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The Institutionalist Reaction to Keynesian Economics
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Volume 30, Number 1, March 2008 THE INSTITUTIONALIST REACTION TO KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS BY MALCOLM RUTHERFORD AND C. TYLER DESROCHES I. INTRODUCTION It is a common argument that one of the factors contributing to the decline of institutionalism as a movement within American economics was the arrival of Keynesian ideas and policies. In the past, this was frequently presented as a matter of Keynesian economics being ‘‘welcomed with open arms by a younger generation of American economists desperate to understand the Great Depression, an event which inherited wisdom was utterly unable to explain, and for which it was equally unable to prescribe a cure’’ (Laidler 1999, p. 211).1 As work by William Barber (1985) and David Laidler (1999) has made clear, there is something very wrong with this story. In the 1920s there was, as Laidler puts it, ‘‘a vigorous, diverse, and dis- tinctly American literature dealing with monetary economics and the business cycle,’’ a literature that had a central concern with the operation of the monetary system, gave great attention to the accelerator relationship, and contained ‘‘widespread faith in the stabilizing powers of counter-cyclical public-works expenditures’’ (Laidler 1999, pp. 211-12). Contributions by institutionalists such as Wesley C. Mitchell, J. M. Clark, and others were an important part of this literature. The experience of the Great Depression led some institutionalists to place a greater emphasis on expenditure policies. As early as 1933, Mordecai Ezekiel was estimating that about twelve million people out of the forty million previously employed in the University of Victoria and Erasmus University. -
AN INVESTIGATION INTO the FORMATION of CONSENSUS AROUND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS in the 1950S
THE ECLIPSE OF INSTITUTIONALISM? AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FORMATION OF CONSENSUS AROUND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS IN THE 1950s A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Julie Ragatz May, 2019 Committee Members: Dr. Miriam Solomon, Department of Philosophy Dr. David Wolfsdorf, Department of Philosophy Dr. Dimitrios Diamantaras, Department of Economics Dr. Matthew Lund, Department of Philosophy, Rowan University, External Reader © Copyright 2019 by Julie Ragatz Norton All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT The Eclipse of Institutionalism? An Investigation into the Formation of Consensus Around Neoclassical Economics in the 1950s Julie Ragatz Norton Temple University, 2019 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Dr. Miriam Solomon As the discipline of economics professionalized during the interwar period, two schools of thought emerged: institutionalism and neoclassical economics. By 1954, after the publication of Arrow and Debreu’s landmark article on general equilibrium theory, consensus formed around neoclassical economics. This outcome was significantly influenced by trends in the philosophy of science, notably the transformation from the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle to an ‘Americanized’ version of logical empiricism that was dominant through the 1950s. This version of logical empiricism provided a powerful ally to neoclassical economics by affirming its philosophical and methodological commitments as examples of “good science”. This dissertation explores this process of consensus formation by considering whether consensus would be judged normatively appropriate from the perspective of three distinct approaches to the philosophy of science; Carl Hempel’s logical empiricism, Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory change and Helen Longino’s critical contextual empiricism. -
Civil Law, Quadruple Entry System and the Presentation Format Of
Civil Law, Quadruple Entry System and the Presentation Format of National Accounts Kazusuke Tsujimura Masako Tsujimura July 20, 2008 ver.4.1 September 11, 2007 ver.1.1 K.E.O. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 109 Abstract One of the advantages of Roman law is simplicity. The quadruple entry system based on it gives a rigorous accounting framework to the system of national accounts when it is combined with historical cost accounting. Such a system retains all the desirable features of modern accounting: intra-sector, inter-sector and intertemporal consistency. The remarkable peculiarity of the system of national accounts is that it is the only statistics that depicts the interrelations between financial and real economy. The proposed scheme of this paper presents flows and stocks in an integrated framework, which makes it possible to clarify the relationship between savings and wealth and, therefore the relationship between income and wealth. This will enhance understanding of the interactivity between financial and real phenomena such as financial bubbles, crashes and depressions well within the domain of the system. Key Words System of national accounts; Historical cost accounting; Concept of income; Capital gain/loss JEL Classification Numbers A12; C82; E01 Acknowledgement The authors wish to thank Emeritus Professor Yoshimasa Kurabayashi of Hitotsubashi University, a former director of the United Nations Statistical Office, for his detailed and valuable comments to the earlier version of the paper. 1. Introduction The system of social accounting1 inclusive of the system of national accounts (SNA) has developed based on various fields of studies including economics, law and accounting. From the viewpoint of jurisprudence, the social accounting system stems from the civil code of Roman law, especially the Corpus Juris Civilis of Emperor Justinian2. -
