Overview of the Tech Tragedy and Implications for Campus Safety The IACLEA Blueprint for Safer Campuses

IACLEA Special Review Task Force April 18, 2008

SUMMARY This document is a synthesis of the reports written following the tragedy at and related recommendations for campus safety by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators

AUTHORS Raymond H. Thrower, Convener and President, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), Gustavus Adolphus College Steven J. Healy, Immediate Past President, IACLEA, Princeton University Dr. Gary J. Margolis, Past General Chair, IACP University & College Police Section, University of Vermont Michael Lynch, George Mason University Dolores Stafford, Past President, IACLEA, The George Washington University William Taylor, Chair, IACLEA Government Relations Committee, Past General Chair, IACP University & College Police Sector, Rice University IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 3

IACLEA’s Key Recommendations ...... 5

Emergency Planning and Critical Incident Response ...... 5

Empowering and Resourcing the Campus Public Safety Function ...... 6

Prevention and Education Programs to Address Campus Safety Risks...... 7

Ancillary Issues Related to the Virginia Tech Tragedy...... 7

Conclusion ...... 8

Summary of 10 Key Findings Of Virginia Governor's Review Panel ...... 9

Fatal Shootings on U.S. Campuses ...... 10

IACLEA Position Statement - Concealed Carry Initiatives ...... 12

This report is dedicated to those whose lives were taken on April 16, 2007 at Virginia Tech:

Ross Abdallah Alameddine Rachael Elizabeth Hill Partahi Lumbantoruan Christopher James "Jamie" Bishop Emily Jane Hilscher Lauren McCain Brian Bluhm Jarrett Lane Daniel O'Neil Ryan Clark Waleed Mohammed Shaalan Juan Ortiz Austin Cloyd Leslie Sherman Minal Panchal Jocelyne Couture-Nowak Maxine Turner Erin Peterson Daniel Perez Cueva Nicole White Michael Pohle Matt La Porte Julia Pryde Mathew Gregory Gwaltney Henry J. Lee Mary Karen Read Caitlin Hammaren Reema Samaha Jeremy Herbstritt G.V. Loganathan

