to recognise the need to address urgently such gender and ethnic minority imbalances as remain. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide further information on what it is doing to remedy this situation. (Paragraph 150)
BBC Monitoring 38. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO explain how the reduction in its funding of BBC Monitoring has contributed to its efficiency savings targets; and whether the Treasury has accepted this. (Paragraph 158)
39. We conclude that it is reassuring that BBC Monitoring has finally been given the financial stability it has been seeking and we believe that this should enable it to plan more strategically up to 2011. We also conclude that the quid pro quo for this certainty should be a continuing drive by BBC Monitoring to maximise its efficiency. We recommend that the FCO and the other sponsoring departments maintain their close interest in the operations of BBCM, to ensure that BBCM continues to offer excellent value for money. (Paragraph 159)
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1 Introduction
Background to the inquiry 1. The annual Departmental Report of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for the period 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005 was published in June 2005.1 Scrutiny of the FCO’s expenditure and administration is an important part of the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC). When, following the general election of 5 May, the Committee was appointed on 11 July, one of our first priorities was therefore to look at the FCO’s Departmental Report. We heard oral evidence on 26 October 2005 from the Permanent Under-Secretary and FCO officials and followed up numerous points in writing. The oral and written evidence is published with this Report.
2. We also heard oral evidence from the British Council, from the BBC World Service and, in February 2006, from Lord Carter of Coles, who at the invitation of the FCO and the Treasury carried out an inquiry into public diplomacy. It had been our intention to publish that evidence and our observations on it with this Report. However, due to the late publication of Lord Carter’s report, we were obliged to decide whether to delay our own Report, or to produce two Reports. We have chosen to publish a separate Report on Public Diplomacy in the coming weeks.
Form of the annual Departmental Report and related papers 3. Overall, we welcome the format of the FCO Departmental Report 2004–05 as being largely in line with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s previous recommendations and generally fit for purpose. We note, however, that over the past six years, the report has doubled in size, from 119 pages in 1998–99, to 240 in 2004–05. Less than one quarter of this increase can be attributed to changes sought by the FAC: the inclusion of cost-benefit analyses and ‘lessons learned’ sections, which in total account for 27 pages of the latest report. The bulk of it appears to be due to a tendency for the narrative parts of the report to expand year by year, and to the consequent need to break up this dense prose with yet more photographs. Unfortunately, this can detract from the report’s main function, which is to inform Parliament and the public about the FCO’s performance against its objectives and to account for its stewardship of public funds.2 We are not unhappy with the quality of the report, which is well-written and which rewards the inquisitive reader. We do, however, believe that clearer presentation of information could make the report more fit for purpose.
4. The annual Departmental Report is not the only document produced by the FCO to convey important information about its use of public resources. Chief among the others are the Autumn Performance Report (discussed above), the Resource Accounts, the Efficiency Technical Note, and memoranda on main Estimates and on supplementary Estimates. We note that in its first Autumn Performance Report, reviewing progress
1 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005 2 The Departmental Report does not contain a statement of its purpose.
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towards Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, the FCO—in common with other Whitehall Departments—has adopted a ‘traffic light’ presentation of its performance: green for “fully on course;” amber for “generally on course;” and red for “not on course.”3 This gives a commendably clear and immediate indication of progress, which is backed up by more detailed explanations of exactly what is being achieved or, in some cases, what is not being achieved, and why. In some ways, the Autumn Performance Report is a more user- friendly document than is the Departmental Report. In just 64 pages, it communicates all the key information.
5. We conclude that the presentation of the FCO’s performance against its Public Service Agreement targets in the Autumn Performance Report is an improvement over the presentation of similar information in the annual Departmental Report.
6. Publication of the Resource Accounts for 2004–05 was considerably delayed by problems with the new management information system, Prism. We discuss these problems in greater detail below.4 The FCO told us that “issues relating to the implementation of the [Prism] system led to a slippage in the timetable we set ourselves”.5 The timetable originally set by the FCO was to sign the Accounts off at the end of September. We were informed of the slippage in early October and the timetable was adjusted by one month, which meant that signing-off was then expected in late October. However, further ‘slippage’ occurred. Eventually, the Accounts were signed off on 30 November, laid before the House on 19 December and printed copies were available only in mid-January.6 Unfortunately, this was too late for us to scrutinise them closely, without delaying our own exercise further. We conclude that the delay of over two months in signing off and publishing the FCO’s Resource Accounts for 2004–05 was excessive and that it had the unacceptable consequence of depriving Parliament and the public of an important tool for exercising scrutiny. We recommend that the FCO explain in its response to this Report what caused this delay and why it missed even the revised target for signing off its accounts.
7. The FCO’s latest Efficiency Technical Note was published at the end of November 2005.7 The Note sets out how the FCO envisages making the 2.5 per cent efficiency savings in its core (i.e. excluding British Council and BBC World Service) expenditure agreed as part of the 2004 Spending Review. It describes 21 separate efficiency projects, including in respect of each a summary of the scale of savings expected, how they will be achieved and how they will be monitored. This is a useful document, and it should be increasingly useful for anyone seeking to track the FCO’s efficiency savings over time.
8. Estimates memoranda are supplied to, and published by, this Committee. In these memoranda, the FCO explains to Parliament why it is seeking authority to spend or appropriate sums of public money. Historically—and the FCO is not alone in this— government departments’ Estimates memoranda have been uninformative and difficult to
3 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005 4 See paras 62–72. 5 Ev 8 6 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Resource Accounts 2004–05, HC 776, December 2005, available at www.fco.gov.uk 7 See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Technical Note, available at www.fco.gov.uk
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understand. The FCO’s memoranda have been less clear and helpful than those of some other departments. The Committee has previously corresponded with the FCO, seeking improvements in these memoranda.8 We are pleased to note that there have been some improvements in recent Estimates memoranda, although we think they could be made more helpful still.9
9. Each year, the Foreign Affairs Committee looks closely at the Departmental Report produced by the FCO and also at these other reporting documents. On this occasion, we have also been able to use the report of an efficiency and effectiveness study commissioned by the FCO from Collinson Grant Limited, a firm of management consultants, and an internal FCO report on lessons learned from the Prism management information project (the ‘Ling report’). We consider both documents in section 3 of this Report, Efficiency and effectiveness.
Assessing performance 10. As we have already noted, the FCO is responsible for reporting to Parliament its performance against its Public Service Agreement targets. However, the FCO faces considerable challenges in doing this. Most of its work is difficult to assess using quantifiable targets. Although most of its public service work—performing functions such as the issuing of visas and passports—can be assessed in that way, the successes or failures of the United Kingdom’s diplomacy cannot be measured by numbers. Many of the FCO’s PSA targets can only be ascertained by making, as the FCO itself admits “subjective, qualitative assessments of progress.”10 Moreover, in the majority of its targets the FCO is far from being the only—or even the main—actor exerting influence. In many cases, there are so many pressures and influences being brought to bear on a target that it is difficult if not impossible to have any certainty over whether achievements or failures can be attributed to action or inaction by the FCO itself or to other actors and other factors. For example, the following indicator applies to PSA target 3 (“An international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts”).
Nepal: By end 2007–08: A stable Nepal with a durable ceasefire in place with the Maoists, democratic institutions restored with respect for human rights and significant progress towards a constitutional settlement11
The ‘data source’ for this indicator is described in the following terms:
Largely diplomatic reporting. However, it is also supported by a conflict analysis, which has been independently verified by an academic with a long-standing interest in Nepal. Some of the information is corroborated by (or even drawn directly from) NGOs and human rights groups, such as ICG, ICRC, OHCHR etc.12
8 Written evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Miscellaneous matters, HC (2004–05) 489, Ev 14, 15, 22, 23 9 Ev 82, 86 10 Ev 12 11 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005, p 16 12 Ibid
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11. As anyone who has followed events in Nepal would expect, this indicator is currently set at ‘red’—not on course. The APR states that “The King’s efforts to consolidate his grip on power have reduced the prospects for peace. However, the Maoists have announced a cease-fire […]”.13 We do not suppose that either of these developments can be attributed to the efforts of the United Kingdom’s diplomats. This calls into question the utility of the indicator—if not of the target itself, in relation to which two indicators stand at red, eight at amber and only two at green. In our view, it really is not within the gift of the FCO to secure achievement of this target; the best the FCO can do is to work with others towards it. The same applies to many other targets.
12. The unsatisfactory nature of this tick-box approach to PSA targets is, moreover, exacerbated by an increasing tendency for the targets to be measured by outcome rather than by input or output. We question whether such targets always provide an appropriate mechanism for measuring the FCO’s performance. We conclude that performance targets defined in terms of inputs and outputs may often be more appropriate for the FCO than targets based on outcomes, particularly where a target is based on outcomes which it is beyond the capacity of the FCO to deliver. We recommend that the FCO discuss with the Treasury the potential for redefining some of its targets and performance indicators accordingly.
13. The FCO told us last October that a review by the National Audit Office of the data systems underlying its PSA targets was still under way.14 We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO publish a summary of the results of the NAO’s review of the data systems underlying its PSA targets, together with its commentary on how it proposes to implement any conclusions reached by the review.
A year of two presidencies 14. The Foreign Affairs Committee in the 2001–05 Parliament looked at all the FCO’s Departmental Reports during that period, and reported on each of them. In its Report on the 2003–04 report, the Committee looked ahead to the forthcoming United Kingdom presidencies of the G8 group of nations and of the European Union. The Committee was concerned lest the expense of administering these presidencies should lead to cuts elsewhere in the FCO’s budget.15 The Government responded to the Committee that “Through a combination of prudent financial management and additional resources provided by HM Treasury, we are confident we can do this without cutting other work on our strategic priorities.”16
15. The two presidencies ended on 31 December 2005, so now is the time to take stock. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide a full breakdown of the costs of the G8 and EU presidencies, how they were met, and whether the diversion of resources to service the presidencies led to any adverse consequences for its other work.
13 Ibid 14 Ev 12 15 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 34 16 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 2
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2 Transparency and openness
Relations with Parliament 16. In a Report on the work it undertook in 2004, the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament made the following comment on its relationship with the FCO:
Although we appreciate the FCO’s willingness to share some types of classified information with us, we are concerned, first, that information provided to us is too often given an unnecessary classification and, second, that by receiving such information we as a committee of Parliament are drawn inside the web of secrecy, which may inhibit our ability to scrutinise areas of policy from outside. The second of these concerns is for us as a Committee to deal with: we may have to decide not to accept a paper if we feel that it will compromise our independence from the executive. The first concern, however, is one which we have raised with the FCO, as is evident from the published exchanges between Committee and Department concerning the provision of information on asset sales. We hope that the eventually satisfactory outcome of those exchanges will inform the FCO’s wider policy on provision of information to the Committee, and lead it to question both the need for and the utility of security and other classifications on a case by case basis.17
The Committee appointed after the 2005 election looked forward to a time of greater openness by the FCO and of improved access to information.
17. Things did not get off to a good start when shortly after our first meeting in July 2005 news filtered through to Parliament of the content of a consultants’ report on efficiency and effectiveness in the FCO. The fact that Collinson Grant Ltd were carrying out such a study had been referred to in the FCO’s Departmental Report, published the previous month, where it was described as
[…] a process activity analysis of the FCO’s operations and a comparative analysis of the expenditure across the organisation as a whole to help ensure that savings are made through genuine improvements in efficiency rather than through cuts in the budget.18
When this was written, the FCO had already been in possession of Collinson Grant’s report for some months.19 However, it was only when a member of this Committee learned something of the contents of the report that Ministers accepted Parliament had a right to be informed. The report was placed in the House of Commons Library as the House rose for the Summer recess in July.
18. We find it disappointing that the body which Parliament has charged with examining the administration, policy and expenditure of the FCO should not have been supplied with a copy of a report entitled Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and
17 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2004–05, The Work of the Committee in 2004, HC 112, para 54 18 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 198 19 The report is dated 14 January 2005; see also HC Deb, 12 September 2005, col 2402W
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Commonwealth Office. Bearing in mind what our predecessor Committee said in 2004, it seems to us that the FCO’s failure to disclose the existence, let alone the contents of such a key document, was a desire to avoid proper scrutiny by Parliament. Such an attitude is wholly unacceptable.
19. If the failure to share the Collinson Grant report with us had been an isolated incident, it would still have been viewed as a serious lapse. Unfortunately, it was not a one-off. We have just heard of the existence of the Hogarth Report, another report commissioned by the Foreign Secretary into the running of the FCO. We are now seeking access to this. In June 2005, the FCO Board received a further report from a senior manager in the FCO, Norman Ling, who had been commissioned by them to draw lessons from the experience of introducing the new Prism information management system. We discuss the Ling report in the next chapter, but for the purposes of this discussion we note that Mr Ling found that the Prism project had been badly mismanaged by the FCO: there was poor planning; support was inadequate; risks were understated; benefits were exaggerated; professional skills were lacking; the Board itself had been insufficiently engaged; security requirements had handicapped the project.20
20. Commendably, the Board placed a summary of the Ling report on the FCO intranet, where it could be viewed by most FCO staff, many of whom had been expressing strong dissatisfaction with Prism. Reference was then made to the availability of the Ling report in a FCO staff magazine which we routinely receive.21 It was only this chance reference which alerted us to the existence of a document which was obviously going to be highly relevant to our scrutiny function. Again, we find this very unsatisfactory. In November 2003, the Committee had asked the FCO to publish the lessons learned from a previous failed ICT project, Focus.22 The FCO knew very well of our interest in these matters.
21. In response to our initial request, the FCO supplied us with a copy of the Ling report in confidence, although most of it was unclassified. We wrote to the FCO, asking them to publish the unclassified summary of the report.23 This they have now done, and the report summary is available on the FCO website, together with a full list of its unclassified recommendations.24
22. Following these failures, we asked the FCO to tell us what criteria it uses when deciding whether to volunteer a document to the Committee. We were somewhat surprised to be told that there have been no such criteria.25 The FCO asserted that it always seeks to ensure that it takes into account the need to keep this Committee informed of its work. Clearly, either this procedure was not followed in relation to the Collinson Grant and Ling Reports, or it was followed and the wrong conclusion was reached. Prompted by our question, the FCO has now reviewed its approach and will in future expect staff to consider “proactive
20 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Prism Lessons Learned, available at www.fco.gov.uk 21 Connect, September 2005, p 2 22 Foreign Affairs Committee ,Twelfth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign and Commonwealth Annual Report 2003, HC 859, para 45 23 Ev 44, 52 24 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Prism Lessons Learned, available at www.fco.gov.uk 25 Ev 44, 52
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 15
disclosure” of documents prepared for the Board. Sir Michael Jay wrote to us that “The presumption will be that such information should be volunteered, but we would always have to take into account personal and commercial confidences, and any impact on the conduct of international relations.”26 We welcome this new attitude on the part of the FCO and we will certainly wish to evaluate how it is working in practice over the coming months.
23. We conclude that the failure of the FCO to share with Parliament the reports prepared for its Board by Collinson Grant Ltd and by Norman Ling is evidence of a disturbing aversion on the part of FCO management to proper scrutiny of its activities. Accountability of the executive to Parliament is a fundamental feature of the United Kingdom’s constitution. We therefore welcome recent undertakings by the FCO to be more open with this Committee in future; we will evaluate this new policy in the light of experience.
Freedom of Information (FoI) 24. It is, of course, not only to Parliament but also to the public that government departments are accountable. One aspect of this accountability was codified in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Act came into force on 1 January 2005 and this is our first opportunity to comment on the FCO’s response to what Parliament intended to be a new era of openness.
25. We asked the FCO for statistical information on its handling of requests made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. They told us that in the period 1 January to 30 September 2005, the FCO received 1,059 requests under the Act.27 Of the cases where the request was not met in full and the inquirer appealed to the FCO, 58 refusals were upheld, seven were partially overturned and three were overturned. Six cases were referred to the Information Commissioner, none of which was overturned. Statistics maintained and published by the Department for Constitutional Affairs show that among Whitehall departments, the FCO is one of the best performers at providing a timely response, but that it grants a lesser proportion of requests in full than any department except the Scotland Office and the Treasury.28 This could be seen as confirmation of the culture of secrecy in the FCO or it may be simply a reflection of the number of secrets the FCO legitimately holds.
26. We congratulate the Foreign Office on being one of the better departments at dealing with freedom of information requests in a timely manner, but we are concerned that the FCO is also one of the departments most likely to withhold information from enquirers. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO publish a statistical analysis of its handling of FoI requests, showing the grounds on which requests were not met or were only partially met.
26 Ibid 27 Ev 51 28 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Freedom of Information Act 2000, Statistics on Implementation in Central Government, available at www.foi.gov.uk
16 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Classified PSA scorecards 27. As we have previously acknowledged, much of the information held by the FCO is necessarily classified, in accordance with criteria and procedures which apply across government. We were concerned, however, to note how many of the ‘scorecards’ against which the FCO’s performance is assessed are classified. These include performance indicators relating to the Millennium Development Goals and other areas of policy which might be regarded as being of very legitimate public interest, where publication might be made without compromising security. We asked the FCO to comment on this.
28. In his reply, Sir Michael Jay told us that some of the scorecards contain sensitive information, which, if made public, would risk damaging the United Kingdom’s international relations. He also referred to the need to ensure that the United Kingdom’s negotiating positions are not prematurely disclosed, because that “would risk getting a worse deal for the UK in the future.”29 Sir Michael confirmed that it was this latter consideration which had led to the Millennium Development Goals PSA scorecard being classified. He agreed, however, to declassify the scorecard, because the danger to the United Kingdom’s negotiating position had diminished over time. We welcome this step.
29. We accept that where there are good reasons for PSA scorecards to be classified according to the usual criteria, they should not be published, but we recommend that the classification of such scorecards be reviewed regularly, with a view to timely publication where possible. In cases where classification of scorecards remains essential, we recommend that consideration be given to publishing a declassified summary.
29 Ev 51
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 17
3 Efficiency and effectiveness
The Collinson Grant Report 30. In August 2004, the FCO asked Collinson Grant Ltd to conduct phase 2 of a study to examine its efficiency, effectiveness and control of costs. Phase 1 had consisted of a pilot project carried out in June and July 2005. Collinson Grant submitted an initial report of its phase 2 study on 19 November and the full report was produced on 14 January 2005.30 The cost of the phase 2 study was £367,000 plus expenses.31 As we have noted above, the report remained unpublished until July, following pressure from a member of this Committee.
31. The methodology adopted by Collinson Grant is described in detail in their report. In summary, the consultants surveyed 1,882 staff in the United Kingdom, 230 United Kingdom-based staff overseas and 595 locally-engaged staff. The response rate was 89% from staff in the United Kingdom and 93% from those overseas. Crucially, there was a poor response rate from the Finance Directorate and from Estates Services. Senior managers at one of the largest Posts, Paris, failed to co-operate fully. Other senior managers failed to collaborate with Collinson Grant. This in our view should attract the severest censure, particularly when one has regard for the considerable public expenditure involved in the report’s preparation. Nevertheless, Collinson Grant had sufficient confidence in their data to draw some strong conclusions. The executive summary of their report is reproduced in full here:
• We have analysed the work of 2,934 employees, using a consistent framework of Processes, Activities and Tasks, which was thoroughly tested before the survey.
• These data on the application of effort have been supplemented by a thorough review of comparative costs at Posts, by an analysis of the organisational structure, and by the development of an overall model for the FCO’s costs.
• Wherever possible, these investigations have been undertaken in partnership with the staff of the FCO. There have been very many opportunities to observe working practices, to discuss the opportunities for improvement, and to review current initiatives for efficiency savings.
• We have identified potential opportunities for an annual reduction in costs of £66.1 million by the end of 2005, the full benefits of which would be realised in 2006/2007. This would remove 533 positions based in the UK, 427 UK-based positions overseas, and 307 local staff positions.
30 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, see www.fco.gov.uk 31 Ibid, Appendix 1
18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
• It is not realistic to assume that all the potential savings could be realised. Accordingly, we have reassessed each element and proposed a revised ‘Target’ of £48.0m, 73% of the opportunity.
• The savings that we identified could help to secure and enhance the FCO’s existing Efficiency Savings Plan. We have reconciled the degree of overlap and calculated a revised, combined total that should be realised at the end of 2005/2006 of £65.8m, freeing up resources that can, potentially, be redeployed.
• In addition to these numerical targets, we have made a number of observations about how work in the FCO is managed, the underlying cultural tone of consensus, which inhibits change, and the structural constraints on efficiency and effectiveness. Our conclusion is that the organisation is not well suited to managing change.
• We have achieved all the success criteria identified at the outset of our work, but there is far more to do. We have only just begun to develop full options for change and to build consensus on the way forward. The FCO will need to adopt and practise stringent project management disciplines in order to achieve the very challenging targets ahead. Many changes will require imposition from senior managers who have properly delegated authority and the will to achieve a consensus.
32. The Collinson Grant report highlights what it suggests could be many possible savings over and above those already envisaged in the FCO’s efficiency savings plans. However, it also states that the FCO has scaled back its own forecast of efficiency savings from £10.7 million to £6.3 million in 2004–05, and from £55.8 million to £32.7 million in 2005–06.32 These figures do not tally with those presented in the FCO’s Efficiency Technical Note (ETN) of November 2005.33
33. Before the ETN was published, we asked the FCO to explain the figures in the Collinson Grant report. In their response, the FCO told us that,
The Collinson Grant report was not originally intended for external publication. Thus, resources were not devoted to ensuring that it was completely error free, providing those errors were not critical to the conclusions of the report or detrimental to its value as a management tool. The section referred to above is one area where the Collinson Grant report contained inaccuracies.34
They then argued that Collinson Grant had double-counted some proposed savings and had used out-of-date figures in respect of others. The figures according to the FCO are that the forecast savings in 2004–05 were £4.7 million and the outturn £6.6 million; and the
32 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 28 33 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Efficiency Technical Note, see www.fco.gov.uk 34 Ev 45
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 19
forecast for 2005–06 is £38.7 million, which the FCO is confident it will exceed.35 If this is correct, we welcome this reassurance. However, we are somewhat alarmed that it was necessary. We are also mindful of Collinson Grant’s complaints about lack of co-operation by some parts of the FCO and the possibility that they were not supplied with all the data they required.36
34. The admission by the FCO that resources were not devoted to adequately checking the report before it was presented to the Board is remarkable when set against the statement in the Departmental Report that “The Collinson Grant study is an integral part of the FCO reorganisation”37 and Sir Michael Jay’s evidence to us that he takes the report “extremely seriously”.38 It appears to back up the claim made by Collinson Grant that:
Unfortunately, the difficulty in engaging relevant people [in the FCO] to review and challenge the emerging findings has meant that our opportunity [sic] has not been developed or scrutinised by managers within the organisation.39
If the Collinson Grant report contains errors that the FCO failed to check and correct then that is the FCO’s fault. They could and should have challenged these errors with Collinson Grant, as is normal with consultants’ reports, prior to final publication.
35. We are disappointed and concerned that the FCO apparently takes the view that, because a study costing hundreds of thousands of pounds and with potentially huge implications for the FCO’s management of its resources was intended for internal consumption only, there was no need to ensure that it was error-free.
36. The Efficiency Technical Note states that at least £43 million will be released by savings made in the period to 2007–8, to be reinvested in the FCO’s priority programmes, although these programmes are not listed.40 In response to one of our written questions, the FCO confirmed that “efficiency savings and returns from the sale of FCO properties will be used to fund additional frontline activities in pursuit of the FCO’s strategic priorities.”41 Like the Efficiency Technical Note, this response did not provide any information on what these additional frontline activities might be. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO list the additional frontline activities which are being funded by efficiency savings and asset sales, giving the amount of funding in respect of each such activity.
35 Ibid 36 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, pp 4 and 5 37 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p199 38 Q 16 39 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 5 40 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Efficiency Technical Note, see www.fco.gov.uk 41 Ev 7
20 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Management 37. Collinson Grant concluded that the FCO’s managerial structure, with eleven layers between the Permanent Under-Secretary and the lowliest staff, is “too deep and too narrow.”42 Among many criticisms, their report suggests that this contributes to a slowness to act, a lack of delegation, avoidance of responsibility, unnecessary work being carried out, and over-supervision.
In the FCO, senior managers operate as highly promoted desk officers, their efforts duplicating work that should only need to be done once and to a satisfactory standard by subordinates, assuming that clear directions have been given. The lack of proper delegation through the many organisational layers prevents senior managers from freeing time to contribute effectively to the development of policy.43
The report goes on to state that the effect of this is for work to be re-done repeatedly at different levels in the organisation; activity levels may be very high, but effectiveness is diminished.44
38. The consultants suggest that FCO managers “need to learn new skills and to adjust their approach.”45 In particular, they criticise the consensus culture of the FCO and the unwillingness of managers to criticise subordinates. “Multiple layers of managers also stifles the innovative, perceptive research and analysis that challenges established thinking. Brave new ideas rarely survive repeated filtering, but are desperately needed if the FCO is to become more effective.”46
39. The report states that FCO managers lack the necessary tools to do their job effectively and that they have no incentive to reduce costs. It calls on the FCO to reduce the size of its human resources (HR) directorate: at present, there is one member of staff engaged in HR work per 20 employees; Collinson Grant suggest that it should be possible to halve this ratio, to 1:40.47 They also propose a “comprehensive overhaul” of the directorate and “the injection of a number of experienced HR professionals.” Speaking in November 2005, the FCO’s Director of Human Resources, David Warren, told us that Collinson Grant had made a “perfectly fair point” about the size of the directorate and that its size would be reduced “by at least 100 positions over the course of the next six to seven months.”48
40. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide further details of the restructuring of its Human Resources Directorate, including full information on the reduction in its size and of any consequences for performance of the HR function in the FCO.
42 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 7 43 Ibid, p 8 44 Ibid, p 18 45 Ibid, p 9 46 Ibid, p 18 47 Ibid, p 17 48 Q 20
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 21
Leadership 41. Collinson Grant also criticised the leadership of the FCO, which they see as weak and unwilling to make changes which do not have the full support of the organisation. They concluded that:
The leaders of the FCO focus primarily on their diplomatic and political duties, rarely on the efficient management of the organisation. There is a clear vision of Strategic Priorities, but the need for robust management to allow core duties to be conducted effectively is neither accepted nor properly understood. People are frustrated and impeded in the execution of critical tasks by the weaknesses of the organisation, yet are unwilling to tackle the root causes that are entrenched in and reinforced by the established culture. The entire organisation needs to be challenged and reformed, but the leadership lacks the skills needed and the will to upset the status quo.49
This is strong comment, which we invited Sir Michael to respond to. He reaffirmed his personal commitment to making “the kind of reforms and changes, including culture changes, which we now need to do if we are going to adapt to new circumstances.” He then described in detail the steps the FCO has taken:
As for the leadership, what are we doing? We have reformed our corporate management. We now have a board structure which reports clearly to ministers and a quarterly meeting between the board and the Foreign Secretary in order to ensure that we are clear on the strategic priorities that he wants us to implement. We have a series of subcommittees underneath the board which are focusing on human resources, investment decisions, finance decisions and so on, which is a much more coherent structure than there was before. I am working much more closely now with the key ambassadors and high commissioners overseas because they need to be brought into part of the corporate leadership. We now have every three months a meeting between the board and the top most senior 20 ambassadors and high commissioners, plus a representative also of a smaller overseas post, in order that we can get the concept of leadership and change management imbued, not just in the centre of London but more widely. Every year we now also have what we call a leadership conference, a conference of all our top management in London and all our ambassadors and high commissioners overseas, who come once a year again with a view to really focusing on the change and modernisation issue which, as an organisation, we have to embrace. This is a conscious attempt to change the culture and to get people to realise that management and leadership are absolutely key to running a really complicated organisation these days.50
42. We welcome the FCO’s commitment to changing aspects of its culture and to giving leadership and management skills their appropriate place in the organisation. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out how it intends to advance this agenda.
49 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 8 50 Q 30
22 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Project management 43. The consultants were particularly critical of the FCO’s poor performance in project management. They concluded that few FCO managers have sufficient experience or training in the necessary skills and that this, when combined with the poor management structure and practices referred to above, meant that projects rarely meet their objectives within budget or on time: “Projects tend to drift, consuming resources without realising the required benefits. […] A radically different approach to project management will be needed if the potential [for improvements] is to be secured.”51
44. We asked the FCO how it intends to rectify the lack of project management skills within its staff. Sir Michael Jay replied that a “dedicated Programme and Project Management team within Finance Directorate [is] responsible for policy in this field.”52 The team provides access to a range of relevant training courses. It is of some interest that Sir Michael’s answer deals entirely with training as the method of addressing the skills in the FCO; nowhere is there any mention of importing skills from outside, by employing experienced professionals from other sectors. We accept that it is desirable and even necessary for senior FCO staff, in common with those elsewhere in the public sector, to acquire and to maintain project management skills, but we are surprised that there is apparently no intention on the part of FCO to recruit people with particularly well- developed skills in this area. We consider this point in relation to a wider range of professional skills below.53
Financial management 45. The Collinson Grant report is critical of the FCO’s resource management systems. The consultants suggest that the budgetary system lacks teeth and expenditure is based too much on precedent. Sir Michael Jay acknowledged that the report had “focused our attention on some new areas of work which we had not focused on sufficiently, like the need for further reform of the finance function, which we are now carrying out with the Treasury and the NAO.”54
46. Collinson Grant noted that completion of the implementation of the new information system, Prism, should release resources for the FCO, but they also called for managers generally to spend less time dealing with routine financial tasks, and for members of the Finance Directorate to spend less time on non-financial tasks. “This, combined with radical reform of the purchase-to-pay procedures and other financial processes, would save significant effort both in the Finance Directorate and throughout the organisation.”55
51 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, pp 22 and 12 52 Ev 50 53 See para 53–57 54 Q 13 55 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 16
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 23
47. In the course of this Inquiry, we became aware of what the National Audit Office has described as “the largest identified loss by fraud in the Department’s history”, 56 and which had continued undetected for at least four years. In July 2004, it was discovered that the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel had been defrauded of more than £790,000 by a locally- engaged employee. However, we did not learn of this from the FCO, even though we visited the Embassy concerned in November 2005. The fraud came to our notice only following publication of the report by the National Audit Office. This incident raises concerns both about the FCO’s financial controls and its detection systems, and about the FCO’s duty to inform the Committee charged with scrutinising its expenditure and administration. We raised these issues with the FCO, who in February 2006 sent us a copy of a paper dated November 2005, in which they set out the lessons learned from this and from other, unidentified, fraud incidents.57 The paper sets out a number of sensible procedures and safeguards which should already have been in place at the Post in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. The Public Accounts Committee is now conducting a detailed scrutiny of the NAO report and will produce its own report in due course. We await that report with interest.
48. We conclude that the FCO failed seriously in its duty to the Committee in not informing the Committee about what the National Audit Office has described as “the largest identified loss by fraud in the Department’s history” and about other frauds. We are extremely concerned that the Tel Aviv fraud continued undetected for at least four years as a result of weaknesses in financial control and involved clear breaches of long standing accounting procedures. We recommend that the FCO in its response to this Report set out the other significant frauds which have taken place in the last five years, and the specific steps it has taken to prevent any recurrence.
49. In its response to our written questions, the FCO described a new Prism-based reporting system—Oracle Financial Analyser—which will provide budget-holders in FCO managers with monthly financial management information.58 The system is already in use at FCO headquarters in London, but its full implementation will have to await a successful introduction of Prism in Posts overseas.
50. We welcome the FCO’s new focus on reform of its finance function. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO provide a detailed explanation of the nature of these and related reforms and of the timescale for implementing them. We further recommend that in future the FCO inform this Committee promptly of any incident involving major fraud or financial mismanagement.
Performance review 51. In his first appearance before our colleagues on the Public Administration Select Committee last October, the new Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, Sir Gus
56 National Audit Office, 2004–05 Resource Account: Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Fraud at the British Embassy, Tel Aviv, September 2005 57 Ev 89 58 Ev 25
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O’Donnell, announced a series of performance reviews of Whitehall departments. Sir Gus described his initiative in the following terms:
In terms of policies, I talked to the Prime Minister about ensuring that we have proper Cabinet committee procedures for the various reform initiatives on health, education, welfare reform and the like, and that we ensure that the Civil Service provides good advice not just on policy but on how deliverable policy is. That is one particular area where I think we need to strengthen things. I wanted to mention this to the Committee today that I feel that we need to enhance central government departments’ capability to deliver policies. As you know, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit looks at delivery in the sense of achievement of PSA targets. What I want the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit to do is to enhance its role by looking at the capability of departments to deliver. The idea of this would be capability reviews run out of the Prime Ministers Delivery Unit but using external people as well—people like, for example, the private sector, the Audit Commission, people who have been good at these from the Audit Commission with experience of comprehensive performance assessments (CPAs), and use them to assess departments’ capabilities on a range of functions like HR, finance, ability to run IT projects, with the idea that we would publish the results of the performance of departments in specific categories. […] The idea is that we would do these reviews and with external input publish the results and then there will be an action plan to ensure that the permanent secretary and I were happy about and agreed on what the steps forward were, and I would then hold the permanent secretary to account for improvements in that department. I have put this idea to my permanent secretary colleagues and to the Prime Minister and received enthusiastic support so I am pleased to say that everybody is behind this and we will now start to consult on how to do it, with a view to getting the first pilot departments around December or January.59
The Government announced in December that the reviews will be carried out under the direction of the Head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU), Ian Watmore.60
52. We note from the published minutes of the meeting of the FCO Board held on 5 December 2005 that it appears that the FCO is to be one of the first Whitehall departments to be scrutinised under the new arrangements.61 We find this significant, especially given how recently the Collinson Grant review was carried out. We recommend that the FCO keep this Committee informed of the progress of the ‘capability to deliver’ review being carried out by the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit and, in due course, of its results.
59 Oral evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee on 11 October 2005, HC 513–i, Q 1 60 Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, see www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk 61 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO Board Minutes, see www.fco.gov.uk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 25
Staff
The need for professional skills 53. The FCO employs over 6,000 people in the United Kingdom and overseas, most of whom are generalists but many of whom are working in specialist roles.62 The Foreign Affairs Committee and the FCO have previously exchanged views on the lack of staff with appropriate specialist skills. In the most recent such exchange, the FCO told the Committee that:
The numbers of specialist staff we recruit varies year on year, but on average we have brought in around 15 per annum in recent years. These people have been recruited at various levels from Band B to SMS and have included accountants, IT specialists, legal advisers, librarians, purchasing specialists, research analysts, medical staff, science and technology specialists and a variety of ad hoc appointments.63
We did not find this response reassuring. It suggested a reluctance on the part of the FCO to recruit from outside the organisation. Our unease increased when we saw the conclusions of the Collinson Grant report, that the FCO still lacks staff with appropriate skills in the project management, finance and human resources fields.64 According to the report, “Employees are seen as generalists, so that a lack of professional competence or experience in (say) finance or HR (or even in specific political or diplomatic skills) is accepted, even where it acts as a significant drag on the effectiveness of a department.”65
54. A member of the Committee tabled parliamentary questions to a number of government departments, asking Ministers to list the professional qualifications and experience of their human resources, finance and estates directors.66 The results are collated below:
62 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 218; Ev 23 63 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's 8th Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 11 64 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, pp 9 and 11 65 Ibid, p10 66 HC Deb, various dates in November and December 2005
26 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Finance Human resources Estates DfID Studying for accountancy Post-graduate diplomas Health and Safety certificate qualification “Range of finance roles” Formerly HR Director of an NHS Trust 20 years experience in Govt Depts
dti No relevant specialist Member of relevant chartered body Chartered engineer qualifications “Wide experience” of the dti 25 years experience in HR roles in private Formerly estates manager sector for Dept of Health
Home Office Post-graduate degree Chartered surveyor Formerly head of HR in Prisons Service “Extensive experience”
Health Member of relevant chartered Member of relevant chartered body body Extensive public sector Formerly worked in HR in NHS experience, including with NAO
DEFRA Fellow of relevant chartered Member of relevant chartered body BSc in Land Administration body and Chartered surveyor Similar posts elsewhere in public Formerly in senior HR roles in local Relevant experience in both sector government public and private sectors
DCMS Has a relevant specialist MA in Human Resource Strategy and Change City & Guilds in Mechanical qualification (not specified) Engineering and Building Not stated 8 years HR experience in public sector Maintenance; Fellow of
Work and Pensions Member of relevant chartered body Similar posts elsewhere in public sector
Education and Skills MA in Labour Economics Fellow of relevant chartered body Formerly seconded to Treasury, Formerly in local government and further education dti and private sector
FCO No relevant specialist No relevant specialist qualifications No relevant specialist qualifications qualifications Senior positions in FCO and 5 years experience in Treasury Economist with experience UKTI in both private sector and FCO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 27
It can be seen that, when compared with other government departments, the FCO has, literally, an amateurish approach to filling some of its senior posts. In particular, the FCO is one of only two departments among those surveyed with a finance director who does not hold a relevant specialist qualification and it is the only department whose director of human resources lacks such a qualification. We have previously drawn attention to the need for a more professional approach to all these specialist functions—particularly to management of the overseas estate, in the light of the poor decisions taken by the FCO’s Estates Strategy Unit on the sales of residences in Dublin and in New York.67
55. We raised with Sir Michael Jay the question of whether certain post-holders should have a relevant professional qualification or outside experience when he appeared before us in November 2005. Sir Michael defended the practice of posting experienced diplomats to very senior administrative roles, pointing out that those currently in post had had some relevant previous experience within (and, in one case, outside) government, that their deputies or assistants are in many cases professionally qualified, and that running a large Embassy is in some respects not unlike running a business.68 He also reminded us that the FCO has signed up to the Civil Service’s Professional Skills for Government agenda, which means that,
[…] people who are going to move to the higher reaches of the Foreign Office need to have a balance of skills. […] We need professional skills and a knowledge of our business because with professional skills without the knowledge of our business we will not get it right. If you have knowledge of the business without professional skills, you will not get it right. You need a balance of those two.69
Finally, Sir Michael informed us that it will increasingly be the case that senior positions in the FCO are filled by open competition.70
56. The FCO may be moving slowly towards the practice which most other government departments appear already to have adopted, of recruiting well-qualified people with outside experience to fill some of the more senior specialist roles. Sir Michael confirmed that in seeking such a development the Committee is pushing at an open door, then added, rather ominously, “but the speed at which the door opens is something over which we have to have some control.”71 We expect to see the door open without delay.
57. We conclude that the FCO needs to catch up with the rest of Whitehall, by recruiting professionally qualified, experienced people to the top roles in finance, human resources and estate management. We recommend that it do so without delay.
67 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, paras 137–139 68 Q 24 [Sir Michael Jay] 69 Ibid 70 Q 28 71 Q 29
28 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Efficiency measures directly affecting staff 58. Collinson Grant claimed to have identified 533 posts in the United Kingdom, 427 posts overseas filled by United Kingdom-based staff and 307 posts overseas filled by locally- engaged staff which could be cut, producing an annual saving of over £66 million from the end of 2005.72 The FCO’s own Efficiency Technical Note, produced some months after the Collinson Grant Report, proposes a reduction in the UK-based staff pay-bill of £5 million in 2005–06, rising to £15 million in 2007–08.73 Its projected figure for additional cashable savings on UK-based staff posted overseas is £1 million in 2005–06, rising to £6 million in 2007–08; this will be achieved by a mixture of reductions in numbers and changes to conditions of service.74 By “refocusing” the work of its locally-engaged staff, the FCO hopes to save another £2 million in 2005–06, and twice that in 2007–08.75 At the same time as reducing staffing numbers, the FCO also aspires to cut its overtime costs by £1 million in 2007–08.76
59. Taken together, the FCO’s savings targets are very modest when set against those proposed by Collinson Grant. Neither is Collinson Grant the first to suggest that more substantial savings might be made: a previous study by KPMG suggested that the Finance Directorate alone could save 10% of its budget by cutting “non-critical functions” and reducing routine processing.77
60. In response to a written question from us, the FCO confirmed that it has identified over 60 jobs in its senior management structure to be cut or downgraded over the current planning period, 2004–07.78 It has also (as at November 2005) accepted 283 applications from staff for early retirement or severance, as part of its contribution to overall staff savings of 310 required under the 2004 Spending Review. However, in response to our question, how many of the jobs vacated by those taking early retirement or severance will be refilled, the FCO told us that due to the frequent rotation of staff, “There will no exact match between staff departures and job reductions.”79 We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO list the senior management jobs which will be cut or downgraded during the SR04 period, and that it state the net increase or reduction in staff numbers that it expects to result from this exercise.
61. Not all job cuts will be among senior management, most of whom are able to obtain generous severance terms. In its response to the Committee’s Report on its 2003–04 Departmental Report, the FCO suggested total cuts needed to be in the order of 350–400 posts, most of which could be achieved through natural turnover and early retirement.80 As
72 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 1 73 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Efficiency technical note. See http://www.fco.gov.uk 74 Ibid, table 8 75 Ibid, table 10 76 Ibid, table 9 77 Ibid, table 16 78 Ev 25 79 Ev 50 80 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 10
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 29
a responsible employer, the FCO has a duty of care to these people. The FCO told our predecessors that those leaving its employment had access to advice on retirement and re- employment options from its ‘PROSPER’ group, but gave no details. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide full information on the work of its PROSPER group.
Prism 62. In common with many large organisations, the FCO needs to be able to generate, process, store and access key financial and other management data, to enable its managers to take well-founded decisions and to be effective administrators. The FCO’s chosen vehicle for achieving this purpose is known as Prism. Prism is not ‘just’ an information technology package; it entails changes in management practice and in working practice. Practically nobody who works for the FCO, including those working in its overseas Posts, will be untouched by the changes embodied in the project. Unfortunately, Prism has gone wrong.
63. To understand what has gone wrong with Prism, it is important to realise the enormous scale of the project. Prism is intended to replace 30 separate existing systems. New software and hardware has to be installed, and new working practices introduced, not only at each Post but throughout the London and Milton Keynes FCO estates. The staff training requirements for this project are huge. It is disappointing, but not surprising, that this important project is substantially behind time.
64. In the overseas Posts where Prism has been implemented, there has been great dissatisfaction. FCO staff publications have received anguished letters for publication. Here is one example: “in the FCO’s long history of ineptly implemented IT initiatives, Prism is the most badly-designed, ill-considered one of the lot.”81 Such letters give only a hint of the true scale of anger in the ‘ranks’; anyone who has visited a Post where Prism has been ‘rolled out’ knows that many staff are at their wits’ end about it.
65. The message that there was something wrong with Prism got through to the FCO Board, who tasked a senior diplomat, Norman Ling, “to draw lessons from the Prism experience.”82 Mr Ling produced his report in June 2005. He did not pull his punches. This is an edited version of his summary of what went wrong:
Planning and Resources The FCO greatly underestimated the requirement for business change when introducing Prism. It continues to do so. Too little forward planning led to hasty and bad decisions. The funding was adequate but the programme was poorly resourced in other areas. When it got into difficulties, it was inadequately supported.
Risk Prism was identified as high risk in early consultancy studies because of its size and the need for a radical shift in FCO culture and working practices if the system was to achieve all that was expected of it. Not enough account was taken of those assessments or the Prism team’s own concerns when the programme got underway.
81 Letter in FCO News and Views, Issue 60, November 2005 82 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Prism lessons learned, see www.fco.gov.uk
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The decision to rate Prism only medium risk meant the review process was not as robust as it might have been. This error was compounded by the choice of system and the failure to adopt a phased approach to implementation.
Benefits If the risks were under-stated, the benefits of Prism were consistently exaggerated. The promised cashable savings were never likely to be realised. Apart from resource accounting, the higher level benefits were vague. The business case was not regularly reviewed after contract signature. Responsibility for benefits was left in the hands of the contractor or over-looked. Many potential benefits were lost through excessive customisation and a failure to assess what impact changes elsewhere in the organisation would have on Prism.
Professionalisation Prism has exposed a shortage of FCO skills in project and programme management. This means the FCO must draw effectively on outside skills and experience. Those parts of the FCO with a clearer focus or a background in finance and procurement have realised Prism’s benefits sooner. The structural changes demanded by a more business-oriented approach (hub and spoke, combined policy and resource units, a reduced level of service from the centre) also demand more professionalism.
Governance, change and communications – the role of the FCO Board Until recently, the FCO Board has not been as actively engaged on Prism as it should have been. Given that the programme is business critical, the Board should have appointed one of its own as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and monitored progress more closely. In addition, it should have ensured that the important changes to working practices that Prism introduced were properly communicated and fully accepted. The Board should also have recognised the impact of change across programme boundaries sooner and taken action to ameliorate it.
Security Prism has been seriously affected by specific security requirements. If left unchanged, they will continue to handicap Prism and all future programmes that aim to introduce more order and transparency into the way the FCO goes about its business.83
66. The Ling report must have been hugely embarrassing, not only for the project’s managers but for the FCO Board, who had failed to become sufficiently engaged with it. And this was despite the debacle of just a few years earlier over the abortive Focus project, which was intended to achieve some of the same goals as Prism. It is also worth noting that some of Mr Ling’s conclusions echo those of the Collinson Grant team—for example, the lack of specialist skills, the unwillingness to accept risk, and the resistance to change.
67. Mr Ling backed up his analysis of what went wrong with a set of recommendations for action. All 26 unclassified recommendations have been published.84 However, we note with some concern that the scope of Prism is understood to include the Secret Intelligence Service as well as the FCO. These are some of the more significant recommendations:
83 The full summary is available at www.fco.gov.uk. 84 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Prism lessons learned, see www.fco.gov.uk
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• The FCO should only appoint programme managers who have the requisite skills and experience for the job or who are assisted by someone with those qualities.
• The FCO Board should appoint a Director General as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for large, high risk programmes.
• The FCO Board should strengthen its capacity to oversee IT enabled change management programmes.
• The FCO should recognise project management as a core skill.
• The Business Systems Team (BST), the FCO’s designated centre of excellence for programme and project management, should be given more powers of oversight to ensure best practice is observed.
• The FCO must allow the health of the programme to dictate the pace of implementation. Health checks should include more robust Gateway reviews and closer questioning of the consultant and the contractor.
• The FCO should establish more substantial relationships with contractors on future programmes. This should include regular contact at Board level.
• The FCO should make a realistic assessment of the staff it can make available before the start of any programme. If there is a shortfall in the numbers or the requisite skills, it should hire the extra people it needs, either in its own right or through the contractor.
• Major IT enabled change programmes require an effective communications strategy. The FCO Board should monitor the effectiveness of the strategy closely.
• Training and other forms of support for users should be seen as a fundamental element in the success of any IT-enabled change management programme.
• SROs should ensure that new working arrangements such as hub and spoke are tested, agreed and implemented in advance of global roll out.
• The SRO should ensure there is a full re-assessment of the business case and thus the benefits of the programme at each Gateway review. In the case of high risk/business critical programmes, the SRO should get FCO Board approval of the business case before moving to the next stage of the programme.
Again, there is a strong degree of correlation between these recommendations and some of those made in the Collinson Grant report.
68. We asked the FCO, what action it has taken in respect of each of the 26 unclassified recommendations. In a letter to our Chairman, Sir Michael Jay wrote that:
All major ICT programmes are now required to assess their performance against each of the recommendations in the Ling report. The assessments are scrutinised by
32 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
the FCO Investment Committee and follow up action commissioned where deficiencies have been identified.”85
We are disappointed that the FCO responded with this general statement, rather than provide information in respect of each of the recommendations, as we had requested. We reiterate our desire for a specific and detailed response in respect of each of the 26 unclassified recommendations.
69. We conclude that the Ling report has exposed a woeful lack of professional skills and a disturbing series of failings in senior FCO management. We welcome acceptance of the conclusions of the report and we recommend that the FCO Board remain fully seized of the need to implement them. We further recommend that the FCO keep this Committee fully informed of the state of play on progress with putting each of the Ling report’s recommendations into practice; that it provide us with updates on the continuing implementation of Prism; and that it supply us with copies of Gateway reviews of further large, high-risk programmes.
70. The FCO’s Departmental Investment Strategy 2004–07 states that Prism “will improve the financial, personnel and procurement information available to FCO decision-makers, enabling them to improve resource and personnel management and achieve procurement savings.”86 Due to the problems already described with the programme, these improvements are yet to be realised. In the short-term, difficulties with Prism have also caused delays in the process of signing-off the FCO’s Resource Accounts.87
71. It appears that the poor performance and late introduction of Prism may also be the cause of the FCO’s position at the bottom of the league table of 46 government departments’ timeliness in paying bills. According to official statistics published by the Department for Trade and Industry in November 2005, the FCO paid only 68% of its invoices on time in 2004–05.88 The next-worst performing department, the Northern Ireland Office, paid over 85% of invoices on time, and the average across Government was just over 97%.
72. Undue delay in paying bills is unacceptable, regardless of who is the supplier or contractor. However, we feel the FCO has a special duty when it comes to paying the bills of individual contractors, small businesses and retailers, whether they be in the United Kingdom or abroad. Additionally, delay in paying bills overseas can be a source of considerable embarrassment to diplomatic staff in overseas missions. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Alan Johnson MP, told the House that “The Government take this issue very seriously.”89 So do we. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out how it proposes to achieve its targets for prompt payment of invoices.
85 Ev 52 86 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Departmental Investment Strategy 2005, See http://www.fco.gov.uk 87 Ev 8 88 HC Deb, 8 November 2005, col 14WS 89 Ibid
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Other IT projects 73. The Departmental Report for 2004–05 lists 20 overseas Posts which now accept on-line applications for visas for entry to the United Kingdom.90 The FCO later informed us of a further five Posts which now offer this facility, and told us that others are being added.91 According to the FCO, “take-up of this service continues at a steady pace.”92 In principle, we welcome the efficiency gains which this service ought to provide, and the comparative ease of use for applicants who may live some distance from a visa-issuing centre. We would, however, welcome further information. We recommend that in its response to this report the FCO provide full information on how refusal and fraud rates for on-line visa applications compare with those for conventional applications.
74. The FCO has also been replacing its desktop IT system, known as Firecrest. The Future Firecrest programme is scheduled to be completed in 2012.93 The FCO told us that “Recent changes in central government technical security policy have required some re-design of the system, which may impact on both the timetable and budget. This impact is still being assessed, but it is expected to have no significant impact on the capability of the project to meet its objectives.”94 It is crucial to the success and efficiency of the FCO that the new system works no less well than the first-phase Firecrest system, and we intend to monitor its progress.
‘Rationalising’ the home estate 75. The FCO operates a number of buildings in London, including its main Whitehall accommodation at King Charles Street and the Old Admiralty Building, and the UKVisas building on the Albert Embankment. A further 1,100 staff are based at Hanslope Park, near Milton Keynes.95 Another 450 staff are being transferred to Hanslope Park; this, together with ‘rationalising’ the central London estate by locating all London staff in the two main buildings, is expected to generate savings of about £1.1 million in 2007–08.96
76. Two very prominent and historic buildings in central London are leased by home departments on behalf of the FCO, who pay the costs: 1, Carlton Gardens, and Lancaster House. Negotiations on a new lease for the former property, effective from 1 April 2005, were still ongoing as we carried out this inquiry.97 The lease on Lancaster House expires in July 2007. Both properties are used in support of the FCOs diplomatic work.
77. The FCO also rents various premises in London and elsewhere. Wiston House, which is used by the Wilton Park agency for conferences, cost £94,000 in rent in 2004–05. The
90 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report, 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 203 91 Ev 7 92 Ibid 93 Ev 11 94 Ibid 95 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Departmental Investment Strategy 2005, para 6, see http://www.fco.gov.uk, 96 Ev 8, Ev 86 97 Ev 49
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total FCO bill for rental charges in the United Kingdom that year was £1,540,374.98 Any potential for efficiency savings is, therefore, modest.
Reinvesting efficiency savings 78. Under Treasury classifications which apply to public expenditure by government departments, spending may be classified as either administrative or programme expenditure. We note that 43% of the FCO’s expenditure is classified as administrative.99 This is an abnormally high figure for a Whitehall department.100 We are also aware that the Treasury has encouraged departments to reclassify expenditure as programme, so that programme savings can be reinvested across a wider range of services.101 When he gave oral evidence, Sir Michael Jay noted that he is not allowed to transfer resources from programme to administrative expenditure—for example, to keep open an Embassy threatened with closure.102
79. We therefore asked the FCO, what work it has done to identify those parts of its administrative expenditure that could be reclassified as programme expenditure. The FCO replied that it had already discussed this with the Treasury as part of the 2004 Spending Review, but that the Treasury had only agreed to the reclassification of consular and visa work.103 It is not clear whether responsibility for the failure to reclassify more expenditure rests with the FCO—because it has not made a sufficiently strong case—or the Treasury is being obstructive. The FCO has expressed the hope that it will be possible for this issue to be reconsidered in the context of the forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review.104 We support the FCO’s efforts to reclassify more of its expenditure on front-line services as programme rather than administrative expenditure and we recommend that it present a strong case to the Treasury for making this change.
Conclusion: the FCO’s response to Collinson Grant 80. The Collinson Grant Report was commissioned by the FCO’s Director General (Corporate Affairs), Dickie Stagg. Commenting on the lack of enthusiasm which the process had encountered among some of his colleagues, Mr Stagg told us that “it is inevitable that, if you bring in people who are clearly seen as being something of a threat to the status quo, there are people who are unenthusiastic about that process.”105 Sir Michael Jay, however, assured us that he and his colleagues on the Board took their duty to consider the report’s findings “extremely seriously”.106 The FCO told us what it has been doing to implement the report’s findings:
98 HC Deb, 13 December 2005, col 1950W 99 Calculation based on 2003–04 FCO resource accounts. 100 Only the Treasury has a higher proportion of administrative expenditure. 101 HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistics (2002) 38, paras 17–19 102 Ev 67 103 Ev 46 104 Ibid 105 Q 16 106 Ibid
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The FCO Board considered the Collinson Grant report at its meeting on 28 January 2005. It re-committed itself to achieving the £87 million target and agreed to incorporate the Collinson Grant work as far as possible into the FCO’s existing Efficiency Plan. In addition, based on the findings, the Board agreed to review the Finance function in the FCO, both in London and overseas; identify resources that could be reallocated from low to high priority activity using the Collinson Grant comparative analysis of expenditure; and monitor, at Board level, the FCO’s efforts to re-prioritise resources. The Board does not accept that the FCO lacks appropriate political and diplomatic skills.
Since the Board decisions a number of actions have been taken to deliver the efficiency targets. These include: substituting locally engaged for some UK-based staff; rationalising the various change programmes in the FCO; reducing the number of people in the Corporate pool; improving the workings of the internal market; and reducing administrative costs. Work on the finance function will be taken forward in the light of the Treasury and NAO review […]
The staff reductions, agreed with the Treasury as part of the FCO’s Efficiency Plan, are being achieved by adjusting recruitment targets and a programme of early retirement. The FCO is committed to increasing both the skills base of its employees and to better utilising the skills already available, including through active engagement in the Professional Skills in Government initiative. We intend to manage changes in our workforce in ways that will support these policies.107
81. The FCO’s response to Collinson Grant is defensive and may not convey the full extent to which the consultants’ conclusions were either anticipated or taken on board. When he appeared before us, the Permanent Under-Secretary was robust in his defence of the institution he heads:
I am proud to lead this organisation. I believe we have reformed a lot in the last three or four years. We have further to go. I think we and our staff do an extraordinarily good job in very difficult circumstances. I want to get that on the record because I think it is important to do so. […] I accept many of the conclusions but not the analysis of that report and I do not accept the root and branch criticism.108
Later in the same session, however, Sir Michael agreed that there needs to be fundamental change in the FCO:
We do need a culture change in the organisation. Introducing major culture changes and other major changes at the same time as managing and maintaining the morale and the ability of a highly complicated organisation is not easy. I do think there has to be a pace in introducing these changes, which makes sense given the challenges that we face, but the general direction in which you want us to go is right.109
107 Ev 50 108 Q 16 109 Q 28
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At our invitation, Sir Michael later supplied us with a more detailed critique of the Collinson Grant report.110 We also invited him to identify those parts of the report that he does not accept, or that he regards as unfair comment.111
82. Closely paraphrasing his oral evidence, Sir Michael wrote that “I accept many of the conclusions but not all of the analysis […] I do not accept the root and branch criticism of the FCO. […] I reject the proposition that the FCO lacks the necessary core diplomatic and political skills”112 In his letter, Sir Michael goes on to state that the FCO believes “some” of the recommendations made by Collinson Grant to be “ill-founded” but he does not identify which recommendations these are. Instead, one example is given: a recommendation to reduce the resource deployed on briefing Members of Parliament and businesses. We have scoured the Collinson Grant report for this recommendation, but have been unable to find it. Possibly, it is based on an unpublished list of “certain high- profile activities” that the FCO itself has identified as those that could be curtailed or even discontinued completely.113
83. We can only conclude from this that Sir Michael is part of the problem. Under his stewardship, the report was originally suppressed. It criticised the management he was supposed to lead. He acquiesced in a situation where some senior managers failed to collaborate with Collinson Grant’s proper inquiries. His senior managers did not contest or seek to correct prior to publication errors which they now allege are contained in the Collinson Grant report. When asked what he deems to be “ill founded” in the recommendations of Collinson Grant, he failed to give a specific example. This is all wholly unacceptable from a Permanent Under-Secretary.
84. We had every expectation, having invited the Permanent Under-Secretary to tell us which parts of the Collinson Grant report he disagrees with, or regards as unfair, that we would receive a lengthy and well-referenced list. Instead, we received a general comment, supported by a single, somewhat gratuitous reference to one aspect of the FCO’s work. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO identify all those observations, conclusions and recommendations in the Collinson Grant report that it does not accept, in each case with a full explanation. We also recommend that the FCO state in that reponse what stage it has reached in implementing each recommendation in the report that it does accept. We further recommend that the FCO publish in its response the list of activities classified as red, amber or green, which is referred to in the report.
85. We congratulate FCO managers on their decision to invite external consultants to carry out a study of their efficiency, effectiveness and control of costs, although we have concerns about the lack of thoroughness with which the review was carried out and about the lack of seriousness with which the FCO regarded and appears still to regard the project. We conclude that, having commissioned the study, the FCO must deal with it seriously: this suggests that the FCO should change some of its management practices
110 Ev 45 111 Q 15 112 Ev 45 113 Collinson Grant Limited, Efficiency, effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Phase 2–Analysis and the development of opportunities for change, 14 January 2005, p 15
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 37
and its efficiency savings targets or it should defend and justify them, explaining where and how the consultants are mistaken in their conclusions. So far, we have seen no evidence that it is succeeding in doing either.