Alan Stuart Blinder February 2020
CURRICULUM VITAE Alan Stuart Blinder February 2020 Address Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs 284 Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 Phone: 609-258-3358 FAX: 609-258-5398 E-mail: blinder (at) princeton (dot) edu Website : www.princeton.edu/blinder Personal Data Born: October 14, 1945, Brooklyn, New York. Marital Status: married (Madeline Blinder); two sons and four grandchildren Educational Background Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, l97l M.Sc. (Econ.), London School of Economics, 1968 A.B., Princeton University, summa cum laude in economics, 1967. Doctor of Humane Letters (honoris causa), Bard College, 2010 Government Service Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1994-1996. Member, President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1993-1994. Deputy Assistant Director, Congressional Budget Office, 1975. Member, New Jersey Pension Review Committee, 2002-2003. Member, Panel of Economic Advisers, Congressional Budget Office, 2002-2005. Honors Bartels World Affairs Fellow, Cornell University, 2016. Selected as one of 55 “Global Thought Leaders” by the Carnegie Council, 2014. (See http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/thought-leaders/index) Distinguished Fellow, American Economic Association, 2011-. Member, American Philosophical Society, 1996-. Audit Committee, 2003- Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991-. John Kenneth Galbraith Fellow, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2009-. William F. Butler Award, New York Association for Business Economics, 2013. 1 Adam Smith Award, National Association for Business Economics, 1999. Visionary Award, Council for Economic Education, 2013. Fellow, National Association for Business Economics, 2005-. Honorary Fellow, Foreign Policy Association, 2000-. Fellow, Econometric Society, 1981-. -
The Transformation of Economic Analysis at the Federal Reserve During the 1960S
The Transformation of Economic Analysis at the Federal Reserve during the 1960s by Juan Acosta and Beatrice Cherrier CHOPE Working Paper No. 2019-04 January 2019 The transformation of economic analysis at the Federal Reserve during the 1960s Juan Acosta (Université de Lille) and Beatrice Cherrier (CNRS-THEMA, University of Cergy Pontoise) November 2018 Abstract: In this paper, we build on data on Fed officials, oral history repositories, and hitherto under-researched archival sources to unpack the torturous path toward crafting an institutional and intellectual space for postwar economic analysis within the Federal Reserve. We show that growing attention to new macroeconomic research was a reaction to both mounting external criticisms against the Fed’s decision- making process and a process internal to the discipline whereby institutionalism was displaced by neoclassical theory and econometrics. We argue that the rise of the number of PhD economists working at the Fed is a symptom rather than a cause of this transformation. Key to our story are a handful of economists from the Board of Governors’ Division of Research and Statistics (DRS) who paradoxically did not always held a PhD but envisioned their role as going beyond mere data accumulation and got involved in large-scale macroeconometric model building. We conclude that the divide between PhD and non-PhD economists may not be fully relevant to understand both the shift in the type of economics practiced at the Fed and the uses of this knowledge in the decision making-process. Equally important was the rift between different styles of economic analysis. 1 I. -
From the Progressives to the Institutionalists: What the First World War Did and Did Not Do to American Economics
From The Progressives to The Institutionalists: What the First World War Did and Did Not Do to American Economics Thomas C. Leonard Review essay on Rutherford, Malcolm (2011) The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947: Science and Social Control, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 410 pp. ISBN: 9781107006997. $95. 1. Introduction Let me begin by recognizing Malcolm Rutherford’s achievement here. In 1998, Geoffrey Hodgson, writing in the Journal of Economic Literature, could say that we lacked an adequate history of Institutionalist Economics. No longer. Thanks to Rutherford’s long labors in the archives, begun before the 21st century was, we now have a splendid history of Institutionalist Economics, and more generally, of the Institutionalist movement, and of American economics between the wars. This is a meticulous, carefully crafted, brick by brick reconstruction of an important but misunderstood era in economic and social thought. At its very best moments, you feel like you are peering into a lost world. Rutherford has produced the new standard against which future contributions will be measured, and also to which historians of American economics will be obliged to respond. Our charge in this symposium is to respond. 2. What the book does The structure of the book is straightforward: we are introduced to the founding group and its students, and we are given compelling portraits of some neglected but important figures, Walton Hamilton and Morris Copeland, who stand in for the first and second generations, respectively. Next we proceed to the core of the book, the professional milieu of the Institutionalist economists, the “personal, institutional, and programmatic bases” of the movement in the Institutionalist academic strongholds – Chicago, Wisconsin, Columbia, Amherst, Brookings, and the National Bureau. -