2 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

INTRODUCTION

The impact of the rampage shootings at Virginia Gun violence on university and college campuses is Tech on April 16, 2007 continues to be felt across not new. While Virginia Tech’s tragedy is by far the the country and the world. Clearly this incident, deadliest in history for an institution of higher edu- along with other active shooter incidents that have cation, others have also been unfortunate. On Feb- occurred since the Virginia Tech tragedy, has im- ruary 8, 2008, a lone female student opened fire in pacted our awareness of campus safety and security. a classroom at Louisiana Technical College in Baton A number of states, other governmental entities, Rouge, Louisiana, killing two students before taking and non-governmental organizations have convened her own life. On February 14, 2008, a former groups to examine the lessons learned from the Northern University graduate student en- tragedy at Virginia Tech and other aspects of cam- tered a packed auditorium-style classroom on the pus safety. IACLEA applauds these on-going efforts NIU campus in DeKalb, opened fire and killed five and believes the national attention that is focused students before taking his own life. In September on this issue presents an opportunity to initiate a 2006, Douglas Pennington killed himself and his national dialogue to strengthen campus public two sons during a visit to Shepherd University in safety and enhance the protection of our estimated Shepherdstown, WV. In October 2002, University 15 million students attending the nation’s 4,200 in- of Arizona Nursing College student Robert Flores stitutions of higher education. murdered three of his instructors on campus before committing suicide. In January 2002, former Ap- In August of 2007, in the wake of the Virginia Tech palachian School of Law student Peter Odighizuwa tragedy, the International Association of Campus killed the dean, a professor and a student, while Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) sought wounding three more, before being subdued by to develop a set of recommendations for institutions other students. In August 2000, University of of higher education through a public safety lens. Arkansas student James Easton Kelly shot and killed IACLEA President Raymond H. Thrower, Jr. con- Professor John Locke before taking his own life in vened a high-level task force to review the various re- an apparent murder-suicide. In August 1996, Freder- ports and make recommendations to the IACLEA ick Martin Davidson, a graduate engineering stu- Board of Directors for a coordinated position on dent at San Diego State University shot and killed the various issues raised by these reports and possi- three professors during his doctoral dissertation de- ble further action by IACLEA and other entities. fense. In November 1991, University of Iowa gradu- This Task Force includes the immediate past presi- ate student Gang Lu opened fire in two buildings dent of IACLEA and a former president; the chair and killed five people, wounded two and then killed of IACLEA’s U.S. Government Relations Commit- himself. Finally, in August 1966, Charles Whitman tee, two past chairs of the International Association climbed the clock tower on the University of Texas- of Chiefs of Police University & College Police Sec- Austin campus and killed sixteen people with a tion, and a representative from a Virginia public sniper rifle while wounding thirty-one others. Uni- university. Several of the members of the review versities and colleges owe it to the victims and their panel also serve on the International Association of families to understand these crimes and take appro- Chiefs of Police Review Panel convened by then- priate measures, when and where possible, to ensure IACP President Joseph Carter. the safety of their communities. While nothing could have prepared Virginia Tech As final reports have not been prepared following or any institution to deal with the loss of life of some of these incidents, this Blueprint does not ad- April 16, 2007, IACLEA would be remiss if it didn’t dress these implications. In preparing this docu- study and learn from the successes and failures of ment, the authors consulted and referenced the the response to the incident. This Blueprint ex- following documents: plores the key applicable findings and identifies IACLEA recommendations for institutions of • Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007, higher education. The Blueprint is divided into 3 Report of Review Panel, Presented to Governor major categories identified as foundations of cam- Kaine, Commonwealth of Virginia, August 2007 pus safety: Emergency Planning and Critical Inci- dent Response; Empowerment and Resources of the • Investigation of April 16, 2007 Critical Incident Campus Public Safety Function; and Prevention At Virginia Tech Prepared by Office of the Inspec- and Education Programs. tor General For Mental Health, Mental Retarda- tion & Substance Abuse Services, James W. Stewart, III. Report: # 140-07

3 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

• Presidential Internal Review, Working Group Re- • Association of American Universities August, 2007 port on the Interface Between Virginia Tech Coun- Survey on Safety on AAU Campuses after the Vir- seling Services, Academic Affairs, Judicial Affairs ginia Tech Shootings and Legal Systems, Submitted to President Charles Steger, August 12, 2007 • Report of the Campus Safety Task Force Presented to North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper • Oklahoma Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force (CLASS) Final Report, January 15, 2008 • National Association of Attorneys General, Task Force on School and Campus Safety, Report & Rec- • Campus Security Task Force Report, ommendations, September 2007 Submitted to Governor Jon S. Corzine, October 2007. • Report to the President of the United States on Is- sues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy, June 13, • Expecting the Unexpected - Lessons from the Vir- 2007 ginia Tech Tragedy, by American Association of State Colleges & Universities • The Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel Syn- opsis prepared by Charles F. Carletta, JD, Secretary • The Report of the University of Campus of the Institute and General Counsel, Rensselaer Security Task Force, University of California Office Polytechnical Institute, October 2007 of the President, January 2008 • Personal relationships and correspondence with • Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Chief Wendell Flinchum, Virginia Tech Police De- Safety, Report on Findings and Recommendations, partment; Colonel Steven Flaherty, Virginia State State of , May 24, 2007 Police; Chief Kimberly S. Crannis, Blacksburg (VA) Police Department • Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, State of Wisconsin, November 15, 2007 • International Association of Campus Law Enforce- ment Administrators Special Review Task Force on Virginia Tech • Missouri Campus Security Task Force, Report on Findings and Recommendations, August 21, 2007