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4 Consular Services
86. The FCO’s Public Service Agreements 9 and 10 cover the main services it provides to members of the public: entry clearance services, and consular services. Our predecessor Committee looked at entry clearance services is some detail in its Report on the FCO’s 2003–04 annual report; this year, we turn our focus to consular services.
87. The new traffic light system used in the FCO’s Autumn Performance Report 2005 shows red for the performance indicator relating to issuing of passports overseas. This is a major activity of the FCO—about half a million passports are issued to British citizens overseas annually.114 The target for 2004–05 was for 95% of these passports to be issued within five working days from receipt of the correct fee and a correctly completed application. Performance against this target was 73.3%.115 This represented a considerable deterioration over the achievement in 2002–03, when, against the same target of 95%, performance was 88.1%.116 A new target of 90% of passports to be issued within ten days of receipt of applications has been introduced for 2005–06, following the introduction of new, lengthier passport-issuing procedures designed to increase security.117
88. In a recent report on FCO consular services, the National Audit Office considered the reasons for the failure to meet this target.118 It found three main causes of delay:
• the introduction of a process whereby passport applications are received at smaller “spoke” Posts and then transferred to a larger “hub” Post in a neighbouring country or region for processing and issuing, which takes between two and five weeks
• the difficulties faced by passport operations in some parts of the world and the need to spend more time checking applications
• problems with information technology systems
89. In its Autumn Performance Review, the FCO states that it has set up a new Nationality and Passports Best Practice Unit “to ensure that posts are operating in the most efficient manner possible whilst still carrying out rigorous checks on applicants.”119 We remain to be convinced that this unit will be able to tackle the three factors identified by the NAO as being responsible for the poor performance. The cost savings associated with a ‘hub and spoke’ arrangement, and the need to apply a consistently high standard of security to applications, are arguments in favour of persisting with that approach and accepting that there will inevitably be delays. We trust that the new unit will take steps to minimise these delays, without compromising security. However, the problems with information
114 ‘Challenges to deliver Consular Services have never been greater', speech by FCO Minister Lord Triesman, 27 October 2005, available at www.fco.gov.uk 115 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005, p 57 116 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 160 117 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005, p 57 118 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Consular Services to British Nationals, HC 594, Session 2005–06, 24 November 2005 119 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005, p 57; Ev 21
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technology give serious cause for concern, providing as they do an echo of the difficulties experienced with Prism. It is far from clear how the new unit—which will conduct a series of reviews of the performance of the larger passport-issuing Posts120—will deal with this.
90. We asked Sir Michael Jay about the reasons for the FCO’s failure to meet this target when he appeared before us.121 Neither he nor Mr Stagg, the Director-General (Corporate), was able to give us full details then, but Sir Michael subsequently wrote to us. His letter appeared to ascribe the cause of the underperformance almost entirely to the GenIE computerised passport issuing system, which “has enabled us to produce fraud-resistant, machine-readable passports overseas but at the price of extended processing times.”122 He was confident that in 2005–06 the FCO would be able to meet its new target of issuing 90% of passports within ten working days. However, the FCO itself states in its Autumn Performance Review that it would have failed by a margin of 7.5% to achieve this new target in 2004–05, 123 so it appears unlikely that moving the target will of itself turn the traffic light to green. Sir Michael did not mention the new Nationality and Passports Best Practice Unit in his letter. Neither did he anticipate a decision taken on 5 December by the FCO Board, over which he presides, to propose to Ministers a move to providing these services based on “need not want”, which represents a potentially significant shift in practice.124
91. The Autumn Performance Review also shows that of the five other performance targets in consular services, the FCO failed to achieve three: registration of births; registration of deaths; and contact with detainees. Each of these has been given an amber light, meaning that they are ‘generally on course’. In each case, a number of Posts recorded failures, but they are not listed, although in a letter following his oral evidence Sir Michael did note that documentation problems are a particular problem when registering births in Pakistan, China and Turkey, and that the large number of British citizens detained in Spain causes difficulties for the Posts there.125 We do not see why the Posts recording failures should not be listed, along with an explanation of the reasons for those failures.
92. We conclude that the FCO’s failure in 2004–05 to achieve four out of the six Public Service Agreements for its consular services is disappointing, although we recognise that the targets are demanding and that activities carried out at Posts overseas will always be subject to pressures or to events which may be more extreme than those which apply in the United Kingdom. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO set out in detail the goals, work programme and achievements to date of its new Nationality and Passports Best Practice Unit. We further recommend that the FCO identify those Posts which have registered failures in respect of consular services PSAs in financial years 2004–05 and 2005–06 and that it supply this Committee with full details of the Board’s proposal on the future of issuing passports overseas.
120 Ev 21 121 Qq 49–53 122 Ev 47 123 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6709, December 2005, p 57 124 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO Board Minutes, December 2005, see www.fco.gov.uk 125 Ev 48
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Emergency response
The Indian Ocean tsunami 93. In November 2002, the FCO wrote to our predecessor Committee, informing them that it was setting up three rapid deployment teams, to respond to consular emergencies overseas.126 In that letter, the FCO noted that the contingency plans it had previously developed for these situations “focused very largely on events such as natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes)” but that the impetus for its new initiative came from the increased danger of terrorist attack. It was ironic that the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 which followed a massive underwater earthquake should have provided the severest test of the new arrangements to date.
94. Our predecessors in the last Parliament commented on the FCO’s response to the tsunami in a Report published in March 2005. 127 In that Report, the Committee concluded that the FCO had generally performed well in appalling circumstances. Lapses—although they had affected families and individuals who had, understandably, been bitterly disappointed—were few, given the scale of the disaster. The Committee recommended that the FCO make further improvements in its procedures for dealing with catastrophic emergencies, and that it keep Parliament informed. The Government fully accepted this recommendation.128 On 28 June 2005, the Foreign Secretary made a Written Statement to the House and published a summary of the FCO’s internal review of its response to the tsunami.129
95. The FCO response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was considered in some detail by the National Audit Office, in its wide-ranging review of consular services.130 In October 2005, the FCO and the NAO also produced a joint paper on the lessons learned from their analysis of the response.131 In summary, the FCO and NAO found that “success in delivering consular support is determined by getting the right, suitably experienced people with the right skills, equipped with the right systems and support, into the right places, at the right time. […] in the case of the tsunami not all these elements were always achieved, and […] on occasions mistakes were made.”132 The mistakes as listed in the joint report were as follows:
• There was insufficient capacity at the Metropolitan Police’s call handling centre to deal with the volume of calls from members of the public and there was no system in place for sifting out non-urgent calls
126 Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003, HC859; Ev 28 127 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2004–05, Human Rights Annual Report 2004, HC 109, paras 55– 62 128 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Fourth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2004–05, Cm 6571, May 2005, p 10 129 HC Deb, 28 June 2005, col 53WS 130 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Foreign and Commonwealth Consular Services to British Nationals, HC 594, Session 2005–06, 24 November 2005 131 National Audit Office/Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Joint findings on lessons to be learned from the handling of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, 24 November 2005 132 Ibid, Summary, para 3
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• No rapid deployment team was sent from London to Thailand until 8 January
• It was 29 December before British officials arrived in one of the badly affected Thai resorts, Khao Lak
• The resources available to the FCO in Thailand were inadequate to the task
• The Rapid Deployment Team sent to Sri Lanka failed to work sufficiently closely with locally-based officials, it did not contain people with the necessary skills and its members had not received appropriate training
• FCO contingency plans for dealing with this type of disaster were cumbersome and difficult to use in a crisis
• The decision—taken largely on cost grounds—to operate only one evacuation flight almost a week after the tsunami meant that many British survivors were obliged to remain in the area in a distressed state, some of them for several days
• Co-ordination between the FCO and other government departments was not as good as it should have been
• FCO and police systems for recording casualty information were—and still are— incompatible
The Foreign Secretary apologised for these mistakes in an interview with the BBC on the first anniversary of the tsunami.133 Work continues across government, and particularly in the FCO, to remedy deficiencies. The FCO supplied us with a table, setting out progress on each aspect of this work as at December 2005.134
96. In January 2006, Sir Michael Jay and two senior FCO managers appeared before our colleagues on the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), to answer questions on the NAO report. Sir Michael told the PAC that the FCO’s emergency plans in 2004 were not fit for purpose when it came to dealing with the extreme circumstances of the tsunami.135 He assured the PAC that in future such plans will be adequate and that they will be rigorously tested.136 He also referred to “a much broader move towards a more professional diplomatic service than we have had in the past and consular work is an increasingly important part of that.” He added “our staff are becoming increasingly professional over time, better trained, more conscious of the duties which will fall on them in an emergency, working more closely with headquarters in London to ensure a consistent response.”137
97. An additional NAO-sponsored study related to the tsunami was under way as we prepared this Report. In November 2005, the Secretary of State announced that the NAO had commissioned the Zito Trust “to undertake a survey of British nationals affected by the
133 ‘Straw apology to tsunami families’, BBC News Online, 26 December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4559484.stm 134 Ev 64 135 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 11 January 2006, HC 813–i, Q 10 136 Ibid, Qq 64–70 137 Ibid, Q64
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Tsunami.”138 The purpose of the study is to gain the views of those directly affected by the disaster, and their families, on the FCO response. We welcome the fact that this study is being carried out, and we await its report with interest.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 98. A further natural disaster occurred in late August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina struck part of the southern coastline of the United States and this was followed by Hurricane Rita, which struck a similar area in September. In many respects, these incidents differed significantly from the Indian Ocean tsunami: they were predicted; there were many fewer fatalities (including just one British citizen); fewer British nationals were directly involved; and they occurred in the most powerful, most well-resourced country in the world. Nevertheless, there were allegations of serious shortcomings in the British authorities’ response, particularly in respect of Hurricane Katrina.
99. We asked Sir Michael Jay to respond to these allegations, most of which related to the failure of consular officials to enter New Orleans, where a number of British nationals were in fear of their lives in the days immediately following the hurricane. Sir Michael was robust in his response. He told us that “Unlike in some aspects of the tsunami, I think the criticism of the response to Katrina was unjustified.”139 Consular and diplomatic staff had been instructed by the US authorities not to enter New Orleans, but to deploy to the towns some distance away, to which survivors were being evacuated. The FCO made strong representations, but felt obliged to comply with this request.140 The FCO’s Director- General (Corporate), Dickie Stagg, pointed out to us that only the previous month, American diplomats had been told to stay away from the scenes of the London bombings, in which US citizens were among the victims.141 We accept that compliance with such requests from a competent ally must be the default action, although in the case of Hurricane Katrina it became apparent at a fairly early stage that the local authorities in the affected area were unable to cope. By that time, FCO personnel had been allowed into the zone and were assisting people.142
100. The NAO’s report of November 2005 did not include its assessment of the FCO response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, the FCO itself sent us a full memorandum on this, in which the Secretary of State undertook to “use the experience gained from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to improve our response further in future.”143 We will also study the report of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security on the US response to Katrina, published on the day we agreed this Report.
138 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, News, NAO reports on consular services and tsunami response, see www.fco.gov.uk 139 Q 35 140 Ev 57 141 Q 55 142 Ev 46 143 Ev 57
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Paying the bills 101. The joint FCO/NAO report on the tsunami suggests that the cost of the FCO’s response to the tsunami was £2.5 million as at October 2005.144 Costs associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had not yet been assessed.145 We asked the FCO how these costs would be met and were told that “The Treasury agreed on 2 December that tsunami costs may be met from a combination of Emergency and Disaster Reserve funds, a claim on the Treasury’s Central Reserve, and a contribution from the FCO’s 2005/06 end year flexibility. FCO and Treasury officials will agree exact proportions in time for the Spring Supplementary Estimates.”146 Discussions are continuing with the Treasury about how the response to any future disasters will be funded. However, it is clear from the FCO/NAO joint report that the Emergency Disaster Reserve, which is funded by a levy on each passport issued, is woefully inadequate—mainly due to demands made on it as a result of the various terrorist threats in the United Kingdom.147 Direct Treasury funding will be necessary.
102. We conclude that it would be wrong in principle for the FCO to be required to fund its response to unpredictable disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami. We recommend that the FCO take a strong line in its discussions with the Treasury and that Ministers accept the need for additional funding to be made available in such circumstances. We further recommend that consideration be given to increasing the resources available through the Emergency Disaster Reserve.
Conclusion 103. The FCO rightly provided a package of exceptional assistance to the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and to their families and we welcome the FCO’s undertaking to us that the Foreign Secretary will take an early decision on the scope of assistance to be provided following any future such disaster.148 The factors that the Foreign Secretary would consider in that instance might include the state of the local infrastructure, the availability of other support, and the numbers of British nationals involved. In more normal circumstances, however, there must obviously be limits on the assistance with which British nationals overseas can be provided.
104. In his interview with the BBC on the anniversary of the tsunami, the Foreign Secretary said that “British citizens [who travel abroad] these days, have very high expectations of what the British government can deliver—and fair enough.”149 When he appeared before us in November, Sir Michael Jay admitted that “There is a really difficult issue of what is the right level of expectation that people should have of the services which the Foreign
144 National Audit Office/Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Joint findings on lessons to be learned from the handling of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, 24 November 2005, table following para 3.23 145 Ev 61 146 Ev 65 147 National Audit Office/Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Joint findings on lessons to be learned from the handling of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, 24 November 2005, para 23 and table following para 23 148 Ev 64 149 ‘Straw apology to tsunami families’, BBC News Online, 26 December 2005, news.bbc.co.uk
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Office and the government can provide. There has been a rising level of expectation to the extent sometimes that we have not been able to deliver it.”150
105. Similarly, the NAO, in its report on consular services, refers in several places to a rise in public expectations of the assistance with which they should be provided by the FCO when they get into difficulties overseas. The report notes that:
The FCO believes that providing […] an intensive level of support in all cases is not sustainable, given resource constraints, but has acknowledged that an expectations gap has arisen and […] is working with some key lobby groups to explain its position and to reduce the expectation gap in some areas.151
The NAO goes on to note that as part of this work, the FCO is developing,
[…] greater publicity regarding the role of the FCO and the responsibilities of the individual, and maintaining a robust but defensible line in setting limits on the services provided, and in tailoring assistance according to transparent criteria based on need.152
106. We agree with this approach. We note, for example, that in its draft Guide to Consular Assistance, the FCO has included a section headed “The limits of what we can do.”153 Among the services which consular staff will not be expected to provide are obtaining work permits, giving legal advice, or searching for missing persons. Any of these circumstances is potentially distressing for the person placed in them in a foreign country, but we accept that in most cases it would not be appropriate for taxpayers to foot the bill for dealing with them. The draft Consular Guide sets out very clearly the help that can be given, and contains excellent advice on how people can help themselves.
107. We conclude that in recent years excessive and unrealistic expectations have arisen of what the FCO is able to do for people who get into difficulties abroad, including in circumstances such as natural disasters. We recommend that Ministers take a firm line in explaining to the public, not only through their official publications but also through the media, that there are practical limits to the consular support that British citizens who choose to travel abroad are entitled to receive, not least because of the FCO’s duty to make efficient and effective use of public funds. We nonetheless recommend that in the case of a further natural disaster on the scale of the Indian Ocean tsunami, exceptional assistance should be provided, tailored to the circumstances.
108. Our predecessor committee in the last Parliament reached the following conclusion:
We conclude that the response by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the appalling consequences of the tsunami was generally comprehensive, well co- ordinated and indispensable to those British nationals and their families affected by the disaster, both in the UK and the affected areas. We commend the strenuous
150 Q 33 151 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Foreign and Commonwealth Consular Services to British Nationals, HC 594, Session 2005–06, 24 November 2005, p 33 152 Ibid, p 42 153 Ev 56
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efforts of FCO staff who worked selflessly in the aftermath of the event to help the victims and their families. We also commend the departmental crisis management structures which were in place before the disaster happened, and which were used so effectively in the event.154
Since that conclusion was made, further information has come to light about shortcomings in the FCO response. As we note above, the FCO has subsequently acknowledged that mistakes were made and it asserts that it has learned the appropriate lessons from those mistakes.
109. We conclude that in most respects the FCO’s response to the immense challenge posed by the Indian Ocean tsunami was timely and successful. We conclude that the same can be said of the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It is important, however, that the FCO learns from the experience of responding to these major incidents and, in particular, from the mistakes which were undoubtedly made. We therefore welcome the FCO’s very informative and helpful progress report on how it is implementing the lessons learned from its handling of these disasters and we recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide an updated version of that table.
154 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2004–05, Human Rights Annual Report 2004, HC 109, para 61
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5 Diplomatic representation overseas
‘Alternative representation’ 110. The FCO’s Public Service Agreement 9 target requires it to provide “effective advice on, support for, and delivery of Government objectives through a viable and responsive network of diplomatic posts.”155 In its Departmental Report for 2004–05, the FCO explains that it “has been reorganising to deliver the priorities […] including closing eight sovereign and ten subordinate posts.”156 It is not clear, however, that this programme of closures has any particular rationale, beyond saving resources. The increased representation in some of the new EU member states, for example, is arguably less important given the EU single market and the number of decisions now taken in Brussels; whereas closures of Posts in small, relatively distant Commonwealth countries where a modest effort may generate a substantial diplomatic or trade return could incur real political and economic costs.
111. Our predecessors in the last Parliament pointed this out in their Report on the FCO’s Departmental Report 2003–04. They recommended that wherever possible the FCO should maintain its wide-reaching network of Posts.157 The FCO agreed that “The network is our greatest asset.”158 Sir Michael Jay also reminded us that “over the last seven years or so, [the FCO has] opened 29 posts and closed 25.”159 This is, as he pointed out, “a reflection of shifting priorities.” However, the latest announcements appear to reflect not so much a shifting of geographical or diplomatic priorities as a cost-cutting measure. We have no doubt that, given the choice, the FCO would have preferred to retain its network of Posts.
112. The most recent announcement of changes in overseas representation was made by the Secretary of State in a Written Ministerial Statement on 11 October 2005.160 The consolidated effect of these when taken together with the changes announced the previous December is as follows:
155 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 158 156 Ibid 157 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 50 158 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 3 159 Q 119 160 HC Deb, 11 October 2005, col 22–23WS
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Region Planned changes
Africa 4 UK staffed Posts to close
Americas 2 UK-staffed Posts to close; 2 Trade Offices to close
Asia/Pacific 5 UK-staffed Posts to close; 1 locally-staffed Post to close
Australia/NZ 3 UK-staffed Posts to become locally-staffed Posts
Europe 4 UK-staffed Posts to close; 5 UK-staffed Posts to become locally-staffed Posts
India 1 Trade Office to close and 2 Trade Offices to open
United States 3 UK-staffed Posts to close; 1 UK-staffed Post to become locally-staffed Post
Total (net effect) 18 UK-staffed Posts to close; 1 locally-staffed Post to close; 2 Trade Offices to close; 9 UK-staffed Posts to become locally-staffed Posts
113. In its response to one of our written questions, the FCO confirmed that 35 UK-based diplomatic staff posts will be cut as the changes are implemented. These reductions are in addition to staff savings in the senior management structure previously agreed.161 The financial savings are expected to be of the order of £6 million, not including property disposals, almost half of this from the closures or localisations in Europe.162 The October 2005 statement shows that 23 Posts will be (in some cases, already have been) closed, nine will be downgraded and one will be opened. These changes, it seems to us, are somewhat more far-reaching than the “adjustments at the margins of the network” which we were assured in November 2004 were all that was expected.163
114. We are particularly concerned that a number of the affected Posts are in Commonwealth countries, with which the United Kingdom has had a long and particularly close association. These include closure of the High Commissions in Swaziland and in Lesotho, both of which are now covered from Pretoria, South Africa. Such Posts will be particularly missed.
115. We also received evidence that the closure of the British Embassy in Antananarivo last August164 took place at a time when Madagascar was emerging from a long period of
161 Ev 7 162 Ev 7; Q 60 163 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 3 164 HC Deb, 19 January 2006, col 1534W
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misrule, with aid and trade opportunities opening up. The world’s second-biggest mining company, Rio Tinto, is reported as having written to the Foreign Secretary, expressing its disappointment at the closure of the Embassy.165 According to The Times, the Chief Executive of another British prospecting company active in Madagascar, Jubilee Platinum, said that embassies “are like insurance—they don’t matter until they matter.”166 A British visitor to Madagascar, Mr Thomas Rambaut, wrote to us to suggest that “The FCO have made a serious mistake in deciding to close the British Embassy in Antananarivo” and pointed out that the decision appears to be at odds with the Prime Minister’s declaration of 2005 as the Year of Africa.167 To these voices were added those of many eminent politicians—including the former Chairman of this Committee, Lord Anderson—Africa specialists, naturalists and others in a letter to The Times on 22 December 2005, calling on the Government to reverse the decision.168
116. We note that the FCO has taken a different approach in Liberia, where a full-time presence has been maintained by locating the sole United Kingdom-based officer in the US Embassy in Monrovia.169 In the Departmental Report for 2004–05, the FCO explains under the heading ‘Alternative representation overseas’ how it seeks efficiency savings by, “wherever appropriate”, sharing accommodation with an ally.170 Although this arrangement is not ideal, we believe that there are circumstances in which it makes good sense to co-locate, for example in countries where the United Kingdom has interests but they are not on a scale or of an importance sufficient to justify a free-standing Post, or where security considerations mean that it is impractical to maintain a separate Embassy. We were surprised that, given the Departmental Report’s endorsement of ‘alternative representation’ as a means of maintaining a diplomatic presence, co-location was not the preferred solution in respect of some of the other Posts which are being closed. We therefore asked the FCO what consideration had been given to this possibility.
117. Sir Michael Jay replied that the FCO had indeed considered co-location, either by having an ‘implant’ in another country’s embassy (as in Liberia) or by sharing premises (as is the case in a number of countries).171 Unfortunately, co-location did not prove to be a viable option in any of the cases this time. Sir Michael told us that the factors which determined this included a lack of opportunity (presumably, lack of a suitable partner or premises) and lack of potential for savings to be made. However, we note that since Sir Michael sent his reply, co-location has been chosen—on security grounds—as the preferred option for continued representation in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.172
118. We conclude that although co-location of a British sovereign Post with or within the post of another country is in general undesirable, it is almost always likely to be
165 ‘Rio Tinto hits hout at closure of embassy’, The Times, 10 September 2005, p 65 166 Ibid 167 Ev 93 168 ‘Embassy in Madagascar’, The Times, 22 December 2005, p 16 169 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Departmental Investment Strategy 2005, http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 8 170 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office departmental report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 201 171 Ev 48 172 Ev 82
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preferable to outright closure. We recommend that the FCO consider very carefully the case for co-location when adjusting its international priorities or when looking to achieve financial savings from its overseas operations.
119. The Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament recommended on more than one occasion the establishment of a United Kingdom-staffed Post in Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro. This recommendation was most recently re-stated in the Committee’s Report of February 2005 on the Western Balkans, when we drew attention to the likelihood that Montenegro will gain independence from Serbia.173 We raised this again when Sir Michael Jay appeared before us last October.174 In a subsequent letter, Sir Michael told us that “The Committee’s views will be given full weight” in the FCO’s deliberations on the future status of the Post in Podgorica.175 We conclude that the forthcoming referendum on Montenegro is likely to add to the case for the FCO to upgrade its Post in Podgorica to one headed by its own British Ambassador and appropriately staffed, and we recommend that this be done without further delay.
120. Our predecessors also consistently made the case for a full-time Post to be established in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, a friendly country which by the standards of its region has made some progress towards democracy.176 The absence of a British Ambassador in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, causes hurt and dismay among that country’s body politic and among those with whom the United Kingdom has a considerable interest in fostering closer relationships. The duties of Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan fall to the British Ambassador to Kazakhstan, some hundreds of miles away in Almaty. His responsibilities include representing British interests in an important and strategic country about the size of North West Europe. In addition, he is not based in that country’s capital but some thousand miles distant from it, which inevitably places an additional representative burden on him. The Committee has repeatedly urged Sir Michael, personally, when he has appeared before us, about the need for a small embassy in Bishkek. He confirmed that the FCO would wish to open a permanently-staffed Post in Bishkek but that it does not presently feel this is a priority for the resources it has available.177 Sir Michael undertook to keep this under review, which is a formulation often heard when something is kicked into the long grass. We recommend that the FCO make the opening of an Embassy in Bishkek a priority.
121. Regrettably, the British Council does not have an office in Kyrgyzstan either.
The overseas estate 122. Our predecessors in the last Parliament took a close interest in the FCO’s programme of selling off embassy, consulate and high commission buildings overseas, known in the FCO as ‘asset recycling’. In their final observations on this practice before the last general election, they reached the following conclusions:
173 Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2004–05, The Western Balkans, HC 87, para 96 174 Q 57 175 Ev 48 176 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles, Kyrgyzstan, available at www.fco.gov.uk 177 Q 66
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[…] the “asset recycling scheme” has had a very serious impact on the Foreign Office’s property portfolio, with valuable buildings that were appreciating in value being sacrificed on the altar of short-term Treasury-inspired targets. […] these sales have left the Foreign Office more at risk from fluctuations in the international property market and exchange rates, and may have significantly damaged the long- term financial strength of its estate.178
[…] serious mistakes were made during the sale and purchase of the residences in Dublin and New York and should not have occurred. Such incidents serve to underline the importance of effective scrutiny of the Foreign Office’s property transactions by Parliament.179
The Committee also criticised in very strong terms the FCO’s refusal to publish details of its estate sales.180 This practice was reversed, following pressure from the Committee. We now receive quarterly reports from the FCO, listing the properties that have been sold.
123. The FCO’s overseas estate consists of some 4,300 properties, including embassy buildings and staff accommodation.181 Of these, about 60% by value are owned and the remainder are leased. The highest proportion by value (over 70%) of owned assets as against leased assets is in Africa and the lowest (under half) is in Central and South America.182 The value of each part of the overseas estate is calculated with reference to the value of buildings put to similar use in the vicinity. The FCO itself recognises this is “not ideal” and it therefore has an agreement with the Treasury to maintain an ‘impairments reserve’ to absorb the negative financial effects of revaluations.183 This reserve has fluctuated from £198 million in 2000–01 to £20 million in 2004–05 and has been set at £50 million for 2007–08.184
124. The FCO’s Estate Strategy Unit (ESU) administers 857 of its overseas buildings. The remainder, which are mostly staff accommodation, are managed directly by Posts.185 In financial year 2004–05, the following disposals were made by the FCO:186
178 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 86 179 Ibid, para 92 180 Ibid, para 83 181 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy, http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 7 182 Ibid, figure 2 183 Ibid, para 12 184 Ibid, Table 2 185 Ibid, Annex III para 11 186 Source: House of Commons Library, see HC Deb, 10 January 2006, col 462W
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Sterling equivalent Post at time of sale (£000) Beirut 373 Budapest 298 Bucharest 1059 Buenos Aires 477 Canberra 856 Caracas 763 Copenhagen 661 Dublin 524 Kampala 14 Kiev 69 Kuala Lumpur 203 Lusaka 343 Port Louis 77 Pretoria 69 St Georges 254 San Salvador 1155 Santiago 470 Tashkent 19 Tel Aviv 725 The Hague 154 Tunis 1,076 Vienna 807 Wellington 128 Total gross income from property sales in 2004–05 was thus £10,574,000. It is, of course, important to bear in mind that there are costs associated with property sales; the FCO estimates its transaction costs at about 6 to 8%.187
125. The Departmental Investment Strategy 2004–07 records that the ESU’s estate sales or ‘asset recycling’ programme “has shifted into a lower gear. There are fewer under- performing properties to sell, and the reduction in the [Treasury’s] Test Discount Rate from 6% to 3.5% has shifted the value for money in favour of owning property.”188 However, the FCO’s Capital Plan for the period 2005–06 to 2007–08 projects a consistent annual income from estate sales of £10 million.189 It appears from the Efficiency Technical Note published in November 2005 that £4 million of these receipts may be cashable.190 The FCO intends that all of this income will be reinvested in the estate191—a list showing the considerable number of building and refurbishment projects overseas scheduled for financial years 2005–06 and 2006–07 was published in Hansard in December 2005.192 The
187 Ev 49 188 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy, http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 47 189 Ibid, Table 3 190 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Efficiency Technical Note, See www.fco.gov.uk 191 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy, http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 48 192 HC Deb, 19 December 2005, cols 2474W and 2475W
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list includes a substantial sum for redevelopment of the estate in Warsaw, an increasingly important EU Post which a number of us visited recently.
126. The FCO has also developed an Estate Strategy for managing its home and overseas estate.193 This strategy notes that “unless there are major changes of policy is respect of the nature and pattern of HMG’s overseas representation, we judge that further large sales or other deals are unlikely. We note that high-profile sales can be difficult to carry through successfully, and can be controversial.”194 We welcome this statement, but we note that notwithstanding the new estate strategy the intention remains to dispose of not less than £10 million of assets overseas in each of the next three financial years. This will be a considerable sum to amass from small, low-profile sales.
127. We are therefore concerned to note that when the strategy refers to an unspecified number of “properties accepted as of special architectural or historical importance”, including 40 residences, it suggests that the decision on whether to retain them may rest on a trade-off between the market value of the property and the “present importance of the country in question.”195 It is quite conceivable that the sale of a single historic property could deliver the FCO’s entire ‘asset recycling’ requirement for a year or more. If the worth of the property is to be assessed on the basis of the “present importance” of the country in which it is situated, there is the danger that short-term priorities may prevail over long- term interests. The ESU has undertaken to consult Ministers on major decisions affecting the historic properties; it does not state whether these include Treasury Ministers.
128. We conclude that there is no clear basis for the FCO’s projected receipts of £10 million from estate sales over the next three financial years. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO explain how it arrived at this projection, whether it regards the figure as a target, and if so how it expects to achieve it without “further large sales or other deals”, particularly involving properties of special architectural or historical importance.
129. In last year’s Report, our predecessors recorded their strong dissatisfaction with the FCO’s handling of the sale of the residence of the Ambassador in Dublin—Glencairn—and the purchase of a new residence—Marley Grange—followed by the decision to retain the original residence, which left the newly-purchased property surplus to requirements.196 The National Audit Office, too, reported its conclusions on this episode.
[…] in 2000 the Department gave insufficient consideration to retaining the Ambassador’s and Defence Attaché’s residences at Glencairn while selling the bulk of the estate. […] The Department embarked on the sale of Glencairn without real knowledge of the likelihood of being able to find the kind of replacement that it wished to purchase. Its criteria for seeking a replacement residence in Dublin 4 were initially too restrictive, and eventually could not be met […] The purchase of Marlay
193 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy, http://www.fco.gov.uk, Annex III 194 Ibid, Annex III para 18 195 Ibid, Annex III para 19 196 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, paras 87–92
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Grange for £6.4 million should not have gone ahead unless the owners had first agreed to a full survey of the general condition of the property.197
The FCO recognised that mistakes had been made, and undertook not to repeat them.198 We sought an update on the position with respect to these properties and were told by the FCO that “it remains our intention to repurchase Glencairn […] Pending completion of the re-purchase, we have not marketed Marley Grange.”199 We asked for a further update when Sir Michael Jay appeared before the Committee in November 2005. Sir Michael wrote that “Work continues on the repurchase” of Glencairn, but that meanwhile the residence is occupied free of rent.200
130. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been paying close attention to the FCO’s management of its overseas estate for some years now. Over that period, despite serious lapses such as the mishandled sale of the Dublin residence, we have begun to see some signs of improvement, particularly in the scope and quality of information presented to Parliament. We conclude that the provision of information on the FCO’s management of its overseas estate has improved in recent years. We welcome the quarterly reports which the Committee now receives from FCO, and we will continue to scrutinise these and the policies which underlie them closely.
197 National Audit Office Report, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Resource Accounts 2003–04: Rationalisation of the Glencairn Estate in Dublin, HC (2003–04) 1088 198 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, pp 6 and 7 199 Ev 10 200 Ev 48
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6 FCO personnel issues
Security of FCO personnel 131. In their Report on the FCO’s Departmental Report for 2003–04, the Committee in the last Parliament condemned the bombing attack on the British Consulate-General in Istanbul, which resulted in four fatalities.201 They welcomed additional security measures being taken to protect those who work in the United Kingdom’s embassies, high commissions, consulates and other offices abroad and expressed satisfaction that the Treasury was releasing additional funding for these measures.202 In reply, the FCO described some of the work it was undertaking and reaffirmed that security of personnel is one of its highest priorities.203
132. The FCO’s Departmental Report for 2004–05 records that more than £21 million has been made available from the Treasury reserve for security measures at Posts overseas, with additional measures being put in place at 167 locations.204 In a memorandum to the Committee, the FCO informed us that £25 million has been set aside for expenditure on security in 2006–07 and £28 million in 2007–08.205 We greatly welcome the fact that the need for this work to be properly funded has been recognised. In some cases, we have been able to see the worthwhile results of the work for ourselves. We are also aware, however, that the threat to officials serving abroad is certainly not decreasing and we are concerned that the security works programme is apparently running behind time.206 We continue to be concerned for the welfare of staff who serve their country in the more dangerous parts of the world. We recommend that the FCO maintain its commitment to ensuring that adequate safety and security measures are put in place, with an appropriate level of funding. This funding should be in addition to the FCO’s agreed public expenditure allocation, in recognition of the exceptional nature of the cost of protecting personnel and property from terrorist attacks.
Disciplinary procedures 133. In January 2005, our predecessor Committee heard oral evidence from Sir Michael Jay on the FCO’s disciplinary procedures.207 We followed up this interest when Sir Michael appeared before us in October 2005 and Sir Michael wrote to us after his appearance with further information. He confirmed that no public money has been spent in any of the last
201 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 56 202 Ibid, paras 62 and 63 203 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 4 204 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, pp 199 and 200 205 Ev 6 206 Ev 9 207 Oral evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 15 March 2005, HC (2004–05) 436
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five years in settlement of grievance procedures brought against senior FCO staff by junior staff; he informed us of the amounts paid out as a result of Employment Tribunal claims in the last five years; he told us that £60,000 has been paid in damages following court cases in the last year; he provided details of disciplinary cases involving members of the FCO’s senior management service in the last three years; and he confirmed that members of staff leaving the service had received payments to which they were entitled, and no more.208
Publication of memoirs 134. Over the past months, several cases have illustrated the difficult issues which are thrown up when former senior public servants—specifically, former ambassadors—seek to publish books of their memoirs. The three cases which have featured prominently have been those of Sir Christopher Meyer, former Ambassador to Washington; Sir Jeremy Greenstock, former Permanent Representative at the United Nations; and Craig Murray, former Ambassador to Tashkent (Uzbekistan).
135. We asked Sir Michael Jay about the procedures for clearing these potentially very revealing personal records. He confirmed that all former public servants seeking to publish recollections of their time in post are expected to submit their work to the Government so that it may be vetted. He identified the three criteria that a would-be author should satisfy as “not crossing the line on issues of international relations or public security or […] the need to maintain the confidence of relationships between ministers and senior officials.”209 Finally, Sir Michael confirmed that “the ultimate decisions, the ultimate judgments, will be made by ministers.”210
136. The Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) has been undertaking an inquiry into political memoirs based on the author’s period in office, and has taken evidence from, among others, the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Sir Christopher Meyer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock. Lord Wilson described for PASC the procedure he followed when in office for approving memoirs, including those of the former head of the Security Service, Dame Stella Rimington.211 Both Lord Wilson’s evidence to the PASC and Sir Michael Jay’s evidence to us describe what are known as the Radcliffe Rules, a voluntary code of conduct introduced in 1976 following the controversy over the Crossman diaries.
137. As he explained to the PASC in January 2006, Sir Jeremy Greenstock followed the procedures set out in the Radcliffe Rules when he submitted to the FCO draft chapters of his book covering the period he spent as Permanent Representative to the United Nations and as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative in Iraq.212 Sir Jeremy acknowledged that his book was unusual, in that it dealt with matters of current as well as of historical interest, but he pointed out to the Committee that this was not against the rules and, moreover, that
208 Ev 49 209 Qq 89–90 210 Q 91 211 Oral Evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee on 17 November 2005, HC 689–i, Qq 46 and 47 212 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee, HC689–iii, Q 294
56 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
he was willing to accommodate changes suggested by the FCO as part of the vetting process.213 This process became quite protracted and eventually, Sir Jeremy withdrew his book, following an interview with the Foreign Secretary.214
138. Sir Christopher Meyer’s book was submitted to the Cabinet Secretary. In his case, this was done only after repeated requests from the Government. In a parliamentary written answer on 28 November 2005, the Foreign Secretary told the House that,
The Cabinet Office sent a copy of the book to the FCO and both Departments reviewed it against the standard criteria for clearing publications under the rules. The judgment, with which I agreed, was made on the particular facts of this case that no changes should be sought primarily because the book posed no national security risk; it contained nothing substantially new which we judged would harm relations with the US; and nothing was specifically identified that was considered so damaging as to require consideration of legal action.215
It appears from this answer that Sir Christopher’s book satisfied the first two Radcliffe criteria; it is less clear that it satisfied the third. However, no objection was raised by the Government, beyond a letter expressing disappointment about the disclosure of confidences. Sir Christopher told the PASC that he regarded the Cabinet Office’s reaction as giving him “a green light to publish” and he therefore went ahead.216
139. Craig Murray states on his website that he submitted the text of his book of memoirs to the FCO on 29 September 2005. In his covering letter, Mr Murray wrote “I rather hope that you do try to prevent publication, because you won’t succeed, and it may help me secure a publisher. Publishers in this country remain less than interested.”217 Following exchanges of e-mails between Mr Murray and the FCO, the FCO formally replied to Mr Murray on 8 February 2006, refusing to condone publication of the book, and reserving the rights of the Crown to take legal action. Mr Murray now intends to publish his book in June 2006.
140. Following all this, and in addition to the inquiry being conducted by our colleagues on the Public Administration Select Committee, both the FCO and the Cabinet Office are reviewing the relevant regulations which apply to serving or to former staff.218 We await the outcomes of those reviews, and the recommendations of our colleagues on the PASC, with considerable interest. Meanwhile, Sir Michael Jay has written to all Ambassadors and High Commissioners, stressing the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers.219
213 Ibid, Q321 214 Ibid, Qq 288–293 215 HC Deb, 28 November 2005, col 165W 216 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee on 15 December 2005, HC689–ii, Q 120 217 See www.craigmurray.co.uk 218 HC Deb, 28 November 2005, col 166W 219 ‘Undiplomatic memoirs cannot be banned, says top civil servant’, The Times, 16 November 2005, p 38
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 57
141. We strongly support the decision by Sir Michael Jay to write to Ambassadors and High Commissioners, reminding them of the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers. We conclude that the breaking of trust or breaching of confidence on either side is against the best interests of officials and politicians alike and that it can be inimical to the conduct of effective foreign policy. However, we also conclude that where FCO officials comply with the Radcliffe rules and criteria, they should remain free to publish if they so choose.
Senior diplomatic appointments 142. On more than occasion during the course of the last Parliament, our predecessor Committee recorded its intention to scrutinise any appointment of someone from outside the diplomatic service to a senior diplomatic post.220 The Government announced its intention to make two such appointments some time ago, but the appointments were actually made shortly after the general election of 2005. Two former Members of the House of Commons who had also been Cabinet Ministers were appointed: Rt Hon Helen Liddell as High Commissioner to Australia, and Rt Hon Paul Boateng as High Commissioner to South Africa. Both appointments were faits accomplis by the time the Committee was nominated in the new Parliament, so we did not hold hearings with them. It is our intention, should comparable nominations be made during this Parliament, to move with some expedition to hold ‘confirmatory hearings,’ hopefully before the appointments are formally made.
143. A further, if somewhat different case which arose at about the same time was the vacancy for a Head of Mission in the Holy See. In this case, the FCO chose to advertise the appointment last July in the following national newspapers:
• The Economist
• The Guardian and The Guardian Web page
• The Daily Telegraph
• The Independent
• The Times
• The Financial Times221
We are concerned that no advertisements were placed in national papers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Ambassadors represent the whole of the United Kingdom. It should not be ignored that for many people the publications listed above can be seen as very London-oriented and ‘English’.
144. Sir Michael Jay told us that 120 applications were received for the post.222 Sir Michael subsequently wrote to our Chairman, informing him that a former diplomat, Mr Francis
220 See, for example, Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2004–05, The work of the Committee in 2004, HC 112, para 50. 221 HC Deb, 1 November 2005, col 954W
58 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Campbell, had been successful in the open competition.223 However, Sir Michael omitted from his letter any reference to the fact that it had already been decided that the new Ambassador should work from offices within the compound of the British Embassy to Italy and that the offices previously used by the Embassy to the Holy See had been closed— according to a newspaper report, in order to reduce costs.224 Sir Michael later wrote to us, stating that the move was in response to security concerns.225 He also confirmed that it had been planned to move the Ambassador’s residence to within the Rome Embassy compound, but that following representations by the Holy See these plans have been abandoned.
145. We recommend that the FCO provide the Committee with full details of any representations made by the Holy See, by the outgoing British Ambassador to the Holy See, or by the British Ambassador to Italy, about the propriety or acceptability of locating the Embassy to the Holy See or the residence of the Ambassador to the Holy See within the campus of the British Embassy to the Republic of Italy.
Diversity 146. In its Report on the FCO’s Departmental Report for 2003–04, the Committee in the last Parliament welcomed the FCO’s commitment to recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce, but noted that the Office still had a considerable way to go to meet its diversity targets.226 The FCO recognised this in its response, noting that it was “unlikely” to meet its diversity targets for 2005.227
147. At its meeting on 5 December 2005, the FCO Board noted that they continue to have a poor record in diversity compared to other government departments:
The Board agreed that there was a strong business case in favour of diversity: current lack of diversity was holding the FCO back. This had to be addressed urgently, within the proper legal framework, and emphasising that promotion continued to be on merit. Discussion focused on gender in the SMS, where we are performing worst […] .228
We asked the FCO to provide us with a breakdown of the diversity of its staff and received the following information in response.229
222 Q 65; see also HC Deb, 17 November 2005, col 1484W 223 Ev 80 224 ‘Britain risks row with Vatican over proposal to close embassy’, The Times, 9 January 2006, p 25 225 Ev 81 226 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 130 227 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 11 228 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO Board Minutes, December 2005, see www.fco.gov.uk 229 Ev 81
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 59
Total staff by grade, at 1 August 2005230
Grade Male Female % Minority % Disabled % Total Ethnic SMS 389 69 15.10% 6 1.30% 7 1.50% 458 D7 178 53 22.90% 2 0.90% 4 1.70% 231 D6 504 233 31.60% 14 1.90% 19 2.60% 737 C5 464 165 26.20% 14 2.20% 17 2.70% 629 C4 802 478 37.30% 30 2.30% 32 2.50% 1280 B3 704 743 51.30% 94 6.50% 39 2.70% 1447 A2 440 671 60.40% 120 10.80% 47 4.20% 1111 A1 125 80 39% 17 8.30% 20 9.70% 205 Totals 3606 2492 40.90% 297 4.90% 185 3% 6098 148. The figures for recruitment of permanent staff in 2004–05 reveal an interesting picture, which may explain the concerns now apparently felt by the Board. Although the proportion of all recruits who were women was very close to the proportion of existing staff who are women—41% as against 40.9%—only 33% of recruits to the mainstream graduate entry (C4) grade were women. For FCO Services the picture was a good deal worse: all 28 recruits to the C4 grade in 2004–05 were men.231 These figures certainly give us cause for concern.
149. The FCO has developed a new Race Equality Scheme (RES) in response to the challenges it faces in conforming with the requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.232 The RES applies to the FCO not only as an employer but also as a service provider, both in the United Kingdom and overseas. However, as with the under- representation of women, the numbers of senior managers from ethnic minorities are disproportionately small.
150. We conclude that the FCO Board is absolutely right to recognise the need to address urgently such gender and ethnic minority imbalances as remain. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide further information on what it is doing to remedy this situation.
230 Note by Foreign & Commonwealth Office: these figures include FCO Services, UKVisas, UK Trade & Investment staff. They do not include staff on special unpaid leave, additional maternity leave, sick nil pay, casual staff, fixed-term contracts and fee-paid officers. 231 Ev 24 232 Ev 25
60 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
7 BBC Monitoring
151. BBC Monitoring (BBCM), part of the BBC World Service, provides a service of international news and comment gathered from the mass media around the world. It supplies a range of public and commercial bodies, including the security and intelligence agencies, with recordings, transcripts and translations of foreign broadcasts. In 2004–05, BBCM kept track of national and regional developments across the world from the Middle East to Russia and Ukraine.233 For example, the World Service told us how the BBCM had helped to unravel a confused picture of events during the Beslan siege.234
152. BBCM’s four main stakeholders are the FCO, the BBC World Service, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office. In 2004–05, the FCO contributed £7 million to the BBCM out of its total funding that year of £22.1 million; the other three stakeholders made up the balance.235 The FCO, as the largest contributor, has been the sponsoring department for BBCM in Government.
153. As our predecessor Committee noted in its Report on the FCO Departmental Report for 2003–04, the FCO carried out a review of its funding of BBCM.236 In June 2004, the FCO wrote to the Committee to say that it planned to reduce its contribution to BBCM by £2 million per annum.237 Sir Michael Jay explained that BBC Monitoring’s overall funding would, however, remain at its then current level as the difference would be made up by the other stakeholders and from a BBC Monitoring Reserve.238 The Committee concluded that,
[…] it is utterly perverse that the future of BBC Monitoring should be placed in doubt at the very time when its services are arguably most important to the country's security and diplomatic needs, and when it is being almost universally praised by its users. We recommend that BBC Monitoring be given financial security by the FCO and its other stakeholders to ensure its future.239
The Government responded that,
The quality of BBC Monitoring’s output is not in question. However, faced with the continuing pressures on resources, the FCO has to determine which activities and products best contribute to delivery of the Strategic priorities, as outlined in the FCO’s Strategy. This has meant tough decisions.240
The message could hardly have been clearer: BBCM was no longer a priority for the FCO.
233 BBC World Service, Annual Review 2004–05, June 2005 234 Ev 99 235 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003–2004, HC 745, para 166; Ev 112 236 Ibid, para 166 237 Ibid; Ev112; 238 Ibid; Ev 112 239 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign and Commonwealth Annual Report 2003–04, HC 745, para 165 240 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 13
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 61
154. It is unlikely to have been a coincidence, then, that in 2004 the Cabinet Office instituted a review of BBCM’s future funding.241 In July 2005 Dr Christopher Westcott, Director of BBC Monitoring, wrote to inform us of its findings.242 The Review concluded that the partnership between the Government and BBCM represented “excellent value for money” and that it should be a “UK objective” to give BBCM stability and confidence, to allow it to focus on maintaining an operation that matches its customers’ needs.243 The Review also recommended that BBCM move to a “ring-fenced” funding arrangement, rather than receiving subscriptions from stakeholders, and that its sponsoring department should be the Cabinet Office, rather than the FCO.
155. It appears that BBCM’s ‘divorce’ from the FCO was less than amicable. According to Dr Westcott, at the outset of the Review the FCO proposed a “non-negotiable” reduction of £4.5 million in BBCM’s funding.244 He went on to say that achieving the final financial agreement took “considerable time and effort” by the reviewers following “extensive discussions” with the stakeholders and HM Treasury and that these discussions had been made difficult by the FCO insistence that it reduce its funding of BBCM’s by more than twice the £2 million reduction it had originally sought.
156. The Cabinet Office Review recommended an increase in average funding for BBCM to £24.6 million per annum for financial years 2006–07 to 2010–11, although ultimately the Treasury agreed an average settlement of £23.8 million per annum over the quinquennium.245 The first table below sets out BBCM’s funding for 2003–04 to 2010–11, and the second shows stakeholders’ individual annual contributions from 2006–07.
Cabinet Office funding review of BBC Monitoring246
£ million Financial year Current Review Review stakeholder recommendation outcome funding for funding
2003–04 22.1 — — 2004–05 22.1 — — 2005–06 21.1 — — 2006–07 — 24.6 24.6 2007–08 — 24.6 24.6 2008–09 — 24.6 23.4 2009–10 — 24.6 23.4 2010–11 — 24.6 23.4
241 The review was carried out by Sir Quentin Thomas (a former senior civil servant) and Sir David Omand (a former security and intelligence co-ordinator). 242 Ev 99 243 Ev 53 244 Ev 53 245 Ev 53 246 Ev 53
62 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Stakeholder financial contributions from 2006–07247
£ million Ministry of Defence 7.5 World Service 6.1 Cabinet Office 5.4 FCO 3.1 Total 22.1 Notes: 1. In addition to stakeholder contributions in FYs 2006–07 and 2007–08 the Treasury has agreed to add £2.5 million per annum to BBCM’s funding from the Counter Terrorism Reserve, making a total of £24.6m 2. From FY 2008–09 the Treasury will add £1.3 million per annum to BBCM’s baseline funding
157. Nigel Chapman, Director of the BBC World Service, told us that finally BBCM had been given a stable financial footing, though he recognised that it faced challenges ahead.248 He added:
I think the stakeholders have also realised the value to Britain of [BBCM’s] services, and that allowing it to wither on the vine, which was a fear many of us had, would have been a very bad thing to have allowed to happen, and it is not now going to happen.249
There will, however, be consequences from the reduction in funding. Dr Westcott told us that as a consequence of the £0.8 million per annum shortfall from 2007 the loss of up to 80 posts was likely to be necessary.250
158. When we took evidence from Sir Michael Jay we of course asked about the FCO’s reasons for reducing its funding of BBC Monitoring. Sir Michael told us that although the FCO valued the work of BBCM, he believed it had been paying too high a share of the overall cost.251 He suggested that reducing its contribution to BBCM was one way for the FCO to achieve its efficiency savings targets.252 We are not convinced that a transfer of responsibility from one government department to another does, in fact, represent an efficiency saving. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO explain how the reduction in its funding of BBC Monitoring has contributed to its efficiency savings targets; and whether the Treasury has accepted this.
159. We conclude that it is reassuring that BBC Monitoring has finally been given the financial stability it has been seeking and we believe that this should enable it to plan more strategically up to 2011. We also conclude that the quid pro quo for this certainty
247 Ev 50 248 To be printed with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s forthcoming report on Public Diplomacy, HC 903, Q 110. 249 Ibid, Q 110 250 Ev 53 251 Q 97 252 Q98
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 63
should be a continuing drive by BBC Monitoring to maximise its efficiency. We recommend that the FCO and the other sponsoring departments maintain their close interest in the operations of BBCM, to ensure that BBCM continues to offer excellent value for money.
64 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Formal minutes
Wednesday 15 February 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr Fabian Hamilton Sandra Osborne Mr David Heathcoat- Mr Greg Pope Amory Mr John Horam Mr Ken Purchase Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanlay Andrew Mackinlay Richard Younger-Ross
The Committee deliberated.
Draft Report [Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05], proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 17 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 18 to 20 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 21 to 30 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 31 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 32 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 33 and 34 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 35 and 36 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 37 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 38 to 42 read and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up and read, as follows:
We understand that consideration of a successor to Sir Michael Jay as Permanent Under-Secretary is imminent. We urge the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to pay heed to the criticisms of leadership and unwillingness to make changes by senior managers which are detailed in the Collinson Grant report, when the appointment to succeed Sir Michael is determined.
Question, That the paragraph be read a second time, put and negatived.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 65
Paragraphs 43 to 46 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 47 read, amended and agreed to.
A paragraph—(The Chairman)—brought up, read the first and second time, and inserted (now paragraph 48).
Paragraphs 48 to 51 (now paragraphs 49 to 52) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 52 (now paragraph 53) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 53 to 54 (now paragraphs 54 to 55) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 55 (now paragraph 56) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 56 to 65 (now paragraphs 57 to 66) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 66 (now paragraph 67) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 67 (now paragraph 68) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 68 to 70 (now paragraphs 69 to 71) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 71 (now paragraph 72) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 72 to 76 (now paragraphs 73 to 77) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 77 (now paragraph 78) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 79 read, as follows:
The Collinson Grant Report was commissioned by the FCO’s Director General (Corporate Affairs), Dickie Stagg. Commenting on the lack of enthusiasm which the process had encountered among some of his colleagues, Mr Stagg told us that “it is inevitable that, if you bring in people who are clearly seen as being something of a threat to the status quo, there are people who are unenthusiastic about that process.” Sir Michael Jay, however, assured us that he and his colleagues on the Board took their duty to consider the report’s findings “extremely seriously”. The FCO told us what it has been doing to implement the report’s findings:
The FCO Board considered the Collinson Grant report at its meeting on 28 January 2005. It re-committed itself to achieving the £87 million target and agreed to incorporate the Collinson Grant work as far as possible into the FCO’s existing Efficiency Plan. In addition, based on the findings, the Board agreed to review the Finance function in the FCO, both in London and overseas; identify resources that could be reallocated from low to high priority activity using the Collinson Grant comparative analysis of expenditure; and monitor, at Board level, the FCO’s efforts to re-prioritise resources. The Board does not accept that the FCO lacks appropriate political and diplomatic skills.
Since the Board decisions a number of actions have been taken to deliver the efficiency targets. These include: substituting locally engaged for some UK-based staff; rationalising the various change programmes in the FCO; reducing the number
66 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
of people in the Corporate pool; improving the workings of the internal market; and reducing administrative costs. Work on the finance function will be taken forward in the light of the Treasury and NAO review …
The staff reductions, agreed with the Treasury as part of the FCO’s Efficiency Plan, are being achieved by adjusting recruitment targets and a programme of early retirement. The FCO is committed to increasing both the skills base of its employees and to better utilising the skills already available, including through active engagement in the Professional Skills in Government initiative. We intend to manage changes in our workforce in ways that will support these policies.
Amendment proposed, in line 5, to leave out from “process” to “us” and insert “We consider these comments to be, at their best, glib and complacent. It is unacceptable that the Collinson Grant review, or any comparable exercise, should face indifference and in some cases wilful obstruction by senior personnel. Consequently, we take some limited reassurance from Sir Michael Jay, when he told”.—(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 80).
Paragraphs 80 and 81 (now paragraphs 81 and 82) read and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up and read, as follows:
We can only conclude from this that Sir Michael is part of the problem. Under his stewardship, the report was originally suppressed. It criticised the management he was supposed to lead. He acquiesced in a situation where some senior managers failed to collaborate with Collinson Grant’s proper inquiries. His senior managers did not contest or seek to correct prior to publication errors which they now allege are contained in the Collinson Grant report. When asked what he deems to be “ill founded” in the recommendations of Collinson Grant, he failed to give a specific example. This is all wholly unacceptable from a Permanent Under-Secretary.
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 3 Noes, 2
Andrew Mackinlay Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase Richard Younger-Ross
Paragraph inserted (now paragraph 83).
Paragraph 82 (now paragraph 84) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 83 (now paragraph 85) read, as follows:
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 67
We congratulate FCO managers on their decision to invite external consultants to carry out a study of their efficiency, effectiveness and control of costs, although we have concerns about the lack of thoroughness with which the review was carried out and about the lack of seriousness with which the FCO regarded and appears still to regard the project. We conclude that, having commissioned the study, the FCO must deal with it seriously: this suggests that the FCO should change some of its management practices and its efficiency savings targets or it should defend and justify them, explaining where and how the consultants are mistaken in their conclusions. So far, we have seen no evidence that it is succeeding in doing either.
Amendment proposed, to leave out from beginning to “We” in line 5 and insert “We would normally congratulate managers who invite external consultants to carry out a study of their efficiency, effectiveness and control of costs. However, in this case there was clearly a rather arrogant assumption that the consultants would make a positive report about the stewardship and management of the FCO. In the event, the report was very adverse and we can only conclude that there was consequently a deliberate attempt to suppress and hide serious failings in the style, management and stewardship of the FCO”.—(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
Paragraph 83 (now paragraph 85) agreed to.
Paragraphs 84 to 87 (now paragraphs 86 to 89) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 88 ( now paragraph 90) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 89 to 116 (now paragraphs 91 to 118) read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 117 and 118 (now paragraphs 119 and 120) read, amended and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up, read the first and second time, and inserted (now paragraph 121).
Paragraphs 119 to 135 (now paragraphs 122 to 138) read and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up and read, as follows:
In any event, we are not comfortable with the fact that it would appear that Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s book may not now be published. We find it hard to countenance that Sir Jeremy would seek to publish anything that would prejudice national security or disadvantage any negotiating position of the United Kingdom. We feel that the publication of his recollections as to the decision-making process or policy formulation
68 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
towards Iraq (both before the conflict and subsequently) would help to inform public and parliamentary opinion.
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 3 Noes, 4
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Sandra Osborne Richard Younger-Ross Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
Paragraph 136 (now paragraph 139) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 137 read, as follows:
Following all this, and in addition to the inquiry being conducted by our colleagues on the Public Administration Select Committee, both the FCO and the Cabinet Office are reviewing the relevant regulations which apply to serving or to former staff. We await the outcomes of those reviews, and the recommendations of our colleagues on the PASC, with considerable interest. Meanwhile, Sir Michael Jay has written to all Ambassadors and High Commissioners, stressing the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers.
Amendment proposed, at the end, to add “Whilst we accept that in the interim it is reasonable that former senior officials are encouraged to adhere to the spirit of the voluntary Radcliffe rules, we nevertheless hope that, within those rules, Sir Jeremy’s desire to publish could still be accommodated. Consequently, we would urge that further discussions be held between Sir Jeremy and the Government, with a view to reaching some agreement on those matters disclosed in his draft, thereby facilitating publication”.—(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question put, that the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 3 Noes, 4
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Sandra Osborne Richard Younger-Ross Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 140).
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 69
Paragraph 138 read, as follows:
We strongly support the decision by Sir Michael Jay to write to Ambassadors and High Commissioners, reminding them of the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers. We conclude that the breaking of trust or breaching of confidence on either side is against the best interests of officials and politicians alike and that it can be inimical to the conduct of effective foreign policy.
Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out “strongly”.—(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, to leave out from “Ministers” to the end of the paragraph. —(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
An Amendment made.
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 141).