Understanding the Greenspan Standard
Commentary: Understanding the Greenspan Standard John B. Taylor No matter what metric you use, the Greenspan era gets exceedingly high marks for economic performance. The era always will be remembered for its price stability—with declining and now low, stable inflation—and for its economic stability—with only two historically short, mild recessions and three long expansions. An indi- cation of how different things are in the Greenspan era is that the current expansion is already one of the longest in American history. Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reis have provided us with a comprehen- sive evaluation of the Greenspan era, shedding light on key policy issues and controversies. I particularly liked their behind-the-scenes review of the move toward greater transparency. And I agree with their overall evaluation of Alan Greenspan that “when the score is toted up, we think he has legitimate claim to be the greatest central banker who ever lived.” Evaluating policy with a monetary policy rule The core of the Blinder-Reis paper is an evaluation of monetary policy through the lens of a policy rule, in particular the Taylor rule. Blinder and Reis find that this rule fits the Greenspan era very well. 107 108 John B. Taylor They then use the estimated rule for a number of purposes. They use it to identify key episodes, defined as the deviations from the rule. They also use the rule to back out Alan Greenspan’s implicit esti- mate of the natural rate of unemployment and to assess the correct response to a change in productivity growth. -
Institutional Economics
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Malcolm Rutherford University of Victoria (This Draft: March 2001) This paper draws on archival work using the James Bonbright Papers, J. M. Clark Papers, Joseph Dorfman Papers, Carter Goodrich Papers, Robert Hale Papers, and Wesley Mitchell Papers, all at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, the Arthur F. Burns Papers at the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, and the John R. Commons Papers at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. My thanks to Lowell Harriss, Aaron Warner, Eli Ginzberg, Donald Dewey, Mark Perlman, Daniel Fusfeld, Mark Blaug, and Walter Neale for sharing their recollections of Columbia. Thanks also to my research assistant Cristobal Young. Any errors are my responsibility. This research has been supported by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada research grant (project # 410-99-0465). 1 1. Introduction In a number of recent papers I have attempted to outline the nature of the institutionalist movement in American economics in the interwar period (Rutherford 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). At that time institutionalism was a very significant part of American economics. In terms of research output and the production of graduate students, the main centers for institutionalism were the university of Chicago (until 1926 and the departure of J. M. Clark), the University of Wisconsin, the Robert Brookings Graduate School (which existed only briefly between 1923 and 1928), and, after the arrival of Wesley Mitchell in 1913, and J. M. Clark in 1926, Columbia University. Columbia University became the academic home of a large concentration of economists of institutionalist leaning, and other Schools and Departments in the University, particularly Business, Law, Sociology, and Philosophy, also contained many people of similar or related persuasion. -
Morris A. Copeland
Morris A. Copeland August 6, 1895 — May 4, 1989 Morris A. Copeland died on May 4, 1989, in Sarasota, Florida, where he had retired following a long and varied career in government and academia. He was born in Rochester, New York, in 1895; attended Amherst College (A.B., 1917); and received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago (1921). Amherst honored him with its Doctor of Humane Letters degree in 1957. His close attachment to his alma mater was reflected also in the generous endowment he provided for its Copeland Colloquia Program, which supports cross-disciplinary studies. Morris began his teaching career at Cornell in 1921, serving successively as instructor, assistant professor, and professor, an appointment he held until 1930. During 1927-29, he was on leave, teaching at the Brookings School of Economics and Government and working at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington. It was during this period that he began an association with the National Bureau of Economic Research that continued until 1959 and resulted in two published works, the latter his path-breaking A Study in Moneyflows in the United States (1951). In 1930, Morris accepted a professorship at the University of Michigan, which he held until 1936. In 1933, he began what proved to be a six-year term as executive secretary of the Central Statistical Board; between 1939 and 1944 he served, successively, as Director of Research at the Bureau of the Budget and Chief of the Munitions Bureau of the War Production Board. For the next five years, he worked on his moneyflows research, now with substantial funding from the Federal Reserve Board. -
Milton Friedman: a Bibliography
