Book review article: ‘The Anarchy: War and Status in 12th century Landscapes of Conflict’ Chapter 2, Historical Outline and the Geog- raphy of ‘Anarchy’, is a good summary of complex events, including the important point that control of Normandy was central to the struggle (p 30). The geographical spread of activity is illustrated by interesting maps of itineraries, particularly of Stephen, divided into phases of his reign. Early on, he went to Cornwall and north onto Scottish territory (in both cases accompanied by his army) but most- ly he was in central and southern England, with forays to Lincolnshire and, occasionally, York. WAGING WAR: FIELDS OF CONFLICT AND SIEGE WARFARE The subject of Chapter 3 (title above) is a critical issue in assessments of the Anarchy. Creighton and Wright note that pitched battles were rare and sieges dominated (p 34, 40). Church authorities attempted to regulate war, in particular protecting the Church’s posses- sions (p 36), but also deployed ‘spiritual weap- ons’, such as the saints’ banners on the mast The Anarchy: War and Status in (the Standard) at Northallerton (p 45). And a 12th-Century Landscapes of Conflict bishop, in a pre-battle speech at Northallerton, Authors: Oliver H. Creighton as recorded by Henry of Huntingdon, promised Duncan W. Wright that English defenders killed in combat would Publishers: Liverpool University Press, Ex- be absolved from all penalty for sin. [HH 71] eter Studies in Medieval Europe Laying waste enemies’ estates was a normal ISBN 978-1-78138-242-4 by-product of Anglo-Norman warfare, not Hardback, 346 pages unique to Stephanic conflict (p 37-8). Catalogue price: £75.00 A theme in military history, why one side King Stephen’s reign (1135-54) when, ac- triumphed, the authors think is redundant for cording to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, men the civil war of Stephen’s reign, as it ended in said ‘Christ and His saints slept’, [ASC 265] deadlock (p 3). Civil wars is perhaps a more has been the subject of considerable docu- accurate description, because the conflict had mentary historical research. Chapter 1, In- phases, pauses, participants left and joined or troduction, explains that this book is an changing sides, and some fought or rebelled for attempt to give a wider perspective, review- reasons not directly related to the struggle for ing archaeology, architecture and other ma- the crown e.g. King David of Scots expansion- terial evidence to investigate whether there ist policies. These factors were not unusual in was anarchy, and how, where and why the twelfth century war, when fighting was often conflicts of the period were conducted (p 3; interspersed with truces, negotiations and polit- page references are to the book unless not- ical realignments. Stephen’s ability to fall out ed). The authors explain how the archaeo- with members of the nobility and senior logical record of the twelfth century is churchmen, particularly his habit of arresting relatively limited and securely dating sites them at court, which gave him a reputation for and objects to a two decade period challeng- being underhand, [E King 227-8, 334-5] regu- ing (p 8-10, 280). larly fuelled outbreaks of rebellion. THE CASTLE STUDIES GROUP JOURNALTHE CASTLE NO 29:276 2015-16 STUDIES GROUP JOURNAL NO 31: 2017-18 Book review article: ‘The Anarchy: War and Status in 12th century Landscapes of Conflict’ Figure 3.1 (a) (p 35) is a map showing battles in one word: ‘Don’t’. [Gillingham 198] An and ‘other military engagements’. The two exaggeration, of course, but Vegetius listed main battles are examined: the Standard 1138 many factors to be considered, and warned of (northern English barons defeated King David difficulties facing large armies e.g. they were of Scots, who was loosely affiliated to Matilda) vulnerable to ambushes at river crossings, ra- and Lincoln 1141 (Stephen defeated and cap- tions run out, and disease was an ever present tured by Robert of Gloucester) (p 43-6). There hazard. [Vegetius 80-2, 63] were two routs: Winchester 1141 (royalists In his General Rules, a summary section captured Robert of Gloucester) and Wilton popular in the Middle Ages, Vegetius stated: 1143 (Stephen fled from Robert of Glouces- ‘Good generals never engage in a general en- ter’s forces). In nineteen years the number of gagement except when opportunity offers, or battles was low because battle was deliberately under great necessity’, and gave an alternative: avoided, due to the risks or a reluctance to face ‘It is preferable to subdue an enemy by famine, the king, the Lord’s anointed (p 40-2), although raids and terror, than in battle where fortune the latter reason cannot have influenced Robert tends to have more influence than bravery’. of Gloucester, Empress Matilda’s half-brother, [Vegetius 108-111 (Book III, chapter 26, Gen- who initiated battle at Lincoln and Wilton. eral Rules of war)] Food supplies were critical, Military history without battles can be difficult ‘for armies are more often destroyed by starva- to understand. Conflicts can often be