Paragraph 139 (now paragraph 142) read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 140 (now paragraph 143) brought up and read, as follows:
A further, if somewhat different case which arose at about the same time was the vacancy for a Head of Mission in the Holy See. In this case, the FCO chose to advertise the appointment last July in the following national newspapers:
• The Economist • The Guardian and The Guardian Web page • The Daily Telegraph • The Independent • The Times • The Financial Times
Amendment proposed, at the end, to add “We are concerned that no advertisements were placed in national papers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Ambassadors represent the whole of the United Kingdom. It should not be ignored that for many people the publications listed above can be seen as very London-oriented and ‘English’”—(Mr Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
70 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Ayes, 4 Noes, 2
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Sir John Stanley Richard Younger-Ross
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 143).
Paragraph 141 brought up and read, as follows:
Sir Michael Jay told us that 120 applications were received for the post. Sir Michael subsequently wrote to our Chairman, informing him that a former diplomat, Mr Francis Campbell, had been successful in the open competition. However, Sir Michael omitted from his letter any reference to the fact that it had already been decided that the new Ambassador should work from offices within the compound of the British Embassy to Italy and that the offices previously used by the Embassy to the Holy See had been closed—according to a newspaper report, in order to reduce costs. Sir Michael later wrote to us, stating that the move was in response to security concerns. He also confirmed that it had been planned to move the Ambassador’s residence to within the Rome Embassy compound, but that following representations by the Holy See these plans have been abandoned.
Amendment proposed, at the end, to add “We have not been given any information as to where the newly-appointed Ambassador is to have his residence or about the nature of his accommodation. However, it appears from Sir Michael’s letter that the lease on the present, rather prestigious residence has been or shortly will be terminated. We therefore seek reassurance that the status of this post is not being diminished by the downgrading of accommodation as part of a cost-cutting exercise.”— (Mr Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2 Noes, 3
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Richard Younger-Ross Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 144).
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up and read, as follows:
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 71
In any event, we have not been given any satisfactory explanation as to why, uniquely, this post was filled by public advertisement. Why was this done? We do not dismiss the possibility that posts could at some time in the future be filled this way. However, the case for altering the existing, traditional appointments system needs to be made to Parliament and should also be subject to extensive consultation with the representative organisations of diplomatic staff.
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2 Noes, 4
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Richard Younger-Ross Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up and read, as follows:
We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO provide us with full details of the size and facilities of the new residence of the Ambassador to the Holy See. We also recommend that the FCO supply us with a fully detailed schedule of the type and cost of works and refurbishment carried out at the Embassy to the Holy See and at the Ambassador’s residence over the past five years.
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2 Noes, 4
Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Richard Younger-Ross Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraph 145).
Paragraphs 142 to 155 (now paragraphs 146 to 159) read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report, as amended, be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.
72 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select Committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.
Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.
Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.—(The Chairman).
The Committee further deliberated.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 8 March at Two o’clock
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 73
List of witnesses
Wednesday 26 October 2005 Page
Sir Michael Jay KCMG, Permanent Under-Secretary, Mr Richard Stagg CMG, Director-General (Corporate), Mr David Warren, Director, (Human Resources) and Mr Ric Todd, Director (Finance), Foreign & Commonwealth Office Ev 26
74 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05
List of written evidence
FCO Annual Report Foreign and Commonwealth Office Written evidence Ev 1: Ev 6: Ev 43 Follow-up to oral evidence on 26 October 2005 Ev 45
BBC Monitoring Dr Chris Westcott, Director, BBC Monitoring Written evidence Ev 53
Consular services Foreign and Commonwealth Office Notifiable serious arrestable offences Ev 55 Consular guide consultation Ev 56 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Ev 57 NAO report on tsunami Ev 64 Consular case – Craig Alden Ev 72
Contingency planning Foreign and Commonwealth Office Flu pandemic: FCO business continuity and contingency planning Ev 79
Diplomatic representation Foreign and Commonwealth Office Embassy to the Holy See Ev 80: Ev 81 Representation to Côte de Ivoire Ev 82 Representation to Equatorial Guinea Ev 82
Finance and estimates Foreign and Commonwealth Office FCO supply estimates Ev 82 FCO departmental investment strategy Ev 86 Winter supplementary estimates Ev 86 Spring supplementary estimates Ev 89 Fraud in Tel Aviv Ev 89
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004–05 75
Global opportunities fund Foreign and Commonwealth Office GOF Annual Report Ev 92
Overseas Posts and FCO estate Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quarterly Sales Ev 94: Ev 96 Overseas network Ev 94 Thomas Rambaut Written evidence Ev 93
Miscellaneous BBC World Service Written evidence Ev 99 Foreign and Commonwealth Office IiP recognition Ev 97 UK International priorities Ev 99
Reports and Evidence from the Foreign Affairs Committee since 2005
The following reports and evidence have been produced in the present Parliament.
Session 2005–06 REPORTS First Report Human Rights Annual Report 2005 HC 574
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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence
Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee
on Wednesday 26 October 2005
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr Fabian Hamilton Sandra Osborne Mr Eric Illsley Mr Greg Pope Mr Paul Keetch Mr Ken Purchase Mr Andrew Mackay Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Richard Younger-Ross
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
The Committee will, as you know, be hearing oral evidence from the PUS on 26 October, as part of its inquiry into the FCO Annual Report 2004–05. As in previous years, the Committee wishes to raise a number of questions in writing, to which it desires answers before the oral evidence session. I therefore enclose a list of questions, to which it would be most helpful to receive answers on or before Monday 3 October. If it should be the case that by then the answers to most questions are ready, but those to a few are not, we would prefer to receive the bulk of the answers on time and the remainder as soon as possible thereafter. The Committee will certainly wish to publish the responses to all the questions. If, for good reasons, it is necessary to classify or to request confidentiality on any answer, we would therefore prefer that answer to be sent as a separate paper. If you require any clarification of the questions or wish to discuss any aspect of the inquiry, I will be pleased to do what I can to assist. Steve Priestley Clerk of the Committee 25 August 2005
Questions from Foreign AVairs Committee for written answer by 3 October
Efficiency and Regulation 1. The National Audit OYce (NAO) and the Audit Commission have reviewed departments’ eYciency technical notes. What recommendations or conclusions aVecting the FCO have resulted from this work? What action has been taken in response to these findings? 2. In the 2004 Spending Review the FCO’s administration budget will increase by 16% from 2005–06 to 2006–07 and then by 4.3% to 2007–08. These increases are significantly greater than the increase in the total resource budget. Almost every other department has a decreasing administration budget over this period, reflecting the Government’s eYciency agenda. Why is the FCO’s administration budget continuing to increase so significantly? What impact is this having on front-line services? 3. The OYce intends to make 2.5% year-on-year eYciency savings over the 2004 Spending Review period (DAR page 197). This target is unchanged from the 2002 Spending Review. Many other departments have increased the scope and extent of their intended eYciency savings. Why is the FCO’s eYciency savings target not more ambitious, in line with those of other departments? 4. The report by Collinson Grant on eYciency, eVectiveness and the control of costs in the FCO concluded that 10% of the OYce’s posts could be abolished and identified over £60 million of potential savings, considerably more than the OYce’s current plans. The report also highlights the lack of appropriate professional skills, including finance, human resources, political and diplomatic skills. Does the FCO accept the findings of the Collinson Grant report? What plans does it have to implement the report’s recommendations? Given the lack of appropriate professional skills, how will the OYce ensure that staV cuts will not further reduce FCO’s skill base? 3255703001 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
5. On 15 December, the Foreign Secretary announced the closure of eight UK-staVed sovereign posts, and moving from UK-based to locally-based staV in a further 11 subordinate posts. What has been the net reduction in FCO UK-based staV as a direct result of these changes? Is this in addition to, or included within, the reduction in SMS posts already announced? 6. Savings from eYciency measures will be reinvested in front-line services. What plans does the FCO have to ensure that services are fully funded in the event that anticipated eYciency savings or returns from sales of FCO properties are not realised or are delayed? 7. Appendix B of the DAR shows slippage of some long-term IT projects. What impact will these slippages have on eYciency savings planned to arise from the increased use of IT? 8. The OYce planned to expand its i-visa service to another 35 posts by 2005. Has this happened? What is the timetable for introducing this service in all posts where it is viable? 9. Page 200 of the DAR outlines what plans the OYce has to relocate staV, but it does not quantify the planned savings. How much will be saved annually from this initiative? What costs will there be, including relocation and redundancy costs? 10. The Treasury PES Paper (2004) 19 (revised) requires the DAR to make a number of disclosures on better regulation, including statistical figures on performance in meeting Regulatory Reform Action Plan commitments, delivering Regulatory Reform Orders, Compliance with the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) process and the number of commitments made in final RIAs to review regulations. The only reference to regulation in the FCO DAR is in Appendix J, which lists the two RIAs made in 2004. Can the FCO provide the omitted information?
Financial 11. The OYce implemented a new financial system in April 2004 and the 2004–05 accounts will be the first produced using this system. How has the accounts production process using the new system worked? In particular will the FCO meet its planned timetable for signing the account? Has the system been fully implemented in all overseas posts? 12. The Treasury and the NAO are currently undertaking a review of the adequacy of financial management in Departments. Have any conclusions or recommendations emerged from this work thus far? 13. The 2006 Spending Review has been postponed until 2007. Will this have any impact on the FCO’s spending plans as outlined in the DAR? 14. The 2004–05 figures given in Appendix A are estimates. Can the FCO provide the actual 2004–05 figures for tables 10, 11 and 12 on pages 215 and 216 of the DAR? 15. The outturn total administration expenditure for 2003–04 in the 2005 DAR (page 217) is £168 million (17%) below the estimate given in the 2004 DAR (page 179). Income was underestimated by £99 (61%). Can the FCO explain why its estimates were not more accurate? 16. HMT published Public Expenditure 2004–05 Provisional Outturn gives the OYce’s year-end flexibility figures (table 6, page 14). This is 6.6% of their total resource. In particular the carry-forward for the capital budget is 30% of FCO’s capital DEL. Why is such a significant carry-forward needed against the capital budget? 17. Paybill figures and an analysis of administration costs by activity are not given for 2004–05 or future years (page 217). There are also no figures for 2004–05 for analysis of resource budget by objective (page 223). Why was the OYce unable to provide estimates for these? In particular the lack of paybill figures seems to conflict with the claim that there is now greater focus on workforce planning and paybill control (page 187). What is the explanation for this? Is the OYce now in a position to provide the committee with the above figures for 2004–05? What impact does the inability to produce budgets for staV costs and administrative expenditure by objective have on the FCO’s planning and budgeting, particularly in relation to delivering its PSA targets and its eYciency agenda? 18. Analysis by objective as per Schedule 5 is currently done by an annual six-week exercise (page 205). This obviously does not provide data in time for inclusion in the DAR, nor can it provide the OYce with useful in-year management information for monitoring purposes. What plans does the FCO have to improve its systems, to enable more timely and frequent information on spend by objective? 19. The actual valuation at the end of 2003–04 of non-residential land and buildings in the 2005 DAR (page 216) is £96 million (16.7%) above the estimated valuation given in the 2004 DAR (page 178). For residential land and buildings the figure is £119 million (28%) below the estimate. The actual net current assets are £54 million (83%) below the estimate. Why did the estimates diVer so significantly from the actual values? What plans does the OYce have to improve its year-end and month-end estimation exercises to enable more accurate financial monitoring by management? 3255703001 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 3
20. Are final figures now available on the repurchase of Glencairn and sale of Marlay Grange? 21. Appendix I states a provision of £2.3 million for disputed claims for rents payable on overseas properties. This is a new provision. What is the nature of these disputes and why have they arisen? 22. Have costs associated with the UK’s presidencies of the G8 and EU been within forecast limits? What was the cost of hosting the G8 summit at Gleneagles; and how much of this was borne on the FCO budget?
Long-Term Investment 23. Writing in e-Diplomacy last year, the then Minister Bill Rammel stated that “The Future Firecrest project will deliver in 2005–06 the next generation of our Desktop system”. Appendix B of the DAR shows that the current estimated date of completion of the Project is 2012. What is the reason for the apparent delay in the Future Firecrest Project? What impact will the delay have on the FCO’s ability to meet its targets and to deliver eYciency savings? In addition, the estimated cost of the Prism project has risen by 20%, from £24.5 million to £29.5 million; and the completion date has slipped from 2004–05 (FCO e-diplomacy strategy document, 2004) to 2006 (DAR, Appendix B). What are the reasons for the delay and for the increase in costs? 24. The estimated costs of three estate building projects have risen significantly: the Chennai new oYces by £574,000 (13%), the Kampala new oYces by £702,000 (10%) and the Belgrade electrical upgrade by £409,000 (33%) (Appendix B). Why this has happened? What impact will it have on the FCO’s operations?
Risk Management and Internal Control Systems 25. The Statement on Internal Control in the 2003–04 resource accounts indicates that the OYce’s risk management and internal controls are still in their infancy. The FCO had only achieved the minimum standard required by the Treasury (section 4). What progress has been made during 2004–05; and what standard of risk management is the FCO currently rated at? Has the FCO now made a full Statement on Internal Control? 26. The review of eVectiveness recommended a more cohesive IT governance structure and identified that Internal Audit recommendations from previous years had not been implemented (section 5). Have these issues now been addressed?
Performance Management 27. The NAO is reviewing the data systems underlying departments’ PSA targets. What stage has the NAO review of the FCO’s systems reached? Are any conclusions or recommendations available? 28. The Treasury PES Paper (2004) 19 (revised) says that “departments should describe the quality of the data systems . . . limitations . . . should be identified and the implications for interpreting progress against the target should be brought out for readers”. There appears to be no reference to this in the DAR. Can the FCO provide details of the quality of the data systems, identifying any known or suspected limitations in the data and explaining the implications for interpretation of progress against the targets?
Objective 1—Security 29. The scorecards for PSAs 1, 2 and 3 are classified. The progress box on page 39 mentions that milestones for 2004–05 will not be met. Can the Committee be provided with these scorecards? Is the FCO on course to meet each element of the three targets? 30. The technical note states that the three departments involved in PSA 4 (FCO, MoD and DfID) are attempting to measure the number of people whose lives are aVected by violent conflict but explains the severe limitations to the quality of the data. As such, it is not yet possible fully to assess the progress against this target, although there is some discussion of the available statistics on page 55 of the DAR. When does the OYce expect to be able to make an assessment of progress towards meeting this target?
Objective 2—Trade and Investment 31. Performance against PSA 5 was below the target level for two of the three measures in 2003–04. Is the OYce in a position to provide data for 2004–05, so that the Committee can see the most recent performance? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? 3255703001 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 4 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Objective 3—Prosperity 32. PSA 6 had a deadline of 2005 but progress has been slow and the target has not been met. There is no similar target in the 2004 Spending Review. Does the achievement of a reduction in trade barriers remain a priority? By when does the FCO now expect the target will be met? 33. The measures underlying PSA target 7 relate to democracy and legal issues in other countries. A large number of factors can aVect whether these measures are achieved, including the actions of other countries. As such, the outcome of this target can be aVected by FCO only to a limited degree. How is the OYce able to assess its own performance against PSA target 7? 34. The actual measures for PSA 7 are the number of functioning democracies in the world, ratification of core human rights treaties, the number of countries with fully independent and impartial judiciaries and four specific outcomes relating to international justice. The progress box on page 84 mentions free elections, projects and training, the millennium development goals and the Kyoto protocol. Whist these are all important in themselves, none of them are the measures set out in the FCO’s technical note for assessing this target. Can the OYce provide information on progress towards meeting the measures specified in the technical note? 35. The Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) is putting in place eVective systems to establish whether projects have achieved their purpose and to measure the impact of programmes (page 126). By when does the OYce expect these systems to be fully embedded? When will the first results of this monitoring be available? When will the GOF annual report for 2004–05 be published? 36. What are the implications of the establishment of GOF for the funding of other bodies by FCO? 37. What plans are there to change the relationship between the FCO and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy? What plans are there to increase or to change the basis of funding of WFD ?
Objective 4—Europe 38. Neither the box on page 76 nor the FCO’s technical note for 2002 targets details the specific measures for assessing PSA 8. It is therefore impossible to tell what progress has been made against this target. Can the OYce provide details of the scorecards used for measuring this target and state for each element of the target whether it is on course to be met? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance?
Objective 5—Impact Abroad 39. The report on PSA target 9 on page 158 does not explain progress in terms of the measures set out in the technical note. For the BBC World Service and the British Council it does not explain what are the underlying targets. It is therefore impossible to judge whether targets are on course or whether those elements with a deadline of 2005 have been met. Can the OYce please give specific details of progress against the measures given in the technical note? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? 40. Lord Carter of Coles has been carrying out a review of public diplomacy in the first half of 2005 (page 146). When does the FCO expect to receive Lord Carter’s Report? Will the Report be published?
Objective 6—Public Services 41. Are the statistics for 2004–05 for PSA 10 now available? Can the FCO provide these, to enable the Committee to see how it has performed against the target? 42. Issuing overseas passports was considerably below target in 2003–04 due to increased security measures. Has this trend continued? If so what measures has the FCO put in place to improve the service? 43. The visa and consular services are intended to be self-funding (page 196). Chapter 13 on consular services uses data that are over a year out of date and the footnote on page 160 implies that statistics are only on an annual basis. In addition, schedule 1 in the 2003–04 resource accounts shows that the demand for consular and visa services was £31 million lower than expected and that demand is volatile and diYcult to predict. Given the diYculty in collecting data and predicting future demand for visa and consular services, can the OYce explain how it can eVectively budget to ensure these services recoup their costs but at the same time do not over-charge? In particular how did the OYce arrive at the provision of £183.264 million for the full cost of consular and visa operations for 2005–06 on page 220 of the DAR? 44. The NAO published a report on the FCO’s visa services in 2004. One of the recommendations from this report is that information on performance needs improving (page 181). In the light of this, how satisfied is the OYce that the performance reported for PSA 10 is accurate? 3255703001 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 5
Objective 7—Overseas Territories
45. The FCO does not expect to meet that part of the PSA target 11 which deals with constitutional reform (page 143). It is not clear whether it is on course to meet the other elements of the target; in particular, there appears to be no mention of progress against the economic development element. Can the OYce state whether it is likely to meet each element of the PSA target 11 and whether it has met those elements with a deadline of March 2005? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance?
46. There has been a review of human rights issues in the populated overseas territories and the FCO is considering ways to address the findings (pages 141 and 142). What were the main issues identified in this review and what is the timescale for addressing them?
Staffing
47. Table 14 on page 218 shows actual and projected staYng for FCO. Given that the long-term aim is an overall reduction in staV, why did the number of staV increase in 2004–05?
48. Overtime has reduced in 2004–05 and the plan is to reduce this still further so that in 2007–08 it will be half the 2003–04 level. This is happening at the same time as a reduction in the overall staYng level and during a time of change for the OYce. How will FCO ensure that this reduction is genuine and that there will not be pressure for staV to work undeclared overtime?
49. The FCO has recognised that it needs to do more to promote diversity in its staV (page 188). The DAR does not give specific diversity statistics. Can the FCO provide figures on women, staV from ethnic minorities and staV with disabilities as a percentage of total staV by grade? Can it provide similar figures for staV recruited in 2004–05, indicating where these are permanent appointments?
50. Has the FCO now identified all the senior staV whose posts will be cut during the SR04 period? Have there been any compulsory retirements as part of this programme?
51. The department had to review its race equality scheme by May 2005 (page 189). What were the outcomes of this review?
52. FCO is still working with DfID to resolve the problems with diVerential local pay scales (page 193). When is this likely to be resolved? Why has it taken so long?
53. The DAR says that “better management information is a vital part of dealing with . . . complex issues . . .” but does not give any indication that management information has improved (page 193). What plans does the OYce have to improve its management information and what is the timescale for this?
BBC World Service/BBC Monitoring Service
54. When does the FCO cease to be the sponsoring department for BBC Monitoring? Is the FCO content for this responsibility to pass to the Cabinet OYce?
55. The review of the BBC Monitoring service concluded that there will be a reduction of 50–80 jobs. Do these job cuts represent eYciencies or a cut in services?
56. The BBC World Service has been asked to develop a business case for an Arabic TV station. This would be funded from its 2004 Spending Review allocation (response to the Committee’s report on the 2003–04 DAR, response 38). How far advanced is this process?
The British Council
57. The Council is intending to use eYciency savings to fund on-going security costs (response to the Committee’s report on the 2003–04 DAR, response 13). What contingency plans does the FCO have to ensure that security of Council staV and premises is fully funded in the event that eYciency savings do not materialise or are delayed? 3255703002 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 6 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Efficiency and Regulation
Q1. The National Audit OYce (NAO) and the Audit Commission have reviewed departments’ eYciency technical notes. What recommendations or conclusions aVecting the FCO have resulted from this work? What action has been taken in response to these findings? Answer: The NAO reviewed the FCO’s EYciency Technical Note in August 2005. They recommended that the FCO, like other Government Departments, should update their technical note by 31 October 2005, using a standard template, which would include measures of quality and specify what validation assurance mechanisms were in place. They also thought that the FCO’s EYciency Technical Note would benefit from clearer description of how benefits from the individual projects that make up the FCO’s EYciency Plan will be calculated and quantified—explaining the measurement methodology in broad terms. In response to this, the FCO is currently examining its eYciency programmes on a project by project basis to ensure that these recommendations are worked into the execution of the projects. The results will be set out in the revised EYciency Technical Note due to be published on 31 October 2005.
Q2. In the 2004 Spending Review the FCO’s administration budget will increase by 16% from 2005–06 to 2006–07 and then by 4.3% to 2007–08. These increases are significantly greater than the increase in the total resource budget. Almost every other department has a decreasing administration budget over this period, reflecting the Government’s eYciency agenda. Why is the FCO’s administration budget continuing to increase so significantly? What impact is this having on front-line services? Answer: Unfortunately there is an error in the numbers shown in the HMT document “2004 Spending Review, New Public Spending Plans 2005–08”. The correct figures for our planned admin budget are as in the Departmental Report table 13 (£798 million 2005–06, £827 million 2006–07, and £833 million 2007–08). We have therefore received an increase of approximately 4.4% over the triennium (a 1% reduction in real terms). The largest single element in the increase was the money we received in SR04 for security costs, after the November 2003 attack on the Consulate in Istanbul (£25 million admin in 2006–07 and £28 million in 2007–08). Under current Treasury classifications approximately 70% of the total expenditure on FCO main (that is, excluding British Council, BBC World Service, Conflict Prevention, etc) is counted as admin costs, even though much of this is what we would consider front line services. As a consequence, all our diplomatic work (for example, our Ambassadors in Washington and Baghdad) count as admin expenditure.
Q3. The OYce intends to make 2.5% year-on-year eYciency savings over the 2004 Spending Review period (DAR page 197). This target is unchanged from the 2002 Spending Review. Many other departments have increased the scope and extent of their intended eYciency savings. Why is the FCO’s eYciency savings target not more ambitious, in line with those of other departments? Answer: The Treasury agreed the FCO’s eYciency target (and those of other Government Departments) as part of the 2004 Spending Review. The Gershon Review highlighted the fact that the potential for increased eYciency varied from Department to Department and depends to a great extent on the structure and work of each Department. For example, the fact that the FCO, unlike other Government Departments, operates on a global basis limits the scope to make eYciency savings envisaged in the Gershon Review.
Q4. The report by Collinson Grant on eYciency, eVectiveness and the control of costs in the FCO concluded that 10% of the OYce’s posts could be abolished and identified over £60 million of potential savings, considerably more than the OYce’s current plans. The report also highlights the lack of appropriate professional skills, including finance, human resources, political and diplomatic skills. Does the FCO accept the findings of the Collinson Grant report? What plans does it have to implement the report’s recommendations? Given the lack of appropriate professional skills, how will the OYce ensure that staV cuts will not further reduce FCO’s skill base? Answer: The FCO has agreed with the Treasury an eYciency plan designed to achieve an £87 million reprioritisation target as part of the SR 2004 settlement. The work of Collinson Grant was intended to help deliver that target. The report on eYciency, eVectiveness and the control of costs represents one of four strands of work that Collinson Grant were commissioned to undertake. The others were a Process Activity Analysis of the FCO’s operations; a comparative analysis of the FCO’s expenditure; and an analysis of the FCO’s organisational structures. The FCO Board considered the Collinson Grant report at its meeting on 28 January 2005. It re-committed itself to achieving the £87 million target and agreed to incorporate the Collinson Grant work as far as possible into the FCO’s existing EYciency Plan. In addition, based on the findings, the Board agreed to review the Finance function in the FCO, both in London and overseas; identify resources that could be 3255703002 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 7
reallocated from low to high priority activity using the Collinson Grant comparative analysis of expenditure; and monitor, at Board level, the FCO’s eVorts to re-prioritise resources. The Board does not accept that the FCO lacks appropriate political and diplomatic skills. Since the Board decisions a number of actions have been taken to deliver the eYciency targets. These include: substituting locally engaged for some UK-based staV; rationalising the various change programmes in the FCO; reducing the number of people in the Corporate pool; improving the workings of the internal market; and reducing administrative costs. Work on the finance function will be taken forward in the light of the Treasury and NAO review, covered in question 12. The staV reductions, agreed with the Treasury as part of the FCO’s EYciency Plan, are being achieved by adjusting recruitment targets and a programme of early retirement. The FCO is committed to increasing both the skills base of its employees and to better utilising the skills already available, including through active engagement in the Professional Skills in Government initiative. We intend to manage changes in our workforce in ways that will support these policies.
Q5. On 15 December, the Foreign Secretary announced the closure of eight UK-staVed sovereign posts, and moving from UK-based to locally-based staV in a further 11 subordinate posts. What has been the net reduction in FCO UK-based staV as a direct result of these changes? Is this in addition to, or included within, the reduction in SMS posts already announced? Answer: There will be a net reduction of about 35 UK-based staV positions once the changes to our network of overseas representation announced by the Foreign Secretary on 15 December 2004 are completed. These positions are in addition to the reduction in SMS positions agreed in September 2004.
Q6. Savings from eYciency measures will be reinvested in front-line services. What plans does the FCO have to ensure that services are fully funded in the event that anticipated eYciency savings or returns from sales of FCO properties are not realised or are delayed? Answer: It is intended that eYciency savings and returns from the sale of FCO properties will be used to fund additional frontline activities in pursuit of the FCO’s strategic priorities. Consular and visa services are funded on a diVerent basis and so do not suVer risk from under-achievement of eYciency targets. If it were felt that the EYciency Plan was slipping from its target, then the FCO would have to consider contingency eYciency projects to meet any shortfall.
Q7. Appendix B of the DAR shows slippage of some long-term IT projects. What impact will these slippages have on eYciency savings planned to arise from the increased use of IT? Answer: For the purpose of clarity, the first column of dates in table 16 of Annex B to the DAR refers to the year of start of each long-term capital project rather than to the original estimate of year of completion. Only two of the programmes referred to under this subhead feature in the FCO’s eYciency programme (Future Firecrest and Prism). The delay in implementation of Prism refers to the overseas roll- out of the project. The savings in the EYciency Plan are unaVected by that delay. We do not therefore expect that any delays in these projects will aVect achievement of the eYciency savings envisaged in the FCO’s EYciency Technical Note.
Q8. The OYce planned to expand its i-visa service to another 35 posts by 2005. Has this happened? What is the timetable for introducing this service in all posts where it is viable? Answer: Since the publication of the 2004–05 FCO Departmental Report, the electronic visa application system has now been rolled out to an additional five sites.1 A further five sites are being added in the near future. The fact that the original, ambitious target was not met partly reflects the expansion of outsourced visa application centres at a faster rate than originally expected. UKvisas are continuing to advertise the benefits of on-line applications, and take-up of this service continues at a steady pace. Work will also commence in the near future to improve accessibility of the i-visa website (visa4uk) for the visually-impaired. Not all countries have the technical capacity for an internet approach to visa services. However, a recent visit to Kinshasa indicated that countries where internet penetration is low are still willing to embrace the system. We are considering options for this as a successful roll-out there would act as encouragement for expansion in similar locations.
1 The original 20 posts listed in the 2004–05 FCO Departmental Report are: Australia, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Ireland, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Monaco, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain and three posts in the United States. The additional five sites added thereafter are: France, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands and Taiwan. 3255703002 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 8 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Q9. P 200 of the DAR outlines what plans the OYce has to relocate staV, but it does not quantify the planned savings. How much will be saved annually from this initiative? What costs will there be, including relocation and redundancy costs? Answer: As the Report notes, the FCO is committed to moving a significant number of jobs from London to Hanslope Park, and to rationalising our central London estate which we estimate will generate eYciency savings of the order of £1.1 million per annum. Our principal concern is to achieve value for money. The major “Future Firecrest” IT contract with Hewlett Packard (qv DAR p202), let in December 2005, will require the location of 150 additional staV at Hanslope Park. We are in the process of consulting the trade unions on a managed relocation project for staV whose jobs move from London to Hanslope, so it is not possible to give details at this stage; however, we think redundancy costs unlikely. The central London rationalisation referred to will include works to improve space utilisation in our King Charles Street building (total cost of £5.4 million), and re-configuring the Old Admiralty Building.
Q10. The Treasury PES Paper (2004) 19 (revised) requires the DAR to make a number of disclosures on better regulation, including statistical figures on performance in meeting Regulatory Reform Action Plan commitments, delivering Regulatory Reform Orders, Compliance with the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) process and the number of commitments made in final RIAs to review regulations. The only reference to regulation in the FCO DAR is in Appendix J, which lists the two RIAs made in 2004. Can the FCO provide the omitted information? Answer: The FCO does not legislate in high volumes and produced just two pieces of regulation in 2004–05. However, the following paragraphs highlight how the FCO has performed against the principles of better regulation over the period.
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) and Consultations The FCO conducted two RIAs with consultations in 2004–05. Both RIAs included commitments to monitor and review: The International Organisation Bill. Consultations were held with interested UK Government Departments and the Devolved Administrations. There was minimal interest and no objections. Given the nature of the legislation, to confer diplomatic privileges on some international organisations based in London, it was not necessary to initiate a public consultation process. The European Union Bill. Consultation took place across Government Departments and was widely held with business. Ministers and oYcials took part in the consultations with stakeholders, for example, the CBI, Chambers of Commerce, Small Business Federation, TUC. The voluntary and charity sectors were also consulted. The Government published a White Paper on the Treaty—A Guide to the European Union, and a commentary on the Treaty, comparing it with the current treaties. The FCO also published the Guide on the FCO website, including the text of the treaty itself. The text of the draft European Constitution was also published in the Welsh language.
Regulatory Reform We are committed to preparing a simplification plan for submission in January 2006.
Financial
Q11. The OYce implemented a new financial system in April 2004 and the 2004–05 accounts will be the first produced using this system. How has the accounts production process using the new system worked? In particular will the FCO meet its planned timetable for signing the account? Has the system been fully implemented in all overseas posts? Answer: We are making good progress with what is a challenging task, adapting to a new and complex system. The Resource Accounts for 2004–05 are based on information from both Prism, our new integrated management information system, and our previous systems overseas. They are currently being audited by the NAO and we await their comments. We had intended that the Permanent Under-Secretary would sign these oV at the end of September (a month earlier than the previous year’s account). However issues relating to the implementation of the system led to a slippage in the timetable we set ourselves, and we now plan to sign the account oV at about the same time as last year. Over 90 of our posts are now using the system (half of those that will receive it). Our target for completion of the roll out is May 2006. 3255703002 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q12. The Treasury and the NAO are currently undertaking a review of the adequacy of financial management in Departments. Have any conclusions or recommendations emerged from this work thus far?
Answer: No. The first meeting with the review team took place on 9 August; the team expect to produce their final report in November.
Q13. The 2006 Spending Review has been postponed until 2007. Will this have any impact on the FCO’s spending plans as outlined in the DAR?
Answer: No. The Spending Review in 2004 set a three-year budget (2005–06, 2006–07 and 2007–08). The postponement of the next Spending review until 2007 means that the third year of the triennium, which in previous spending reviews has been an overlap year (and therefore subject to review), will not be re-opened.
Q14. The 2004–05 figures given in Appendix A are estimates. Can the FCO provide the actual 2004–05 figures for tables 10, 11 and 12 on pp 215 and 216 of the DAR?
Answer: We are in the process of finalising the actual 2004–05 figures. The first draft was presented to the NAO on Friday 2 September. They are due for sign oV on 18 November.
Q15. The outturn total administration expenditure for 2003–04 in the 2005 DAR (p 217) is £168 million (17%) below the estimate given in the 2004 DAR (p 179). Income was underestimated by £99 (61%). Can the FCO explain why its estimates were not more accurate?
Answer: Due to a printing error the formatting on Table 14 of the 2004 DAR was out of line, meaning that the actual figures for estimated outturn for 2003–04 are somewhat diVerent from those stated in the question. The outturn total administration expenditure for 2003–04 in the 2005 DAR is in fact £287 million below the estimate given in the 2004 DAR, and Income is £170 million less than the estimate.
The main reason for this diVerence, as stated in the notes below the table on p 217, is the reclassification of Consular and Visa services from Administration to Programme as part of the 2004 Spending Review. This reclassification is retrospectively adjusted in the figures back to 1999–2000.
Taking into account this reclassification, outturn is £102 million below the 2004 estimate and income £31 million less than expected, a net underspend of £71 million. The major underspend elements are set out in the FCO’s 2003–04 Resource Accounts, but headline figures are: — Spending on additional pressures projected for late in the year that did not occur before the year- end, such as in Iraq. — Slippage on IT projects, mainly on Future Firecrest.
The shortfall in operating cost Appropriation-in-Aid reflects lower than estimated increased demand for consular and visa services, which are inherently diYcult to forecast.
Q16. HMT published Public Expenditure 2004–05 Provisional Outturn gives the OYce’s year-end flexibility figures (table 6, p 14). This is 6.6% of their total resource. In particular the carry-forward for the capital budget is 30% of FCO’s capital DEL. Why is such a significant carry-forward needed against the capital budget?
Answer: Some capital projects that were assigned funds for 2004–05 have not been able to reach completion within the year. Most significant were estate projects in Iraq and the security upgrades to our overseas network after the Istanbul bombing. The former has been delayed due to the diYcult security situation. The latter was funded by a special £14.5 million package, rather than from the regular budget, and it has not been possible to carry out all these upgrades within one year. It is important for these works to be completed, thus the application to carry forward the funding.
There is also £1 million of unspent Departmental Unallocated Provision from 2004–05 and a £5 million adjustment to the carry forward from FY 2003–04 based on audited outturn as the 2003–04 EYF carry forward was based on provisional outturn. 3255703002 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q17. Paybill figures and an analysis of administration costs by activity are not given for 2004–05 or future years (p 217). There are also no figures for 2004–05 for analysis of resource budget by objective (p 223). Why was the OYce unable to provide estimates for these? In particular the lack of paybill figures seems to conflict with the claim that there is now greater focus on workforce planning and paybill control (p 187). What is the explanation for this? Is the OYce now in a position to provide the committee with the above figures for 2004–05? What impact does the inability to produce budgets for staV costs and administrative expenditure by objective have on the FCO’s planning and budgeting, particularly in relation to delivering its PSA targets and its eYciency agenda? Answer: (i) Analyses of administration and resource budgets by objective are calculated using Schedule 5 data that will be published in the 2004–05 Resource Accounts. The answer to question 18 addresses the issue of how we are exploring options for more frequent reporting of expenditure by objective. (ii) The FCO, in line with some other government departments, does not publish a forecast of paybill expenditure for future years to avoid assuming pay rises that have not yet been agreed. Paybill budget forecasts are produced for planning and management purposes to enable paybill control. (iii) The 2004–05 paybill figures are due to be published in the Resource Accounts in November. (iv) The FCO budgets by input to enable budget holders to deliver PSA targets but does not currently draw up budgets by PSA targets. Strategic programme funds are linked directly to objectives but the vast majority of administration budgets are allocated geographically which reflects the fact that our network of posts are our main delivery mechanism. As Prism beds down we are exploring the options for budgeting by objective. See also questions 18 and 43.
Q18. Analysis by objective as per Schedule 5 is currently done by an annual six-week exercise (page 205). This obviously does not provide data in time for inclusion in the DAR, nor can it provide the OYce with useful in- year management information for monitoring purposes. What plans does the FCO have to improve its systems, to enable more timely and frequent information on spend by objective? Answer: As part of the Prism programme the FCO is currently exploring options for more frequent, automated reporting of staV time spent by objective. Regular in-year objective budgeting reports, rather than the existing high-level retrospective annual report, will also be available. These reports, showing costs apportioned to objectives, should be available to users later this financial year. The introduction of more frequent time recording will greatly improve the quality of the objective cost data. This will take longer as it is dependent on roll out of the Prism system to all FCO Posts around the world.
Q19. The actual valuation at the end of 2003–04 of non-residential land and buildings in the 2005 DAR (page 216) is £96 million (16.7%) above the estimated valuation given in the 2004 DAR (page 178). For residential land and buildings the figure is £119 million (28%) below the estimate. The actual net current assets are £54 million (83%) below the estimate. Why did the estimates diVer so significantly from the actual values? What plans does the OYce have to improve its year-end and month-end estimation exercises to enable more accurate financial monitoring by management? [FCO note: a correction to the Question. The actual valuation at the end of 2003–04 of non-residential land and buildings in the 2005 DAR (page 216) is £96 million (16.7%) below the estimated valuation given in the 2004 DAR (page 178). For residential land and buildings the figure is £119 million (28%) above the estimate.] Answer: Forecasts of our net current assets at any given balance sheet date are subject to a number of uncertainties; in particular, shifting values in the world property market. Other factors influencing the position include that in our 2003–04 accounts we reclassified as “residential” property to the value of some £60 million that had previously been considered “non-residential”. This flowed from an analysis of the composition of compounds previously recorded as single property assets. In addition, we extended the £33 million long-term balance sheet liability recognised in 2002–03 for the Berlin Embassy PFI project out to 2028, when the write-down of that liability ends. And we added £17 million to our 2003–04 provisions to cover staV tax liabilities in US, compensation to Istanbul victims and prudent dilapidations cover at Lancaster House. As described in Questions 11 and 18 we are investing a lot of resources in the modernisation of our financial control and management systems, with a particular focus on accurate and timely reporting.
Q20. Are final figures now available on the repurchase of Glencairn and sale of Marlay Grange? Answer: Final figures are not yet available but it remains our firm intention to repurchase Glencairn, and we are actively discussing the matter with the owners, Park Developments. Pending completion of the repurchase, we have not marketed Marlay Grange. Meanwhile, the Ambassador continues to occupy Glencairn by agreement with the owners. 3255703003 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q21. Appendix I states a provision of £2.3 million for disputed claims for rents payable on overseas properties. This is a new provision. What is the nature of these disputes and why have they arisen?
Answer: The response to Question 21 is confidential and is sent separately.
Q22. Have costs associated with the UK’s presidencies of the G8 and EU been within forecast limits? What was the cost of hosting the G8 summit at Gleneagles; and how much of this was borne on the FCO budget?
Answer: The FCO was only responsible for the organisational costs of the G8 Summit at Gleneagles. Our forecast for these costs is £12.1 million. The final costs will be made available when all invoices have been received, but we expect it to be within the forecast. We do not hold details for the other costs of the Summit, for example policing and security—which were the responsibility of the devolved administration. The EU Presidency will not conclude until December. We have a budget allocation of £10.4 million over the two financial years (2004–05 and 2005–06). We will not be able to give a detailed out turn of expenditure until the end of the financial year, but at this stage we do not anticipate that overall demands on the FCO will exceed our current forecast.
Long-Term Investment
Q23. Writing in e-Diplomacy last year, the then Minister Bill Rammel stated that “The Future Firecrest project will deliver in 2005–06 the next generation of our Desktop system.” Appendix B of the DAR shows that the current estimated date of completion of the Project is 2012. What is the reason for the apparent delay in the Future Firecrest Project? What impact will the delay have on the FCO’s ability to meet its targets and to deliver eYciency savings? In addition, the estimated cost of the Prism project has risen by 20%, from £24.5 million to £29.5 million; and the completion date has slipped from 2004–05 (FCO e-diplomacy strategy document, 2004) to 2006 (DAR, Appendix B). What are the reasons for the delay and for the increase in costs?
Answer: Future Firecrest is a seven-year contract with Hewlett Packard, awarded in February 2005. Mr Rammell’s statement referred to the requirement under the contract for HP to start rolling out the next generation of the Firecrest desktop in 2005–06, a milestone that remains on target for completion by this date. The date quoted in Appendix B of the DAR refers to a separate project milestone, which is the scheduled termination of the contract in 2012. Recent changes in central government technical security policy have required some redesign of the system, which may impact on both the timetable and budget. This impact is still being assessed. But it is expected to have no significant impact on the capability of the project to meet its objectives. The capital costs of the Prism Programme have increased principally because of additional security requirements which were not fully factored into our original costings. Implementation of the Programme has been delayed because we under-estimated the complexity of the design and the diYculty of introducing the IT and associated change in our processes; we have subsequently slowed down the global roll-out to ensure that Posts have the necessary support and guidance in using Prism to maximum eVect (See Question 11 above).
Q24. The estimated costs of three estate building projects have risen significantly: the Chennai new oYces by £574k (13%), the Kampala new oYces by £702k (10%) and the Belgrade electrical upgrade by £409k (33%) (Appendix B). Why has this happened? What impact will it have on the FCO’s operations?
Answer: 55% of the increased costs in Chennai arise from accounting changes in the attribution of FCO Services charges. The remainder flow from additional costs for fire and lift consultants, and Clerk of Works costs. In Kampala, the estimated costs increased as a result of enhanced security measures, including the purchase of land to increase stand-oV, and increased physical protection. Eighteen per cent of the increased costs in Belgrade arise from the charge attribution changes referred to above. The remainder flow from additional works, including a new standby generator and distribution switchboard, roof works and a revised Incident Alarm system specification. Increased building costs reduce the funding available for other projects. To minimise the operational impact of this funds are allocated to proposed projects in order of priority of need, assessed on the criteria of security, health and safety and fitness for purpose. 3255703003 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Risk Management and Internal Control Systems
Q25. The Statement on Internal Control in the 2003–04 resource accounts indicates that the OYce’s risk management and internal controls are still in their infancy. The FCO had achieved only the minimum standard required by the Treasury (section 4). What progress has been made during 2004–05; and what standard of risk management is the FCO currently rated at? Has the FCO now made a full Statement on Internal Control? Answer: The FCO’s Statement on Internal Control for the 2003–04 resource accounts set out in detail the systems and processes that constitute the Department’s risk and control framework. The implementation of this framework was in response to the Treasury-led Risk Programme which aimed to improve the quality of risk management across all Departments. The Programme concluded in December 2004 with a report to the Prime Minister on progress across Whitehall. This demonstrated that the standard of risk management in the FCO was comparable with the average level achieved across all Departments as measured against the Treasury’s Risk Management Assessment Framework. A full Statement on Internal Control will be published with the 2004–05 resource accounts. This is consistent with the Treasury standard.
Q26. The review of eVectiveness recommended a more cohesive IT governance structure and identified that Internal Audit recommendations from previous years had not been implemented (section 5). Have these issues now been addressed? Answer: The Internal Audit recommendations on a more eVective and cohesive IT governance structure have now been addressed and are subject to regular review by senior management. The last major outstanding item was the recommendation of the creation of a Chief Information OYcer accountable for ICT in the FCO. This will come into eVect on 1 October 2005 when the current Head of the IT Strategy takes on the role.
Performance Management
Q27. The NAO is reviewing the data systems underlying departments’ PSA targets. What stage has the NAO review of the FCO’s systems reached? Are any conclusions or recommendations available? Answer: The NAO has completed the necessary fact-finding field work and is currently drafting their provisonal findings. These findings will then be discussed with the FCO before any final conclusions or recommendations are made. As such, there are no conclusions or recommendations presently available.
Q28. The Treasury PES Paper (2004) 19 (revised) says that “departments should describe the quality of the data systems . . . limitations . . . should be identified and the implications for interpreting progress against the target should be brought out for readers”. There appears to be no reference to this in the DAR. Can the FCO provide details of the quality of the data systems, identifying any known or suspected limitations in the data and explaining the implications for interpretation of progress against the targets? Answer: The nature and content of many of the FCO’s Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets means that we rely on forming often subjective, qualitative assessments of progress. This is especially true for targets that are not public service related. However, limitations in data systems are explained in the introduction to the PSA Autumn Performance Report and the FCO’s Technical Note. Both of these are published. Data limitations are also explained for each target within the Technical Note and more generally in its preamble. Where the FCO has joint targets, statements on data limitations included in the Technical Note are cleared with relevant Government Departments. To ensure that published assessments oVer a true interpretation of actual performance and progress towards meeting our targets, the FCO maintains a robust system for analysing and verifying data. Most of our data is sourced from the relevant diplomatic Post. Information from multiple sources is compared and assessed for validity both at Post and by country desks in London. We crosscheck in-house FCO reports with Whitehall and independent assessments, drawing on appropriate international organisations. We feel confident in our assessments as a result. The FCO has a rigorous system of clearing draft reports through senior management before publishing. This system draws on individual target monitors, departments responsible for delivering a target, Directors General, the Permanent Under-Secretary and ultimately the Secretary of State. Assessments on joint targets are reviewed in consultation with relevant Government Departments to ensure accuracy and validity. For the conflict prevention target, the exact performance text is trilaterally agreed. Furthermore, all aspects of performance reporting are subject to regular scrutiny by the FCO’s Internal Audit Department. Their findings are submitted to the Audit and Risk Committee (ARC) which meets quarterly. The ARC reports regularly to the Board, both on an ad hoc basis (where appropriate) and through an annual audit report. 3255703004 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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The FCO has strengthened the PSA reporting process in light of recommendations included in the NAO’s validation of data systems for the 2001–04 Public Service Agreement targets (July 2003). The FCO has also implemented all recommendations made in an internal audit report on the FCO’s SR02 PSA targets carried out in September 2004. Since the publication of the FCO’s Departmental Report, the FCO has revised the way in which performance data is gathered and reported on. This will be first evident in the FCO’s next PSA Autumn Performance Report (APR) published in November this year.
Objective 1—Security
Q29. The scorecards for PSAs 1, 2 and 3 are classified. The progress box on page 39 mentions that milestones for 2004–05 will not be met. Can the Committee be provided with these scorecards? Is the FCO on course to meet each element of the three targets?
Answer: As requested, copies of the scorecards underpinning PSAs 1, 2 and 3 will be provided to the Committee under separate cover. PSA 1: The FCO PSA milestones relating to counter-narcotics work for 2004–05 were all met. As an Inter-Departmental Unit, Afghanistan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU) is expected to meet targets other than those defined by the FCO’s PSA milestones. The milestones referred to in the progress box on page 39 of the Departmental Report were in fact those set by the Cabinet OYce in the UK’s Counter Narcotics Plan, “Turning the Tide”, agreed by the Prime Minister in November 2004 (copy attached). It is these milestones that have been set for ADIDU and some of them have not been met. This distinction was not made clear within the PSA Performance Return in March 2005 when ADIDU declared that significant gaps had been identified that would prevent us from fully achieving our [Turning the Tide] milestones for 2004–05, particularly with criminal justice reform. PSA milestones for 2004–05 were also met resulting in a reduction in threat to the UK from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have met our 2004–05 PSA Counter Terrorism milestones in large part. In particular, we have made notable progress in reducing the risk of terrorist attacks overseas to British interests through considerably enhanced political and operational cooperation with key partners in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Our partners have demonstrated, publicly and privately, a clear increase in their support for eVective counter- terrorism. This cooperation has in great part been facilitated by additional UK CT capacity building. GOF CT expenditure rose from £3.3 million in FY 2003–04 to £7 million in FY 2004–05. The UK G8 Presidency is improving further aviation security through the developing implementation of the Secure and Facilitated Transport Initative (SAFTI).
PSA 2: There are over 35 elements and performance indicators underpinning PSA target 2. The FCO is on course to meet many of the indicators. Evidence of FCO performance can be seen on page 53 of the Departmental Report and found on page 5 of the latest FCO PSA Autumn Performance Report.
It is however, too early to say whether the FCO will meet this target in full. Many of the underpinning targets have been rolled forward into our SR 04 PSA targets and it will be possible to make a firmer judgement after the FCO’s first public analysis of our SR 04 targets contained in the 2005 Autumn Performance Report, published in November this year.
PSA 3: The FCO has met most of its milestones and is on track to meet those remaining for PSA 3.
Q30. The technical note states that the three departments involved in PSA 4 (FCO, MoD and DfID) are attempting to measure the number of people whose lives are aVected by violent conflict but explains the severe limitations to the quality of the data. As such, it is not yet possible fully to assess the progress against this target, although there is some discussion of the available statistics on page 55 of the DAR. When does the OYce expect to be able to make an assessment of progress towards meeting this target?
Answer: The Conflict Prevention Pools currently publish six-monthly reports on progress against the PSA 4 target, including both narrative assessment and assessment against statistical indicators. Assessment against the statistical measurement indicators for the target relies on the publication of data by external sources. The timing of the publication of this data means that there is a time lag between the period being assessed and date at which an informed assessment can be made. That is why a complete assessment of performance against the PSA 4 target cannot be made until autumn 2006, which is when the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] is due to publish battle related fatalities data for 2005. Departments have agreed to publish this in their 2006 Autumn Performance Reports. 3255703004 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Objective 2—Trade and Investment
Q31. Performance against PSA 5 was below the target level for two of the three measures in 2003–04. Is the OYce in a position to provide data for 2004–05, so that the Committee can see the most recent performance? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? Answer: The two measures, progress against them and plans for improvement are as follows: At least 70% of firms receiving assistance with major projects overseas should report that UKTI’s help was a significant factor [actual performance in 2004 was 65%.] UKTI’s performance has improved from 58% in 2003 to 70% in the first half of 2005. Following SR2004, this particular measure will no longer be a formal PSA target, but we plan to continue to track it to ensure we provide ever more eVective support to firms pursuing major projects overseas. We are also improving the way we record and evaluate performance data across the organisation so that we can relate activities to outcomes even more closely. At least 50% of established exporters assisted improved their business performance within two years [actual performance in 2004 was 43%.] As stated above, we are improving the way we record and evaluate performance data across the organisation so that we can relate activities to outcomes even more closely and help drive continuous improvement of our service quality. UKTI has also been undertaking new research to improve understanding of where and in what ways UKTI can add most value. On the sectoral side, we work closely with business to identify specific opportunities and priority markets. Following a review of our sector strategy, we are now focusing on a smaller number of sectors, which were identified as ones where UKTI can add most value.
Objective 3—Prosperity
Q32. PSA 6 had a deadline of 2005 but progress has been slow and the target has not been met. There is no similar target in the 2004 Spending Review. Does the achievement of a reduction in trade barriers remain a priority? By when does the FCO now expect the target will be met? Answer: Reducing trade barriers remains a Government priority. HMG believes that the biggest gains, particularly for developing countries, are to be made if trade barriers are reduced at the multilateral-level. The current WTO Round of trade negotiations has not been progressing as quickly as it should. We are working with our EU partners, the European Commission and other WTO members to ensure that we achieve an outcome to the WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December which will allow us to meet our aim of concluding the Round in 2006. We must build on the progress achieved so far. For example, developed countries agreed in the WTO in July 2004 to negotiate an end date for agricultural export subsidies. This commitment was reaYrmed by G8 members at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005. G8 members also agreed at Gleneagles to increase the assistance that they provide to help developing countries improve their capacity to trade.
Q33. The measures underlying PSA target 7 relate to democracy and legal issues in other countries. A large number of factors can aVect whether these measures are achieved, including the actions of other countries. As such, the outcome of this target can be aVected by FCO only to a limited degree. How is the OYce able to assess its own performance against PSA target 7? Answer: Factors beyond the FCO’s direct control aVect the achievement of many of our PSA targets. To overcome the inherent diYculties in measuring performance, the FCO has developed a system of scorecards to monitor progress towards our PSA targets. These set out the indicators that will be used to show whether progress is being made. The scorecards do not show everything that the FCO is doing to achieve its targets, but they do give an indication of the main areas of progress and of the direction in which we want to head. Implicit within them is that the FCO will take action in support of the indicators—not just on the specific measures themselves but of the overall intention of the target—and in particular where there is a concern about possible failure or slippage of targets. For instance, we have twice resorted to Security Council Resolutions to deal with such situations. Specific examples of how the FCO is able to assess our performance against indicators relating to democracy and legal issues in other countries are as follows: Performance Indicator: “International Criminal Court (ICC): 100 ratifications and 20 more States parties complete domestic implementation legislation by end-2003.” The ratification of the ICC Statute is a straightforward measurement and it is easily monitored via open source information. In order to support increased ratification/implementation, the FCO supports a number of promotion activities and tracks which States attend these activities and then go on to ratify/implement. 3255703004 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Performance Indicator: “Satisfactory progress towards the completion strategy for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), with investigations completed by end-2004.”
The indicator relating to the ICTY is again easy to monitor as the ICTY has an agreed completion strategy, the first step of which was completed at the end of 2004. Implicit is that the FCO will take action if it has concerns that the strategy is or will be missed. This led the FCO to take action—including in Security Council Resolutions to limit slippage, including by limiting the range of new indictments. We also worked successfully for language asking the Court to deliver six-monthly progress reports to ensure it was focussing on meeting the strategy and allowing us to monitor this more closely.
Performance Indicator: “Most trials conducted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) completed by end-2005.”
Our performance indicator on the SCSL is also measurable. But when it became apparent that the Court’s completion strategy could be badly missed because of the UN diYculty in appointing a suYciently experienced Trial Chamber in a timely way, the FCO took highly proactive action. We advertised in The Times using FCO funds allowing us an open and transparent system for putting forward a British nomination. It attracted attention from well-qualified foreign judges which we able to pass on for consideration by the UN.
Performance Indicator: “African Court of Human Rights established and becoming functional by end 2006.”
Lord Triesman raised this with senior figures in the African Union (AU), on behalf of the EU, when he attended the AU Summit in Libya at the beginning of July. The AU Summit Executive Council met at the Summit and agreed a draft legal instrument to establish the merged Courts. It is impossible to judge what impact Lord Triesman had in the AU’s decision to push on, but we are able to demonstrate that we are briefing Ministers and that they are raising the issues with their interlocutors.
On rule of law, the FCO has supported a number of practical projects through the Global Opportunities Fund, aimed at improving the independence of the judiciary, including:
— Human rights training to the judiciary in Turkey, cascaded to 6,000 judges and prosecutors, helping the judiciary to absorb and implement reform consistently.
— A three-year project in Afghanistan, implemented by the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (BHRC) aimed at disseminating legal skills and knowledge in the legal sector.
— We have funded the International Commission of Jurists’ Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (ICJ/CIJL) to produce the Practitioners’ Guide to International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors which sets out international standards on the independence of the judiciary, including on the security of tenure of judges, accountability and judicial corruption.
While it takes time for the impact of such projects to become clear, monitoring and evaluation can give an indication of the contribution the project has had.
But, as the Committee notes, it is clearly often diYcult to attribute broader results or developments directly to FCO intervention and this has been a significant weakness in these measures. Judgements about the status of a given country as being a democracy or having an independent judiciary are often not clear- cut given the number of factors at play.
We have therefore produced a strategy for work on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance over 2005–08 under FCO Strategic Priority 6 and intend to develop more detailed strategies to take forward work on democracy, governance and rule of law. Once we have these strategies in place we should be able to see more clearly how far FCO work in these areas has achieved or helped to influence the desired outcomes. We have also changed the specific measures for the SR04 PSAs to some which reflect more directly FCO activity.
Identifying external factors that can aVect the FCO’s ability to deliver a target is an important element of ensuring successful delivery. Risk assessments in our business plans for achievement of the targets include external risks, such as the non-cooperation of other countries. This helps us to work out how to mitigate those risks and develop management strategies where there is scope for the FCO to make a diVerence. Knowing where the FCO is best placed to make a diVerence is another important factor in promoting our ability to assess performance against all of our PSA targets. 3255703004 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q34. The actual measures for PSA 7 are the number of functioning democracies in the world, ratification of core human rights treaties, the number of countries with fully independent and impartial judiciaries and four specific outcomes relating to international justice. The progress box on page 84 mentions free elections, projects and training, the millennium development goals and the Kyoto protocol. Whist these are all important in themselves, none of them are the measures set out in the FCO’s technical note for assessing this target. Can the OYce provide information on progress towards meeting the measures specified in the technical note? Answer: FCO PSA 7 reads “Make globalisation work for sustainable development in the UK and internationally (and particularly in Africa) by promoting democracy and the rule of law, good economic and environmental governance, and security of long-term energy supply, measured by specific underlying targets”. This target is measured using scorecards (agreed between FCO and HMT) covering the five elements of the target: (a) increased democracy and the rule of law; (b) more eVective economic governance; (c) more eVective environmental governance; (d) enhanced security of energy supplies; and (e) reformed and eYcient international organisations (the UN, OSCE, OECD and Council of Europe), oVering better value for money for the UK. The scorecards for (b)–(e) are classified and are therefore not published but are being sent to the Committee under separate cover. This target covers a vast array of work. We tried to represent a broad range of activity and performance in the Departmental Report, incorporating performance information against both the unclassified and classified scorecards. This therefore included reference to the Millennium Development Goals and the Kyoto protocol; indicators that do not appear on the unclassified scorecards for this target. Further performance information can be found in the Department’s PSA Autumn Performance Report (APR) 2004. The FCO is currently revising the way in which we report on our PSA targets so that, in future, we are able to release as much performance information as we hold. This will be evident in the Department’s next APR published in November this year. Information on the FCO’s performance towards achieving the indicators specified in the Committee’s question is as follows: (i) Number of functioning democracies in the world increases from 95 in 2003 to 105 in 2006. We judge that, while up to 140 countries have some attributes of democracy, there are currently 99 countries which might be assessed as fully functioning democracies with a range of associated civil rights. The figure disguises the fact while some countries have improved, others have regressed. It also does not capture positive trends (such as successful elections) in countries which still cannot presently be judged fully democratic. While we would not currently expect to achieve this measure, the overall trend over the period of the PSA has been positive and there has been a significant increase in the number of countries implementing systems, processes and procedures widely accepted to be necessary in a fully functioning democracy. (ii) Ratification of any of the six core treaties by 25 additional states by 2006. Achieved, with 28 new ratifications of core treaties by December 2004. We are currently focusing on encouraging ratification of Optional Protocols to the core treaties that will give them greater force through implementation mechanisms, in particular OPs to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention Against Torture (which still requires a number of further ratifications to bring it into force). (iii) The number of countries with fully independent and impartial judiciaries increases from 90 in 2003 to 95 in 2006. We judge that there are currently 91 countries which can be judged to have fully independent and impartial judiciaries. Below the headline figure there have been a number of positive developments in the review period which illustrate a generally positive trend over the period of the PSA towards more independent and impartial judiciaries in some countries. But these have also been oVset by negative developments elsewhere. As noted in the answer to question 33 above, the FCO has supported a number of practical projects through GOF, aimed at improving the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law more widely. Other current projects in hand include: — Promoting human rights in the administration of justice in Cameroon. — Developing national monitoring mechanisms for human rights in Georgia. — Phase 2 of improvements in prison management in Brazil. — Training for judges and prosecutors working with the Human Rights Court in Peru. 3255703005 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q35. The Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) is putting in place eVective systems to establish whether projects have achieved their purpose and to measure the impact of programmes (page 126). By when does the OYce expect these systems to be fully embedded? When will the first results of this monitoring be available? When will the GOF annual report for 2004–05 be published? Answer: The GOF has eVective systems in place at project level to establish whether projects have achieved their purpose now. StaV are required to report quarterly on progress against success indicators set at the beginning of a project. This includes up-to-date expenditure against a financial profile and narrative information on activities and outputs. On completion, all projects are evaluated to assess achievement of purpose. To standardise this approach across the organisation a global project database goes live in November 2005, which will compile all FCO (including GOF) project bids, progress and evaluation reports and enhance sharing of best practice and lessons learnt. Systems that ensure programmes are able eVectively to measure their impact continue to evolve. This year a concerted eVort has been made to ensure all programme strategies have realistic objectives with appropriate success indicators. Programmes are required to report internally against these indicators every quarter as part of a mini-review with the Programme OYce (the former GOF Central Management Team). An oYcial report is also laid before Parliament annually; the annual report for 2004–05 will be laid before Parliament on 12 October. A launch event is being held the same day, when members of civil society will be given an update on progress to date, and be given an opportunity to discuss future direction. Existing project and programme progress reports are available now; a more formal review of GOF will take place at the end of 2005–06 (a review not an evaluation since on current plans these programmes will continue to run for a number of years).