__________________________________________________________________ MILTON FRIEDMAN: A BIBLIOGRAPHY Compiled by Julio H. Cole1 Milton Friedman (1912-2006), the world-famous author of Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and Free to Choose (1980), was one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, and his memory will live long in the lore of economics. To mark the centenary of his birth, Laissez-Faire is pleased to publish this bibliography, the most complete listing to date of his scholarly writings. It provides both an indication of the breadth of his interests, and a measure of the magnitude of his contribution to economic scholarship. A. Books by Milton Friedman .…………………………………………… 98 B. Other Publications by Milton Friedman .……………………………… 100 C. Published Correspondence ……………………………………………. 120 D. Published Interviews ...………………………………………………... 121 1Professor of Economics, Universidad Francisco Marroquín (Guatemala). This bibliography is based upon three earlier bibliographical orientations to Friedman‘s writings: Niels Thygesen, ―The Scientific Contributions of Milton Friedman,‖ Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 79 (1977): 84-98, Kurt Leube (ed.), The Essence of Friedman (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 526-51 (compiled by Gloria Valentine), and Marc Lavoie and Mario Seccareccia (eds.), Milton Friedman et son oeuvre (Montreal: Presses de l‘Université de Montréal, 1993), pp. 191-24 (compiled by Gilles Dostaler). It includes books authored, co-authored or edited by Milton Friedman, introductions and forewords to books by other authors, articles in scholarly and professional journals, comments and replies, chapters in edited volumes, articles in encyclopedias and general interest magazines, book reviews, and published interviews. It does not include articles published in newspapers or in news magazines, speeches, or testimonies to congressional committees. -
Quantitative Easing: Entrance and Exit Strategies
Quantitative Easing: Entrance and Exit Strategies Alan S. Blinder This article was originally presented as the Homer Jones Memorial Lecture, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, April 1, 2010. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review , November/December 2010, 92 (6), pp. 465-79. pparently, it can happen here. On easing is something aberrant. I adhere to that December 16, 2008, the Federal Open nomenclature here. Market Committee (FOMC), in an I begin by sketching the conceptual basis for effort to fight what was shaping up quantitative easing: why it might be appropriate Ato be the worst recession since 1937-38, reduced and how it is supposed to work. I then turn to the the federal funds rate to nearly zero. 1 From then Fed’s entrance strategy—which is presumably on, with all its conventional ammunition spent, in the past, and then to the Fed’s exit strategy— the Federal Reserve was squarely in the brave which is still mostly in the future. Both strate gies new world of quantitative easing . Chairman Ben invite some brief comparisons with the Japanese Bernanke tried to call the Fed’s new policies experience between 2001 and 2006. Finally, I “credit easing,” probably to differentiate them address some questions about central bank inde - from actions taken by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) pendence raised by quantitative easing before earlier in the decade, but the label did not stick. 2 briefly wrapping up. Roughly speaking, quantitative easing refers to changes in the composition and/or size of a central bank’s balance sheet that are designed to THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS ease liquidity and/or credit conditions. -
1 CHICAGO and INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS1 Malcolm Rutherford
CHICAGO AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS1 Malcolm Rutherford University of Victoria 1. Introduction For most economists the terms “Chicago economics” and “institutionalism” denote clearly antithetical approaches to the discipline. Various members of the modern “Chicago School” have made highly dismissive remarks concerning American institutionalism. Coase has commented that American institutionalists were anti-theoretical, and that “without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire” (Coase 1984, p. 230). Some of these attitudes have their roots in the interwar period, most obviously in Frank Knight’s bitingly critical attacks on the methodology and policy positions of institutionalist and advocates of the “social control” of business (Knight 1932). Nevertheless, what this presentation seeks to reveal is a much more complex interrelation between institutional and Chicago economics. To fully understand this relationship it is necessary to begin with the early years of the Chicago Department of Economics. 2. Chicago Economics and Institutionalism 1892-1919 The Chicago Department of Political Economy was begun in 1892 with Laurence Laughlin as its head. While Laughlin was extremely conservative in his economic and political views, and very much at odds with the historicist or “new” school influence in American economics, he built a department that was extremely diverse in its interests and had significant representation of those critical of “orthodox” economics (Nef 1934). Most obviously, Laughlin brought Thorstein Veblen with him from Cornell, and shortly thereafter placed him in charge of editing the Journal of Political Economy. As Hodgson has argued (Hodgson 2004), Veblen’s years at Chicago (from 1892 to 1906) were remarkably creative ones.