4 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

IACLEA’S KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

While there are many recommendations that arise d. 24/7 Client Care: A contract with a third party from these lessons learned for each of the disci- vendor should include training, customer service, plines that bring to bear expertise, IACLEA has and technical support. identified 20 specific recommendations. They rep- resent the Association’s priorities for the betterment e. Experience: The vendor should have significant of campus safety and reinforce key goals and objec- experience delivering calls at institutions of vari- tives in mitigating and responding to threats at insti- ous sizes across the country. tutions of higher education. They are not designed f. Assessment: The service should have reporting ca- to be all inclusive, but do represent emerging best pabilities that allow the institution to monitor, and promising practices which institutions should manage and measure the system’s consider now and implement when possible. The effectiveness. findings are outlined in the 3 major foundational areas identified in the introduction. Campus public safety officials as well as other appro- priate administrators should have the authority and capability to send emergency messages from on/off Emergency Planning and Critical Incident campus and from anywhere around the world. Response Campus administrators should consider the follow 1) All colleges and universities should conduct a criteria before sending emergency messages: 1) the threat and vulnerability assessment as part of the in- message should be timely; 2) the information must stitutional risk management strategy. The assess- be accurate; and 3) the notice must be useful to the ment should consider the full spectrum of threats recipients. Recipients of emergency messages (i.e., natural, criminal, terrorist, accidental, etc.) for should be urged to inform others. the campus. The results of this assessment should 3) Institutions should use the National Incident guide the institution’s application of protective Management System (NIMS) as the framework to measures and emergency planning assumptions. manage emergencies and should have a decision- The assessment will necessarily be unique given the making process and structure to facilitate interac- specific characteristics of individual campuses. tion among institutional leadership, institutional 2) Institutions should use an array of means and resources and local first responders. methods to disseminate information to the campus 4) Institutions should develop succinct emergency community during emergencies. A campus emer- response plans that allow for a coordinated, organ- gency, mass notification system and plan must in- ized response to critical incidents while avoiding clude multiple means of sharing information, complexity and obfuscation. The plan should com- including high-technology (i.e., mass notification ply with the National Incident Management System system) and low-technology (flyers, loud speakers) and the Incident Command System per Homeland solutions. Institutions selecting systems should en- Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Ideally, sure their systems meet these minimum criteria: such plans will specify levels of an emergency and a. Multi-Point Communication: The service should the general responsibilities of the emergency re- enable the campus to notify the entire campus sponse and policy groups at each level. Appendices community via multiple channels. The system may include incident action plans for specific criti- should be capable of reaching its audience cal incidents (i.e., snow storms, bomb threats or vio- through multiple points of contact, such as voice lent crime). Institutions should conduct annual messages, e-mail, and text messaging/SMS. training for the emergency operations and policy group, and include campus service providers in ad- b. Capacity: The system vendor should have suffi- dition to public safety first responders. cient, demonstrated capacity to deliver all mes- sages quickly and reliably. 5) Universities and colleges should work with their local government partners to improve plans for mu- c. Security and Redundancy: If the institution uses tual aid in all areas of emergency planning and criti- a third-party vendor, access to private student and cal incident response, including that of victim employee data must be limited only to authorized services. The IACLEA “Guide to Strengthening personnel. The system must have redundant ca- Communications between Campus Public Safety pabilities in all the power interconnects. Departments and Federal-State-Local Emergency