Q36. What are the implications of the establishment of GOF for the funding of other bodies by FCO? Answer: GOF was created through a combination of new money and transfer of funds from existing programme budgets. Funding arrangements for non-departmental public bodies was not aVected and remains subject to the usual government criteria for such bodies: whether or not the task they perform is necessary, and if so whether an NDPB is the best option for its delivery. However, in some cases management of NDPBs has been moved to GOF teams in view of the synergies between their work and that of the GOF programmes. Public bodies whose remit includes project implementation are able to apply to GOF for project funds. Their proposals are appraised against the GOF criteria, including their contribution towards delivering FCO strategic priorities and programme objectives.
Q37. What plans are there to change the relationship between the FCO and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy? What plans are there to increase or to change the basis of funding of WFD? Answer: There are presently no plans to change the arms-length relationship between the FCO and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. However, Ministers are considering recommendations to improve the eVectiveness of WFD, accountability for its expenditure and the working relationship between WFD and the British political parties. As announced on 4 April 2005 by the then FCO Minister, Bill Rammell MP, Ministers will take into account the review undertaken by River Path Associates and WFD’s subsequent response together with the contributions submitted during the three-month-long public consultation exercise that was completed in July 2005. Ministers intend to take decisions in the autumn following further consultations with the Chairman and members of the WFD Board on their return from the summer break. There are no current plans to change the level or basis of grant-in-aid funding of WFD.
Objective 4—Europe
Q38. Neither the box on page 76 nor the FCO’s technical note for 2002 targets details the specific measures for assessing PSA 8. It is therefore impossible to tell what progress has been made against this target. Can the OYce provide details of the scorecards used for measuring this target and state for each element of the target whether it is on course to be met? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? Answer: The text of the classified scorecard for PSA 8 is being provided separately. Progress against the scorecard is as follows: (a) Reform of the EU institutions—achieved: the new Treaty met all the objectives specified. (b) EU Enlargement—largely achieved with more progress needed on Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather than a new contractual relationship with Ukraine, the same eVect was achieved through an Action Plan under the wider European Neighbourhood Policy in February 2005, after the “orange Revolution.” 3255703005 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
(c) CSFP—achieved in full. Examples include Solana’s “European Security Strategy”, adopted by the December 2003 European Council, which set out a framework to enhance the EU’s foreign policy and crisis management capacity; successful EU-US Summits in 2004 and 2005 building on the Washington summit in June 2003; more than 75% of 2003 and 2004 CFSP budget allocated for conflict resolution and prevention (EU Monitoring Mission, EU Police Missions in Bosnia and Macedonia). (d) Economic reform: achieved in full. The EU collectively recommitted to the Lisbon agenda at the Spring 2005 European Council. (e) CAP: Mostly achieved. Major reform packages agreed in June 2003 and April 2004 saw the principles of decoupling, compulsory modulation and cross-compliance adopted, although degressivity was not agreed. (f) Justice and Home AVairs: The Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country national and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection was adopted in March 2004. The Council reached a general approach in April 2004 on the Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. This proposal will be adopted once the European Parliament has delivered its opinion on the Directive: this should happen soon. Work on strengthening the protection capacity in or near regions of protracted refugee situations, through practical co-operation with third countries in these regions, included co-funding (with Denmark and the Netherlands) of two UNHCR-led EU funded projects. The first is a preparatory study into a comprehensive plan of action for Somali refugees. The second is a study of gaps in the protection capacity of four African countries. Both projects started in mid 2004 and are due to conclude by 31 December 2005. Since 2002, EU Readmission Agreements have been signed with Macao, Sri Lanka and Albania. (g) Public awareness: covered in the Departmental Report.
Objective 5—Impact Abroad
Q39. The report on PSA target 9 on page 158 does not explain progress in terms of the measures set out in the technical note. For the BBC World Service and the British Council it does not explain what are the underlying targets. It is therefore impossible to judge whether targets are on course or whether those elements with a deadline of 2005 have been met. Can the OYce please give specific details of progress against the measures given in the technical note? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? Answer: Progress against PSA target 9 is measured through three scorecards: (a) Delivery of Government objectives overseas. (b) Viable and responsive network of influence. (c) Improved perceptions of UK and HMG policies. These scorecards contain performance milestones and indicators that must be achieved if we are to assess this target as “met”. Each element of the PSA target is on course, and those with a deadline of 2005 have been met. Examples of FCO performance are given on page 158 of the Departmental Report and further information can be found in the FCO’s 2004 PSA Autumn Performance Report. As requested in the Committee’s question, there follows an additional detailed break down of performance against the measures and underlying targets for scorecard (c) relating to Public Diplomacy, the BBC World Service and the British Council: (c) (i) The Public Diplomacy Strategy was adopted by the key public diplomacy partners, through the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, in May 2003. A polling and evaluation expert was recruited from MORI to assist the FCO and public diplomacy partners evaluate the impact of their public diplomacy activity. (c) (ii) The final report evaluating the “Think UK” campaign in China was published in February 2004. The campaign was judged to have been a success and the report underlined some key lessons learned in the areas of planning, co-ordination, delivery and impact assessment that have informed a subsequent campaign in North America and presently in India. (c) (iii) The Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund has now completed two full Financial Years of operation. In FY 2003–04 it supported 86 projects in 53 countries with a total spend of £2.25 million. In FY 2004–05 some 70 projects were supported with a spend of £2.28 million. In the second year of operation activities were refocused towards imaginative and innovative public diplomacy activity delivering outcomes that supported the FCO’s Strategic Priorities, especially SP 3 (international system based on the rule of law etc) and SP 6 (sustainable development etc). (c) (iv) FCO Internet activity is on course against a balanced scorecard. Specifically: — average monthly page impressions across all websites on the FCO web platform 5 million (FCO website 3 million). Up 25% on figures for 2004; 3255703005 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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— over 54,000 registered subscribers; — 1 million e-mail alerts sent per month—41,000 email alerts can be processed in one hour; — 500 consular registration forms submitted per month; — 168 Posts’ websites live. EU Presidency websites are now live. Over 400 users of the Content Management System; and — online survey published to gain feedback from website visitors. (c) (v) We do not expect to meet the target of 3,000 Chevening scholars annually by 2005–06. Total Chevening numbers for 2004–05 were 2,211. Following an external review of FCO scholarships released in January 2004, we have focused on strengthening the impact of the Chevening investment on government strategic priorities. In particular, through (i) development of a Fellowship programme (now in its second year), which oVers bespoke short courses that directly support the SPs and (ii) progressive prioritisation of Chevening scholarships in countries of long term strategic importance, while maintaining a global scheme. (c) (vi) BBC World Service performance is measured against five targets. These are global weekly audience, shortwave audibility, quarterly online interactive forums per language, monthly internet page impressions and capital cities with BBCWS FM outlets. In 2004–05, BBCWS has performed strongly and is on track to achieve or exceed its overall performance target. The most recent performance measurements were: — Global weekly audience (2004–05): 149 million (target 153 million). Up from 146 million in 2003–04. — Shortwave audibility (2004–05): 81% (target 86%). Fall from 83% in 2003–04 . — Quarterly online interactive forums per language (2004–05): 12 (target at least 12). Level with 2003–04. — Monthly internet page impressions: 330 million in May 2005 (2004–05 target 170 million). Up from 279 million in December 2004. — Capital cities with BBCWS FM outlets: 144 in June 2005 (2004–05 target 142). Up from 143 in March 2005. (c) (vii) The British Council measures its eVectiveness in improving perceptions of the UK through five targets taken from its global scorecard: — Number of target audiences reached through purposeful participation in programmes and services (excludes web-users); — Number of high-level decision-makers and leaders significantly engaged with the Council; — Customers that have improved perceptions of the UK as a result of interaction with the Council; — Customers reporting long-term impact on perceptions of the UK following engagement with the Council; — Number of international students (excluding European students) in further and higher education in the UK.
The scorecard was rolled out globally to all countries in April 2003 and the first set of data was collected in May 2004. The FCO and Council agreed that, for the purpose of the PSA, their target should be to improve performance year-on-year. The data from May 2005 shows that the Council improved its performance on four of the five targets. On one target—engagement with high level decision makers/leaders—the number has dropped. This is because the Council has this year applied stricter definitions of high-level decision makers and leaders and of significant engagement.
Q40. Lord Carter of Coles has been carrying out a review of public diplomacy in the first half of 2005 (page 146). When does the FCO expect to receive Lord Carter’s Report? Will the Report be published?
Answer: We expect Lord Carter of Coles to send his report to the Foreign Secretary at the end of September or early October. We anticipate that the report will be published. It will certainly be made available to the FAC at the earliest opportunity. 3255703006 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Objective 6—Public Services
Q41. Are the statistics for 2004–05 for PSA 10 [“EVective and eYcient consular and entry clearance services, as measured by specific underlying targets”] now available? Can the FCO provide these, to enable the Committee to see how it has performed against the target? Answer: Consular Services The 2004–05 figures for PSA 10 are now available from the Consular Annual Return.
Target Achieved Comment
1 95% of overseas passports issued 73.3% Target amended in SR04 to 90% within 10 days within five working days from following introduction of a lengthier but more receipt of correct fee and secure passport issuing process. Under this correctly completed application. newer target an 82.5% success rate was achieved. (The former 95% target within five days figure is used, as 2004–05 is within the SR02 reporting period.) 2 98% of notarial acts carried out 99.64% Notarial acts include witnessing oaths, attesting within one working day from signatures, preparing certificates and certifying receipt of correct fee and documents. In 2004–05 we carried out 85,074 correctly completed application. of these activities at our overseas posts: only 303 failed the target thus we achieved a 99.64% success rate and passed this measure. 3 98% of birth registrations carried 95.78% There were 8,260 birth registrations in 2004–05 out within five working days of which 8,256 were done within the time target from receipt of correct fee and and 364 outside. This gives a success rate of correctly completed application. 95.78% which means we failed this scorecard measure. 29 overseas posts registered one or more failures. 4 98% of death registrations 96.19% There were 446 deaths registered at overseas carried out within three working posts in 2004–05. 429 of these met the five-day days from receipt of correct fee target and 17 did not. The success rate was and correctly completed 96.19% which means we failed this measure. application. Eight posts failed to meet the target.
5 98% of detainees contacted 96.56% There were 5,975 detainee cases recorded in within 24 hours of notification of 2004–05 but 748 of them were not relevant to arrest, and detainee visited as the PSA target mainly because local police had soon as possible thereafter if the detained and released the individual within detainee wishes. 24 hours before they notified the Consulate of the case. There were therefore 5,227 relevant cases of which 180 did not meet the 24-hour contact target. We achieved only a 96.56% success rate and therefore failed this measure. 42 posts record failing on at least one occasion.
6 99% of hospitalised consular 99.31% Only 26 of the 3,766 hospital cases missed this cases contacted within 24 hours target giving us a success rate of 99.31%. of notification.
Answer: Entry Clearance Services Annual statistics for the entry clearance operation are published each year at the end of October, following a period of collection, data cleansing, analysis and evaluation. The statistics for 2004–05 for PSA 10 for entry clearance services are therefore not yet available, as the data collation and validation process is currently under way. We will make them available to the Committee as soon as possible.
Q42. Issuing overseas passports was considerably below target in 2003–04 due to increased security measures. Has this trend continued? If so what measures has the FCO put in place to improve the service? Answer: Consular Directorate has introduced greater security in relation to passports. This has extended the processing time. Action is in hand to introduce ways of improving and speeding up passport services. A new Nationality and Passports Best Practice Unit has been set up within the Directorate, with a remit to ensure that posts are operating in the most eYcient manner possible whilst still carrying out rigorous checks 3255703006 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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on applicants. They will carry out a rolling programme of reviews of larger passport issuing posts, beginning in October. In cases where posts are clearly not meeting targets, we are sending trouble-shooters out to assess and resolve the problems, in order to bring issuing times to within the PSA target. We recognise that there has been a gap in terms of capturing management information electronically. Steps are being taken to address this prior to the rollout of the Biometric passport issuing system in 2006. These steps include: — improved training and support for users of each IT system, to ensure maximum use of the systems and that information is captured and maintained eVectively, delivered by a new Consular ICT Operations team; — developing new software to generate more accurate reports from GenIE (current passport issuing system), and tasking contractors with extracting reports from Compass (the consular casework management database); — commissioning a feasibility study into available Reporting Tools with a view to developing an application which can be used on all Consular IT systems.
Q43. The visa and consular services are intended to be self-funding (page 196). Chapter 13 on consular services uses data that are over a year out of date and the footnote on page 160 implies that statistics are only on an annual basis. In addition, schedule 1 in the 2003–04 resource accounts shows that the demand for consular and visa services was £31 million lower than expected and that demand is volatile and diYcult to predict. Given the diYculty in collecting data and predicting future demand for visa and consular services, can the OYce explain how it can eVectively budget to ensure these services recoup their costs but at the same time do not over-charge? In particular, how did the OYce arrive at the provision of £183.264 million for the full cost of consular and visa operations for 2005–06 on page 220 of the DAR? Answer: As explained in the reply to Q18, we are exploring options for more frequent collection of the activity data used to compile consular and visa service costings. Currently though we have to rely on the most recent data held. Where data collection exercises are annual the timing of subsequent costing exercises may mean that the data used is up to a year old. However, the public service costings which form part of the FCO’s published resource accounts are subject to scrutiny by the NAO to ensure they conform to government accounting rules and represent a true and fair view. While demand is volatile and often diYcult to predict, nevertheless we have to make the best forecasts we can. Forecasts of demand and of the resources needed to meet it form the basis of periodic submissions to HMT for changes in the consular and visa fee. Before these submissions are presented to Parliament for approval, we have to satisfy HMT that the forecasts are as realistic and robust as possible. Analysis of series of monthly statistical returns from Posts detailing the level of demand for various consular and visas services is a key element in this process. EVective budgeting for self-funding services is therefore challenging, especially as the lead-time for fee changes is usually around six months. HMT have therefore allowed the FCO to adopt a flexible approach to cost recovery. While normally consular and visas are expected to reach the end of each financial year as close to break even as possible, HMT recognise that there will be occasions when costs may be under recovered—due for example to an unforeseen reduction in passport issues as happened in 2001 following 9/11—or over recovered due to income exceeding forecast while cost increases are contained. In both circumstances arrangements exist (Section 102 Orders) for spreading under or over recoveries over succeeding years. Additionally, where the cost of the services are expected to increase significantly, as a result for example of the introduction of biometric passports, it may be desirable to spread the change evenly over a number of financial years rather than have a sudden step change in fees. There may therefore be a planned period of over recovery followed by an oVsetting period of under recovery covering say five years. The figure of £183.264 million given on page 220 of the DAR for FY 2004–05 is the amount of total FCO resource (set in Spending Review 2002) that would be consumed if public service levels of activity remained at 2003–04 levels: the most recent activity data available when the DAR was written. Clearly neither the consular or visa services are constrained by this figure since if they receive more income than originally assumed they will be able to spend more in providing the services demanded.
Q44. The NAO published a report on the FCO’s visa services in 2004. One of the recommendations from this report is that information on performance needs improving (page 181). In the light of this, how satisfied is the OYce that the performance reported for PSA 10 [“EVective and eYcient consular and entry clearance services, as measured by specific underlying targets”] is accurate? Answer: UKvisas’ specific underlying targets in support of PSA 10 are as follows: — PSA 1: 90% of straightforward non-settlement applications processed within 24 hours; — PSA 2: 90% of non-settlement applications requiring further enquiries to be decided within 15 working days; 3255703006 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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— PSA 3: 90% of settlement applications interviewed within 12 weeks (or target times for posts operating 4 queue system); and — PSA 4: 60% of visa applications to be processed by posts with Risk Assessment Units or visa assessment teams in 2005–06. UKvisas obtains management information from the overseas posts’ IT system, PROVISO. The information is downloaded every night into the Central Reference System (CRS). All posts also compile a monthly statistical return based on information from PROVISO, which is forwarded to UKvisas in London for review, analysis and discussion of mitigating action where PSA targets are not being met by individual posts. As streamlining measures have been implemented and ways of working changed, data collection on PROVISO does not now systematically record information in line with current processes. Work is under way to revise the main system software, but in the meantime posts have adapted their data recording processes in order to continue their provision of management information. This has led to some inaccuracies and discrepancies between posts through diVerences in interpretation and procedures. However, UKvisas continues to provide advice and guidance and through central monitoring remain satisfied that monthly management information compiled locally at posts is suYciently accurate and robust to ensure that PSA targets may be monitored eVectively. A Data Analyst has now been appointed in UKvisas. He will have a dual role of (a) ensuring the management information collected by posts is relevant and adequately informs assessment of staYng requirements; and (b) working with the raw data supplied by posts so that input errors and inconsistencies may be resolved. UKvisas further plans to improve the quantity and quality of data collection overseas through the provision of additional data entry resources and to establish Data Quality oYcers within posts to improve data input into the system at an operational level.
Objective 7—Overseas Territories
Q45. The FCO does not expect to meet that part of the PSA target 11 which deals with constitutional reform (page 143). It is not clear whether it is on course to meet the other elements of the target; in particular, there appears to be no mention of progress against the economic development element. Can the OYce state whether it is likely to meet each element of the PSA target 11 and whether it has met those elements with a deadline of March 2005? Where there has been slippage, what measures are being taken to improve performance? Answer: The indicators agreed with the Treasury as a measurement for meeting PSA target 11 and progress in meeting them is as follows: (a) Modernisation by 2006 of the constitutions of all populated territories (except Gibraltar and Pitcairn). As is suggested in the Departmental Report, this indicator will not be met. The 1999 White Paper placed the onus for establishing review commissions on the territories. Commissions have been set up in six of the territories, but not all have yet come forward with proposals. To date discussions have been held with the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St Helena, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. A new draft constitution for St Helena was agreed at the discussions but then rejected in a consultative poll. Within the next few months we plan to have further discussions with representatives of the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. But successfully concluding the discussions is dependent on striking a balance between the territories’ proposals and the need for the UK to retain the necessary powers for it to deliver on its responsibilities as an administering state. In addition, the Bermuda Independence Commission has been preparing a report for public discussion on the option of independence. The FCO held extensive talks with them and produced a paper covering issues that they raised. (b) Improvement in Overseas Territories (OTs) participation in key multilateral environmental agreements by securing extension by 2006 of three core agreements to named OTs. There has been good progress on this indicator. Following an FCO-funded training workshop, Anguilla and the Turks and Caicos Islands are preparing draft legislation to enable implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Bermuda and the Falkland Islands are in the process of drafting legislation to enable implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). There has, however, been less progress in trying to persuade the Caribbean OTs to accept extension to them of the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW). As environmental issues are the responsibility of the OT governments, the FCO’s role is one of encouragement. This is continuing, with help for projects being provided under the joint FCO/DFID-funded Overseas Territories Environment Programme. (c) Disaster management plans agreed for three OTs by the end of 2003–04 and for 10 OTs by the end of 2004–05. This indicator has been fully met, with disaster management plans set up for all populated OTs. 3255703006 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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(d) Agree borrowing guidelines in all Caribbean OTs by 2004–05 and develop new strategic plans in all COTs, Falkland Islands and St Helena by 2006 in order to improve financial planning and budgetary discipline; This is the main indicator for economic development. Borrowing guidelines have been agreed with three of the four COTs. Agreement with the British Virgin Islands is close. Montserrat does not have borrowing guidelines as it is in budgetary aid. The situation on Strategic Country Programmes (SCPs), which were drawn up as a result of DFID’s bilateral aid programme, has changed since the PSA was drafted. SCP documents for Anguilla and TCI were not renewed following cessation of DFID’s bilateral aid programmes, to which the plans were linked. Through a programme of visits by the Overseas Territories Department’s Economic Adviser, the FCO is encouraging those OTs not in receipt of budgetary aid to develop locally owned medium-term strategic plans and to maintain budgetary discipline.
Q46. There has been a review of human rights issues in the populated overseas territories and the FCO is considering ways to address the findings (pages 141 and 142 [of the FCO’s Departmental Annual Report]). What were the main issues identified in this review and what is the timescale for addressing them?
Answer: The Reviews, on the Realisation of Human Rights, were wide ranging. They highlighted a number of specific areas of concern (not all the same for each territory) including child abuse and domestic violence, the status of immigrants and long-term residents, and labour rights. Each report set out a series of issues and actions for the Governments of the Territory and the UK Government to consider. The overarching recommendation to the UK Government was that we should provide further support to help raise the territories’ institutional capacity to address human rights, and to help promote local ownership and involvement by civil society.
As the local governments have limited local capacity to act in the human rights field, they need to prioritise their eVorts. The UK Government is helping the territories in a number of ways. The FCO is working with DFID and the territories’ governments to identify how they and we can provide targeted assistance to implement the findings of the reviews. As a first step we are consulting the Overseas Territories to discover the nature and training needs of their Human Rights Committees. We have recently sent questionnaires to the Territories involved. We have also written to the Territories’ Attorneys General to identify the way in which the Territories currently tackle the process of extension and implementation of international human rights treaties. Meanwhile, DFID are in the process of working up a four-year human rights strategy with a view to supporting the development of local institutional capacity.
We are already working with DFID on a four year DFID-funded child-protection programme, to help raise awareness of child rights and to strengthen local institutional capacity in line with the requirements under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The programme was launched in 2004 and oVers technical assistance and training to help the Territories develop an integrated approach to child protection. It will complement technical assistance provided under a four-year (2001–05) FCO-funded project in Anguilla, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. The recently completed project covered child and family law reform and associated welfare standards and procedures.
Beyond these specific areas, the UK held a workshop in 2003 to provide training on the reporting requirements under the core UN Human Rights Conventions, most of which have been extended to most of the territories. Further training will be provided as necessary. Workshops have also been held on alternatives to custodial sentencing, and on the reporting requirements under the International Labour Organisation Conventions. We have also funded a study on the provision of legal aid, with a view to securing wider public access to justice.
Staffing
Q47. Table 14 on page 218 shows actual and projected staYng for FCO. Given that the long-term aim is an overall reduction in staV, why did the number of staV increase in 2004–05?
Answer: The FCO is committed to a reduction of 310 in its centrally funded staV by 1 April 2008, and we are on course to achieve this target. At the same time, however, there will be an increase in the numbers working in the service delivery areas of Consular and Visa services, where staV numbers depend on external revenue income. There is agreement with the Treasury that these areas will not therefore count against our eYciency targets. The increase in staV numbers during 2004–05 reflected growth in these two areas. 3255703007 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 24 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Q48. Overtime has reduced in 2004–05 and the plan is to reduce this still further so that in 2007–08 it will be half the 2003–04 level. This is happening at the same time as a reduction in the overall staYng level and during a time of change for the OYce. How will FCO ensure that this reduction is genuine and that there will not be pressure for staV to work undeclared overtime?
Answer: As part of the FCO’s SR04 eYciency plan, we are committed to reducing the overtime bill by £2 million in real terms from the 2003–04 baseline. To achieve this we are implementing a more robust bidding, allocation and monitoring system for overtime budgets, in conjunction with better management practices at department level, to ensure that managers devise more eVective working arrangements to reduce the need for long hours.
Q49. The FCO has recognised that it needs to do more to promote diversity in its staV (page 188). The DAR does not give specific diversity statistics. Can the FCO provide figures on women, staV from ethnic minorities and staV with disabilities as a percentage of total staV by grade? Can it provide similar figures for staV recruited in 2004–05, indicating where these are permanent appointments?
Answer: Total staV by grade, at 1 August 2005
Grade Male Female % Minority % Disabled % Total Ethnic
SMS 389 69 15.1 6 1.3 7 1.5 458 D7 178 53 22.9 2 0.9 4 1.7 231 D6 504 233 31.6 14 1.9 19 2.6 737 C5 464 165 26.2 14 2.2 17 2.7 629 C4 802 478 37.3 30 2.3 32 2.5 1,280 B3 704 743 51.3 94 6.5 39 2.7 1,447 A2 440 671 60.4 120 10.8 47 4.2 1,111 A1 125 80 39 17 8.3 20 9.7 205 Totals 3,606 2,492 40.9 297 4.9 185 3 6,098
Note: These figures include FCO Services, UKVisas, UK Trade and Investment staV. They do not include staV on special unpaid leave, additional maternity leave, sick nil pay, casual staV, fixed-term contracts and fee-paid oYcers. Permanent staV recruited in 2004–05 FCO
Grade Male Female % Minority % Disabled % Total Ethnic
A1 12 17 59 15 52 2 7 29 B3 25 12 32 8 22 1 3 37 C4 14 7 33 2 10 1 5 21 C4 14 7 33 2 10 1 5 21 Total 51 36 41 25 29 4 5 87
FCO Services
Grade Male Female % Minority % Disabled % Total Ethnic
A2 13 2 13 6 40 2 13 15 B3 5 1 17 4 67 0 0 6 C4 28 0 0 7 25 0 0 28 C5 5 2 29 0 0 0 0 7 D620000002 D710000001
These figures are for permanent staV only. Once we have full roll-out of our management information system, we will be able to produce figures on all aspects of diversity for our temporary staV. 3255703007 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 25
Q50. Has the FCO now identified all the senior staV whose posts will be cut during the SR04 period? Have there been any compulsory retirements as part of this programme?
Answer: The FCO has identified over 60 jobs in its senior management structure to be cut or downgraded during the SR04 period. Nearly 70 SMS oYcers have agreed to take early departure from the FCO and will be leaving under the terms set out in the Civil Service Pensions Scheme for compulsory early retirement or compulsory early severance. The need for further reductions in either staV or posts will be kept under review in line with progress towards our overall eYciency targets and the need to maintain an inflow of new staV into the SMS.
Q51. The department had to review its race equality scheme by May 2005 (page 189). What were the outcomes of this review?
Answer: The FCO’s Human Resources Directorate led a thorough review of the FCO’s Race Equality Scheme (RES) in early 2005. This review included wide consultation within and outside the FCO. The main outcome of this review was the publication of a fully revised and updated RES which is available on the FCO’s website. The new Scheme highlights the fact that race issues are very important in the FCO’s work. In the review, we assessed the FCO’s functions (Strategic Priorities (SPs) and Public Services) for relevance to the general duty of the RR(A)A, as required by the Act. We found that all our SPs and Public Services except SP8 (security and good governance of the Overseas Territories) were relevant to the general duty. We must therefore continue to fully consider race issues in our work at all levels, and across our policies, services and employment. In the review we recognised that the FCO has made considerable progress in promoting diversity, including ethnic diversity, since the first Scheme was published in 2002. But we also acknowledged that we still have a lot of work to do. We face particular challenges in the following areas: — How we apply the RR(A)A to our overseas work which may not directly aVect UK citizens; — Ensuring that all staV throughout the FCO understand how the RR(A)A aVects their work; and — Ensuring that we apply the RR(A)A to all areas of the FCO’s work, not only its employment.
Q52. FCO is still working with DfID to resolve the problems with diVerential local pay scales (page 193). When is this likely to be resolved? Why has it taken so long?
Answer: We have now had several meetings with DFID. The latest meeting at Director level took place on 13 September 2005. The issue is complex. We are two diVerent Government Departments, working within diVerent operational and financial frameworks. The scope for achieving complete parity across the board is likely to be limited. Our aim is therefore to narrow as far as possible the pay diVerentials, where they exist, in particular in those missions where FCO and DFID are physically co-located. As a first step both Directors are writing jointly to the respective Heads of Mission and DFID oYces in posts falling within this category, to encourage closer working and the establishment of a more systematic process for conducting pay reviews. This would involve greater consultation on the timing and scope of reviews and the selection of markers. We are already working on a joint pay review in Jerusalem and hope to learn lessons for the future from that exercise. We also agreed to explore further the idea of the FCO and DFID jointly establishing a broad pay range for junior staV in some locations. This would provide a platform for undertaking further job analysis and the possibility of using the same or similar markers for future pay awards in the medium to longer term. Directors will meet again on 23 November.
Q53. The DAR says that “better management information is a vital part of dealing with . . . complex issues . . .” but does not give any indication that management information has improved (page 193). What plans does the OYce have to improve its management information and what is the timescale for this?
Answer: In consultation with its Board, the FCO’s Finance Directorate has developed a new monthly reporting package designed to take advantage of the information available through the Prism system. Oracle Financial Analyser (OFA) is a component of Prism that makes a standard set of financial management information available to all budget holders at home and overseas. This is already being used by staV in London, and will be fully accessible to staV overseas once the global roll-out of Prism is completed (planned for May 2006—see Question 11). Procurement Strategy Unit and HR Directorate are also receiving and using management information from Prism. 3255703007 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 26 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
BBC World Service/BBC Monitoring Service
Q54. When does the FCO cease to be the sponsoring department for BBC Monitoring? Is the FCO content for this responsibility to pass to the Cabinet OYce? Answer: The transfer of sponsoring department status from FCO to Cabinet OYce is likely to take place in the first half of 2006. The FCO is content for this responsibility to pass to the Cabinet OYce.
Q55. The review of the BBC Monitoring service concluded that there will be a reduction of 50–80 jobs. Do these job cuts represent eYciencies or a cut in services? Answer: BBC Monitoring are currently going through a consultation period with management and staV to attempt to minimise the impact on services of job reductions. While some reprioritisation may be necessary, BBC Monitoring are working towards delivering eYciencies aimed at ensuring minimum disruption to core services.
Q56. The BBC World Service has been asked to develop a business case for an Arabic TV station. This would be funded from its 2004 Spending Review allocation (response to the Committee’s report on the 2003–04 DAR, response 38). How far advanced is this process? Answer: BBCWS prepared an updated business case for an Arabic TV channel in June 2005. This was subsequently discussed at an annual ministerial meeting between BBCWS and FCO on 21 June. After a period of internal consultation, FCO Ministers gave approval for BBCWS to commence a 12-hour Arabic TV channel on 1 September. It is now for BBCWS to take this forward.
British Council
Q57. The Council is intending to use eYciency savings to fund on-going security costs (response to the Committee’s report on the 2003–04 DAR, response 13). What contingency plans does the FCO have to ensure that security of Council staV and premises is fully funded in the event that eYciency savings do not materialise or are delayed? Answer: The FCO and British Council hold regular meetings to discuss financial issues. At these meetings we ensure that the Council’s eYciency plans are progressing on time. So far, the Council is on track to meet the targets and cover increased security costs. A condition of the Council’s settlement letter is that they should have 2% unallocated reserves each year for “new or unexpected demands”. These reserves could be drawn upon if eYciency savings proved insuYcient to meet any essential security needs. Chris Stanton Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team 3 October 2005
Witnesses: Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Permanent Under-Secretary, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Director- General (Corporate), Mr David Warren, Director, (Human Resources), and Mr Ric Todd, Director (Finance) Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, examined.
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. As you are aware, how it might be presented? What changes have you we are discussing issues related to the FCO’s Annual made as a result of these representations or Report from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005. suggestions? Inevitably, this gives us the opportunity to raise Sir Michael Jay: We see the most important almost anything. I would be grateful, Sir Michael, if representations that we get as coming from this you could just introduce your colleagues. Committee and we do try to take those into account Sir Michael Jay: First of all, it is good to be back. On when we can. We do go through it ourselves and try my far left is Ric Todd, finance director. On my to improve it each time, in particular to ensure that immediate left is Dickie Stagg, director general of it is readable, that it follows our evolving priorities, V corporate a airs. On my right is David Warren, the strategic priorities and objectives. I am not aware director for human resources. myself of other comments from outside the Foreign OYce or the Committee but if there were any we Q2 Chairman: Can you begin by talking about the would certainly take them into account. format of the annual report? We as a Committee over the years have made a number of suggestions about how it might be improved but for the record Q3 Chairman: You must put an enormous amount do you get suggestions from others who read it as to of eVort into producing this document. How widely its format? What other suggestions do you get about is it read and do you feel that the eVort is worth it? 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 27
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Sir Michael Jay: It is an eVort. It is also a discipline demonstrators. That was a very unhappy experience because it does get us to focus on what we have done again in 2001, notwithstanding the assurance that during the course of the year. The way in which it is Mr Hain had given to this Committee. Can I ask you now structured, partly as a result of this to give us a very categorical assurance that there has Committee’s suggestion, based on lessons learned been no deal done with the security police and cost benefit analysis, the fact of having to do surrounding the Chinese State President; that those that for the report means, to be honest, that we tend who wish to demonstrate, including on behalf of the to do it more in the ordinary course of business. It is Falun Gong and on behalf of Tibet and indeed not just a report to read but the production of it is others who are protesting, with justification, about also helpful in managing the business. abuses of human rights, that their protests are going to remain invisible from the Chinese State President Q4 Chairman: Is it available on the internet? whilst he is here. Sir Michael Jay: Yes, it is. Sir Michael Jay: I am not suYciently aware of the detailed negotiations either with the police or with Q5 Sir John Stanley: You may recall that prior to the demonstrators to give you that absolute assurance last state visit by the Chinese President it transpired but I can promise you that I will look into this after that there were, following the questions that were this hearing and inform myself on where the put by Members of this Committee and indeed on negotiations have got to. Ultimately, this has to be a the floor of the House, a total of eight meetings none matter for the police but we will work very closely of which was minuted between the Foreign OYce with them to ensure that we try to get a better and the police dealing with the security balance between the right to demonstrate and the arrangements for the visit and the programme. It right to security than was the case in 1999 or in 2001. was certainly a view which was shared in all parts of I have not, I am afraid, been reminded of the 2001 the House that the October 1999 visit was events. accompanied by some of the most gross suppressions of the right of peaceful protest in this Q7 Sir John Stanley: Could I ask that you report country that most of us had ever seen in our political back to this Committee following your inquiries? I lifetimes. When this was the subject of ministerial hope that your report back in writing will give us the examination in front of this Committee, the then Y assurances which I think, in all parts of the Foreign O ce Minister of State, Mr Peter Hain, Committee, we are seeking. said—I quote from his evidence on 19 December Sir Michael Jay: Ministers and senior oYcials do 2000—“I think some hard lessons have been learnt. regularly raise human rights issues in their contacts Certainly I would not like to see anything like a with the Chinese authorities and that is an important repeat of that unhappy series of events and that is part of our multifaceted relationship with China.1 true for the government as a whole.” Can you assure us that there will be no repeat of those unhappy events during the forthcoming state visit by the Q8 Chairman: Can I take you onto the wider issues Chinese President next month? about access and information from your Sir Michael Jay: It is certainly our intention that department? Do you apply the provisions of the there should not be. We are, as you can imagine, Freedom of Information Act in practice, in eVect, working very closely with the police over security for when you make information available to this the visit. I know that the police are as well aware as Committee and to Parliament? we are of the lessons that we all need to learn from Sir Michael Jay: I am not sure I quite understand the Y the 1999 visit. It is always a di cult balance to get question. to allow demonstrators to make their views known within the law, which they must be able to do, and to preserve the security of the visitor but I think we all Q9 Chairman: I will be specific. It is a widely held learnt lessons from last time. I hope very much when view in this House, not just amongst Members of this visit is over it will be shown that we have this Committee but other select committees, that it learnt them. is easier to get information from some government departments by invoking Freedom of Information Q6 Sir John Stanley: I do not think there was very provisions than it is from answers to inquiries by much diYculty experienced by Members in all parts select committees. of the House last time that the balance had been Sir Michael Jay: We are increasingly conscious in struck profoundly wrongly. Given that assurance, everything we do now of the obligations under the when the present President came to this country as Freedom of Information Act and that would vice-president in 2001 the assurance that this certainly apply to requests for information from this Committee was given by Mr Hain did not appear to Committee. I would be surprised if there was have been fulfilled. As was reported in The information which could be obtained under the Independent on 15 October, when the then vice- Freedom of Information Act which we would not, if president Hu visited the United Kingdom in 2001, asked, release to this Committee. We take our the Chinese asked that supporters of the Falun Gong responsibilities to release information to this and Free Tibet movements, both of which are Committee extremely seriously. banned in China, be kept away from him. The Metropolitan Police obliged by blocking the 1 Please refer to Ev 43. 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 28 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Q10 Chairman: We will come later to some questions of accountability and responsibility, a failure with about the Collinson Grant Report but this regard to middle management decision making.” Committee was made aware of that and the Ling They say that there is significant redundancy of Report to do with the Prism Project after the fact eVort in the managerial chain that leaves the Foreign that these committees had been established for some OYce—which must mean you and your considerable time, so clearly we were not put in the colleagues—rarely focused on eYcient management loop at an early stage. We found out about these of the organisation. The entire organisation needs to later on and that is the context in which I ask the be challenged and reformed. Leadership lacks the question. skills needed and the will to upset the status quo. Sir Michael Jay: The issue there, surely, is whether Accountability is poor. The changes required will we should send this Committee automatically cause pain, and it goes on. Surely this is really a anything which we release under the Freedom of document which the Foreign OYce commissioned— Information Act. Anything we release under the I did not commission it—which really indicates that Freedom of Information Act is immediately put on there needs to be a root and branch reform of the our website and indeed there is a special part of the organisation? It also goes on to indicate that savings website now which is there just specifically for are not going to be made. Human resources are Freedom of Information Act requests, so once they inflated. They make comparisons with the Ministry are available they are available to anybody. There of Defence and the armed forces. What say you to all will be classes of documents, particularly relating to those charges which are not mine but Collinson our internal management, the day to day Grant’s? management, which would be releasable under the Sir Michael Jay: Let me start by getting a bit of Freedom of Information Act but which we would context. You are right in saying that we not release unless asked because they are not of any commissioned the report. We commissioned the intrinsic interest. That would explain perhaps why report because we are very conscious of the need to something would be submitted in response to a change, modernise and reform and have been for the Freedom of Information Act request which would last two to three years. I can go through some of the not have been seen previously by the Committee. changes that we have made if that would be helpful. We are also conscious that we have as a result of Q11 Chairman: Is there not a wider issue here? It SR2004 an obligation to further improve our would be a bit bizarre, would it not, if select operations and our systems and to fulfil a committees of this House had to invoke the demanding eYciency agenda. We believed that it Freedom of Information Act to get information would help us if we were to have a hard hitting report when holding government departments to account? from a firm of consultants, pointing up some of the Sir Michael Jay: Yes. areas in which there was room for development. That is why we commissioned the report. The Q12 Chairman: Surely we ought to have a better commissioned report is hard hitting. It concerned position than would be available to any member of much of what we already knew about areas in which the public or any journalist invoking freedom of we need to improve. For example, delayering in information? London to reduce the number of senior staV, greater Sir Michael Jay: Over the years there have been large focus on risk management and on delegation of amounts of information which have been made authority. We have learnt and we are implementing available to this Committee which would not have a number of those points. It also focused our been made available under the Freedom of attention on some new areas of work which we had Information Act, information that we send you not focused on suYciently, like the need for further sometimes in confidence so that you can have a reform of the finance function, which we are now proper understanding of the way in which we work. carrying out with the Treasury and the NAO. We I entirely agree with you. I think it would be bizarre commissioned the report. We do not accept all the if it was easier to get information from the public. analysis. We accept many of the recommendations. A number of them we are implementing; some of Q13 Andrew Mackinlay: Collinson Grant was them we were already implementing. There is always received formally in February of this year. At no a risk. It would have been easy for us not to stage was the Committee made aware of this commission a report in which case I would not have comprehensive report which was looking at savings to answer this kind of question, but I think it is better and management style of the Foreign and if we do feel we need some support in managing Commonwealth OYce. The report castigates the ourselves to look for some outside help and then Y management of the Foreign O ce. It also indicates take it into account. that there was obstruction in its preparation. It says that the failure of some people to respond to inquiries “detracted from the quality analysis, Q14 Andrew Mackinlay: I welcome the fact that you caused severe diYculties and significant delays.” The are saying you are going to adopt some of their report goes on to use the National Audit OYce recommendations but it condemns hook, line and criteria, seven warning signs, and it says, “The sinker the culture in the Foreign OYce. It says, Foreign OYce is deficient to some degree at least in “poor leadership; closed culture; poor information many of these requirements. The Foreign OYce is for decision makers; low accountability; lack of slow to act. There is lack of delegation, insuYciency clarity; poor management, poor worker relations.” 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 29
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
They are not my words; they are theirs. How are you Q16 Andrew Mackinlay: Can I go to two specific going to change the culture because it does confirm charges, though? One suggests there was obstruction what a lot of us knew. by some of your colleagues. It was also put to me, Sir Michael Jay: It confirms what a lot of you though I am sure it is a tissue of atrocious lies, that believed, because I do not accept all of that. I accept you yourself did not complete the questionnaire. some of that. We have changed a lot in the last two That is completely untrue, is it? or three years because of a consciousness that we Sir Michael Jay: If I did not complete the need to reform and modernise if we are going to be questionnaire, I am remiss. I am not conscious of as eVective as we need to be in a pretty complicated obstructionism. We discussed the report with world. The Foreign OYce has a high reputation Collinson Grant and they came and gave a very around the world with its peers, deservedly so in my good presentation to the board. After they had view, and there are plenty of examples of the way in reported we immediately set up a number of focus Y which we have been extraordinarily professional in groups in the o ce in order to take forward what we have done. To take some examples recently, specifically the individual work streams. We took the work on Turkey, saving the UN Millennium this extremely seriously. We would not have spent Review Summit conclusions document, the work of that money on it if we had not. our mission in New York. As this Committee knows, Mr Stagg: On the question of opposition or we have a large number of people doing very high resistance, it is inevitable that, if you bring in people grade work in very diYcult and dangerous places who are clearly seen as being something of a threat such as Baghdad, Basra and Kabul. Let me start by to the status quo, there are people who are saying that I am proud to lead this organisation. I unenthusiastic about that process. I think you would believe we have reformed a lot in the last three or find that anywhere in any organisation. It is not four years. We have further to go. I think we and our good but it is a reality. At the end, we got a good return from staV on the questionnaire. I personally staV do an extraordinarily good job in very diYcult commissioned the report so I am seen as the person, circumstances. I want to get that on the record in some ways, to blame in the organisation. I think because I think it is important to do so. We have we have since then been able to do quite a lot in terms always recognised that there are further changes we of altering some of our structures, reducing some of need to make. We have changed a lot. We have, by the layers. We have downsized quite significantly comparison with what we had three or four years some of the departments in London by 20–25% and ago, our strategic priorities. We are focusing our we have also introduced a much clearer system of resources far more around strategic priorities. We corporate governance at the top which is now seen are much more flexible than we were, as we know as in line with Whitehall best practice, which frankly from the rapid deployment teams which we can the previous system was not. come to if we talk about consular work later on. We are more adaptable in shifting resources to where they are needed. We have a much greater focus on Q17 Andrew Mackinlay: We were told that service delivery. We are much more open, working Collinson Grant is engaged in three other strands of more closely with other government departments work. Would you be able to supply the Committee and, in my view, we are increasingly professional, with the reports on these strands and also let us know whether the 2005–06 accounts are expected to not just in the traditional forms of regional and V linguistic expertise but also in the new professional be signed o before next summer’s recess. Given that expertise we need to run a highly complex business. you have been unable to move the timetable of your There are a lot of changes which have been made. accounts forward this year, how likely is it that the We need to change further. I accept many of the deadline will be met? What systems are being put in place to improve the situation? conclusions but not the analysis of that report and I Sir Michael Jay: On that second point, I have had do not accept the root and branch criticism. long discussions with the finance director, with the board and with the audit and risk committee. I am absolutely determined to sign oV the accounts before Q15 Andrew Mackinlay: For fairness and for the recess in 2006. This is not going to be expedition this afternoon, could you give us a note straightforward because it is going to require all our on those things with which you profoundly posts around the world to manage their accounts or disagree—your words, not mine. For instance, all at least to get the information in earlier. This is the things that you think are unfair criticism. Could coming on top of quite a heavy programme of other you flag them up and rebut them perhaps in a note? change, but I am determined to do that. Sir Michael Jay: I will certainly do that.2 One of them I have already flagged up in response to one Q18 Andrew Mackinlay: I would like you to respond of the 57 questions which you asked us a couple of to the fact that the report castigates the scale, size months ago when there was a suggestion that we did and nature of the human resources department but not have professional, diplomatic skills, which I also, when I drew attention to this in the summer, I profoundly reject because it is simply untrue. There was assured by your oYce that Collinson Grant are other areas where we do need to develop further would be put on the website. I am open to correction skills and we are developing them. but I do not think it is there now and certainly was never volunteered to this Committee. It was never 2 Ev 45 uttered that such a report was being done. Perhaps 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 30 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd taking the last point first, one, why is it not on the Q23 Mr Mackay: From my experience I think we website? Can it be on the website? Why were we not potentially have the best diplomatic and consular acquainted with it and, two, if you can come back to service anywhere in the world and it is something human resources again I would be grateful. that you should be rightly proud of. You rightly Mr Stagg: It is on our intranet internally because we defend it. The problems seem to be in other areas view it essentially as a matter of us trying to improve such as our estate management, finance, human internally and not something we are— resources, and this is very much mentioned in the report we have just discussed. I was alerted to it last time you came to this Committee when, as an aside, Q19 Andrew Mackinlay: I was assured it was going you just happened to say about the previous finance on the internet, on the website, and I cannot see any director, “I am afraid he will not be with you next logic why it should not be, bearing in mind there is time because he is just going back to be our considerable, legitimate interest in the stewardship Y ambassador in Athens” which I am sure was a very of the Foreign O ce. good appointment. It caused me to start to look at Sir Michael Jay: It should be if it has been released what other people did. If we take, for instance, Mr under the Freedom of Information Act. It ought to Gillham who runs the estate strategy unit, there have be and I am slightly surprised that it is not on our been endless problems about and bungling, financial 3 website. We will look into that. mismanagement which I do not want to go into here because we discussed it with you before. You look at Q20 Andrew Mackinlay: Human resources? his very distinguished career and look at Caracas, Sir Michael Jay: We would accept some of the Madrid, first secretary and later Counsellor in New comments and analysis in the Collinson Grant Delhi, a distinguished diplomat, who should be Report. Our human resources operation has been doing what he knows best; yet for some reason he too large and we are now in the process of has been put in charge of estate management of substantially reducing it and moving to a new system which he, like you and I, will have had very limited of managing our human resources. experience. Then we turn to your two distinguished Mr Warren: Collinson Grant made the perfectly fair colleagues here today. Without wishing to unduly point that we were too large as a human resources embarrass Mr Todd who is in charge of finance, he organisation, with 270 staV for an organisation the has just come back from being our ambassador in size of the Foreign OYce’s UK based staV Slovakia at a time—correct me if I am wrong—when complement of around 6,000. We have already put Slovakia entered the European Union, an absolutely into place a change programme which should shrink vital time for us in Slovakia. One assumes that he the size of the human resources directorate of the was there because he is a damned good diplomat. Here again, it seems to me that he is wasted at Foreign OYce by at least 100 positions over the finance. Turning to Mr Warren, a distinguished course of the next six to seven months. This career: Tokyo, Nairobi and back to Tokyo; yet for programme is in hand and indeed it answers one some strange reason he seems to have been plonked point, Mr Mackinlay, that you drew attention to, in charge of human resources. I want to make two about the delayering of the organisation, by points to you which I would appreciate your reducing the number of assistant directors of human comments on. In any normal organisation, you resources from eight to three. This was in hand when would have professional experts dealing with these Collinson Grant tabled their report. three areas. In any normal organisation, if you have diplomats as distinguished as these three gentlemen, Q21 Chairman: The reply to us from the FCO when you would be asking them to do what they are best you answered our written questions referred to the at, in which they have had considerable training and fact that there were four strands of work that experience in cultivating their art. I think it is a Collinson Grant were commissioned to undertake. double blow. One, we are not getting best value as Can we be supplied, please, with copies of the has been proved by the report in these three areas. reports on the other three strands? Secondly, these three distinguished gentlemen are Mr Todd: There are not reports on these. What they completely wasting their time in areas in which they did was to put together for us, for example, a only have limited expertise, which seems to be database of costs. There is not a written report by hugely unfair on them when I would like to see them Y them. There is material which we are using in order either posted up the road at the Foreign O ce or out to take forward Collinson Grant. in the field, doing what they are really good at. Sir Michael Jay: Let me try to answer those points.