coherent- tion than battle’; ‘food should be sufficient for ly summarised by battles that changed its you while dearth should break the enemy’. course (e.g. Trafalgar) or marked its end (e.g. Therefore, supplies ‘should be assembled at Waterloo). A measure of a general’s strategic points well-placed for waging war and very skills is how he manoeuvred his army to force well fortified’, and anything ‘which the enemy his enemy into battle at a time and place fa- invader can seize for his own sustenance vourable to himself, and his battlefield judg- should be collected into strong forts’. [Vege- ments, in arranging his forces and reacting to tius 65-6] Ironically, Vegetius’ main princi- events, demonstrated his tactical abilities. ples were probably more relevant in the twelfth Without battles, how are these assessed? The than the fourth century. authors do not dwell on the ideas behind the conduct of twelfth century war, so I offer a Medieval armies were, as Creighton and brief explanation in the next three sections of Wright note, often loosely organised (p 155). aspects of these wars without battles. They were coalitions: of the royal household, noble allies and their contingents, mercenaries, Warfare: battle (avoidance of) local levies, irregulars etc. These contingents Twelfth century war had a logic (different to were of variable quality and differing levels of modern Clausewitz derived military ‘rationali- commitment. Magnates had their own, some- ty’), reflecting principles found in the Epitoma times competing, interests; levies no longer Rei Militaris, by the fourth century Roman possessed the capabilities of an Anglo-Saxon author Vegetius. Creighton and Wright’s sole fyrd shield-wall, and though they would fight mention of Vegetius recounts how Geoffrey of in defence of their own localities, they were Anjou, Empress Matilda’s husband, consulted likely to be unreliable further afield. In 1137 Book IV for a solution to a siege problem Stephen’s army in Normandy advanced to face (p 49), but military historians generally consid- Angevin forces, but quarrels and suspicions er Vegetius’ influence was considerable. In among the magnates resulted in his army disin- Volumes 1 (2002) and 2 (2004) of the Journal tegrating, and little was achieved. [E King of Medieval Military History Clifford Rogers, 74-5] At the battle of Lincoln Stephen’s earls Stephen Morillo and John Gillingham debated and William of Ypres, his mercenary com- ‘Vegetian’ strategy. Gillingham had earlier mander, fled soon after the Angevins began summed up Vegetius’ advice on giving battle getting the upper hand; the earls’ commitment THE CASTLE STUDIES GROUP JOURNALTHE CASTLE NO 29:277 2015-16 STUDIES GROUP JOURNAL NO 31: 2017-18 Book review article: ‘The Anarchy: War and Status in 12th century Landscapes of Conflict’ was limited and William considered the battle to central Normandy, and the bishop of Lisieux lost, and probably that Stephen should not have surrendered his city to him. [RT 54-5] Impor- fought. [Bradbury 97] The Scots army at the tant magnates, notably Waleran of Meulan, sub- battle of the Standard was drawn from various mitted to him. In 1142 Geoffrey took ten castles sources: different clans of Scots (Richard of in western Normandy, including Vire and Mor- Hexham distinguishes ‘Picts’ from Scots), and tain, the latter Stephen’s personal property (he northern English. [RH 69] Their small cavalry was count of Mortain before becoming king). contingent was largely composed of Englishmen By 1143 Geoffrey controlled all Normandy and Normans. [HH 72] The defeated Scots south of the Seine. suffered heavy casualties, probably more in the Warfare: raids pursuit than in the battle. They were hunted down and summarily dispatched [HH 72], ‘like Logistical support rarely features prominently sheep for the slaughter’. The fleeing Scots lost in ‘popular’ military history, despite its vital cohesion and separate contingents began fight- importance. When considering modern con- ing among themselves. [RH quote 68, 69] Bat- flicts food supply is generally taken for granted tles were high risk, subject to chance, defeat (though civilians starved in both World Wars) often had disastrous consequences, and victory but in earlier periods it was crucial, hence Vege- did not necessarily bring advantages commensu- tius’ concentration on collecting food in forts rate with the risks and losses. With these factors (castles by the Middle Ages) to feed your forces in mind, a twelfth century commander accepting and deny them to your enemy. Castles were also battle usually kept his tactics simple. bases for the alternative strategy to battle: raid- ing, and bases for men attempting to intercept Creighton and Wright suggest that Stephanic enemy raiders. Raiding, ravaging, rapine, plun- battles were not decisive; despite King David’s dering, burning and laying waste, the elements crushing defeat at Northallerton, he retained of ‘fire and sword’, are often thought of as possession of Cumberland and Northumber- ill-disciplined looting and mindless destruction.