5 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

Response Agencies” contains model policies and can quickly access each other to coordinate needed practices for developing and nurturing these rescue and emergency activities. The Public Safety important relationships. The Guide is available on Wireless Network program (a joint initiative of the the IACLEA web site at: U.S. departments of Justice and the Treasury) has http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/WMDCPT/ identified the following as two important types of cprc/aboutcprc.cfm interoperability: 6) Institutions should consider providing First Re- i) Day-to-day interoperability covers routine public sponder or EMT training to a sufficient number of safety operations, such as a building fire that re- campus public safety officers to ensure there is the quires backup from a neighboring fire depart- capacity on the campus to provide potential life-sav- ment, or when a vehicle chase crosses between ing treatment to injured persons at the scene of a towns. critical incident in the event that EMT's from out- side agencies face delays or otherwise cannot get to ii) Mutual aid interoperability supports a joint and the scene in a timely manner. First Responder train- immediate response to catastrophic accidents, ing generally refers to a 40-hour course of training large-scale incidents, and natural disasters. It sup- and the EMT course typically consists of 120 hours ports tactical communications in response to air- of training in providing pre-hospital care for med- plane crashes, bombings, forest fires, ical emergencies. earthquakes, hurricanes, and similar events that occur without warning. 11) Each state should pass enabling legislation that Empowering and Resourcing the allows their colleges and universities the choice to Campus Public Safety Function employ a sworn police agency in lieu of or in addition to non-sworn security 7) The campus public safety executive must report professionals. directly to the senior operations officer with institu- tional decision-making authority. The campus pub- 12) Campus public safety agencies should explore lic safety director or chief of police should be part of accreditation through the Commission on Accredi- the emergency operations team developing emer- tation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) gency response and recovery plans. Additionally, and the International Association of Campus Law the campus public safety executive should have di- Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA). rect access to the most senior decision makers dur- ing an emergency. 13) If the institution employs a full-service, sworn law enforcement agency, then the officers should 8) Institutions should regularly review physical secu- have access to a range of use of force options includ- rity infrastructure, including locking mechanisms ing lethal () and less-than-lethal (impact on all doors, to ensure optimal safety of faculty, tools, chemical, and electronic control devices). In staff, students, visitors and guests. short, sworn officers should be armed. Campus public safety personnel who are provided any defen- 9) The nature of the emergency should direct what sive should be trained to the standards re- and how campus authorities communicate with the quired for public-sector law enforcement personnel campus and under what timeframe. See earlier rec- within the political sub-division. Campus law en- ommendations on timely warning process. Universi- forcement or security personnel provided with ties and colleges must comply with the Clery Act, should meet the standards established which requires timely public warnings of imminent for use of those weapons as determined by the state danger. Institutions must have a policy that de- in which the community is located. Clear policy scribes their timely warning practice and in that pol- statements should be implemented establishing icy, they should develop an individual definition of such weapons as defensive weapons. "timely" in relation to available technology, available NOTE: IACLEA has a long-established Position communication systems, and nature of the crisis. Statement that supports this recommendation. 10) Interoperable communications is an absolute 14) Campus public safety authorities must clearly must for effective critical incident response. Inter- understand their authority in addressing involun- operable communication systems allow two or more tary hospitalization procedures for members of the responding agencies, even those using disparate community they interact with who suffer from acute communications systems, to exchange information mental health disorders. directly. With interoperability, on-scene personnel

6 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

15) The complex nature of law enforcement de- 20) Campus public safety should develop collabora- mands knowledge, skill, training, and experience. tive, supportive relationships with victim advocacy Judgments frequently required are beyond the train- services in order to respond directly and immedi- ing, preparation, responsibility, or authority of pri- ately to the needs of victims of crime. vate citizens. Personnel who do not have the necessary judgment resulting from the acquisition of this knowledge and skill acquired through law en- Ancillary Issues Related to the Virginia Tech forcement training should not be assigned to func- Tragedy tions which may require them to question, detain, or restrain the movements of citizens. Concealed Carry of Firearms on Campuses IACLEA does not support the carry and conceal- ment of weapons on a college campus, with the ex- Prevention and Education Programs to ception of sworn police officers in the conduct of Address Campus Safety Risks their professional duties. (Please see Position State- 16) Institutions should implement a process ment on pages 12 of this report). whereby all members of the community upon appli- cation (admissions and employment) are asked whether or not they have been charged or convicted Implementation of Security of a crime and all related details. Institutions should Technology conduct criminal record checks for their students, faculty and staff as appropriate. Security technology, such as automated card access systems, intrusion detection systems, and security 17) Institutions of higher education should have a cameras, can serve as force multipliers on a college behavioral threat assessment team that includes rep- or university campus. In fact, some systems, such as resentatives from law enforcement, human re- automated access control, have become the industry sources, student and academic affairs, legal counsel, standard on campuses around the country. Cam- and mental health functions. Specifically, campus puses should continue to implement proven security public safety should be included on the team. technology in an attempt to enhance safety on cam- pus. Some systems, such as security cameras, have 18) Institutions should employ a comprehensive proven valuable in specific circumstances and have program to end violence against women crimes on not only increased the community’s sense of secu- campus. These crimes include stalking, sexual as- rity, but have also aided in the apprehension of sault and relationship violence and, in addition to criminals. As with any system, policy, or practice, self-defense for women, require prevention training IACLEA recommends that the campus evaluate ex- focused specifically on men and key campus con- isting literature and research to ensure there is stituencies. These areas include Athletics, Student ample evidence of the system’s effectiveness prior to Affairs, Judicial Affairs, Academic Support, and implementation. Residential Life. The institution should establish protocols and procedures that support a woman’s decision to not participate in a criminal or judicial proceeding, but which allow the institution to take action against the accused independent of a crimi- nal investigation. Campus public safety should be trained to conduct these investigations and in- quiries. 19) Faculty, staff and students should be trained on how to respond to various emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used. This train- ing should be delivered through a number of deliv- ery options, such as in-person presentations (i.e., residential life programming; orientation sessions for students and employees); Internet-based delivery; and documents.