Q22 Chairman: Perhaps you could send us what material you can.4 Q24 Mr Purchase: “Try” I think will be the word. Sir Michael Jay: Can we give you more information Sir Michael Jay: Let me answer those points. Firstly, about those very strands and what details we can we very much share in the Foreign OYce the about them? Professional Skills for Government agenda which Chairman: We will consider what we get and decide has been adopted in the Home Civil Service by Sir if we need to write to you again. Andrew Turnbull and subsequently Sir Gus O’Donnell. What this means is that people who are 3 Ev 45 going to move to the higher reaches of the Foreign 4 Ev 45 OYce need to have a balance of skills. They need to 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd have skills in policy work, service delivery and Mr Stagg: I have just had a review done of our estate corporate management, not least because when you function by a very big firm of London surveyors and become an ambassador, as for example at the they made a lot of recommendations for change in moment our ambassador in Mexico City who is the structure but did not suggest changing the sort of down in Cancun helping British citizens get out of person at the head of the organisation. their shelters, you need to have people who have the diplomatic skills, the policy skills but also a real focus and understanding of the service delivery Q25 Mr Mackay: We all know that New York and agenda and people who can also manage a business Dublin were spectacular mistakes which, if they had because an embassy these days is quite a complicated happened in the private sector, would have led to the business with a lot of staV and a lot of finance to resignation of the board but we will leave that on one manage. We want people at the top of the Foreign side. I trust that Mr Todd is going back to what he OYce who have all three of those skills. Secondly, in knows best and I look forward to a senior managing our business—let us take our estates ambassadorial appointment being made shortly. business—we need to have a balance of two things. Returning to your two main points, Sir Michael, do We need professional skills and a knowledge of our you not see that, first of all, these are not really open? business because with professional skills without the It was only open within Whitehall. It is this knowledge of our business we will not get it right. If impression of a little closed shop. It does you such harm unnecessarily when so much that you do is so you have knowledge of the business without Y professional skills, you will not get it right. You need good. It is the impression that the Foreign O ce a balance of those two. That is what we have tried to looks inward. Nobody is capable of holding a top job there unless they have the ethos of the Foreign do. I do not think we yet have the balance right and Y I will go through, if I may, the various areas which O ce. Do you not also understand that in other you have mentioned. First of all, Ric Todd was organisations the top people in estate management, indeed the last ambassador in Bratislava. Before that when you have an estate the size you have to he was in the Treasury where he was managing the manage, in human resources, in finance, are spending division. He was chosen by a selection absolutely expert in that field? You as—shall we call board which included the then government chief you the chief executive for the sake of argument— accountant, against a Whitehall wide competition weigh along with your colleagues their advice and involving people with professional skills. That is an make the final decision because you have to see the impeccable credential. All his four deputies are wider picture. I entirely accept that, but it would be professionals. The chief accountant and his two much healthier if there was an open competition for deputies are professionally qualified accountants. these top jobs and there was not an assumption that The finance, planning and performance department your senior diplomatic colleagues would have these is headed by an economist who is a professionally jobs, which as I pointed out earlier is neither fair on trained accountant. Our procurement strategy unit us nor British taxpayers. is headed by a qualified procurement specialist and Sir Michael Jay: I think that was the presumption. the head of our internal audit department is an I do not think it is the presumption any more. The auditor and accountant brought in two years ago competition for Ric Todd’s finance director and his three deputies are qualified auditors. We will succession will be an open competition, outside be having an open competition for a professionally Whitehall. qualified finance director shortly to replace Ric Todd. I do not want to give the impression that Q26 Mr Mackay: You did admit that the estate because the director himself has not all the management one was not. professional qualifications we would expect the Sir Michael Jay: That was not. finance function in the organisation has not, because it has. As far as human resources are concerned, there are 42 staV in the human resources directorate Q27 Mr Mackay: There has been a change of policy who hold or are working towards professional and now senior appointments which are not related qualifications in training, personnel practice, to diplomatic and consular work, like these three employment relations in law, management and positions I have been talking about, are open business studies and pensions administration, for selection and not just selection within Whitehall? example. The head of our estate strategy unit you Sir Michael Jay: We will have to decide that case by mentioned. You are right about his career. He is a case, because I do think it is important to have the qualified economist with six years’ private sector right balance of people who have the professional experience as well. His deputy is an experienced basis to understand the business. chartered surveyor and there are five other chartered surveyors and three qualified architects. I do not think it is easy to look at individuals in the Q28 Mr Mackay: I am trying to get us to where we organisation and deduce from that that the hopefully all agree and move forward. In any organisation as a whole does not have the right company, the finance director, the human resources balance of skills. We are trying to ensure we have the director and the estates director would be hugely right balance of skills. We will be making changes to expert in that field and probably have very little some of the positions which you have mentioned— knowledge or understanding of the company or in particular, the finance director and, as I said, open about the field the company was in. Take BP, for competition for that will start shortly. instance: they would not be oil men. 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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd know nothing about oil but the chief executive of BP Q30 Sandra Osborne: I accept the comments that would say, “This is all very well, Mr Finance Man. have been made about cultural change being very You are absolutely right on financial matters” or, diYcult to achieve in any organisation. The report “Mr Estate Management Man, you are right on does quite clearly state that leadership skills are one estate management matters, but this will not work of the biggest problems that you have. It says that because of what happens in the oil industry.” That is the entire organisation needs to be challenged and your job, to weigh the professional advice on the one reformed but the leadership lacks the skills needed hand with your own expertise as the Permanent and the will to upset the status quo. Do you accept Secretary in the Foreign OYce. Surely you should that criticism and, if so, what are you going to do not be afraid of having outside people in and should about it? welcome the best professionals coming in to do a Sir Michael Jay: I accept it in part. I think there is very important job? a natural desire perhaps to stay with the status quo Sir Michael Jay: Indeed. We have had an outside partly because the output of the oYce is very good. competition, for example, recently for the director of My point is—and this is a point I make constantly to UK visas. We will be having an outside competition our own staV and our own leaders, both at home and for our Legal Adviser. We are about to have an abroad—it is only going to stay that way if we make outside competition for the director of FCO Services the kind of reforms and changes, including culture and we will have one for the finance director. A changes, which we now need to do if we are going to couple of years ago there had not been any. We also adapt to new circumstances. As for the leadership, have one director general on our board who has wide what are we doing? We have reformed our corporate experience elsewhere in Whitehall. I think there is a management. We now have a board structure which move away from the kind of closed approach that reports clearly to ministers and a quarterly meeting you have been describing. Mr Mackinlay was right between the board and the Foreign Secretary in earlier on to talk about the need for a culture change order to ensure that we are clear on the strategic in the organisation. We do need a culture change in priorities that he wants us to implement. We have a the organisation. Introducing major culture changes series of subcommittees underneath the board which and other major changes at the same time as are focusing on human resources, investment managing and maintaining the morale and the decisions, finance decisions and so on, which is a ability of a highly complicated organisation is not much more coherent structure than there was easy. I do think there has to be a pace in introducing before. I am working much more closely now with these changes, which makes sense given the the key ambassadors and high commissioners challenges that we face, but the general direction in overseas because they need to be brought into part which you want us to go is right. of the corporate leadership. We now have every three months a meeting between the board and the Q29 Mr Mackay: I am pushing at an open door, top most senior 20 ambassadors and high am I? commissioners, plus a representative also of a Sir Michael Jay: You are pushing at an open door, smaller overseas post, in order that we can get the yes, but the speed at which the door opens is concept of leadership and change management something over which we have to have some control. imbued, not just in the centre of London but more Mr Purchase: Could I congratulate you on your very widely. Every year we now also have what we call a spirited and forthright defence of the department? leadership conference, a conference of all our top We know that people work extremely hard in your management in London and all our ambassadors department and elsewhere through Whitehall. I am and high commissioners overseas, who come once a delighted to hear the way in which you have year again with a view to really focusing on the defended the department. I hope the people who change and modernisation issue which, as an work in that department do take real good spirit organisation, we have to embrace. This is a from what you have been able to say this afternoon. conscious attempt to change the culture and to get I make no comment at all about management. There people to realise that management and leadership are so many books written about it. I cannot think are absolutely key to running a really complicated there is anything you do not know about good organisation these days. management or how to structure any department. All is known, as Spike Milligan would have said. The truth is you are damn well short on politics at the Q31 Richard Younger-Ross: I believe external oYce because how on earth you come to organise a appointments are absolutely vital to the health of report of this nature and how it ever got published in any organisation. If you look at the social services this form beats the living daylights out of me. Now is department in Orkney, they believed there were the time to put into place the monitoring and review witches and warlocks running all over the island procedures that would avoid any repetition because of ignorance within the organisation. You whatsoever any further Collinson Grant finding. In obviously have a lot of pressures on the Civil Service a well organised management structure, it is vital at the moment in terms of job cuts, not just in your those checks and balances are there to avoid this department but in other departments as well. When kind of report ever appearing again. It is very you come to appointments, there is a lot of pressure harmful to morale and that is why I say I am on you to appoint other people who might be being delighted at the way in which you defend it. displaced from elsewhere. Can I ask what 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd discussions you have had with the unions to try and Q33 Mr Pope: I would like to raise the issue of the overcome some of those problems and what tier of Foreign OYce response to emergencies overseas. external appointments will you go down to? Is it just There has been some criticism of the response of the the top jobs? How far down the structure? oYce to the tsunami disaster. Do you think that is Sir Michael Jay: On the last point, we would go out because people have an unrealistic expectation of to external competition when we thought that the what they can expect in terms of help from the FCO subject matter required it and that was the when an unprecedented disaster like the tsunami professionalism we needed, irrespective of the level hits? in the organisation. For example, in a lot of our IT Sir Michael Jay: I think it is partly that, yes. There work we are working very closely with outside is a very real and diYcult issue for us which is going professionals because we cannot possibly do that to be addressed now in the consultation which is ourselves. starting tomorrow, I think, on consular work. There Y Mr Warren: We have had no formal consultation is a really di cult issue of what is the right level of with the unions on the specific point that Mr expectation that people should have of the services Y Younger-Ross makes, which relates to our being which the Foreign O ce and the government can pressed to accept people who are being moved out of provide. There has been a rising level of expectation other organisations, if I have understood the point to the extent sometimes that we have not been able correctly. to deliver it. That is part of the answer. Part of the answer on the tsunami was that it was an unprecedented disaster. One forgets now just quite how awful it was at the time and how diYcult it was Q32 Richard Younger-Ross: You have other to handle with the uncertain knowledge there was, departments with job losses and people being but I think we also have to accept—and we do moved. They are downsizing. You are looking to accept—that in the handling of the tsunami we made make external appointments in some posts but that, some mistakes. We learned some lessons from that I would have thought, would be resisted by the as we have done from all the crises we have handled unions. from the time of the first terrorist attack in Bali Mr Warren: The unions have expressed reservations which we discussed particularly with Sir John about a spread of external appointments, as you Stanley in other appearances before this Committee. would expect the trade unions to do. But the number We learn lessons from all these disasters and I think of appointments made to senior positions from we are getting better at the crisis response but we are outside the Foreign OYce is currently very few. We never going to be perfect. There are always things we have kept the unions informed about our specific have to learn. proposals to hold more open competitions, which may indeed result in external appointments. We value the close consultation we have with the unions Q34 Mr Pope: I do not want to be unfair over the on that point, although it has not taken the form of tsunami because, as you rightly say, it was any formal negotiations. As far as other government unprecedented in scale. I do think though that departments downsizing and our being required to within the report it does rather pull a punch on page take staV, this has not been an issue of contention 171. It says that, for example, many people who tried between us and the unions. The unions who to ring the emergency telephone number in the first few days of the crisis were unable to get through. represent Foreign OYce staV, the three major What we do know as well, which is not in the report, unions, are of course national unions, because our is that the relatives of some of the victims were in Diplomatic Service Association is aYliated to the some circumstances turned away. Would it be fair to First Division Association, who have interests in the V say that some victims or the relatives of some victims work and fortunes of sta in all government were failed by the OYce in the immediate aftermath? departments. This is not an issue of contention Sir Michael Jay: I think it would be fair to say that between us and the unions and we maintain close some were, yes, and some did not get the treatment liaison with other government departments and the Y that they had the right to expect, but I would like to Cabinet O ce as all departments do. The specific put it in context because I do think that the response point you make is not a contentious issue for us with was extraordinary. From our point of view, we had the unions. a rapid deployment team at Sri Lanka the day after Sir Michael Jay: It is partly a question of scale, I the tsunami and we had redeployed our staV down suspect. If it goes beyond a certain point then it to Phuket and elsewhere in Thailand on the day of would begin to have an eVect on morale. If it is clear the disaster and we had a huge response from that the reason for going for outside competition is volunteers and our own staV as well, who were not because of the need to have the right professional trained in this. This is another lesson we have learnt skills, that is both readily understandable and also about handling natural disasters like this. If it is a increases our own professionalism agenda. We can really huge disaster, it is not just your consular staV say to our own people, “Look, you developed those who are handling it; it is everybody in the embassy professional skills through outward secondments, who is going to go and help out. That means that we through working elsewhere in the private sector, all need to have a degree of training in trauma elsewhere in Whitehall and that will both help you management and handling people who are in a and reduce the need perhaps for outside skills to desperately sad state. There were some very good come in.” things that happened and I have been very impressed 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd by the number of letters of appreciation that we have geographical spread as far as the FCO was had since the tsunami. I also think there are some concerned. Having said that, I am interested that the families who are right to feel they did not get the National Audit OYce is now conducting a formal treatment that they would expect from us and that is inquiry. Could you tell us when the FCO was last the a lesson that we have learnt for the future. subject of a formal NAO inquiry? Mr Stagg: This is a regular event. I think it happens Q35 Mr Pope: I would place on record the thanks, I almost every year. It is called a value for money am sure, of the whole Committee for the work that study done by the NAO. The previous one was was done by many people in the aftermath of the about the global visa operation which you may tsunami. It is appreciated. In terms of the lessons remember ended up focusing a bit on the issues in learnt—you have looked at the response and you say Romania and Bulgaria in the context of the EEA. you have learnt some lessons—why then was there This study began towards the end of last year. When so much criticism of the response to Hurricane the tsunami occurred, they asked to do a special Katrina, because it seems to me that there was study of our response to the tsunami as a good widespread criticism of the response of our consular example of the sort of crisis we needed to deal with, services. There were some reports in the newspapers an extreme example as you have said. This study was of British citizens being left without food, water and underway beforehand and they are now doing two at the mercy of street gangs in New Orleans whilst extra bits to it. One is on the overall response to the tsunami and the other is the views of the victims, our consular services were not deployed quickly V enough into that area to provide help and support those a ected, of the service we provided. for British citizens. Sir Michael Jay: Unlike in some aspects of the Q37 Sir John Stanley: Would it be correct to say that tsunami, I think the criticism of the response to the NAO would not have made this specific Katrina was unjustified. What happened was that extension of its existing inquiry into the tsunami there were indeed in New Orleans, in the Convention response had it not been for very strong Centre, a very large number of people of all sorts of representations it received at least from some diVerent nationalities, including British, who were relatives of victims as to the inadequacy of the there in very diYcult circumstances. They were at FCO’s response as they saw it? the mercy of gangs and looters. Our consular people Sir Michael Jay: I do not know whether that is true. were deployed in order to get to New Orleans as The original NAO value for money study into soon as they could. They were given very clear consular work was done with our agreement. I think guidance and instructions from the United States when Sir John Bourn came and saw me and authorities that consular oYcials were not welcome suggested it I very much welcomed it. This is exactly and should not enter New Orleans. What they the kind of study we do need into our consular should do is to go to the cities around other parts of operations because they are complicated, diYcult, the south where the American authorities intended evolving. There are lessons to be learnt and we to evacuate people. The issue for us as consular would welcome the NAO’s comments on them. It oYcials was we knew there were British people in seems to me that, whatever the response to the there. We knew they wanted help, but we are a tsunami, whether there had or had not been government organisation and a friendly government criticism, it would have been an entirely sensible was saying, “No, do not go there.” What do we do thing for the NAO to say, “Look, we have just had in those circumstances? I do not think we had any one of the most massive consular emergencies the choice except not to go there but at the same time all Foreign OYce has ever had to deal with. Let us take our consular staV who were in Houston, in New that as a case study as to how the broader consular Orleans, who had been deployed from Washington, work is going.” I am afraid I do not know whether the rapid deployment teams deployed also from it was their suggestion, our suggestion or whether it here, were going around all the areas outside New came from the families, but in any event I think it Orleans in the other towns aVected looking for and was an entirely sensible thing to do. We are indeed finding and helping British citizens who did genuinely looking forward to the NAO reports both need help. From those there have been many letters on consular work more generally and on the tsunami of appreciation. because we do think it is important to learn lessons Mr Stagg: We had exactly the same issue about and also to be open about it. I know there are risks, access to crisis centres over the 7 July bombings. We as we discussed earlier in this hearing, in had huge pressure from the American embassy to commissioning reports and in a freedom of allow their consular people into the areas aVected by information age having them widely read; but I the bombs immediately after. Our police were think we have to have the confidence in our own completely determined they should not go there systems and procedures to commission things and until they had managed the crisis to their own then to learn the lessons from them, even though satisfaction. We therefore said no; they could not go they may sometimes be tough. in there. There is something of a parallel between the two situations. Q38 Mr Keetch: First, Sir Michael, may I say on the tsunami that I had constituents there who reported Q36 Sir John Stanley: I would like to say straight back to me that there had been a fantastic response, away that I recognise that the tsunami event given that this literally came out of the blue on presented a challenge of unprecedented severity and Boxing Day. Certainly I had reports of them being 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd able to find the British tent, because it had the Sir Michael Jay: I thought that this was an biggest Union Jack outside. Other tents did not have important point which you raised, Mr Keetch, of the national flag, and so that was an extremely useful which I had not previously been aware. I asked Mr thing to do. On Katrina and your suggestion that Stagg to look into it, in case you did raise it today. British oYcials were told not to go there, I have to Could I ask him to say a bit more about it? say that has been countermanded—or, rather, it has Mr Stagg: Happily. On the question of deaths, I been suggested it was not the case—by the mayor of think we have statistics for those who die overseas, New Orleans, who said publicly that was not the which is about 4,000 British citizens every year. I am case. If that was the case, perhaps you would write to not sure if they are categorised exactly by the nature us, because certainly the mayor of New Orleans said of that death. In terms of standard guidance, I have that no instruction was given for consular staV, from here the standard guidance we have for our consular Britain or any other country, not to go in. Perhaps oYcials, Dealing with the death of a British citizen you could write to us on that specific point. overseas. So there are some quite carefully crafted— Sir Michael Jay: We will write to you about that point. Q41 Chairman: Can you send that to us, please? Mr Stagg: I can even give a copy after this.
Q39 Mr Keetch: Can I come to a more specific point, Q42 Chairman: I think that the Committee should which we touched on briefly when we met with you have it formally. V as a committee yesterday? That is, how consular sta Mr Stagg: Yes, I will happily do that. The second deal with individual tragedies abroad. Do you know thing to say is that, in the case of murders, we would how many British citizens are murdered or killed normally communicate with the family in the UK accidentally overseas every year? through the police, because they have an Sir Michael Jay: I think that I have the information investigative interest in the case and they have here. I do not have it in my hands. trained family liaison oYcers, who are the normal channel through which we work. They are trained to Q40 Mr Keetch: It is an astonishingly large number. deal with these issues and they have a network all round Britain, which means they can deal with In terms of people individually being murdered—as people face to face, which we obviously do not. opposed to Iraq or tsunamis or individual incidents like that—it is a large number of people. What amazes me is that there is no standard procedure to Q43 Mr Keetch: Are you aware of an organisation deal with the murder of British citizens overseas, called SAMM, Support for Murders and when that dreadful thing happens when they are on Manslaughters of British citizens overseas? Mr Stagg: I have heard of it. I have never dealt holiday. You are aware that I raised, with both the with it. minister and with you, the case of a constituent Mr Richard Collins—and his family are aware that I am Q44 Mr Keetch: I would suggest that the Foreign going to mention this—who was murdered in Y Thailand on 9 March this year, and yet his body was O ce ought to inform next of kin of British citizens allowed to decompose to such a degree that no who have been murdered of the existence of that organisation, because certainly in this instance— proper coroner’s investigation was able to be carried and I think in other instances—that does not out. What astonishes me about this incident is that normally happen. If we cannot support citizens back there is no set procedure as to what information is at home in that respect, then I think that we are given to families; what information is given to the failing. insurance companies of the deceased concerned; in V Mr Stagg: Thank you very much. We are very keen what way our consular sta overseas tries to deal to use these occasions to learn as well as to give you with the family back in the UK, who are obviously our views. To conclude, in the tsunami we found a Y going through very di cult times; and to deal with number of organisations which we had not heard of the insurance company to try to ensure that the body before who were specialist in helping those who had is repatriated as soon as possible. We see in our been bereaved. So this is a help to us. passport that Her Majesty’s Government demands that we are looked after. Surely if we, or our next of Q45 Mr Mackay: Sir Michael, as has been kin, or our sons, fathers, brothers or sisters are mentioned earlier, the tsunami was geographically murdered, there ought to be a standard procedure widespread. When you are doing a post-mortem and V whereby our consulate sta keep us informed? If we learning lessons, you presumably will have a chance cannot do that correctly, then how can we deal with to compare best practice in diVerent embassies and situations like tsunamis or Katrinas? I think that you high commissions, because it seems to me that some ought to look as a matter of urgency at how that is did considerably better than others—and I am not dealt with, to ensure that when these appalling going to name them, because I think that would be things happen—as they happen dozens of times a invidious at a public meeting like this. In one year, sadly, to British citizens travelling overseas, particular case there seemed to be severe and are more likely to increase as travel increases— shortcomings, and in one particular case a specific there are standard procedures which are followed, to senior diplomat fell a long way below the standards ensure that these mistakes do not happen in the that should be expected. I gather that this is a matter future. that has been and is being taken up. However, I do 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd hope that we can have an assurance that you will within five working days, and you only got 73.3%. Is compare, because there seemed to be a vast that acceptable? If it is not acceptable, can you diVerence in performance. I am not on a witch-hunt; explain why it has happened and what you are going I am trying to ensure best practice thereafter. to do about it? Sir Michael Jay: Certainly we would look at the Sir Michael Jay: We have worked really hard to diVering nature of the response from diVerent meet the targets and it is not acceptable not to meet embassies and high commissions, and draw lessons them, unless there are overriding reasons why we from that. I do not want to get into the particular have not. I am afraid I ought to, but I do not have case either, though there are, as you know, diVering the details of our consular targets at hand. I do not views about that. The general point you make, know whether any of my colleagues do. however, is an entirely valid one. Mr Stagg: To respond to your underlying question, I think that there have been problems over Q46 Richard Younger-Ross: Of course, with the technology to a degree. We introduced, over the last tsunami there are bodies that are recovered. That is two years, a new system. a closure, in a sense. There were many British citizens in the tsunami whose bodies were never Q50 Chairman: This is Prism you are talking about? recovered: who are missing. There are others who Mr Stagg: No, Chairman. I would happily come on are kidnapped, presumed murdered or whatever. to Prism, but this is GenIE. You will know the case of the Popes, whose son was kidnapped, presumed murdered, in Angola, and Q51 Chairman: More technology problems? there has been a long correspondence with the Mr Stagg: I think not extremely diYcult, but department. implementing these programmes around the world Sir Michael Jay: Yes. I have met the family in in quite diVering environments is quite a challenge. Luanda.
Q47 Richard Younger-Ross: One of the diYculties Q52 Chairman: What is the programme called? they face and others face is presumption-of-death Mr Stagg: It is GenIE. certificates, as I raised with you yesterday, and Chairman: Is it still in the bottle? advice given them at that time was contradictory and wrong. Advice was given on what the presumption Q53 Mr Keetch: Lamp! of death was in Angola, but of course most families Mr Stagg: We could easily give you an overview of are not interested in what happened in Angola; they this in writing, because it is more than just the are interested in the death and how they register it in technology issues.5 the UK. Do you have standard notes of how Y consular o cials should deal with people who are Q54 Chairman: Can I move on to some other areas? missing and presumption of death, both in terms of Diplomatic representation overseas. We have just abroad and in the UK? If so, could that be placed had a letter from the Foreign Secretary, listing the with this Committee? Also, would you look at number of posts which are being planned to be revising your draft Support for British Nationals closed or already have been closed; also plans Abroad document, to include a little bit more on to localise some others and to change facilities in that? I think that is an area which is perhaps weak at other places. I had a personal experience when the moment. I led a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Mr Stagg: I do not know exactly what you are delegation to Swaziland in September. As you are looking for in our guidance, but I will find what we aware, we have closed our high commission and, have and send it to the Committee, and then if there while I was there, we were advertising the sale of the are other issues— residence in the local newspapers. This has gone down extremely badly in Swaziland. I understand Q48 Chairman: We will write to you. that you are also closing Lesotho, and both are being Sir Michael Jay: If it would help the Committee, I run from Pretoria by our new high commissioner— think that we should try to look through—given the who is a very good high commissioner—in South real interest that you have in consular work and the Africa. There are similar concerns from the Pacific. importance for us of getting your suggestions—and We have had letters, representations to do with make certain that the Committee has all the relevant closures in a number of the Pacific islands—all of documents here. Even though this may be quite a them Commonwealth countries, as are Lesotho bundle, I think it would be helpful for you to have and Swaziland—and similar concerns have been that. expressed for other parts of the world. Can you explain why these decisions have been taken? Q49 Chairman: We will decide which ones we want Also, do you agree that for many, very small, to cover. Send us the lot! Before we move oV Commonwealth countries which have long consular services, can I raise the question of your associations with the UK, this is being interpreted as public service agreement targets? I understand that our withdrawing from interest in their countries, the FCO failed to meet four of the six PSA targets on downgrading their significance, and they feel deeply consular services and that, specifically, you failed to hurt by this? meet the target with regard to issuing passports overseas. You were supposed to have 95% issued 5 Ev 47 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 37
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Sir Michael Jay: The overseas network can never be honorary consul, then maybe having other static. We have, over the last seven years or so, departments of government move in there, I am not opened 29 posts and closed 25, and that is a sure, in the long run, will save a huge amount of reflection of shifting priorities. One of the things that money. Certainly in terms of what the mayor and we try to do is to ensure that our resources, which are other important people in that city think, they constrained, are allocated in accordance with our consider it to be a slap in the face to them—because priorities and, in particular, with the strategic they see HM Government is moving out. I would priorities which were set out in the strategy hope that, when we make these closures— document which the Foreign Secretary and I particularly if we are going to localise them, as is published a couple of years ago. That is the starting described—we see whether we are actually saving point for where we want to put our resources. With any money in the long run, looking at the long-term the resources constrained, if you want to put your consequences as opposed to just making that resources into areas which have become a high decision. priority, you have to take them from somewhere. Sir Michael Jay: We do try to do that, Mr Keetch. This inevitably means some hard choices and hard The decision to close the consulate-general in Seattle priorities—about places which are not unimportant was one which was taken as part of the restructuring but which are not as important as the high-priority of the whole network in the United States, in order ones. We would much rather not have had to close to ensure that our resources were eVectively any posts but, had we not closed some, we would not deployed across the United States, and taking into have been able to put our resources where they account the relative importance of diVerent cities needed to be, or we would have run our network too and diVerent areas. It was taken in close conjunction thin across the board and been unable to achieve with UKTI,6 because it is essentially a commercial what we need to do in the places that really matter. post. The judgment was made that it would meet our We judged that our interests in Swaziland and interests in Seattle if we were to move to having a Lesotho could be satisfactorily represented by our locally employed team there, supported by stronger high commissioner in Pretoria and equally that, in UKTI representation elsewhere on the west coast. the Pacific, we could move to more of a hub-and- The decisions are not arbitrary; they are taken after spoke arrangement, making more use of our high a really careful consideration of where our interests commission in Suva, in Fiji. These were not easy lie, what our resource constraints are, and how best decisions; they were decisions that were made after a we can allocate our resources over time. If I may say quite rigorous examination of where our interests so, your point about Scotland and Wales is a very lay; they were as a result of quite lengthy discussions good one. I think I need to make sure that we are with ministers, and taking into account various closely in touch—as I believe we are—with the other considerations. That is the explanation for it, Scottish Executive and with the Welsh Assembly Mr Chairman. I accept that it is seen by those over their plans. As I think you know, in many parts concerned as being a withdrawal of interest, and to of the globe the Scottish and the Welsh are indeed an extent it is. It does not mean a complete co-located with our embassies and high withdrawal of interest. We will continue to have commissions, and we do work very closely together. relations with the countries and, in the case of Swaziland, there will be an honorary consul there Q56 Sir John Stanley: Sir Michael, I return to and he will be supported by regular visits from the V another matter that you and your department will be high commissioner and his sta from Pretoria. familiar with. Instead of flying last night from Belgrade to Podgorica, I chose to come back to have Q55 Mr Keetch: Again, this was mentioned the pleasure of this meeting with you. yesterday but I want to raise it in the case of Seattle, Sir Michael Jay: Thank you, Sir John! where we are closing a consulate and we are replacing that with an honorary consul, who I am Q57 Sir John Stanley: At the meetings I had in sure will do a very good job. We are replacing that Belgrade on Monday and Tuesday, it was absolutely with a trade post, which I am told will not have fewer clear that there will be a referendum in Montenegro people in it than the consul’s oYce did, in a place next February/March. Nobody expects the result of where there are so many ex-pats that they even have that referendum to be anything other than a cricket league, and where important decisions are independence for Montenegro, and the Serbian made for Rolls-Royce and other companies about senior ministers that we met were absolutely clear their investment in the Boeing programmes; and at that, if that was the wish of the Montenegrins, Serbia a time also, I am told, when other aspects of UK-plc, would not stand in the way of Montenegro’s namely the overseas oYces of the Scottish Executive independence. Against that, first of all is it not very and the Welsh Development Agency, are regrettable that, at this extremely politically considering moving into that area because they important time, we still have no embassy in believe there is a very good trade reason to do so. I Podgorica? If you agree that the events in would like to be assured that, when we make a Montenegro in the next few months will be as I have decision to do this, we consult with other aspects of indicated, surely the Foreign OYce should now be government like the Scottish Parliament and the taking very early steps to establish an embassy in Welsh Assembly and that we also look at this over a Podgorica? This would be a country which will be long period of time. Closing a very small consulate, replacing it with a trade oYce, then having an 6 UK Trade and Investment. 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 38 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd looking for EU applicant status; it has an important amount. The only way you can do that is by reducing position in the Balkans; it is not wholly unrelated to the number of staV. So it contributes to that as well, the important issue of a settlement in relation to and allows you to have staV elsewhere. Kosovo. Surely this is an area which, certainly on political grounds, most conspicuously should be Q61 Chairman: That is salary savings. That is the having more attention on the ground from the Foreign OYce? recurrent annual expenditure. Sir Michael Jay: I will look into that question, Sir Sir Michael Jay: Yes, running costs. John. Clearly Montenegro will have an important role to play in our overall Balkans policy. We have Q62 Chairman: What about capital? Are you likely to consider whether we can represent it adequately to get capital receipts from all this? from elsewhere or whether we need to be represented Sir Michael Jay: We will get some capital receipts there. If we are represented there, of course, we will from the sale of buildings. I cannot tell you what have to make a judgment as to where we take the those will be, because in not every case has the resources from. There are no free posts. We are building been sold; and it is a mug’s game trying to under pressure to reduce our total number of staV estimate— and if we are to open up in places, we have to take them from somewhere else. However, I will look into that. Q63 Chairman: Who gets that capital? Do you get it or does the Treasury have it? Sir Michael Jay: Yes, we get it. Q58 Sir John Stanley: The root issue is perhaps that the Foreign OYce should have been tougher with the Treasury in accepting assumptions for eYciency Q64 Chairman: All of it? savings, and indeed assumptions of the benefits of Sir Michael Jay: Yes. That counts as asset recycling, IT, than the department has actually been. It has so we would get the benefit from that. Our policy as been seriously salami-sliced by the Treasury. from, I think, the beginning of next year—this Perhaps you at senior oYcial level and your financial year—is that 100% of the money that we ministers need to do some more standing-up- get from asset recycling goes into the estate. So the toughly to the Treasury’s demands. issue which this Committee has been concerned Sir Michael Jay: We certainly felt at the time that we about in the past—that some of the money which we were standing up toughly, I can tell you, Sir John. have received from asset recycling has gone into Some of the outcome of the last spending round was, IT—is no longer the case. from the Foreign OYce’s point of view, very Andrew Mackinlay: Two matters I want to ask satisfactory, particularly in the amount of money about. The first one is the Holy See. We were told by that the Treasury agreed to give us for the security of yourself that there were going to be new ways, our overseas posts, following the attack on our alternative ways, of dealing with this and I consulate-general in Istanbul. At the time, that was understand that the post is being advertised. I have a very high priority for us, because it was essential to heard what you say about the need for savings, be able to reassure our staV that we were providing which you have elaborated on today. However, as them with the security to enable them to operate. well as an important post, it is a great honour to be That was a very high priority for our settlement, and Ambassador to the Holy See. Am I correct that, I personally was very glad that that money was given frankly, nobody could succeed in the advert for this to us. Like all government departments, however, post unless he or she was of some private means and/ we were subject to the eYciency targets, which we or located at their expense in Rome? Put another are now aiming to meet—but I will look into that. way, is there any chance of working-class people being appointed? Q59 Chairman: Before I bring in Andrew Chairman: Give him a job! Mackinlay, can you tell us what annual savings in Andrew Mackinlay: Or do you have to be part of the financial terms will be made by these closures and magic circle which runs this country? Discuss. It is a localisations of posts which you have just serious point though. announced, and about which you have sent us a Mr Keetch: I will do Seattle! memo. Sir Michael Jay: There are two issues here. One is Q65 Andrew Mackinlay: Can an ordinary person about the savings in terms of money, and the other is apply? You have to have money, frankly. That is V the savings in terms of sta . I might ask either Dickie point A. Stagg or Ric Todd to say a bit more about that. Sir Michael Jay: I do not think that is the case. The post has been advertised and there were a very large Q60 Chairman: Perhaps when you have the figures number of applicants—I think 120 applicants you can send us a note; but if you have some round altogether. There has been a competition, a figure now, it would be helpful. candidate has been chosen, and agre´ment is being Sir Michael Jay: We expect to make about £6 million sought. An announcement will be made in the near savings, which would contribute to the eYciency future. This will be, I think I am right in saying, a target of £87 million. That is by 2007–08. However, normal diplomatic service appointment when made. there are other targets which we also have to meet. What will be new is the method of appointment. In We have to reduce our local staV pay bill by a certain other words, an outside competition. 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:21 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 39
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Q66 Andrew Mackinlay: We look forward to details Q68 Mr Mackay: And that is a Treasury rule that on that. Point B is not for ritual but seriousness— you have signed up to—or you have no choice? Kyrgyzstan. Since we last met on the annual report Sir Michael Jay: As accounting oYcer, I get letters and in previous years, I have asked you about this. from the Treasury explaining what I have to do. Since then, we have had something of a velvet revolution in Kyrgyzstan. There is now the problem Q69 Mr Mackay: That does seem a pity, because I of refugees from Uzbekistan in Kyrgyzstan, and the would prefer you and the Foreign Secretary to be United States are moving from Uzbekistan to given a free hand to allocate your budget as you see Kyrgyzstan. Other key players are represented there. fit within your department, which clearly you cannot We are not represented even on the cultural side, by quite do. the British Council. Is it not now time that you Sir Michael Jay: We can to a certain extent. What we reviewed your decision not to have anybody in can certainly do, and do try to do, is to find more Bishkek, bearing in mind that the ambassador who eYcient ways of doing things, so that we therefore does serve it is based in Almaty, which is not only not release resources to open a post or to keep a post the capital of Kazakhstan but is also in a country open; but there are constraints on our ability to—the which is the size of western Europe? Discuss! technical term is—vire between one budget and Sir Michael Jay: Again, I would like to have an another. embassy, we would like to have an embassy, in Bishkek. It is a question of the proper allocation of resources. By far the most important of the central Q70 Mr Mackay: So there is ring-fencing, in other Asian countries in terms of British interests is words? Kazakhstan, which is why we plan to maintain an Sir Michael Jay: Yes, in that sense. There is also embassy in the new capital, in Astana, but also a ring-fencing, of course, in that very substantial substantial presence in what will remain the proportions of our overall budget are for the British commercial centre, Almaty, which is about two or Council and the BBC World Service, which are ring- three hours’ drive from Bishkek; and there will be fenced and therefore are not accessible to us, either regular visits from the staV of the post in Almaty to for our capital or for our programme or for Bishkek. For the moment, I suspect that is how it administration budget. will stay, but I can assure you that we do keep these Chairman: Can I just say to my colleagues that there constantly under review. The views of this are a number of areas we have to cover. I want to get Committee on where we might have posts would on to personnel issues but, before we do that, I want clearly be a factor, if we are in the happy position of to get Fabian Hamilton in on the BBC World being able to open more than we feel now we can. Service and to touch briefly on public diplomacy; then we will deal with the personnel matters. I am very conscious of time. Q67 Mr Mackay: Sir Michael, clearly you would like Richard Younger-Ross: Very briefly? to keep more posts open and clearly it is a matter of Chairman: It has to be very brief. One question. balance—priorities, as you have pointed out. We understand your budgetary constraints. We Y Q71 Richard Younger-Ross: It is one question on understand that you are having to make e ciency asset recycling in Dublin. Can you explain whether savings right the way across your department. we are likely to get Glencairn back, when we are Would it be wrong to say, however, that every bit of likely to sell Marley Grange, how this debacle came saving for a new post has to come out of closing an about, and how much it has cost us so far? existing post, or is there not a possibility of making Sir Michael Jay: We are of course in occupation of further cuts in other things your department does? Glencairn and we are in touch with the owners— For some of us, one of the most important things constantly in touch with the owners—in the hope you do is to be represented in as many countries and that we can complete the purchase of Glencairn, as many commercial cities as possible. I do not want which we have not yet succeeded in doing. Until we to prejudge your answer, but I guess that if I were can, we think it is better to keep Marley Grange. looking at your budgets I might, in a slightly biased Whether you want me now to go into all the way, come up against other things that I think could background again— be cut out to ensure that our representation was not cut out. Sir Michael Jay: There are two answers to that. The Q72 Andrew Mackinlay: The background is in the first is that we are always looking at doing things public domain. more eYciently, in order to produce savings which Sir Michael Jay: I have been asked about it by this can then be put to higher priority activities. One of Committee before, and I think it is in the public the benefits of a lot of our IT will be, I hope, that it domain. If it would help the Committee, however, I 7 will release resources and release staV to go to higher would be very happy to write again to update it. priority tasks, including overseas posts. As for Andrew Mackinlay: Presumably you are paying rent. cutting programmes, I think I am right in saying that we are not allowed to use capital or programme Q73 Chairman: Perhaps you could send us a note money for administrative expenses. So even if we updating us on the current position and, if necessary, were to reduce our programme expenditure, we we will pursue it with you. could not use that on our staV, to open or keep open an overseas post. 7 Ev 48 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 40 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Sir Michael Jay: Certainly. I am very happy to do like, the job is done and now is the time to allocate that, Mr Chairman. those resources to today’s priorities. We would, in Mr Hamilton: Sir Michael, I want to ask you some the Foreign OYce, argue that one of today’s questions about the BBC World Service and the priorities is to have a stronger public diplomacy changes that are being planned there. I am well focus on the Arab world and that an Arab-language aware, of course, of your deep involvement with the TV service would be a very good way of providing World Service. Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary, in that. That is the reason why we would support and a written ministerial statement, endorsed the do, and the Foreign Secretary did yesterday endorse proposed changes by the World Service and the the changes to the vernacular programme and the rationalisation of some of their local language suggestion that this should go towards an Arabic services. They are intending, as you know, to cut TV service. some of the language services in places like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia— Q76 Mr Hamilton: We know, do we not, that Chairman: And Thailand. satellite TV services are notoriously diYcult to start up, especially in the Arab world? We also know how Q74 Mr Hamilton: Yes, and Thailand—which have expensive they are. I wondered whether you thought very small audiences at the moment, and use those that £25 million, which I understand is the cost that savings primarily to establish a BBC Arabic is being allocated and therefore being funded out of Y television service. I wondered what your reaction to some of these savings, is su cient to do the job this would be. Do you endorse what they are trying properly. to do? Do you feel that an Arabic TV service would Sir Michael Jay: I do not have the expertise to more accurately report what the British comment on that, Mr Hamilton. Government is trying to do in its foreign policy, as well as its interest in the Arabic countries? How do you feel that the BBC is best served, and is it in our Q77 Sir John Stanley: I have to say that I do most interest to drop these local language services, which profoundly disagree with you, Sir Michael, at least have been so important over the last 60 years? in respect of one country, and I am most disturbed Sir Michael Jay: These are essentially questions for that you should have given a blanket endorsement to the BBC, but we have encouraged the BBC to look a policy of going for English language services as constantly at the profile of their vernacular services, opposed to vernacular language services. If I may, to check that they really were focused on the areas there is a country I would want to make an which are important today rather than, say, 40 or 50 exception. I am Chairman of the Britain-Nepal years ago. We do endorse their judgment that this is Parliamentary Group, and perhaps I may just put a good time or the right time to discontinue the that on the record. Last week I had the benefit of vernacular services in these countries, bearing in meeting the President of the Institute of Journalists mind that the English language services will in Nepal, who is in this country on an FCO- continue and that there will still be the availability of sponsored visit—and I am delighted that your BBC World and online BBC World Service services. department did sponsor his visit. He told me how So they will have English language services; they will concerned they were in Nepal at the threat to Nepali have BBC World; and they will have BBC online. language services. In that country, where something What they will not have is the vernacular services. like two-thirds of the country is in Maoist control, We endorse that judgment, though it is a judgment where the people of that country are utterly by the BBC. dependent for information and for news on the BBC, I think it is absolutely appalling that at this Q75 Mr Hamilton: Of course I understand that their particular moment there should be a threat to Nepali operating policy is a judgment for them, but my language services in that country. question to you relates to British foreign policy Sir Michael Jay: I am not informed about the Nepali interests, which I know the BBC is not there to service, Sir John. Perhaps I could look into it.8 conduct fully, but that is why you fund them. We have an interest, do we not, in terms of our foreign policy in some of the countries in which the BBC Q78 Chairman: We will no doubt pursue it if World Service broadcasts? I wonder whether you necessary. I think that we have dealt with some feel—where, for 60 years in many of these countries, aspects of the public diplomacy side. May I ask you we have broadcast in those services—that we shall be why we have not yet had Lord Carter’s review on best served by dropping those local, vernacular public diplomacy? We were promised that it would language services? be completed by the summer. This Committee took Sir Michael Jay: I think that the BBC would argue— evidence from the British Council a couple of weeks and we would not dispute this—that in a sense, 60 ago. We had expected it before then; so had they. It years on, the services have served their purpose. The did not happen. We had to ask them questions about vast majority of these countries are now it in the absence of actually seeing it. It is not democracies, liberal market economies, members of available today. We have not yet had any indication the EU or of NATO, with a much greater ability to of when it will be published. Can you tell us why not? speak English than was the case in the past. In a sense, this is a good moment to recognise that, if you 8 Ev 50 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 41
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Sir Michael Jay: My understanding is that Lord Q86 Chairman: In essence, is there not likely to be a Carter is still discussing one or two elements of the conflict, a tension, between the way in which NDPBs report with one or two of the other stakeholders have traditionally operated—not just the British involved. Council, because I think other NDPBs, including the Westminster Foundation for Democracy which I Y Q79 Chairman: The British Council? used to chair, also had some di culties because of Sir Michael Jay: The British Council, yes. this—and your desire, maybe driven by the Treasury and public service agreements, to have more control as accounting oYcer over the expenditure which is Q80 Chairman: Predominantly, I guess. coming from your department? Sir Michael Jay: I am not sure whether he still is Sir Michael Jay: I hope that, if there are any discussing with the BBC World Service, but I think tensions, we can resolve them. I think it is entirely that is really a question for him. right that I should, as accounting oYcer, be able to satisfy myself that the funds are being properly spent Q81 Chairman: So you have no idea when it is going and accounted for; but I do not see why that should to be concluded? be inconsistent with the NDPBs concerned carrying Sir Michael Jay: We look forward to it and we hope out their functions, which we support. As you know, that it will be published quickly and, when it is, we the FCO very much values the role of the want to get on with considering it and implementing Westminster Foundation for Democracy in it—but I would hope very soon. delivering a number of our strategic priorities; but at the same time we do need to assure ourselves that the accounting arrangements are as they should be. I do Q82 Chairman: Presumably you have seen drafts in not see this as being a real diYculty, but we have not your department. quite got there yet. Sir Michael Jay: We have seen drafts, yes. Q87 Chairman: I think that you mentioned Q83 Chairman: Knowing the way these things work. governance arrangements. Do you believe that the Sir Michael Jay: Yes. time has come for the FCO to have more direct roles within the governing bodies, the boards, of Q84 Chairman: Your oYcials will have been poring organisations which are funded by your over those drafts closely, to see what the department? Specifically, would you want to have a recommendations are. Is there anything in the representative of a very high level on a board, for report, as you have seen it so far, which causes you example of the British Council? Would you want to concern or that you are worried about? have someone there, if you like, as your eyes and ears Sir Michael Jay: We are broadly content with the and mouthpiece when they are making decisions, recommendations, but I would not want to go because you would regard them as being too beyond that, because we have not seen the final independent in the way that they have traditionally version and we do not know precisely what it will approached certain matters? say. We are broadly content with the Sir Michael Jay: This is one of the issues which I recommendations which we believe will emerge from suspect will be dealt with by the Carter review. the report. Q88 Chairman: I am sure that it will. Y Q85 Chairman: Do you believe that there should be Sir Michael Jay: I am myself an ex-o cio member a change in the relationship between the FCO and of the British Council’s board, and that has been the non-departmental public bodies, and that case for as long as I can remember. That provides organisations funded by the Foreign and some advantages in terms of arguing within the Commonwealth OYce should be more closely board for the British Council to reflect the aligned to the priorities and strategic choices of the Government’s priorities. I do not think that can ever Government than has hitherto been the case? be the complete answer. I think that there needs to Sir Michael Jay: Our ministers believe that they be a network of relationships between the British should be able to show, and to show Parliament, that Council and the FCO to ensure that the the money which is spent on non-departmental Government’s priorities are carried forward, at least public bodies is spent consistently with, in in respect of the money that we give through our conformity with, the Government’s objectives. That grant-in-aid, which is of course only part of the may lead to a consideration of governance British Council’s operations. arrangements for our non-departmental public Chairman: I suspect that we may have to come back bodies. There is also, as far as I am concerned as to this when we have seen Lord Carter’s report. accounting oYcer, a requirement that I sign a statement of internal control as part of the FCO Q89 Sir John Stanley: How are you getting on with accounts, which means that I have to satisfy myself the censoring of Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s memoirs? that certain accounting practices are in place in all Sir Michael Jay: He, like all public servants, has an our non-departmental public bodies. That too is obligation to submit his work, which he has done requiring some changes in the accounting and we are at the moment discussing that with him. arrangements for some of our non-departmental I hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on public bodies. the basis on which the book can be published, 3255703008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 42 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd subject to our being satisfied that he is not crossing Sir Michael Jay: May I just say that clearly we have the line on issues of international relations or public absolutely no wish whatsoever that a reply should lie security or— on the table which a member of the House believes is wrong. So we would want to try to clarify that too. Q90 Sir John Stanley: Political embarrassment. Chairman: We look forward to receiving a letter Sir Michael Jay: No. I am sorry, there are three—or from you. Then, if necessary, we will discuss it in the the question of the need to maintain the confidence Committee and take it further. of relationships between ministers and senior Andrew Mackinlay: I think I am happy then, because oYcials, which is an important part of the obligation time is pressing. that all of us have as public servants. Q95 Mr Illsley: Following on from that, have any Q91 Sir John Stanley: Sir Michael, could you clarify payments been made in respect of external claims this for us? Are you the ultimate censor or is the against the Foreign OYce, perhaps from Cabinet Secretary the ultimate censor or is the Prime employment tribunals or through other actions? Minister the ultimate censor? Mr Warren: I think I would need to confirm the Sir Michael Jay: In this, as in other issues, the details of employment tribunals which have been ultimate decisions, the ultimate judgments, will be concluded in which the Foreign OYce has been a made by ministers. party, and advise the Committee. Q92 Andrew Mackinlay: I had a parliamentary reply—for the record it is 21 July, column 2101W— Q96 Chairman: That is helpful. Can you, when you from Jack Straw, and your colleagues would have do write to us, also let us know how many serving or prepared a reply. I asked him, “. . . how much public former members of the senior diplomatic service are money has been spent in each of the last five years in currently the subject of disciplinary investigations settlement of grievance procedures brought against or actions? senior staV of his department by subordinate staV; Sir Michael Jay: Certainly. how much was paid in each case; and whether the payment was in full and final settlement in each Q97 Chairman: There is one other area on which we case”, and the reply is, “None”. I am advised that in have not yet touched, and I am very conscious of the fact there had been grievance procedures—quite a time and am grateful, gentlemen, that you have few—where a settlement had been made and people stayed so long. Can we wrap up by asking about had perhaps subsequently signed confidentiality BBC Monitoring? We understand that there has clauses. In other words, that on the basis of their been a change in its sponsoring departments and, as withdrawing their grievances there has been a a result of the review, the funding problems that they payment. I take quite seriously the parliamentary had have been sorted out, and it is now sponsored by reply. Clearly the Foreign Secretary has to get it the Cabinet OYce rather than the Foreign and from you and your colleagues. However, I put it to Commonwealth OYce. Can you tell us why did you you that there are and have been grievance value the work of BBC Monitoring less than that of procedures, that sums have been paid, and people the review team, and why were you prepared, in have signed confidentiality clauses to withdraw their eVect, to hand on the organisation to another grievance. Am I correct or am I wrong? I do not want government department? to split hairs, as it were, because I may not use the Sir Michael Jay: We very much value the work of correct terminology, but I am saying to you that that BBC Monitoring, but we believe that we were paying reply is wrong and that payments have and are being a higher than fair share of the overall cost of BBC made. Is that correct? Monitoring, given the even greater interest that Sir Michael Jay: I am not aware of any such some other stakeholders had in it. There was payments having been made. therefore a negotiation which resulted in a shift in the balance of funding among the various Q93 Andrew Mackinlay: You are absolutely sure? stakeholders, as a result of which we thought it was Sir Michael Jay: I am not aware of any and, had I sensible, along with others, that the sponsorship of been aware of any, that answer would not have been BBC Monitoring should move to the Cabinet OYce. given, or we would not have given that advice to the As I understand it, the total funding for BBC Foreign Secretary. I am not aware of any. Perhaps I Monitoring will continue to increase. So this is an could ask the Human Resources Director. internal housekeeping issue, rather than an issue Mr Warren: Nor am I in relation to internal Y which will lead to any reduction in the size or output grievance procedures against the Foreign O ce, of BBC Monitoring. which is what the question referred to. However, if the Committee wishes, we will send a note formally confirming the position.9 Q98 Chairman: But will that funding in any way come from your own budget, or will it now be Q94 Andrew Mackinlay: I would like that, because I funded by its new sponsoring department? am advised that that parliamentary reply is wrong Sir Michael Jay: We will continue to fund it, but at and I would like that to be clarified, please. a lower level than in the past. This is one way of achieving our eYciency savings without having to do 9 Ev 49 so in other ways, such as cutting posts. 3255703008 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 43
26 October 2005 Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, Mr Richard Stagg, CMG, Mr David Warren and Mr Ric Todd
Q99 Chairman: So you would still regard yourself as in the past, whatever convenient number of years— a stakeholder? three years, five years, or whatever? I am not talking Sir Michael Jay: Absolutely. about where people go—which I actually have reservations about throughout the public sector— Q100 Chairman: Even though you are not the but where there has been a payment which is higher sponsoring department? than what they should have got. This is people below Sir Michael Jay: We would see ourselves as being a retirement age. stakeholder and having an interest in BBC Mr Warren: We shall send the Committee a note Monitoring, and in its output. in reply to Mr Mackinlay’s question, but I would make the point that all early retirement or early Q101 Chairman: How much will you be contributing severance agreements that are reached with staV— to it? and we have reached a number recently, as part of 1 Mr Todd: I think it is £22 million. the downsizing of the Foreign OYce—are reached in terms of the framework that the Cabinet OYce Q102 Chairman: So the other £2 million, or whatever imposes on all departments. So there is no question it is, is coming from where? of our being able to oVer any diVerent terms. Sir Michael Jay: It is coming from other stakeholders. I do not have the details with me at the moment. Q105 Andrew Mackinlay: Indeed. So that if my information is incorrect, there should be no people Q103 Chairman: Could you send us a note? who have had more advantageous terms than those Sir Michael Jay: We could send you a note, Mr which they are entitled to. Chairman, certainly.10 Mr Warren: Indeed. Andrew Mackinlay: But it has been put to me that Q104 Andrew Mackinlay: Going back to my that has happened on some occasions, and no penultimate question, I am also told that there are doubt you would write to me and say, “Mackinlay, some people who have retired early, not through your information is wrong again”. It will not be the sickness, but are retired because—and I do not use first time I have been humiliated but, on the other this in an emotive way—they are no longer wanted hand, just remember that sometimes, on some or their face does not fit, but terms are reached under occasions, I am right! which they are paid much higher sums than their Chairman: At that point, can we thank you, Sir service would justify. It is like a package. Could we Michael, for your and your colleagues’ time with be told on how many occasions that has happened us? It has been a long session. We are very grateful, and no doubt we will be communicating with you 10 Ev 50 in future. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce I undertook in my evidence to the Committee on 26 October to return to you on security and human rights aspects of the forthcoming State Visit of President Hu Jintao of China. Sir John Stanley sought assurances that an appropriate balance would be struck between security for the President’s party and the right of demonstrators to make their views heard; that no “deals” had been done with the Police over security; and that the President would not be shielded from demonstrators. As I said in evidence, we have of course been in discussion with the Police about security aspects of President Hu’s visit. This is in line with normal practice. It is also what would be expected for any high-level visit. The role of the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce in this regard is to ensure the safety of visiting VIPs and make the necessary arrangements appropriate to the dignity of a major State Occasion. It is the Police who have responsibility for security and the maintenance of public order during the visit. The operational details of security arrangements are for them alone. Protests in the UK are a domestic matter over which the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has no direct authority. But we fully recognise the rights of individuals and groups who object to, or wish to influence, Chinese policies to make their views heard peacefully. It is not least for this reason that I believe it is important that the UK is able to show during the visit, as at other times, that we have a mature democracy capable of accommodating legitimate protest. The Police recognise the sensitivities surrounding the handling of protests on occasions such as this visit. I have no doubt that they are fully aware of the expectation that the rights of individuals peacefully to demonstrate will be respected. At the same time, they have clear responsibilities for the safety and security of the visiting Head of State. It is of course impossible to predict all aspects of the handling of security surrounding a State Visit, and it would be foolish to suppose that all with an interest in the matter would be likely to agree after the event that every arrangement had been handled to their satisfaction. But I can certainly give Sir John and the rest 3255703009 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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of the Committee the assurances sought. I am confident that the judgement of most observers of President Hu’s visit will be that the balance between security and the right of peaceful protest will have been respected in a manner which reflects the democratic credentials of the UK. Sir Michael Jay KCMG 3 November 2005
Letter to the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce from the Clerk of the Committee I know that the Committee found the session with the Permanent Under-Secretary and his colleagues on Wednesday to be very useful. A lot of ground was covered, and we are expecting to receive a number of notes expanding on some of the oral answers. I will liaise with PRDT on the timing of these notes. Meanwhile, shortage of time meant that there some issues which either were not raised at all, or were discussed only briefly. I am therefore writing with some supplementary questions to which the Committee desires answers. I hope that it will be possible for replies to these questions to reach us not later than 22 November. 1. What criteria does the FCO use when deciding whether to volunteer a document to the Committee? Will the OYce consider in future sending the Committee important Reports that are clearly relevant to its work, such as those by Collinson Grant and by Norman Ling, without waiting to be asked? 2. In how many cases since the Freedom of Information Act came into force has a decision by the FCO to withhold information sought under the Act been overruled on appeal? 3. The FCO’s classified scorecards include performance indicators relating to the Millennium Development Goals and other areas of policy which might be regarded as being of very legitimate public interest, without compromising security. Is the FCO satisfied that the classification of a very high proportion of its performance measures is consistent with its obligations to enable public scrutiny of its achievements? Will the OYce have another look at this, with a view to achieving greater openness and transparency? 4. Will the FCO publish the unclassified summary of the Ling Report on Prism? If not, why not? 5. What changes have been made to FCO procedures to avoid problems of the type experienced with Prism? Specifically, what action has been taken in response to each of the 26 unclassified recommendations made in the Ling Report? 6. Recent examples of failure in project management at FCO have included slippages in implementing Prism and i-visas and cost overruns on building projects. A lack of project management skills was also highlighted by the Collinson Grant Report. How does the FCO intend to rectify the lack of project management skills within its staV? 7. The Collinson Grant Report highlights considerable slippage in the eYciency programme to date. The initial plan was to deliver £10.7 million by the end of 2004–05, in September 2004 this was cut to £6.3 million. The target for 2005–06 was cut from £55.8 million to £32.7 million. Is the FCO confident that it will achieve its eYciency plans? — What was the actual saving made in 2004–05? — What is the current target saving for 2005–06? 8. How many applications from all grades for voluntary redundancy have been received; how many have been accepted; and how many have been rejected? In respect of the posts held by those whose applications have been accepted, how many will be refilled and how many will be scrapped? 9. 70% of FCO’s expenditure is classified as administrative expenditure, even though much of this relates to front-line services. A Treasury PES a few years ago encouraged all departments and agencies to review their expenditure and to move anything related to front-line services into programme expenditure. Has the FCO done any work to identify which staV in its Posts abroad are directly involved in delivering front line services, with a view to reclassifying the expenditure as programme, thus allowing it to use programme eYciency savings elsewhere to support the work of Posts? 10. When considering the need to close Posts overseas, has the FCO evaluated the possibility of maintaining a UK presence in the manner it has adopted in Liberia? Could sharing premises be in some cases a cost-eVective and preferable alternative to outright closure? 11. What is the final outturn for overseas property sales in financial year 2004–05? What is the FCO’s prediction for sales in the current financial year? 12. Has the lease on One Carlton Gardens been renewed? Will the lease on Lancaster House be renewed? If so, at what cost? Who is the leaseholder for each of these properties? Steve Priestley 28 October 2005 3255703010 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Foreign and Commonwealth OYce Departmental Report 2004–05 evidence session—further information I have seen Steve Priestley’s letter of 28 October to Chris Stanton. Our responses to the Committee’s oral and written questions are as follows:
1. Collinson Grant
Question 1. (a) With what elements of the Collinson Grant analysis do you disagree? Answer: As I said to the committee, I accept many of the conclusions but not all of the analysis of the Collinson Grant report. I do not accept the root and branch criticism of the FCO. The FCO commissioned the report because we are conscious of the need to change, modernise and reform and have been for the last few years We also commissioned the report to help the FCO meet its SR2004 commitments to further improve our operations and our systems and to fulfil a demanding eYciency agenda. We have made significant progress on change in recent years. We are focusing our resources more around strategic priorities: We are more adaptable in shifting resources to where they are needed. We have a greater focus on service delivery. We are more open, working more closely with other government departments and external partners such as NGOs. As I said in my testimony to the committee, I reject the proposition that the FCO lacks the necessary core diplomatic and political skills. We have a large number of people doing high grade work in diYcult and dangerous places. We accept many of the recommendations of the Collinson Grant Report. A number of them, such as the review of the HR and Finance functions, we are already implementing. Some of them we believe to be ill- founded. The report, for example, proposes savings through reducing the resource deployed on briefing MPs before overseas visits, or providing briefing to British business.
Question 1. (b) What are the other “three strands of work” referred to in your Answer to Q4 received from the FAC on 25 August 2005. Can we receive reports on these strands? Answer: The FCO has agreed with the Treasury an eYciency plan designed to achieve an £87 million reprioritisation target as part of the SR 2004 settlement. The work of Collinson Grant was intended to help deliver that target. The report on eYciency, eVectiveness and the control of costs represents one of four strands of work that Collinson Grant were commissioned to undertake. The others were a Process Activity Analysis of the FCO’s operations; a comparative analysis of the FCO’s expenditure; and an analysis of the FCO’s organisational structures. These latter three strands were delivered by databases rather than by reports. Based upon self-completed questionnaires from a large number of FCO staV in the UK and overseas, the Process Activity Analysis breaks down the activities of staV in all grades into process activities (eg initiating submissions, managing staV, budgeting). The comparative analysis of the FCO’s expenditure contains cash expenditure broken down by type of expenditure and location (eg travel expenditure in Africa, electricity in New York). The analysis of the FCO’s organisational structure provides a database on management workloads, organisational spans (ie the number of subordinates managed by staV at each level and the number of management levels in each organisation) as well as a hierarchical breakdown of the FCO. The information is in the form of a database. It is therefore not possible to send it to the Committee. I am happy to invite members of the Committee to visit the FCO to look at the database itself and interrogate it as they wish. The database is held in Finance Directorate (contact Rod Bunten in FPPD on 020 7008 1058)
Question 1. (c) The Collinson Grant Report highlights considerable slippage in the eYciency programme to date. The initial plan was to deliver £10.7 million by the end of 2004–05, in September 2004 this was cut to £6.3 million. The target for 2005–06 was cut from £55.8 million to £32.7 million. Is the FCO confident that it will achieve its eYciency plans? — What was the actual saving made in 2004–05? — What is the current target saving for 2005–06? Answer: The Collinson Grant report was not originally intended for external publication. Thus, resources were not devoted to ensuring that it was completely error free, providing those errors were not critical to the conclusions of the report or detrimental to its value as a management tool. The section referred to above is one area where the Collinson Grant report contained inaccuracies. These are explained below. 3255703010 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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The targets specified in the Collinson Grant report against which they suggest the FCO eYciency plan has slipped were erroneous due to a mixture of incorrect calculations, double counting and including projects/savings figures that did not find their way into the final eYciency programme. In detail these errors are: (i) The report refers to £55.8 million target in 2005–06 in its text, the detail for which is given in the report’s Appendix 5. The corresponding figure given in this appendix is £50.8 million suggesting a typographical mistake of £5 million. (ii) A further error appears in arriving at the £50.8 million quoted in Appendix 5. Totalling the savings quoted for each project in the table actually sums to £47.3 million. The error appears to be due to incorrect subtotalling of the 3 projects under “Elements with links to CG study” which add up to £16.5 million not the £20 million quoted. The remaining diVerences between the “corrected” £47.3 million detailed in 2005–06 in the CG report and the £38.7 million agreed with HMT in our eYciency plan are accounted for as follows: (iii) Appendix 5 of the CG report lists projects “Major contract service”, “OGD” and “Workforce eYciencies”. Earlier drafts of the eYciency plan did mention such projects, but those projects have since been rolled into other projects, with which they overlap. Including them separately leads to £4 million of double counting. (iv) Targets for a number of the projects quoted in the report are diVerent from (mainly higher than) those towards which project managers are working. It is unclear the exact reasons for this, but may be due to CG working to earlier drafts of the projects. The overall annual targets as agreed with HMT have always remained constant, but targets for individual projects fluctuated slightly in the early days of the eYciency programme as project planning advanced and it become clearer what individual projects could realistically deliver. Quoting the higher targets for individual projects leads to further double counting. As part of the 2004 Spending Review the FCO agreed with HMT to make eYciency savings in its core (ie excluding British Council and BBC World Service) expenditure of £4.7 million in 2004–05 and £38.7 million for 2005–06. The actual for 2004–05 was £6.6 million, thus exceeding the target. In 2005–06 we are confident of reaching £39 million, which will be marginally above target.
Question 1. (d) Why is the CG report not on the internet and can it be published there? Answer: The Collinson Grant report is on the Internet. It was published on the FCO website on 4 August 2005. It can be found at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/CGReportFinal,0.pdf
Question 2. Seventy per cent of FCO’s expenditure is classified as administrative expenditure, even though much of this relates to front-line services. A Treasury PES a few years ago encouraged all departments and agencies to review their expenditure and to move anything related to front-line services into programme expenditure. Has the FCO done any work to identify which staV in its Posts abroad are directly involved in delivering front line services, with a view to reclassifying the expenditure as programme, thus allowing it to use programme eYciency savings elsewhere to support the work of Posts? Answer: The question of reclassification of FCO expenditure overseas from administration to programme was raised with the Treasury in SR04. The FCO suggested that all overseas work should be classified as non-admin, since all staV overseas are involved in service delivery. The Treasury have only agreed to allow us to re-classify Consular and Visa work. We hope that it will be possible to reconsider this issue in the context of the Comprehensive Spending Review. (For the committee’s information 95% of the savings in the FCO’s eYciency programme derive from the FCO’s administration budget rather than from its programme spend.)
Question 3. Consular access to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina Answer: Consulate staV first sought access to New Orleans on 30 August, the day the levees broke and followed this up in the days thereafter. They were told by the Louisiana State authorities that advice from the Louisiana Police, the National Guard and the US State Department was that they should not seek to enter New Orleans. They did not speak to the Mayor of New Orleans as they considered the competence to lie with the State and Federal authorities. At that time there were serious law-and-order problems in New Orleans and the authorities believed the risk of harm befalling our staV was too great, and they lacked the resource to provide the requisite protection. Nor would the US government relief agencies have welcomed foreign representatives on the ground there, potentially adding to their problems. Our staV did, however, deploy to several other locations, in particular Baton Rouge, Houston and Dallas, where the authorities told us evacuees were being channelled. And as soon as they were allowed, staV began making daily visits to New Orleans from the Baton Rouge oYce. The UK team was the first to enter New 3255703010 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Orleans on 4 September, when the US authorities gave permission to foreign missions to do so. We and the Irish were the only foreign consulates on hand in Dallas when 27 British and some 40 other foreign nationals arrived there from the aVected area on 2 September. The Foreign Secretary has written separately to you about our response to Hurricane Katrina. His letter included a detailed account of our eVorts to enter New Orleans.
Question 4. Request to see Consular Guidance Answer: We enclose copies of our consular best practice publications, the Consular Handbook and the Consular Desk Guide, all of which are available to all consular staV on an internal basis, and a copy of our Emergency Planning Guidance. The Consular Handbook has been produced for consular staV overseas. The Consular Desk Guide has been produced for consular oYcers based in the UK and is less detailed since UK-based staV benefit from a wider range of expertise in London. The best practice publications cover our most up to date policies on consular assistance issues and are the main foundation of our consular training courses. The publications are underpinned by Diplomatic Service Procedure (DSP). However, parts of DSP are now out of date as they have eVectively been replaced by the best practice guides. Consular Directorate is therefore looking to set up a rolling exercise to review all our consular guidance and best practice volumes and create a more coherent, single volume. This is likely to be completed by spring 2006. These documents are internal guidance for staV, and therefore have not been released to the public. In the interests of transparency, the Government made a manifesto commitment to set out in a comprehensive guide to our consular assistance. The Guide, which the FAC has seen, was launched for consultation in draft form by the Foreign Secretary on 20 October 2005. The draft Guide was carefully reviewed by Government lawyers bearing in mind its status as a public document and the need to manage public expectations about the consular assistance that we can provide. The same is not the case with these documents, which were not drafted with the intention of publication—firstly because they focus on internal issues such as best practice and specialist advice regarding delivery of assistance in particular situations rather than general policies about the assistance we provide, and secondly because they need to be frequently updated in order to reflect changing circumstances, policy developments and lessons learned. In order for us to be consistent in the message that we give to the public about the core assistance that we provide and to ensure that we do not raise public expectations unrealistically, we have taken a policy decision not to publish these documents, but I am happy to share them with the Committee on the understanding they will not be released.
Question 5. Failure to meet PSA Targets (i) Passports Target: “to issue 95% of passports overseas within five working days” Answer: The Committee noted that we had failed to meet our PSA target during 2004–05. Our GenIE passport issuing system has enabled us to produce fraud-resistant, machine-readable passports overseas but at the price of extended processing times. We recognised at the time of the GenIE rollout in late 2003 that we would need more than five working days to process passport applications at peak times of the year at our largest passport issuing posts. Accordingly, we negotiated a revised 10-day PSA target with HM Treasury in the summer of 2004 as part of the 2004 Spending Review. This enabled the FCO to begin working to the same timeframe for passport issuing as the UK Passport Service (UKPS) from 1 April 2005. The 2004–05 statistics before the Committee were produced under the five-day target agreed as part of the 2002 Spending Review. With the revised target in place, we expect to meet the PSA target for GenIE passport issues during the current financial year. PSA Targets: (ii) Births and iii) Deaths Registration Target: “98% of birth registrations carried out within five working day from receipt of correct fee and correctly completed application” Result: 95.78%. Target: “98% of death registrations carried out within three working days from receipt of correct fee and correctly completed application” Result: 96.19%. Both targets are particularly challenging due to the relatively small number of registrations undertaken. It only takes a few failures to lead to an overall target miss (five days (births) and three days (deaths) respectively). And for these, the principal cause is: — InsuYcient documentary evidence: (a) Deaths (17 failed from 446)—for example, there may be a delay in receiving the death certificate issued by the local authorities; there may be a lack of evidence of the deceased’s claim to British nationality, eg full birth certificate or full British passport or certificate of naturalisation or of registration as a British national. There may be a delay in obtaining the original documents that are required. (b) Births (364 failed from 8,620)—staV need to see satisfactory documentary evidence which establishes both the facts of the birth and the citizenship of the person whose birth is to be registered. Delays (known to be a particular problem in Pakistan, China and Turkey, where nearly half these failures occurred) may result whilst the original documents are obtained. 3255703010 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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— If staV have reason to doubt the validity of supporting documentary evidence, eg marriage certificate, they must refer to Passports and Documentary Services Group in Consular Directorate, London, before registering (even if the birth may be registered by virtue of the mother’s citizenship). This will cause delays. — Some Consular posts do not have a Registration OYcer who is able to carry out birth/death registrations. Such Posts have to forward applications to a larger hub Post to register and return to the spoke Post to pass back to the customer. Delays will occur because of the travelling time; using FCO facilities or local postal services. Customers are given the choice to use express delivery services, eg DHL, but they have to cover the extra cost involved. PSA Targets (iv) Detainees Target: “98% of detainees contacted within 24 hours of notification of arrest, and detainee visited as soon as possible thereafter if the detainee wishes.” Result 96.67%. In 2004–05, FCO consular staV contacted detainees within 24 hours of arrest in 96.67% of cases, narrowly missing the target. Those cases when detainees were not contacted within 24 hours of arrest were spread across consular Posts throughout the world. Detainees were not contacted within the target time for a variety of reasons, including local conditions in some countries (eg diYculties in contacting detainee by telephone or post due to poor facilities) and very large numbers of detainees at some Posts, eg in Spain. Where we experience diYculties in contacting detainees due to local conditions, we will always subsequently raise our concerns with the local authorities.
Question 6. What annual savings in financial terms will be made by these closures and localisations of posts which you have just announced, and about which you have sent us a memo? The Written Ministerial Statement issued by the Foreign Secretary on 11 October was an update, including some minor changes, of the package of proposals of closures and localisations announced on 15 December 2004. Our estimate of savings remains as stated in the original Statement. The savings will come to some £6 million at 2004–05 prices and exchange rates. Of this figure £2.7 million will result from closures and localisations in Europe, £0.7 million from the Americas, £0.9 million from Africa and £1.4 million from Asia. In addition to these cash savings, human and other resources will be released for redeployment elsewhere. There will be some revenue from asset sales, although these will take time to realise.
Question 7. Dublin—The Committee would like an update on the current position [on the Residence] Answer: As the Committee will be aware, we currently occupy Glencairn. Work continues on the repurchase. We believe that it is better to retain Marlay Grange until the repurchase terms are finally agreed. It may also be worth clarifying that, under an agreement made at the time of sale, we are not paying rent on Glencairn.
Question 8. When considering the need to close Posts overseas, has the FCO evaluated the possibility of maintaining a UK presence in the manner it has adopted in Liberia? Could sharing premises be in some cases a cost-eVective and preferable alternative to outright closure? Answer: The package of closures and localisations announced in December 2004 was the outcome of a careful consideration of possible changes to our overseas network in order to align our resources more eVectively to our priorities. We looked at the option of moving to an implant in a partner country’s embassy (as in Liberia) or sharing premises in a number of cases but it did not prove to be a viable option. Among the factors were lack of opportunities and that for these, generally small, posts the net savings in running costs would have been negligible. Given the overriding need to realign resources we therefore either kept to the status quo, in cases where there remained an operational necessity to retain a presence, or closed. We will continue to look for opportunities for collocation. We are already collocated with the following partners: Germany — Almaty, Ashgabat, Dar es Salaam, Pyongyang, Quito, Reykjavik France — Almaty, Ashgabat Italy — Minsk The Netherlands — Dar es Salaam, Chisinau European Commission — Dar es Salaam
Question 9. Why is there no UK representation in Montenegro? Answer: We recognise that the 2005 FAC report on the Western Balkans concluded that independence for Montenegro in 2006 is probable, and this adds to the case for a Post headed by a UK-based diplomat in Podgorica. As circumstances change, the shape of the network of posts is continuously reviewed to align resources more eVectively to priorities. Following the 2001 FAC report that recommended a permanent post in Podgorica, we established an oYce there, headed by a locally-engaged member of staV who is highly 3255703011 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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eVective. The Embassy staV in Belgrade work very closely with the British oYce in Montenegro and HMA Belgrade pays regular visits to Podgorica. These arguments work well enough for our needs in the present circumstances. If a referendum results in an independent Montenegro that has been achieved through a free and fair process, then the question of opening an Embassy in Podgorica will need to be revisited. We have noted the Committee’s interest in and concern about the level of our representation here. The Committee’s views will be given full weight in our deliberations.
Question 10. What is the final outturn for overseas property sales in financial year 2004–05? What is the FCO’s prediction for sales in the current financial year? Answer: As notified to the Committee through our quarterly returns, the gross proceeds for FCO property sales in FY 2004–05 was £10.574 million. The net outturn figure is not yet available. Transaction costs vary, but average 6–8%. During the 2004 Spending Round negotiations, we agreed a ceiling of £15 million for asset recycling for the SR2004 period, although in most years we expect receipts closer to £10 million.
Question 11. Has the lease on One Carlton Gardens been renewed? Will the lease on Lancaster House be renewed? If so, at what cost? Who is the leaseholder for each of these properties? Answer: The One Carlton Gardens lease has not yet been renewed. We are holding over on an interim rent. The FCO’s agents, Debenham Tie Leung, are currently in negotiation with The Crown Estate for its renewal from April 2005. The new rent and lease terms have not yet been agreed. The tenant has been the Secretary of State for the Environment. Should a new lease be signed the tenant would be the First Secretary of State. This decision will be for Ministers. The Lancaster House lease, also held in the name of the Secretary of State for the Environment, expires in July 2007. No decision has yet been made on whether to renew. This decision will be for Ministers. Question 12. the Committee asked for confirmation that the Foreign Secretary’s reply to Mr Andrew Mackinlay’s Parliamentary Question 14400, relating to money paid by the FCO following grievance procedures was correct. Mr Mackinlay asked how much public money had been spent in each of the last five years in settlement of grievance procedures brought against senior staV of the Department by subordinate staV; how much was paid in each case; and if he would indicate in each case whether the payment was in full and final settlement. Answer: We can confirm that the Foreign Secretary’s answer to this question, namely that no public money had been spent in this way, was correct.
Question 13. Have any payments been made in respect of external claims against the Foreign OYce, perhaps from employment tribunals or through other actions? Answer: The amounts paid as a result of settling some Employment Tribunal cases were given in the answer to a Parliamentary Question in June 2004 from Mr Malcolm Bruce MP. The amounts paid as a result of Employment Tribunal claims over the last five years is as follows:
2001 £500 2002 £38,750 2003 £500 2004 £5,000 2005 £6,000
As is standard practice in the process of settling a legal claim, confidentiality clauses are included where the case has not yet been heard by a tribunal. The Committee also asked about other actions brought against the FCO. The Committee may like to know that in the last 12 months, there have been three awards of damages made by the courts against the FCO, amounting to a total of £60,000.
Question 14. How many serving or former members of the senior diplomatic service are currently the subject of disciplinary investigations or actions? Answer: Our current records start in 2003, from the promulgation of the FCO’s new disciplinary procedures. To provide details prior to this date could only be done at disproportionate cost. In 2003, there were two cases of misconduct involving serving members of the SMS. Both oYcers received written warnings. In 2004, there were two disciplinary cases involving a member of the SMS who has since left the Service. One case resulted in a written warning, the other was discontinued on the oYcer’s retirement from the Service. There have been no disciplinary cases involving members of the SMS to date in 2005. 3255703011 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Question 15. The Committee asked whether any former members of staV had been paid more than their entitlement in early retirement or severance terms.
Answer: OYcers leaving the FCO on early retirement or severance, including those who volunteered for early departure as a result of the reduction in size of the Service following the 2004 Spending Review, have been paid the amounts due to them under the provisions of the Civil Service Pensions Scheme. We have no record of any oYcer receiving payments in excess of these entitlements.
Question 16. Recent examples of failure in project management at FCO have included slippages in implementing Prism and i-visas and cost overruns on building projects. A lack of project management skills was also highlighted by the Collinson Grant Report. How does the FCO intend to rectify the lack of project management skills within its staV?
Answer: There is a dedicated Programme and Project Management team within Finance Directorate responsible for policy in this field. The team manages their own in-house website, which oVers links to a range of internal and external programme and project management training courses. Internal training courses include an introduction to programme and project management for all staV, with priority being given initially to new entrants, and two courses aimed specifically at those running Global Opportunity Fund programmes. To support the Global Opportunity Fund programmes we have established a regional Programme Management OYce in Delhi. This oVers training to staV based in the region. We are currently reviewing all training on oVer for Professional Skills for Government core skills, which of course includes programme and project management, and looking at the possibility of obtaining accredited programmes. FCOServices are the main providers of professional project management to the FCO. As part of the move to trading fund status, they aim to establish a centre of excellence for programme and project management to improve delivery through further staV training.
Question 17: How many applications from all grades for voluntary redundancy have been received; how many have been accepted and how many have been rejected? In respect of the posts held by those whose applications have been accepted, how many will be refilled and how many will be scrapped?
Answer: 402 members of staV applied for early retirement or severance to help the FCO meet the staV savings required under the 2004 Spending Review. Of these 269 were accepted. We are continuing to consider applications from members of the Senior Management Structure, until 31 March 2006. So far a further 14 applications have been successful. There will be no exact match between staV departures and job reductions. This is inevitable in an organisation where staV move jobs regularly. But the FCO is committed to a staV reduction of 310, to be found mostly from administrative support functions, by 1 April 2008. We are on course to achieve this target. There will be an increase in the numbers working in the service delivery areas of consular and visa work, where staV numbers reflect external revenue income.
Question 18. BBC World Service—is there a threat to the Nepali service?
Answer: BBC World Service’s Nepali language Service was not part of the changes to BBCWS announced on 25 October. The BBCWS has no plans to close the Service. There has been some disruption to the rebroadcasting of the Nepali service. But this is a result of the political situation in Nepal, rather than any changes implemented by BBCWS—the Nepalese government has barred FM stations from broadcasting news.
Question 19. What is the financial breakdown of stakeholder contributions to BBC Monitoring?
Answer: There are four BBC Monitoring stakeholders. These are Cabinet OYce (who will assume the lead stakeholder role for BBC Monitoring in 2006), MOD, BBC World Service and the FCO. Under the terms of the new funding settlement, the financial contributions from 2006–07 onwards will be as follows:
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In addition to the stakeholder contributions, in FY 06/07 and 07/08 the Treasury have agreed to add £2.5 million pa to BBC Monitoring from the Counter Terrorism Reserve. From FY 08/09, the Treasury will add £1.3 million pa to BBC Monitoring’s baseline funding. This will deliver an average funding level for the five- year period of £23.8 million pa. This amount is augmented by some income derived from BBC Monitoring’s commercial sales.
Question 20. What criteria does the FCO use when deciding whether to volunteer a document to the Committee? Will the OYce consider in future sending the Committee important Reports that are clearly relevant to its work, such as those by Collinson Grant and by Norman Ling, without waiting to be asked?
Answer: We always seek to ensure that the Parliamentary aspects of our work are taken fully into account as it is progressing, including the need to keep the FAC informed. This is particularly true of areas in which we know the FAC has an active interest. But we have not in the past had formal criteria for volunteering documents.
We have therefore reviewed our approach and will incorporate guidance to staV in writing submissions or presenting reports to the Board that proactive disclosure to the FAC of decisions or activity should always be considered. The presumption will be that such information should be volunteered, but we would always have to take into account personal and commercial confidences, and any impact on the conduct of international relations.
Question 21. In how many cases since the Freedom of Information Act came into force has a decision by the FCO to withhold information sought under the Act been overruled on appeal?
Answer: In the period since the Freedom of Information Act came into force on 1 January this year until 30 September, the FCO has received a total of 1,059 requests. Of the 68 cases that were subject to internal review within the FCO, three were overturned, seven were partially overturned, and the remainder were upheld. In the same period, the FCO has received and responded to six complaints from the Information Commissioner, none of which has so far led to a decision to withhold information sought under the Act being overruled.
Question 22. The FCO’s classified scorecards include performance indicators relating to the Millennium Development Goals and other areas of policy which might be regarded as being of very legitimate public interest, without compromising security. Is the FCO satisfied that the classification of a very high proportion of its performance measures is consistent with its obligations to enable public scrutiny of its achievements? Will the OYce have another look at this, with a view to achieving greater openness and transparency?
Answer: The FCO agrees all of our PSA performance scorecards with the Treasury.
Under the 2002 Spending Review (SR), the FCO and Treasury agreed to classify certain scorecards to ensure that the FCO’s strategy for achieving our targets would not be compromised, and that the UK’s position in international negotiations would not be prematurely disclosed. If the FCO made public its negotiating position, it would risk getting a worse deal for the UK in the future. Some of the classified scorecards also contain sensitive information, which, if made public would risk damaging UK’s international relations.
We do however recognise the importance of transparency in order to allow proper public scrutiny of our performance and achievements. We have therefore declassified the performance scorecard relating to SR 02 PSA 7 which included our activity in respect of the Millennium Development Goals. We were mindful that as time has elapsed the risks to the UK’s negotiating position have diminished.
Having learned from our experience following SR02, we sought to reduce the number of classified scorecards underpinning our SR04 PSA targets. Hence, only one of our SR04 PSA targets (PSA3 relating to NATO and European Security, shared with the Ministry of Defence) is completely underpinned by classified scorecards.
To promote transparency, the FCO has also changed the way in which we report against our targets. We will in future routinely publish our unclassified scorecards and indicators alongside performance assessments, starting with publication of the 2005 Autumn Performance Report. 3255703011 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:22 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Question 23. Will the FCO publish the unclassified summary of the Ling Report on Prism? If not, why not? The unclassified summary of the Ling report on Prism has now been published on the FCO Website.
Question 24. What changes have been made to FCO procedures to avoid problems of the type experienced with Prism? Specifically, what action has been taken in response to each of the 26 unclassified recommendations made in the Ling Report? Answer: All major ICT programmes are now required to assess their performance against each of the recommendations in the Ling report. The assessments are scrutinised by the FCO Investment Committee and follow up action commissioned where deficiencies have been identified. A report summarising the impact of the Ling report on ICT programmes will be submitted to the FCO Board in January 2006. The Future Firecrest Programme were the first to carry out an assessment, a copy can be made available for the FAC if required. Sir Michael Jay KCMG Permanent Under Secretary of State 22 November 2005 325570PAG2 Page Type [SO] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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BBC MONITORING
Copy of an email sent to the Chairman of the Committee from Dr Chris Westcott, Director, BBC Monitoring As you know the FAC has engaged closely with the future of BBC Monitoring since the FCO publicly stated that they intended to remove £2 million pa from our funding. You commented favourably on BBC Monitoring’s work and impact in your Report on the FCO’s Annual Report (HC 745 para 167): 167. We conclude that it is utterly perverse that the future of BBC Monitoring should be placed in doubt at the very time when its services are arguably most important to the country’s security and diplomatic needs, and when it is being almost universally praised by its users. We recommend that BBC Monitoring be given financial security by the FCO and its other stakeholders to ensure its future. Following the FCO decision to reduce its contribution to our funding the Cabinet OYce commissioned a Review of BBC Monitoring which got underway last summer. That Review has now concluded and reported. I’m pleased to report that the FCO signed oV on the BBCM Review outcome last week. This completes the final stage of the review’s terms of reference following sign oV by the BBC Board of Governors at the beginning of July. I am going to announce the outcome to all BBC Monitoring staV tomorrow, Monday 1 August. This announcement will coordinate briefings for our staV in Caversham, Nairobi, Moscow, Kiev, Baku, Tashkent and Cairo. Coincident with my announcement to BBC Monitoring staV (timed for 12:00 BST Monday 1 August) I wanted to share the outcome with you and your committee. I believe the Review outcome is a very positive one for BBCM. The outcome provides us with an increase in our funding and a new, more strategic, framework within which to work with our stakeholders and users. I’ve summarised the outcome and some next steps on a 1 pager that all BBCM staV will get tomorrow that I’ve attached to this email. In summary the outcome establishes: — A good funding outcome for FY 06/07—10/11 given the circumstances: — While the Review recommended an average of £24.6 million pa from 06/07 to 10/11, the actual outcome equates to an average of £23.8 million pa over the same period. As a result we will regrettably need to close 50–80 posts by March 2007. We feel that this is manageable given positive engagement in strategic change by BBCM staV, including the Trades Unions. — Achieving this level of funding took a considerable amount of time and eVort by the Reviewer, Sir Quentin Thomas, and Sir David Omand, both of whom had extensive discussions with our stakeholders and HM Treasury. These discussions, and those of the Review group, were made more diYcult by the FCO stating to the Review at its inception that they wished to remove £4.5 millon pa from our funding, not £2 million pa, a position that was described by the FCO as “non- negotiable”. — A new funding regime: single “ring fenced” funding (similar to that pertaining to BBC World Service) replacing the current “dis-aggregated” subscription model. — The Cabinet OYce is our new “sponsor department” replacing the FCO. — A new Governance Panel chaired by the Cabinet OYce to replace the current FCO chaired Stakeholder group. Furthermore the Review concludes: — that BBCM services—in partnership with the US FBIS—match UK requirements; — the review says the partnership works well, is crucial and provides excellent VFM; that the UK requires global open source (“a rich resource”); that open source is low cost relative to the benefit, and its value is greater when dealt with systematically and speedily; and — that it should be a UK objective to give BBCM stability and confidence allowing us to focus on maintaining the operation and developing products/services that match customer needs. As you can see from this brief summary the outcome is a very considerable advance on where we have been under the current stakeholder regime and where we could been if the FCO’s position had led to other stakeholders also removing funding. That the Review outcome is such a positive one for BBC Monitoring is due to the strong support shown at the highest levels by our MoD, Cabinet OYce, BBC World Service and Intelligence Agency stakeholders. It is also due to the professionalism and dedication of two fine public servants: the Reviewer Sir Quentin Thomas and for the former Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator Sir David Omand. 3255704001 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Finally, on behalf of myself and all my staV at BBCM, I’d like to thank you for your committee’s role. From your very public support to your extensive and eVective work behind the scenes, your position on BBCM was instrumental in getting us to where we are today. In all the staV briefings on the outcome I and my Direction team will be making this point and expressing their thanks as well. I would be more than happy to provide you and the members of the FAC with a fuller briefing at any time. Please feel free to contact my oYce and if there is anything I or BBCM can do for you just call. 31 July 2005
CABINET OFFICE—REVIEW OUTCOME — A good funding outcome for FY 06/07—10/11 given the circumstances: — initial five year agreement: stable funding to the end of the decade; — tight public sector funding a fact of life, so: — cost reductions ! eYciency savings ! reprioritisation continue; and — £2 million pa cost reduction by March 2007: 50–80 net jobs lost.
Financial Year 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 Current Stakeholder funding £m 22.1 22.1 21.1 Review recommendation £m* 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 Review outcome £m 24.6 24.6 23.4 23.4 23.4 * the Review recommended an average of £24.6 million pa from 06/07 to 10/11 the actual outcome equates to an average of £23.78 million pa from 06/07 to 10/11 — New funding regime: single “ring fenced” fund a.k.a. BBC World Service — replaces separate subscriptions and core/product split — The Cabinet OYce is our new “sponsor department” — FCO relinquishes role of lead stakeholder — New Governance Panel chaired by Cabinet OYce — members: existing stakeholders ! three agencies. — BBCM ! FBIS normally attend, HM Treasury can be invited — BBCM services—in partnership with FBIS—match UK requirements — partnership works well, is crucial and provides excellent VFM — UK requires global open source—a rich resource — open source: low cost relative to the benefit & value greater when dealt with systematically & speedily — UK objective: to give BBCM stability & confidence: — allowing us to focus on maintaining the operation — develop products/services that match customer needs
Next Steps — Ensure all BBCM staV fully understand the review outcome — The Direction team and Project Group: — will work with all BBCM staV to identify the best ideas for the future — iterative process involving stakeholders, FBIS and Trades Unions — Direction team, BBCM Supervisory Board & ExBo: — decide on detailed, costed proposals for the future — complete formal I.R. processes in line with Agreed Statements — Whole of BBCM: — execute to time and budget
Strategic Themes to 2010 — Digital—source of competitive advantage — impacts of the digital media landscape and our use of the technology 3255704001 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— Processes—greatest opportunity for change — simplify & reduce cost; add value & avoid repetition, key to flexibility, resilience and VFM — People—at the heart of what we do — culture, values, trust, openness; types: staV, IC, UK, overseas, etc. — Products—stakeholder needs now & in the future — quality, reach, reputation, impact, volume ! insight & analysis
CONSULAR SERVICES
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from Paul Sizeland, Director, Consular Services, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Updating of Consular Directorate’s List of Notifiable Serious Arrestable Offences I wrote to you last year suggesting that you might like to share with the Foreign AVairs Committee the list of serious arrestable crimes which our consular oYcials overseas use to ensure that the National Criminal Intelligence Service is informed if a British national is arrested for one of these crimes. As I said then, I try to ensure that consular staV working overseas have the best reference tools and information available to them and to ensure a consistent, world-wide approach. It has recently been brought to our attention by the law enforcement agencies that this list had some omissions. We have therefore updated it. In addition to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, we have also used definitions in the Criminal Justice Act (Schedule 15) 2003 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. We have also taken the opportunity to clarify our obligations under the Sex OVenders Register and the Sexual OVences Prevention Orders. I thought that you might again like to share the enclosed updated list with members of the Foreign AVairs Committee. Paul Sizeland Director, Consular Services 14 September 2005
APPENDIX 1
Serious Crimes—Notifiable to NCIS on Arrest (Amendments to previous list in italics)
General — Treason — Murder and manslaughter — Kidnapping and Hostage taking — Hi-jacking and Endangering trains, ships, planes, etc — Terrorism — Torture — Human traYcking (for exploitation) and People Smuggling (illegal immigration), to include preparatory and ancillary oVences of forgery and possession of forged documents — Causing explosions likely to endanger life or property — Possession or use of firearms or imitation firearms with criminal intent — Assault causing serious injury—the injury can be physical or mental — Child cruelty and Neglect — Female Genital Mutilation — Riot and Violent Disorder, such as football hooliganism, etc — Theft and related oVences, such as robbery, fraud, burglary, etc, involving substantial sums or significant loss or injury — Arson and other cases of serious criminal damage, such as threat to life and serious damage to property — Money laundering 3255704002 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— Causing death by dangerous driving — Causing death by careless driving, when under the influence of drink or drugs.
Drugs — Production, supply and possession with intent to supply controlled drugs — Manufacture and supply of substances mainly used in the manufacture of controlled drugs — Illegal importation and exportation of controlled drugs — Excise oVences, such as large-scale smuggling of alcohol and tobacco.
Sexual Offences — Rape — Assault by penetration, by a part of another person’s body or with an instrument — Causing or inciting a person to engage in activity involving such penetration without consent — Indecent assault which constitutes an act of gross indecency — Publication of obscene material — Publication, possession and distribution of indecent images of children — Attempts and conspiracies to commit any of the above oVences. Notification of all the above oVences to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), via the Desk OYcer in Consular Directorate, is triggered by a person’s arrest, charge, conviction, other finding of guilt, or deportation. If the person is convicted of the crime overseas, then that conviction will appear on their record of previous criminal convictions on the Police National Computer (PNC), if the conviction is supported by fingerprint evidence. Otherwise, the information will be recorded on intelligence databases.
Sex Offenders Register and Sexual Offences Prevention Orders In addition, and in order to include relevant oVenders on the Sex OVenders Register or to apply for Sexual OVences Prevention Orders in the UK, NCIS should also be informed of: — Any sexual oVence, from rape to indecent exposure, committed against a person under the age of 18 Notification in these cases is triggered by a person’s conviction. However, if Posts inform their Desk OYcer of a person’s arrest for any of these oVences, then the Desk OYcer will inform NCIS at the appropriate time.
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
CONSULAR GUIDE CONSULTATION British people now make some 65 million overseas trips a year, and some 13 million British nationals live overseas. Thankfully, the vast majority of those British nationals who travel and live abroad do so without serious diYculty. But the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s consular staV in the UK and worldwide now deal with some 3.5 million enquiries and some 85,000 new cases requiring more acute support every year. A number of factors have led to a steady increase in demand for consular assistance, including the growth in travel; more trips by vulnerable groups such as the elderly; the rise of international terrorism; and natural catastrophes such as the tsunami or the recent hurricanes in the United States. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has worked hard over the past years to respond to these challenges, including through better arrangements for responding to crises, building stronger partnerships with other organisations in delivering consular assistance, and implementing changes to our travel advice to help people make informed decisions about their safety overseas. In its manifesto for the last General Election, the Government committed itself, if elected, to consulting widely before drawing up a comprehensive statement of the consular assistance which the FCO can provide to British travellers and residents in diYculty overseas. Such a comprehensive guide to this support has not previously been available in a single document. By publishing this document and through the consultation preceding its formal launch, the Government hopes to achieve two main objectives: — to raise public awareness of what support our consular staV can oVer and of the constraints on that help imposed for example by the very diVerent conditions in which we operate around the world 3255704003 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— to foster a wider debate on the questions underlying our services: for example, how much should public money be used to help those who have got into diYculty abroad, including those who have not taken out appropriate insurance? How can we help British travellers and residents overseas better to protect themselves against things going wrong. I enclose a draft text1 of the comprehensive statement foreseen in the Government’s manifesto. Lord Triesman is hosting a consultative event with external stakeholders on 27 October to discuss the key issues. He would very much welcome an opportunity to discuss these with you, as Chair of the Foreign AVairs Committee, beforehand. I am very keen to engage Members on these important issues and am making a written statement to the House this week inviting Members to give their views. Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary 18 October 2005
Letter to the Chairman from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs As you are no doubt aware, the last two months have been exceptionally busy ones for the Foreign OYce’s consular crisis teams. Hurricane Katrina at the beginning of September was followed in quick succession by Hurricane Rita from 23 September 2005 onwards, the bombings in Bali on 1 October 2005, the Pakistani earthquake on 8 October 2005 and, most recently, Hurricane Wilma in Mexico. This memorandum sets out in detail the action which the Foreign OYce took in response to the two hurricanes which hit the United States—concentrating in particular on our handling of Hurricane Katrina. I believe it shows that, on the whole, Foreign OYce staV did an exceptional job in extremely diYcult circumstances. Hurricane Katrina caused major destruction to the coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama—and in particular to the city of New Orleans. In total the federal authorities designated over 233,000 square km as a disaster zone—an area about the same size as the United Kingdom. The hurricane displaced over one million people and caused damage estimated at between US$ 70 billion and US$ 130 billion. The oYcial death toll stands at around 1,300 people. Although we do not know the exact number of British nationals aVected, we estimate that in Hurricane Katrina it was probably fewer than 1,000. Of these only a small number were tourists. Most were businessmen and long term residents, many of the latter being British/US dual nationals. They were spread across the aVected area. One Briton (a long term resident of New Orleans) is confirmed dead, and nine remain on the list of those originally reported missing. There are no reported British casualties from Hurricane Rita. In response to both hurricanes, we used well-rehearsed standing arrangements to make sure that we got trained staV on the ground quickly. This included sending rapid deployment teams from London to provide support to our consular staV deployed from across our posts in the United States. The first such team arrived in Houston on 1 September, the day after the levees broke in New Orleans. Our Consulate General there had already set up a reception centre for British nationals being evacuated out of New Orleans and had been asked by the local authorities to co-ordinate international relief eVorts. The British consular presence was the largest of any country. Our staV continued to work around the clock providing a rapid and co-ordinated response in extreme conditions. Attached to this memorandum are examples of the praise which British nationals gave for the help provided by our consular staV, and for the eVorts which were made to search for and locate those reported to us as missing. We have also been thanked by EU partners for our co-ordinating role with them. In addition to the purely consular response, our Embassy in Washington, and staV from the Cabinet OYce and DfID, helped to co-ordinate UK and EU assistance to the US authorities. I am sure that you will remember that there was criticism at the time of Hurricane Katrina that we were slow in getting to those British nationals who were in the New Orleans Superdrome. As the attached record shows we repeatedly requested access to New Orleans but were denied it by the State authorities. Once those authorities sanctioned access on 4 September 2005, our consular staV were among the first into the city. I would also like to make a point of noting that some of the criticism in the press—most notably from the Mail on Sunday—had no basis in fact. An article written by that newspaper, and subsequent correspondence between the Managing Editor and David Triesman, are attached at section G. I am sure that you will fully understand that it would be quite wrong for ministers to allow such a false accusation to stand against staV who have volunteered to work extraordinarily long hours in very harsh—and sometimes traumatic— conditions. This is not to say that our response was faultless; it wasn’t and it never will be in such a situation. Where there were complaints we have investigated them. And just as we have learned from previous incidents, including the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, we shall use the experience gained from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to improve our response further in future.
1 Not printed. 3255704004 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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But overall, I believe that the Foreign OYce’s response to these huge natural disasters was professional and well-run. In the vast majority of cases our staV did a good job and in many they went well beyond the call of duty. I would be happy to provide any further detail or clarification which the Committee may need. Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary 10 November 2005
Memorandum to the Foreign AVairs Committee: FCO Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita This memorandum sets out the FCO response to Hurricane Katrina which hit the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama on 29 August 2005, and to Hurricane Rita, which hit the Texas Coast on 24 September 2005.
A. Timeline of Events 26 August: Tropical Storm Katrina hits Southern Florida 26 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Tropical Storm Katrina hit Florida during the night of 25 August, causing damage to trees and buildings. It is currently moving southwest across southern Florida. You should check news reports and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 26 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina hit Florida during the night of 25 August causing flooding and damage to trees and buildings. It is now gaining intensity in the Gulf of Mexico and is expected to re-enter Florida or Alabama sometime on 26–27 August. You should check news reports and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 27 August: Katrina becomes Category 2 Hurricane. 28 August: New Orleans Mayor orders mandatory evacuation of the city. 29 August: Authorities move those not evacuated from New Orleans to the Superdome and Convention Centre. 29 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina hit Florida during the night of 25 August causing flooding and damage to trees and buildings. It has since gained intensity and has remained in the Gulf of Mexico region. The situation is liable to change quickly. You should check news reports regularly and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 29 August: Katrina strikes New Orleans at 6.10 am local time, 12:10 pm London time. Wind speeds up to 155 mph are recorded. 29 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina reached landfall on the coast of Louisiana during the morning of 29 August. It has been classified as a Category 4 hurricane (wind speeds of 131 to 155 mph). The storm will proceed northwards on a projected path through the states of Louisiana and Mississippi. Please visit http://www.noaa.gov/ for more information on the hurricane and http:// www.fema.gov/ for advice on how to deal with hurricanes. The situation is liable to change quickly. You should check news reports regularly and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 30 August: Louisiana State Authorities advise residents to wait for area to be declared safe before returning home. 30 August: Mississippi Emergency Management Agency report that they have no knowledge of any British citizens being injured in the recent hurricane. 30 August: Consulate General in Atlanta report all known missing British citizens to the Red Cross national helpline. Red Cross advise that families are going to have to wait until communications are up- and-running to contact family members. Their priority is reaching those people who are disabled or in need of special assistance. 30 August: FCO Emergency Response Team (ERT) take over call handling in London but are stood down after only four calls received. Responsibility passes back to FCO Response Centre out of hours and Consular Directorate during oYce hours. Consulate General in Houston is the principal call centre and is staVed for 24-hour operation. 30 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Katrina has been downgraded from a hurricane to a tropical storm and, although still aVecting the southern US, it is expected to further diminish in strength. There have been an unconfirmed number of casualties, as well as widespread damage and disruption to parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Please visit http://www.noaa.gov/ for more information 3255704004 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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on the hurricane and http://www.fema.gov/ for advice on how to deal with hurricanes. The situation is liable to change quickly. You should check news reports regularly and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 30 August: Houston Deputy Consul General contacts Louisiana authorities seeking information about British nationals, state of the city and consular access. Was told that Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were denying access to New Orleans because the city was unsafe. 30/31 August: New Orleans levees break. 31 August: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina has caused widespread damage in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Communications and the transport infrastructure have been badly aVected. All airports in the region are closed. There have been a number of casualties. Please visit http://www.fema.gov/ for advice on how to deal with hurricanes. You should check news reports regularly and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 31 August: US declares State of Emergency. Governor of Texas calls Harris County oYcials (at 3:00 am) asking them to help with New Orleans evacuation. 31 August: State of Georgia relays the following message to all Consulates in Atlanta—“Governor Barbour of Mississippi and Governor Blanco of Louisiana have essentially ordered that only essential emergency, rescue, and recovery personnel may be in the area.” 31 August: UK response being co-ordinated from British Embassy Washington. Deputy Head of Mission is the crisis manager, with an Embassy team allotted specific roles. Regular teleconferences chaired by Washington between Embassy, FCO in London, Houston, Atlanta and (later) teams in the field. 31 August: Consulate General in Houston informed that Britons in New Orleans Superdome were to be evacuated to Houston Astrodome from that night. 31 August: Consular oYcials set up 24-hour reception centre at the Houston Astrodome to meet British and other eligible nationals (EU and Commonwealth) arriving from New Orleans Superdome. 31 August: Deputy Head of Mission Washington travels to Houston to co-ordinate UK operation. 31 August: Director Consular AVairs for the US travels to Houston to lead consular relief eVort. 31 August: Consular oYcials obtain credentials from Harris County and set up 24-hour reception centre at the Houston Astrodome to meet British and other eligible nationals arriving from the New Orleans Superdome. Within 24 hours, British Consul General Houston is asked by Harris County OYce for Foreign Missions to co-ordinate international response to evacuation. Began operating two sites: one at the point where buses oV-loaded evacuees, to extract them from the flow of people; the other in nearby Reliant Center which served as Consulate Headquarters, with phone, fax and internet capability. Both sites were staVed by consulate volunteers 24 hours/day for seven days and 18 hours/day subsequently. Fifty-one consulates registered with the headquarters. For two weeks, the British Consul General Houston met daily with the Incident Command Team and provided briefings to the Houston Consular Corps. 31 August: Our team in the US sends list of all British citizens reported missing to State Department Crisis Management OYce. 1 September: ERT reactivated and new public enquiry numbers released in London and in the US. 1 September: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina has caused widespread damage in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Communications and the transport infrastructure have been badly aVected. All airports in the region are closed. There have been a number of casualties. If you are having trouble getting in touch with family and friends in the area aVected by the hurricane, please call the British Consulate in Houston on Tel No: 713-659 6270—this line is open 24/7. Please visit http:// www.fema.gov/ for advice on how to deal with the aftermath of hurricanes. You should check news reports regularly and keep in touch with your local travel agent about how this might aVect your travel plans. 1 September: First 5-man FCO Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) arrives in Houston. 1 September: Travel Advice amended as follows: Hurricane Katrina has caused widespread damage in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Communications and the transport infrastructure have been badly aVected. All airports in the region are closed. There have been a number of casualties. The US authorities are not allowing anyone other than the emergency services into the aVected areas, and this situation is likely to prevail for some time. You should listen for announcements by US Government and State oYcials and follow any instructions about when to return. 2 September: Team deployed to Baton Rouge to liaise more closely with the Louisiana authorities. 2 September: Deputy Head of Mission Washington speaks to Louisiana Secretary of State Olivier requesting access to New Orleans and is denied. 2 September: News media continue to report that there is a lack of security in New Orleans and that the US authorities are going over the weekend to “take back the streets”. 2 September: Consular Teams sent to other emerging evacuation reception centres in Dallas, Baton Rouge and San Antonio. 3255704004 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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2 September: Cheryl Plumridge (Director Capabilities, Cabinet OYce Civil Contingencies Secretariat, COCCS) arrives to pursue detailed discussion with the Administration and US military over UK assistance. 3 September: Four-person team from Atlanta, supported by other US posts, travels to Alabama and Mississippi checking Red Cross shelters in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. 3 September: Consular team from Los Angeles deploys to Arkansas. 3 September: StaV outside New Orleans try to gain access to the city and are refused by US authorities on the ground. 4 September: Second RDT deployed to aVected area (four people). 4 September: Director Consular AVairs and RDT gain access to New Orleans. 4/5 September: British Ambassador visits Houston. 5 September: Hurricane Unit set up in FCO with team of four staV. 7 September: OYcer deploys from Washington to set up an FCO oYce in Baton Rouge to liase with State Department oYce, Louisiana authorities and Consular teams. 9/10 September: British Ambassador visits Atlanta. 10 September: Second oYcer deploys to Baton Rouge to take charge of FCO oYce. 10/11 September: British Ambassador visits Baton Rouge and New Orleans. 14/15 September: Greater Manchester Police (GMP) visit FCO Hurricane Unit to discuss arrangements for GMP assistance with missing person enquiries. 15 September: Lord Triesman, Minister of State for Consular AVairs, visits Baton Rouge. Meets consular team and speaks by telephone to those aVected. 17 September: Consular teams withdraw from Mississippi/Alabama. 19 September: Greater Manchester Police (GMP) take over enquiries to trace remaining 68 missing Britons following Katrina. Police operation named Operation Dimension. A FCO Liaison OYcer is assigned to work alongside GMP. 23 September: Hurricane Unit takes on handling of calls following Hurricane Rita. 26 September: Head of FCO Hurricane Unit and Police Liaison OYcer in Consular Directorate visit the GMP operation in Manchester. 27 September: Progress being made in tracing Katrina-related missing persons. GMP start to reduce the number of oYcers deployed on Operation Dimension. 30 September: FCO Liaison OYcer withdrawn from Manchester. Continues to act as police liaison oYcer from London.
B. Activity in London 1. Over the bank holiday weekend of 27–29 August, the FCO Response Centre remained in touch with our posts in the United States and with Britons concerned about relatives and friends who might have been in the vicinity of the Hurricane. There were very few such calls. Consular Directorate’s emergency call handlers in the Emergency Response Team (ERT) were on standby to man the Emergency Response Unit as they are each weekend. The duty Rapid Deployment Team was also on standby. 2. Following the Bank Holiday, our Consular Assistance Group took over contact with posts and the fielding of calls from relatives. During 30 August they received only 35 calls relating to Katrina. As a precaution, Consular Crisis Group brought the ERT call handlers on duty for the night of 30 August but they were stood down during the evening after receiving only 4 calls. Responsibility for handling Katrina calls overnight reverted to the FCO Response Centre until the next day. 3. On Wednesday 31 August, news reached London that the New Orleans levees had broken. The Emergency Response Team of call handlers were again deployed to handle calls which began to increase steadily throughout the day. New contact numbers for relatives—an emergency information line—were released in both London and Houston. These numbers were kept open on a 24 hour basis. 4. The Head of Consular Crisis Group liaised with his opposite numbers in EU capitals by teleconference. They agreed that the UK as Presidency would co-ordinate information on local consular assistance on the ground. 5. Following discussion with Washington on 31 August, 11 Rapid Deployment Team volunteers were deployed from the UK to the aVected areas to support staV from our US network: five on 1 September, four on 4 September, one (a Press OYcer) on 9 September, and one on 11 September. In addition three members of staV were deployed to Baton Rouge on temporary duty to continue local enquiries about missing Britons. 6. Consular Directorate kept FCO Ministers up to date on the consular response to the hurricane through daily briefing sit-reps. The FCO web-site and Travel Advice was also continuously updated. 3255704005 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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7. The Cabinet OYce Civil Contingencies Secretariat (COCCS) mechanism for inter Whitehall departmental co-ordination was also activated at FCO request on 1 September, to discuss consular and other issues including assistance to the US and requirements for support from other Whitehall departments (eg the return to the UK of any British nationals; contingencies for the return of bodies for burial). 8. A separate Hurricane Unit was set up with four additional staV, as part of Consular Crisis Group, on 5 September. This unit also handled calls concerning Hurricane Rita from 23 September.
C. Reports from the British Embassy,Washington During the Crisis
The following reports2 were received from Washington in the aftermath of the hurricane. Also attached is a special feature article3 on the work and experiences of our teams on the ground, produced by the Embassy for their Focus magazine.
D. Financial Implications
1. It is too early to put a figure on the total cost to the FCO of our response to Hurricane Katrina. The bill from Greater Manchester Police is awaited. 2. In addition to staV deployed from the UK and from around the US, we put together a package of measures from which assistance could be drawn for British nationals as follows (a similar, though slightly refined package was oVered to British national aVected by Hurricane Rita): — Continuing support for tourists who need help before they return to the UK (accommodation, food and clothing and help with tickets back to the UK). — Five nights’ accommodation for any residents in desperate need of help. Posts have discretion to add a further two nights’ food and accommodation. — Flights for US residents who want to return to the UK. — Flights for family of those most likely to have been involved and still missing, who want to travel out to the US as soon as it is appropriate. — If British deaths are confirmed, repatriation of remains and assistance as above to families who wish to travel out to the areas. 3. So far there has been little take-up of this assistance package. Only seven people have had tickets paid for, or reimbursed after the event. 4. Lord Triesman spoke to the son of the deceased Briton and oVered to pay for the funeral expenses in the US and the repatriation of her ashes to the UK. This was in recognition of the help the son gave to our teams operating in New Orleans, work for which he refused payment.
E. International and Bilateral Assistance
1. As EU Presidency, the Embassy co-ordinated the EU response alongside our own bilateral assistance and consular activity. 2. The Embassy collated lists of missing EU citizens and put out information to EU Embassies whenever it had been obtained from the US authorities. Our consular teams on the ground helped EU (and other) nationals when requested. The Embassy acted to facilitate EU assistance as and when needed. We have received a number of plaudits from EU Ambassadors for both our consular and assistance work (attached). 3. Cheryl Plumridge (Director Capabilities, Cabinet OYce Civil Contingencies Secretariat, COCCS) arrived on 2 September to pursue detailed discussion with the Administration and US military over UK assistance. She was joined by three colleagues, from the COCCS and DFID. The team were co-located with the OYce for Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Response Management Team (RMT) which was set up in Arlington, Virginia. It included staV from US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense, US Customs, State Department, and international personnel from the EU, UN, NATO and the International Red Cross. 4. The DFID expert (David Horobin) with the COCCS was designated the EU Expert Co-ordinator by the Commission—the US point of contact for the EU co-ordination mechanism (known as the MIC).
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5. The COCCS team was charged with supporting USAID eVorts following Hurricane Katrina. In particular it helped to provide structured arrangements for co-ordination between the RMT and both the EU member states and the European Commission. It assisted with incoming enquiries from participating US entities regarding EU activities in support of the US government and assisted in providing clarification on any technical issues arising from planned activities. 6. The team handled specific enquiries on operational assistance from EU members. The UK Embassy, in its capacity as Presidency of the EU, helped the US Government with broader questions.
F. Latest Figures on UK Nationals Affected 1. We estimate that the total number of British nationals aVected by Hurricane Katrina to be less than 1,000. Most of these were long term residents (including British-US dual nationals), businessmen and tourists. 2. As of 13 October, one British national has been confirmed dead (a long term resident of New Orleans and a UK/US dual national). Nine people remain on the list of those originally reported to us as missing.
G. Public Criticism, and Bouquets 1. There were some critical comments made in the early days of the crisis. We received one MP’s letter regarding a constituent’s complaint that their son had not received consular assistance while he was in the New Orleans Superdome. 2. The FCO is aware of the following criticisms:
We did not respond to requests for help from distressed British Nationals — In many cases, our consular teams were the first people to reach British nationals trapped in their houses. We provided whatever help we could. This took many forms, including giving food, money, use of a cell phone to call family/friends, helping evacuate etc (see attachment D for more details). 420 missing persons were reported to the Emergency Response Team (ERT) in London and to our 24-hour response line set up in the US. We were able to resolve 250 of these cases fairly quickly, leaving 170 people unaccounted for. Our consular teams on the ground conducted a house-by-house search, as areas became accessible using addresses provided by those reporting missing persons. We also immediately notified their family when a missing person was found.
The Embassy refused to help callers — On Friday 2 September press reports of trapped Britons in the New Orleans Superdome started to appear. Britons in the aVected areas called relatives and complained that they were not being helped. The British Embassy, Washington received a call on 30 August from a UK National in the Superdome who asked if we could send a team by helicopter to evacuate her and a group of others which had congregated together in the stadium. A member of the Embassy’s consular section explained this was not possible and advised that the group should stay close to the police in the stadium. She also gave them the contact details for our Consulate General in Houston and our Honorary Consul in New Orleans. She recommended that they keep in touch but understood that communications were likely to be diYcult.
The FCO should have entered New Orleans earlier to help those trapped in the Superdome and local hotels. — At least 13 complaints were received from people who had been in the New Orleans Superdome. The time line (attachment A) shows that we sought access to New Orleans from the very beginning. We were refused access to the city on three grounds: (a) that it was unsafe to enter; (b) that the US authorities did not want such a presence on the ground at a time when they were gearing up their relief eVort and seeking to restore order in the city; and (c) that those in the Superdome were being evacuated immediately to the Astrodome in Houston and we would be better placed to deploy a team to meet them on arrival. — The UK had the only consular team (four people) on the ground to meet and help British and eligible nationals when they first arrived in Dallas after being evacuated from the New Orleans Superdome. (An Irish Consular OYcer was the only other diplomat present.) We ferried 30 British nationals and several others to hotels, organised meals, the purchase of new clothes, professional counselling and medical advice and sorted out (and in some cases paid for) their onward flights. We did the same for other British nationals who had not been in the Superdome, but rather in hotels, shopping malls and other places of refuge, and who made it out of New Orleans by other means. We were also one of the first to gain access to New Orleans, once the ban on entry to the city was lifted on 4 September (along with two Australian consular colleagues). 3255704005 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— Over the weekend of 3–4 September press stories circulated that our consular response was “inept”, “cowardly” and “unhelpful”. The Mail on Sunday published a factually incorrect article. The article, Lord Triesman’s response (sent after he had visited the area on 15 September), and subsequent correspondence, are attached. The article was demoralising to our staV who had been working around the clock to help UK nationals, often in diYcult conditions. Many of our staV went for days with little sleep and no change of clothes.
3. The following is a report4 of 6 September from the Embassy in Washington on good news stories and bouquets.
H. Role of the Greater Manchester Police Force
1. Although FCO eVorts had reduced the number of missing persons significantly, it became apparent that there was a need to draw on police expertise so that formal missing person investigations could be carried out to trace the 68 Britons still unaccounted for (these included a number of people who we assessed as unlikely to have been in the aVected area). The Greater Manchester (GMP) took over the investigations at noon on 16 September. GMP named their operation “Operation Dimension”, on which they deployed 13 police oYcers.
2. By the week beginning 19 September, the number of outstanding cases had been reduced to fewer than forty as a result of GMP’s enquiries and reports from the US and to the FCO. GMP assessed a substantial number of the cases as unlikely to have been directly involved in the hurricane. As at 30 September, the number of outstanding cases stood at 30. We do not anticipate having many, if any, long term missing persons as a result of the hurricane.
3. A FCO Liaison OYcer was attached to the Greater Manchester Police for two weeks. On 26 September the head of the FCO Hurricane Unit and Consular Directorate’s Police Special Adviser visited the police operation in Manchester. On 30 September the FCO Liaison OYcer was withdrawn from Manchester, but continued to act as a police liaison oYcer from London.
4. Our assessment is that the work done by the Greater Manchester Police, the first time that we have worked with them on a consular emergency, has been a success. Co-operation between the FCO and the Police was excellent throughout.
I. Hurricane Rita
1. Hurricane Rita, at various times, was a tropical storm and a Hurricane varying between Category 1 and 5. It crossed the Texan Coast at Port Arthur on 24 September at 03.31 am as a category 3 hurricane. Our travel advice was updated daily. It impacted on our Katrina work in the following way. The US authorities ordered the re-evacuation of New Orleans on 22 and 23 September. As a result, the search for missing British nationals in New Orleans had to stop. On Friday 23 September, rain from the edges of Hurricane Rita resulted in a number of repaired levees being breached once more, causing parts of New Orleans to be flooded once again.
2. Hurricane Rita aVected an area of Texas and Louisiana in which some 60,000 British nationals live and work, a sharp contrast to the much smaller numbers directly aVected by Katrina. Parts of Houston and coastal areas were placed under mandatory evacuation. The tower block housing our Consulate-General oYce in Houston was closed on the morning of 22 September and was not open again until 26 September. Our Consul General and her staV then worked from home. Because of this, a Rapid Deployment Team of five was sent to Dallas as a precaution on 23 September, ready to deploy to aVected areas once the hurricane had passed. The Consul in Washington also deployed to Dallas on 23 September.
3. The Consular Directorate’s Emergency Response Team was activated at noon on Friday 23 September to take calls from friends and relatives of those that might be aVected in the path of Rita. Because of the swift response of the US authorities, casualties as a result of Hurricane Rita were low: 107 deaths (including 23 elderly people who died when the coach in which they were being evacuated was engulfed in flames).
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4. We are not aware of any British casualties. Nor have there been any complaints about assistance being provided by our oYcials on the ground. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce October 2005
Letter to the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce from the Clerk of the Committee The Committee yesterday received copies of the NAO Report on FCO consular services. It has also obtained from the NAO copies of a joint NAO-FCO document, entitled Joint findings on lessons to be learned from the handling of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. As you know, the Committee has taken a close interest in the response to the tsunami, and the FCO has previously supplied us with helpful material on this. A number of points arise from initial study of the NAO/FCO joint report and the Chairman of the Committee has asked me to write requesting further information, for the Committee to take into account when it comes to make its report on the FCO Annual Report 2004–05. 1. Does the FCO intend to implement all the recommendations made in the joint report on the response to the tsunami? If not, why not? 2. The box following para 3.20 of the joint report sets out the assistance package for victims of the tsunami, which covered repatriation of remains, travel by family members, emergency medical assistance and other expenses. Para 3.22 eVectively recommends that such a package be made a permanent feature of the FCO’s crisis response strategy. When will this recommendation be implemented? 3. Para 3.23 suggests that the costs of the tsunami response “might partly be met by the Treasury.” What is the latest information on the extent to which the Treasury has met or will meet these costs? How will the remaining costs be met? 4. What discussions has the FCO had with the Treasury about whether the Treasury would in principle fund all or part of the response to a comparable future crisis? If possible, I would appreciate a reply on each of the above points not later than 12 December. The Committee notes that a further report by the Zito Trust, presented from the perspective of victims and their families, will be published by the NAO next year. The Committee may have further questions arising from that Report. Steve Priestley Clerk of the Committee 25 November 2005
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, at the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce Thank you for your letter of 25 November in which you asked several questions about the FCO response to the NAO report on the Tsunami. Our answers are as follows:
Q. Does the FCO intend to implement all the recommendations made in the joint report on the response to the tsunami? If not, why not? A. Yes. Many have already been implemented, and the remainder will be implemented as soon as possible. The attached matrix details each recommendation and the action we have taken or plan to take.
Q. The box following para 3.20 of the joint report sets out the assistance package for victims of the tsunami, which covered repatriation of remains, travel by family members, emergency medical assistance and other expenses. Para 3.22 eVectively recommends that such a package be made a permanent feature of the FCO’s crisis response strategy. When will this recommendation be implemented? A. Following any major catastrophes in the future, the Foreign Secretary will make a decision as soon as possible on whether there is a need to oVer exceptional assistance and what the components of that assistance should be, bearing in mind the circumstances of the catastrophe and the resources available. The factors that the Foreign Secretary can consider in making that decision may include whether there is a 3255704007 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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breakdown of basic infrastructure, local services etc preventing British nationals from accessing support directly; or whether as the result of a natural disaster such as flood or earthquake, large numbers of British nationals have lost all forms of ID, travel documents, insurance policies, belongings etc.
This will be covered in the Guide “Supporting British Nationals Abroad” (see the Foreign Secretary’s written statement to the House of 20 October), which will be launched in final form in the New Year.
Q. Para 3.23 suggests that the costs of the tsunami response “might partly be met by the Treasury”. What is the latest information on the extent to which the Treasury has met or will meet these costs? How will the remaining costs be met?
A. The Treasury agreed on 2 December that tsunami costs may be met from a combination of Emergency and Disaster Reserve funds, a claim on the Treasury’s Central Reserve, and a contribution from the FCO’s 2005–06 end year flexibility. FCO and Treasury oYcials will agree exact proportions in time for the Spring Supplementary Estimates.
Q. What discussions has the FCO had with the Treasury about whether the Treasury would in principle fund all or part of the response to a comparable future crisis?
A. This will be considered as part of the ongoing discussion with the Treasury about the future management of the Emergency and Disaster Reserve, between Treasury’s Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team and the FCO’s Finance Directorate.
We also thought the Committee would find it helpful to have matrices listing each of the recommendations in the NAO’s main review of consular services, along with those of the joint NAO/FCO review of lessons learned from the tsunami, and the action taken or planned by the FCO on each one. We have therefore prepared these matrices, which are attached here. I hope the Committee find them useful. Chris Stanton Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE: CONSULAR SERVICES TO BRITISH NATIONALS DETAILED NAO RECOMMENDATIONS AND FCO RESPONSES
NAO summary recommendation NAO detailed recommendation FCO response
Influencing and changing behaviours of travellers
1. There is scope to better (a) Undertake structured analyses of previous The new version of our consular casework software, understand the root causes of assistance cases, building on other on-going Compass—which isnow beingrolledout—allowsus assistance cases, and to target research, to better identify key risk traveller better to identify the groups of travellers most likely hard hitting messages at groups which are less likely to access and to get into diYculty, and the types of cases traveller groups which do not digest the full text of existing, extensive concerned. Analysing and using this information to prepare adequately, or those travel advice; target our communications activity is a high priority which have historically for the consular communications team. We have required more consular alsoconductedbench-markingresearchto establish, assistance. for example, which groups are least likely to read Travel Advice or obtain travel insurance, and are targeting our communications work accordingly.
(b) Increase the use of trend analysis, We are building a capacity for this within our small international passenger surveys and future consular policy team. We have also increased our modelling techniques to forecast the likely engagement with outside stakeholders, for example future demand for assistance; through the Travel Advice Review Group and Consular Strategy Board, enabling us better to draw on and be aware of their own analysis of future trends.
(c) Ensure that all country travel advice pages We have begun to collate the necessary information include in their summaries advice on the most (where it exists), and will implement this common causes of assistance cases in that recommendation soon for those countries where country; and information is already available. 3255704008 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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(d) Increase the range of media sources used to We have appointed new “student ambassadors” in disseminate messages, targeting identified 15 of the UK’s biggest universities, to promote our risk sectors—for example using features on safe travel messages to this vulnerable group of television travel programmes, student travellers using student media and networks. Our magazines and tabloid newspaper travel Rough Guide to Safer Travel is also targeted at this sections—and make wider use of illustrative audience. Our TV “fillers” on safety abroad are the personal case histories to convey most-played of any Government information films, consequences of being under-prepared. with the equivalent of £324,000 of free air-time in the last quarter alone. Through a PR company, we have generated extensive press, radio and TV coverage through research-based stories on key travel themes such as winter holidays or Hen and Stag parties abroad. Clearly we need to handle case studies sensitively and respect confidentiality. But we are using our customer satisfaction survey for the first time to ask people if they would be prepared for the details of their cases to be used as appropriate in case studies, and hope that the results of this will provide material.