7 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

CONCLUSION

While the tragedy at Virginia Tech is on a scale never before experienced at an institution of higher education, the circumstances that led Seung-Hui Cho to com- mit the crime he did are all too common. Unmanaged mental health issues; easy access to firearms; a lack of communication among campus direct service providers; and erroneous interpretation of federal law with specific focus on FERPA and HIPPA all coalesced into the perfect storm at Virginia Tech in April 2007. IACLEA wants to recognize the professionalism and well coordinated response of the Virginia Tech Police, Virginia State Police, Blacksburg Police, and the various Emergency Medical Services that responded to the call of duty on April 16, 2007. Their heroism in the face of extreme danger speaks to the highest commitment of public safety, specifically campus public safety. Long after the spotlights dim and the news reports silence, the men and women who rushed into Norris Hall to gun fire and screams will continue to replay those images in their minds. Their hero- ism and dedication will not soon be forgotten. The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators recognizes its responsibility to the fallen students, faculty and staff, and the first responders who ended Cho’s rampage. To this end, this report serves to prevent such tragedies through careful analysis and well-crafted recommendations that address prevention, physical security, and re- sponse capacity. Securing the safety of our campuses is an iterative process that requires an institutional and personal commitment from every member of our educational communities. Let these recommendations strengthen that resolve.

8 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

SUMMARY OF 10 KEY FINDINGS OF THE VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA GOVERNOR

1. Cho exhibited signs of mental health problems administrators, acting as the emergency Policy during his childhood. In 1999, after the Columbine Group, failed to issue an all-campus notification shootings, Cho’s middle school teachers observed about the WAJ killings until almost 2 hours had suicidal and homicidal ideations in his writings and elapsed. University practice may have conflicted recommended psychiatric counseling, which he re- with written policies. ceived. 8. The presence of large numbers of police at WAJ 2. During Cho's junior year at Virginia Tech, nu- led to a rapid response to the first 9-1-1 call that merous incidents occurred that were clear warnings shooting had begun at Norris Hall. The police re- of mental instability. Although various individuals sponse at Norris Hall was prompt and effective, as and departments within the University knew about was triage and evacuation of the wounded. Evacua- each of these incidents, the University did not inter- tion of others in the building could have been im- vene effectively. No one knew all the information plemented with more care. and no one connected all the dots. 9. State systems for rapidly deploying trained profes- 3. University officials in the office of Judicial Af- sional staff to help families get information, crisis fairs, Cook Counseling Center, university police, intervention, and referrals to a wide range of re- the Dean of Students, and others explained their sources did not work. failures to communicate with one another or with Cho’s parents by noting their belief that such com- 10. The university established a family assistance munications are prohibited by the federal laws gov- center at The Inn at Virginia Tech, but it fell short erning the privacy of health and education records. in helping families and others for two reasons: lack In reality, federal laws and their state counterparts of leadership and lack of coordination among serv- afford ample leeway to share information in poten- ice providers. University volunteers stepped in but tially dangerous situations. were not trained or able to answer many questions and guide families to the resources they needed. 4. Cho purchased two guns in violation of federal law. The fact that in 2005 Cho had been judged to The report contains more than 70 recommenda- be a danger to himself and ordered to outpatient tions directed to colleges, universities, mental treatment made him ineligible to purchase a gun health providers, law enforcement officials, emer- under federal law. gency service providers, lawmakers, and other pub- lic officials in Virginia and elsewhere. 5. On April 16, 2007, the Virginia Tech and Blacks- burg police departments responded quickly to the The other reports reviewed for this Blueprint report of shootings at West Ambler Johnston resi- echoed the major findings outlined in the dence hall, as did the Virginia Tech and Blacksburg Virginia report. Where recommendations differed, rescue squads. Their responses were well coordi- IACLEA Task Force members reviewed those points nated. and found common themes that, when extrapo- lated, are presented in the IACLEA report. 6. The Virginia Tech police may have erred in pre- maturely concluding that their initial lead in the Other tangential issues have arisen as a result double homicide was a good one, or at least in con- of the tragedy. For example, there is a national veying that impression to university officials while movement in more than a dozen states calling for continuing their investigation. They did not take concealed weapons carry laws on college and sufficient action to deal with what might happen if university campuses. The State of Oklahoma re- the initial lead proved erroneous. The police re- cently considered legislation to allow the concealed ported to the university emergency Policy Group carry of firearms on college campuses. The IACLEA that the "person of interest" probably was no longer position regarding this issue is contained at the end on campus. of this report. 7. The VTPD erred in not requesting that the Policy Group issue a campus-wide notification that two persons had been killed and that all students and staff should be cautious and alert. Senior university