2. In developing a consular (a) The consular guide should make clear: customer guide for assistance — The boundaries of consular of consular The Guide will make this clear. It will be launched in work, the FCOshould consider activity and the services FCO will the New Year. the key criteria it should use to never oVer; establish levels of assistance — The minimum service FCO will try to The Guide will make this clear. which are appropriate for provide in all countries; the country and individual — The minimum level of support which The Guide will make this clear. circumstance. the public can expect to receive in all cases,whether forterroristatrocities, or other murders overseas or other circumstances. This may result in the need for flexible resourcing to provide short-term assistance to Posts during more exacting cases; — The principles, such as the vulnerability The Guide will set out the principles that Ministers of individuals, which will be considered will consider when deciding if a particular event or when assessing whether to provide an set of events is a major catastrophe, which merits enhanced level of assistance for provision of an enhanced level of support. It also particular cases. takes a criteria-based approach for example in describing when we will make exceptions to our policy on support for dual nationals. We are doing further work on criteria such as individual vulnerability—see under 2(b) below.
(b) The guide should be underpinned by: — A central set of criteria on risks and We have set work in hand to consider what criteria appropriate assistance levels, to assist staV should use in deciding on the resources to posts in setting—and justifying if devote to individual cases. One example is the challenged—an appropriate level of vulnerability of individuals (2(a) 4th bullet point assistance; above).StaV are likelytoneedto devote moretimeto delivering service to, say, a vulnerable and frail individual far from home, than to a long-term resident abroad with family support, knowledge of the local language and procedures, etc. We are considering whether we can codify such criteria in our internal guidance to staV.
— Increased emphasis on sharing the We are co-located with EU partners in Almaty, burden of consular services by working Ashgabat, Dar es Salaam, Pyongyang, Quito, closely with other nations, services, Reykjavik, Minsk and Chisinau. We are alert to including pooling of staV resources and further opportunities to expand this list. We have accommodation, and driving forward made work on the “EU consular space” a priority of ideas such as European Union our EU Presidency. However, this is still at an early consular space. stage:most BritishNationalsindiYcultyabroadstill expect to see a representative from the British mission rather than having to rely on an EU oYce or the local authorities. 3255704009 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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NAO summary recommendation NAO detailed recommendation FCO response
Moving towards more consistent frontline service to individuals
3. Both increasing the breadth (a) Post reviews should be extended to cover the and depth of coverage of the following areas in more depth: Post review system, and — The appropriateness andconsistency of This has been implemented. collecting fuller management the level of assistance provided; information, would assist the — The accuracy of performance and This has been implemented. FCO in ensuring that posts management information and provide a consistent level of performance against targets; service, appropriate for the — Customer care, including enquiry This has been implemented. country circumstance. handling, complaints, and facilities; — The use made of the Compass This has been implemented. assistance software tool; — Opportunities to work with other This has been implemented. embassies to routinely provide joint information or consular assistance in remote locations, as well as co- operation in crisis situations; and — The quality of decisions being taken on In July 2005, a Nationality and Passports Best the handling of applications of Practice Unit (BPU) was set up, with a remit to passports. undertake a rolling programme of visits to the main passport issuing posts, and to other posts as the need arose. The BPUreviewsallaspects of passportwork, eg management of the operation, staYng levels, quality of decisions. The BPU works closely with the Reviewers, and has so far visited Amsterdam, Beirut and Damascus.
(b) Following reviews, the team should Where possible, and following discussion with Post maximise impact by encouraging Posts to management, recommendations will be reasonably agree action plans linked to specific and precise on timings. However, for any which are measurable achievements, andbydeveloping dependent on staV moves (in and out), or budget more formal mechanisms to disseminate availability, timings are less certain. Reviews will be lessons learned. followed up, six to 12 months after the report has been issued, to check on progress with implementing recommendations, and to determine what benefits have been realised. As part of the review process, Posts are also being encouraged to share best practice with colleagues at other Posts. We will monitor this to see if we need to do more. One mechanism for best practice sharing is via articles in the Real World (consular network) newsletter. Others are being considered.
(c) Post reviews and subsequent management In financialyear 2005–06wehaveforthefirsttimeset action could be better informed by: a PSA target for customer satisfaction which we are — More rigorous collection and analysis measuring through a survey conducted at overseas of customer satisfaction measures, posts and in the UK (for clients who have returned including more comprehensive analysis here). Posts which devote more than two staV years of complaints and other to consular work are also required to conduct correspondence. regular customer satisfaction surveys of their own, and we are looking to strengthen central collection and analysis of the information which these provide. We have set work in hand to review and strengthen our procedures for dealing with complaints. — Better methods of reviewing and We are about to issue the first detailed guidance on comparing workload, including the using Compass (the Consular database with reassessment of the potential for using e-mail facility). We are also rolling out an advanced a basic method of time recording, version of Compass (Compass Next Generation) particularly for assistance cases, using worldwide. Consistent use of Compass needs to be the capabilities of Compass. embedded across all posts. Once that has been achieved, we will consider how we can use the programme to compare workloads. Roll-out is planned to be complete by the end of 2006.
4. The FCO should continue to (a) Continueto refinea risk-basedassessment to: work on ensuring that crisis — Prioritise feedback to Posts on the We maintain a rolling programme of such management and emergency qualityof theircrisis managementplans assessments and feedback results to posts on a planning at Posts is robust, and according to key factors such as the regular basis. should complete its action plan number of British visitors and arising from lessons learned expatriates, the likelihood of civil from the Indian Ocean unrest, natural disasters and terrorist tsunami. activity; — Agree with Posts the frequency with This exercise is now complete. Posts are asked to which they should test crisis plans. carry out regular reviews on a quarterly or annual basis. 3255704009 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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(b) Experience shows that understandably, the We are maintaining the momentum of checking all need to respond to successive crises has Posts’ plans, despitethe numberof crisesto whichwe detracted from progress in reviewing haverespondedsince the tsunami(8). Butthe dateby emergency plans. The FCO should review the which we can complete this exercise has slipped from level of its staYng commitment to these areas October to December 2005. to ensure that crisis planning is given suYcient attention, and maintains the momentum towards completion by the date the FCO has set itself of October 2005. (c) United Kingdom-based and overseas senior This exercise will be complete by the end of the year. management should regularly review achievement against agreed dates for submitting and testing emergency plans, and respond to any failures to comply. (d) The FCO should ensure that the crisis This involves,forexample,consultationwith Trades planning and training is included in the Unions; our target for implementing this objectives of senior oYcials at Post, against recommendation is June 2006. which their performance is assessed. (e) The FCO should establish a system for In principle we agree. Best practice guidelines are ongoing review and enhancement of currently being disseminated via theFCO’s intranet. emergency planning and testing, including We are recruiting more staV to take this forward. establishing baselines from which to monitor improvements in quality. (f) Expanding and extending the role of Rapid Expansion is ongoing. The Hong Kong RDT is now Deployment Teams to promote faster operational and work is well under way to establish responses. Giving regional rapid deployment a second RDT for the US Network by the middle of teams such as that being developed in Hong 2006. For the time being, responsibility for testing Kong for South East Asia the responsibility plans will remain at thecentre, but regional expertise for providing a regional source of crisis will be useful for relevant Posts. Regional RDT management expertise to assist Posts in members have limited time to devote to extra testing their plans. RDT activities for which they volunteer.
5. The FCO should seek to (a) Establish formal liaison points, guidance and Tessa Jowell is the Cabinet Minister with maximise the benefits from practical arrangements with other United responsibility for the co-ordination of the improvingexisting,andforging Kingdom government departments to Government’s support to British nationals new, working partnerships provide aco-ordinatedgovernment serviceto returning from major incidents overseas. We are with others to provide a more United Kingdom citizens seeking initial finalising a formal agreement with the DCMS on eVective end-to-end service to assistance from consular staV. This should exactly how a transfer of responsibility will take British nationals, in crisis and include ensuring that responsibility for place: this will be ready by the end of 2005. It will non-crisis situations. British citizens returning to the United include a DCMS colleague being embedded in the Kingdom passes smoothly to relevant Home FCO Crisis Unit. departments. (b) Implement more flexible arrangements for Onlyaround50% ofloansarerepaid; theothershave allowing Posts to use some discretion in to be written oV from public funds. We believe this issuing loans to individuals as Undertakings rate would increase if Posts were given more to Repay once all other sources of funding discretion (they can currently issue UTRs up to have been explored, to reduce costs and to £100 excluding costs without reference to London). avoid unnecessary deterioration in the We are considering how we might implement this individual’s circumstances. recommendation but we need to take account of the fact that allowing Posts more discretion would lead to inconsistent practice, which could, in turn, lead consular customers to complain about perceived unfairness. To ensure consistency in advancing loans, the policy and decision making on the issuance of most UTRs should remain in London. (c) Develop arrangements with United We oVer routine consular assistance through Kingdom based non-governmental partners working with NGOs. The best example is Prisoners who can provide additional services and Abroad, with whom we have a three-year rolling support to those seeking routine consular funding Agreement (based on Home OYce best assistance and in times of major crisis. practice guidelines—”Compact”) and who deliver routine welfare support to British prisoners overseas.OtherpartnersincludeFair TrialsAbroad, SAMM Abroad [support for victims of murder and manslaughter], REDRESS [victims of torture], REPRIEVE [death penalty cases], REUNITE [international child abduction], Veterans Association, Travelcare [support for people at Heathrow and Gatwick], Missing Persons Helpline. We alsoworkwitharange ofNGOstodeliver helpin crisis situations, eg British Red Cross Society, Samaritans, Salvation Army, Victim Support, CRUSE International [bereavement], Disaster Action, WRVS. Many of them play formal roles in our crisis handling arrangements. 3255704010 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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We are looking for scope for more partnerships with such organisations. An example could be to contract out the transmission of some funds from families to their overseas prisoner relatives (in most countries). Another couldbe regularcontactwithrelatives post- event (death, injury, detention), or prison visiting in some countries. (d) For significant emergency situations, a clear See 5(a) above. Negotiations with the DCMS are trigger pointshould beestablished toensurea close to completion, including on exactly when the co-ordinated cross-governmental response, trigger point should occur. Contact is also made at including clear understanding of respective the initial stage of an incident with Cabinet OYce managerial and budgetary responsibilities by Civil Contingency Secretariat, to set in hand cross all stakeholders. Whitehall co-ordination arrangements. (e) Ensure that Post crises plans include Posts’ crisis plans take account of all existing consideration of the scope for and benefits of resources, including Locally Engaged staV.We co-operation with others such as local staV recognise the latter are essential in making the and volunteers in emergency situations. regional RDT conceptwork. We have alsostarted to engage with the Diplomatic Service Families Association, and provide crisis training for our Posts’ Community Liaison OYcers, to ensure that spouses and partners are better equipped to help out in acrisis.Postsareencouraged todiscover anddraw on whatever expertise exists amongst the local community (eg the resident British community), while ensuring that any such volunteer response in a crisis would not conflict with the main one. The British Red Cross Society would, if necessary, send out managers with the appropriate skills to ensure maximum eVectiveness of volunteer groups. 6. The FCO has made good (a) Consider scope for extending the range of The majority of 100% consular jobs are at Bands B3 progress in enhancing the career opportunities in consular work to and C4, which are relatively junior grades. professionalism of its consular encourage high quality staV to embed Thereafter, the jobs tend to have a smaller staV but still needs to use consular skills into their portfolios, and to percentage of consular work. Within the FCO’s training and innovative engage in consular work at diVerent points current structure, there is opportunity to return to approaches to further improve throughout their careers; consular work, in a supervisory capacity, as staV the quality of its service. progress through the grades. (b) Developing a better mix of experience We are encouraging those with consular experience of consular staV, including widening toapply forkeyconsularjobs astheybecomevacant. opportunities for less experienced London- The Professional Skills in Government agenda is based casework oYcers to do consular work leading to changes in the way that HR Directorate overseas in addition to familiarisation visits; will expect oYcers to gain experience across the diVerent work groups in the FCO. When these take eVect, oYcers from all entry streams will be required to have experience of service delivery work (including consular) to be able to progress through the grades. This should increase the pool of talent available for consular work, and help to ensure more oYcers have experience of it as they advance in their careers. The majority of casework oYcers in London do not have overseas experience and many are new entrants to the FCO. We encourage caseworkers to pay familiarisation visits overseas. However, the constraint on resources—financial and personnel— does not allow us, at present, to release caseworkers for an additional period to gain valuable experience working in a consulate overseas. (c) Pilot a scheme to evaluate the costs and We will consider by the end of March 2006 whether benefits of introducing a United Kingdom the Canadian system of handling consular work out based system for “out of normal hours” of hours would bring benefits to the FCO and our assistance, similar to that used by the consular clients. We need to take account of the far Canadian foreign ministry; greater number of British people travelling and living abroad, and consequently of the greater challenge which maintaining such a system would pose. We would still need to maintain the same system of out of hours cover at our Postsoverseas, so that cost savings might be less significant. (d) Make attendance at core consular training We have made training mandatory for all these courses mandatory for all locally engaged groups.We haveset upa newdatabase to ensure that consular staV (including Honorary Consuls), all staV overseas who have not had the required and duty oYcers; training quickly receive it, and to monitor ongoing training for all staV. We will also be able to monitor thisthroughthenewCOMPASSsoftwarenowbeing rolled out. We are producing a distance-learning video for duty oYcer training to allow posts quickly to train any oYcers that need this. 3255704010 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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(e) Increase the number of regional training We are doing this. Our internal reviewers are events and make specific provision in these to conducting a review of our consular training team to share lessons between Posts. see if its resources need to be increased to cope with the growing demand for training in the UK and overseas.
7. Passport applicants overseas (a) Agree with the United Kingdom Passport We have agreed this with the United Kingdom should be given greater choice Service that overseas citizens should be able Passport Service (UKPS). to obtain their passports from to obtain their passports directly from the the United Kingdom or from United Kingdom Passport Service if they the FCO, subject to meeting desire,withimmediateeVect; wheretheyhave basic security requirements. travelled back to the United Kingdom, can attend any necessary interviewsthere and can provide a verifiable address. The United Kingdom Passport Service believes that this can be made to work, particularly for renewals, given adequate arrangements to ensure applicants’ eligibility and identity.
(b) Align Consular and United Kingdom We are working hard towards closer alignment with Passport Service security checking and UKPS standards. Wherever possible we will also quality assurance processes for the issue of standardise procedures; where local circumstances passports. overseas may renderexactduplicationof procedures impractical, we are coordinating closely with UKPS to ensurethatwemeet thesamestandards,evenifthe means may diVer. This has been agreed with UKPS. Recent UKPSattachmentstoour missionshavealso resulted in increased awareness by UKPS of the rigorous nature of the checks (eg on foreign documentation) which we carry out. Those concerned have commented that they will be more careful when checking foreign documents presented to them in the UK.
(c) Regularly review the impact of the new We will closely monitor how the new latitude for arrangements on speed and security of applicants overseas to obtain a passport in the UK passport issuing, and particularly on the level aVects the numbers of issuesPosts make. This will be ofdemandforpassportstobeissuedoverseas. recorded in Posts’ annual returns. Theimpactofsuch caseswill providevaluable input into a more fundamental decisions regarding the future of issuing passports overseas (see recommendation 8).
Equipping consular services meet emerging change
8. Given the radical changes (a) In response to our findings the FCO has The Cap Gemini review confirmed the required for the passport already commenced the process of the recommendation that passport production overseas operation, the FCO should fundamental review through a report from should be concentrated in regional hubs. This oVers change its current business consultants CapGemini. We consider that an eVective way forward.The recommendations will model for issuing passports the future direction of the Passport operation be presented to ministers for their approval in overseas. should include: December/January. In the meantime, we are — Production of passports should be engaging Cap Gemini for a detailed follow-up based in far fewer locations than at workshop, which will result in a transformation present. Specifically, a passport map. The process of hiring workstream managers network based on production for the various strands of recommendations is now capability mainly in the United underway. Kingdom, but with the option to maintain several regional “hubs” wheretherearemajor concentrationsof British passport holders (such as Spain and North America). — A clear definition and service standard for those residual functions that need to be retained in the country of residence of the applicant. This should focus of maintaining the capability at Posts to issue non-biometric emergency travel documents or temporary passports to assist emergency travel, and to undertake local checks on passport entitlement, such as interviews, biometric enrolment and the inspection of local records. Since a relatively small number of emergency passports will be issued, unit costs will increasebutfeesshouldbe settorecover full cost. 3255704011 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— To build up capability in passport productions hubs to take on tasks such as the authorisation of passport decisions made by Posts, and to advise Posts on their decisions on nationality. Once the nature of the next stage of biometric passports is clear the FCO shouldreconsiderwhetherfurtherwork should be consolidated to “hubs”, to obtain lower costs and more consistent standards. 9. The FCO should ensure that (a) Re-invigorating Compass, the consular Pilotingof Compass NG(NewGeneration) beganin existing consular information assistance software programme, with more October, with rollout to Posts expected to begin at technology systems are fully detailed training and a staged rollout of its theendofFebruary 2006.Therewillbe moreface-to- utilised and new systems are functions; including its planned improved face training at Posts, and trainers will also take part developed to enable it to functionality. in regional conferences. New modules to come allocate its resources where onstream later in the year include Crisis they are most needed. Management and On-line registrations. (b) Monitoring whether posts are using the We actively encourage Posts to use Compass and we Compass system, including enforcing monitor its use. The Directorate’s senior staV raise compliance through linking any staYng bids Compass use on overseas visits. We are currently to case workloads shown on the systems; considering the benefits of enforcing compliance by linking future staYng bids to Compass statistics. (c) Regular and proactive investigations of This function is now covered by the Head of common infrastructure problems and Consular Directorate’s ICT Operations Team, frustrationswith thesystemreported byPosts created in February 2005. Co-ordination with IT to the centre; and Helpdesk, FCO Services and UKPS has tightened considerably, ensuring that we obtain regular reportsof problemswithconsularIT systemsandare able to investigate and resolve them. The current focus is on resolving problems Posts experience with OmniBase—a joint UKPS/FCO database of all UK passports issued. (d) Better generation of management and A new tool has been developed to produce performance information from the key management information from GenIE (our current information technology systems. digital passport issuing system). BRIT, the new biometric passport system, to be introduced at Posts from February 2006, has been developed to produce extensive management and performance information, including for example data on performance against PSA targets. 10. The FCO should, in (a) Regular reviews to assess the adequacy of When assessing passport fee increases, assumptions conjunction with HM funding levels should consider: are made based on available statistical information, Treasury, regularly review the— Changing patterns of travel and the of the likely demand for consular services. This basis of funding for consularobserved level of demand; information will include: assistance work and should — Projected trends in the issue of Numbers of journeys; reconsider the range of passports; and Travel trends (for example the growth in travel to consular activities covered by — The case for linking the consular more exotic locations, the increase in adventure its internal and external premium to the number and type of holidays, the increase in independent travellers); targets. overseas visits as well as the number of The numbers of passports predicted to be issued; passports issued. The increase/decrease in popularity of some locations (and staYng implications for those Posts); The likely benefits of improved travel advice and Know-Before-You-Go campaigns. We will continue to seek to improve the forecasting of demand forservices. The introduction ofID cards will pose important challenges, as they will allow British Nationals to travel within the EU without a passport. The introduction of the ID card could well mean a reduction in the number of passports issued by UKPS. We will keep in close contact with UKPS regarding their predictions of the impact of the ID card on passports issued. (b) A hierarchy of targets should be established The number of hits on the travel website is up under the existing Public Service Agreement 25% year on year. To take account of growing and underlying targets, to develop more interest in the subject in the travel and insurance detailed working level targets in areas where industries and the public, the frequency of Travel none currently exist. For example, targets for Advice Review Group meetings has been increased travel information and crisis management from two to three per year. could include: We will introduce targets to measure website hits. — The level of public awareness of, All Posts should have current, reviewed and tested or a number of visits to, traveller emergency plans. The review and test programme is information; a rolling one. 3255704011 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— The number of Posts who have current, It would be diYcult to set a target for deployment reviewed and tested emergency plans; speed, because so much depends on the nature, and — The speed of deployment in response to location,of thecrisis. Thefirstjobwouldbe to decide crises, and level of continuing support upon the requirements and only then could an during crises. appropriate response be planned. It should be possible to devise targets for speed of both analysis and advice to Ministers (within X hours of event). We will give this matter further thought.
Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 6 December 2005
Letter to the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, from the Clerk of the Committee
Mike Gapes has asked me to write to you, requesting a detailed note on the FCO’s handling of the case of Mr Craig Alden, a British care worker who is imprisoned in Brazil. Mr Gapes understands that some two years after Mr Alden’s conviction, the FCO appointed a QC to give an opinion on this case; that the QC found that Mr Alden had been denied a fair trial and that his conviction was unlawful; but that subsequent correspondence between the Secretary of State and his Brazilian opposite number has been unproductive. As you know, the Committee has taken an interest in the provision of consular services to British citizens overseas. I would therefore be grateful to receive a note setting out in detail how Mr Alden’s case has been handled by the FCO, including the dates of each development in the case and of each action taken, and an indication of what further steps are envisaged. I would hope to receive this note not later than 10 January Steve Priestley Clerk of the Committee 12 December 2006
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Consular Case—Craig Alden In the first two reports Mr Richardson found that there were serious concerns about the fairness of Mr Alden’s trial proceedings. He further found that the appeal process oVered little hope of addressing these concerns and suggested three options to take the case forward. His third report focussed on Mr Alden’s welfare. All three reports were submitted to the Foreign Secretary. In early 2005, Mr Alden indicated he would prefer to pursue non-legal avenues, if his latest appeal failed, as they might oVer a better prospect of resolving his situation. Under Brazilian law, clemency was not an option because Mr Alden had been convicted of a “heinous” crime which was outside the scope of clemency. The Pro Bono lawyer advised that an alternative was to apply for Presidential Expulsion. Presidential Expulsion is limited to foreign nationals and is enacted by Presidential prerogative. Once expelled, an individual may not return to the country unless the decree establishing his or her expulsion is revoked. In order to seek expulsion, an individual must have exhausted, or abandoned, the judicial process. This option obviously denied Mr Alden the chance to clear his name. He and his family had explicit concerns about going down this route. We also considered that this was a high risk strategy given domestic political pressures in Brazil about the nature of the alleged crime. Nevertheless, Mr Alden and his family decided to apply for Presidential Expulsion, and the Foreign Secretary agreed to write in support of Mr Alden’s application. The Foreign Secretary wrote to the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Mr Celso Amorim, on 30 March 2005 setting out our reasons for supporting Presidential Expulsion and expressing concern about the trial as outlined in the independent pro-bono lawyers’ reports. In parallel, our Ambassador in Brazil presented a copy of the Foreign Secretary’s letter and copies of Mr Richardson’s reports to the Minister of Justice and was assured of a swift response. On 15 July, the Foreign Secretary sent a second letter to Mr Amorim expressing the family’s frustration that a decision on Presidential Expulsion had not yet been made. Mr Amorim replied on 11 November saying that it was impossible to expel someone before his sentence had been served or who has a Brazilian child, as Mr Alden does. He suggested that the Prisoner Transfer Agreement be engaged. 3255704013 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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The Foreign Secretary wrote again on 18 November asking the Brazilian Government to look again at the human rights issues at stake. In between these ministerial exchanges, our Ambassador and his staV kept in regular touch with Brazilian Ministers and their oYcials pressing for a response to the Foreign Secretary’s letters on behalf of Mr Alden. On 16 December, Mr Amorim replied to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 18 November saying that his Ministry and the Ministry of Justice had carefully considered the human rights concerns raised by the Foreign Secretary. The letter referred to a power of attorney signed by Mr Alden about the engagement of criminal lawyers on his behalf, added that Mr Alden was convicted only after all possible measures within the Brazilian judicial system had been taken and provided a re´sume´ of subsequent habeus corpas appeals by Mr Alden. The letter also repeated the Brazilian Government’s willingness to look at applying the Prisoner Transfer Agreement in this case and to the possibility of regime progression (parole). Embassy oYcials called on the Ministry of Justice on 23 December seeking a meeting to clarify its contents and we will discuss possible next steps with Mr Alden and his family in coming weeks. Since his arrest, Mr Alden and his family have expressed concerns over his safety while in prison. In Brazil, prisoners convicted of heinous crimes are usually imprisoned within the general prison population. We have taken his fears about his safety seriously and Embassy oYcials have made numerous successful representations to the Brazilian authorities, requesting that he remain apart from other prisoners. For example, in September 2005 the Embassy received information that Mr Alden was to be moved into the general prison population. The Consul and Pro Consul visited the prison (some 45 miles away) immediately to dissuade the new prison director from moving Mr Alden and to remind him of the Brazilian authorities’ obligation and responsibility for Mr Alden’s welfare. After some discussion the director agreed to keep Mr Alden isolated from the general prison population. Two days later, the Embassy followed up this discussion in a meeting with the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign AVairs. The Embassy also had meetings with the Ministry of Justice. As a result, the Consul wrote to Mr Alden outlining a number of options that were open to him, including transferring to another prison. But Mr Alden preferred to remain where he was at Planaltina prison. In his letter of 11 November 2005 to the Foreign Secretary, Mr Amorim referred to a report he had received from the Ministry of Justice about the Planaltina prison, and confirmed that Mr Alden would remain there, separated from other prisoners. Since his conviction, Mr Alden has talked a number of times about going on hunger strike. He did so on 1 November 2005. We urged him to reconsider his decision, while, at the same time, recognising that it was ultimately his decision to take. Consular staV and the Embassy nurse paid a number of visits to Mr Alden to check on his welfare. On the days that they did not visit in person, they telephoned to check on his health. They ascertained that Mr Alden was accepting liquids and that food was available to him. Mr Alden ended his hunger strike during a visit by the Consul and the Embassy nurse on 13 December. But we understand that he may resume his hunger strike. Ultimately, decisions on the next steps can only be taken by Mr Alden and we will do everything we reasonably can to support his decision. In addition to Presidential Expulsion Mr Alden has applied for Criminal Revision. If this is granted he will have the opportunity to produce new evidence to clear his name. Alternatively he could apply under the Prisoner Transfer Agreement to serve his remaining sentence in the UK. Another option would be to apply for parole when he is qualified to do so under the Brazilian penal system. Mr Alden currently has a case before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of not allowing regime progression for heinous crimes. We will continue to oVer Mr Alden consular support and remain engaged with the Brazilian authorities, within the boundaries of our consular policy and respect for the sovereignty of Brazil, including the independence of its judiciary. Chris Stanton 10 January 2006
CRAIG ALDEN—CHRONOLOGY
01/07/02 Craig Alden arrested by Brazilian authorities, accused of sexual abuse of a minor. Taken to Delegado de Policia, Barrolandia, Planaltina de Goias. Charged by police with four accounts of child abuse and corruption of minors. Embassy Consular OYcer attends police station to provide consular assistance. 02/07/02 First Court Hearing. Mr Alden visited by lawyers, Dr Mauricio. Mr Alden attends a preliminary hearing with lawyer. Exact charges are Articles 214 and 224 (a) of the penal code and Articles 232 and 243 under the statute of the Child and Adolescent relating to child and corruption of minors. 03/07/02 Mr Alden’s mother, Mrs Maureen Alden, informed of his arrest. 15/07/02 Mr Alden summoned to local courts by judge. Served with new charges. Visited by Consular staV. 3255704013 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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18/07/02 Consular staV visit Mr Alden. The then Ambassador speaks to Mr Alden on telephone. 19/07/02 The then Ambassador calls on Ambassador Marcelo Jardim, Director for Europe at Ministry of Foreign AVairs (MFA). Hands over Note Verbale expressing concerns relating to Mr Alden’s safety and welfare since his arrest. 22/07/02 Embassy oYcial meets Mr Alden’s lawyer and Embassy nurse. 25/07/02 The High Court in Goiania provided Mr Alden’s lawyer a statement of release. Charges not dropped. District Prosecutor insists Mr Alden should not be released. Mr Alden is taken to hospital for a pre-release medical. Police OYcer provides lawyers with new paperwork signed by local Judge. Mr Alden served with new charges and re-arrested. 26/07/02 Consular staV visit Mr Alden. 29/07/02 Embassy oYcial calls Ambassador Marcelo Jardim, Director for Europe, MFA. 30/07/02 Embassy oYcials meet Mr Alden’s new lawyer, Cristina Dos Santos. 02/08/02 Consular staV visit Mr Alden. Consul and VC meet member of the Superior Tribunal of Justice. 14/08/02 Final hearing postponed until 26 August. 24/08/02 Letter from Mr Alden to then Ambassador. 26/08/02 Hearing takes place. Appointed lawyer fails to appeal. Court appoints Dr Ana Maria to represent Mr Alden. He declines but accepts public lawyer Dr Jarmisson Goncalves de Lima. 27/08/02 Pro Consul visits Mr Alden before court hearings. 02/09/02 Report sent by Mr Alden’s lawyer, Maria Cristina Santos, to British Embassy Brasilia. 17/09/02 Report from Maria Cristina Santos to BE Brasilia. 23/09/02 Mr Alden’s lawyer calls on the then Ambassador and oYcials. 01/10/02 Embassy oYcial called by Celso Franca, International Adviser to the State Secretary for Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice. 04/10/02 Mr Alden visited by Embassy oYcial. 08/10/02 Embassy oYcial calls Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice. 17/10/02 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice contacts Embassy oYcial. 25/10/02 Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice calls on Embassy oYcial. 29/10/02 Mr Alden appoints new lawyers, Carvalho, Ribeiro, Melo and Tognolo. 31/10/02 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 08/10/02 Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice, contacts Embassy oYcial. Report sent to British Embassy Brasilia by new lawyers. 14/11/02 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. Second report sent to British Embassy Brasilia by new lawyers. 19/11/02 Mr Alden formally convicted. Sentenced to 48 years. Mrs Alden informed by friends. Lawyers confirm appeal process has already started. 20/11/02 Habeas Corpus denied by Judge Fernando Goncalves. Mr Alden’s lawyer, Gustavo de Carvalho, attends Embassy to brief on case. 21/11/02 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 27/11/02 Mr Alden moved to a state prison. 28/11/02 Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden. The then Ambassador calls on Ambassador Marcello Jardim. 03/12/02 Embassy oYcial speaks to Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Ronaldo Dunlop, Ministry of Justice, Pedro Saldanha, Ministry of Foreign AVairs and Mr Alden’s lawyer. 04/12/02 Mrs Alden and Pastor Simon Trundle5 arrive in Brasilia. The then Ambassador calls on Minister of Justice Mrs Alden meets the then Ambassador Mrs Alden meets Secretary of Justice (Deputy Minister).
5 Pastor Trundle, friend of the family, heads Mr Alden’s supporters’ group. 3255704013 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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06/12/02 Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle meet Embassy oYcial. Embassy oYcial escorts Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle to visit Ambassador Jardim, Director for Europe, Ministry of Foreign AVairs. 17/12/02 Habeas Corpus application to Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) is denied. 24/12/02 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 31/01/03 Embassy oYcial speaks to Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice. 03/02/03 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. Embassy oYcial speaks to National Secretariat for Human Rights. 04/03/03 Baroness Amos, the then Foreign OYce Minister, meets Sir Brian Mawhinney MP, Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle in the House of Lords. 07/03/03 The then Ambassador and a consular oYcial meet Mr Alden’s defence lawyer, Gustavo Carvalho. 13/03/03 The then Ambassador meets Minister of Justice. 18/03/03 The then Ambassador meets the Brazilian Foreign Minister. 24/03/03 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 26/03/03 Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle arrive in Brasilia. Embassy oYcial accompanies Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle on a call on her lawyer. 27/03/03 Embassy oYcial takes Mrs Alden to call on National Secretary of Justice, Claudia Chagas. Embassy oYcial calls on Ambassador Jardim, Director for Europe, MFA 04/05/03 Bill Rammell, Minister for Latin America, raises case during trip to Brasilia with Special Secretary for Human Rights. 23/06/03 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 10/07/03 The then Ambassador meets Celso Franca, International Adviser, Special Secretariat for Human Rights, Ministry of Justice. 11/07/03 Foreign Secretary raises case during meeting with Brazilian Minister of External Relations, Celso Amorim. 31/07/03 Pro Consul visits Mr Alden. 12/08/03 Embassy oYcial accompanies Mrs Alden to call on Ambassador Jardin at the Ministry of External AVairs. 03/09/03 State Court in Goiania hears Mr Alden’s appeal. Sentence is reduced from 48 years to 11. 14/10/03 The Supreme Court rejects Mr Alden’s application for Habeas Corpus. 19/11/03 Embassy oYcial calls on the Federal Director for Prisons at the Ministry of Justice. 12/12/03 An appeal sent to the Prime Minister from Pastor Trundle about Mr Alden. 28/01/04 Consular oYcials visit Mr Alden. 02/03/04 Embassy oYcial speaks to Celso Franca, Adviser, Ministry of Justice. 04/03/04 Consular oYcials visit Mr Alden. 08/03/04 Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle call on the then Ambassador in Brasilia. 09/03/04 Mrs Alden, Pastor Trundle and an Embassy oYcial, call on Claudia Chagas, Secretary for Justice. 10/03/04 FCO contacted by Brazilian Embassy, London. Mr Alden’s case raised. 10/03/04 Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle visit Mr Alden. Also meet lawyer, Gustavo, and Dr Agostinho, of the Human Rights Commission of the Federal Chamber of Deputies. 27/04/04 Mrs Alden, Sir Brian Mawhinney and Pastor Simon Trundle meet the Foreign Secretary. Consular oYcials (including London Consular Case oYcer) visit Mr Alden. 24/06/04 Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden. 13/08/04 Jeremy Richardson QC, first report submitted to Alden family. 22/09/04 Consul and Pro Consul visit Mr Alden. 27/09/04 Jeremy Richardson QC visits Brazil (until 01/10/04). 11/10/04 Jeremy Richardson QC, second report submitted to Alden family. 3255704013 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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09/11/04 At family’s request, Consul writes to Mr Alden asking for his views on the options presented after Jeremy Richardson’s report. Options provided as follows (options 1–3 from Jeremy Richardson’s report, and option 4 from Mrs Alden and the Supporters’ Group): 1. Maintain the status quo and continue with legal avenues. 2. Take a “twin track” approach of legal avenues (including “criminal revision”) and simultaneously seek “Presidential Expulsion”. 3. Drop the legal avenues and seek “Presidential Expulsion”. 4. Continue with the application for Habeas Corpus based on a lack of defence; the Ambassador to call on the President of the STJ (the Supreme Court for Judicial Matters) to seek reassurance that the Habeas Corpus application will be given due and proper consideration. Mr Alden asks for “Option 4” to be pursued. 07/12/04 The then Ambassador calls on Mr Edson Vidigal, President of the Supreme Court of Justice (STJ). 22/12/04 Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden. 01/02/05 Director of Consular Services meets Mrs Alden, Sir Brian Mawhinney MP, Jeremy Richardson QC, and Pastor Simon Trundle. 03/02/05 Email from Director of Consular Services to Mrs Alden. 11/02/05 The Foreign Secretary agrees to support Mr Alden’s application for Presidential Expulsion. 14/02/05 Letter from Mr Alden to Consular oYcial. 21/02/05 Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden. 02/03/05 Mr Alden formally requests to apply for Presidential Expulsion, with HMG support. 11/03/05 Consul speaks with both Mr Alden and his lawyer. 17/03/05 Mrs Alden meets Director of Consular Services and Ambassador Brasilia. 21/03/05 Jeremy Richardson QC provides a three-page summary of his two reports into Mr Alden’s case. 22/03/05 Letter from the Foreign Secretary informing the Home Secretary that Sir Brian Mawhinney wishes to meet to discuss implications of Mr Alden’s possible transfer. 30/03/05 The Foreign Secretary writes to Brazilian Foreign Minister. 01/04/05 The Ambassador visits Mr Alden. Mr Alden’s lawyer delivers his signed letter, applying for Presidential Expulsion, to the Brazilian Ministry of Justice. The Ambassador sends the Foreign Secretary’s letter to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign AVairs, Celso Amorim, with covering letter. 04/04/05 Ambassador meets Claudia Chagas, National Secretary of Justice. 05/04/05 Ambassador calls on Brazilian Minister of Justice, to discuss Mr Alden’s case. Hands over copies of Mr Alden’s request for Presidential Expulsion, the Foreign Secretary’s letter, and Jeremy Richardson QC’s summary. 07/04/05 David Lammy, Minister at the Department for Constitutional AVairs, raises Mr Alden’s case with Brazilian Minister of Justice during his visit to the UK. 26/04/05 Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) panel of judges meets to consider Mr Alden’s Habeas Corpus application. Panel judges ask to see further papers. Once papers have been read, panel judges will meet again to consider application. Minister Bastos (Ministry of Justice) contacts the Ambassador. Explains that they are looking carefully at the case but have not yet made a decision. Minister tells the Ambassador that when a decision is made he would like them to meet so he can personally discuss and advise him of the decision. 05/05/05 Embassy oYcial raises case with Claudio de Alencar, Bastos’ Chefe de Gabinete, and Ambassador Portella, International Adviser. Mr Alden informed that Habeus Corpus application was denied. Consul speaks to Mr Alden. 13/05/05 Consul speaks to Mr Alden. Mr Alden states that he has given permission to Mrs Alden and Pastor Trundle to take his story to UK media. Both Mr Alden and Mrs Alden advised that it is their decision, but would not be in his best interests. 19/05/05 Embassy oYcial raises case with Ambassador Oswaldo Portella, Minister Bastos’ Senior Adviser (Ministry of Justice). 3255704013 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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01/06/05 Email from Mrs Alden to Director of Consular Services stating her concerns about the lack of response from the Brazilian authorities regarding Mr Alden’s Presidential Expulsion application. Letter from the Ambassador to Minister Bastos. Asks when Minister might be in a position to discuss the case with HMG. 16/06/05 Ambassador meets Claudia Chagas, National Secretary of Justice. 20/06/05 Ambassador meets Mrs Alden and Rev Bartlett (Supporter’s Group). Mrs Alden and the Ambassador meet Claudia Chagas, National Secretary of Justice. 04/07/05 Letter from Mrs Alden to Director of Consular Services. Attached copy of a letter from Craig Alden to the Prime Minister. Director of Consular Services telephones Mrs Alden. 12/07/05 Ambassador meets Lord Mawhinney and Mrs Alden’s MP, Shailesh Vara. 13/07/05 Baroness Scotland, Home OYce Minister meets Claudia Chagas, National Secretary of Justice. 14/07/05 Director of Consular Services and the Ambassador telephone Mrs Alden. 15/07/05 Second letter from the Foreign Secretary to Minister Amorim. 22/07/05 Letter from Director of Consular Services to Lord Mawhinney re UK/Brazil Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA), and the Sex OVenders Register 26/07/05 Foreign OYce Minister, Lord Triesman meets Mrs Alden and Shailesh Vara MP. 27/07/05 Embassy oYcial visits Mr Alden. 28/07/05 Letter from Director of Consular Services to Shailesh Vara MP re Prisoner Transfer Agreement. 29/07/05 Mr Alden visited by Consul. 02/08/05 The Ambassador calls on Claudia Chagas, National Secretary of Justice. The Ambassador delivers letter from Mrs Alden to Ms Chagas. 10/08/05 Embassy oYcials receive letter from Brazilian National Secretariat of Justice accepting Mr Alden’s original request to remain in Brazil for two years after his sentence finishes. 11/08/05 Letter from Director of Consular Services to Mrs Alden about the UK-Brazil Prisoner Transfer Agreement. 25/08/05 Embassy oYcials and London based case oYcer attend meeting at the Ministry of Justice with the Secretary of Justice’ Chefe de Gabinete. Brazilians inform that they will reject Mr Alden’s application for Presidential Expulsion. An oYcial letter from the Foreign Minister to the Foreign Secretary will be forthcoming soon. 26/08/05 Embassy oYcials visit Mr Alden at Planaltina prison. Inform him of Ministry of Justice’s decision. Mr Alden threatens to go on hunger strike if family do not go to press. 31/08/05 Pastor Trundle arrives at FCO unannounced. Meets consular oYcials. 13/09/05 Embassy oYcial meets Dr Andre Macedo, Private Secretary to Claudia Chagas. 14/09/05 Director of Consular Services meets Mrs Alden, Shailesh Vara MP, and Pastor Trundle. 16/09/05 Director of Consular Services speaks to Minister Mitzi Costa, Deputy Head of Mission the Brazilian Embassy in London. 20/09/05 Consul talks to the new prison director, Dr Dercio Sebastiao de Oliveira, regarding new threats to move Mr Alden in with general prison population. 21/09/05 Consul and Pro Consul attend prison to discuss threats of moving Craig in to general prison population. 22/09/05 Dr Andre Macedo contacts Embassy oYcial. 23/09/05 Embassy oYcial calls on Counsellor Lineu de Paula, acting Chef de Cabinet. 30/09/05 The Ambassador raises Mr Alden’s case with Foreign Minister Amorim’s Chefe de Gabinete. 03/10/05 British Embassy, Brasilia, receives written reply from Brazilian Ministry of Foreign AVairs to the Foreign Secretary’s letters to Foreign Minister Amorim. Letter briefly explains that Ministry of Justice is now dealing with the case. 11/10/05 Embassy oYcial calls on General Athos, Secretary of Security for the federal district. 18/10/05 Consular oYcial writes to Mr Alden about his safety in prison, and options available to him. Letter from Mr Alden to Director of Consular Services. 21/10/05 Mr Alden informs Embassy oYcial that he intends to go on hunger strike on 1 November. 24/10/05 Mrs Alden, Shailesh Vara MP, and Pastor Trundle meet the Ambassador to Brasilia in London. Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden. 3255704013 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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27/10/05 Consular oYcial visits Mr Alden in prison.
28/10/05 Director of Consular Services replies to Craig Alden’s letter of 18 October.
31/10/05 The Ambassador meets the Foreign Minister, Amorim’s acting Chef de Gabinete. Consular oYcials meet Mrs Alden in Brasilia.
01/11/05 Embassy oYcial speaks to Dr Andre Macedo, Chefe de Gabinete to Claudia Chagas. Craig Alden starts hunger strike.
03/11/05 The Ambassador speaks with Ambassador Portello, Ministry of Justice’s international adviser. Consular oYcial and Mrs Alden visit Mr Alden. Letter from Craig Alden to FCO, London.
04/11/05 Third report by Jeremy Richardson QC on Craig Alden on welfare. Reply from Director of Consular Services to Craig Alden’s letter of 3 November, delivered immediately by Embassy driver.
08/11/05 Letter from Dr Andre Macedo, to Embassy oYcial about Mrs Alden’s letter to Claudia Chagas.
10/11/05 Embassy oYcial speaks to Foreign Minister Amorim’s Chefe de Gabinete.
11/11/05 Foreign Secretary receives oYcial written response from Ministry of Foreign AVairs. Vice Consul and Embassy nurse visit Mr Alden.
15/11/05 Letter from Lord Triesman to Mrs Alden.
16/11/05 Lord Triesman raises Mr Alden’s case with the Brazilian Ambassador to London.
18/11/05 Letter from Foreign Secretary to Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim.
22/11/05 Consul and Embassy nurse visit Mr Alden.
23/11/05 Pastor Simon Trundle informs that Mr Alden has agreed to end his hunger strike, for a holding period, which is soon retracted by Mr Alden who continues his action.
01/12/05 Consul and Embassy nurse visit Mr Alden.
05/12/05 Lord Triesman meets Mrs Alden, Shailesh Vara MP, Pastor Trundle, and Sarah de Mas from Fair Trials Abroad.
07/12/05 Pro Consul and Embassy nurse visit Mr Alden.
08/12/05 Letter from Mrs Alden to Lord Triesman. Sarah de Mas, Fair Trials Abroad, sends report on Craig Alden.
12/12/05 Report from Pastor Trundle of his meeting with Minister Mitzi Costa at the Brazilian Embassy, London.
13/12/05 Receive FAC request for report on Craig Alden case. Ambassador receives email from Ambassador Bustani re Pastor Trundle’s meeting at the Brazilian Embassy. Consul and Embassy nurse visits Mr Alden. Mr Alden confirms that he will end his hunger strike and eats sandwich. Recovery diet and food supplies list provided by Embassy nurse. Provisions bought. Mr Alden states that if there are no positive developments by 1 March 2006 he will resume his hunger strike.
16/12/05 Reply to the Foreign Secretary’s letter to Minister Amorim, of 18 November, is received by BE Brasilia, translated immediately and forwarded to Consular Directorate.
23/12/05 Embassy oYcials meet at the Ministry of Justice with Dr Andre[acute] Macedo and Dr Douglas Vasconcellos (Counsellor, Legal AVairs Division, Ministry of Foreign AVairs) to seek clarification of some points in Mr Amorim’s letter of 18 November.
05/01/06 Pro Consul visits Mr Alden. 3255704014 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Flu Pandemic: FCO Business Continuity and Contingency Planning When I appeared before you recently to give evidence on the FCO Departmental Report, you made clear that the Committee would welcome more information on the key management issues facing us. Given its topicality, I thought you would be interested in our preparations for a possible human flu pandemic. The FCO, along with other government departments, is revising its business continuity and contingency plans to respond to the threat of a pandemic. In developing our plans we are working closely with the Department of Health, Defra, DFID and other government departments within the framework set by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet OYce. We are also keeping in close touch with other British organisations with large overseas networks, including British companies. We have established contacts with key partners, for example EU Member States, the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan, to encourage closer international cooperation on prevention and preparedness and also to ensure we are in step with others, for example, on providing consular assistance for our nationals. Central to our contingency planning is a programme of action to help us to continue delivering services to the public, particularly the estimated 15 million British nationals resident and travelling overseas, at a time when our staV are as likely to succumb to a pandemic virus as others. This will be a considerable challenge. We are planning to enhance significantly our remote working capacity to help us to continue to operate, at home and overseas. This should also be of longer-term benefit in terms of business continuity. However consular work presents a particular challenge as it generally involves face-to-face contact. In a pandemic our ability to work in this way would inevitably be constrained. To maximise our capability to maintain business critical services, and to provide our staV and families overseas with healthcare equivalent to that available to the UK population under the National Health Service, we are putting in place additional support for our staV. We have already procured stocks of Tamiflu anti-virals for our posts in the Asia-Pacific region. We now want to extend the supply of anti-virals to posts in the rest of the world. Even with additional health measures in place some staV and families, for example those in high-risk medical categories, and those with young, elderly or frail dependants in the UK, may wish to return to this country in the event of a pandemic. FCO ministers have therefore accepted the principle of oVering voluntary evacuation to staV and families overseas, if the situation deteriorates, with the clear caveat that reducing staV numbers to a level below that needed to fulfil business critical tasks, would be very much a last resort. We have asked Regional Directors and Heads of Mission to draw up contingency plans, by the end of November, which strike a balance between public service commitment and duty of care to staV, and taking account of local circumstances. In close liaison with DH and the Government Communications Network, we will be working to ensure realistic expectations on the part of the British public and British nationals overseas of what consular assistance and other activity we could in practice deliver during a flu pandemic, not least given the likely constraints on international travel, and advising them how best to look after their own health and safety. We already have an Avian Influenza fact sheet on our website (I enclose the current version). This will be updated regularly as the situation changes, as will our travel advice. While the Department of Health clearly has the Whitehall lead on planning for a flu pandemic, the FCO is involved in a wide range of avian influenza and pandemic related activity, in particular in our EU Presidency capacity. We decided that the most eYcient way to bring together the diVerent areas of activity would be to set up a programme with a virtual team of staV or project managers from relevant departments across the organisation. This has made best use of existing resources rather than creating new positions and structures. I see it as a good example of the sort of cross-cutting teamwork, coordinated by one additional member of staV, which we increasingly need to use to maximise the impact of our work within tightly constrained resources. I would be happy to provide further information, as our planning develops, if Members of the Committee would find this useful. Sir Michael Jay KCMG Permanent Under Secretary of State 16 November 2005 3255704015 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
During my recent appearance in front of the Foreign AVairs Committee, there was interest from the Committee on our Embassy to the Holy See. I thought I would therefore write to let you know that we intend to announce on Tuesday 15 November the appointment of Francis Campbell as our new Ambassador to the Holy See. I enclose a copy of the announcement and Mr Campbell’s CV.
This is the first time that we have appointed an Ambassador by open competition. It is, however, in line with the Government’s policy of recruiting people with appropriate skills and experience from all areas of public life. I believe that this is a positive step that demonstrates how the FCO is becoming more modern, open and diverse. By opening the competition up, we have ensured that we have someone with the right skills and experience for what is an interesting and challenging job.
Francis Campbell’s knowledge and understanding of the mechanics of government and work with faith organisations and civil society in the UK and internationally mean that he is ideally placed to promote and develop the UK’s overseas strategic priorities with regard to the Holy See. His background in diplomacy, coupled with his experience outside the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, will enable him to interact at the highest levels within UK and Vatican circles. I am confident that his appointment will be warmly and widely welcomed in the UK and at the Holy See.
Francis Campbell will have full diplomatic status and will carry out the full range of diplomatic duties. Sir Michael Jay KCMG Permanent Under Secretary of State 11 November 2005
CHANGE OF AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE
Mr Francis Campbell has been appointed Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the Holy See in succession to Mrs Kathryn Colvin CVO who has retired from the Diplomatic Service. Mr Campbell will take up his appointment in December 2005.
CURRICULUM VITAE Full Name: Mr Francis Martin-Xavier Campbell Date of Birth: 20 April 1970 2005– Senior Policy Director, Amnesty International 2003–05 1st Secretary, British Embassy to Italy 2001–03 On secondment to No 10 Downing Street as Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 1999–2001 On secondment to No 10 Downing Street as Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister 1998–99 European Enlargement Unit, FCO 1997–98 On secondment to the European Commission⁄appointed to the EC Delegation at the UN in New York for the UK Presidency of the EU 1997 European Enlargement Unit, FCO 1996–97 University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (MA) 1994–95 Katholieke University of Leuven, Belgium (MA) 1989–92 Queen’s University Belfast, (BA) 3255704015 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, from the Chairman of the Committee
Further to your letter to me of 11 November 2005, informing me that a new Ambassador had been appointed to the Holy See, I am writing to seek your observations on the accuracy of the enclosed report from yesterday’s The Times newspaper, in which it is suggested that the staYng of the Vatican Post is being reduced, and that the oYces and residence are being relocated outside the Holy See. I am sure the Committee would also wish to know at what stage plans for the changes in representation to the Vatican were when you wrote to me in November. I would appreciate a response to this letter by Friday 27 January. Mike Gapes MP Chairman of the Committee 10 January 2006
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Thank you for your letter of 10 January and the invitation to comment on the article which appeared in The Times on 9 January. The article is accurate on one point only regarding our representation to the Holy See. It correctly states that we have re-located our Embassy to the Holy See from its rented oYces in Via Condotti, at the foot of the Spanish Steps in Rome, to the compound where our Embassy to the Republic of Italy is located. That decision was taken as a result of security concerns about the exposed Via Condotti site. The move took place in July 2005, with the prior consent of the Holy See. The Embassy to the Holy See remains separate from the Embassy to Italy, with a separate building, flag and plaque. So the headline of The Times’s article, which refers to a proposal to close the Embassy, is entirely incorrect. There is of course no question of closing the Embassy, as the Foreign Secretary made clear in his Written Statement to Parliament in December 2004. It remains an important part of our overseas network. The Times article also raises the issue of the Ambassador’s Residence. It is true that we were considering moving the Ambassador’s Residence from the current rented property at the Villa Drusiana to a property on the same compound as the Residence to the Ambassador to Italy (the Villa Wolkonsky). Unfortunately, it appears that there was a genuine misunderstanding between ourselves and the Holy See regarding the acceptability of this move to the Holy See. Their concerns about such a plan only became clear late last year when the new Ambassador took up his appointment. We therefore agreed that the Ambassador to the Holy See should not take up residence on the Villa Wolkonsky compound and communicated this decision to the Holy See last December. However, it remains our plan to move the Residence from the Villa Drusiana, for a mixture of financial, practical, and security reasons, and we expect this move to take place during 2006. On the question of staV, some changes have been made to staYng levels following an internal review of the Embassy last year. This resulted in a small reduction (the equivalent of one part-time member of staV) in the overall level of staYng. Before the review, the Embassy was staVed by the Ambassador, a part-time Deputy Head of Mission, a full-time assistant to the Ambassador and two part-time support staV. Following the review, the Ambassador now has a full-time political oYcer and a full time assistant/support oYcer. The final requirements for domestic staV to support the Ambassador will depend on the nature of the Residence but we expect that fewer staV will be required. As such, four Residence staV have already been made redundant. This decision was taken before the arrival of the new Ambassador. You mention my letter of 11 November. That was of course exclusively focused on the announcement of the new Ambassador and followed on from the interest your Committee had expressed in the appointment when we met in October. The move of the Embassy had already taken place by then. I believe that the changes we have made to our Embassy to the Holy See are leading up to a more modern and eVective Embassy. We constantly seek eYciencies in the way we run our posts in order to get the best value for money from every Embassy. I am confident that, in this case, the appointment through open competition of an Ambassador with a deep understanding of the workings of Whitehall and the Vatican will result in an Embassy which focuses at least as much on policy and serious relationship-building as on the representational and ceremonial (as indeed the new Ambassador has made clear in the press), and is therefore better suited to contribute to the delivery of the Government’s overseas priorities. Sir Michael Jay KCMG 25 January 2006 3255704017 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
I am writing to inform the Committee of a change to our diplomatic representation in Abidjan, Coˆte d’Ivoire. On 1 April 2005 we suspended operations in our Embassy in Abidjan, and withdrew all UK diplomatic staV from the country, due to the uncertain security situation. Following a review of our representation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, I have decided to appoint a First Secretary in Abidjan to provide political reporting and analysis. This oYcer will operate from within the United States Embassy. We intend to accredit Gordon Wetherell, High Commissioner in Accra, as Ambassador to Coˆte d’Ivoire, and are currently seeking agreement to this from the authorities. I also plan to appoint a British national resident in Abidjan to act as Honorary Consul, to assist British nationals in diYculty. Though we will be vacating our current premises, this does not constitute a permanent decision to close our Embassy in Abidjan. I judge that the new arrangement will provide the right level of representation without placing our staV at undue risk, given the real and continuing security threat to foreign nationals in Abidjan. But I intend to review the position on a regular basis. Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary 19 January 2006
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
In view of the Committee’s ongoing interest in our overseas network, I am writing to inform you that we have taken the decision to transfer coverage of Equatorial Guinea from our High Commission in Yaounde´, Cameroon. We intend that the High Commissioner in Abuja will be appointed as the UK’s non-resident Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, and are seeking the necessary agre´ment. Day-to-day responsibility and management will rest with the Deputy High Commission in Lagos. They will provide consular services for British nationals in Equatorial Guinea and oVer a visa service to Equato-Guineans. We expect this will take place in January 2006, but the exact date will be dependent on agre´ment being granted. We are making this change because the Deputy High Commission in Abuja is a larger mission than Yaounde´ with greater resources and flexibility to devote to covering Equatorial Guinea. It will also allow our mission in Yaounde´ to engage more eVectively in the other countries in the region where we do not have a resident mission, such as Chad Sir Michael Jay KCMG 6 December 2005
FINANCE AND ESTIMATES
Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
FCO Supply Estimate 2005–06 Memorandum for the FAC
I attach an Estimates memorandum to be read alongside the 2005–06 Main Supply Estimate, which will be published by HM Treasury on Wednesday 25 May. In accordance with Treasury guidance Michael Jay, as Accounting OYcer, has authorised Ric Todd, as Finance Director, to sign future Estimates memoranda on his behalf. The memoranda will continue to be cleared by Michael Jay in near final draft. Chris Stanton Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 24 May 2005 3255704019 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Annex 1
Foreign & Commonwealth OYce Main Estimate 2005–06
Reconciliation of 2005–06 Main Estimates to SR2004 Outcome
1. The 2004 Spending Review settlement showed the FCO Resource Budget for 2005–06 as £1,581.311 million and the capital budget as £84.074 million. Since July 2004 there have been a number of changes to the FCO’s Departmental Expenditure Limits (DELs) which bring the current Resource DEL figure for 2005–06 to £1,813.483 million and the Capital DEL to £122.978 million. The tables below show the main changes and reconcile the DELs with the Main Estimates figures.
Table 1 Resource 2005–06 Resource DEL Baseline from SR 2004 (£m) 1,581.311 Changes to Resource DEL Conflict Prevention Pool Main Estimate Changes (net) 171.886 Near Term Pressures Reserve Claim 50.700 Impairments Departmental Unallocated Provision 20.000 EYciency Challenge Fund 9.600 Iraq: increased expenditure on behalf of OGDs 47.347 Iraq: OGD receipts to match increased expenditure "47.347 Iraq OGD transfer from resource to capital "10.875 OPM adjustment 2003–04 FCO "7.600 Net eVect of reclassifying British Council as Public "2.340 Corporation Other changes less than £1 million 0.801 New Resource DEL 1,813.483 DiVerence Between Resource DEL and Main Estimate Remove Common Foreign and Security Policy (non-voted "6.713 expenditure in DEL) Add Reimbursement of Taxes (voted expenditure outside 18.000 of DEL) Exclude Departmental Unallocated Provision—including "46.000 £20 million impairments DUP (not voted) 2005–06 Main Estimate Resource Total 1,778.770
Table 2 Capital 2005–06
Capital DEL Baseline from SR 2004 (£m) 84.074 Changes to Capital DEL Near Term Pressures Reserve Claim for security 35.900 Iraq OGD transfer from resource 10.875 Net eVect of reclassifying British Council as Public "7.800 Corporation OPM "0.071 New Capital DEL 122.978 DiVerence Between Capital DEL and Main Estimate Departmental Unallocated Provision for Capital (not "1.000 voted) 2005–06 Main Estimate Capital Net Total 121.978 3255704019 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Explanation of most significant changes
Conflict Prevention Pool Main Estimates Changes 2. Activity and expenditure under the Conflict Prevention Pools are undertaken jointly by the FCO, MOD and DFID. The FCO manages the Peacekeeping and Global programme expenditure elements of the pool and has £74 million for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool in its Resource DEL baseline which is added to by other pool partners through transfers between Departments in Main and Supplementary Estimates. The eVect of the transfers between pool partners to the 2005–06 FCO Main Estimates is a net increase of £171.886 million, which includes an increase of £200 million for peacekeeping. 3. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury has so far agreed that Parliamentary approval should be sought for up to £373 million of peacekeeping expenditure for 2005–06. Since there is uncertainty over these costs due to changes in demand for military involvement, the Treasury has agreed that an initial amount of £200 million should be applied for in the Main Estimate. The Treasury expects that further provision will be sought in the Supplementary Estimates, by which time more accurate information will be available.