9 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

U.S. College and University Fatal Shootings Source: Media reports

Aug. 1, 1966 June 28, 2000 Charles Whitman points a rifle from the observa- Medical resident Dr. Jian Chen kills his tion deck of the University of Texas in Austin and supervisor and then himself in his supervisor’s of- begins shooting in a homicidal rampage that goes fice at the University of Washington in Seattle. Fac- on for 96 minutes. Sixteen are killed and 31 are ulty say Chen, 42, was upset he’d be forced to wounded. return to China because of academic shortcomings.

May 4, 1970 Aug. 28, 2000 Four students were killed and nine wounded by Na- James Easton Kelly, 36, a University of Arkansas tional Guard troops called in to quell anti-war graduate student recently dropped from a doctoral protests on the campus of Kent State University in program after a decade of study and John Locke, 67, Kent, Ohio. the English professor overseeing his coursework, are shot to death in an apparent murder-suicide.

Nov. 1, 1991 Jan. 16, 2002 Gang Lu, 28, a graduate student in physics from China, reportedly upset because he was passed over Graduate student Peter Odighizuwa, 42, recently for an academic honor, opens fire in two buildings dismissed from Virginia's Appalachian School of on the University of Iowa campus. Five University Law, returns to campus and kills the dean, a profes- of Iowa employees are killed, including four mem- sor and a student before being tackled by students. bers of the physics department. Two other people The attack also wounds three female students. are wounded. The student fatally shoots himself.

May 17, 2001 Jan. 26, 1995 Donald Cowan, 55, fatally shoots assistant music Former law student Wendell Williamson shoots two professor James Holloway at a dorm at Pacific men to death and injures a police officer in Chapel Lutheran University in Parkland, Washington, then Hill, NC. turns the gun on himself. He leaves a 16-page sui- cide note expressing anger at a colleague of Hol- loway’s whom he dated briefly as a teenager. Aug. 15, 1996

Frederick Martin Davidson, 36, a graduate Oct. 28, 2002 engineering student at San Diego State, is defending his thesis before a faculty committee Failing University of Arizona Nursing College stu- when he pulls out a and kills three dent and Gulf War veteran Robert Flores, 40, walks professors. into an instructor's office and fatally shoots her. A few minutes later, armed with five guns, he enters one of his nursing classrooms and kills two more of his instructors before fatally shooting himself.

10 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

U.S. College and University Fatal Shootings Source: Media reports

May 9, 2003 Oct. 1, 2007 A 62-year-old man with two and a bullet- University of Memphis football player Taylor Brad- proof vest fires hundreds of rounds during a seven- ford, 21, is fatally shot on campus in a botched rob- hour shooting spree and standoff at a Case Western bery. Four men are later charged in the slaying, Reserve University building in . One stu- including one student. dent is killed and two others are wounded. Biswanath Halder, who authorities say was upset be- cause he believed a student hacked into his web site, Dec. 13, 2007 is later sentenced to life in prison. Two Ph.D. students from India are found shot to death in a home invasion at an apartment on the Sept. 2, 2006 campus of Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. Douglas W. Pennington, 49, kills himself and his two sons, Logan P. Pennington, 26, and Benjamin M. Pennington, 24, during a visit to the campus of Feb. 8, 2008 Shepherd University in Shepherdstown, W.Va. Latina Williams, 23, opens fire during an emergency medical technology class at Louisiana April 2, 2007 Technical College in Baton Rouge, killing Karsheika Graves and Taneshia Butler. She then kills herself. University of Washington researcher Rebecca Griego, 26, is shot to death in her office by a former boyfriend who then turned the gun on himself. Feb. 14, 2008 Steven Kazmierczak, a former graduate student at April 16, 2007 Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois, opens fire in a lecture hall, killing five students and Seung Hui Cho kills 32 people and injures at least wounding 15 others. He then commits suicide. 24 others in a dorm and a classroom at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Va. The gunman then kills him- self by gunshot.

Sept. 21, 2007 Two students are wounded at a late-night shooting at a campus dining hall at Delaware State University in Dover. Shalita Middleton, 17, dies Oct. 23 from her injuries. A student is charged in the shooting.

11 IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

IACLEA Position Statement Concealed Weapon Carry Proposals IACLEA Board of Directors March 2008

The International Association of Campus Law En- Among the concerns with concealed carry laws or forcement Administrators, Inc., (IACLEA) has policies are: the potential for accidental discharge been asked by its Members to react to legislative ini- or misuse of firearms at on-campus or off-campus tiatives in some states that would allow students to parties where large numbers of students are gath- carry concealed weapons on college and university ered or at student gatherings where alcohol or campuses. drugs are being consumed, as well as the potential for guns to be used as a means to settle disputes be- IACLEA’s Board of Directors believes “concealed tween or among students. There is also a real con- carry” initiatives do not make campuses safer. cern that campus police officers responding to a There is no credible evidence to suggest that the situation involving an active shooter may not be presence of students carrying concealed weapons able to distinguish between the shooter and others would reduce violence on college campuses. In fact, with firearms. we are concerned that concealed carry laws have the potential to dramatically increase violence on We urge public policy makers to proceed with ex- college and university campuses that our Members treme caution in dealing with proposals to allow are empowered to protect. college students to carry concealed weapons on campus. IACLEA is committed to working with In an article published in The Christian Science public policy makers on reasonable solutions to en- Monitor, Jon Vernick, the co-director of the Johns hance campus public safety. We are working with Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research in other campus public safety stakeholders to provide Baltimore, MD, was quoted as stating that “the best and promote campus crime prevention training science that we have says concealed carry laws do programs, as well as to develop strategies and pro- not save lives, as the proponents contend.” grams to enhance emergency preparedness.

12 BUILDING BLOCKS OF CAMPUS SAFETY

SAFE CAMPUSES

1. Campus safety executive reporting lines 1. Threat & Vulnerability Assessment 2. Physical security infrastructure 2. Mass, Emergency Notification 3. Interoperable communications 1. Background checks 3. NIMS Compliance 4. Enabling legislation 2. Behavioral Threat Assessment 4. Emergency Plans 5. Use of Force options 3. Community Training 5. Mutual Aid 6. Involuntary hospitalizations 4. Collaboration with victim 6. First Responder training 7. Employing sworn officers advocates

Emergency Planning & The Campus Public Safety Prevention & Education Critical Incident Response Function Programs to Enhance Safety

•Mitigation/Prevention •Appropriate •Comprehensive •Preparedness •Resourced •Collaborative •Response •Empowered •Evidence Based •Recovery 342 North Main Street, West Hartford, CT 06117-2507 Tel: (860) 586-7517 Fax: (860) 586-7550 Email: [email protected] www.iaclea.org