Near Term Pressures Reserve Claim 4. The FCO made a claim on the Reserve in July 2004 for funds to implement changes recommended in the review of FCO security that followed the November 2003 attack on the British Consulate General in Istanbul and also for funds for network modernisation and exceptional pressures. The overall amount granted was £50.7 million resource and £35.9 million capital. 5. The security related claim for £20.7 million FCO resource, £35.9 million FCO capital and £6 million for British Council (resource) was met in full. In addition, £10 million was made available from the Reserve for network modernisation and £14 million for exceptional pressures. The network modernisation funds will be used towards the Future Firecrest Project, which will replace the FCO’s current ICT systems, as well as towards the up-front costs of our eYciency programme. The funds for exceptional pressures will mainly be used for the cost of the UK presence in Iraq.
Departmental Unallocated Provision for Impairments 6. The non-cash Departmental Unallocated Provision for impairments does not form part of the FCO’s baseline and so was not included in the Spending Review figures. Treasury has allowed the FCO continued access to this unallocated provision of £20 million for 2005–06. Impairments arise where the cost of a building exceeds its current value and an accounting adjustment is made to write oV the diVerence as a non- cash cost. The diVerence arises because the FCO has to provide buildings that, as far as possible, conform to UK health and safety standards and incorporate additional safety and security features. It is rare for such additions to be fully reflected in the local market value.
Efficiency Challenge Fund 7. The FCO is drawing down the £9.6 million that HM Treasury made available for 2005–06 from the EYciency Challenge Fund as part of the 2004 Spending Review settlement. This will be used to continue to fund FCO EYciency Plan proposals for early retirement in the UK and to restructure the overseas network of locally-engaged staV. The aim is to bring the FCO staYng structure into line with current operational requirements.
Iraq 8. Income and expenditure have been increased by £47.347 million to account for the contribution of other government departments to their share of the cost of the UK presence in Iraq. Of this, £10.875 million has been transferred to the capital DEL to cover higher capital costs.
Overseas Price Movements 9. OPM is an agreement between the FCO and the Treasury that safeguards the Department’s overseas spending power against exchange rate movements and increases in overseas inflation rates, when the latter exceed UK inflation. Where spending power is eroded by exchange rate variations or inflation, the Treasury makes good the shortfall in the Department’s budget. Where sterling exchange rate gains or relative overseas deflation produce windfall gains, as here, the Department returns funds to the Treasury. 3255704019 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Net Effect of Reclassifying British Council as a Public Corporation 10. The reclassification of the British Council from a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) to a Public Corporation has been reflected in the FCO’s Resource and Capital Departmental Expenditure Limits since the 2004 Spending Review. As an NDPB the resource and capital expenditure of the British Council was included in the FCO’s Resource and Capital DELs and the Resource DEL included an element for British Council non-cash costs such as depreciation. As a Public Corporation only the grant-in-aid payable to the British Council needs to be recorded in the FCO’s Resource DEL and the British Council’s capital expenditure is no longer included in the FCO’s Capital DEL. The amount of grant-in-aid payable to the British Council is unaVected by its change in status.
Impact on PSA Targets 11. The additional £14 million for Iraq outlined in paragraph 5 will contribute to the FCO’s pursuit of PSA targets one, two and three, relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorism and conflict prevention. The additional expenditure on security and network modernisation will contribute to the achievement of all the FCO’s PSA targets.
Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) and Administration Budgets 12. The tables below shows a comparison of the 2005–06 DEL (Table 3) and Administration (Table 4) budgets with the 2003–04 outturn, 2004–05 forecast outturn and plans for 2006–07 and 2007–08.
Table 3 (£m) 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Actual Forecast Budget Plan Plan Resource DEL1 1,585.188 1,786.890 1,813.483 1,683.660 1,720.660 Capital DEL 49.821 77.533 122.978 111.203 109.203 Less: Depreciation2 "103.538 "111.218 "133.624 "168.624 "184.624 Total 1,531.471 1,753.205 1,802.837 1,626.239 1,645.239
1 Resource DEL figures for 2006–07 and 2007–08 are understated because they do not include conflict prevention expenditure, which will be transferred at the time of the 2006–07 and 2007–08 Main and Supplementary Estimates. 2 Depreciation, which forms part of Resource DEL is excluded from the total DEL, since Capital DEL includes the purchase cost of capital assets. To add on the depreciation of those assets would double count their cost.
Table 4 (£m) 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Actual Forecast Budget Plan Plan Administration Budget 745.715 741.855 797.638 827.068 833.068
Departmental Unallocated Provision 13. In accordance with Treasury guidance, the FCO have put aside a Departmental Unallocated Provision (DUP) on RfR1 of £16 million resource and £1 million capital for 2005–06. This would be used to meet unforeseen requirements arising in-year. There is also a non-cash DUP of £20 million (see paragraph 6 above) to meet costs relating to the impairment of fixed assets. 14. In addition, in 2004–05, the FCO did not draw down its RfR1 DUP of £11 million resource, £1 million capital or its £20 million non-cash impairments DUP and anticipates rolling these forward under the end year flexibility scheme. 15. For RfR2 there is £10 million of DUP remaining for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool global programme expenditure. Sir Michael Jay KCMG Accounting OYcer May 2005 3255704020 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter to the Clerk of Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
FCO DEPARTMENTAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY 2004–07 As part of its scrutiny of the expenditure and administration of the FCO, the FAC has in the past expressed particular interest in the FCO’s capital investment plans. I enclose a copy of the FCO’s latest Departmental Investment Strategy, which documents our investment plans for the Spending Review period 2004–07. You may wish to show this to the new Committee, once appointed. This document has been published on the FCO’s website at www.fco.gov.uk. Chris Stanton Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team 5 July 2005
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
FCO WINTER SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE 2005–06 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FAC I attach an Estimates memorandum to be read alongside the 2005–06 Winter Supplementary Estimate, which will be published by HM Treasury on Thursday 17 November. In accordance with Treasury guidance Michael Jay, as Accounting OYcer, has authorised Ric Todd, as Finance Director, to sign Estimates memoranda on his behalf. Michael Jay has cleared this memorandum in final draft. Chris Stanton Head, Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team 16 November 2005
Memorandum for the Foreign AVairs Committee: Foreign and Commonwealth OYce Winter Supplementary Estimate 2005–06
Summary of Changes 1. The 2005–06 Winter Supplementary Estimate for the Foreign & Commonwealth OYce (FCO) provides for changes arising from a number of transfers to and from other government departments. These are reflected in changes to the Departmental Expenditure Limit and the Administration Budget. There are no changes to the FCO’s Capital budget.
Detailed Explanation of Changes 2. Table 1 lists the individual changes included in the Winter Supplementary Estimate. The changes are shown in descending value within each category. All changes aVect the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL).
Table 1
DETAILED EXPLANATION OF CHANGES
Amount Description (£m)
Transfers from Other Government Departments RfR1 7.985 Transfer to Section A3 (grants) from the Department for International Development (DfID) for transfer of responsibility for the Small Grants Scheme. This is a baseline change that carries through to 2006–07 and 2007–08. From 2006–07 onwards these funds will form part of the FCO’s bilateral programme budget. 3255704021 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Amount Description (£m)
1.000 Transfer to Section A2 (other current) from the Home OYce for funding of the Afghan Delivery Plan. RfR2 12.000 Transfer to Section C3 (grants) from DfID from the Conflict Prevention Pool for Africa Peacekeeping activity. 0.150 Transfer to Section B3 (grants) from DfID for funding of the Caucasus Conflict Prevention Projects. 21.135 Change to Resource DEL Transfers to Other Government Departments RfR1 –3.588 Transfer from Section A2 (other current) to the SIA for planned programme activity. –1.400 Transfer from Section A1 (administration) to the SIA for language training. RfR2 –0.100 Transfer from Section A3 (grants) to the SIA for funding revisions in conflict prevention activity. –5.088 Change to Resource DEL Increase in gross spending oVset by Appropriations in Aid RfR1 1.400 Increase in administration provision for language provision (Section A1 administration). –1.400 OVset by increased income from SIA for language training (Section 5 A in A)—see transfer to other government departments above. 0.000 Change to Resource DEL 16.047 Net total change to Resource DEL
Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) and Administration Budgets
3. The tables below shows the eVect of changes to the FCO’s DEL (Table 2); and a comparison of the 2005–06 DEL (Table 3) and Administration (Table 4) budgets with the 2003–04 outturn, 2004–05 forecast outturn and plans for 2006–07 and 2007–08.
Table 2
CHANGES TO DEPARTMENTAL EXPENDITURE LIMIT IN 2005–06
2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Voted Non-Voted Total DEL Total DEL Total DEL
Resource1 Main Estimate Figure 1,760.770 52.713 1,813.483 1,683.660 1,720.660 Winter Supplementary Change 16.047 0.000 16.047 7.985 7.985 Current Resource DEL1 1,776.817 52.713 1,829.530 1,691.645 1,728.645 Capital Main Estimate Figure 121.978 1.000 122.978 111.203 109.203 Winter Supplementary Change – – – – – Current Capital DEL 121.978 1.000 122.978 111.203 109.203 Less depreciation at start of year 113.624 20.000 133.624 168.624 184.624 Winter Supplementary Change – – – – – Current depreciation 2 113.624 20.000 133.624 168.624 184.624 Total Departmental Expenditure Limit 1,785.171 33.713 1,818.884 1,634.224 1,653.224 3255704021 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Table 3
DEL COMPARISON (£m)
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Actual Forecast Budget Plan Plan
Resource DEL1 1,585.188 1,786.890 1,829.530 1,691.645 1,728.645 Capital DEL 49.821 77.533 122.978 111.203 109.203 Less: Depreciation 2 "103.538 "111.218 "133.624 –168.624 "184.624 Total 1,531.471 1,753.205 1,818.884 1,634.224 1,653.224 1 Resource DEL figures for 2006–07 and 2007–08 are understated because they do not include conflict prevention expenditure, which will be transferred at the time of the 2006–07 and 2007–08 Main and Supplementary Estimates. 2 Depreciation, which forms part of Resource DEL, is excluded from the total DEL, since Capital DEL includes the purchase cost of capital assets. To add on the depreciation of those assets would double count their cost.
Table 4
ADMINISTRATION BUDGET COMPARISON (£m)
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Actual Forecast Budget Plan Plan
Administration Budget 745.715 741.855 796.238 827.068 833.068
Departmental Unallocated Provision (DUP) 2005–06 4. There is no change to the Departmental Unallocated Provision set out in the memorandum that accompanied the 2005–06 Main Estimate. For RfR1 there is a £16 million resource DUP and £1 million capital DUP to meet unforeseen requirements arising in-year. There is also a ringfenced non-cash DUP of £20 million to meet costs relating to the impairment of fixed assets. For RfR2 there is £10 million of DUP remaining for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool global programme expenditure. 5. The FCO is currently reviewing whether to draw down these unallocated provisions in the Spring Supplementary.
End Year Flexibility (EYF) 6. The Public Expenditure Outturn White Paper published in July 2005 showed a total figure of £111.991 million for carry forward of 2004–05 DEL underspending into 2005–06 under the DEL EYF scheme. Table 5 below shows how this figure was made up from a mixture of adjustment for 2003–04 final outturn, forecast 2004–05 underspend and unused Departmental Unallocated Provision. 7. The FCO is currently reviewing whether to request take up of any of this end year flexibility requirement in the Spring Supplementary.
Table 5
ACCUMULATION OF EYF in 2004–05 (£m)
Administration Programme Capital Total
RfR1 Adjustment for 2003–04 final outturn (6.306) – 5.297 (1.009) Forecast voted underspend 2004–056 30.000 – 25.000 55.000 Ringfenced Impairments DUP 2004–05 not used 20.000 – – 20.000 FCO Core DUP 2004–05 not used 8.000 3.000 1.000 12.000 RfR2 – 26.000 – 26.000 Total FCO EYF in PEOWP 51.694 29.000 31.297 111.991 6 An adjustment to reflect final outturn will be made in the 2005–06 EYF exercise. 3255704021 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Impact on PSA Targets 8. Changes to the FCO’s budget provision relate to planned activity and so will not impact our public service agreements. D R Todd Director Finance November 2005
Letter from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce to the Clerk of the Committee
FCO Spring Supplementary Estimate 2005–06 Memorandum for the FAC I attach an Estimates memorandum and the FCO extract from the 2005–06 Spring Supplementary Estimate,7 which will be published by HM Treasury today. In accordance with Treasury guidance Michael Jay, as Accounting OYcer, has authorised Ric Todd, as Finance Director, to sign Estimates memoranda on his behalf. Michael Jay has cleared this memorandum in final draft. Chris Stanton 14 February 2006
Letter to the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, from the Clerk of the Committee The Committee has noted with interest the NAO Report on Fraud at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv. As you know, this Report will be the subject of a hearing of the Public Accounts Committee next week. The Committee has asked me to request, before its meeting on 15 February, answers to the following two questions. — What steps have been taken to prevent any repetition of a fraud such as that perpetrated at the Embassy in Tel Aviv? — Why was this Committee not informed of the fraud, either before or during its visit to Israel in November 2005? I apologise for the very tight deadline for a response, but as you know, the House will be in recess from 16 February and the Committee is then away on oYcial business until 6 March. Steve Priestley Clerk of the Committee 9 January 2006
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce Fraud in Tel Aviv Thank you for your letter of 9 January. In answer to your first question, we have taken a number of steps to ensure that there is no repetition of the fraud in Tel Aviv. On the question of Rest Home Payments, we have checked with all of our overseas posts and confirmed that all additional payments or allowances that are paid as part of salary are correct and based on the proper scale. We found no evidence of a similar fraud at any other post. We have amended our internal audit package so that additional payments made with salary are automatically scrutinised as part of the audit. We have also issued a “Lessons Learned” paper that focuses on the weaknesses which allowed the Tel Aviv Fraud to go undetected. This paper has been sent out to all Heads of Posts and Departments in London—a copy is attached for the Committee’s information. The key weaknesses that allowed the bag clearance element of the fraud to happen were cash payments, hand written receipts and lack of rotation of duties. We have a world wide initiative to reduce cash payments: this is an area that is closely looked at in our self-audit package as well as by visiting Audit and Financial
7 Not printed. 3255704024 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Compliance teams. We are also making further improvements to our guidance and anti-fraud training presentations to highlight the importance of questioning hand written receipts and invoices and benefits of rotation of duties of staV working overseas. Prism, our new financial management computer package, will enable us to gather more informed and detailed budgetary and financial information. This has enabled us to develop more analytical end of month checks of Posts accounts and the introduction of a monthly management account report to the Head of Post. The embedded controls within Prism, for example the need to match an invoice to a Purchase Order before it is paid, have also strengthened our payments procedures. We have also increased the number of staV in Internal Audit Department and Financial Compliance Unit thus enabling a increased frequency of internal audits of medium risk posts from every five to four years (high risk posts are audited every three years) and an increase in FCU proactive visits from 10 a year to 15 a year. On your second point, this incident was not raised in briefing for the Committee’s visit to Israel because the present system for commissioning briefing does not cover fraud. We will, however, check with our Financial Compliance Unit when preparing future briefing. It was not raised by Post while the Committee was in Israel as it was not thought to be relevant to the purpose of the Committee’s visit. I attach a full copy of the report for your information. Chris Stanton 14 February 2006
Annex
Tel Aviv and other Frauds: Lessons Learned
1. Payments should only be made on receipt of formal invoices Too many Posts continue to pay for too many transactions by way of an advance that is only supported by a receipt, which in many cases is hand written. We all need to work harder to reduce the incidence of payments made in this manner so that only the most minor of payments (ie those made through imprests) are made this way. In countries with a cash based economy this may be diYcult but even in this environment payment for material purchases should only be made against a formal invoice. The best way to ensure that payments are only made on receipt of an invoice is to have formal relationships with your suppliers, perhaps even contracts, such that Post receives a periodic invoice for goods supplied. Such an arrangement has many advantages: — payments are only made on presentation of original invoices; — management at Post are able to exercise much more control over suppliers used therefore confirming that suppliers are indeed bonafide; — it is more evident how much is being spent with suppliers making it easier to negotiate on price when contracts are tendered resulting in better value for money from procurement; and — cash payments are reduced (see below). Post should approach those suppliers who don’t currently provide invoices and request them to do so. Consideration should also be given to whether it is appropriate to continue to do business with suppliers which cannot provide invoices for all but small one-oV items ie those items being purchased from imprest. The prescribed use of Purchase to Pay on Prism will give management at Post some assurance that good procedures are being followed as Prism, when correctly used, requires a properly authorised requisition and purchase order to be raised on the system before a payment can be made. Management at Posts with Prism should therefore ensure that purchases are being made in accordance with prescribed procedure. Management OYcers must however ensure that all claims and advance payments are brought to account on-line and released by the SMO before cash is issued. Otherwise the potential scam will be that the Accountant could raise fraudulent STD invoices.
2. All payments where there is no formal invoice should be questioned If it is not possible to obtain an invoice the oYcer certifying the payment or releasing the payment on Prism: — must question why this is the case and satisfy themselves that it is acceptable to pay on a receipt only; — must not pay on the evidence of a hand written receipt unless absolutely necessary; and — must confirm that the price paid represents value for money and is genuinely what was paid if it is necessary to pay on a hand written receipt. 3255704025 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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3. Cash payments should be minimised Cash payments are inherently risky. Not only is there an increased risk of fraud and impropriety but they are also ineYcient. All Posts should review the number of cash payments made with a view to reducing them. The latest guidance for end of month accounts checks for Prism posts sets a limit of £100 over which payments should be made by non cash means. You should also be aware that we encourage the use of corporate credit cards where possible to reduce the level of cash payments. All posts should actively consider whether a corporate credit card can be used.
4. Only pay on original documentation An easy control overlooked on too many occasions. All Post’s need to make every eVort to ensure that both invoices/demands for payment and supporting documentation is original and genuine. If an invoice/ supporting documentation is not an original, this needs to be questioned and extra attention given to the payment to ensure that it is valid and has not been paid before.
5. Be aware for duplicate payments We all need to be aware of the potential of duplicate payments. Whilst vigilance from the Accountant, the accounts supervisor and checking oYcers remains of vital importance there is some good news to help you in this area. Prism, if used properly, can help give you an assurance that duplicate payments are not being made on your account. If a transaction is processed through purchase to pay the payments cannot be made without matching it to a Purchase Order. A duplicate payment should not therefore be able to be made as it has no matching Purchase Order. As with point 1 above it is important that you ensure that Prism Purchase to Pay is being properly applied at your Post. SMOs should be aware that although it is not possible to pay the same invoice twice or even enter it twice against the same supplier, it is possible within the system to pay for the same goods/services by altering the invoice number with a space, dot or dash 1. If this coincides with an open purchase order then it would automatically be paid. But if it was a single purchase order then it would go on hold and could only be released by the SMO. SMOs should therefore be careful to check invoice numbers when authorising payments against open purchase orders.
6. StaV should take their annual leave entitlement Locally engaged staV should be required to use their annual leave allowance, including at least one block a year that means another oYcer must take over their responsibilities for at least a whole week. Persistent failure to take leave may be an attempt to hide malpractice, ie someone else will have to do my work while I am away and will discover what I have been doing. There should be a rotation of duties to enable diVerent staV to undertake the same activities during diVerent periods. This is not just to prevent fraud, but also gives posts maximum flexibility during periods of staV absence or leave.
7. General Awareness of staV lifestyles Take notice of any staV who accumulate significant debt or whose lifestyle appears incommensurate with their income. There may be a perfectly acceptable explanation but an extravagant lifestyle can be indicative that a person has a second, perhaps fraudulent, income. Tied in with this all staV should be asked to declare outside business interests annually.
8. Confirm that suppliers are genuine Prism can be used as a database of regular suppliers that can be used as a tool when inviting companies to bid for tenders. New suppliers should only be added to the database when it has been confirmed that the company actually exists. This may involve a member of staV actually visiting the premises or checking that the company is registered or simply checking the details against other publications such as the local telephone directory.
9. Ongoing awareness of Posts main suppliers Posts should monitor those companies that are winning larger contracts to ensure that a variety of suppliers are being used. In the case where one supplier is regularly winning contracts, Post should ensure that there is a valid reason for this. 3255704025 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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10. If the worst should happen ensure that Post can protect FCO interests Terms and Conditions of Service for locally employed staV should include a provision for immediate dismissal for gross misconduct (eg fraud) and, where possible the withholding of terminal gratuities. Financial Compliance Unit November 2005
Annex Fraud: Lessons Learned from Tel Aviv and other Frauds 1. I think you are all aware of the fraud that was discovered in Tel Aviv a little over a year ago. The National Audit OYce have completed their report, which will be attached to the FCO 2004/05 Accounts. We expect Public Accounts Committee interest. The PUS may be called to give evidence. 2. Against this background, I attach a note written by Financial Compliance Unit on the lessons learned from the Tel Aviv and other frauds. I commend this to you. You should ensure both that those involved in management work in your post read it carefully and that the relevant checks are in place as far as possible. 3. The paper is a statement of good practice, not a catch-all document. It highlights some of the key indicators of fraud and the key steps which, in our experience, help you prevent it. It is neither a set of iron rules which must be followed nor a guarantee that fraud will be avoided by following them. Rather the paper is designed to help you discharge your responsibilities as SAO in support of Michael Jay as Accounting OYcer. 4. You should be guided by your own judgement and common sense in the light of local circumstances. So, for example, if the circumstances of your post compel you to make cash payments or make it diYcult to obtain invoices in every case, then you need to think about what flanking and/or other arrangements will help mitigate the risks (”compensating controls” in auditor speak). What I would say is that it would be much more diYcult for an SAO to explain a fraud to the Accounting OYcer if it has occurred by failure to implement the good practice set out in this paper. 5. I am aware that DSP and FCO guidance need to be updated, not least in the light of Prism, and we are working to this end. 6. Finally, may I repeat that if you would like specific advice on tackling fraud or you suspect malpractice in your post, please contact me or FCU immediately. I would encourage you to make use of their expertise. D R Todd Finance Director 3 November 2005
GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs It gives me great pleasure to enclose the Global Opportunities Fund’s second Annual Report which will be laid before the House as a Command Paper on 12 October 2005. I launched the GOF in May 2003 to focus the FCO’s programme spending more closely on our priorities; and to bring greater professionalism to our programme and project management work. The GOF’s second year has built upon the foundations laid in 2003–04. Its programmes are now directly aligned to the Strategic Priorities which continue to support an impressive portfolio of projects, many of which are beginning to bear fruit. The Fund has also played a key role in the evolution of the wider FCO programme budget. From 2006–07, it will expand to include all strategic programmes (Drugs and Crime Fund, Migration and Overseas Territories programme) so that the FCO can provide well-structured and coherent support to its overarching strategy. I am aware of the Committee’s continuing interest in the GOF and trust you will find this second Annual Report an interesting and informative read. I would be happy, as always, to arrange a separate informal briefing on the progress of GOF in year three and the wider changes taking place to the programme budget if required. Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary 10 October 2005 3255704028 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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OVERSEAS POSTS AND FCO ESTATE
Written evidence submitted by Thomas Rambaut
Government Shuts Embassy and Cuts Aid to Madagascar I am writing to you in the hope that you can influence a situation which needs to be urgently put right. I know that for the moment there is no Committee but that one is expected shortly. However could you please assist with your influence in putting right a wrong that seems totally unnecessary. I recently returned from a visit to Madagascar—a country of enormous potential, but one of the poorest on earth—due mainly to a succession of bad and corrupt governments over the past 30 years. I can confirm from my own observations that the level of poverty, malnutrition and misery are every bit as bad as indicated. Since 2002 Madagascar has been governed by a new breed of leaders; who have the interests of the people at heart, and who are determined to beat corruption and bring prosperity to the people of Madagascar. There is now a mood of hope which has not been felt for two generations, and to which aid donors and the international community have responded with generous financial and technical assistance to help rebuild the country’s shattered infrastructure. The British Embassy has become the most visible diplomatic presence. The Americans are bunkered down and the French have a long and awkward history to forget. The British presence is noted and spoken about very well, in even the remotest parts of Madagascar where television reaches. This was all noted and praised in a report by an FCO man called James Bevan. Against this background I was astonished to discover that the government has decided to close the British Embassy in Antananarivo later this year—to save pounds sterling 300,000 a year. Furthermore, when the Embassy closes a fund used to finance the construction of schools, equip medical centres and projects which provide regular incomes to poor communities will also come to an end. This cannot be right. The British government claims to be determined to reduce poverty and suVering in Africa. But closing the British Embassy and ending British aid will have precisely the opposite eVect. After only three years the government of Madagascar has achieved a great deal. It is one of Africa’s few success stories, and it is already showing the way to other developing countries. To withdraw British support at this time makes no sense at all. It is damaging to the interests of Britain and Madagascar and could undermine the government’s eVorts. Furthermore it contradicts everything that Mr Blair and Mr Brown have said, particularly in the context of the recent Commission for Africa report. I understand that several large British investments in Madagascar have recently been announced or are expected to be announced. The British Embassy has been in the forefront of facilitating these. I know that it is common amongst a very few staV of the FCO to say that they are not interested in British investment overseas, only in generating British exports or investment into Britain. I am sure that you are aware that most of the largest investments overseas also arrange huge procurement in the UK. When Companies such as Rio Tinto and BAT wish to invest in Madagascar you must expect substantial exports from Britain to sustain these companies’ operations. It is also my understanding that these same companies want to help pay for the operation of the Embassy because they find it so helpful and useful in their endeavours. So the savings can be made by other means. The FCO ignores this oVer. I also understand that there are dozens of local staV in the Embassy and residences, most of whom, because of the extreme poverty, will never work again. There are opportunities not to break up this staV and to pass the buildings and staV to another country. Your staV in London have vetoed this. This would seem a vile way to treat loyal staV and, those who propose it, deserve to rot in the same kind of poverty. It is also totally against the policies and declared intentions of the FCO. It is fairly clear what has happened. In spite of the glowing report by Mr Bevan,the FCO has decided to make an economy by shutting this embassy, without thinking, analysing or listening. Once someone had made the decision and his error became apparent to him, all he could do was to bring forward the closure to stop the protests. Jack Straw does not know the truth about this and Gordon Brown and Tony Blair would surely be surprised by the cavalier way in which this person has done his best to bring misery to dozens of British employees, a disservice to British industry, incomprehension to a very friendly government and a stab in the back to those who are trying to bring aid to this, one of the poorest countries in the World. You know two f***s from Bob Geldorf and the culpable manager would be well in the S***. Could the FCO not quietly put this right before the Gleneagles Conference and save themselves from looking asinine? The FCO have made a serious mistake in deciding to close the British Embassy in Antananarivo. It should be big enough to admit it and reverse this decision before it is too late. I hope you will use your influence to ensure that British support for Madagascar continues, for the benefit of the people of Madagascar to end the poverty and suVering they have endured for so long. Thomas Rambaut 22 June 2005 3255704029 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter to the Second Clerk from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team at the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Quarterly Estates Sales Return Chris Stanton wrote to Steve Priestley in April 2005 enclosing a list of properties that the FCO had sold in the third quarter of the Financial Year 2004–05, in fulfilment of a commitment made by Sir Michael Jay to the Committee on 20 July 2004 to submit regular reports. Enclosed with this letter is a table listing the properties sold in the fourth quarter of the Financial Year 2004–05. As with previous tables, the figures shown are the gross sales proceeds. Transaction costs will vary, but can be expected to average 6–8%. Only one of the properties involved, that sold in St Georges, Grenada, was the Residence of a Head of Mission, which has been replaced.
Mark Turner Parliamentary Relations & Devolution Team
26 July 2005
FCO PROPERTY SALES FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY to 31 MARCH 2005
Post Type of property Gross sales receipts
4 January 2005 Copenhagen Residential £661,000 6 January 2005 Wellington Residential £128,000 23 March 2005 St Georges Residence £254,000 Gross Sale Proceeds £1,043,000
Letter to the Chairman from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs I am writing to you as Chair of the Foreign AVairs Committee to alert you to a written Statement I will be publishing tomorrow setting out my plans for changes to the network of overseas post. I attach a copy. I am also copying this to The Speaker. Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary 10 October 2005
Written Statement, OYcial Report, 11 October 20058
Overseas Network The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs (Jack Straw): In December 2003, I set out the Government’s international priorities for the next five to 10 years and the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s strategy for delivering them in a world of new challenges, opportunities and threats. On the basis of that strategy and the outcome of the 2004 spending round I announced on 15 December 2004, OYcial Report, columns 137–140WS, changes to the overseas network, aimed at enhancing our eVectiveness in representing British interests abroad, and helping to deliver an eYcient service on behalf of the British taxpayer. However, in the light of further reviews I have agreed to make the following small adjustments to our plans: One subordinate post, Hamburg, scheduled to remain open with locally based staV, will now close and our interests will be covered from Berlin. Two subordinate posts, Munich and Miami, will now continue to be headed by a UK based member of staV rather than covered entirely by locally engaged staV as originally proposed. Other changes will go ahead before end 2006, as previously announced.
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The overall picture on implementation of the changes announced in December is as follows:
Post Planned change State of Play
ASIA PACIFIC Port Vila (Vanuatu) Close To be closed by end 2006 Nuku’alofa (Tonga) Close To be closed by end 2006 Dili (East Timor) Close To be closed by end 2006 Tarawa (Kiribati) (currently a locally Close Closed staVed post)
AMERICAS Asuncion (Paraguay) Close Closed Nassau (Bahamas) Close Closed
AFRICA Maseru (Lesotho) Close Closed Mbabane (Swaziland) Close Closed Antananarivo (Madagascar) Close Closed
AUSTRALIA Brisbane Localise To be localised by end 2006 Perth Localise To be localised by end 2006
NEW ZEALAND Auckland Localise Localised
JAPAN Fukuoka Close Closed
LAOS Vientiane (Laos) (Trade OYce) Close Closed
UNITED STATES Seattle Localise Localised Miami Localise To remain UK based Phoenix Close Closed Dallas Close Closed San Juan (Puerto Rico) Close Closed
FRANCE Bordeaux Localise To be localised by end 2006 Lyon Localise To be localised by end 2006
GERMANY Munich Localise To remain UK based Hamburg Localise To close by end 2006 Frankfurt Close To close by end 2006 Leipzig Close Closed Stuttgart Close To close by end 2006
SPAIN Palma Localise To be localised by end 2006 Bilbao Localise Localised
PORTUGAL Oporto Close Closed
CAMEROON Douala Close Closed
In addition, I have agreed the following further changes to the network: In Brazil, following a review of our commercial eVort there, I have agreed that our Trade OYces in Belo Horizonte and Curitiba should be closed, but the existing Honorary Consuls will remain. Commercial services currently provided in Belo Horizonte and Curitiba will in future be delivered through our other posts in Brazil. In India we plan to upgrade our Business Information Centres in Pune and Chandigarh to British Trade OYces and cease to operate a Business Information Centre in Bhopal. 3255704030 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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The full details of these additional changes are as follows:
Post Planned change
Trade OYce, Curitiba, Brazil Close. Honorary Consul to remain. Trade interests covered from other Posts in Brazil (Brasilia, Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro). Trade OYce, Belo Horizonte, Brazil Close. Honorary Consul to remain. Trade interests covered from other Posts in Brazil (Brasilia, Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro). Business Information Centre, Bhopal, India Close. British Council Library to remain. Trade interests covered from Mumbai. Business Information Centre, Pune Upgrade to full Trade OYce. Business Information Centre, Chandigarh Upgrade to full Trade OYce.
We have no other plans to close or open any further sovereign posts but like any well-run organisation we will continue to move resources flexibly as priorities require in line with UK interests. I will inform the House of any further planned changes.
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Head of the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team at the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Quarterly Report of Estate Sales My colleague wrote to Sarah Ioannou in July 2005 enclosing a list of properties that the FCO had sold in the fourth quarter of the Financial Year 2004–05, in fulfilment of a commitment made by Sir Michael Jay to the Committee on 20 July 2004 to submit regular reports. Enclosed with this letter is a table listing the properties sold in the first quarter of the Financial Year 2005–06. As with previous tables, the figures shown are the gross sales proceeds. Transaction costs will vary, but can be expected to average 6–8%. None of the properties involved was the residence of a Head of Mission. Chris Stanton Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team 11 October 2005
FCO PROPERTY SALES FOR THE PERIOD 1 APRIL to 30 JUNE 2005
Gross Sales Post Type of Property Receipts
30 May 2005 Brisbane Residential £160,000 8 June 2005 Helsinki Residential £185,000 20 June 2005 Bratislava Residential £383,000 Gross sale proceeds £728,000
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Quarterly Report of Estate Sales My letter of 11 October 2005 enclosed a list of properties that the FCO had sold in the first quarter of the Financial Year 2005–06. In accordance with Sir Michael Jay’s commitment in July 2004 to send the Committee regular reports, I am enclosing a further report which shows that only one property was sold in the second quarter of the Financial Year 2005–06. 3255704032 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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As with previous tables, the figure shown is the gross sales proceeds. Transaction costs will vary, but can be expected to average 6–8%. The property involved was not the residence of a Head of Mission. Chris Stanton Parliament Relations and Devolution Team 19 January 2006
FCO PROPERTY SALES FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2005
Post Type of Property Gross Sales Receipts £
29 September 2005 Lisbon Residential 800,000
Gross Sale Proceeds £800,000
MISCELLANEOUS
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce I am writing to share with you the good news that the FCO’s network of overseas Posts achieved Investors in People (IiP) recognition in December 2005. As the FCO’s UK-based operations (an IiP organisation since 2001) were judged to be successfully maintaining the IiP Standard back in November 2004, we are now recognised together under FCO corporate accreditation. This is a real achievement and a testament to the hard work that Posts overseas and Directorates in London have put in to improving the management and development of staV. The Assessor highlighted revised induction programmes and the development of Locally Engaged (LE) staV as two major improvements since his last visit in 2004, noting that these had been facilitated with the assistance of internal team members and the 10 Regional Training Centres around the world, which we introduced in April 2004. He commended the latter as being a very innovative step to improving the opportunities for LE staV to access training and noted the significant commitment by senior managers at Post in encouraging and supporting staV development. The Assessor acknowledged that a considerable eVort has been made at all levels of the FCO to develop the skills, knowledge and behaviour of line managers. The greater rigour in our appraisal system coupled with a clearer competence framework and increased (and improved) management training has contributed to the raising of management standards. In particular, “LE managers now have a far better appreciation of their responsibilities for supporting and managing the successful performance of their teams”. While we are pleased that the progress we have made, we are conscious that a great deal more remains to be done if we are to maintain recognition against the revised (more challenging) IiP Standard in future reviews. Looking ahead to 2006–07, the impact of our new leadership training for Heads of Mission as well as mandatory performance management training for all senior managers should start to be felt. At the same time we intend to expand our network of Regional Training Centres to include more Posts and more staV. And we will also be addressing the development points highlighted in the Assessor’s report by continuing to enhance our ability to plan and evaluate training eVectively—continuous improvement being a key IiP theme. Sir Michael Jay KCMG 6 January 2006
Letter to Chairman of the Committee from the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce In December 2003 the FCO published a White Paper entitled “UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO” (which you can find at www.fco.gov.uk/strategy). In publishing the Strategy, we committed to reviewing it every two years in order to ensure that it continued to reflect the Government’s international priorities. We do not expect this review to lead to radical changes. But in light of developments since 2003, and a complex and rapidly changing world, we are updating our analysis of the key issues, institutions and relationships; and the international priorities for 3255704034 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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the UK identified in the Strategy. In doing so we are likely in particular to underline the importance of migration, public service delivery, in particular consular services, and the growing importance of China and India. We intend to publish a new paper at the end of March and will of course ensure that the Committee receives copies. If in the meantime you and FAC colleagues have views on the Strategy and the areas the review should cover, these would of course be welcome, if possible before the end of January. Sir Michael Jay KCMG 12 January 2006
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from the Director of the BBC World Service I enclose BBC World Service’s written evidence for the Committee’s Inquiry into the FCO Annual Report. It is in two parts: the first part is a summary of BBC World Service activity over the year, and the second part is a summary of BBC World Service’s strategy and vision to 2010, which focuses on major changes to be formally announced on 25 October 2005 following full approval by the BBC Board of Governors last week. In preparation for the Committee’s hearing on the FCO Annual Report 2003–04, the World Service sent members a briefing on its SR04 submission, which included a separate bid for funding to establish an Arabic television service. The Committee will be aware that the bid for extra funds for Arabic television was unsuccessful and the World Service was asked to look at ways of funding it through re-prioritisation. This work has been ongoing throughout the year; during this period, there have been two other major public exercises which have contributed to our strategic thinking: — In March 2005, the DCMS published its Green Paper on BBC Charter renewal, A Strong BBC Independent of Government. This included the recommendations that the World Service should explore how it could face up to the arrival of satellite TV in many markets; and that it should consider reducing its portfolio of languages, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. — And, as you know, at the beginning of 2005, a Review of Public Diplomacy, led by Lord Carter of Coles, was established. BBC World Service welcomed the opportunity to provide information to the review. The review team is shortly to report, and is expected to echo the Green Paper in proposing that the language portfolio should be carefully scrutinised. It is also expected to recommend that the World Service should continue to exploit new technologies, services and platforms, and should respond more quickly to changing geopolitical circumstances. Both of these developments have reinforced the BBC’s own conviction that a far-reaching, radical strategy is needed to ensure that the World Service can retain its pre-eminence in a multimedia world. The second attached paper sets out the main elements of the BBC World Service’s strategy to 2010, with specific financial plans through 2007–08. It lays out the strategic principles and priorities that will guide the changes in activities, and details the areas of new investment. It also describes the reprioritisation of activities that will be necessary to deliver this exciting vision. The paper was endorsed by the BBC Board of Governors on 20 October. Consultations have also been held with the FCO about the proposed changes. The Foreign Secretary has given written approval, as he is obliged to do under the Broadcasting Agreement, for the proposed investment in Arabic TV and the proposed service reductions. Nigel Chapman Director 24 October 2005
1. BBC WORLD SERVICE: 2004–05 A YEAR IN REVIEW In 2004–05 BBC World Service consolidated its position as the best known and most respected voice in international broadcasting Independent research indicated that its reputation for trust and objectivity was higher than for any other international broadcasters in virtually all markets surveyed—including in Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and USA. Its reputation also improved in markets in the Islamic world where it suVered a reverse during and immediately after the Iraq war. Throughout the year, the range, intensity and geographical spread of major news stories was unprecedented. As well as developments in Iraq and the Middle East, there was extensive news coverage of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Darfur crisis, the Beslan school siege, the US and Ukrainian elections and 3255704035 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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the enlargement of the European Union. BBC World Service produced some of its strongest-ever news programmes, pioneered the use of new interactive media and provided enhanced services where most needed.
Audiences — BBC World Service’s overall audience figure rose to 149 million weekly listeners, a rise of three million listeners compared to 2004’s estimate of 146 million. This is the sixth year in succession that BBC World Service has attracted an audience over 145 million. This equates to over 50% more listeners than any comparable international broadcaster. — Listening in the USA increased to 5 million, the highest ever level, up from 4.7 million last year. One in five opinion formers in New York and Washington listen each week while the figure in Boston is even higher at over one in four. — In India, weekly audiences rose 4.8 million to a total of 16.4 million weekly listeners. The increase has been due to improvements in Hindi language programming and to a high-profile series of BBC Hindi road-shows in rural areas of the country. This is the first increase in a number of years following a dramatic drop in overall radio listening in India, as well as a ban by Indian regulators on local FM stations carrying news from foreign broadcasters. This had resulted in a drop of over 12 million listeners between 1995 and 2002. — The weekly audience for the BBC Bengali Service has risen by 2.6 million to 13 million in the past year. The growth of the audience to BBC World Service is mostly driven by the increase in rural listening, and represents a strong recovery from the audience drop in 2003, particularly in Bangladesh, following the Iraq war. This latest survey reveals that the vast majority of those who have ever listened to the BBC—more than 80%—consider it to be trustworthy. — Audiences in Indonesia rose by 1.2 million to 4.4 million. — World Service audiences in the UK were measured at 1.3 million regular listeners. Programmes are now more easily available following the growth of digital and cable services. — In Nigeria, a Government ban on the rebroadcasting of foreign broadcasters’ news programmes by local FM stations, imposed in April 2004, has resulted in an overall drop of 1.5 million listeners in the country. However 20.2 million Nigerian listeners still tune in every week—17.6 million in the Hausa language, mostly on shortwave. Growth of competition had a negative impact on World Service audiences in some regions: — Listeners to the BBC Urdu service in Pakistan fell by 3.2 million to 9.4 million — Kenyan audiences to BBC programmes fell by 2.1 million to an overall total of 4.5 million. — Listeners to the BBC Swahili service in Tanzania fell by 1.3 million to an overall total of 10.2 million.
FMs BBC World Service programmes are now available in high quality audibility on FM in 146 capital cities (77% of the world’s capitals), up from 139 last year.
Iraq Research showed that BBC World Service is the biggest speech radio station in Iraq. Weekly audiences in the country increased to 3.3 million (22%) from 1.8 million weekly listeners (13% of the radio audience) last year—an increase of 1.5 million. The independent surveys also showed that 43% of opinion formers in Iraq listen every week. The BBC’s new FM transmitter network in the country has made a crucial diVerence in ensuring the World Service remains competitive—we now have FMs in Baghdad, Mosul & Irbil, Kirkuk, Al-Nasirya, Basra, Al-Kut, Salahuddin and Al-Amara. The news bureau in Baghdad gave the organisation an important edge in reporting from a country that remains diYcult and dangerous to cover. For World Service news teams it complements the new bureau in Cairo, where a significant amount of programmes are now made for the Arabic Service.
Afghanistan Despite limited survey work due to safety considerations, the BBC attracted 2.8 million listeners in five provinces of Afghanistan—an increase of 2 million on last year’s Kabul only survey. That survey showed that BBC World Service programmes in Pashto and Persian had a 60% reach in the Afghan capital. 3255704035 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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New Media Monthly page impressions to the BBC’s international news site, including bbcnews.com, increased to 351 million in August 2005 from 284 million a year previously, an increase of 67 million (for the period of this review, figures were 324 million in March 2005 from 279 million exactly a year previously—a rise of 45 million). In Brazil, online services now attract larger audiences than radio. BBC World Service is pioneering the introduction of video content and working closely with key media partners in that country. In January 2005 the BBC’s Brazilian website, bbcbrasil.com, registered 14.3 million page impressions, up more than 120% in a year. Since the period covered by this review, a BBC Persian Service programme became the first BBC language programme to be available to audiences via a podcast in August 2005. The podcast provided listeners with the flexibility to listen to a 15-minute highlight how and when they want to at bbcpersian.com.
Finance In the SR04 settlement, the Government announced an increase in funding for the World Service of £27 million over the period 2005–08. The separate bid for an Arabic television service was supported by the Government, but it said that funding would need to come from reprioritisation. BBC World Service will channel all the additional funds into expanding FM in major cities, strengthening its impact in the Islamic world, improving interactivity and partnership development. In order to maximise the value of new investments, World Service strives to cover all rising costs from eYciency gains. In this financial year, BBC World Service achieved eYciency savings of £4.4 million. The organisation also commenced a far-reaching reprioritisation exercise, the results of which are given in the second part of this paper.
General Editorial Overview BBC World Service continued to report on and from the Islamic world, including powerful coverage on Iraq—especially the elections and handover of power—enabled by a strong presence on the ground, complemented by insightful analysis and interviews. The network carried strong coverage of the Afghan and Iraqi elections, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and other key stories including developments in Saudi Arabia, the death of Yasser Arafat—the World Service began broadcasting on FM in Bethlehem on the day of his death, and the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister. Elsewhere, reporting was unparalleled, including in-depth coverage of the Beslan crisis (for which the World Service won the News Output Award at the Sony Radio Academy Awards), leveraging editorial coordination and newsgathering strength under diYcult circumstances. There was extra programming across several languages for the Tsunami disaster and comprehensive coverage of: events in Darfur; elections in Ukraine, and the USA; the death of Pope John Paul II; EU enlargement; the Davos summit.
Landmark Programming Landmark programmes included The Jigsaw in Pieces, on diplomacy after the Iraq war; The New Europe, broadcast across all European languages; and Profit and Loss: The Story of African Oil. The World Service played an important role in the BBC-wide China Week, a week of original and groundbreaking programmes. The organisation was given unprecedented access inside the country. There was a high degree of editorial collaboration across the BBC’s Global News Division. Talking Point from Tsinghua University was carried across all three media—radio, television and online. Both BBC World and BBC World Service carried the Shanghai edition of Question Time.
Global Conversations The World Service continued to expand its interactive debates on radio and online. Opportunities for users to question key decision-makers and to exchange views across nations and continents included a groundbreaking initiative to connect families separated by the Line of Control dividing Kashmir. For the first time in years Kashmiris were able to communicate through a video conference organised and webcast by bbcurdu.com. In May 2004, the Foreign Secretary took part in Talking Point, an interactive debate covering Iraq, the wider Middle East and the future of Europe. BBC World Service interactive websites in Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Persian and Urdu won awards for excellence. 3255704035 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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The Indian Ocean tsunami prompted one of the largest news eVorts ever undertaken by the BBC, with correspondents deployed on an unprecedented scale. Within hours of the waves striking, the World Service launched notice boards for missing people. In five aVected regions—India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia—more than two million people looked at these pages. BBC World Service received over 25,000 emails, and several families were reunited with the help of the BBC.
BBC Monitoring BBC Monitoring continued to provide highly valued material for stakeholders from areas such as the Middle East, Darfur, Russia and Ukraine. Pan Arab TV coverage was enhanced, including a supply of TV feeds to BBC World. During the Beslan siege, Monitoring helped to unravel a confused media picture of events. Our Russian teams in the UK and overseas were able to reveal the widely diVering accounts being given in newspapers and on television, and the diVerences between regional and Moscow-based media. The benefit of following events over a long period was demonstrated by the tremendous expertise and analysis applied to explaining Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution”. This year also saw the conclusion of the Cabinet OYce-led Review of BBC Monitoring. The BBC welcomed the outcome of the review, and its endorsement of the role and value of BBC Monitoring as a national and international resource of information on the media. The BBC believes that the new Funding and Governance regime is a positive development, providing a framework within which Stakeholders can join with BBC Monitoring to concentrate on strategic developments, rather than on short-term funding issues. The stability aVorded by the Review outcome will enable BBC Monitoring to focus on meeting the challenges of operating in a rapidly evolving global media environment. In addition, the Review provides a firm foundation for the future of BBC Monitoring’s long term partnership with the US-based FBIS. BBC Monitoring is now working with the Cabinet OYce and others to establish the new Funding and Governance Regime. It is also examining how to remove £2 million pa from its annual costs by March 2007—a consequence of the funding settlement agreed between the Stakeholders being lower than that recommended by the Review. BBC Monitoring believes that 50-80 net job cuts (10–16%) will arise as a consequence of the funding profile in the later years of the 5 year settlement. There will be some changes, but BBC Monitoring estimates that coverage and services will be broadly maintained.
BBC World Service Trust The World Service Trust had a good year, with income of over £13 million in 2004–05. The Trust continues its work on various projects around the globe: Southern Iraq’s first regional broadcaster, Al Mirbad, developed from scratch by the Trust, began broadcasting in June; the Trust’s FCO- funded Media Dialogues programme in the Middle East and North Africa is addressing training needs of journalists. A major new TV drama—Taste of Life—is spearheading the Trust’s mass media health campaign in Cambodia. The first Burmese-language soap opera Thabyegone Ywa (Eugenia Tree Village), addressing health issues, celebrated its 100th episode.
2. BBC WORLD SERVICE THREE YEAR PLAN 2005–08 AND VISION TO 2010
1. Introduction This paper sets out a series of significant changes in the strategic direction of the BBC World Service (BBCWS) to 2010. It includes specific developments funded by agreed Grant in Aid levels to and including 2007–08, and outlines: — The context of the changes. — The proposed strategic vision to 2010. — The proposed specific investments to the end of 2007–08, including proposed service reductions. — Aspirations beyond 2007–08. — Impact on jobs. — Success measures to 2010. 3255704035 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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2. Context 2.1 This revised strategy for the BBC World Service proposes the biggest single set of changes in its recent history. It is designed to take advantage of geopolitical change, specifically in Central and Eastern Europe, the development of independent media there, and support from the FCO for reprioritisation which will enable the BBC to shift resources to where audience need is greater and where competition is intensifying. 2.2 In the context of limited funds, and a more restrictive public spending climate by the Government, the strategy is predicated on selective and increased investment in key areas: television and video news in the most important vernacular languages complementing the global role of BBC World, increased interactivity across all three media (TV, radio and online), modernised distribution for radio and stronger marketing. 2.3 While there is a strong case a priori for the closure of some language services, funds released from this, plus a refocusing of the English network, and the benefits of a simpler management structure and savings in administration and support areas will enable us to make the new investments. In addition, over the 2005–08 period, other eYciency savings and changes in the distribution portfolio will fund rising costs. All this adds up to a demanding set of financial targets in a part of the BBC that has already made significant eYciency savings over many Spending Review periods. 2.4 The proposals have been thoroughly discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce and we have secured the written approval of the Foreign Secretary for the intended closures as well as the launch of Arabic television.
3. Proposed Strategic Framework to 2010 and Financial Plan to 2008
3.1 Strategic framework to 2010
3.1.1 Vision To be the world’s best known, most creative, and most respected voice in international news, thereby bringing benefit to the UK, the BBC and to audiences around the world: — To provide the most trusted, relevant, and highest-quality international news in the world, and an indispensable service of independent analysis and explanation, with an international perspective which promotes greater understanding of complex issues; — To connect and engage audiences by facilitating an informed and intelligent dialogue—a Global Conversation—which transcends international borders and cultural divides; and to give audiences opportunities to create, publish and share their own views and stories; — And by so doing, to enable people to make sense of their increasingly complex world and, thus empowered, lead more fulfilling lives.
3.1.2 Target audiences — We will target influencers—opinion formers and decision makers—in every market; — In less developed markets, we will also target news followers—audiences with a wider need for basic news and information; — We will oVer lifeline services to audiences in areas of conflict or failed states.
3.1.3 Priority markets We have assessed our existing services against criteria of geopolitical importance and information need, as well as prospects for continued impact. As a result we have redefined our priority markets and services: — English will continue to be our core global oVer. Alongside BBC World, the BBC World Service English radio network and the international news online site will serve audiences around the world as part of a multimedia oVer from the BBC; — We will seek to provide a vernacular multimedia service in priority markets—the Arab and wider Islamic world including Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia; and China, Russia, India, and Spanish- speaking Latin America. — China is a critical market but there is as yet no likelihood of better access to the TV market in the time frame in question. We will work with BBC Worldwide to maximise the value of our current oVer; and we will continue to lobby Chinese authorities. — We will continue to serve less developed markets in Africa and Asia, such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, as well as a number of information poor markets with clear need for independent information. — We will also continue to serve a number of other markets such as parts of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Turkey, but review our oVers there regularly based on political, market developments and audience impact. 3255704035 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— We will close our services in 10 languages that no longer fulfil these agreed strategic criteria: Czech, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak, Slovene, Bulgarian, Croatian, Thai and Kazakh. These currently attract under four million weekly listeners for a spend of ca. £12 million. Portuguese for Brazil will become an Internet-only oVer, and we will reduce spend on Hindi online.
3.2 Specific investment proposals through 2007–08
3.2.1 Arabic Television Developing an Arabic television news service is our highest priority. We would launch a 12-hour oVer in early 2007, supported by a text and audio service for the remaining part of the day, with a view to going to full 24-hour provision as funds become available. — TV is the dominant news medium in the Arab world. — Audience research commissioned in 2003, and repeated in 2005, has indicated a very strong demand for a BBC Arabic television service. Between 80–90% of those surveyed said they would be “very” or “fairly likely” to use the service—with about half in the “very likely” group. The trusted nature of the brand—its independence and strong record in news—is cited by most potential users as the reason for their strong interest. — The oVer would build on the trusted legacy of the BBC’s Arabic radio services. In surveys from the region over recent years, and in bespoke focus group research, the BBC emerges as the most trusted international news provider on radio. — Even though there are strong competitors in the region—mainly Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya—the Middle East is still relatively immature as a TV news market. There is a clear opportunity to occupy a genuine “high ground” in the market, away from the perceived pro-US oVer of Al Hurra and with a diVerent and wider perspective to the Arabic regional channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. — The establishment of an Arabic television service would mean the BBC was the only media player with a genuine tri-media oVer and all the opportunities which flow from this in terms of cross- promotion and awareness raising. — We would maximise synergies between a linear TV oVer and emerging on-demand opportunities on broadband, mobile and other platforms, especially video news reports. — The channel proposition would consist of world class news and current aVairs about international and major regional issues. This would be complemented by discussion programmes and debates mounted in conjunction with our radio and online services. — We believe the commercial impact on BBC World will be minimal as the channel propositions will be complementary rather than competitive. — In five years’ time, we would expect at least 25 million weekly viewers, as part of an overall BBC tri-media portfolio, and to be the largest international Arabic-language TV news channel in terms of reach after Al Jazeera.
3.2.2 Digital interactive services — BBC World Service will aim to deliver broadband video news reports in vernacular languages and make them available on broadband (inc. as downloads), mobile, and other platforms. — High priorities for video investment will be Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese for Brazil, Persian and Russian. — We will invest in a wide range of opportunities for audiences to engage with our content and to publish and share their views and stories—the Global Conversation.
3.2.3 Strengthened distribution on FM and other platforms We will invest in the acquisition and management of distribution partners on FM and other emerging audio platforms and in ensuring our product portfolio remains competitive.
3.2.4 Marketing activities We will invest further in marketing our services in the context of increasing competition These investments will total over £33 million over three years: 3255704035 Page Type [E] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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3.2.5 Other television aspirations We will also move quickly to explore the viability of priority TV services outside Arabic—focusing on Russia, Latin America, and India, by leveraging partnerships with local and regional players, given the diYcult financial climate.
3.3 Funding change: 2005–06—2007–08 We are proposing to achieve a balance of eYciency savings and reprioritisation representing up to 20% of our total operating budget in order to enable new high-priority activities and absorb rising costs.
3.3.1 Language service reductions The strategic analysis shows that there are 10 language services that no longer fulfil the key criteria for investment. Eight of these (Czech, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak, Slovene, Bulgarian, and Croatian) are in Central and Eastern Europe, where the huge changes in the political and media environment of the last fifteen years now means that the need for BBC language services is far lower, and in many cases the trend is of audience decline. We also propose to close the Thai service and Kazakh for reasons of lower impact. Furthermore, we propose to reduce our investment in Portuguese for Brazil, retaining the online service. In addition, with the roll out of an Arabic tri media service, savings will be sought by 2007–08 on production and distribution synergies. Once Arabic TV is proven, we will also examine Arabic radio with a view to reducing investment in non-peak areas.
3.3.2 English output — The English schedule is also changing to reflect increased focus on news and information. A number of non-News programmes will be decommissioned in the area of factual and music and there will be a merging of programme titles in other areas. These changes have already been announced to the relevant staV. — There will be significant savings in the way BBC News currently produces its output for the World Service. This will involve a re-organisation in the way the teams are set up and their senior producer supervision. — Initial estimates indicate a number of job losses in BBC News which supplies the World Service with its English news and current aVairs programmes. This is in addition to 16 post closures in non-News programmes.
3.3.3 Regional structures and support areas We will reduce the number of managerial regions from five to three. This rationalisation will lead the way to further savings when we complete our review of support staV and business development which has been on hold pending the outcome of our review.
3.4 Rising costs and eYciencies — Before funds can be refocused for new investments in 2005–08, we must also meet our obligations under Spending Review 2004 in relation to rising costs. We will continue to achieve further eYciency savings of at least 2.5% on baselines throughout the 2004 Spending Review period, in order to fully fund all rising costs.
3.5 Overall financial picture The overall financial picture over the 3 year plan shows that: — We will absorb most of our rising costs, via eYciency savings and changes in distribution methods. — We will invest new funds granted under SR02 and SR04 in the vital developments outlined earlier, and towards the savings generated by language service closures and other programme/ managerial changes. — Funds have been set aside to cover expenses such as increased employer pension contributions, from 2007–08.
3.6 Impact on jobs — It is currently forecast that there will be 236 overall job reductions from these restructuring proposals. However more job reductions will be announced after the impact of the restructuring on BBC News has been discussed with unions and staV. 3255704035 Page Type [O] 03-03-06 00:54:56 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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— The current forecast total is made up of 218 posts due to the closure of 10 language services (around 127 jobs in the UK and 91 overseas); and a further 18 posts lost in other reprioritisation, such as the Portuguese for Brazil service concentrating on news bulletins and online. — In all around 201 new jobs have been or will be created by the new investment. It is expected that 148 new jobs will be created by the new Arabic channel; 41 new posts for New Media and interactive initiatives; and 12 in international oYces.
3.7 Aspirations beyond 2007–08 To deliver the 2010 vision we also aspire to further initiatives beyond 2007–08. Where possible, we plan to bid for additional funding in Spending Review 2007 to fund these. — We will seek to upgrade our 12-hour Arabic television oVer to a full 24 hour service. — We will seek to launch a limited Persian television oVer funded through Grant in Aid. — Depending on the evolution of television markets elsewhere, we will continue to explore opportunities in other languages, emphasising partnerships as a cost-eVective route to market. — We will invest in further digital interactive services. — Video production in further languages: Urdu, Mandarin and Hindi. — Continuing expansion of interactive and user-generated content. — We will continue to invest in strengthening radio distribution where relevant. — We will continue to invest in strengthening marketing initiatives.
3.8 Strategic success measures by 2010 — BBC World Service aims to achieve the highest reputational ratings of any international news provider in all priority markets, overall and among target audiences. — By 2010, we aim to have increased the global reach of the BBC’s international news services— including through the World Service—around the world from over 190 million to over 250 million weekly users. While we expect radio audiences to decline somewhat, despite a migration from short wave to FM and other platforms, growth in digital media and vernacular television will more than compensate, alongside growth in BBC World. — The services operated by the BBC World Service will make a key contribution: — We are aiming to vigorously defend radio audiences, though by 2010 we expect a slight decline in radio listening. — We are aiming to reach significant new audiences through vernacular television by 2010, with about half through Arabic. The balance would come through a presence in a further range of vernacular TV markets—depending on partnerships and additional funding. — We are aiming to multiply our reach in new digital media like online, broadband, and mobile. — We aim to secure the highest reach of any international news provider in all priority markets— both overall and among target audiences. — We also aim to be recognised as providing the most innovative interactive services of any international news provider.
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